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The destruction of African agriculture

2008-08-05

Walden Bello

Biofuel production is certainly one of the culprits in the current global food crisis. But while the diversion of corn from food to biofuel feedstock has been a factor in food prices shooting up, the more primordial problem has been the conversion of economies that are largely food-self-sufficient into chronic food importers. Here the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) figure as much more important villains.

Whether in Latin America, Asia, or Africa, the story has been the same: the destabilization of peasant producers by a one-two punch of IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programs that gutted government investment in the countryside followed by the massive influx of subsidized U.S. and European Union agricultural imports after the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture pried open markets.

African agriculture is a case study of how doctrinaire economics serving corporate interests can destroy a whole continent’s productive base.

FROM EXPORTER TO IMPORTER

At the time of decolonization in the 1960s, Africa was not just self-sufficient in food but was actually a net food exporter, its exports averaging 1.3 million tons a year between 1966-70. Today, the continent imports 25% of its food, with almost every country being a net food importer. Hunger and famine have become recurrent phenomena, with the last three years alone seeing food emergencies break out in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa, and Central Africa.

Agriculture is in deep crisis, and the causes are many, including civil wars and the spread of HIV-AIDS. However, a very important part of the explanation was the phasing out of government controls and support mechanisms under the structural adjustment programs to which most African countries were subjected as the price for getting IMF and World Bank assistance to service their external debt.

Instead of triggering a virtuous spiral of growth and prosperity, structural adjustment saddled Africa with low investment, increased unemployment, reduced social spending, reduced consumption, and low output, all combining to create a vicious cycle of stagnation and decline.

Lifting price controls on fertilizers while simultaneously cutting back on agricultural credit systems simply led to reduced applications, lower yields, and lower investment. One would have expected the non-economist to predict this outcome, which was screened out by the Bank and Fund’s free-market paradigm. Moreover, reality refused to conform to the doctrinal expectation that the withdrawal of the state would pave the way for the market and private sector to dynamize agriculture. Instead, the private sector believed that reducing state expenditures created more risk and failed to step into the breach. In country after country, the predictions of neoliberal doctrine yielded precisely the opposite: the departure of the state “crowded out” rather than “crowded in” private investment. In those instances where private traders did come in to replace the state, an Oxfam report noted, “they have sometimes done so on highly unfavorable terms for poor farmers,” leaving “farmers more food insecure, and governments reliant on unpredictable aid flows.” The usually pro-private sector Economist agreed, admitting that “many of the private firms brought in to replace state researchers turned out to be rent-seeking monopolists.”

What support the government was allowed to muster was channeled by the Bank to export agriculture – to generate the foreign exchange earnings that the state needed to service its debt to the Bank and the Fund. But, as in Ethiopia during the famine of the early 1980s, this led to the dedication of good land to export crops, with food crops forced into more and more unsuitable soil, thus exacerbating food insecurity. Moreover, the Bank’s encouraging several economies undergoing adjustment to focus on export production of the same crops simultaneously often led to overproduction that then triggered a price collapse in international markets. For instance, the very success of Ghana’s program to expand cocoa production triggered a 48% drop in the international price of cocoa between 1986 and 1989, threatening, as one account put it, “to increase the vulnerability of the entire economy to the vagaries of the cocoa market [1]." In 2002-2003, a collapse in coffee prices contributed to another food emergency in Ethiopia.

As in many other regions, structural adjustment in Africa was not simply underinvestment but state divestment. But there was one major difference. In Latin America and Asia, the Bank and Fund confined themselves for the most part to macromanagement, or supervising the dismantling of the state’s economic role from above. These institutions left the dirty details of implementation to the state bureaucracies. In Africa, where they dealt with much weaker governments, the Bank and Fund micromanaged such decisions as how fast subsidies should be phased out, how many civil servants had to be fired, or even, as in the case of Malawi, how much of the country’s grain reserve should be sold and to whom. In other words, Bank and IMF resident proconsuls reached into the very innards of the state’s involvement in the agricultural economy to rip it up.

THE ROLE OF TRADE

Compounding the negative impact of adjustment were unfair trade practices on the part of the EU and the United States. Trade liberalization allowed low-priced subsidized EU beef to enter and drive many West African and South African cattle raisers to ruin. With their subsidies legitimized by the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, U.S. cotton growers offloaded their cotton on world markets at 20-55% of the cost of production, bankrupting West African and Central African cotton farmers in the process [2].

These dismal outcomes were not accidental. As then-U.S. Agriculture Secretary John Block put it at the start of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1986, “the idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on U.S. agricultural products, which are available, in most cases at lower cost [3]."

What Block did not say was that the lower cost of U.S. products stemmed from subsidies that were becoming more massive each year, despite the fact that the WTO was supposed to phase out all forms of subsidy. From $367 billion in 1995, the first year of the WTO, the total amount of agricultural subsidies provided by developed country governments rose to $388 billion in 2004. Subsidies nowaccount for 40% of the value of agricultural production in the European Union (EU) and 25% in the United States.

The social consequences of structural adjustment cum agricultural dumping were predictable. According to Oxfam, the number of Africans living on less than a dollar a day more than doubled to 313 million people between 1981 and 2001 – or 46% of the whole continent. The role of structural adjustment in creating poverty, as well as severely weakening the continent’s agricultural base and consolidating import dependency, was hard to deny. As the World Bank’s chief economist for Africaadmitted, “We did not think that the human costs of these programs could be so great, and the economic gains would be so slow in coming [4]."

That was, however, a rare moment of candor. What was especially disturbing was that, as Oxford University political economist Ngaire Woods pointed out, the “seeming blindness of the Fund and Bank to the failure of their approach to sub-Saharan Africa persisted even as the studies of the IMF and the World Bank themselves failed to elicit positive investment effects [5]."

THE CASE OF MALAWI

This stubbornness led to tragedy in Malawi.

It was a tragedy preceded by success. In 1998 and 1999, the government initiated a program to give each smallholder family a “starter pack” of free fertilizers and seeds. This followed several years of successful experimentation in which the packs were provided only to the poorest families. The result was a national surplus of corn. What came after, however, is a story that will be enshrined as a classic case study in a future book on the 10 greatest blunders of neoliberal economics.

The World Bank and other aid donors forced the drastic scaling down and eventual scrapping of the program, arguing that the subsidy distorted trade. Without the free packs, food output plummeted. In the meantime, the IMF insisted that the government sell off a large portion of its strategic grain reserves to enable the food reserve agency to settle its commercial debts. The government complied. When the crisis in food production turned into a famine in 2001-2002, there were hardly any reserves left to rush to the countryside. About1,500 people perished. The IMF, however, was unrepentant; in fact, it suspended its disbursements on an adjustment program with the government on the grounds that “the parastatal sector will continue to pose risks to the successful implementation of the 2002/03 budget. Government interventions in the food and other agricultural markets…crowd out more productive spending.”

When an even worse food crisis developed in 2005, the government finally had enough of the Bank and IMF’s institutionalized stupidity. A new president reintroduced the fertilizer subsidy program, enabling two million households to buy fertilizer at a third of the retail price and seeds at a discount. The results: bumper harvests for two years in a row, a surplus of one million tons of maize, and the country transformed into a supplier of corn to other countries in Southern Africa.

But the World Bank, like its sister agency, still stubbornly clung to the discredited doctrine. As the Bank’s country director toldthe Toronto Globe and Mail, “All those farmers who begged, borrowed, and stole to buy extra fertilizer last year are now looking at that decision and rethinking it. The lower the maize price, the better for food security but worse for market development.”

FLEEING FAILURE

Malawi’s defiance of the World Bank would probably have been an act of heroic but futile resistance a decade ago. The environment is different today. Owing to the absence of any clear case of success, structural adjustment has been widely discredited throughout Africa. Even some donor governments that once subscribed to it have distanced themselves from the Bank, the most prominent case being the official British aid agency that co-funded the latest subsidized fertilizer program in Malawi. Perhaps the motivation of these institutions is to prevent the further erosion of their diminishing influence in the continent through association with a failed approach and unpopular institutions. At the same time, they are certainly aware that Chinese aid is emerging as an alternative to the conditionalities of the World Bank, IMF, and Western government aid programs.

