The African Union and security sector reform

(FES)-- Executive summary

The process of establishing peace and security in Africa currently involves a number of intergovernmental initiatives including the African Union’s peace and security council (PSC), with its planned African Stand-by Force (ASF), and the peace and security component of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The PSC provides a comprehensive framework for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts (including peace operations) at a continental level. At a sub-regional1 level, sub-regional organisations (also known as Regional Economic Communities-RECs), have taken the de facto lead in promoting peace and security.

The last decade has also witnessed a huge increase in international efforts at security sector reform (SSR). The African Union has acknowledged the importance of SSR to re-establish the architecture of the state, an essential component of post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development. While the AU has been increasingly active in peace support operations (PSOs) and other elements of conflict prevention and management, it has a substantially lower profile in post-conflict peace building activities in general and SSR in particular.

The policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) reflects the AU’s desire to be the lead actor in reconstruction efforts on the continent. The AU has sought to address SSR by finding a significant niche within the policy, which was adopted in 2006, to handle SSR processes on a case-by-case basis. Most SSR actors in Africa consider the development of the PCRD and the incorporation of SSR to be critical to any successful peace building initiative. The AU already has many SSR related elements in place and is currently developing an SSR policy, yet there is an urgent need to complement this process by developing sub-regional SSR strategies.

There is a great need for African scholars and policy makers to rethink strategies to develop a continental framework for SSR. The AU, as a continent-wide organisation engaged in conflict prevention and management, should take a higher profile in post-conflict peace building activities in general and SSR in particular. With the increased focus on the security sector in Africa, the need for AU and Regional SSR strategies has never been more evident.

Conclusion

Regional peace and security initiatives have underlined Africa’s determination to come to grips with its conflicts. Within Africa, a range of mechanisms and strategies have been developed in response to specific challenges. The African Union has acknowledged the importance of security sector reform to re-establish the architecture of the state, an essential component of post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development. The framework for an approach to SSR can be found in a number of existing AU policies, treaties and solemn declarations, including the Constitutive Act and the common defense and security policy. The AU has tried to ensure that most of its policy documents reflect some degree of SSR, but they are fragmented and have a narrow focus, so far not allowing for a coherent SSR framework to be put in place. However, the AU’s post-conflict reconstruction policy framework has demonstrated the organisation’s commitment to promote ‘sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict.’

The policy aims to encourage a timely, effective and coordinated response to recovery and reconstruction efforts by addressing the challenges of security, humanitarian assistance, socio-economic development, political governance, human rights, justice and reconciliation as well as issues of gender. The PCRD is comprehensive and broad in terms of post-conflict reconstruction, but rather thin on SSR. Other than explaining the need for reform and enumerating the target groups, the document says little about the strategic and substantive considerations required to initiate long-term and comprehensive SSR strategies in Africa. Furthermore, the implementation of the PCRD policy has not made headway. While the AU’s attempt is encouraging, it has shortcomings, and a case can be made that SSR requires a new approach and mechanism and should be supported in a much more strategic, patient and regional manner. Africa is the largest ‘market’ for SSR and SSR-related services. African ownership, however, remains limited. The AU should provide that. Meanwhile, new concepts (such as SSR and human security) are entering into all of the AU’s important policy documents and security discourse. The AU should develop an African framework for SSR that prioritises the continent’s needs and concerns and which will reflect African ownership; making sure that the orientation and content of reforms are guided by an African framework. Developing a strong and comprehensive continental framework for SSR is a prerequisite for peace and security in Africa and the AU must address it robustly and effectively.

Recommendations

• Link SSR to the entire AU peace and security structure, and to other existing AU policy frameworks and norms, more specifically: the PCRD, ADSP, PSOs, APRM, etc. All add-up to create the context within which the AU can make its mark as an actor and begin to develop and advance its own articulation of SSR policy for the continent. SSR should be mainstreamed in the whole APSA.

• Expand the AU’s SSR unit, which currently only consists of one SSR officer within the defense and security division. There should be a comprehensive structure for SSR within the AU, liaising with other important departments, such as political affairs.

