Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji (ed) (2008) China’s New Role in Africa and the South: A search for a new perspective. 
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Pambazuka News 357: China, the West and Africa
The authoritative electronic weekly newsletter and platform for social justice in Africa
Pambazuka News (English edition): ISSN 1753-6839
With nearly 500 contributors and an estimated 500,000 readers Pambazuka News is the authoritative pan African electronic weekly newsletter and platform for social justice in Africa providing cutting edge commentary and in-depth analysis on politics and current affairs, development, human rights, refugees, gender issues and culture in Africa.
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CONTENTS: 1. Editors’ corner, 2. Announcements, 3. Features, 4. Comment & analysis, 5. Pan-African Postcard, 6. Letters, 7. Obituaries, 8. Books & arts, 9. African Writers’ Corner, 10. Blogging Africa, 11. Podcasts, 12. Zimbabwe update, 13. African Union Monitor, 14. Women & gender, 15. Human rights, 16. Refugees & forced migration, 17. Social movements, 18. Elections & governance, 19. Africa & China, 20. Corruption, 21. Development, 22. Health & HIV/AIDS, 23. Education, 24. LGBTI, 25. Land & land rights, 26. Media & freedom of expression, 27. Conflict & emergencies, 28. Internet & technology, 29. Fundraising & useful resources, 30. Courses, seminars, & workshops, 31. Jobs
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Highlights from this issue
EDITORS' NOTE:
- Pambazuka Readers help raise one million dollars
ANNOUNCEMENTS:
- Policy brief on Agro-fuels
FEATURE: Firoze Manji on China in Africa
COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS:
- Stephen Marks on how to read China
- Koulsy Lamko on France in Chad
- Herbert Jauch on Export Processing Zones
- Daniel Volman on how the US plans to sell Africom work
PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD:
- Tajudeen on the feasibility of change in Zimbabwe
- Zimbabwe watch on upcoming elections
LETTERS: Readers' comments and announcements
OBITUARIES: Ivan Toms found dead
BOOK REVIEW: Alice Macdonald reviews Francis Nyamnjoh's "Souls Forgotten"
AFRICAN WRITER'S CORNER: Excerpt from "Souls Forgotten"
BLOGGING AFRICA: Kenyan bloggers on sexism and racism
AFRICAN UNION MONITOR: AU weekly round-upANNOUNCEMENTS:Policy brief on agrofuels and the 2007 US energy bill
ZIMBABWE UPDATE: Opposition suffer pre-election harassment
WOMEN AND GENDER:Weak response to Ghana's child-sex industry
CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Ivorian soldiers riot
HUMAN RIGHTS: Advancement of the right of access to information
REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRATION: Egyptian police kill two at Israel border
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: Burkinabe coalition threatens more action
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: World Bank blamed for Kenya violence
CORRUPTION: DRC government publishes mining review
DEVELOPMENT: Experts to interrogate implementation deficit
AFRICA & CHINA: African Review of Political Economy does Special issue on China and Africa
HEALTH AND HIV/Aids: Rise in DRC TB cases link to HIV co-infection
EDUCATION: Kenya's free schooling policy hits snags
LGBTI: Gay accused in Cameroon released
LAND & LAND RIGHTS: So few owning so much land in Kenya
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Vocal Egyptian editor jailed
INTERNET & TECHNOLOGY: getting to grips with media convergence
PLUS: e-newsletters and mailings lists; courses, seminars and workshops, and jobs
*Pambazuka News now has a Del.icio.us page, where you can view the various websites that we visit to keep our fingers on the pulse of Africa! Visit http://del.icio.us/pambazuka_news
Editors’ corner
Rape crisis centers in Kenya: Readers raise a million
2008-03-27
Pambazuka News Editors
Kaari Murungi, the Director of Urgent Action Fund - Africa, passed by Fahamu's office this week to tell us that as a result of the appeal sent out in Pambazuka News in January for support for the rape crisis centres in Kenya, they received nearly $1 million! Kaari told us: "The majority of the funds we received were from people who had read about the appeal in Pambazuka News."
We take this opportunity of thanking our readers for responding so wonderfully. This is exactly the kind of solidarity that Pambazuka News stands for. So, thank you to all of you who responded!
Announcements
Policy Brief on Agrofuels and the 2007 US Energy Bill
2008-03-26
Food First
Report highlights growing hunger, energy dependency on Global South, corporate control
Food First/The Institute for Food & Development Policy, based in Oakland, Calif., has released a policy brief titled, “When Renewable isn’t Sustainable: Agrofuels’ and the Inconvenient Truths behind the 2007 U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act.” The report, co-authored by Food First Executive Director Eric Holt-Giménez and program consultant Isabella Kenfield, discusses the implications of the Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS) targets for agrofuels in the 2007 U.S. Energy Bill.
The first inconvenient truth of the RFS mandate is the effect it is already having on food prices and supplies around the world. It is estimated that half of the U.S. corn harvest will be diverted to ethanol production by the end of 2008. Because U.S. corn accounts for some 40% of global production, increased demand for U.S. corn as feedstock for fuel impacts global markets for corn as food. As acreage planted to corn increases from rising demand, acreage for other food grains such as wheat and soybeans is reduced, raising the prices for these crops as well. People around the world are already experiencing the food price and supply shocks that the spike in U.S. ethanol demand and consumption is causing.
A second inconvenient truth about the RFS mandate is that instead of offering energy independence and security, the 2007 Energy Bill actually reflects a bi-partisan, unspoken agreement to rely on imported agrofuels from the Global South. This is already leading to massive environmental destruction, loss of livelihoods and human rights abuses in agrofuels-producing regions of the South, and threatens to further economic and political instability in these regions.
To better understand the agrofuels boom, the authors analyze how the industry is aiding market expansion and consolidation by the giant grain, biotech and oil companies. Contrary to being “clean” and “green,” agrofuels exacerbate all of the problems currently caused by industrial agriculture—including global warming.
Holt-Giménez concludes that “In order to think about alternatives to agrofuels—local biofuels, conservation, wind, or solar—and in order to advance truly sustainable agricultural development at home and abroad, we need to construct an alternative food and energy context. We must challenge the political-economic context as well as the technologies, debunk the assumptions as well as the claims, and propose new relationships between producers and consumers in our food and fuel systems.”
To remove the artificial market incentive that created the industry—the RFS targets—Food First, with a coalition of progressive U.S. organizations, proposes a Moratorium on U.S. agrofuels. The call for a Moratorium can be found and signed here: http://ga3.org/campaign/agrofuelsmoratorium
To obtain a copy of the report, log on to www.foodfirst.org
Features
China still a small player in Africa
2008-03-27
Firoze Manji
Firoze Manji argues that in comparison to Europe and the US, China in Africa is still a small player. While keeping an eye out on China, Africans should not be distracted from paying attention to the West's continued exploitation of the continent including the use of military might to protect its economic interests.
"What I find a bit reprehensible is the tendency of certain Western voices to … raising concerns about China’s attempt to get into the African market because it is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned about how China is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with Africa, starting with slavery and continuing to the present day with exploitation and cheating."
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2007)
Open any newspaper and you would get the impression that the African continent, and much of the rest of the world, is in the process of being ‘devoured’ by China. Phrases such as the ‘new scramble for Africa’, ‘voracious’, ‘ravenous’ or ‘insatiable’ ‘appetite for natural resources’ are typical descriptors used to characterise China’s engagement with Africa. In contrast, the operations of western capital for the same activities are described with anodyne phrases such as ‘development’, ‘investment’, ‘employment generation’(Mawdsely, 2008). Is China indeed the voracious tiger it is so often portrayed as?
China’s involvement in Africa has three main dimensions: foreign direct investment, aid and trade. In each of these dimensions China’s engagement is dwarfed by those of US and European countries, and often smaller than those of other Asian economies.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) of Asian economies globally has been growing. The total flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asia to Africa is estimated to have been an annual average of $1.2 billion during 2002-2004 (UNCTAD, 2006). Chinese FDI in Africa has in fact been small in comparison to investment from Singapore, India and Malaysia, which are the principal Asian sources of FDI in Africa according to UNDP (2007) with investment stocks of $3.5 billion and $1.9 billion each by 2004, respectively. Such investments are greater than those of China. The same report goes on to say, however, that Asian investments in Africa are dwarfed by those of the United Kingdom (with a total FDI stock of $30 billion in 2003), the United States ($19 billion in 2003), France ($11.5 billion in 2003) and Germany ($5.5 billion in 2003). And if China sits in fourth place amongst the Asian ‘tigers’, the scale of its investments in Africa are miniscule in comparison to the more traditional imperial powers.
Asian FDI flows to Africa have certainly grown 10-fold since the 1980s, but smaller than the 14-fold growth in FDIs globally in the same period. Compared with India, for example, China’s FDI is small. India has a larger investment in oil in Sudan and Nigeria than does China. Of 126 greenfield FDI projects in Africa, Indian companies accounted for the largest number. Indeed, amongst the Asian economies, Malaysian companies dominate in mineral extraction sector in Africa. Africa’s share of total outward flow of Chinese FDI is marginal - only 3 per cent goes to Africa, while Asia receives 53 per cent, Latin America 37 per cent. It should be borne in mind that China is a net recipient of FDI, and receives a flow of FDI also from Africa: SAB Miller breweries and SASOL from South Africa, Chandaria Holdings in Kenya, amongst many others.
Africa is certainly important trade partner for China, the volume increasing from $11 billion in 2000 to some $40 billion in 2005. China has a growing trade surplus with Africa. According to UNDP (2007), China has become the third largest trading partner of Africa, following the United States and France. China has focused primarily on the import of a limited number of products - oil and ‘hard commodities’ for a few selected African countries . China’s trade with Africa represents only a small proportion of Africa’s trade with the rest of the world, and is comparable to India’s trade with Africa, although both have been growing rapidly.
China imports from Africa five main commodities - oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds and logs. The export of these commodities, and in particular oil, has grown significantly in the last ten years. A few African countries (Sudan, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya) source a significant share of their imports of manufactured products, mainly clothing and textiles, from China. (Kaplisky, McCormick and Morris, 2007). China has been vigorously castigated for its support of repressive regimes. In almost all cases, China’s involvement has been in support of its need for strategic natural resources, especially oil. And it is perhaps here that one finds the reason for the fears expressed in the west about China’s role in Africa. USA is the world’s largest consumer of oil products , with 25% of its requirements destined to come from Africa. While China sources some 40% of its oil from the Middle East, it currently sources 23% from africa 23%.