Beyond Africa, even former supporters of adjustment, like the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington and the rabidly neoliberal Economistacknowledged that the state’s abdication from agriculture was a mistake. In a recent commentary on the rise of food prices, for instance, IFPRI asserted that “rural investments have been sorely neglected in recent decades,” and says that it is time for “developing country governments [to] increase their medium- and long-term investments in agricultural research and extension, rural infrastructure, and market access for small farmers.” At the same time, the Bank and IMF’s espousal of free trade came under attack from the heart of the economics establishment itself, with a panel of luminaries headed by Princeton’s Angus Deaton accusing the Bank’s research department of being biased and “selective” in its research and presentation of data. As the old saying goes, success has a thousand parents and failure is an orphan. Unable to deny the obvious, the Bank has finally acknowledged that the whole structural adjustment enterprise was a mistake, though it smuggled this concession into the middle of the 2008 World Development Report, perhaps in the hope that it would not attract too much attention. Nevertheless, it was a damning admission:

Structural adjustment in the 1980’s dismantled the elaborate system of public agencies that provided farmers with access to land, credit, insurance inputs, and cooperative organization. The expectation was that removing the state would free the market for private actors to take over these functions—reducing their costs, improving their quality, and eliminating their regressive bias. Too often, that didn’t happen. In some places, the state’s withdrawal was tentative at best, limiting private entry. Elsewhere, the private sector emerged only slowly and partially—mainly serving commercial farmers but leaving smallholders exposed to extensive market failures, high transaction costs and risks, and service gaps. Incomplete markets and institutional gaps impose huge costs in forgone growth and welfare losses for smallholders, threatening their competitiveness and, in many cases, their survival.

In sum, biofuel production did not create but only exacerbated the global food crisis. The crisis had been building up for years, as policies promoted by the World Bank, IMF, and WTO systematically discouraged food self-sufficiency and encouraged food importation by destroying the local productive base of smallholder agriculture. Throughout Africa and the global South, these institutions and the policies they promoted are today thoroughly discredited. But whether the damage they have caused can be undone in time to avert more catastrophic consequences than we are now experiencing remains to be seen.


*Walden Bello is a senior analyst at Focus on the Global South, a program of Chulalongkorn University's Social Research Institute, and a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org) where this article first appeared under the title, "Destroying African Agriculture."

*Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/


Notes:

1. Charles Abugre, “Behind Crowded Shelves: as Assessment of Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Experiences, 1983-1991,” (San Francisco: food First, 1993), p. 87.

2. “Trade Talks Round Going Nowhere sans Progress in Farm Reform,” Business World (Phil), Sept. 8, 2003, p. 15

3. Quoted in “Cakes and Caviar: the Dunkel Draft and Third World Agriculture,” Ecologist, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 1993), p. 220

4. Morris Miller, Debt and the Environment: Converging Crisis (New York: UN, 1991), p. 70.

5. Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers (Thaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 158.

Food shortages: stories of strife across the globe

2008-08-05

Azad Essa

The current food crisis has been heralded as the worst since the 1970s. Ordinary people, from South Africa to Egypt, India to Turkey, have been forced to make severe adjustments to their lives to deal with food hikes that continue to rise exponentially since late 2007. A combination of complex factors, including poor harvests, higher energy prices and unprecedented demands exceeding supplies, amongst other contributing factors have led to the current condition. The world is a different place compared to the 1970s though; it is a vastly connected and interdependent globe, highly networked, largely dependent on the dictums of the logic of globalization, where chinks in supplies have a ricocheting effect across the globe, including the first world. We know that such increases have resulted in lifestyle changes and increased vulnerability for those at the bottom, but how similar are these struggles and experiences? The IOLS-Research Unit, UKZN bring together a collection of real stories of how ordinary people are being affected by the current spate of food and oil hikes, compiled by Azad Essa.

MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA

DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA by Nomkhosi Xulu

Margaret Shabalala*, 85, is a pensioner and the breadwinner of her household. She lives with two of her unemployed children who are in their mid 40s. She has four grandchildren, all high school graduates, but unemployed, except one. "Whenever I get my pension I have to carefully distribute each and every cent so that all in the family gets some share, said Ms Shabalala. "Obviously my pension is unable to cover buying the food for such a big family. From my pension at the end of the month, I try to buy basic foodstuff like rice, flour, maize meal, oil and sugar. These are the kind of things that should last us for the whole month, but that does not really happen. Sometimes I am left with nothing and I can't even go to church as taxi fares are also increasing with everything else."

"Things are not the same anymore," she continues, "our life situation just keeps on getting worse. I only wish that things were different. I am old and sick and have hardly anything to eat because of rising food prices. My daughters and grandchildren are looking for employment but that is not helping as well. Instead it is emptying our pockets for bus fare and photocopying, faxing and posting of CVs. I even tried looking for land in order to plant vegetables but have not yet succeeded. Every now and then I try to encourage my family to boil food as that will save oil. Things are really bad."

*name changed
DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA by Samira Banoo

Busi Mhlongo*, 30, a Malawian national, is employed at a carwash in one of Durban's suburbs. Unable to support her family with the basic income earned in Malawi, she chose to emigrate to South Africa in 2007, in search of better employment opportunities. When she first arrived in Durban she rented a bedroom in a house near her workplace. Today, the same room has to be shared by two more women. Busi confirmed that the reality in South Africa is not any different than in her country, "When I arrived I could afford my own room but today it's almost impossible; I barely managed to pay my rent, most of my money goes in food."

Her reality, like that of many others is mainly due to the fact that she has not received a raise in the last year. As she says, 'I only earn R300 per week with which I have to pay for food, rent and send money back home. It's hard because everything is gone up, rice, maize, milk and bread, but my wages hasn't. Even the price of cooking oil has trebled since January, we have to use the same oil three times.''

*name changed

ISTANBUL, TURKEY by Tamer Söyler

Derya Gundogan, 56, a retired government clerk, complained that his pay was Ytl.1.200 ($970) in 2007, and after one year he had only Ytl.70 ($56) increase in retirement salary whereas fuel increased by 15%. He manages a smile as he explains, "After the economic crisis of 2001, all of us became economy experts, and this had a direct effect on my life. They say, the transportation costs had raised and this triggered the food prices. Come with me I'll show you." Derya dragged me to the closest food market to prove his point. He asked the manager of the food store, a friend of his, to give us the exact prices of some of the food items from June 2007 and June 2008. "Look, you know in Turkey there are typical things we eat, I will just ask him about these only" he said. He starts reading from a list, "Bread, from Ytl. 0.40 ($0.32) to Ytl. 0.50 ($0.40); sugar, Ytl 1.80 ($1.45) to Ytl 2.15 ($1.73); 5 kg olive oil, Ytl. 35 ($28) to Ytl. 41 ($33); 5 kg sunflower oil, Ytl. 20 ($16) to Ytl. 28.90 ($23); rice, Ytl. 2.95 ($2.37) to Ytl. 3.75 ($3) etc."

Derya continued, "you don't need to be a genius to see the problem. Today my monthly expenses, meaning just my basic living expenses, have gone up to Ytl 1.300 ($1044) in total. This is more than my income! This means we are having a diet, but an unhealthy one!" When asked about the Turkish government's attitude regarding the economic condition, Derya became angry, "I don't like the ideology of (the ruling) Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) and Prime Minister Erdogan, but because they did well with the economy I voted for them the last time. But their second term is totally different to their first term. After the 2001 crisis the priority was economy. Now, God knows what their priorities are!"

DAMASCUS, SYRIA by Bilal Randeree

Abu Maajid*, in his 80s, runs a small supermarket, selling basic groceries, cool drinks, snacks and odds and ends. He used to sell Egyptian rice (Zarzour) for SYL30 ($0.59) per kg and claims that the price has increased steadily to SYL90 ($1.77) per kg. 'But not for long, it will go up again soon. I just know it!' He used to sell 100kg of rice a week and now he sells anything around 5 to 10 kg a week.

Many people have stopped eating rice and now eat local wheat known as 'Burghur'. Even this has gone up from SYL20 ($0.39) to SYL50 ($1) per kg so sales have only marginally increased. 'One customer is my friend- he told me he is now eating just tomato and bread! Things are really bad and people are suffering', says Abu Maajid in broken English.

