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Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum mobilises for South Africa action

Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/Announce/47360

The newly elected chair-person of the South-African based Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum, Mr Solomon Chikowero, has urged Zimbabweans based in South-Africa to remain resilient in the face of many challenges confronting them in the country.

Chikowero urged Zimbabweans based in South-Africa to unite and press for democratic reforms in Zimbabwe that will enable an environment that fosters stability to ensure a peaceful transition and reconstruction, for them to be able to go back home.

"Many of us are here for economic and political reasons, for as long as these remain unresolved then we are going to remain in foreign lands forever. We want to go home. The harmonised election on March 29 offered an opportunity for the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis, but it seems as though the Robert Mugabe regime will stop at nothing to disregard the people's will. No solution that does not respect the will of the people will be sustainable."

Chikowero urged Zimbabweans based in South-Africa to come out in their hundreds for a demonstration to be held on Wednesday the 16th of April, to press for a lasting solution on the Zimbabwean situation. South-Africa's President Thabo Mbeki at the weekend declared that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe.

"We know there is a crisis in Zimbabwe, that is one of a ruling elite that refuses to accept that the people rejected it at the polls. We know who won in the elections, we demand that the results be made public for all without any further delays."

*Please note that the logistics and mobilisation will be handled by ZDF affiliates the Zimbabwe Revolutionary Youth Movement and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum - Demonstrators will start gathering at 10.AM. For more information, please contact, Sox Chikhohwero Chair-person of the ZDF at 27 72 238 9192 or Simon Mudekwa at 0796192955.

African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from Kenya

Bronwen Manby

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/47406

As the baton of violence heads over to Zimabwe, Bronwen Manby looks at the African Peer Review Mechanism in relation to Kenya, its shortcomings such as lack of follow-up and political teeth and the urgent lessons from its engagement with Kenya

"There is a need for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarized. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalization and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved."

This is not a quote from a report on the recent election violence in Kenya, but from the country review report of the African Peer Review Mechanism, presented two years ago by the APRM panel of eminent persons to African heads of state and defended by President Mwai Kibaki himself on the margins of the July 2006 African Union summit.

The report went on to consider previous violence in Kenya, making observations that are just as valid today as when its writers made them. The APRM eminent persons noted ‘the role of prominent members of the ruling party and high ranking government officials in fuelling the so-called ethnic clashes’. They complained that many of the people involved ‘have neither been investigated nor prosecuted. Some have continued to serve as senior officers, ministers, or members of parliament. The inability to act [against them] tends to underline general public perception of impunity, while at the same time constricting the ability of people to come to terms with the past experiences of injustice and violence thus further aggravating and reinforcing polarities and suspicion.’

All in all, the APRM country review report made a remarkably frank assessment of Kenya’s problems. The report did not shy away from highlighting issues of corruption, especially in land allocation, nor from the ethnic tensions that have been so horribly demonstrated in recent weeks. It identified ‘overarching issues’ that Kenya would need to address, starting with ‘managing diversity in nation building’, and going on to filling the ‘implementation gap’ between policy and action on the ground; addressing poverty and wealth distribution; land reform; action against corruption; constitutional reform; and addressing gender inequality and youth unemployment.

Finally and notably, the report called for ‘transformational leadership’ – leadership that ‘recognizes the need for dramatic change in a society’ and that ‘entails not simply directing change but managing it in a way that ensures broad ownership, legitimacy and self-directed sustenance and replication of change in all associated systems.’

Thus, just two years ago, Kenya was being lauded as one of the first countries in Africa to complete the process of examination by the APRM, while the resulting report provided a hard-hitting analysis of the challenges the country faced and made some important recommendations on the way forward. The country’s decision to sign up for the APRM was supposed to be an indication of commitment to good governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights. Had the problems the APRM report then highlighted been tackled, it is possible that the violence and distress of the 2008 crisis could have been avoided. And yet nothing was done. What went wrong?

The Kenyan APRM report does have some weaknesses. Most importantly, it does not identify the issues relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya that were so critical on election day and in the following period. This in turn reflects a weakness in the APRM questionnaire that guides the reviews, which does not focus on electoral management and its independence, but rather the simple fact of holding elections.

A much greater weakness lies in the gap between the country review report and the programme of action which is supposed to set out concrete, costed actions that will address the problems identified in the report.

For example, the review report decries the lack of independence of the judiciary, and especially the vulnerability to executive influence of the process for nomination and appointment of judges. The eminent persons noted that during their visits to Kenya, they had received reports of incidents in which prominent government officials either disobeyed court orders or expressed an intention to disobey them. They state forthrightly that, ‘The Chief Justice being an appointee of the President is not trusted to be able to take an independent decision’ – the very reason why Raila Odinga and his ODM party rejected the insistence by the incumbent PNU that any challenges to the election results should take place in court.

Yet the programme of action talks only of ‘enforcement of judicial reforms and existing administrative measures to ensure members of the bench improve efficiency, accountability and monitoring of judicial functions’. There is no mention of steps to end executive interference and ensure respect for the rule of law.

In other areas too, the programme of action shies away from the difficult political issues, focusing rather on capacity building and resource mobilisation; matters to which even President Kibaki could happily agree – and in many cases had already done so as part of ongoing donor-financed reforms.

But the biggest concern is the issue of political will. Was the Kenyan government ready to try to fix what was broken? Were the APRM eminent persons and secretariat willing to hold them to account? And were other African heads of state who had signed up for the APRM process – to whom the APRM eminent persons and secretariat report – ready to urge remedies for poor performance, or would their own glass houses discourage the throwing of stones?

A journalist and member of Kenya’s national NEPAD secretariat was present at the APR Forum (the meeting of all the heads of state who have signed up for the APRM) when it met to review the Kenya report. His account gives us a clue as to what the ‘peer review’ element of the APRM really means:

"I counted the number of leaders who spoke after President Kibaki had responded to Dr Machel. They were from Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria. Not one posed a question to Mr Kibaki. They all praised the report and commended Kenya for being candid, thorough and open. They pledged to support Kenya in seeking solutions to its constitution review and diversity problems.

When it was all over, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia expressed relief and promised to go on with the process, after realising that it was not a life-and-death situation."

Thus, though Kibaki was said to be ‘committed to addressing all the issues, among them tribalism, poor corporate management and corruption, which were raised’ by the APRM report, he need not expect too critical a review from the other heads of state on his follow-up in practice.

Although each country that has undergone the APRM process is supposed to report back to the APR Forum on its progress, there is no serious monitoring exercise of how effectively this is done. Nor any sanctions for failure to act. Nor, apparently, is there any real system to ensure that the commitments the government makes address the most important problems highlighted in the APRM review. Certainly, no individual or institution at the African level, least of all the APR Forum, raised the implementation of the APRM commitments as critical issues during the recent Kenyan crisis – or, perhaps more importantly, during the lead up to the election, when such a focus could perhaps have averted the near-catastrophe into which Kenya was drawn.