Much attention has been drawn to the negative impact of the cheap Chinese commodities on African economies. Certainly this has contributed to the decline of industrial production and the growing retrenchment of workers. But China has essentially taken advantage of the ‘opening-up’ of Africa’s market that has resulted from the adoption of neoliberal economic policies that the international financial institutions, backed by the majority of the international aid agencies, have forced Africa’s governments to comply with. Given that the relative size of Chinese imports is small in comparison to imports from industrialised countries, the blame for the decline in industrial production and growing unemployment in Africa can hardly be place entirely at China’s door. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that some 58% of exports from China are manufactured by foreign owned companies. The retrenchments and closures of local industries occurring as a result of cheap goods imported from China need to be placed at the door of the multinationals concerned as much as on the Chinese government and Chinese companies.
Just like other western powers, China has used aid strategically to support its commercial and investment interventions in Africa. Aid has taken the form of financial investments in key infrastructural development projects, training programmes, debt relief, technical assistance and a programme of tariff exemptions for selected products from Africa, not dissimilar to the agreements that Africa has had with Europe, US and other western economies. China’s aid is attractive to African governments not only because of the favourable terms offered, but in particular because of the lack of conditionality that is offered that has so constrained, and many would argue, undermined develop that would have the potential for bringing about social progress.
The most serious worry for the US was expressed by the spokespersons of the IMF and World Bank who complained that China’s unrestricted lending had ‘undermined years of painstaking efforts to arrange conditional debt relief’. There is clearly concern that China can now offer favourable loans to Africa and weaken imperial leverage over African economies. (Campbell, 2007). “The US and World Bank claim to be fighting poverty in Africa,” he continues, “but after two decades of structural adjustment the conditions of the African poor have worsened, with indices of exploitation and deprivation increasing by geometric proportions. According to one estimate, at the present pace of investment in Africa from the West, it will require more than one hundred years to realise the Millennium Development Goals. Chinese investment potentially provides an alternative for African leaders and entrepreneurs, while providing long term potential for the development of African economies.”
"China’s official development discourse is explicitly non-prescriptive, employing a language of ‘no strings attached’, quality and mutual benefit. It emphasises the collective right to development over the rights-based approaches focused on individual rights. Once the dust settles on the current China-in-Africa fever, and notions of China’s exceptionalism wear off, all involved will need to harness hopes to realistic vehicles in order to make the most of the current potential." (Large, 2007). Rocha (2007) suggests that Chinese investments in Africa are having and could continue to have some positive impacts. China is helping African countries to rebuild their infrastructure and providing other types of assistance to agriculture, water, health, education and other sectors. This could have very positive spin-offs in lowering transaction costs and assisting African governments to address social calamities such as poor health services, energy crisis, skills development. However, it is true that ‘Chinese companies are quickly generating the same kinds of environmental damage and community opposition that Western companies have spawned around the world’ (Chan Fishel 2007).
The evidence available suggests that the drive to increasing the rate of profit is exhibited as much by Chinese as by western capital. The west has the advantage in having already established its dominant position that is potentially being threatened by the ‘new boy on the block’.
But China has the advantage of never having enslaved or colonized the continent. China has also not made any false promises coated with neo-liberalism. While the West, the IMF and the World Bank put conditions that only aid in their fleecing of Africa, China has so far been willing to provide unconditional aid and invest in infrastructure. At the same time, however, it freely takes full advantage of the opening up of markets that neo-liberal economic policies over the last 25 years have offered, unencumbered.
And so far, unlike the US, China has not sought to establish military bases in Africa to protect its economic interests, which the US has sought to establish through AFRICOM
* Firoze Manji is director of Fahamu and editor of Pambazuka News.
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
***Footnotes are available at the URL shown below
K. Kwaa Prah (2007) ‘Africa and China: Then and Now’, in F Manji and Stephen Marks (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa. Oxford/Nairobi: Fahamu, pp. 57–61.
E Mawdsely (2008) ‘Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? How British broadsheet newspapers represent China, Africa and the West’, Pambazuka News, http://www.ambazuka.org/en/category/comment/45593
UNCTAD (2006) World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for development. New York and Geneva: United Nations, sales no. E.06.II.D.11.
UNDP (2007) Asian Foreign Investment In Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Countries. New York/Geneva: United Nations Publications, UNCTAD/ITE/ IIA/2007/1. UNDP (2007).
R. Kaplinsky, D. McCormick and M. Morris (2007) The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa, IDS Working Paper, no. 291.
H. Campbell (2007): China in Africa: challenging US hegemony. In F Manji and Stephen Marks (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa. Oxford/Nairobi: Fahamu, pp. 119-137.
D. Large (2007): As the beginning ends: China’s return to Africa. In F Manji and Stephen Marks (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa. Oxford/Nairobi: Fahamu, pp. 153-168.
J. Rocha (2007): A new frontier in the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources: the emergence of China. In F Manji and Stephen Marks (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa. Oxford/Nairobi: Fahamu, pp. 15-34.
M. Chan Fishel (2007): Environmental impact: more of the same. In F Manji and Stephen Marks (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa. Oxford/Nairobi: Fahamu, pp. 139-152.
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Comment & analysis
What does china think?
2008-03-26
Stephen Marks
Stephen Marks argues in this extended review of recent publications about China that there are few other important global players whose affairs are so exclusively analysed on the basis of ignorance and stereotype. There is little understanding outside China about the differences of perspectives of Chinese intellectuals - they are far from being a homogeneous group.
China is no longer a topic - it’s a dimension. On every issue, from global warming to the credit crisis, China and its impact can no longer be ignored, not as a subject apart to be left to experts, but as an integral component of the global picture, on which every analyst or commentator has to have an opinon.
And as we all do when we have to come up with an opinion on something of which we know nothing, we reach off the shelf for a ready-made answer. In the case of China, these are easy to find.
There is the cold-war image of China the sinister Communist dictatorship. There is the older racial image of the sinister ‘inscrutable’ Chinese. And for Africa, there is the image of the voracious Chinese imperialist, concerned only to rape the ‘eternal victim, the dark continent’, of its precious resources. [see ‘Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? by Emma Mawdsley - ]http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/45593]
There are few other important global players whose affairs are so exclusively analysed on the basis of ignorance and stereotype. Across the world, those who follow international politics are aware of the major policy debates in Washington between neo-cons, traditionalists and ‘multilateralists’. The ebb and flow of federalist currents in the EU are common knowledge. Even the revival of Russian assertiveness under Putin can be analysed as a modern trend, without invoking the ghost of Stalin or images of the Russian Bear.
But as Mark Leonard, Director of what calls itself ‘the first pan-European thinktank’, asks us in his recent book, ‘how many of us can name more than a handful of contemporary Chinese writers and thinkers?’ Indeed, if we are honest, ‘a handful’ would be generous where most of us are concerned.
The chief merit of Leonard’s contribution [What does China think? Fourth Estate 2008] is to show us what we are missing, and whet our appetite for more. The same feeling of stumbling across a hitherto unknown continent of argument and debate around central issues of our time comes from Zhang Yongle’s summary of the range of ideas in a leading Chinese intellectual journal in his article ‘Reading Dushu’ [New Left Review 49 second series, Jan Feb 2008].
It is no surprise to be introduced to the ideas of ‘New Right’ economist Zhang Weiying, a pioneering advocate of the free-market economic reforms which led to China’s astonishing record of 9 per cent growth year after year for three decades.
But cliches will be shattered by exposure to the thinking of some of China’s ‘New Left’, who have no wish to turn their backs on the market at home or abroad, or to turn the clock back to a central command economy, but instead are grappling with the same issues of combining market institutions with social justice and equity, as their counterparts in the West and South.
Economists Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang argue persuasively that a central state which was at once stronger and more democratic could curb unaccountable regional power centres which currently waste resources through corruption and duplicated prestige investments. The resulting resources could finance a welfare safety-net which would give the public confidence to consume, thereby strengthening the domestic market and reducing China’s dependence on Western consumer demand.
Other writers such as Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan lament the ‘new enclosure movement’ which is ripping-off public property, and discuss ideas such as an Alaska-style ‘social dividend’ for citizens from the profits of state-owned enterprises, which would provide a ‘social wage’ to replace the largely dismantled welfare state.
Slightly more exposure abroad has been given to the environmental critique of Pan Yue, quantifying the horrific human, ecological and economic cost of the environmental degradation that has accompanied China’s breakneck growth. Though appointed to head the official State Environmental Protection Association, his report has been shelved, and widely ignored on the ground. But its concerns are certainly reflected, however inconsistently, in official pronouncements.
When it comes to political institutions, the Chinese debate is also far from the stereotype of Stalino-Maoist totalitarianism, though still remote from any Western concept of democracy. There have been some widely-trumpeted experiments in village-level democracy, contested inner-party elections, and consultative innovations such as ‘citizens juries’ and public policy hearings. But these remain few, localised and untypical.
Moreover, their champions do not see them as leading to multi-party democracy but rather to a ‘chinese model’ of ‘deliberative democracy’ where the central government allows a range of consultative opinions to be presented to it, supplemented by low-level electoral participation.
However, as new leftist Wang Shaoguang points out, this represents in effect a convergence with the West where the established electoral democratic system is increasingly perceived as ‘hollowed out’ and formal, and is frequently being supplemented by consultative processes, citizens juries and local referendums. Could China and the West be converging on the same destination from different starting-points?
The debate that Leonard reports on issues of global governance is equally stimulating, and shows a keen awareness that Chinas’s interest lies in promoting a notion of ‘soft power’ against the one-dimensional US obsession with hardware.
Many of us are familiar with solemn Western debates about how to ‘manage’ China’s rise, so as to ‘assist’ the new arrival to be a ‘civilised’ member of the ‘international community’ just like an assumed Western ‘us’. So it is a pleasant and amusing surprise to be introduced to the mirror-image debate in Beijing about how to ‘manage’ the West’s decline.
This debate came out into the open in 2006 when Wang Yiwei, a young scholar, asked in a newspaper article ‘how can we prevent the USA from declining too quickly?’ Shen Dingli argued that China’s goal should be ‘to shape an America that is more constrained and more willing to co-operate with the world’.