Canisters of gas used to sell for SYL175 ($3.50) when the cost price was SYL150 ($3). Now the government outlet is selling it for SYL275 ($5.50), the man who transports it adds on SYL25 ($0.50) and it's sold for SYL325 ($6.40) with a SYL25 ($0.50) mark-up. 'Petrol is the problem', he says. But he has no idea why the petrol price has gone up or who is to blame. There is no time to worry about that and there is nothing one can do but just try to work harder.

In some shops the employees make more than the owners. But jobs are not easy to find - his four married sons are all struggling to get proper jobs. The supermarket used to give him SYL10 ($0.20) profit for every SYL100 ($2) of sales- this has now dropped to 5%, and with the drop in sales, it is really tough to make ends meet. He has not paid the last four electricity bills and his phone has been cut because he couldn't pay the bill. He forces me to take the phone and listen - the line is dead and I'm greeted only by silence.

*name changed

CAIRO, EGYPT by Julten Abdelhalim

Muhammad Yusuf, 28, works as a janitor in a residential building in Cairo. Though he has an intermediate Diploma in Technical Education, he could never find any job that uses his qualifications. He earns less than a hundred US dollars per month He is responsible for a family composed of 8 individuals; his parents, his wife, his baby daughter, and his younger siblings whose education he is supposed to pay for. Since the age of 15, he has been working in low paid blue-collar jobs to ensure that his family meets their basic needs of food and education. He stresses that wages in Egypt, for the majority of the population, are ridiculously low. This is if anyone finds a respectable job in the first place. His wife has a BA in literature, however, it is impossible for her to find any job. He works 18 hours a day, and still he cannot afford to get a medical radiological examination for his wife who is sick. He says he cannot even describe his situation. It is not just food prices, all prices are soaring and wages remain low. No words can depict the suffering of young people of his age. He stresses the fact that he is simply "too exhausted and suffocated from everything".

CAIRO, EGYPT by Radwa Rabie

Nadi Atteya, 44, a doorman, lives in the security room at the bottom of an upmarket residential building in modern Cairo. Nadi has been living with his wife and four young sons in Cairo for the last 17 years. He left his small village a long time ago, and worked for some years as a builder, but after his contract ended he battled to find another job.

Nadi's monthly payment from guarding the building is 200 EGP ($38). This is supposed to cover their livings, food, buying clothing, and paying the school fees for his three young boys. "A few good people help me with it, otherwise I could not make it." Nadi says. Nadi explains further, "One kilo of meat is EGP40 ($7), but my monthly income is just EGP200 ($37), and the prices of everything else is increasing, like sugar, oil, meat, but my payment has not increased. It was increased a year ago from EGP150 ($28) to EGP200 ($37) and it remains there. Honestly, we have not tried the apricots this year still. One kilo is EGP4 ($0.75), and I have growing boys, and one kilo of such a fruit will not be enough. They used to like it, but now I have to substitute fruit with other basic items."

To provide protein for his growing boys, Nadi has begun resorting recently to substituting their meat diet with beans and potato. Once a week they could get a chicken, but in a family of six, it is hard to imagine one chicken weighing 1.5 kilos filling the hunger or appetite of all.

TUNIS, TUNISIA by Sebastian Veit

Sabrina Hajri, 26, a single mother in Tunis, struggles to survive. Although some prices like baguette and fuel are controlled and subsidised, the recent increase of prices effecting people in the low income groups is taking its toll. In Tunisia, there is no support program for single mothers; women support groups do not practically exist. The average wage for someone in Tunisia without any significant educational background is around US$200 to 300.

She explains her situation, almost reduced to tears, "Life is very tough for us here. I don't know how to make ends meet even though I am working hard every day cleaning other people's houses. I am counting every cent, but food & transport and rent are exceeding the little I am making". Often, during our conversation, she reminds me that she can no longer afford basic essentials like milk or tomatoes.

KAKOLA, TANZANIA by Mohamed Raiman

Caleb Lukaka, 28, works as a casual employee wherever he can find work. He lives with his wife and two children, aged 8 and 6, in a rented two-room, mud brick house. He has worked as a gardener and as a cleaner but has spent large periods of time either unemployed or doing odd jobs. Currently, he works as a cleaner in a clinic and earns 647 shillings an hour (50 US cents). He works 12 hours a day, with a 1 hour unpaid lunch break, and no benefits. He earns about TZS150 000 ($127) a month, of which TZS30 000 ($26) goes for taxes and rent. He buys all the food for his family of four from the village market – a diet that comprises largely of vegetables with the occasional meat or fish. Food costs about TZS3000 ($2.60) a day, amounting to 75% of his remaining salary. About a year ago, the same food was costing him about half of what he pays today (TZS1500 ($1.27) per day) or 38% of his salary. His salary has increased only slightly since last year, and now, with the majority of his income going to food, he has little money for clothing, medical expenses, school fees, books etc. Caleb doesn't always have a stable income, but he always has hungry mouths to feed.


ASIA:

BHOPAL, INDIA by Reva Prakash

Irawati Yadav, age 50, is a homemaker. She sometimes helps her son look after their small vegetable shop in Chunabhatti, Bhopal. The increases in the price of essential commodities have made life very difficult over the last few months. Earlier, the profit margins were modest and earnings amounted to around Rs.100-150 ($2.30 - $3.50) per day. But now, Irawati laments that it is difficult to even recover the amount spent on buying the vegetables. Potatoes have doubled in price in the last three months, while prices of tomatoes and onions have skyrocketed, trebling in the same duration. As there are no savings, the family can only afford to buy enough for a few days. They do not have enough money to buy wholesale in order to partially insulate themselves from prices that are increasing by the day. Irawati knows fully well that they are at the receiving end of processes over which they have no control but wonders why the prices of big cars haven't risen the way it has for essential commodities.

Buyers troubled by the price rise themselves bargain with Irawati, to decrease the price even if by one rupee. But she is relentless and says, "Buyers do not understand that the prices are not under my control. I go with my husband every morning to mandi (wholesale market for vegetable, fruit and grains) on a bus to buy the little that we can from his daily earnings, which range from Rs65 to Rs100 ($1.50 – $2.50) per day. These days we buy only five kilos of each vegetable because people everywhere are cutting corners to make ends meet. Then the cost of bus tickets has also increased by one rupee. The rent for the shop is fixed at Rs500 and I suspect that it might also increase in the days to come. I do not understand how I will be able to recover the cost if I sell for less. I, also, have to feed my family." She is worried that they might be pushed to the brink of hunger and poverty in the months to come

JAIPUR, INDIA by Nishtha Prakash and Flora Saint-Sans

Gayatri Sharma, 47, guard of the Sun Temple in the Pink City, runs her home through chadhava (offerings) and her husband's income as a clerk in one of the government banks. The family struggles between making ends meet, and maintaining their social status.

"The poor can live on onions and bread. We can't. We live on the most simple diet, but we make sure that our guests are served the best meals. She continues, "The prices of oil, pulses, wheat and salt – all indispensable ingredients in Indian cooking – have doubled in just one year. In just two months, sugar price has gone up from Rs16 ($0.37) to Rs20 ($0.46) per kg. Most of the spices cost twice as much today as they did a year ago. If food prices rise further, we cannot possibly cut down more on our basic diet – all the family members will have to work and contribute to the family income".

Sunil, a relative of Gayatri's, used to come up to the temple with his friends often and cook daal-baati (a Rajasthani delicacy made out of pulses and flour) for dinner. Now they don't do that anymore – they would rather save the money. Gayatri doesn't buy fruit as she used to before. Both Gayatri's and Sunil's families stick to their staple diet – delicacies like kheer (an Indian dessert made of rice and milk) are not affordable. They also go without an air cooler even on the hottest days for it saves the electricity costs. Unable to save anything, both Gayatri and Sunil's only investment in the future is investing in their children.

SUZHOU, CHINA by Huang Yue

Min Li*, 40, has been working as a taxi driver in Suzhou, a city in South East China, for the past six years.

Every alternate day, Min awakens at 7am and gets into his blue Santana car with anxiety on his face. He needs to work till 1 or 2am the next day to make ends meet. He normally takes the next day off to recover before he goes to work again, and continue the cycle: every week, every month, every year.