At national level, meanwhile, the implementation of the APRM programme of action is also left entirely to the executive, with no formalised role for parliamentarians or civil society to hold the government’s feet to the fire should it fail to perform. As in other countries, the APRM process has not been well-integrated into other national development planning processes – a problem recognised by the APRM secretariat in South Africa – and it does not appear to have informed other important reform programmes under way at the same time.

Moreover, the systems in place to monitor the implementation of other national policies (however imperfect) are also not mobilised to engage with the implementation of the APRM programme of action. President Kibaki did not report back to parliament on the APR Forum meeting and on the actions he had committed to take, nor was the report tabled for debate. Though there was some coverage in the media of the APR Forum discussion of Kenya, it did not generate a real national debate on the report and programme of action and their implications. The conclusions and recommendations were not widely disseminated throughout the country by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat or other means. Although a meeting hosted by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat in mid-February 2008 aimed – encouragingly – to involve civil society in the process of preparing the country’s progress report to the next APR Forum, the report of the meeting is surreal in its lack of any suggestion that this review might be relevant to, or affected by, the national political crisis.

Even the continental APRM secretariat failed to engage in any serious way with national institutions, such as the Electoral Commission of Kenya or the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, in order to brief them on the conclusions relevant to them and the follow-up role they might play.

Without this sort of integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making.

There is no demand from civil society in Kenya or elsewhere for the APRM to issue condemnations of countries’ performance on governance or to ‘take action’ on the behaviour of recalcitrant governments (as some international commentators have suggested—for example, in the case of Zimbabwe): the APRM is not a human rights monitoring body, but rather a tool for mutual learning, and there are other AU institutions that are more appropriate for the more obviously critical and political role. Nevertheless, civil society groups do feel strongly that while peer review by fellow heads of state is all very well, it should be backed up by a greater effort by the APRM Secretariat or other independent groups to monitor performance of governments against the programmes of action to which they have signed up. The Pan-African Parliament could also be brought in to play this role.

‘National ownership’ – which everyone agrees is critical for the success of the APRM project – should not be interpreted to mean that the only actions agreed are those that ruffle no feathers and disturb no vested interests. And whatever actions are undertaken should be subject to monitoring and enforcement by institutions that are independent of executive control – at both continental and country levels, by national parliaments, constitutional oversight bodies and civil society coalitions.

There are now 29 countries that have acceded to the APRM – Mauritania being the most recent, after signing the APRM memorandum of understanding at the January 2008 AU summit. To date, the process has exceeded the expectations of many observers. The eminent persons appointed when the APRM was established have, by and large, done a good job in establishing its credentials: many civil society activists were taken aback that the level of criticism directed at Kenya could have emerged from the APRM process.

But lessons should be learned as the mechanism takes on its next countries. The APRM process needs a stronger connection to three critical constituencies: to the citizen in whose name it is being undertaken (through outreach by government, media and civil society); to the political class (through policy planning processes, parliament and political parties) and to the wider African and international community (through African continental institutions as well as the structures through which development assistance is channelled).

The new members of the APRM panel due to be appointed in 2008 will have to take on board the lessons learned so far – and be strong enough to resist the pressure placed on them to conform to executive wishes. The heads of state themselves should have the courage to stick to their original commitment that the process be independent and effective, as they select the next members and agree the budget for the secretariat.

For Kenya, meanwhile, the 2006 conclusion of the APRM report remains relevant today:

"From all indications, it is obvious that the challenge in Kenya is beyond the mere adoption of a new constitution. The challenge remains that of resolving the following contentious issues: the nature and character of executive powers, devolution of power, constitutional provisions for religious courts, and the mode of transition to the new constitution. These issues, among others, cannot be resolved by simple technicalities or constitutional legalese, but will require a modicum of political sagacity to evolve necessary political solutions. Current prognosis suggests that a carefully managed mediatory and conciliatory intervention under the aegis of the African Union may prove crucial in facilitating the much needed political compromise and solution in resolving these issues and minimise loss of face by the different power centres and factions. The sustainability of the proposed outcome will be hinged on the ability to devise a win-win formula while simultaneously responding to the collective aspirations of a highly divided society."

The important and serious effort that went into producing these recommendations must not go to waste. If the official oversight institutions are neglecting to ensure that they are implemented, then civil society organisations must step into their place.


*Bronwen Manby is a Senior Programme Adviser - AfriMAP at the Open Society Institute. For more analysis of the APRM process in Kenya and elsewhere see www.afrimap.org

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Thabo Mbeki must reconsider his Zimbabwe position

Azad Essa

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47411

Azad Essa speaks to Grace Kwinjeh, Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum on South Africa, foreign aid, the MDC and the role of the Zimbabwean diaspora in bringing about change, amongst other things

GRACE KWINJEH: The Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum (ZDF) was launched in 2005 to bring together a plethora of Zimbabweans civil society organizations and individuals. It is platform to initiate dialogue, network and build a community of Zimbabweans abroad committed to lobbying for a new democratic Zimbabwe. While the world waits with bated breath too witness how Robert Mugabe deals with a new expected MDC victory, Zimbabweans in exile just cannot wait to get back home.

AZAD ESSA: Tell us more about the ZDF?

GRACE KWINJEH: We are 3 million Zimbabweans in exile. This forum was launched in December 2007, with the view to unite the diaspora, to create dialogue and networking. We also deal with specific issues to do with health, issues of access and education of children in the diaspora. We are essentially a platform that brings together a diverse group of Zimbabweans in exile, and these include professionals working abroad to organizations on the grassroots level.

AZAD ESSA: So much is said to rest on the outcome of these elections. Why so?

GRACE KWINJEH: For many of us, we want to go home. We want to reconnect with our family. As long as there is political conflict, we cannot return. The elections are crucial, and with indications there might be a regime change, if so, and if this is handled well, we will be home sooner than later.

AZAD ESSA: If Mugabe has indeed lost the elections - does he have the muscle and support to continue ruling Zimbabwe?

GRACE KWINJEH: It depends, if he concedes that he has lost the elections, then he cannot do much. However, if he does not concede, then we have a problem. The balance of power lies with the security forces and the side they end up supporting will largely determine the outcome. There is a lot of anxiety and speculation in this regard.

AZAD ESSA: It is reported that even his closest allies are advising Mugabe to quit - what is he hoping to achieve with delaying the results?

