Features
Socio-economic development in Southern Africa
Challenges and prospects
Henning Melber
2009-09-17, Issue 448
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/58805
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The following reflections are based on the assumption that the current mainstream model for socio-economic development in Southern Africa is elite oriented and therefore inadequate. To serve the interest of the majority of the people, fundamental new approaches are required. Considering the global challenges, this is not only a task confined to Southern Africa. Given the number of unknown or at least little predictable variables concerning both internal and even more so external dimensions, it borders on reading tealeaves. Local, sub-regional and global dynamics are difficult to predict and not pre-determined.
The following assessment might therefore appear as a kind of ‘wishful thinking’ for how a people-centred development in the region might be promoted. However, visions of this nature are also ingredients to policymaking.
In Namibia, ‘Vision 2030’ was initiated at the turn of the century by President Sam Nujoma to become the guiding document for the country’s development strategy. It diagnosed a very true dilemma the SWAPO government has to reckon with, if it wants to retain its legitimacy and credibility among the electorate, when stating: ‘The goals of the Namibian struggle for Independence were framed in terms of social justice, popular rule and socio-economic transformation, thus the legitimacy of the post apartheid system of governance rests on its ability to deliver transformation or, at any rate, to redirect resources to address the socio-economic causes of poverty and potential conflict. […] Continued prevalence of widespread poverty would, in the eyes of those affected, imply government’s unwillingness to change the status quo, or its inability to improve their economic conditions.’ (Office of the President 2004: 174 and 175).
In line with this conviction, which defines the challenge not only for the Namibian government but also for most former liberation movements when moving into political power, my presentation is motivated and guided by the following goals a strategy should pursue in the Southern African sub-regional context:
- Reduce social inequality and poverty;
- Create meaningful opportunities for employment or work;
- Secure an ecologically sustainable development, which adapts to climate change;
- Provide a maximum of human security for all people in the region through a responsible state and government policy seeking to promote and satisfy basic needs in all spheres of life (including the political domain, based on the values and norms of a democratic culture embracing the full protection and promotion of civil liberties and human rights).
The point of departure is the conclusion that hitherto dominant and largely unquestioned growth based models of economic development and social reproduction become increasingly dubious and come at a far too high price for the majority of the people.
They are also anchored in what could be termed a ‘pact among elites’, transgressing national, regional and continental boundaries. It is a class-based model of accumulation and (self-)enrichment at the expense of the majority of the people. Walter Rodney (1973) showed this in his seminal work How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Since then, local compradors were eager to have their share in the externally dominated structures shaping African economies.
Already more than a decade earlier Frantz Fanon (1961) pointed to the ‘Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ in a chapter of his equally fundamental critique relating European colonialism to the role of the new elites appropriating African nationalism for their own gains after Independence. Moeletsi Mbeki translated this into the current social, economic and political realities not only confined to post-Apartheid South Africa in his scathing critique of the present African elites as a ‘rentier class’ in the following way: ‘These elites have no sense of ownership of their country and are not interested in its development. They view the country primarily as a cash cow that enables them to live extravagantly on imported goods and services as they attempt to mimic the lifestyles of the colonialists. It is this mindset of non-ownership that largely accounts for sub-Saharan Africa’s non-development and, as a consequence, its poverty. With the lack of a sense of ownership goes the pillaging of resources, neglect of the welfare of the people, corruption, capital flight and, ultimately, brutality against dissenting voices.’ (Mbeki 2009: 174). My own critical analyses of both the socio-economic as well as political ‘limits to liberation’, with particular reference to the Namibian case, concurs to a large extent with the approach by Mbeki (cf. Melber 2007, 2009a and 2009b).
CURRENT POSITION
Southern Africa (considered to be composed of most of the SADC countries in this context) has since the mid-1990s achieved full political Independence and ownership by (more or less) democratically elected governments in most (though not all) of its countries. This does however not mean true sovereignty and ownership over all internal matters. The sub-region remains closely linked to external interests and influences and has some of the most open economies. What David Sogge (2009: 22) recently stated in conclusion for Angola, applies to all countries in the region: ‘politics remain entwined with powerful outside actors and are still politics of limited access to assets and privileges. State/party elites pursue their interests on the basis of understandings with foreign extractive and banking corporations, and with foreign governments […] elites harbour social and economic ambitions, but those do not now include a developmental state pursuing a socially inclusive agenda.’