So however we are to analyse the complex and changing reality of the ‘actual’ China, the cliches of the conventional wisdom – the ‘evil Communist Tyranny’, the ‘inscrutable oriental’, or the new imperialist raping and looting Africa – are clearly more a hindrance than a help.
Which therefore leads us to ask why these unhelpful images persist. One obvious approach would be to ask whose interests are served by portraying China in this way. Less obvious, but also perhaps more interesting, is to make a comparison with the first encounter between the West and China, in which the prevailing stereotypes were not negative but on the contrary, rather idealised.
Leading philosophers of the 18th Century Enlightenment, including such figures as Leibniz and Voltaire, frequently referred to China in the most glowing terms. This followed an explosion, reminiscent of our own days, in the volume of Western publications about China.
According to the German scholar Thomas Fuchs [The European China – receptions from Leibniz to Kant [url=http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2006.00334.x:]http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2006.00334.x[/url]:[/url]
“In the half-century from 1600 to 1649, China literature emerged in moderate numbers, between 32 and 47 titles per decade.14 Later, the publication output increased… In 1700–09, literary productivity peaked—599 works on China came out in one decade.”
As Fuchs tells us:
“China’s discovery challenged the cultural and political identity of European intellectuals. China was the first civilization found by Westerners that could be neither ignored nor destroyed. Nor could it be integrated in Europe’s cultural identity.
But in the Enlightenment, as a result of seeking emancipation from tradition, China became a normative model in its own right. For Europeans, China served as a tool for interpreting the religious customs, the political system, and the social order on their own continent. “
Leibniz went so far as to argue that “Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese”.
Fuchs continues:
“Apparently, China had just what late eighteenth-century scholars were missing in Europe: A strong central government that acted in line with rational criteria. It is thus no coincidence that the second edition of Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica (1699) depicts an engraving of Emperor Kangxi. In Europe, China represented a rational state and the ideal of enlightened absolutism.” And Voltaire” transformed China into a political utopia and the ideal state of an enlightened absolutism; he held up the mirror of China to provoke self-critical reflection among European monarchs."
Now these utopian images of China did indeed draw on aspects of reality. But their purpose was not so much to understand the real China, as to say something about the society of the West. Could the same be true of today’s negative image?
For example, the ‘neoconservative’ US columnist Robert Kagan goes so far as to argue that China's policy towards Sudan and Zimbabwe is determined not so much by economic self-interest as by political solidarity with their dictatorial regimes, and foresees a Sino-Russian 'League of Dictators'. [Robert Kagan League of Dictators? Why Russia and China Will Continue to support Autocracies Wahington Post April 30 2006.]
Is he really trying to say something about China’s policy? Or is he using a certain image of China in order to say something positive by contrast about US policy – just as the Enlightenment philosophers used their idealised image of China for the opposite purpose?
Likewise when China’s African role is reduced to a supposed re-run of Europe’s exploitative colonial past, is the real purpose a better understanding of China’s role? Or is it to imply, by comparing China’s present to the West’s past, that the West’s present is different to the West’s past?
Of course, just as with the idealised China of the European past, the demonised image of today can also draw on aspects of reality. But perhaps any such correspondence is, also as in the past, purely incidental to other more important functions.
To separate fact from fiction, and disentangle reality from the myths, an indispensable first step must be to acquaint ourselves with the actual and often surprising debate taking place within China itself.
However before we all get carried away we must remember that these debates are taking place within limits which, while far broader than the generally accepted cliches would suggest, are still constrained by a government which does not claim to subscribe to Western concepts of democracy and individual rights.
Paradoxically, the lack of western-style political pluralism enhances the role of ‘insider intellectuals’ and their debates. And as Leonard points out; ‘The Chinese like to argue about whether it is the intellectuals that influence decision-makers, or whether groups of decision-makers use pet intellectuals as infornal mouthpieces to advance their own views’.
But either way, if China is a central component of the issues that we face in every continent, including Africa, so the ideas that contribute to shaping its policies, and those who frame those ideas, should be part of our reality too.
* Stephen Marks is research associate with Fahamu.
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Ndjaména grieves her dead as Franco-Africa rejoices
2008-03-19
Koulsy Lamko
For Koulsy Lamko, France is at the center of war in Chad. He argues that France's central presence in Chad is only facilitating the continued fleecing of resources by a corrupt Idriss Derby government. The rebel leader, he concludes is only vying for a slice of the national cake
It would take a very wise man to understand and untangle the mess that is France foreign policy towards Chad. Regular observers would not be surprised by the erratic nature of the relationship over the decades; but the latest event in Ndjamena clearly demonstrate the inconsistent nature of a cynicism.
France coming to the aid of Idriss Deby, her protégé is simply history repeating itself. Over the last two decades, France has propped up a corrupt clannish regime that has shown its inability to improve the lives of its citizens. This is a regime that has ruled through terror, electoral fraud, manipulation of the elite and the politicized classes, intimidation of civil society, widespread corruption, and the diversion of public funds to military expenditure, among other things. That France should continue to prevaricate and gloss over these problems while continuing to trample over the fresh corpses of innocent Chadians is indeed lamentable.
Over the last three decades France has carried out a policy of propping up warlords and pillagers. By giving unconditional support to these mediocre and illiterate soldiers and predators governed by clan interest, she has consolidated the notion that power is only achieved through the barrel of a gun, while at the same time destroying any future hope for true independence.
For Chadians interested in peace, Idriss Deby and rebel leaders Timran Erdimi and Mahamat Nouri are birds of a feather – Members of the same family fighting for a slice of the same cake: political power and control of petroleum, which remains the country's only source of revenue following the destruction of industry and the food-processing sector! Politicians lacking in nationalist vision or ideals, devoid of direction and upon whom countless political and economic indictments can be heaped!
The fact that one could cling to power to the point of barricading himself right in the midst of hapless citizens held hostage in the conflict, while his assailants only war cry is that they “ want a power-sharing deal” reveals the ignoble intentions of all involved.
While one side cosies up to Franco-Africa, the other side lets itself get sucked by Sudan into the Darfur crisis, plunging the people of Chad in even deeper misery. Chad 's long suffering is evident when one traverses its deserted towns and villages. The Zoe's Arch incident is proof of this; what parent, however poor and desperate, would agree to hand over his or her child to a stranger? Here, illiterate warlords extract tribute and rule over oppressed populations, exercising limitless power. The media is spectacular in its mediocrity, and the few independent press who dare to speak up suffer the wrath of Deby's autocratic rule.
The French army has for along time monitored troop movements across the country. This time, admittedly, they were caught unaware by the advancing rebels whom the French media had previously given ample coverage. The official statements that followed; “France is Neutral”, then “France is not entirely neutral”, and finally “France will support the legitimate government of Chad, and take on its responsibilities” clearly demonstrate the cold-blooded duplicity that has characterised its involvement with Chad over the years. As the rebels advanced, it seemed as if victory was theirs for the taking. And they were quick to point out very loudly that France's interests would be “safeguarded, if not better protected”. Then just as suddenly, a counter -offensive is executed and the rebels are defeated. One wonders what could have weighed so heavily in Deby's favour: negotiations on the exploitation of oil resources in the Middle Chari region? The die is cast!
The fact that hundreds of Chadians died, thousands were injured and tens of thousands displaced is of little concern to the French government and its Special forces. Strategic geographical concerns, control of oil and other mineral resources and the maintenance of a “civilizing influence” are stakes too enormous for “La Metropole” to concede. In Franco-Africa, there is no price to high to pay, even if it comes at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. The Rwanda genocide speaks volumes on this count.
If Sarkozy was cynical enough to demand the release of the Zoe's Arch six while Chad was mourning her dead, he should have demanded the release of opposition leaders whose only crime was to dream of a new political dispensation based on constitutionalism, in the midst of military occupation and neo-colonialism aggravated by rapacious clanism. What is France doing in Chad? One would be hard put to come up with an answer! Defence Minister Hervé Morin's pussyfooting and grinning in N'djamena speaks volumes.
It would indeed be tragic if the divvying up of resources between partners and relatives was the sole cause for a putsch. These complicit politicians are still in some way players in Chad's democratization process. It is imperative that France stops its meddling. It must allow for a national dialogue to take place, for recent events to be laid bare and for a truth and reconciliation process to begin, so that the people of Chad can freely choose their leaders.
Translated by Joshua Ogada.
* Koulsy Lamko is currently Director of the University Centre for Arts and Drama in Butare and teaches Creative Writing and the Performing Arts at the National University of Rwanda.
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Pitfalls of export processing zones
2008-03-26
Herbert Jauch
Under AGOA, Ramatex Textile & Garment Factory, a Malaysian company moved to Namibia. Herbert Jauch looks at the cost of allowing companies to operate without government regulation, tax exemption and government sanctioned suspension of worker rights in Export Processing Zones.
The closure of the Ramatex clothing and textile factory in Windhoek last week, marked the end of one of the most controversial investments in Namibia since independence.
The way in which the closure occurred once again showed the disregard of the company for its workers as well as the host country.
The company managed to mislead Namibia (in particular the government) time and again by providing false information to hide its true intentions of using the country merely as a temporary production location.
While trade unions and government are still trying to achieve some compensation for the retrenched workers, we need to draw some hard lessons from the Ramatex experience.
This article sketches some of the events surrounding the company's operations in Namibia and suggests that a fundamentally different approach to foreign investments should be pursued in future.
When Namibia passed the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) Act in 1995, government argued that both local and foreign investment in the first five years of independence had been disappointing and that EPZs were the only solution to high unemployment.
The EPZ Act went as far as suspending the application of the Labour Act in EPZs which government described as necessary to allay investors' fear of possible industrial unrest.
Namibia's trade unions on the other hand opposed the exclusion of the Labour Act and after lengthy discussions a "compromise" was reached which stipulated that the Act would apply in the EPZs, but that strikes and lock-outs would be outlawed for a period of 5 years.
In 1999, the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) carried out a comprehensive study of Namibia's EPZ programme which found that EPZs had fallen far short of the expectations of creating 25 000 jobs and facilitating skills and technology transfer needed to kick-start manufacturing industries in the country.
At the end of 1999, the EPZs had created very few jobs although millions of dollars had been spent on promoting the policy and on developing infrastructure with public funds.