Supporting his nuclear family was relatively under control, until last year, that is. Since 2007, food prices have increased exponentially in China, Min points out, especially basic necessities like vegetables and meat. What has been the killer though, is the sudden rise in petroleum prices to unbelievably high levels, which has obviously hit taxi drivers very hard.

"We used to pay about RMB200 ($30) for gas everyday. And now we need to pay RMB250 ($36) or more, which is almost one third of our daily turnover. Apart from the cost of other things, we will lose RMB40-50 ($5-7) per day, RMB700-800 ($100-120) per month and RMB8000-10000 ($1200-1500) per year after the oil price markup", complained Min, knowing well that life must simply go on.

*name changed

SINGAPORE CITY, SINGAPORE by Karen Yeo

KK Yeo, 58, runs a transportation services business. KK is still servicing a mortgage for his flat, which he bought 9 years ago. He has three children in their late-twenties and early thirties. Desiring to be financially independent from his children, KK Yeo does not want his children to help service the mortgage for his flat. Therefore, he continues to provide a one-man transportation services, including the transportation of recycled goods for import and export.

He said that the increased prices, particularly fuel prices, have drastically affected his business. He used to own 3 trucks and hire 2-3 drivers for his transportation business 4 years ago. However, he had to sell off the trucks and let the drivers go due to increased overhead costs. Although he continues to meet his target revenue of SGD$3000 ($2200) monthly, KK Yeo says that it is no longer possible for him to save the SGD$1000 ($734) monthly that he used to save previously. Instead, he is finding it difficult to save even SGD$500 ($367) per month. When asked about what he intended to do with his savings, he replied that he had to prepare for "rainy days", including possible medical bills, which continue to soar. He sardonically commented that, "In Singapore, if you have no money, you better not fall sick. It would be better to die than to be suffering, broke and being a burden to everyone else around you."

His truck runs on diesel fuel and a full tank used to cost SGD$180 ($132), but now costs SGD$360 ($264). With this 100% increase in his fuel costs, he has chosen to mark up his service charges from the previous SGD$50-80 ($36 –$58) per trip to the current SGD$80-100 ($58-$73) per trip. To cut fuel usage, he avoids making multiple trips, but instead plans his routes carefully such that he can service 5-6 customers per trip. These, he concedes, means that the customer volume has dwindled. To meet his target revenue each month, he works 12-16 hours daily. He has also secured a contract transporting goods and materials to and from the port and the warehouses every Thursday from 4 a.m. to 6 a.m. KK Yeo cuts down his personal expenses by buying cheaper food from canteens and coffee shops. Instead of buying cigarettes which costs about SGD$11 ($8) per packet of 20 from the shops, he has chosen to purchase contrabands at half the price. He admits that this is illegal, but says that, "everyone is doing something illegal to cut costs. It is a risk I am willing to take."


AUSTRALIA:

SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA by Elizabeth Lyburn

O.J., in his fifties, operates a small business in Sydney, Australia, of home-delivering fruit and vegetables to clients in the cities' southern suburbs. Four mornings each week, he makes the trip out to the produce market at Flemington, hand-picks the necessary items, returns home to pack the orders over lunch, and delivers them in the afternoons when his clients arrive home from work.

While the rise in oil prices, the global food shortage and – in Australia – the on-going drought have been cited in the media as responsible for the rising price of fresh produce, O.J. says this is largely "rubbish". His fuel costs, he estimates, have risen only AUD$ 7 ($6.70) per week – which he says he could easily off-set by picking up one or two more customers – but he concedes for major transport companies it is much more of a burden, and likely to be reflected in rising supermarket prices for such items.

He still believes we are paying too much for our food though, but have other culprits to blame: the stall holders at Flemington markets. How? According to O.J., most of the stalls have belonged to the families who run them for a hundred years or more; and it is very tough to buy in. Flemington is also the third largest market of its kind in the world: overkill for a city of only 4 million people. Most food bought in Sydney will thus come from there. The result is lack of competition, and allegations of informal price fixing.

The much-hyped drought has largely affected livestock and grain farmers, making meat and cereals more expensive but not causing serious harm to the fruit and vegetable sector. The biggest threat he sees come from freak natural occurrences, such the recent floods in Queensland, that effectively wiped out a seasons' worth of mandarins and caused the price to triple overnight – a phenomenon that he laments city people simply can't understand because they don't bother to think about it.


EUROPE:

BERLIN, GERMANY by Katharina Weltecke

Firat Kurt, 24, runs a small döner kebab diner named Ali Baba together with his father Kemal and brother Cahit, one of many families of Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg, Berlin. All three acknowledge that their business is going slow. The price of dairy products and meat are becoming unbearable. As Firat says, "the cost for meat jumped up € 0.20 ($0.36) per kilo at least'. Once upon a time döner was prepared with more luxurious lamb, but tradition is proving to be too expensive; chicken will have to do. The anxiety of the Kurt family isn't an irregularity in Germany. The situation has even given birth to a new word in the press to describe the situation, 'Lebensmittelkrise' or food crisis.

"The price I pay for a box of salad varies from € 6 ($9.50) one week to € 12 ($19) the next. I can't make a calculation on the basis of such chaos'. A growing question is whether to raise the price of their döners, but Firat says making this decision is difficult, "the competition in Berlin is tough, too many of us migrants are involved in the same business". Consequently, customers rarely experience the increases. They come and go every week paying the same € 2.50 ($4) for döner. Firat argues that they do not want to risk losing their customers, but this does come with consequences. All seven employees are brothers, cousins and uncles coming from the same village close to Konya, and the small family business earns less to support them all.

Firat now regrets not completing secondary school and says he lacks skills dealing with wholesale and retail. 'I don't have proper training, nobody ever told us how to react in a situation like this'. He fears he does not have enough knowledge or background information and is at the mercy of international politics. "We are angry, very angry. Also about ourselves because we feel helpless" Firat admits.

MEDIAS, ROMANIA by Ercument Celik

Dumitru Popescu*, 50, works in the construction sector. A few years ago he wanted to apply for early retirement, but after seeing that the retired have the worst living standards in the country he decided to keep on working. Although Romania has rich natural gas resources, he says the increase in food prices in the country is mainly due to the price increases in natural gas and petrol, which are used in production and in the transport of processed food items such as sugar and sunflower oil. The price of 1kg of sugar has increased from Lei 2.70 ($1.20) to Lei 3.8 ($1.65) in one year. As they cannot afford olive oil they primarily use sunflower oil whose price has doubled as well. He is thankful that the bread has a constant price because of government's subsidies. Dumitru remarks that eating is culturally very important, that is why they have to accept these prices and try to save money from other expenditures. But he and his wife have already forgotten what healthy food is. They can go to a restaurant only once or twice a year. Like many other people they try to grow their own vegetables and fruit in their small garden. However, they still have to buy some of them. For example, they used to buy tomatoes from the local market, but now it is cheaper in the new supermarket-chains, which sell imported ones of poor quality. In general, they look for discounts in various supermarkets to fight price increases, but it actually does not help. Dumitru drives to the villages close to the city to buy milk directly from the farmers since he pays Lei 2.50 ($1.10) for one litre instead of paying Lei 3.70 ($1.60) at the supermarkets. He says "I cannot believe how everything became so expensive in the last year. In Romania nobody is dying from hunger at the moment, but I feel very sad when I see my retired colleagues fighting hard to survive".

*name changed

TRENTO, ITALY by Arianna Baldo

Armando Pedevilla, 57, is the owner of a little transport company situated in northern Italy, that imports/exports perishables all over Europe. Armando deals daily with the problems related to oil prices.

He argues that, "in the last six months the oil price increased by over €0.30 ($0.47) per liter. One single truck needs hundreds of liters of fuel daily […] then you have to think that my trucks transport mostly fruit and vegetables, which, in addition, need to be stored in refrigerated trailers that work with fuel as well." Armando tries to explain how hard it is to continuously bargain and re-bargain freight charges with clients vis-à-vis the higher transport costs due to fuel price increases. This, according to him, also explains why wholesale dealers are gradually less keen to buy imported goods and, at the same time, consumers are less tempted to buy as much as they used to do.