He also points to the fact that the world economic crisis ‘has exposed the massive regulatory deficit in national and global governance’ (ibid., 23). The ‘new scramble for Africa’ triggered since the turn of the century through increased competition of industrialised and industrialising countries outside of the continent a race to secure access to and control over the vast natural resources of some of the countries (cf. Southall/Melber 2009). But the resource boom (which in the sub-region benefited among others and in different degrees Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia) has been short lived and reproduced a deeply entrenched structural pattern not in support of locally owned sustainable development. Exceptionally high annual economic growth rates did not translate into poverty reduction, employment, local ownership or value-adding activities. Instead, South Africa registered a massive deindustrialisation.
The economies of the sub-region remain dependent more than ever on a few basic raw materials for export and outward oriented trade regimes securing revenue income and gains from international trade under preferential schemes, such as the US-American African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or some other bilateral agreements such as the South African Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. The collapse of the growth-based global economy in 2008 once again underlined that the economies in the region remained at the receiving end. Their own economies ended in recession due to the massive dependencies on the world market and the skewed exchange relations.
One is tempted to conclude that recent trends testify to the bankruptcy of the established outward oriented economies. This outward orientation looked beyond the region and missed opportunities to consolidate a regional architecture geared towards homemade development, based on mutual interests among neighbours. The massive internal discrepancies among SADC countries might add to the challenge but do not render systematic efforts futile or doomed to failure.
If the currently dominant approaches to running the economies prevail, the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions seems to be more likely than any gains. The resource curse needs to be addressed. Replacing one commodity with another where possible (like in the case of Namibia, where the collapse of the diamond market was to some extent compensated with the increased production of uranium oxide) is not an answer but adds to the problem. As long as such growth-based models do not benefit the majority of the people as a means to transform the economic basis in the medium to long term perspective, they are merely more of the same and no cure from the disease.
‘Business as usual’ will add to the deterioration of the living conditions for the majority of people in the region and would ignore the fundamental challenges which go along with climate change and the need for climate adaptation. As a report for the Commission on Climate Change and Development stated in no uncertain terms: ‘achieving an approach to adaptation that reflects the human dimension of climate change will require a significant departure from the status quo. It will require a far more critical perspective regarding traditional development models, which must be recognised for their contribution to current levels and distributions of poverty and to vulnerability to climate change impacts.’ (Christoplos et. al. 2009: 31)
A forward looking perspective would therefore need to address among other issues alternatives to the hydrocarbon-based model, the challenges this brings for energy production and consumption, as well as the need to find ways dealing with the predictable water stress as well as droughts and floods, which will increasingly be risks for the majority of people and once again affect the poor most of all. These challenges should be met with regional rather than national efforts to find solutions. The primacy of the so-called nation state and its government needs to be supplemented (if not replaced) by collective regional efforts.
IMMEDIATE TASKS
There are several immediate tasks which ought to be tackled in pursuance of the search for true alternatives seeking to secure survival of the poor majority of the Southern African population. The point of departure would require that Southern African countries would decide on a way forward, which strengthens the regional component and collaboration. The current disorientation is indicative of a lack of common vision in terms of a regional strategy.
In terms of emerging economic exchange patterns, the architecture requires clarification over the house to be build: Is it an apartment block in which all tenants have a say and can participate in the maintenance and expansion of the assets, no matter how big or small their own flat is? Or is it a collection of individual houses – from huge mansions and posh villas to farmsteads and huts – with their own gardens and plots in very different sizes cultivated to the liking of the owner and his/her individual means alone – if necessary even at the expense of the neighbourhood?
The regional architecture requires urgent attention and policy-based solutions also for the economic interaction and dimensions. The future of SACU (Southern Africa Customs Union) as much as of SADC is at stake and requires determined initiatives to solve the crisis. The positioning with regard to the external partners such as the EU‘s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) but also the emerging actors related to the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and beyond (including South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and others competing for access to global markets) requires a systematic approach.
The same applies to preferential access to selected markets like the regulations under AGOA – is this a trade act, which induces true economic growth based on a model really benefiting the majority of the people? Or is the ‘trade as aid’ paradigm not rather more of the same, entrenching external dependencies even deeper? While in the context of Namibia, the short bonanza and ultimate closure of the textile outlet Ramatex was a warning light, maybe the same can be said for seedless table grapes produced for the US-American and European pre-Christmas season? Who benefits from such ‘windows of opportunity’?
There is an urgent need for a regionally defined and owned agenda, even though this is a difficult endeavour. Some of the internal dynamics remain a huge challenge to assess and handle: Will South Africa decide to act as a benign hegemonic leader? Will Angola emerge as the competing hegemonic power seeking a dominant role? Will Zimbabwe recover and resume a more constructive regional role in the near future? What will be the possible effects of such trends for the smaller economies?