GRACE KWINJEH: We are all wondering! He is even printing too much money. In fact, economically, I don't see him holding the country for even a month more. There is no capacity for a run-off. This was the opportunity to lay the platform for a proper framework, involving democratic reform and reconstruction of the economy.

AZAD ESSA: But if Mugabe stepped down in respect of the outcome: Wouldn't this be ironic?

GRACE KWINJEH: Yes it would be. The chances that he steps down without charges against him for his acts of brutality during certain parts of this tenure as President is quite slim. But the opposition party has been careful not to suggest that he will be charged, but this does not stop an individual to charge him, especially through using international legal instruments.

AZAD ESSA: What does this reaction tell you about Mugabe's pre-election expectations?

GRACE KWINJEH: He insisted he wanted it now. You will recall that the MDC wanted it in June, but it is clear he underestimated how unpopular he had become in his own party. He was unprepared and misread the political climate. If he unleashes violence, he will be condemned by SADC and the international community. He has no option but to exit gracefully.

AZAD ESSA: What would an MDC victory mean for Zimbabwe?

GRACE KWINJEH: Firstly, a breath of fresh air. Secondly, Zimbabwe will become part of the community of nations once more. Thirdly, much needed AID and assistance would return. And lastly, it would mean that Zimbabwe would be run by a new government with a lot of repair work. The people of Zimbabwe will have expectations, for we will be looking at a government emerging out of the social liberation movement - with an understanding of the multifaceted crisis at hand - the people will want results immediately. This is going to be very difficult.

AZAD ESSA: So much talk about aid - and the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank - plans that Robert Mugabe rejected a number of times, for a number of reasons including the conditions of such economic assistance. Working under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank - is this the way forward?

GRACE KWINJEH: This is one the challenges that Tsvangerai and the MDC faces. The MDC emerged from the union movement, and so how it balances its ideological stance with the literally the desperate need for economic aid - and we cannot deny aid - is what is going to be very tricky. We need aid; there is not question about this. But to secure aid immediately while considering the sustainable economic advancement of all of Zimbabwe will be a very difficult path to follow. We are surrounded by nations that have assumed political change but with economies that have not reduced economic inequality. Kenya and Zambia are prime examples, and of course so is South Africa. How they find a balance, a very tricky balance to negotiate.

AZAD ESSA: President Thabo Mbeki's stance of not interfering just yet - is this the right approach?

GRACE KWINJEH: It is not. Things are deteriorating fast and he must reconsider. He must reconsider a more robust approach. The war veterans are said to be intimidating in certain areas. To what extent this will continue, is unknown.

AZAD ESSA: But the South African government has been ambiguous in its approach to the Mugabe regime, and that is putting it quite mildly. How do you see their role now?

GRACE KWINJEH: South Africa must play a role in resolving the election crisis. They don't benefit from an influx of Zimbabweans and we want to go home. The South African government issued a statement that the will of the people must be respected. How big and how robust a commitment this implies is yet to be tested. Looking forward with regards to the MDC assuming power and political shifts in South Africa - especially post-Polokwane - a more trade union backed ANC has come to the fore. Given the COSATU-MDC link, and the political focus (in South Africa) somewhat shifting, we are looking forward to a good partnership between a potential new government and the ANC

AZAD ESSA: So we wait for the courts to decide?

GRACE KWINJEH: Well for the MDC - yes. But on the Zanu PF side, there is all this talk of recounting votes and all that. To sum up, it is a total mess. Yet, we are optimistic that Zimbabwe, as indicated by the people, are geared for change, but we know it is going to be a very hard transition.

AZAD ESSA: Finally, you mentioned a few times that the diaspora wants to return home. What do you see as the role of the diaspora in this process?

GRACE KWINJEH: The diaspora is crucial. But before we return home, we will have to know that we have some sort of security there. Will we have jobs to support our families? Poverty drove many out?we have had qualified teachers who have swept in South Africa, and who would rather do that than suffer in Zimbabwe. We do not want to pre-empt these things, but we have started discussions - to start programs to get the diaspora back home - not unlike those that took place when Zimbabwe found independence in 1980 and what happened after the fall of Apartheid in South Africa. The challenge is indeed to get people back and into the reconstruction process.


*Azad Essa is a researcher & journalist at the IOLS-Research Unit, UKZN.

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Zimbabwe – who can halt the slide to inevitable violence?

Sam Kebele

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47412

Sam Kabele looks at the fault lines along which violence in Zimbabwe is traveling and calls for solidarity the Zimbabwean people

At the time of writing President Mugabe is refusing to engage with his reasonably supine fellow southern African leaders, concerned about the crisis and lack of declared results from the presidential elections. Instead he has chosen the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence with reports coming in especially in Manicaland of targeted intimidation and beatings of opposition activists, especially in areas that swung to MDC. The votes in the parliamentary elections went so overwhelming for the opposition that the government was unable to fix that election and we thus had a historic victory for the Movement for Democratic Change. It seems clear the ruling ZANU-PF party are desperately trying to avoid a similar meltdown in the presidential ones. So, unsurprisingly, Zimbabwe’s High Court refused to rule on the MDC’s urgent application for release of the presidential election results on April 14. 

As President Mugabe opts for the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence, it is worth asking how we even reached the stage where the opposition was allowed to win the parliamentary elections and where the usual violence and intimidation appear not to have paid off. Were the ruling party over-confident and the rest of us, expecting the usual stolen election, too dismissive of the effect of the crisis on ordinary Zimbabweans – urban and rural? Of course in any normal situation, hyperinflation signals an end to any ruling government, but Zimbabwean ‘normality’ has been different since 2000, and arguably before that. Given the normal retaliation that ZANU-PF unleashes when it is threatened as in 2000 after the referendum (farm invasions etc) and Operation Murambatsvina after 2005, there is a second and probably more important question. Who is willing and able to stop a descent into repression and violence? And, thirdly, who in Zimbabwe and the region has the strategic vision to change this? Is there still the possibility of a peaceful transition (even if not a transformation as such)? 

The ZANU-PF government has largely appeared impervious to international pressure to reverse repression and its economic policies. Zimbabwe has few close allies, after leaving the Commonwealth, having been near to expulsion from the International Monetary Fund (perhaps the only possibly advantageous element), its policies criticised by the UN and some African institutions like the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and with its elite subject to ‘smart’ sanctions from the EU, Switzerland, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has retained some African, Chinese and some Third World state and popular support by astute playing of the ‘anti-imperialist card’.   Is, however, the southern African region now sufficiently worried to push harder for real change after the (unadmitted) failure of their negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’?

CAN ZIMBABWEANS CONTINUE THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR MASSIVE REJECTION OF ZANU-PF?