By 2001, Namibia still had not managed to attract any large production facility through its EPZ programme. This changed when the Ministry of Trade and Industry announced that it had succeeded in snatching up a project worth N$1 billion ahead of South Africa and Madagascar, which had also been considered by the Malaysian company Ramatex.
This was achieved by offering even greater concessions than those offered to other EPZ companies, such as corporate tax holidays, free repatriation of profits, exemption from sales tax etc.
Drawing in the parastatals providing water and electricity (Namwater and Nampower) as well as the Windhoek municipality, the Ministry put together an incentive package which included subsidised water and electricity, a 99-year tax exemption on land use as well as over N$ 100 million to prepare the site including the setting up of electricity, water and sewage infrastructure.
This was justified on the grounds that the company would create close to 10 000 jobs.
The plant turned cotton (imported duty free from West Africa) into textiles for the US market.
Ramatex' decision to locate production in Southern Africa was motivated by the objective to benefit from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which allows for duty free exports to the US from selected African countries who meet certain conditions set by the US government.
Even before the company began its operations in 2002, it made headlines, as it became the most talked about investment in Namibia.
The debate around Ramatex revolved around the massive size of its operations, the establishment of a new industry and the controversies surrounding the company's environmental impact and working conditions.
A study carried out by LaRRI in 2003 found widespread abuses of workers rights, including included forced pregnancy tests for women who applied for jobs; non-payment for workers on sick leave; very low wages and no benefits; insufficient health and safety measures; no compensation in case of accidents; abuse by supervisors; and open hostility towards trade unions etc.
Tensions boiled over on several occasions.
After spontaneous work stoppages in 2002 and 2003, Ramatex finally recognised the Namibia Food and Allied Workers Union (NAFAU) as the workers' exclusive bargaining agent in October 2003.
The recognition agreement was supposed to pave the way for improved labour relations and collective bargaining.
However, the union was unable to make progress on substantive issues and on several occasions reported Ramatex to the Office of the Labour Commissioner for unfair labour practices and the company's unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.
Despite several attempts to find a solution through mediation, no agreement was reached.
By September 2006, the company had not raised wages and benefits and claimed that its operations in Namibia were running at a loss.
Ramatex' workers, however, had run out of patience and declared that they would go on strike unless their wages were significantly improved.
When the company refused to meet their demands, they went on strike in October 2006, bringing the operations to a standstill.
Within 2 days, workers achieved what 4 years of negotiations had failed to deliver: Hourly wage increase from N$ 3 to N$ 4 plus the introduction of some benefits such as housing and transport allowances.
Ramatex used a significant number of Asian migrant workers, mostly from China, the Philippines and Bangladesh.
Although the companyclaimed that they were brought in as trainers, most of them were employed as mere production workers with basic salaries of around U$ 300 - 400 per month which were higher than their Namibian counterparts.
The import of Asian workers also served the company's strategy of "divide and rule".
Workers were divided according to nationalities, received different remuneration and benefits and found it hard to communicate with each other.
As a result there was hardly any joint action by all Ramatex workers.
Protests by Namibian, Filipino and Bangladeshi workers were isolated and found no support from their Chinese counterparts while protest by migrant workers usually resulted in the immediate deportation.
At the height of Namibian operations in 2004, Ramatex and its subsidiaries employed about 7000 workers, including over 1000 Asian migrant workers.
Following retrenchments in 2005 and 2006 (including the closure of one subsidiary), this number dropped to 3 400 (including 400 Asian migrants) in early of 2007 and further to about 3000 by the end of that year.
These trends provided a clear indication that Ramatex was preparing for closure.
This followed the end of the global clothing and textile quotas in 2005 and could be observed all over the continent.
In Ramatex' case, the company indicated it was planning to expand in Cambodia and China and negotiations are underway for the establishment of 2 new plants in Vietnam.
Ramatex' global strategy always regarded Namibia as a temporary production location although the Namibian government seemed to think otherwise.
Ramatex' claims of losses of up to N$ 500 million in Namibia seem devoid of truth.
Ramatex pays no taxes in Namibia, receives water and electricity at subsidised rates and is exempted from import duties in the USA.
It is thus almost impossible for the company to make losses in Namibia and the truthfulness of Ramatex' claims is highly questionnable.
The economic assessment of Ramatex' operations must also take into account the substantial environmental damages caused by operations including the pollution of Goreangab dam and underground water resources.
The Namibian government had been warned by Earthlife Africa but did not take precautionary measures. Instead, the municipality announced near the end of 2006 that it would take over the company's waste management.
Ramatex should have been held fully accountable and forced to rectify the damage at its own costs.
Ramatex represents a typical example of a transnational corporation playing the globalisation game. Its operations in Namibia have been characterised by controversies, unresolved conflicts and tensions.
Worst affected were the thousands of young, mostly female workers who had to endure highly exploitative working conditions for years and in the end were literally dumped in the streets without any significant compensation.
Ramatex had shown the same disregard for workers when it closed its subsidiary Rhino Garments in Namibia in 2005.
Workers had observed the company shipping equipment out of the country but when confronted, Ramatex initially denied plans to close its subsidiary but then retrenched about 1 500 workers in April.
Overall, Ramatex' presence in Namibia was a disaster for the country and some hard lessons will have to be learned to avoid a repeat in future.
When dealing with foreign investors there is an urgent need to ensure (at the very least) compliance with national laws and regulations, workers rights, as well as environmental, health and safety standards.
Experiences elsewhere have shown that compromises on social, environmental and labour standards in the name of international competitiveness lead to a "race to the bottom", leading to a process of self-destruction.
In the case of Ramatex, the Namibian government abandoned its role as regulator and some officials defended Ramatex.
The case has shown the problems of blindly accepting any investment as beneficial.
Instead of adopting an open-door policy towards foreign investment, Namibia (and Africa in general) need to adopt selective policies that channel investments into certain strategic sectors that will have a lasting developmental impact.
They require a very clear and strategic development agenda that is not based on blind faith in foreign investment as the panacea to our development problems.
The lack of alternative programmes for effective economic development and job creation places government in a weak position to negotiate adherence to labour, social and environmental standards with foreign investors.
This has to be the starting point for breaking the chains of dependency.
The project on Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA), for example, is an attempt to develop a different and comprehensive development strategy for the region.
The ANSA proposals will be introduced in Windhoek next week and hopefully will pave the way for a more open-minded discussion about a suitable development strategy.
* Herbert Jauch is head of research and education for the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI). This report was written prepared for The Namibian by the author.
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
What is Africom really about?
2008-02-26
Daniel Volman
These following notes, written by Daniel Volman, are based on the Conference on “Transforming National Security: Africom—An Emerging Command” Organized which was organized by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Virginia from 19-20 February 2008.
Although the conference was open to the public, it was immediately clear that it was very much an “in group” affair explicitly held to bring together people from all the different agencies and African governments that will have to coordinate their activities to make Africom work. Thus, the conference itself was part of the process of organizing Africom. Technically, the conference was held under the NDU rules of “non-attribution,” i.e. participants can quote statements made at the conference, but are not supposed to identify speakers. I’ve complied with the rule in this memo, but just let me know if you want to know who said what.
About half of the audience of approximately 300 people (they said that this was the largest meeting devoted to Africom that has been held so far) were from the U.S. military services, mostly from the various agencies and departments that have been working through Eucom up until now and will now have to begin working with the new Africom HQ staff in Stuttgart. Most of the ones that I talked to were actually from Defense Intelligence staff, i.e. the people who decide to do with the intelligence information collected by the DIA and other agencies.
Then there were a substantial number of people from other departments, not just DoS and AID, but also Agriculture, Commerce, Judiciary, and others, since they all have programs in Africa that they will have to coordinate with Africom. And finally, there were a number of people from African embassies and governments, including both political and military personnel.
The conference was part of the ongoing effort of the Pentagon to actually get Africom going and to bring other countries into the structure, including by bringing their personnel into the Africom structure. I know that they organized a parallel conference in London, at the Royal United Services Institute, on 18-19 February to bring the Brits in, and I assume that they have/will do the same kind of thing to bring in the French and other European countries.
The conference was very much a nuts-and-bolts discussion of all the practical matters of making Africom work.
The first interesting thing was the discussion of how they define Africom’s mission. The presentation on this were based on internal DoD presentations, so they were much more honest and revealing than the kind of thing that comes from the public pronouncements. The presentation specifically cited the challenge of preventing disruptions in African oil production and exports as one of Africom’s six chief missions, along with meeting the challenge of China, controlling ungoverned regions and transnational extremism, dealing with instability in the Horn of Africa, dealing with instability in the Great Lakes region, and dealing with the situation in Chad/Sudan.
When one of the African representatives asked about China, they backtracked and said that Africom doesn’t see itself as a response to China and will seek to cooperate with China in the future. Africom is scheduled to produce a posture statement outlining its mission and intentions in March 2008.
A couple of other interesting points they made was to say that they saw the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (the people who are spearheading U.S. involvement in Somalia and Ethiopia) as a model for what Africom could do in the rest of the continent. They admitted that they had made no attempt to consult with anyone at the UN while they were developing Africom and hadn’t really consulted with anyone in Africa either.
It was clear from their statements that they were very surprised and unhappy about the public response from Africans to Africom and that this was the reason that they were going to have to keep the Africom HQ in Stuttgart for the time being, although they will continue to look for African hosts and will also work on ways to station Africom staff people in less obvious and provocative ways like sending small groups to liaison with selected African military forces. They want to believe that this is just a problem of public relations and that they just have to do a better job of explaining themselves. One of the new buzzwords in Africom is “active listening,” i.e. pretending to care what other people think.
Finally, on a purely practical matter, there was considerable discussion about just how much trouble they are having finding adequate personnel and developing the kind of linkages and working relations with the agencies they will have to depend upon to actually do anything. This is all taking them a great deal of time and it’s clear that they will not really be ready when they become operational on 1 October. They’re worried that the difficult process of organizing Africom may actually disrupt U.S. military activities in Africa because the transition process itself will confuse everything.
* Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Pan-African Postcard
Zimbabwe's election: Is change coming?
2008-03-26
Tajudeen Abdul Raheem
Tajudeen Abdul Raheem argues that regardless of the outcome in Zimbabwe, African people's solidarity should be with the Zimbabwean people
Zimbabweans go to the polls on 29th April the outcome of which many have forecast as going only one way: the 84 years old former Guerrilla leader and President since independence in 1980 will, willy-nilly, be ‘re-elected’ to power. Admittedly he is facing stiffer challenge than before in the person of his former Finance Minster, Makoni, and the official opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai.
