Comment & analysis
The Darfur Peace Agreement: Which way forward?
2006-06-22, Issue 260
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/35335
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Laurie Nathan, formerly the head of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, was a member of the African Union (AU) mediation team based in Abuja that facilitated negotiations for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). In this interview he offers some perspectives on the negotiations and the Agreement.
Pambazuka News: Many analysts and observers have warned that the ceasefire promised by the DPA is unlikely to be attained. What are the main problems in this regard?
Laurie Nathan: The most obvious problem is that the Agreement has not been signed by all the armed groups in Darfur. Two of the rebel movements that participated in the AU mediation – the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) that is headed by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur – refused to sign. The Agreement concluded on 5 May was endorsed only by the Sudanese government and the SLM/A faction headed by Minni Minawi. Abdul Wahid is the rebel leader with the most popular support in Darfur. Without his endorsement of the Agreement, there is little prospect of a lasting peace. [Note from Pambazuka News editors: Subsequent to this interview, reports indicate that some groups have now committed to the terms of the agreement. See http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53837 for further details.]
In addition, there are numerous armed groups in Darfur that were not present at the Abuja negotiations. Most significantly, these groups include the Janjaweed, the rampaging militia that have been responsible for so much of the death and destruction in the region and that are used by the government to crush the rebels and their communities.
It should also be recalled that the government, JEM and the SLM/A have signed several humanitarian ceasefire agreements over the past two years and then violated these agreements repeatedly and egregiously. This constitutes fair warning of the possibility of further violations, especially if the signatories are not genuinely committed to the new agreement.
Another huge problem is that the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur is hopelessly ill-equipped to oversee the ceasefire and protect civilians from attacks by government, militia, rebels and bandits. The AU has roughly 7,000 troops when it needs, according to the AU Force Commander, as many as 60,000 troops to cover inhospitable badlands the size of France.
Pambazuka News: Do you think the signatories are genuinely committed to the new agreement?
One of the most remarkable things about the Abuja peace process was that, for months on end, the negotiating parties were unable or unwilling to engage in serious negotiations. They made no effort to accommodate each other’s positions and showed no interest in trying to forge common ground. None of them was willing to make concessions to its opponents. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving.
Instead, the parties spent their time reiterating their demands ad nauseum, rejecting the positions of their opponents, trading accusations and recriminations, grandstanding for the benefit of the international observers and attempting to win support for their positions from the mediators. In the midst of this immensely frustrating experience, the head of the AU mediation team, Sam Ibok, was quoted as saying that “our experience over the past sixteen months had led us to conclude that there is neither good faith nor commitment on the part of any of the Parties”.
In light of all this, one of the most important points about the DPA is that it is not by any stretch of the imagination a negotiated settlement. It is a document which was drawn up by the mediators and which the Sudanese government and Minni Minawi signed under pressure from sections of the international community. The final draft of the text prepared by the mediators was presented to the parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis five days before the final deadline of 30 April set by the AU Peace and Security Council.
The government and Minawi evidently believed that their interests would not be served by refusing to sign the document and being portrayed as spoilers. In the absence of real negotiations and hard-won concessions, however, none of the Sudanese parties has any sense of ownership of the Agreement and it is therefore unlikely that they are committed to it.
Several commentators have pointed out that the DPA contains more compromises on the part of the rebels than on the part of the government, particularly in relation to power sharing. (A summary and critique of the DPA appeared in the Sudan Tribune on 3 May; see www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=15343.)
It needs to be remembered though that all successful negotiated settlements in the context of civil war entail compromises. No party can ever get everything it wants. Yet a settlement stands a good chance of enduring if all the parties and their constituencies believe that it is sufficiently just. So the problem with the DPA is not the fact that it contains compromises. The problem is that the compromises were crafted by the mediators and were not a product of agreements negotiated by the parties.
Pambazuka News: Why were the parties in Abuja so intransigent?
There were several reasons. First, in all deadly conflicts there is a high level of hatred and mistrust among the belligerents. This is a powerful barrier to dialogue and negotiations, which require at least some trust and a willingness to co-operate with one’s enemy. Consequently, the primary job of the mediator is to build the parties’ confidence in each other and in the process of negotiations. This did not happen in Abuja, where there was no thawing of enmity.
More specifically, the Sudanese government believes that the rebel movements are not worthy military, political and negotiating opponents and therefore does not take them seriously. The government is convinced that the rebels are not representative of the people of Darfur, pose little military threat and are too divided to ever achieve a unified negotiating posture.
From the perspective of the rebels, the government is a perfidious, evil regime that has repeatedly broken its promises and reneged on peace agreements. In addition, the government has enormous wealth and power while the rebels have neither wealth nor power. Therefore the government can and must make substantial concessions whereas the rebel movements and their constituencies have nothing to give up.
Second, the divisions within the rebel alliance inhibited progress in the Abuja negotiations. There were serious differences between JEM and the SLM/A; as noted above, the SLM/A itself is split into two factions; and there are deep divisions within the Abdul Wahid faction, some of whose members attempted to oust him as their leader during the peace talks. As a result, the rebels were unable to speak with one voice and at a certain point even refused to meet in the same room.