Whilst the results dribbled out, the courts are largely supine and the counter-offensive starts. After the failure of the negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’ perhaps the real question is whether their self-interest in a reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe is likely to continue? With the exception of South Africa’s ANC president Jacob Zuma - who called for the election results to be declared after meeting Zimbabwe’s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai - the region has been largely silent. It has, however, after its weekend summit issued a lame statement calling for the election results to be ‘expeditiously’ declared and for the parties to contest any run-off. This is despite evidence of increased intimidation and violence and strong opposition from regional civil society.

The only path appears to be people power, but is the fearful population, committed peaceful forms, subject to eight years of intimidation, and having to engage in every possible strategy for mere survival able to sustain this? Recent general strikes such as the one called for from 15th April cannot really be anything other than staying at home since only 8% of Zimbabweans are actually employed. 

It has been argued that in any transition Zimbabwe should be characterised as a post-conflict state since it exhibits many characteristics of a society in violent conflict due to the scale of economic collapse and casualisation, political violence and social trauma, the breakdown of basic services (although the party structure of ZANU-PF remains intact), mass flight of people and capital. Zimbabwe currently has the highest rate of inflation in the world, with an annual rate of over 100,000%.

1. Wages have plummeted as the cost of necessities spirals out of control.  About 80% of the country’s population lives in poverty, while about 3 million people have left the country in search of work.

2. Failed agricultural policies have meant widespread food shortages of food with this year’s harvest predicted to be one of the lowest on record.

3. Agriculture was the motor of the pre-crisis economy, but is massively depleted in production and export. Zimbabwe once a food exporter (in good years) is now food insecure with up to half the population reliant on food aid.

4. The above is particularly worrying given the generalised HIV and AIDS pandemic and life expectancy being the lowest in the world at 34 years for men and 33 years for women.

5. The humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by government food distribution being manipulated to secure votes.

6. Demands for change emanating from civil society have been routinely suppressed by the state, including the use of assaults, arrests and torture.7 The number of health professionals fleeing the country has escalated while resources for the health sector have collapsed, with dire effects on the around 20% of the population with HIV or AIDS.  

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence in all its parallels with the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and at the same time becoming more vicious. The combination of centrally directed and presidential-inspired incitement to violence, including sexual violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, the use of informer networks and covert ‘Third Force’ hit squads to brutalise the opposition and destroy its structures before elections, and the manipulation of the media and hate speech attacks, all seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition and licensed informal violence. However, whether through over-confidence or under pressure from South Africa and the region, there was less violence in this election with both the opposition factions of the MDC and the ZANU-PF ‘renegade’ Simba Makoni being able to campaign in rural areas. 

Several post-Mugabe scenarios are possible, including a transition to Mugabeism without Mugabe, an MDC-led government, the rise of a reformist faction within ZANU-PF, a broad government of national unity, a military coup, or even a descent into chaos. But at present a Mugabe hardball response urged on by the ‘Jacobin’ faction inside the party around a presidential run-off seems likely. Violence and intimidation have worked in the past to keep the president in power, have tended to divert the party from its internal divisions, and sidelines the ‘moderate’ ZANU-PF faction which is tempted to reach out to MDC and the international community – not least to try to safeguard their businesses, and other resources including land. Use of the militia and to some extent the police also avoids using the military some of whose loyalty is suspect – at elite level where the would-be kingmaker is thought to have bankrolled the Makoni presidential bid, and at lower ranks level, where many soldiers presumably voted MDC. 

ELECTIONS

The background to the elections was of fear of state-sanctioned violence through use of police, military and militias with the aim of ensuring a ruling party victory at whatever cost8.  Conditions for free and fair elections in the called for in the recent pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops were not followed. Key aspects of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ratified by the Zimbabwean government were not respected.9  These included the pro-government bias of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)10, insufficient mechanisms for voter registration and roll inspection and ZEC failing to clearly publicise boundaries of new voting constituencies and locations of polling stations. There was also the disqualification of three million diaspora Zimbabweans, lack of voter education, state domination of the media and a lack of independent international and civil society observers.  

All reports from partners and credible observers note that the organisation of the elections was partisan, the opposition parties had little access to state media and to rural areas of the country, and the state media overwhelmingly privileged the messages of the ruling ZANU-PF party11. Nor was there sufficient time between the unilateral announcement on 25th January of the election date for political parties to organise their campaigns. Indeed the electoral commission itself was disorganised as well as partisan. The weighting of the new constituencies is also towards the rural areas – normally seen as government strongholds where opposition parties rarely get access. (But it seems that rural voters were less intimated, including in areas that were formerly ZANU-PF-leaning, although there have to be concerns about any second round where there are no observers). There were widespread reports of government attempting to buy voters’ allegiances through provision of agricultural equipment and (deferred) pay rises to the armed forces and teachers. President Mugabe also amended the electoral law on 18th March to allow the police into polling stations - widely seen as an intimidating tactic, although it is not certain that it was that effective. 

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS

The conditions of the post-election period do not promise well for Zimbabwe escaping from its current interlinked crises and hence helping to stem the increasing poverty of its citizens. Civil society is currently working out its strategy, but it is uncertain what the MDC’s is bar the general strike weapon and Tsvangirai’s regional tour of uninterested leaders. There are worries in civil society that violence and intimidation will characterise any possible second round and that manipulation of results is aimed at gaining either an outright victory or to provide a weakened MDC that will be railroaded into a spurious government of ‘national unity’ to provide greater regional and international legitimacy for continued ZANU-PF misrule. 

It seems that any effective response to the Zimbabwean crisis must be African-led, however unlikely that currently seems.  There should be support and encouragement for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and SADC to provide stronger political mediation in the post-election period aimed at securing government commitment to political and economic reform and to the restoration of basic rights of citizens. Secondly, there is a need to respond to the long-term humanitarian crisis and its effects on the people of Zimbabwe. 

Even if Mugabe were to win the run-off vote he faces a country in total meltdown. A transition point - if not a transformation point - now appears inevitable. The immediate tasks will be to reform the security and legal sectors; create legitimate institutions of government; political reconciliation; rebuild the state; economic recovery, normalisation of relations with the international community for aid; debt relief  and investment. All will take place under circumstances in which Zimbabweans will be extremely vulnerable to externally imposed agendas.

Sequencing of reform will be vital. A return to due process of law and transparency needs to take place with depoliticisation, demilitarisation and demilitia-isation of formal and informal state institutions top of the agenda. Perhaps Zimbabwe can then start to move away from a culture of violence, impunity, corruption and cronyism.

Addressing the question of land will be a volatile process. There will need to be a detailed investigation into who has what land under what conditions. It would be politically unacceptable to return to the highly unequal colonial-pattern of land ownership. But for those former commercial farmers prepared to share their expertise innovative land sharing/ renting schemes could be piloted.