"Fruit and especially vegetables have become luxury goods" continues Armando, "and transporting them around is getting difficult. It is a paradox that me and my family are living in everyday life: on one hand I have to ask for higher transport prices in order to give my business a chance to survive, and on the other I have to suffer from the same cause when going to shop at the market, and my wife has to spend at least a couple of extra Euros just to buy bread…just to buy the most essential elements: flour, water and salt. We transporters are probably going to strike again at the end of the month. Food is becoming so expensive that the entire population should strike!" suggests Armando, leaving aside for a moment his entrepreneur's seriousness to give a bittersweet laugh.

*name changed


AMERICA(2):

BOGOTA ORTEGA, COLOMBIA by Ana MacNaught

Hugo*, 54 of Bogota, Colombia says that from July 1st, the price of fuel that is due to go up once more, is sure to add to his economic woes. In the past year, it has increased by more than 10%. While he does not own a car, his wife's vehicle is costing more and more, becoming quite a burden on the monthly family budget. To deal with the increase in general goods, Hugo and his wife have switched supermarkets, shopping in less hygienic but cheaper stores.

He says that supermarkets they used to frequent are today owned by European trans-nationals and the prices of all goods have increased to the point that buying goods in such supermarkets is often more than 400% more. Hugo says that it is a misconception that just the lower classes are being affected by such shifts in prices, the middle classes are feeling the pinch as well, many of whom are rapidly changing the way they live and spend.

*name changed

TORONTO, CANADA by Aimee Holmes

Wazhma, in her early thirties manages a small variety store in Toronto, specializing in a variety of fresh produce and foods from around the world. The rise in food prices have not spared her shop. "Tomatoes have gone through the roof," she laments, citing customer concern with a recent salmonella outbreak in the United States. Most of the produce she gets from the States has gone up in price, some rapidly. "We used to buy a case of watermelons for $200. Now it's $400." Customers seem willing to accept the price increase in some foods but simply refuse to buy others. A year ago she was selling two cases of flat beans a week. These days it's one every two weeks. "People don't want to spend $2.99 a pound for beans." With tangerines it's even worse and she may have to stop stocking them altogether as the minimal profit margin is simply not worth the trouble. Still, the prices in her shop are notably lower than what the major grocery stores offer. She returns to her work with a smile, "We're trying."

*Azad Essa is a journalist and researcher at IOLS-Research, UKZN.

*Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

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Food crisis: Where is the African strategy?

2008-08-05

Mammo Muchie

“The elevation of an agricultural people to the condition of countries at once agricultural, manufacturing and commercial, can only be accompanied under the law of free trade, when the various nations engaged at the time of manufacturing industry shall be in the same degree of progress and civilization; when they shall place no obstacle in the way of the economical development of each other, and not impede their respective progress by war or adverse commercial legislation.” - Friedrich List, in the National System of Political Economy

People often say when Africans argue for an integrated national African economy, they are self-indulgent entertaining nothing but a futile illusion. They claim that to argue that Africa must unite economically, ‘knowledge-ically’, politically, and ’society-ically’ is to day-dream and to give in to fantasy. They assert that Africa does not exist in anything, form or shape other than as a geographical accident.

Of course, they would hardly say this of the USA, for example, where 'the tribes of the whole world’, and people have united under one constitution and national flag, and right now seemingly poised to electing an African –American with a father from Kenya! To claim more than a geographical reality to Africa is often condemned and reproached. The pursuit of African integration is said to be a too pie in the sky dream, fantasy, utopian, unrealistic, which distracts from taking realistic incremental actions. Thus, going for unity on a big scale is pronounced dangerous!
AFRICA IS TO RICH BUT ALSO SO POOR!

A brief overview of the African economic picture reveals a paradox where the continent that has rich mineral resources, nearly a billion people and a land mass which can contain China, USA, India, Western Europe, and Argentina all together is in the unacceptable state of being an object of aid, debt and loans.

Africa should have been a production and innovation centre not a charity and aid centre of the world where currently ‘donorship’ has sadly replaced African national ownership’ of not just Africa’s resources, but even worse Africa’s own agency, autonomy and independence to shape and determine policy and direction to undertake national development.

The main thrust of the African quest to unite such key ideas, projects, programmes and infrastructures connecting its politics, knowledge and the economy flows from a recognition that Africa must organise a production, economic and innovation system by integrating consumers with suppliers, producers with users, users with other users in Africa and for Africa. This is both desirable and possible and knowledge of how to do it- know-how- can be cultivated so that the continent emerges fully as a region free from the ‘donorship’ gaze it suffers from so cruelly at the moment under the enormous burden of a crippling fragmentation and dependency myopia.

It is no exaggeration to state that African political and economic arrangements today are characterized by pervasive internal and schizophrenic disconnections, mismatches, fragmentations and external dependence. Nearly 70 % of Africa’s overall population exist in subsistence and primary resource and agrarian condition. Where a region has the overwhelming portion of its production as agricultural, that region invariably remains vulnerable even in being able to feed itself.

Africa will remain permanently vulnerable unless it changes unequal primary agriculture and mineral exports for the production of knowledge, technology and innovation value added manufactured elsewhere. African countries produce similar primary products for the same market and compete against each other thus accentuating and deepening their fragmentation. A key example is the horticulture produced by many East African countries today!

Africa faces a true dilemma: if it is able to insulate itself from the world economy, it can incur possible welfare, income and knowledge losses. If it continues to integrate as it does now based on current dominant patterns of relating on the basis of primary commodity transactions with the world economy, it faces continued economic dependence and fragmentation and lack of structural transformation of its fundamental economic, social and knowledge infrastructure.

Africa’s current pattern of insertion in the world economy comes at the cost of fragmenting the African economic, knowledge and political space. It appears the continued cost of fragmentation is supposed to be offset by Africa being in the international aid system. Whether African fragmentation can be offset by dependence on aid or national development should be a genuine issue for deep reflection and foresight for the AU and others with broad commitment to African freedom and unity.

WHERE IS THE AFRICAN STRATEGY?

An African national project is necessary for launching the infrastructure for a comprehensive structural transformation of African economy, state, society, communities and people. What seems lacking is exactly what is most needed: an African national project and national spirit first and foremost to anchor the evolution and dynamics of an African strategy!

Africans continue to experience fragmentation that reproduces dependence on outside powers. But they have not tried a unified African national project yet that inspires their self- composition, self-organisation and self-definition and self-recognition as Africans in order to undertake challenges together - deal with those that they have to deal with and respond to opportunities together. Their ‘advisors’ provide hundreds of reasons why Africans are different from each other. Why they cannot come together. The fact that under conditions of fragmentation and dependency, the existing fractured states have not succeeded to transform structurally and undertake a credible national development strategy is very often conveniently ignored. Strategies that accentuate fragmentation continue to be devised.

No one says or counsels that going on a path of fragmentation that leads to nowhere is even more unrealistic and utopian than a united strategy that can work which has not been tried yet in spite of the compelling recognition over half a century now that either Africa unites or perishes!!

Instead the search for a united African national alternative gets castigated for being futile and utopian. But when too many fragmented states scramble for resources carefully doled out to them from an international aid regime to pursue goals they can hardly meet, no one dares to say this path is even more utopian than the alternative African national project that has never been tried. Where there is no African national project in place there exists a a big void and vacuum at the heart of Africa’s confident march to the future where there will be no clear African national strategy to guide policy and practice!

Africans are now treated to admonishments from the likes of Bono and Wolfensohn, who are calling openly for African unity. At the Aggrey-Fraser-Guggisberg Lecture in Accra, Ghana under the title “Africa in the Global Century: Partnerships for Success”, the former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, argued for Africa to unite saying: “Africa can make the best of the opportunities and wealth available to it to grow its people and economy if it unites.” (Wolfensohn quoted in Dogbevi, 2008)

The World Bank has also begun to echo the ‘integration line’ by recognising that the flow of goods, capital and people are so limited that inter-African collaboration and integration remains largely untenable. Also it has produced the [url=go.worldbank.org/U0V68KDLL0]New Development Strategy Focuses on Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa[/url].