A catalogue of imminent issues and tasks for such a collective agenda setting would also need to address a series of issues already identified by Sogge (2009: 23). These include:
Domestic and regional inequalities; distribution of productive assets, in particular land; the role of domestic markets for locally produced goods (in contrast to the primacy of foreign markets and dependency on imports); distribution of public goods (which include not only water, sanitation and health listed by Sogge, but also energy, housing and education); and finally the development of means for conflict resolution and the protection of basic rights.
The promotion of coherence and the entrenchment of common normative frameworks will be essential aspects for the implementation of such a strategy, which would pursue the interests of individual countries through a rigorous advocacy of and respect for the regional interests. The economically related topical issues on such an agenda would include among other things the expansion of regional material infrastructure (roads, railways, harbour utilisation); mobility of goods and people (including matters of migration and citizenship); securing means for reproduction of all people through addressing the issues of land utilization, water resources and energy production and use. A ‘Most Favoured Nations Policy’ ought in this context remain limited and restricted to member countries in the sub-region instead of extending special rights and privileges to those who claim old bonds of friendship (and by doing so kind of imply that this is now pay back time).
CHALLENGES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PATH
These tasks require the de-linking from structurally entrenched global trade relations, an inward looking economic policy with domestic and regional components, efforts to secure an ecologically sustainable (renewable) resource base (solar and wind energy) and a local and regional water management policy seeking to provide access to clean water for all people. It would emphasise the promotion of local food production and stimulate decentralised economic activities for local and regional markets with the aim to reduce the dependency from external factors such as FDI, commodity prices, income from overseas tourism based activities, access to external markets beyond the region.
In the first place, however, this draws attention to the role of the current political and economic elites and beneficiaries of the past, as well as the role of a developmental state and its bureaucracy. As Sogge (2009: 24) suggested: ‘a realistic way forward in the short term is to promote a “minimally responsive state”, one that would act as chief duty-bearer towards a rights-holding citizenry’. This ultimately becomes once again a question of class interests – domestically, regionally and globally. Given the massive challenges facing human reproduction not only but also in Southern Africa, the time to accept such a challenge is ripe: ‘At a time of unprecedented economic and ecological crisis, the means and imperatives for an in-depth debate have intensified. Important tenets of capitalist growth are being critically re-visited. Alternative models appear more viable and even necessary. It is time to adopt a new compass and chart another way forward.’ (ibid.)
While this paper formulates a strategy directed towards the governments in the sub-region, it should not be taken for granted that those occupying the commanding heights in politics and in local control over parts of the economy would be willing listeners and learners when it comes to such appeals. Social change in the interest of the majority of the people hardly ever (if at all) came voluntarily from the top. It almost certainly was in nearly all cases enforced through popular pressure and demands from below. Hence the decisive local aspect in the Southern African region will remain the force of the people and the strength of the social movements. As the modified African proverb says: Don’t focus too much on the elephants (no matter if they are fighting or making love) – the future lies with the grass.
BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS
* Dr Henning Melber is Executive Director of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Sweden.
* This is a revised paper presented at the conference Southern Africa 2020 Vision: Public policy priorities for the next decade hosted by The University of Namibia and The University College London.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.
REFERENCES
Christoplos, Ian/Anderson, Simon/Arnold, Margaret/Galaz, Victor/Hedger, Merylyn/Klein, Richard J.T./Le Goulven, Katell (2009), The Human Dimension of Climate Adaptation: The Importance of Local and Institutional Issues. Stockholm: Commission on Climate Change and Development/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Fanon, Frantz (2001), The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin (first published in French, Paris 1961)
Mbeki, Moeletsi (2009), Architects of Poverty. Why African capitalism needs changing. Johannesburg: Picador Africa
Melber, Henning (2007), ‘Poverty, politics, power and privilege. Namibia’s black economic elite formation’, in Henning Melber (ed.), Transitions in Namibia. Which changes for whom? Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 110-129
Melber, Henning (2009a), ‘Namibian sellouts: Cashing assets in for crumbs’, Pambazuka News. A Weekly Electronic Forum for Social Justice in Africa, no. 442, 16 July
Melber, Henning (2009b), ‘Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation’, Review of African Political Economy, no. 121, 453-461
Office of the President (2004), Namibia Vision 2030. Policy Framework for Long-term National Development (Main Document). Windhoek: Office of the President
Rodney, Walter (1973), How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications and Dar-Es-Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House
Sogge, David (2009), Angola: ‘Failed’ yet ‘Successful’. Madrid: FRIDE (Working Paper 81)
Southall, Roger/Melber, Henning (eds) (2009), A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press
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