The tasks will be immense and there is already talk of creating a Trust Fund to help Zimbabwe’s absorptive capacity which will be fairly modest. Measures to help the skilled and the diaspora return will need to be balanced with employment creating schemes for those who stayed,without overwhelming what few social services remain. Health care professionals could be invited back, initially on a short term basis without losing residence rights elsewhere, and with a range of inventive packages.  

A national convention process could be vital in producing a new people-driven constitution. A stakeholder conference to take this forward could address issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform, land reform, truth recovery and economic and social recovery.

Promoting justice and reconciliation will be a long term process, but Zimbabwe is one of the best-documented sustained human rights abuse processes. Finally from a rather longer run historical view are we seeing the end of the sustainability of the nationalist/ liberation project as it is unable to recuperate and reproduce itself except through violence? State authoritarianism had the dual inheritance of the interventionist settler state and the command politics of the liberation movements.

The seeming illogicality of the politics of disorder has been functional for rewarding clients and supporters, once the original nationalist coalition of workers, peasants, trade unionists, urban dwellers, students and intellectuals had been destroyed through structural adjustment, elite accumulation strategies and corruption. ZANU-PF has been unable to address what Chris Alden saw as the interlinked crises of illegitimacy, expectations and governance; it has only been able to respond through violence/ clientilism, destruction of the disparate social forces opposed to it such as farmers, farmworkers and urban dwellers through militarisation/ militia-isation. This has been accompanied by a location of the crisis as external – Western imperialism and ‘sanctions’. Whilst these have their niche the crisis is overwhelmingly local although not without an initial external dimension that Patrick Bond has pointed to - acceptance of settler debts, ESAP etc, with an ideological debate around ‘who is a real Zimbabwean’? This has acted to exclude urban, white, farmworker, professional etc Zimbabweans through denial of their legitimacy as citizens. The battleground is not just economic and political but also ideological through identity, exclusion and exclusion questions and demonisation of non-ZANU supporters, ruralisation/ totems etc.  

For now Zimbabweans need the greatest international solidarity and pressure on regional governments. The UN Security Council should also be a forum for laying open the human rights abuses which are likely to get worse in the days and weeks ahead. 


*Sam Kabele is a human rights activist. 

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Zimbabwe - Sites of human rights violations

Zimbabwe Peace Project

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47403

Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) as an organisation has strength in its permanent deployment of two monitors in each electoral constituency of Zimbabwe ensuring a grassroots presence. ZPP monitors work in the communities of their ordinary residence, which gives ZPP the leverage to sense potential violations and record incidents swiftly and discretely with a high degree of accuracy. ZPP received a worrisome report last week of the existence of torture bases in Mutoko and Mudzi constituencies in Mashonaland East province and our Provincial Coordinator took time during the weekend to investigate the incidents and gave us the following report:

War Veterans have unleashed terror in Mashonaland East with the assistance of the ruling party Zanu PF. War Veterans, youths and war collaborators are beating and torturing suspected opposition party supporters and local observers of the harmonised elections like ZESN.

MUTOKO SOUTH CONSTITUENCY

About ten war veterans using a new B1800 truck and two Toyota trucks all armed are moving around Mutoko beating up people suspected to have voted for MDC Tsvangirai they are forcing villagers to attend meetings during the day and in the evening with the help of Zanu PF youths beat up people. Bases of torture have been established at Corner Store, Kushinga, Jari, Nyahondo and Rukanda.

Last week on Friday, 11 April 2008 around 1900hrs about twenty people were beaten at Corner Store Base and those assaulted included Desmond Dovi residing in Village 13. The war veterans are led by one Chimhini and youths are led by Brighton Mutendera and Jimmy Chivambu. Our Coordinator spoke to a policeman who confirmed the beatings and the bases. The Coordinator said all those who observed elections on the ZESN ticket have been allegedly listed for beatings.

MUTOKO NORTH CONSTITUENCY

Armed veterans are moving around villages forcing people to meetings where suspected MDC members are being beaten up. Bases have been established at Charehwa, Chitekwe, Nyamuzuwe, All souls mission where doctors have fled for their lives.

On Thursday, 10 April a police officer by the name Ngorima said war veterans visited Mutoko police station where they ordered the Member in Charge to call all police officers at the station for a meeting. They were allegedly threatened with death if they arrest any of the perpetrators and were also ordered that during the run off all police officers should cast their votes at the office before the member in charge. Bases were also established in Mutoko East at Lot and Kawere villages and Bondamakara and Chikuhwa schools.

MUDZI CONSTITUENCY

Bases have been established at Nyamapanda, Dendera, Kotwa, Suswe and Chifamba. The same war veterans stated above are holding meetings in villages and people are being beaten. On Thursday, 10 April 2008 three MDC activists were heavily assaulted at Kotwa and are detained at Kotwa hospital. These war veterans have instructed all hospitals not to attend to these victims. ZPP is still trying to establish the identity of the three MDC activists.

MUREHWA NORTH CONSTITUENCY

On Friday 11 April 2008, war veterans and Zanu PF youths held a meeting at Murehwa Centre around 1600hrs. All shops were closed and war veterans fired two shots in the air to instil fear in the people. At around 17.30 hrs more than 100 MDC supporters toyi toyied in the centre and the war veterans and Zanu PF youths were outnumbered and were forced to disperse.

In Matenda village two ZESN observers Blessing Chirambadoro and another were threatened with eviction and are now living in fear.

MARONDERA EAST

ZPP Provincial Coordinator also visited the constituency and reported that by Friday 11 April 2008 three houses had been burnt down and people were being assaulted by Zanu PF supporters. On Friday three MDC activists were heavily assaulted at Rapid farm and they are being guarded by Zanu PF youths so that they do not access treatment. The victims were assaulted by war veterans.

MASHONA LAND WEST

One polling agent Aaron and three MDC activists Broderick Marigawa, Taka Ganje and Caleb Marufu were for the past two weeks living in mountains in Kanzamba village, Makonde constituency. The four are said to have ran away from their homes after serious threats of violence from Zanu PF men namely, Black Jesus of Mhangura, Thomas Ganure a soldier from the village, Lovemore Mupoto, Marko Gungungu, a Mashintini and one Brown all from the same constituency are said to be the perpetrators haunting the polling agent and the activists. The polling agent’s plight has been allegedly heightened because his parents belong to Zanu PF and are aiding the perpetrators in threatening the activists. The four are in dire need of legal and counselling services.