In addition, a number of countries far and near to Africa appear to develop their own Africa strategy based on their understanding or mis-understanding of what they think Africa is and may or may not be, or become. The list continues. The EU has had an Africa strategy since 2005. The Chinese have theirs. The Indians had a Summit in March 2008. The Japanese held a summit on May 28, 2008. Even a small country- Denmark, has set up an Africa Commission like the Blair commission before it, to organise its own mode of intervention in Africa. It looks more countries will develop strategies on, for and to Africa and probably not with Africa despite the abundant talk of partnership, national ownership the Paris terms and such like rhetoric and discourse.

What seems to be lacking is the African strategy for Africa and a combined African strategy from those who make strategies for Africa and others involved and continue to do their business to, for and in Africa.

The time is long overdue to make each of the nearly billion Africans in the continent develop an African national spirit and unite on the shared experience, challenges and a grand national project to transform Africa from an agrarian economy to a knowledge-service and knowledge- industrial economy to achieve food security and improve the health, education and well being of all the people, and not just a few elites. Only then can Africa achieve the freedom, security and stability to emerge with its own voice and act with policy and practice to secure its independence without fear or favour in a complex world.

NATIONAL SPIRIT NECESSARY TO OFFSET PERVASIVE FRAGMENTATION AND DONOR DEPENDENCY

The problem is that after nearly 50 years of post- colonial independence African economies continue to be fragmented in spite of the AU/NEPAD salutary processes. The more the fragmentation amongst African economies deepens the harder for each of the fragments not to be supplicants to the aid system. Africa thus also faces another critical dilemma of being an unequal ‘partner’ with the burgeoning aid industry that has created a business of what is known as ‘technical assistance,’ where those who provide the aid consume a sizeable portion of the resources allocated, and the recipient Africans continue to be in a vulnerable position as long-term the aid receivers are unable to get out of this dependency situation.

In general, it may not be easy to disprove that aid is not useful to some within the recipient countrie. But,this does not validate, however, aid or the international aid system per se, since it is not also difficult to show, that the long term impact of aid is negative - If we proceed from the normative preference that the recipient countries options to plan their development free from conditions imposed that often do not take the specific context of the countries can be misdirected by the international aid system. In the long term, it is better to take the suffering and learn how to fish rather than receive fish for a day. Recently Tanzania announced to all the donors that they want time to think and cope with the influx of hundreds of donor inputs. They said they needed time to work out what this all means and even made a moratorium on donors’ visits to Tanzania!

It is thus no exaggeration that a country relying on aid is most likely not to develop a national strategy without the interference and the factoring of the interests and policies of the aid system. Being a recipient in an international aid system for many African countries has not brought development but corruption and poverty. It undermines a given state in Africa from making mistakes and learning from the routines and practices of creating an integrated African national economy. Africa cannot afford to continue to suffer the opportunity cost of receiving aid only to defer building the much needed ability to create the capacity, capability, competence, learning and innovation to transform the largely agrarian and subsistence economic system.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over half century has passed; Africa suffers from myopia of a particularly pernicious 'fragmentation-dependence.' The root problem for this unchanging predicament lies in the state of fragmentation that invites dependency that conversely continues to prevent the evolution of an African national spirit, purpose, project and strategy.

There is need for a fresh approach, a new departure to embark on a roadmap to convert the 'fragmentation-dependence' dilemma into an enabling integration-self-sustaining, innovative, learning, capabilities building' national project - and re- launch African development on a secure pedigree with confidence and inspiration.

*Mammo Muchie is the coordinator of DIIPER, Research Centre on Development Innovation and IPER and also the NRF/DST SARCHI Chair Holder, TUT, South Africa.

*Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

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Violence against women in Africa: from discrimination to impunity

A call for ratification and implementation of the Maputo Protocol

2008-08-07

African Women’s Day gives us the opportunity to remember that gender-based violence is one of the most serious and widespread violations of the basic rights of women, particularly on the African continent. Gender discrimination is both one of the causes and an aggravating factor of the consequences of violence against women, thus contributing to the perpetuation of impunity of such cases.

The signatory organizations call on African States to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on women’s rights (the “Maputo Protocol”), harmonize national laws with international standards and take all necessary measures to fight against violence against women by tackling the general context of discrimination which encourages such violations and which perpetuates the marginalization of women, particularly as regards their access to justice.

In this context, the signatory organizations want to draw the African States’ attention to the need to tackle the general environment of discrimination, which leads to such violence against women, generally of a sexual nature, perpetrated by the State but also within the community or in the private sphere.
This general discriminatory environment, which affects women from a very young age, is reflected in positive and national customary law rules that must be brought into compliance with international law and national constitutions. These rules legitimate and perpetuate the subordination of women in all areas. State obligations in this field include the adoption of specific measures to increase public awareness of this issue, training of state officials, as well as positive measures concerning access for girls to education and for women to employment and to positions of responsibility and decision-making. States must guarantee women’s legal capacity, which is needed to empower them. Women’s empowerment also entails unhindered access to reproductive and sexual health services and protection of girls from forced marriage and other harmful practices.

Further, we should note that, in addition to being a vehicle for violence, this general context of discrimination against women also has a direct effect on women’s’ access to justice and their right to an effective remedy. Thus, in many African States, there is still impunity for cases of violence against women, not because there is no legal framework, but because of the lack of political will to implement the law.

This reality is highlighted by the all too many cases of women who, due to pressure or even threats by family or law enforcement agents, withdraw proceedings against their aggressors. In the same way, the financial dependence of a woman on her husband constitutes an insurmountable hurdle to her starting legal proceedings against him for domestic violence.

States must, therefore, put an end to this culture of impunity which serves only to re-victimize female victims of violence, a situation made only worse by armed conflict in certain African countries.

Antananarivo-Brazzaville-Bujumbura-Geneva-Kinshasa-Lusaka-Nairobi-N’jamena, 31
July 2008.

Contact:
OMCT – Mariana Duarte, md@omct.org / Orlane Varesano, ov@omct.org
ACAT-Burundi – Lucie Nizigama, nizigama_lu@yahoo.com
ADHUC (Congo-Brazzaville) – Moké Loamba, adhuc_congo@yahoo.fr
ASADHO (DRCongo) – Amigo Ngonde, amtshatsho@yahoo.fr
Marie Mossi Mota, motadok@hotmail.com
CIRID (Burundi) – Joël Hakizimana, burundi@cirid.org
CODHO (DRCongo) – NS’ii Luanda, nsiiluanda_codho@yahoo.fr
COVAW (Kenya) – Grace Kimani, gkimani@covaw.or.ke
LIZADEEL (DRCongo) – Madeleine Madilu, lizadeel2@hotmail.com
LTDH (Chad) – Masslabaye Ténébaye, ltdh_tchad@yahoo.fr
SOAT (Sudan/UK) – Hannah Logan, hannah@soatsudan.org
SVND (Madagascar) – Mathilde Rabary, rabary@moov.mg
WILDAF-Zambia – Muziula Kamanga, muziula8@yahoo.com

Recent reports by OMCT and its African counterparts on the status of women and violence against women in Africa:
Benin: http://www.omct.org/pdf/UNTB/2007/BEN_report_UN_CAT_11_2007_eng.pdf
Burundi: http://www.omct.org/pdf/VAW/2008/CEDAW40th_Rep_alt_Burundi_fr.pdf
English executive summary:
http://www.omct.org/pdf/VAW/2008/CEDAW40th_Rep_alt_Burundi_eng_summary.pdf
Kenya: http://www.omct.org/pdf/procedures/2005/s_violence_kenya_6_2005_eng.pdf Madagascar:
http://www.omct.org/pdf/UNTB/2007/unhrc_89th/rapport_alt_madagascar_89th_hrc_07_fr.pdf
DRCongo: http://www.omct.org/pdf/VAW/2006/CEDAW_36th/CEDAW36_DRC_en.pdf
Togo:
http://www.omct.org/pdf/procedures/2006/CAT_36th/altern_reports/togo_cat_0406_violences_etatiques_fr.pdf
Tunisia: http://www.omct.org/pdf/UNTB/2008/report_tunisie_2008_12_unifie_2.pdf
Zambia: http://www.omct.org/pdf/UNTB/2007/unhrc_90th/Zambia_OMCT_alt_report_HRC_Women.pdf

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Enforcement of the Sexual Offences Act in Kenya

2008-08-05

Anne Kithaka

INTRODUCTION

Is the criminal justice system in Kenya well equipped to protect women from gender-based violence? This a critical question because in July this year, the Sexual Offences Act (SOA) is celebrating two years of existence having came into force on 21 July 2006.