If there is a more level playing field it may not be a foregone conclusion that President Mugabe will win. The playing ground is very much weighted against Mugabe’s opponents. In spite of the enthusiasm with which Makoni has been received both nationally and internationally by forces of regime change that are tiring of the dramas surrounding Morgan and beginning to wane in their support for him Makoni’s performance in the elections may actually be more to the benefit of Tsvangirai as it is at the expense of President Mugabe and his dwindling support within the ZANU-PF. I may be wrong but I don’t think the election will provide a Makoni moment. It is also highly unlikely that Morgan’s courage and perseverance in forcing open the political space is about to be rewarded with electoral victory. What the election may show is that as in Kenya in the 1990s the majority of the masses are tired of President Mugabe but the opposition is not ready to assume power.
The comparative experience from other countries in Africa with long term Personal/One party rule is that as long as the incumbent Maximum ruler is standing in the election it is more difficult to defeat the ruling party. A combination of intimidation, open bribery of voters, restraints on the opposition and the media or brutal force and scandalous manipulation of all rules governing the electoral processes will be used to retain power failing which direct theft of the votes would be effected. Senegal (Abdou Diouf) and Benin ( Kerekou) were exceptions in the 90s and early 2000s where Presidents in a One party Dominant state was defeated by an opposition alliance. In Kenya and Ghana before that it was not possible to defeat Moi/KANU and Rawlings/NDC respectively as long as the incumbents were standing. Coincidentally it took 10 years in both countries before the opposition could get their acts together and realise that individually they could not defeat the ruling party. Another factor is that in both countries the unseating did not happen without a significant breakaway from the ruling party thus eroding its hegemony through the equivalence of internal bleeding.
Is Zimbabwe at this stage now? Judged against the three factors I will say Zimbabwe has not arrived at the point for change. The incumbent is still standing. The opposition still believes they can win on their own or are expecting a runoff which will establish whether Morgan or Makoni is best placed to unseat their aged Uncle! Finally while Makoni represents an important internal rupture in ZANU-PF causing self doubt and realignment away from ZANU –PF the much talked about and expected break within ZANU-PF has not produced significant smoking guns. This means that so far not enough influential individuals and constituencies are willing to put their heads above the parapet to unseat Mugabe.
A particularly distorting aspect of the Zimbabwe conflict is the open advocacy for regime change by outside non African forces that has made it difficult for Africans to decisively intervene in the Zimbabwe situation without being dubbed lackeys of imperialism by Mugabe and his fellow travellers. Some of his more hard line supporters especially in the Diaspora have even accused some of us who openly criticise Mugabe and advise him to quit as being paid by MI5 and CIA!. What is so revolutionary about taking a country that you help to build back to the dark ages just to prove you are a strong man to Bush and Blair! Many of those who cheer Mugabe as revolutionaries from their rostrums outside Zimbabwe would not go and live and suffer in ‘revolutionary Zimbabwe’.
The focus on the Anglo-American and Western multiple standards in relation to Zimbabwe also make many Africans suspicious of the opposition and amenable to Mugabe’s propaganda that his opponents are traitors’ to the cause of Zimbabwe and Africa. In particular Morgan/MDC’s perambulations on the Land issue (very popular with Africans with historical memory of land alienation by colonialists) further strengthen their hostility. While Mugabe/ZANU –PF complain about the ‘unfair’ coverage they get from Western Media I have never heard them raise any query about their overwhelmingly positive image in many African Media!
However we should not allow other people’s agenda, legitimate or illegitimate, to detract us from formulating our own. The knee-jerk cold-war induced reaction of ‘if the Americans are here I must be there’ no longer hold. This does not mean that imperialism is dead or that the West has suddenly become our friends but their enemies need not necessarily be our heroes or heroines either. It is certainly not the case that everybody opposed to President Mugabe is a traitor working for the British just like it is true that not all those refusing to back the opposition are supporters of of ZANU-PF/Mugabe. They may even be ZANU-PF loyalists without being fans of Mugabe.
Our solidarity is with the people of Zimbabwe whether they are in ZANU-PF or outside of it and their right to choose those who govern them. President Mugabe does not own the people of Zimbabwe. They are no less Zimbabweans for voting the opposition therefore it is most undemocratic for President Mugabe to say as quoted recently that the opposition will never rule Zimbabwe in his life time . That is a decision that only the people of Zimbabwe can make.
This election may be another missed opportunity for changing the deplorable conditions that the long suffering masses of Zimbabwe live with. Real change may not happen until after President Mugabe either quits (highly unlikely) or is retired by the ancestors. Zuma coming to power in neighbouring South Africa may also trigger realignments that may limit Mugabe’s room for manouvre.
*Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem writes this syndicated column in his private capacity as a Pan Africanist. His views are not attributable to that of any organization he works for or is affiliated with.
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Zimbabwe after the elections
2008-03-27
Zimbabwe Watch
In collaboration with both its European andZimbabwean partners, Zimbabwe Watch organised a roundtable titled“Elections and Post-Elections period in Zimbabwe: What to do after 29 March2008 - Views from Civil Society and Dialogue with the European Union” on 13 March 2008 in Brussels. The roundtable brought together civil society activists from Zimbabwe, officials of the European Union (EU) institutions and variousEuropean and international interest groups. These are the recommendations from the round-table.
1. The conditions for the elections are such that they will not be free nor fair and therefore cannot be called a legitimate expression of the will of the people. The African Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) should be encouraged to make objective assessments of the conditions and the process based on the SADC Guidelines on Free and Fair Elections. The European Union (EU) should welcome such assessments that recognise the unfree and unfair environment. If the AU and SADC fail to recognise this, the EU needs to voice a very clear position on the the unfree and unfair nature of the elections and condemn these partial assessment. The international community must exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to restore the rule of law.
2. The delegation of the European Commission in Harare will produce a report on the election process and outcomes. The EU Commission needs to consult relevant Zimbabwean and European civil society organisations and include their inputs in this report as well as in the EU’s common position on the elections. This report and the EU conclusions will should refer explicitly to the SADC Guidelines for free and fair elections and look at the longer term election environment which can already be considered as not conducive for free and fair elections.
3. After the elections, a new fully inclusive AU led mediation process that leads to a transitional process need to take place. This mediation must include not only the political parties but also Zimbabwean Civil Society and take place in an open, transparent and accountable process. Such a process should be actively supported by the EU.
4. SADC proposed and started discussing an economic recovery plan for Zimbabwe in 2007 but they will need the support of the international community to implement this plan. The EU should work together with SADC (and with the broader international community) through its regional assistance programme on a broad economic, political and social recovery plan. This process must be strongly inclusive of Zimbabwean Civil Society (including Trade Union). Any recovery plan must reflect the demands and needs of Zimbabwean Civil Society while having good governance and human rights as key concepts.
5. For such a recovery plan to be devised initial audits of all the relevant sectors (such as education, health, land, etc – not only the economy) needs to be undertaken. For example proper accounting of the education sector is required and support to local research institutions and universities is needed. In addition a comprehensive census, including of Zimbabweans outside the country, is needed for planning the recovery. Such a recovery plan needs sustainable planning and clear commitments from the EU for at least the next ten years.
6. The new Africa strategy emphasises common principles on human rights and governance, the role of civil society and regional approaches – the EU should together with SADC develop regional programs on governance, human rights and crisis prevention in which Zimbabwe can be addressed. Europe must develop and maintain a consistent position on Zimbabwe which also responds to the needs and demands of the Zimbabwean Civil Society. The EU must look at all the policy and financial instruments it has at its disposal (such as the Cotonou agreement, the EU-Africa strategy, human rights, peace and security and crisis prevention instruments) to engage SADC and AU partners on Zimbabwe in a principled manner. It must consider Zimbabwe as a military crisis and bring SADC and the AU to look at it in this way e.g. by having SADC excluding Zimbabwe from joint military operations. The EU must investigate if they support regional military training which includes Zimbabwe and pressure for their exclusion from such programs.
7. The European Commission has produced a draft Country Strategy Paper (CSP) in negotiation with the current Zimbabwean government for the spending of the 10th EDF. It plans to adopt it as soon as the political situation allows it. This is not the way to go. The EU has stopped bilateral aid because the current government is not following good governance rules and is not accountable. The EU therefore needs to re-open the negotiation of the CSP with an eventual new (transitional) government and negotiate the key sectors with them and Non-State actors in a very inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. This must apply for any assistance to any new (transitional) government.
8. The influence of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should be fostered in Zimbabwe, so that labour standards are observed and upheld and serious abuses stopped. Zimbabwe should be answerable to the ILO.
9. The International community should now start to plan for and deploy assistance programmes for the coming transition phase including recovery policy development plans by Zimbabwean Civil Society. Planning the transition is campaigning for it! In the event of significant power shifts leading to a transitional government and policy changes, swift support for the reconstruction of institutions, especially the justice, police, banking and education sector must be available.
10. Continued support to civil society organisations as providers of checks and balances for the human rights situation is needed. Protection of human rights defenders (HRDs), especially in the case of escalating post-election violence and security/military clampdowns needs to be prioritised and the EU and member states must find urgent ways to provide necessary support. Adequate actions need to be devised in accordance with the demands from HRD’s themselves, the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and the Handbook linked to them provide examples of such actions including observation of demonstrations and trials, visits in prison or hospital, staying in touch with the HRD’s and providing safe houses.
11. The EU must support the strengthening of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council and making the AU Peace and Security instruments more effective and operational, using Zimbabwe as a test case. The full implementation of the African Charter of Peoples and Human Rights, which Zimbabwe signed, must be demanded. In view of the military nature of Mugabe’s regime, no Zimbabwean participation in international peace and military interventions, in the context of the UN or the African Union, must be allowed.
12. Silence of the United Nations Human Rights Council to post-election violence would not be acceptable; it must then come up with a clear resolution. The Mugabe government must be pressurised particularly by African countries to extend an open invitation to all UN human rights special rapporteurs (such as the one on torture) to the country. The EU must work with African partners to ensure such steps. The EU must also continue the monitoring of the human rights violations on the ground and engage the AU and African countries to implement the resolutions coming out of the Afican Commission on Human and People’s Rights condemning the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Finally, in the event of escalating post-election violence, Zimbabwe needs to be referred to the UN Security Council.