As ZPP we are getting frustrated with the situation prevailing in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West and in other parts of Zimbabwe in direct contravention of the country’s laws and international laws that the Government is a signatory. These actions should come to a quick stop as no people should be terrorised continuously with perpetrators threatening police officers that they should not carry out their law enforcing duties by arresting perpetrators and intimidating Doctors and victims that they should not get medical assistance. These are serious forms of politically motivated violations and they should just come to a stop in the spirit of letting Peace Prevail.

Let Peace Prevail


*ZPP envision a Zimbabwe that would transform into a society that cherishes the pursuit and realisation of justice, freedom, peace, human dignity and development.

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Peeling the Kenyan Conflict Onion

Alice Nderitu

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47407

Nderitu argues that development, security and human rights should be the priorities in Kenya post conflict reconstruction; and not creating a bloated cabinet under the guise of power-sharing

It’s official. We have a grossly overpaid cabinet of 40, the largest ever in East Africa. The 34- 44- 40 cabinet debate in Kenya is an ominous pointer to what our politicians consider priorities; positions and not needs. Yet our needs are the embers which opportunely stoked ignite into conflict. Kofi Annan argued as UN Secretary General in 2005 that we cannot enjoy development without security, security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights and that unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed. This are needs, not positions. He repeated this statement when he came to Nairobi to mediate. What does this statement have to do with our post conflict priorities? Let us use a human rights education training method on analysis, the conflict onion to understand what he meant. To do so we have to peel the onion together.

Experience teaches us that in peaceful situations people relate and act on the basis of their actual needs (what we have to have). The lack of basic access to must have needs lays the basis for the presence of structural violence characterised by resentment which does not necessarily translate into open conflict. As instability rises, people coalesce around collective interests (what we want) rather than needs. With the escalation of the conflict people then withdraw to certain positions (what we say that we want). The positions we then demand at this point and as apart of conditions for peace deals have their roots in the dynamics of the conflict but have little to do with actual needs.

In Kenya, the needs are the core of our onion, the first ring of the onion the interests and the outer ring of the onion the positions. Let’s peel the outer ring. What are the politicians saying that we want? Positions in Government for all parties because it’s the only way to for everyone to benefit and guarantee peace. Let’s peel the second ring - But what are our interests? What do we want? Equality and non-discrimination on all fronts especially ethnicity, disability, gender and equitable access to resources, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of Law. The interests are in their totality human rights based approach to development principles.

LET’S NOW TAKE THE CORE OF THE ONION APART. WHAT MUST WE HAVE?

We urgently need roads in good conditions; to markets for our produce, to a hospital with medicine, to a school with teachers and books, to a water point. We need security. We need leaders we can speak to who will listen just as we do as they address political rallies and religious gatherings. We need the IDP‘s resettled, MP’s salaries reduced and our taxes manageable, we must have an end to impunity and a Truth and Justice and Reconciliation Commission. We must have support for arts and sports and debunk the myth that education is the only way out of poverty for our youth. Sportsmen like Catherine Ndereva, Paul Tergat and musicians like Tony Nyandundo did not hone their skills in examination rooms. We need to afford maize and wheat flour, to get direct benefits for the cane and coffee farmer. We must have our textile industry back on its feet again. We need opportunities for the neglected North Eastern Province. We must have massive land education initiatives similar to the HIV-AIDs campaigns at the community and policy level. We need well remunerated Doctors, nurses, University lecturers and law enforcement officers. We need jobs for our youths.

Peeling onions is a tear shedding business so let’s ask the loaded question; to what extent is the creation of a bloated cabinet based on prioritising of positions truly suited to promoting Kenyans needs and interests? Numbers do not mean delivery of services to meet our needs. Kenya’s post conflict reconstruction will be founded on the basis of solutions to needs and well-understood interests, not political positions.Granted; conflicts do undergo transformations that have nothing to do with the original reasons such as the need for self protection, revenge or the economic or political opportunities offered by the conflict.

But working out the conflict issues (at the level of the various positions and interests) and the conflict causes (at the level of the interests and needs) from wherever you stand will help us all examine our own positions and assist us gain an understanding of the interests and needs of the other side. This will help us lay the foundations for the permanent resettlement of the IDP’S hand in hand with enforcement of the rule of law. Try it. You will be surprised that our original needs are in fact perfectly compatible with each other and that in fact Positive peace encompasses human security, stability and development as needs, not positions as priorities to guarantee peace. And that a cabinet of 40 just adds to our socio economic dilemmas. Brace yourselves Kenyans. We are in for tough times.


*Alice Nderitu is a Nderitu is a senior human rights officer, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

End the Zimbabwe Political Impasse!

Feminist Political Education Project

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47404

We the under-signed Zimbabwean women, in our capacity as THE FEMINIST POLITICAL EDUCATION PROJECT (FePEP), urgently call for an end to the political impasse that our country is in. Over a week after we voted in the harmonized elections, we note with great dismay that the results of the Presidential elections are yet to be released. The country is in limbo. Violence, poverty, HIV & AIDS and deterioration of social services continue to disproportionately affect women and girls. We voted on the 29th of March for our representatives in Parliament and for a Head of State in the hope that collectively they can address these problems. As citizens we demand to know and see the fruits of our vote, which would affirm our rights to participate in politics.

We call for the immediate release of the presidential election results. But regardless of who wins this elections among the four presidential candidates, it is our view that the country is too politically polarized to move on. Whoever becomes our next President has the Herculean task of bringing all sides together to think nationally, and in the best interests of all Zimbabwean citizens, not just their own party, or personal self interest. We believe that neither Mr Robert Mugabe nor Mr Morgan Tsvangirai is trusted enough by everyone to foster unity and national coherence that will be required to move forward. We strongly believe that this is what is at the heart of the present impasse. Equally we do not believe that a run-off will be in our best interests as women. We are too familiar with the violence that was meted upon numerous of us from 1890 when the colonialists came into our country right up to the most recent elections. Chief among these forms of violence is sexual violence, and it concomitant implication, HIV infection. Zimbabwean women now have the lowest life expectancy world wide because of HIV & AIDS, 34 years. We can not afford yet another pointless violent election that will slice more years off our lives.

We boldly suggest that all political parties and players in Zimbabwe come together in a national Transitional Authority, (TA). The TA should be headed by a person who can be trusted by both ZANU PF and the MDC formations. She or he must not be the leader of a registered political party. The TA will be composed of up to 15 members, ensuring geographic, ethnic, and gender balance. We believe that such an interim authority will provide a moderating voice and can pave the way for a government of national unity that can steer Zimbabwe to a more democratic dispensation, guided by a new constitution.

We therefore call upon the Southern African Development Community, supported by the African Union, and the United Nations, to bring all the parties in Zimbabwe together to discuss a move towards this interim arrangement. In this regard the South African President Mr Thabo Mbeki should continue his mediation role. It is our contention that the people of Zimbabwe are so deeply polarized yet again and can not possibly negotiate on their own.