It has been lauded as an evolutionally piece of legislation that provides for the prevention and protection of all persons from harmful and unlawful sexual acts. It expanded the definition of rape to comply with jurisprudence that is evolving from the international arena and introduces new crimes that did not exist in the previous legal framework.
The Office of the Attorney General has formulated a Reference Manual [1] that expounds the Act as well as setting standards and recommendations on best practices to various key service providers. The target is not only the police investigator and prosecutor, but also medical practitioners, civil society, gender activists and general consumers of criminal justice services.

If used well, the manual can become an important tool in achieving the objectives set out in the preamble of the Act as well as sensitizing communities through outreach programs.

This discussion paper is going to examine the shortcomings encountered by women who seek redress within the criminal justice sector as well as making recommendations to counter them. The right to development, to peace and to justice cannot be overemphasized [2].

Violence against women denies women peace of mind, bodily integrity and a sense of development, curtailing their contribution to development.

INADEQUACIES WITHIN THE NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

According to international practice, it is the duty of states to promote and protect human rights at the national level. In its 85th Plenary Meeting held on 20th December 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.

It encourages governments to take steps to ensure that women are protected from all forms of violence be it of physical, sexual psychological nature. Among specific acts of violence delineated in the declaration are sexual offences, battering, marital rape, FGM, dowry related violence etc.

Kenya has a legal framework that purports to comply with the above declaration and other related instruments. Unfortunately, it has failed to go the full mile and criminalize all the offences envisioned in the Declaration.

I think it is correct to say that there appears to be subtle discriminations within our legal framework that blatantly refuses to recognize that all women, no matter marital status, are equal before the law and should therefore get equal treatment and protection. The status quo is that marital status and cultural relativism are being used to deny a certain section of the women constituency a sip from the communal calabash of justice.

There is no justification for the continued failure to criminalize domestic violence and marital rape. Our sisters from the SADC countries seem to be steps ahead in this thrust and heave for the ultimate price that is equality in justice.

Already, six countries; Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania have taken the cue from international organizations and agreements and passed legislation that criminalizes marital rape.

The truth is that rape is rape, is rape; whatever name may precede it.

Pamela Mhlanga observed that "Rape in all its forms can be a matter of life and death, causes untold trauma on survivors and in some cases social ostracizition including permanent scars, aside from destroying the essence of their life [3]."

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ACCESSING PROTECTION UNDER THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT

Even for those women who have a ‘legitimate’ right not to be raped; (because their experience of rape fall under the legislative mandate) their road to legal redress is not smooth sailing. Apart from the high cost of accessing justice, ignorance and technicality of the court process, they risk falling foul to rogue police officers who may take advantage of their vulnerability to extract the ‘extra pound’ of flesh before they receive services.

It is unfortunate that although section 24 of SOA prohibits law enforcement officers extracting sexual favors from people who seek their services, there is no enforcing and monitoring mechanism in place to ensure compliance.

Women who seek services at the police station have get sexually attacked; harassed or simply forced to give bribes in order to receive services. Take the case on Sarah, a woman who had complained against her estranged husband for assault. Every time the case came for hearing it got adjourned. When she made inquiries from the prosecutor, she learnt that the magistrate was waiting to be ‘seen’. The prosecutor asked for her mobile number and she began to receive very seductive messages from the trial magistrate. He wanted to have sexual relations with her and at one time told her that her case would not ‘go’ anywhere unless she complies. Although the matter was referred to police for investigations, nothing happened. They alerted the rogue magistrate who stopped sending the offensive messages. They also claimed that they did not have the technical know-how to extract the previous messages from Sarah’s phone. In the end, the matter fizzled to oblivion after the case got transferred to another court. The trial magistrate later got disciplined by getting a transfer to a remote area, where it is feared, he may be continuing his wayward ways against defenseless, disempowered and ignorant women.

At the worst, a woman who is a victim of violence also risks being victimized under section 38 of the SOA which criminalizes the offence of making false allegations. Many police investigators and prosecutors are categorical that they would not hesitate to charge complainants in sexual offences case if the trial magistrate failed to place an accused on his defense. To them failure of a prosecution case at this stage showed that the complainant had given false allegations. The police need to be disabused from this hackneyed interpretation of section 38. They should know that a criminal prosecution can flounder for other reasons. Sometimes a crucial witness such as a doctor can fail to appear in court and exhibits can get misplaced.

Another problem facing women in Kenya in their quest for justice is lack of specialization and sensitization of police investigators and prosecutors. Police prosecutors carry out most prosecutions before subordinate courts where most sexual offences are prosecuted. State counsels who are trained lawyers handle the more serious crimes like murder and treason in High court.

Many factors contribute to the high rate of acquittals in sexual offences. In a system where access to justice is based on dichotomies of whether one is rich or poor, man or woman, health or sick; with the first variable almost always getting the upper hand, women are bound to suffer.

This makes nonsense the doctrine of equality and non-discrimination in justice, which is the cornerstone of international, regional and national jurisprudence.

Also heavy work loads on the part of prosecutors lead to shoddy prosecutions. In a day, a prosecutor may handle 25 cases, so he is not able to give focused attention on any particular case. Logistics deny him research facilities, which put him at a disadvantage when compared with sharp defense lawyers who have all the time and facilities to prepare for their cases. There is no opportunity for holding pre-trial interviews with witnesses or even visiting the scene of crime in preparation for the hearing. Most prosecutors’ offices are one room affairs tucked in a corner of the court premises and sometimes it is shared between two to five prosecutors. This makes it impossible to comply with the good practices recommended to services providers in cases of violence against women [4].

DORMANT ‘WHITE ELEPHANT’ PROVISIONS

It is laudable that the Attorney General has appointed a multi-sectoral task force that is now in the process of developing a National Policy Framework to guide in the implementation and enforcement of the SOA. Once the policy is formulated, the Attorney General will have complied with the provisions of section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act.

Unfortunately, there are many sections existing in our current legal framework, which are not yet operational for lack of regulations to make them effective. Designated officers who are mandated to formulate rules and guidance to trigger their operation have failed to do their duty.

I have in mind section 39 of SOA, which places the onus of keeping a register and a data bank of convicted sexual offenders on the registrar of the high court. Section 47 likewise gives the implementing minister power to prescribe regulations on what is to be contained in this data bank. I am not sure such regulations have been formulated so far. Perhaps they will be included in the National Policy Framework.

Another glaring example is section 329 (A) which was introduced by a 2003 amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Chief Justice is required to make rules and regulations to guide the manner in which Victim Impact Statements can be received and their use by courts. Such statements are intended to guide the court in its exercise of sentencing discretion as well as assessing damages that can be ordered against convicted accused person. Attempts by prosecutors to produce such statements in spousal battering cases get rejected because courts are of the opinion that ground rules have not been legally defined.

THE PROBLEM WITH CIVIL SOCIETY, NGOS AND GENDER ACTIVISTS

Agitators for equality and justice among the justice system are ignorant about the law, the legal process and the court procedure.

Many members of civil society do not appear to know that the office of the Attorney General can help in cases where victims feel they have been short charged by first line service providers.

A good example is a recommendation appearing in COVAW report entitled; ‘In pursuit of justice’, Recommendation Number 5.3.2 advices women to seek other supportive mechanisms ‘be they social or legal from the civil society or other higher ranks within the provincial administration.’ Should they feel that the services they are getting ‘wanting’

How is an ignorant and non-legal person to know that a service is wanting if no parameters are defined to show them what to expect? Secondly, which specific ‘high’ rank officers should these women approach at the provincial level? Would it not have been better if the report had identified some particular officers within the provincial administration who can be approached for help?

One such officer should ideally be the state counsel who ideally monitors the administration of justice within a province or even district.