These divisions naturally reduced the scope for flexibility. When the rebels came to the negotiating table with fixed positions that had been thrashed out in their caucus meetings, they had no mandate to negotiate. Their mandate was simply to put forward a consensus position. Any consideration of flexibility required a return to protracted discussion in caucus and the hardliners invariably prevailed over the moderates.
Third, the balance of power was such that it reinforced intransigence on all sides. The rebel bodies lacked military and intellectual weight and were confronted by a relatively strong and sophisticated adversary. They were intimidated by many of the concepts associated with ceasefire arrangements, such as assembly and demobilisation, and they were frightened of being outmanoeuvred in the negotiations. They were especially scared of agreeing to anything that might weaken them militarily and make them vulnerable to government attack.
Intransigence is typically the refuge of weak parties in negotiations. Perversely, it is also an option commonly taken by very strong parties that do not feel threatened and see no need to offer concessions.
Fourth, most of the parties in Abuja appeared to view the battlefield as the strategic arena of conflict; the negotiations were simply a tactical arena. The SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi seemed to believe that its interests would be best served through a war of manoeuvre against the militarily weaker faction of Abdul Wahid.
The government, on the other hand, seemed to believe that its interests would be best served through a war of attrition. It was not under any military threat from the rebels. Nor was it incurring any significant military costs since it relied on the Janjaweed as a proxy force. Moreover, the rebels were busy fighting each other. The government was much more concerned about hostilities with neighbouring Chad and was determined to avoid any military restrictions in a peace agreement with the rebels.
Only Abdul Wahid, who was taking a hammering in the field from the government, the Janjaweed and Minawi, appeared to believe that his interests lay in a negotiated settlement. But the settlement had to satisfy the political and economic needs of his constituency in Darfur and he was convinced that the Darfur Peace Agreement did not achieve this.
Pambazuka News: Can you say something about the international pressure you referred to earlier?
Laurie Nathan: For various reasons the international community did not apply strong pressure on the parties, relying instead on a weak form of ‘deadline diplomacy’. The UN, the AU and foreign powers repeatedly set unrealistically short deadlines for the conclusion of an agreement and, when these were not met, set new and equally unrealistic deadlines.
The deadline diplomacy was meant to constitute pressure on the parties and convey the international community’s seriousness about resolving the conflict. But since the deadlines came and went without any negative repercussions for the parties, they were not an effective form of pressure and they undermined the seriousness of the international community.
Unlike the parties, however, the AU mediators were obliged to heed the deadlines set by their political masters and donors. This had several negative consequences. For example, the deadline diplomacy inhibited the development of a meaningful mediation strategy and plan. If the talks were always due to end in a matter of weeks, there was no point in preparing a plan of action for the following six months. The external pressure stifled a programmatic effort to build momentum over time and led instead to an ad hoc approach that proceeded in fits and starts.
The deadline diplomacy also caused the mediators to proceed with a haste that is incompatible with effective peacemaking. The only sustainable solution to a civil war is a settlement shaped and embraced by the protagonists. The mediator’s job is to help them overcome their enmity and mistrust, build their confidence in negotiations and facilitate dialogue, bargaining and co-operative problem-solving. This requires protracted efforts and immense patience.
In Darfur, as in all civil wars, there are compelling humanitarian reasons for wanting to secure a settlement quickly. But there is never a quick fix. These wars are social phenomena whose causes, dynamics and contested issues are multiple, complex and intractable. The difficulty of resolution is compounded greatly by the parties’ mutual hatred and suspicion. In these circumstances, short-cuts are cul-de-sacs.
In summary, the deadline diplomacy that put intense pressure on the mediators and no real pressure on the disputant parties was patently flawed.
Pambazuka News: Are there any positive aspects of the peace agreement in relation to a ceasefire and protection of civilians?
Laurie Nathan: The DPA’s provisions on security are very good. The Agreement provides for government to demobilise the Janjaweed by mid-October. It also provides for disarming other militia and for a staggered withdrawal of government and rebel forces in a process of disengagement and redeployment into defensive positions.
This process would lead to the creation of demilitarised buffer zones around the camps that house internally displaced people, and the AU troops would monitor and patrol the zones. In addition, the Agreement strengthens the authority of the AU Force Commander, particularly in relation to ceasefire violations, and provides for punitive action in the event of transgressions.
But of course the success of these provisions depends firstly on the will of the parties and secondly on the strengthening of the AU’s force levels in Darfur. Neither of these conditions looks likely to be met in the immediate future.
Pambazuka News: What is the way forward?
Laurie Nathan: The most serious international pressure has to be brought to bear on Khartoum. The Sudanese government is responsible for the historical marginalisation that gave rise to the rebellion in Darfur and for unleashing waves of destruction and ethnic cleansing by the Janjaweed militia. The government is by far the strongest party and the most able to make concessions that would unblock the impasse.
Since the massacres in Darfur seem likely to continue long into the future, the greatest imperative is to strengthen the force levels, funding and resources of the AU peacekeeping mission and to move decisively to transform this mission into a UN operation with a robust mandate to protect civilians.
Pambazuka News: If our readers want more information on the Darfur crisis, where should they look?
Laurie Nathan: The Sudan Tribune is possibly the best source of up-to-date news (www.sudantribune.com). For analysis, the reports of the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch are superb (www.crisisgroup.org and www.hrw.org The Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre has an excellent website (www.darfurcentre.ch). I would also strongly recommend “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War” by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal.
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