Our position as FePEP reflects and amplifies the voices of so many women, who are tired of seeing their country torn apart by selfish male egos, the quest for unbridled power, and total disregard for citizens’ rights.


Signed,
Teresa Mugadzam, Isabella Matambanadzo, Thoko Matshe, Everjoice Win, Shereen Essof, Juliana Manjengwa, Karin Alexander, Janah Ncube, Priscllah, Misihairabwi-Mushonga Revai Makanje

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

SADC and AU - Deploy a peace keeping mission to Zimbabwe

Young Communist League

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47408

The Young Communist League of South Africa [YCLSA] had sent its delegation to Zimbabwe as observers in the recently held elections. The purpose of the mission was to make our own observation independent of various observer missions.

The delegation was led by the Deputy National Secretary, Cde. Khayelihle Nkwanyana, and comprised of 12 members of the YCLSA drawn from district, provincial and National Committees. The delegation was based in the three main regions of Zimbabwe, which are Bulawayo, Harare and the Midlands.

INTIMIDATION OF THE DELEGATION

It should be noted that the delegation observed constatnt surveillance from the Central Intelligence Officers, which led to three members of the delegation returning to South Africa before they were due. In the same vein, one members of then delegation who was based in Bulawayo was interogated by the CIO. This shows the level of intimidation that is still prevalent in Zimbabwe.

We are however pleased that the Zimbabwe government allowed our delegation to enter and leave the country without any major intereference of the mission.

We engaged various formations and structures that are active in Zimbabwe. Amongst those were our interactions with civil society organizations, the attendance of political rallies of the contesting parties. We engaged with the Youth structures such as the NYDT, student formation ZINASU and individual candidates contesting in constituencies for Parliament and Local government from all the political parties.

ABSENT CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Our observation as the YCL is that conditions towards elections were not conducive to be regarded as "free and fair elections" because of the following factors:

1. The State controlled media (the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the paper – Herald) were openly campaigning for the incumbent President, vilifying the contesting opponents and giving more TV airtime and paper spaces to the ZANU-PF.

2. No voter education done given that these elections were harmonized for the first time with Presidential, Senate, Parliament and Local government level.

3. Voters roll was not given to the opposition, this underpinned the court challenge against the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and dead people in the voters roll.

4. Delimitation of constituencies in favour of the ruling party.

5. Polling station where there was no people residing in the area.

6. The Army generals who threaten Zimbabweans that they will not support any Head of State except Mugabe.

7. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is ran by senior leaders of the Zanu PF.

The current electoral results which are displayed outside the various polling stations shows that the MDC has won this current electoral process in all the four categories. The remaining result for the Presidential contest is reported to be in favour of Morgan Tswangirai. There is fear of rigging the Presidential leg, thus the delay of the announcement of the results.

As the YCL we are calling for the ZANU PF and the current President of Zimbabwe to accept the will of the people. He must accept the outcomes without any attempt of rigging.

(The actual parliamentary votes as tabulated by the opposition has MDC-Tsvangirai at 14, Zanu at 2 and MDC-Mutambara at 1. See http://www.sokwanele.com/election2008) 

INTERVENTION BY SADC, AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS ON THE POST ELECTIONS' PROCESS

We are calling, once more, the SADC and AU to immediately deploy the peace keeping mission in Zimbabwe to avoid any instability that might be generated by the electoral outcomes. There is fear for the Kenyan situation if Mugabe force his way back. And there is fear about the Army and police staging a coup if the opposition takes the Presidency.

In this regard, we call for the immediate deployment of SADC and United Nations Peace Keeping forces so as to avert any attempt towards sinking Zimbabwe further into violence.

This should serve as a post elections process undertaken by all the parties involved in the elections and all the countries in the region.


**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

What kind of political change?

Tajudeen Abdul Raheem

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/47413

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem looks at Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF and MDC and asks whether the Zimbabwean people are being truly represented in the winds of change

I have to begin this week’s column with an open apology to a dear brother and comrade, Thomas Deve. He was one of the ‘original politburo’ of seven  idealistic young men (unfortunately  we were all men) who masterminded the organising of the 7th Pan African Congress in Kampala in 1994. The others were Napoleon Abdulai, Col. Serwanga Lwanga,  Major Ondogo ori  Amaza, Brig. Noble Mayombo Rwaboni and Myself. Our chairman was then Col. Otafiire (now Major-General, who was really  ‘utter fire’ in those days).

Sadly, of the four Ugandans in this team only one person (Otafiire) is alive today. By a coincidence all the other three non Ugandans have ended in the UN system! Is the UN where Pan Africanists retreat or resign to? The answer (s) will have to wait another time. In spite of changing trajectories we remain close both personally and politically. We generally hold similar views on political developments based on our shared political and ideological values and orientation. Most of the time none of us needed to do double checks to know where ‘the correct political line’ is. 

However twice now I have disagreed with Thomas’ judgement and twice I have had to recant. Both had to do with Zimbabwe. In 2000 I was part of the CDD delegation led by former President of Liberia, Prof Amos Sawyer, that the government of Zimbabwe had allowed to monitor the referendum. In several conversations with CSOs, National Constituent Assembly advocates, academics, journalists, opposition and government spokespersons and partisans the general conclusion was that ‘there was no way’ ZANU-PF was going to allow MDC and its allies to win the referendum. Even Morgan Tsvangirai was convinced that ‘Mugabe will not allow it’ and expressed doubts that if they won h Mugabe would put all of them in jail! 

Thomas Deve was the only one among all the people we officially interviewed who told us categorically that ZANU-PF/Mugabe was going to lose the referendum. I thought my comrade had been talking too much to disgruntled city dwellers and was taking the chattering classes for the masses. Off I went to Masvingo region where I was convinced that the rural masses as in other areas will troop out and vote for ZANU-Pf and dwarf the urban guerrilla movement of the MDC and angry CSOs. Was I not wrong?  The masses in the rural areas voted with their feet and the urban warriors were triumphant. At an African Association of Political Science (AAPS) and SARIPS  public Public Forum at Hotel Monomapata the day the result was released I had expressed my fears about the future of the country because the opposition was not prepared for Victory and the government had not been prepared for defeat. Both bore bad omen.  ZANU-PF went ahead to controversially ‘win’ the election the following year and the subsequent and has held on to power since then.

Come 2008 elections I and many other pundits repeated our ‘Mugabe will never allow the opposition to win’ mantra. He swore so himself openly. In case the world was deaf of hearing Army Commanders, Head of Police and other Security goons let it be known that they were not willing to salute a president who was not part of the Liberation war. Pity all those Zimbabweans  (demographically a majority of the population!)who missed out on the CHHIMURENGAs by being born too late. We had many discussions with Thomas and he insisted that there was  not going to be an outright winner and predicted a run off. I thought that Mugabe would not risk the humiliation of a run off.