Letters
Where does TICAD go?
2008-03-26
Mie Takaki
Libreville– Despite the Japanese Government’s emphasis that it is an international development forum for Africa, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and its action plan are still pretty much perceived as Japan’s official aid package deal towards Africa.
Firstly, there is notable under-reorientation of key players: other donor governments (for harmonization of aid efforts), other Asian governments (for Asia-Africa partnership), private sector (for economic growth), the civil society organizations (for the downward accountability) and more. One of the African Government expressed the frustration in the plenary of the Ministerial Conference in Gabon that TICAD should stop pretending that it was the Asia-Africa meeting.
The Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), for one, have been fighting to find its way to be involved in the process since the first TICAD held in Tokyo in 1993. To be fair, TICAD has come a long way. Since the third TICAD in 2003 especially, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has continued dialogue with the Japanese CSOs, and today the CSOs have gotten the observatory status in the TICAD proper and all the preceding meetings. The participation of the CSOs, however, still depends on the approval of the Japanese and the host country governments, and it is limited to African and Japanese organizations.
Secondly, the draft Yokohama Declaration and Action Plan are weak with respect to CSO engagement vis a vis CSO being recognized as a strategic partner in fostering the TICAD process forward. The documents do not necessarily reflect the positions of the co-organisers (The Japanese Government, The World Bank, the UNDP, and the UNOSAA) on the Civil Society participation in development, either. As the two documents are considered by some as the guideline of Japan’s bilateral commitment, the political game seems to continue to make the bilateral aid process as exclusive as possible. The obvious omission of the CSOs from the documents was lamented by the some Government Delegates in the plenary session.
Finally, the involvement of the co-organisers are no way equally prominent in the meetings. The presence of the World Bank, UNDP, and UNOSAA seems only tokenistic. The African Governments only acknowledge the contribution of GoJ in their diplomatic speeches. The commitments from the TICAD process are almost exclusively from the Japanese Government. Where is the spirit of “harmonization of aid?”
TICAD is standing at the turning point. In mid 1990s, when the developed world was experiencing the aid fatigue, it played an important role to keep Africa on the agenda. Today, African Governments have plentiful commitments from different donors. There are different forums that discuss African Development. Time has changed. The Japanese Government and the Co-organisers should revisit the relevance and mandate of TICAD seriously in May. If the age demands the transformation of TICAD, so should it be.
Obituaries
Ivan Toms found dead
2008-03-27
http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20031920
Stunned friends have remembered Ivan Toms as a larger than life character who had tremendous energy and huge passion for the country he loved and served. Toms was on Tuesday morning found dead in his Mowbray, Cape Town home after he failed to pitch for an important meeting. No foul play is suspected.
Books & arts
Book Review: Souls Forgotten by Francis B. Nyamnjoh.
2008-03-11
Alice Macdonald
Langaa Publishers. Bamenda, Cameroon. 2008. [ISBN: 9789956558124, 360 pages, Price: £14.95]
The prolific Cameroonian writer and academic Francis Nyamnjoh continues to delight his readers with the publication of his latest novel Souls Forgotten. Souls Forgotten is a bitter indictment of the political and social situation of many African countries. The novel is set in the fictional land of ‘Mimboland’, a linguistically divided nation presided over by none other than President Longstay and suffering from endemic corruption, failing public services and wild nepotism whose similarities with the author’s native Cameroon are hard to miss.
The novel follows the path of Emmanuel, the apple of his villager parents’ eye whose hopes of social progression and riches are pinned on his academic achievements. Indeed as Nyamnjoh insightfully observes Emmanuel has the expectations of his entire home village resting on him as ‘one person’s child is only in the womb… from birth the child belongs to the entire community, to tend and harness for the good of all and sundry’. Emmanuel is thus emblematic of the many African youths who head to Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi and other African capitals in search of fame and fortune to bring to themselves and their home village as the relentless pace of urbanisation continues across the continent.
The author effectively captures the frustration and desperation that many young Africans face when they arrive in the supposed ‘cities of gold’ and have to face the ‘guillotine’ of exam results. These results, which determine the have and have-nots, are not determined by academic ability but rather by the insecurity of the lecturers who see these youths as potential rivals. Like the lives of these many youths Emmanuel’s path in life does not go smoothly as his transformation from optimistic youth to desolate dropout unfolds in front of us. Ironically it is in his journey back to the village he was so desperate to escape that Emmanuel finally comes of age finally demonstrating the strength of character and integrity that the city often sucks away.
Competition is rife among the young and old as they strive to attain their share of the national ‘cake’. However, Emmanuel is not alone. Indeed it is the devotion and integrity of his girlfriend Patience, which provides one of the most touching images of the novel. Indeed Nyamnjoh’s characterisation is one of his strengths as his eloquent prose consistently forces the reader to reshape their opinions and prejudices throughout the course of the novel with the transformation of the apparently feckless Emmanuel into an unlikely hero.
Parallel to Emmanuel’s urban adventures runs the tale of his home village of Abehema where black magic, power struggles and greed prove to be a lethal combination. Emmanuel’s decision to return to his village after prophetic dreams links the two narratives and leads us to the inaccessible inner regions, where governmental indifference and ruthless exploitation lead to unimaginable devastation.
Nyamnjoh’s complex and rich interweaving of narratives is a further strength of the novel. He plays on African legend and traditional beliefs, often digressing into anecdotes and the supernatural, thus ensuring that the reader remains fully engrossed. Although the subject matter may seem depressing Nyamnjoh, as always, manages to inject the narrative with his humorous, satirical style. The author is a true analyst of African society never failing to use his literature to criticize and chastise the ruling classes in both Africa and abroad.
This is a complex novel which avoids the usual clichés about Africa. Through the juxtaposition of peaceful pastorality and cold urbanity Nyamnjoh offers an insightful study of the conflicting demands of tradition and modernity forced on many Africans, particularly the young. The question of tradition and modernity and achieving a balance between the two touches upon a central issue in modern day Africa. However, Nyamnjoh does not merely pose questions but gives answers as to how we can best continue ‘the battle for change’ which, long and tiresome though it may be, demands a constant struggle. He is far from resigned to the depressing situation depicted in Souls Forgotten instead this novel is a testimony to the strength of solidarity. Ironically this message is delivered by Chief Ngain, the greedy and ruthless leader of Abehama, who brings the wrath of the ancestors onto his village, just as President Longstay’s prolonged insensitivity to the will of the people has brought untold suffering to the land of Mimbo. He tells the local chiefs, ‘if after my death you decide each to go his own way, you shall all perish as the pieces of wood you’ve just crushed…‘If you stay united, you shall be as firm as the bundle you couldn’t break.’ It is this ‘power of togetherness’ that lingers with the reader particularly through the close bonds between Patience and Emmanuel. In fact this is exactly the message the author leaves us with: that where institutions and the ruling classes fail it is up to Africans themselves – together - to take hold of their own destiny.
*Alice Macdonald is a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Just another Emperor?
The Myths and Realities of Philanthrocapitalism
2008-03-26
http://www.justanotheremperor.org/
Business involvement in philanthropy is increasing day by day, but is it a blessing, a curse, or somewhere in between? Just Another Emperor? is the first book to take a comprehensive and critical look at this vital new phenomenon. Whatever position you take, this will be one of the most important debates of the next 10 years.
African Writers’ Corner
Chapter excerpt from "Souls Forgotten"
2008-03-17
Francis B. Nyamnjoh
The following is only a short exerpt of Souls Forgotten. The extend article can be found at the link below.
Four years have gone by since disaster struck the villages of Abehema, Tchang and Yenseh, killing over 2000 peasants and tens of thousands of livestock. Life has not returned to normal for most of the survivors now scattered all over Chuma Division and beyond, but they all seem resigned to their abnormal way of life. They are resigned to being ignored when they complain of heartburn, eye lesions, nerve problems, dying muscles, and paralysis. They have waited long for resettlement, rehabilitation or return from living and partly living, but they have waited in vain.
Four years ago when disaster struck, their fellow Mimbolanders came to their rescue, and so did the outside world. Then, although charred and burnt and roasted, even the most desperate of them found reason and determination to keep hope alive, which they did exceptionally well. This hope started fading only weeks after the immediate flare and universal gestures of solidarity and concern had died down.
The bulk of the victims were temporarily accommodated in camps and tents in Abeghabegh, Kakakum River, Pukafong and Hepalem, while men of science competed with one another to divine the causes of the disaster, ignoring whatever diviner-healers like Wabuah had had to say on the matter. They were determined to force feed Mimbolanders with their conviction that they knew best, and that only their ‘scientific’ opinion would have to count at the end of the day. To them, Wabuah and his likes were simply much too superstitious and illiterate to have anything to contribute. How could they be so insensitive as to deprive Science of the opportunity to be baffled by the fact that it was not in the nature of lakes to simply rise up and wipe out thousands of people and tens of thousands of livestock?
That was four years ago. Today they are still waiting, waiting with fading hope for the scientists’ famous master verdict. The diviner-healers pronounced theirs a long time ago, but no one in high office would listen to them, being schooled in science as modern politicians and civil servants all pretended they were. Waiting for the scientists seems like waiting for eternity. Three years ago, international experts in matters of gases, lakes and volcanoes met, deliberated and separated without agreeing on the causes. Wabuah and his fellow diviner-healers did not meet the criteria for invitation to participate in the conference, which was held under their very noses. The government of enlightened politicians and bureaucrats has repeatedly rejected the verdict of the diviner-healers for being “primitive and superstitious, and for taking Mimboland back to the dark ages prior to colonisation,” but their hopes for “more scientific explanations” are yet to be fulfilled by the high priests of modern science.
Yet Wabuah and his fellow diviner-healers are perplexed by the contradictions of the men and women of Kwang: “How can the same politicians, civil servants and intellectuals who consult them daily in private and at night for solutions to the challenges of modern city life, not want to acknowledge them and their expertise in broad daylight?” Many diviner-healers, shaking their heads in perplexion, have asked themselves this question, wondering how such a crop of dishonest elite can be trusted with the affairs of the land of Mimbo.
Survivors continue to live half a life as scientists, politicians, civil servants and intellectuals play games of hierarchy of cultures, civilisations and knowledge systems with their future, their very existence.