• Create similar SSR units within the RECs to ensure coherence and synergy among Africa’s regional organisations. 


• Recognise that SSR is fundamentally a conflict prevention tool. As such, the SSR agenda has wide applicability beyond conflict and post-conflict contexts as a prevention mechanism in more stable countries and as a normal process of public sector reform. The Panel of the Wise being the AU organ for preventive diplomacy which works mostly behind the scenes on confidence-building can play an important role in promoting the SSR agenda.

• Encourage and influence all national political processes to assimilate some or all aspects of SSR. The AU should ensure that SSR is inserted in constitution writing processes, elections, the formation of national unity governments, the design of national security strategies as well as all peace agreements.

• Facilitate, encourage and support regional SSR strategies: the AU Commission should devote time and energy to the creation of synergies between existing processes, enabling them to complement and support one another. The AU should also be encouraged to bring coherence to these sub-systems. Hence, having an AU policy would be the logical starting point to achieving coherence on SSR strategies being developed by the sub-regions.

• Recognise NEPAD as an important actor in SSR within APSA, especially in relation to norm-creation and good governance of the security sector. Make sure SSR is incorporated into the APRM taskforce.

• Focus more on the informal security sector. The AU should ensure that the informal security sector is taken into account and greater respect is given to the role which traditional African and community mechanisms have played and continue to play in governing and delivering security and justice. This has already been recognised in earlier works on African approaches to conflict-resolution.

• Apart from the formulation of an African SSR policy in an inclusive consultative process, the roles of the AU should encompass the following:

1. Coordinate the mobilisation of resources for SSR in Africa.

2. Facilitate vetting and mobilisation of African SSR expertise and capacity (maintain register of existing African capacity for SSR).

3. Build coherent regional consensus on engagement with donors and global military players. Help design a united African position on every aspect of engagement with external actors. Serve as a watchdog and norm-setter of external security actors. This helps to ensure a more balanced partnership (as well as monitoring, etc.), which ensures better alignment between SSR conceptualisation and design and African realities.

4. Provide a framework to guide stakeholders’ engagement in security sector reform in Africa. This ensures that SSR activities in Africa are demand-driven and framed to the needs of the African states themselves. 
5. Provide a monitoring and evaluation regime for SSR in Africa, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations. Greater focus and priority should be given to troop-contributing African countries for particular SSR tasks. SSR should inform the ASF doctrine and training curricula.

6. Most importantly: encourage targeted research, facilitate policy processes and dialogues and experience-sharing around the ten major policy directions (substantive recommendations) discussed in section five above.

7. Allow a stronger role for civil society. Although Africa’s regional peace and security architectures basically respond to the needs and decisions of governments, analysis and insights needed to determine SSR processes are available mainly from civil society. The challenge for the AU will therefore be to develop a reliable and confident relationship between the PSC and civil society. Identifying an SSR cluster within the CSO (ECOSSOC) process and engaging with it in a sustained and strategic manner may help greatly. Much is needed from the UN to help ongoing initiatives effectively interface between Peace and Security CSOs and the African Union.

8. Develop better and more systematic coordination and communication between the UN, the AU and sub-regional organisations on matters of the security sector, including an MoU between the AU and RECs which clearly defines the division of tasks and responsibilities.

9. Encourage and support member countries to develop national security strategies including elements of SSR. Similarly, RECs should review their regional peace and security strategies in order to integrate SSR elements.

10. Encourage and support the Pan-African Parliament as a forum of dialogue on issues related to the governance of security in Africa. Strengthening the capacities of political parties and parliaments to deal with security issues is, therefore, a key concern of SSR in Africa. Regional parliaments should engage the RECs on the issue of SSR. 


11. Seek the support of the UN as the most politically neutral and legitimate among the international players to strengthen the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations to undertake peace operations. In this regard, an increase in the number of SSR training courses for peace operations offered in African military schools would greatly help.

* Tadesse, Medhane (2010): The African Union and Security Sector Reform. A review of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Development (PCRD) Policy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa

The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.Editing by Sabine

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