Needless to say that Thomas was right again. How could we all have got it wrong? Could it because we have been so saturated with the 7days/24 hours highly biased reports on Zimbabwe and Mugabe that we have resigned ourselves to the devilish regime using all kinds of tricks to continue to hold on to power? One of the weaknesses of this politics of demonisation is that one becomes wedded to the doomsday scenario. Another is that we undermine and under estimate the creeping power of resistance and incremental democratic gains of the people of Zimbabwe. Even the opposition underplays its own victories (such as the reforms of the electoral processes) in order to have Mugabe permanently roasted in the court of public opinion especially in its constant pandering to Western audiences. The possibility of its victory was talked down in favour of a flawed process producing a flawed outcome . 

As in 2000 we were preparing for outright rigging by ZANU-PF which did not materialise.  Even when the much predicted violence did not happen we were still fearing it was only delayed. The Western Media and cynical reflexes about flawed elections across the continent had prepared our minds for rigging but the parliamentary results showed otherwise. The opposition’s victory then meant we had to change the script because of the potential contradiction of accepting  the parliamentary result and denying  the presidential result.

There is wrong comparison with what seemed a similar situation with the recent ‘top up’ rigging in Kenya but the real parallel is probably MKO Abiola’s denied June 12 1992 mandate  in Nigeria. In Kenya the conclusion of many independent observers has been that it was impossible to say with all certainty who had won the presidential election.  

In 1992 the Prodemocracy forces were able to unofficially publish Abiola’s result because of the ‘open secret’ ballot system that limited every polling station to a maximum of 500 voters and the requirement that each voter lined up behind their candidate’s poster and the certification of the result by all present.

It was possible to know who won by tallying the result from all polling stations which in Zimbabwe (for the first time) were required to be publicly displayed after counting. So no problem of we cannot find our returning officers as the Chairman of Kenya’s discredited Electoral Commission infamously claimed.

It now seems that in Zimbabwe the possible margin of error could swing either way. Even the MDC had only claimed it had barely met the 51% requirement. And ZANU-PF’s figures already conceded that they have not met the requirement by a few percentages. Strangely ZANU-PF had called for a rerun even before the official result is announced while the MDC now claims that it has ‘won’ and therefore there is no need for a rerun.

Is the MDC not falling into the trap of ZANU-PF and Mugabe? Are we not seeing a repeat of the referendum vote here where ZANU PF saw their defeat as a wake up call to clobber the populace into line by the time of the General elections.

Is it not clear that they are preparing for the rerun while the opposition is shuttling between the court and diplomatic capitals? I am not quite sure if the MDC will achieve anything by choosing this course. Why can’t they just go for the rerun and humiliate the Old man? 

It is to Thomas who has now earned his status as the ‘authentic guru’ that I turn for some homely clarity. His view is that the opposition may be more vulnerable  than everyone is predicting if there is a run off. If the rerun were to go against MDC what are we going to say? The only ‘solution’ we have been prepared for is Mugabe losing. One Member of the European Commission even suggested that  the EU and the rest of the international community (often used to mean EU and USA!) should recognize the result as declared by MDC. Where were they when Abiola was jailed for no other crime than winning an election? What implication does this type of ‘help’ have for the legitimacy of our institutions? 

Yes something needs to be done but what, by whom and when? And how? God knows that Mugabe is no longer part of the solution but central to problem but should he go simply because the West want him out? Should he also be holding the country to ransome in the name of defying the west even if the country is ruined? When would patriotic Zimbabweans both inside the ZANU-PF/MDC and those outside both parties say enough is enough.

How democratic is it that we hold elections with only particular outcomes in mind? Do elections ion themselves solve socio-economic and political problems Or they just reflect them? Were Hitler and Mussolini not elected? 

Instead of looking at ZANU or MDC victory is it not possible to conclude that Zimbabweans like Kenyans are tired of winner takes all politics by not giving overwhelming mandate to either the tired gerontocrat or his prodigal sons and daughters in the MDC?

Before you start following the Afropessimists’ please reflect that Kenya, Zimbabwe or Nigeria and their controversial Elections are not the only way . Botswana just had a transition from one president (voluntarily retiring one year before his term) and giving way to another without any fuss. It was so normal to the people of Botswana that it did not even make much news. 

Is Mugabe revolutionary enough to liberate himself from power and national suicide and bow out even at this late stage with some dignity or he will wait to be humiliated whatever the outcome of the result?

From Nigeria through Kenya  and now passing through Zimbabwe it is now clear that elections in themselves, important they may be, are not as decisive as the power to ‘announce’ the official result. How can we guarantee the integrity of this all powerful messenger? 


*Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem writes this column as a Pan Africanist.

**Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Africa stand up, clean up your act!

Alfred Mafuleka

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/47417

Zimbabwe remains a sensitive issue, that has been allowed to fester to almost unredeemable proportions. But it is the people of Zimbabwe who must stand up and be counted. Yes, they need support from all of us in Africa and the world, but they must know that they have the power to decide how they want their country to move forward.

It is clear that the outgoing ruling elite of Zanu-PF is not willing to let go of power. The irony of the situation in Zimbabwe is that you hear of only one man, who runs the show there! Who are the side-kicks? Who are the pretenders to the throne? Does that mean there is no other potential leader to take over, as in all cases it is Mugabe being put forward? Does he ever consult or get any second opinion from party members? Is there space for such opinion or advice?

My opinion is that Mugabe has become a liability for Zanu-PF, hence people like Simba Makoni and others decided to jump ship, though very late! But it is disappointing that in Africa, leaders are doing what is not in the interest of their people! They don't seem to take advice kindly if they get it at all!

Why are both the AU and SADC silent when such clear electoral transgressions as happened in Kenya and Zimbabwe take place? Is this the closing of ranks among the elite? President Mbeki said "the situation in Zimbabwe is manageable", really so? How do you prepare for a run-off when the results are unknown, have not been released? Shouldn't a run-off take only after a tie? Who is fooling who here?

Africa stand up, clean up your act!

Kenya Zimbabwe solidarity

Hlatywayo Kudzaishe Hlatywayo

2008-04-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/47416

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kenyan civil society for their solidarity [Kenyans call and solidarity with Zimbabwe, ]http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/47089] Indeed Zimbabwe is too big to be left to Zimbabweans alone and all people world over have the duty to at least denounce the evil and ensure the good triumphs.Your words of solidarity and encouragement is a source of hope and strength to most activists in Zimbabwe.

Fahamu