Suffering has not placed itself on hold as power elites debate themselves and their contradictions. At the temporary camps in Abeghabegh, Kakakum River, Pukafong and Hepalem, children have died of chronic diarrhoea, cough, fever, vomiting and infections. Some have been born with nervous and genetic disorders, some with lung and heart infections, while others have become epileptic and paralytic. Abortions, stillbirths and premature deliveries have increased, and certain children with good school performance prior to the disaster have degenerated remarkably.
Cases of madness and loss of memory amongst adult survivors have multiplied. Mr Tangh-e-keh is one of the latest victims. After waiting in vain for four years to be compensated for his cattle – his life essence –, he has taken to the streets of Kaizerbosch. From sunrise to sunset he roams about in nakedness, making strange noises and absurd accusations, defying attempts by his family to re domesticate him, and by the police to shackle him. Some have heard him accuse the government of recruiting mercenaries to dispossess harmless villagers. The mysterious Ravageur and Vanunu are his favourite scapegoats, for the story has spread, since it was first featured in the critical West Mimboland Post, that Ravageur and Vanunu had been agents testing nuclear and chemical weapons for foreign governments too powerful to name. Wabuah has tried in vain to bring Mr Tangh-e-keh back to normal, which is understandable, as Mr Tangh-e-keh’s madness is not caused by witches extracting his heart to be eaten at Msa. His madness has been induced by government’s failure to fulfil its own pledges of rehabilitation and compensation, thereby denying him reconnection with the soul of his existence.
Most cases of madness are among the Fulani who have lost their lifeways. Unable to bear the loss of their herds and families, most of the survivors have felt derooted, dispossessed. After a long time of waiting in vain for something to happen, for the rays of the sun to smile again, many of them are out of their minds. They can be seen wandering up and down the hills and mountains, chasing after and herding imaginary cattle. Day and night, under the sun and in the rain, they re-enact this same old ritual in honour of the herds, family, peace and life of relative quiet they once enjoyed. The cement of their lives is gone, the centre can no longer hold: “Isn’t it time we went back to our herds?”
Once in a while the man specially appointed by the District Officer to oversee life in the camps leaves Kaizerbosch with a lorry of assorted foodstuffs. His destinations are the temporary camps of Abeghabegh, Kakakum River, Pukafong and Hepalem, where the victims have their eyes on the road always looking in the direction of Kaizerbosch, full of expectations of survival. He distributes the food for which they are thankful, but there is seldom enough. That is not their major concern now. Before disaster struck they were self sufficient peasants, even exporting most of their harvest to the towns and cities, and paying various types of taxes to the government. No, their problem isn’t exactly food. It’s something quite different, something they’ve wanted to know from the overseer for the past four years.
Each time he visits, they want to know when this will all be over. “When shall we stop living in tents and go back home to start life again? Isn’t it time we went back to life as normal? When shall we say farewell to the farms imposed on us? We want to live like people once more. We want to reconnect with our land, our shrines and our ancestors. We want our souls back. So please tell us. When shall we be home again?”
When he tells them he doesn’t know either, that the answer lies somewhere well above him, they think he is mocking them.
“What do you mean ‘government’?” they would retort. “Aren’t you the government? Do you expect us to believe that? Please sir, try something else. All we want is to be able to farm again, to be able to feed ourselves so that you can stop wasting your money trying to get us food. All we want is to live a full life in tune with our values, which is not possible disconnected as we are from where our forefathers, parents, brothers, sisters, wives and husbands are buried. Or should we say rotting away? Please, please, understand us. We beg you.”
“If only they knew that I would readily help if I could,” the overseer laments, getting into the lorry, sorrow in his eyes. And as he drives away, he can hear them curse and call him witch. He cannot blame them, knowing what they’ve been through. “If only I could help,” he mutters, heaving a sigh of regret. “Life is larger than logic,” he tells himself, as if hit by the veracity of the statement for the first time.
Little wonder that a newly launched unauthorised political party promises to bring misery to a halt, to imprison all the architects of sorrows, and deliver all those confined to the margins of existence. Little wonder that this party has been warmly embraced by survivors determined to give the insensitive government of Mimboland a piece of their peasant mind.
Meanwhile in Nyamandem, Emmanuel and Patience have been married for four years. Their first son and daughter – a set of twins just as Mr Tangh-e-keh had wished when he permitted them to marry four years back – are called Mukong and Ngonsu respectively, after Emmanuel’s late parents. They both adore the mischievous little things, as Patience chooses to call them. They keep intending to move house, but Patience’s meagre salary cannot afford a bigger and better accommodation just yet. When Mukong and Ngonsu have grown bigger and ripe for school, Emmanuel hopes to find a job to supplement his wife’s efforts. Until then, they are both satisfied with his current role as stay-home father.
Officially, Emmanuel Kwanga Mukong is not a recognised victim of the Lake Abehema disaster, because he failed to register as one before the deadline set by the National Coordination Commission. He had been in Camp-Kupeh when the announcement was made and hadn’t felt like abandoning his wedding halfway through, to certify himself as a victim. He wasn’t alone in failing to meet the deadline. Others, mostly illiterate farmers and breeders, had simply not heard the announcement on radio. Radio was captured with difficulty even at the best of times in Kaizerbosch, and announcements were made in Muzungulandish and Tougalish, languages the farmers and breeders neither spoke nor understood.
Not being thus recognised, Emmanuel harbours no illusions concerning the funds in the famous Disaster Account created by the commission four years ago. Not that those duly registered would benefit from the funds in any case. It is rumoured that Mr Tchopbrokpot, ministre plénipotentiaire and director of The Disaster Fund, is contemplating retirement to a quiet life in Muzunguland, where he has bought a whole street in an upper-class residential area of the capital city, for himself and his childhood friend and kinsman, President Longstay. A recent song by a once renowned musician is rumoured to have been paid for by Tchopbrokpot. It hails his patriotism and selflessness in public service, and has taken Radio Mimboland International by storm. Mimbolanders are dancing to it with their feet, their hearts and their minds, as Tchopbrokpot laughs all the way to bank in hard currency.
This doesn’t worry Emmanuel as much as the fact that four years after the disaster no conclusion about its so-called ‘scientific’ causes has been reached. The deaths of more than two thousand people are now history, forgotten under duress even by those who should actively be praying to the ancestors through sacrifices to cleanse and admit them into their ranks. Few survivors have fully recovered from the impact of the disaster. The nature and origin of their tragedy has been deliberately made a mystery by the authorities, even as obvious culprits remain at large. For how much longer this mystery would continue to defy the collective wish of Mimbolanders to know the whole truth remains an unanswered question by scientists and a government who claim more than they can deliver.
In the meantime, Emmanuel has become active in the newly created popular political party, promising to bring an end to misery in the lives of ordinary Mimbolanders trapped in victimhood. The party leaders seem to enjoy his total confidence, especially as they are armed with the right slogans and rhetoric and have even rewarded his intellectual abilities by appointing him to the party’s think tank. Reason enough to hope, won’t you say?
Emmanuel isn’t so hopeful. Two days ago he dreamt again.
Patience came to his rescue when he woke up sweating in the heart of the night as if bitten by a poisonous snake.
He shared his dream with her. He dreamt about an election, a second and third.
“My party, popular though it was, lost all three.”
Patience could see he was perplexed.
“We had campaigned and campaigned, and had been reassured by people big and small, high and low, in villages and in towns. Each time the results were released, we couldn’t believe what we saw and heard. President Longstay was always the winner, even though he never went out to campaign. We couldn’t understand a thing. How could that be?” he asked, a worried look on his face.
Patience was quiet. He should finish his story before asking her for answers.
“How could President Longstay win an election when he never went out to campaign? When he wasn’t even popular in his own home village?”
Emmanuel told her of a rally at President Longstay’s home village. Their new party had organised the rally with the intention of using it as a red card, knowing that massive attendance would send shock waves through the ruling clan with a clear message: “Pack and go. Your time is up.”
The attendance was indeed massive, and the chairman of his party had spoken the language of ordinary people, a language of the right to dream. He had been hailed. A messiah had come, and hope had been born again. Never again shall a chief take Mimboland for a ride with greed as creed.
Even more, village musicians who had come from all over President Longstay’s home area had animated the rally. The villagers had turned out to share their plight with the chairman of the new party, by asking President Longstay, a son of the soil in absentia, some pertinent questions in music.
The first group of musicians, singing in the president’s native tongue mixed with Muzungulandish, lamented and called him a liar. He was like the person in folklore who had cried wolf time and again in vain, to the point that his people had lost faith only to fall prey to him as the real wolf. Men and women alike had given up their farms for the day, to share their disillusionment with a son of the soil who had promised without fulfilling, and who had used them to fight his sterile battles for selfish power. They stated their case in enchanting music, and left the scene, still heavy with the disappointment that had poisoned their blood and turned their music bitter.
The Chairman, dressed strangely in white calico gown, hat and gloves, and white shoes like a ghost at night, told them: “I’ve heard your plight. The resources are yours. The country is yours. The power should be yours. There is no reason to suffer with so much in abundance.”
Emmanuel continued recounting the dream while Patience listened patiently, “The Chairman, who was sitting on a kingly throne elevated by a specially constructed platform to welcome him, had, to my surprise, seated our little Mukong on his right lap, and little Ngonsu on his left. Like him, the twins were enjoying the music, and shaking their heads in sympathy with the villagers who had had enough of President Longstay. How our children came to be with him, I couldn’t say. And how they felt at ease with his white calico gown, even playing with it, when ordinarily they would be running to hide from a ghost, was beyond my comprehension.”
A second group took over, using the same musical instruments to play a different tune. The tarred roads, electrification and other development initiatives President Longstay had promised his own people upon assuming office decades ago were still to be delivered. “Papa Longstay, why have you abandoned your promise of hope? It is important that we live a decent life Papa Longstay. We need funds. We are suffering, and our crops sell poorly, but we work very hard. You’ve abandoned us, Papa Longstay, and we are not happy about it. ” In return for their support, the president had simply compounded their hardships with his callous indifference to their plight and the bleakness of the future of their children.
The Chairman, echoed by Mukong and Ngonsu, greeted them with hope: “I’ve heard your plight. The resources are yours. The country is yours. The power should be yours. There is no reason to suffer with so much in abundance.”
In a moving song, a third group comprising mostly young men and women, rejected the god-like status President Longstay had assumed based on false promises and the torture his insensitive regime had imposed even on them, his own supporters of the same ethnic origin. Their disappointment and frustrations were such that their music was no longer enveloped in metaphors. It would have pierced directly into the president’s heart, had he been present.
To them, the Chairman, still echoed by Mukong and Ngonsu, repeated his message: “I’ve heard your plight. The resources are yours. The country is yours. The power should be yours. There is no reason to suffer with so much in abundance.”
The fourth group was also direct and clear and without fear. Their song was critical of the economic crisis. It denounced surging social injustices and the slow pace of development, and condemned government inaction and complicity in the face of corruption and misappropriation. President Longstay was even compared unfavourably to his predecessor, President Habas, during whose leadership money was available, and peasants were at least sure to sell their crops, feed themselves and keep their children in school. In angry tempo, they invited the people to meet President Longstay with pertinent questions and demands. He should have foreseen the economic crises, and assumed his responsibility “to save them from death and not let them perish”. Schools are without teachers, hospitals without drugs, and harvests have ceased to fetch money, yet the president was insensitive to all this. He must be reminded that it is his duty to bring things back to normal, for “your team is working without output”, and many seem to have been born to watch a few enjoy the country’s resources. President Longstay, they concluded, through the excesses and indifference of his gang to their plight, was presiding over a sorcerer state that delighted in sucking the blood of innocent folks.
Applauding, the Chairman, echoed by Mukong and Ngonsu, told them: “I’ve heard your plight. The resources are yours. The country is yours. The power should be yours. There is no reason to suffer with so much in abundance.”
The fifth and final group was made up of elderly women, who came up to the Chairman and asked Ngonsu and Mukong to join them in their music, which they did. The women sang with dignity. They invited the other groups to join in, for theirs was a popular tune known throughout the region. In their song, they asked President Longstay to tell them where he had kept the money of the country for life to become so expensive. Their farm products sold poorly, but the price of meat, salt and other essential items had skyrocketed. Life in the village and in the city had become unbearably expensive, and President Longstay must say what he had done with the country’s money. It cannot be true, the women sang, that Longstay knew what was going on in his country and decided to sit quiet: “Longstay do you know where it hurts? Out here it hurts, out here things are bad. Do you have a heart, Longstay, to feel our hurt?”
Then the strangest thing happened. Mukong and Ngonsu, all of a sudden, became my late parents – Peaphweng Mukong and Mama Ngonsu. Singing along with the women, they shared with them the stories of Chief Ndze of Tchang, who for years had bamboo-holed the commonwealth, only to die and be kept in Msa until he had repented through a diviner-healer he sent back with word on where to look for the money he had stashed away in bamboos and pleads to his people to be forgiven. They also shared with the women the story of Ngain, the chief who had connived with the devil to bring death and untold suffering upon Abehema and beyond. Upon hearing the stories, the village women composed an instant song: “President Longstay. Or is it President Ndze? Or shall we say Ngain? Your sterile love of bamboo-holes has drained our resources and lifeblood. Your greed is suffocating us. You have forgotten your own. You have sold your soul to the devil to feast on the blood of your forgotten kinswomen. And the children – can’t you at least be good to children: our future, our hope?” At the mention of the word children, Peaphweng Mukong and Mama Ngonsu became little twins again and were returned to the Chairman.
Then, accompanied by Mukong and Ngonsu, the Chairman went down to the women and shook hands, saying: “I’ve heard your plight. The resources are yours. The country is yours. The power should be yours. There is no reason to suffer with so much in abundance. Together we must fight for the dignity that was once the pride of Mimboland.”
Then with one voice, all the villagers who had assembled at President Longstay’s home village to welcome their new hope gave the Chairman their vote of confidence: “He is not a listening president, he is not informed, and he does not care even for those who have sacrificed so his unproductive reign may keep power. We do not know him any more. Go ahead and chart out a new course for us and for people where you come from.”
“We danced and celebrated, thinking the election results a foregone conclusion,” Emmanuel shook his head, still unable to make head or tail of the dream. “We were mistaken.”
Patience became more attentive.
“When President Longstay was told about the rally, how successful it had been, he is reported to have said: ‘Ils ne savent pas à qui ils ont affaire.’ In an interview with Radio Mimboland International he went on: ‘Vandals cannot build the country, thieves and those who burn down banks are incapable of building the country, those who destroy roads are uninformed of what it takes to build the country. We want a country that is strong, rich and united, and there are no two people in Mimboland who can ensure that. So what change are they plotting?’ The radio interview was followed by a menacing declaration in a newspaper published by Tchopbrokpot of the Disaster Account, his best friend and right-hand man, and consumed exclusively by his ethnic kin: ‘Traîtres. Vous allez me sentir!’
“The interviews were followed by the first snap election, which we lost. The second and third elections, we lost as well. What does this mean, Patience? I’m lost for an explanation.” Emmanuel was desperate for reassurance from his wife.
“I can’t say fortunately it’s only a dream, since I know better,” Patience told him. “You mustn’t share your dream with anyone else. I don’t want you inflaming sensitivities in high places,” she cautioned.
“We can’t go on like this. Things must change in this country,” he protested.
“You must be patient. Why are you in such a hurry? Your party isn’t even legal yet.”
“You sound just like President Longstay in his victory speeches. He made the same promises he had made twenty years ago, and when confronted by a journalist, he said Mimbolanders must be patient for Rome was not built in a day: His exact words were: ‘Il faut attendre. Tu es pressé pour aller où?’ Am I to believe that you and President Longstay think alike?”
“Of course not, but we’ve lost too many people already, and I’m too young to be a widow. And my children aren’t going to start life as orphans.”
Emmanuel gave up on her. He would have to decipher the head and tail of his dream himself. It was out of the question to simply wait and see.
Two days later Emmanuel came back to her.
“I’ve decided to give up on the state,” he told Patience.
“What does that mean?”
“That it isn’t through problematic state structures that change shall see the light of day in Mimboland,” he explained.
Still Patience failed to understand what he was driving at.
“What I’m saying is that if we wait for the government to change our lives, we shall have to wait forever. There is no hope from that direction. That I gathered from my dream.”
“So what do you intend to do?” Patience asked, preparing Mukong and Ngonsu for church, for it was the morning of August 21, fourth anniversary of the Lake Abehema disaster. She and Emmanuel had offered a special mass for the victims of the disaster, and had to be in church in time to take the readings.
“I have decided to start an NGO to do for my dead and alive what the government and Tchopbrokpot have failed to do with its Disaster Account.”
Patience was interested. “Tell me more,” she said, combing Mukong’s hair.
“It is all planned out,” Emmanuel began. “It shall be called ‘Foundation for the Forgotten Victims of the Lake Abehema Disaster – FOVILAD’. It shall be totally owned and controlled by the victims themselves, with a steering committee and technical committees comprised of persons from their own ranks elected on a rotating basis for specified periods of time. FOVILAD shall have its headquarters in Kaizerbosch, and branches throughout Mimboland and wherever sons and daughters and well-wishers of the region are found in the world. FOVILAD’s principal role shall be to raise funds within and outside of Mimboland and shall directly manage the use of these funds in the interest of survivors of the Lake Abehema disaster seeking rehabilitation and a future of hope.”
“And what role shall you play in the management of FOVILAD?” asked Patience, passing Emmanuel a white shirt to wear for church.
“No managerial or executive role in particular,” he answered, not sure, as he hadn’t quite expected this question. “The idea is to initiate it, raise enough funds at the beginning, and allow the villagers themselves to run the show.”
“Excellent idea,” Patience congratulated her husband. “I see it working!” She meant it. Structured in this way, FOVILAD was unlikely to pass for the type of NGO that the late Professor Moses Mahogany had termed: ‘Nothing Going On’.
Emmanuel thanked Patience for her understanding and encouragement, and told her he would need to travel to Kaizerbosch to start work on the project immediately and intended to stay there until FOVILAD was up and running.
“Go for it, my husband,” said Patience, proudly. “This is a good initiative. I’m sure Peaphweng Mukong, Mama Ngonsu and all the forgotten souls of Abehema and beyond would be proud of their son and kinsman – Kwanga.”
Emmanuel embraced her, tears of appreciation in his eyes.
“Let’s hurry,” said Patience, pretending not to notice the tears. “We mustn’t be late for mass.” Then, pointing at the children, she said: “Look. Your parents are waiting for us.”
“May their souls rest in perfect peace,” said he, in between tears.
* Francis B. Nyamnjoh is Associate Professor and Head of Publications and Dissemination with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Email: Nyamnjoh@gmail.com, Website: www.nyamnjoh.com
** Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
***Please note that Pambazuka Editors erroneously indicated that this excerpt was going to appear in last week's issue. We apologize for the mistake.
More...
Blogging Africa
How bloggers covered Kenya violence, deal with racism, sexism
2008-03-26
Sokari Ekine
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/03/mini_headblogging_for_africa.html
Within 24 hours of the outbreak of the post election violence in Kenya, Kenyan blogs were posting hour by hour reports. On December 31st there was a complete shutdown of the mainstream media. Sokari Ekine, who blogs at www.blacklooks.org, explores how bloggers filled the information gap.
Podcasts
Arts Azimuts - International Arts Festival in Butare, Rwanda
2008-03-27
ContactFM
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/broadcasts/podcasts.php
Between the 25th of January and the 2nd of Feb 2008, the town of Butare, Rwanda, hosted its first International Arts Festival organized by the University Centre for Arts. Entitled ‘Arts Azimuts’, this festival focused on theatre, music and dance, bringing together artists from Rwanda, Western Africa, Belgium and the United States
Du 25 janvier au 2 fevrier 2008,la ville de Butare au Rwanda a abrite son premier Festival International des Arts organise par le Centre Universitaire des arts. Intitule "Arts Azimuts", le festival incluait theatre,musique et dance et a rassemble des artistes du Rwanda, de l'afrique de l'ouest de laBelgique et des USA.
Zimbabwe update
Zimbabwe opposition suffer pre-election harassment
2008-03-27
http://tinyurl.com/2syvna
Opposition groups in Zimbabwe are suffering harassment, intimidation and discrimination in the run-up to national elections on 29 March. Police in some parts of the country are clearly restricting the activities of opposition party members, while supporters of the ruling party enjoy total rights. Amnesty International has warned that the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly are being unnecessarily restricted in advance of the poll date.