Gender activists need to do more in monitoring the quality of services that victims of violence receive from service providers. My experience with most civil societies is that they come into the scene when it is too late. Even when they do, they concentrate on raising their public profile through postulating to the media and international press at the expense of seeking real justice for the victim.

Many do not take the trouble to observe and monitor the case through the various criminal justice stages. Perhaps it due to lack of knowledge about procedure and processes applied in court of law or even lack of sufficient funding that is the culprit here.

Where a gender activist in not well versed in legal procedures, it would be advisable to get a trained lawyer or even a paralegal who can ‘watch legal brief’ during the day to day hearing of the case in order to protect the interests of the victim. This effort would force the magistrate and prosecutor to be on best professional behavior because they are ‘aware’ that they are being watched. It minimizes opportunities for mischief, which would favor the accused defendant.

There is more to case monitoring than just appearing from the blues after an accused has been acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and threatening magistrates to hold demonstrations to protest release of dangerous criminals.

Apart from this, gender activists need to familiarize themselves with post trial process. They should know the ground rules for appeals and the role of Attorney General in criminal appeals. Appeal is a creature of statute and the A-G can only appeal on grounds of law not facts.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is evident that the office of the Attorney General has taken the initiative to initiate a national policy framework that will aid justice consumers access justice. Until the task force completes it work, it is not possible to know what practice tools will be developed. Apart from making the policy framework, it is recommended that a gender unit be established in the department of public prosecution. Its work should be to monitor how cases that are brought under the Act are dealt with through the various stages of our criminal justice system. One of the greatest bottlenecks facing research in Kenya is lack of information on court cases. There is no established mechanisms for addressing existing bottlenecks because there is not data to go by. Other suggestion are as follows.

- To win the war against violence against women, we must first have a paradigm shift in our service delivery system.

- We must make our services consumer friendly and sensitive.

- Gender focal points manned by specialized officers should be available in all police stations.

- Gender mainstreaming within the police department should be taken seriously, so that more women get appointed as prosecutors and officers commanding stations (OCS).

- Model One-stop centers ought to be introduced at select police stations, preferably in every province.

- Community outreach programs during chiefs barazas so that women and communities at large can be sensitized about VAW.

- Human rights training for women’s groups and service providers should be given.

- Training of paralegals within society and encouraging volunteering by key community leaders can effectively protect wome

- Monitoring of out come of criminal cases in court should be done as a matter of routine by the A-G.

- Simple guidance manuals that can aid consumers of justice in understanding court process so that they can adequately represent their interests.

- Which brings me to my final recommendation: we must have an oversight body to police the police and other service providers in order to stop the impunity with which violence against women is treated.


*Ann Nyambura Kithaka is a Judicial System Monitor in the Legal and Judicial System Support Division (LJSSD), United Nations Mission Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Notes:

1. The Reference Manual on the Sexual Offences Act, 2006 for Prosecutors which a product of joint collaboration between the Office of the Attorney General, in particular the Department of Public Prosecutions and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF).

2. Koffi Annan; in Larger Freedom 2005 available at www.un.org

3. An article entitled ‘South Africa: Justice for survivors of marital rape, how far has SADC come?’ by Pamela Mhlanga Reported in www.pambazuka.org/16 days of activism against gender violence last accessed 22.01.08

4. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/doc/finaldoc/goodpractices.pdf last accessed on 26-1-08

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Ending Impunity for Sexual and Gender Based Violence conference Communiqué

2008-07-31

SGBV Conference

Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) is a scourge on Africa; a pandemic that has undermined women and girls’ rights to autonomy, bodily integrity, human dignity, sexuality, security and tranquillity. SGBV has, and continues to be a major hindrance to rights and justice. It is prevalent in all our societies across the continent, including non-conflict situations. It is repeatedly used as a weapon against girls and women in conflict/crisis situations. SGBV, including intimate partner violence, is a leading factor in the increasing "feminisation" of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa.

The inadequacy of our societies’ responses has cast SGBV as an abuse we are willing to live with. Women and girls, regardless of their race, age, social and economic status, live in perennial fear of violation.

We, the delegates of this conference say ENOUGH.
As representatives of parliaments, regional institutions and civil society organizations in the Great Lakes, East, West, Southern and Horn of Africa regions, after three days of deliberation, identify these critical actions to ensure we are collectively and individually accountable. We determine together to effect a major push forward in ending impunity and promoting accountability.

We commit to:

1. Ending impunity through accountability and implementation

2. Centring on women survivors of SGBV in conflict and non conflict situations

3. Mobilizing popular support in the fight against SGBV

4. Securing adequate human, financial and material resources in fighting SGBV

5. Building bridges across sectors and within movements

6. Developing a new cadre of leadership

These commitments include the following specific actions:

1. Ending impunity through accountability and implementation

- Law is as useful as we make it. We determine to use the laws we have, including national laws, regional and international instruments, to demand accountability. We will engage in strategic litigation at national and regional levels to enforce implementation.

- We will hold our Executives accountable for decisive action against SGBV. We will require them to uphold and enforce legislation against this pandemic.

- We will prominently, publicly and consistently underscore that violence against women and girls is a major driver and consequence of HIV&AIDS on the continent. It must be addressed as such.

- We will ensure the development of a gender violence index to hold governments accountable to consistently work to reduce the prevalence of SGBV. At a regional level we will name and shame nations that take inadequate action to deter SGBV. At the same time, we will seek the enforcement of the reward system proposed in the AU Solemn Declaration 2004 for nations with progressive gender records.

- We will ensure that our governments ratify and report on conventions that protect and promote the rights of women and girls. As civil society, we vigilantly submit shadow reports on our governments’ record on implementation of conventions, treaties, and international instruments that protect and promote the human rights of women and girls. We will specifically focus at a regional level on domestication and implementation on the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.

2. Centring on women survivors of SGBV in conflict and non-conflict settings

- We will scale up our efforts and support our governments in providing universal access to social services, including but not limited to education, post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), emergency contraception and mental health and trauma support for survivors of sexual violence.

- Transitional justice processes in post conflict settings must address SGBV. Women and girls must be central in defining what justice means for them in a transitional justice process. We will reject the pattern of developing reparation priorities on behalf of survivors and seeking to impose these ‘solutions’ on them.

- Drawing on the Nairobi Declaration on the Right of Women and Girls to Reparation, we will insist on reparations and compensation for women and girls that enable them to move forward with their lives. This includes state support for women and girls who have been raped, and support for the children born out of these rapes.

- We will support survivors to give voice to their ideas on justice and reparations as well as their experiences. This means desisting from appropriating the stories of survivors, but rather, enabling survivors to exercise their agency.

- We insist on a gender-conscious state approach to reparations. Post conflict initiatives of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration must acknowledge the unique situation and needs of women victims and survivors. Equitable attention must be paid to disarmament and demobilization as to rehabilitation and reintegration. Women must be involved in designing, implementing monitoring and evaluating post conflict reconstruction, development, assistance and restoration packages

3. Mobilizing popular support in the fight against SGBV

- SGBV is a vice that affects the entire community. We will focus on reviving communities’ outrage at SGBV and prompting public outcry against the vice. We will work to ensure that SGBV is addressed at all societal levels.

- We acknowledge the need to redefine the concept of masculinity in our communities to embrace the inherent value of women and girls as equal members of society. We recognize that the family as the basic unit of society is an important site for transformation. Thus our collective efforts to engage societal commitment to change will include strategies that tackle attitudes, ideologies and practices that drive and sustain SGBV at this level.

- We will elucidate SGBV in the context of other areas of activism that inspire passionate outrage by society, including rape as torture, and women’s right bodily integrity as a human security concern.

- We will campaign for a sustained approach to change attitudes, beliefs and myths that perpetuate SGBV. We determine that civic education, public education and institutional education must begin to promote human rights and women rights as critical components of citizenship. We commit to supporting the development of model codes of conduct for teachers and curriculums that will enable such education.

4. Securing adequate human, financial and material resources in fighting SGBV

- We commit to harmonize and better coordinate our SGBV focuses as civil society. We will focus on building complimentary approaches, including databanks of actors, that allow us to maximize the human and financial resources at our disposal in fighting SGBV.

- We will seek to ensure dedicated resources for interventions that prevent SGBV across the spectrum and transparent tracking mechanisms to evaluate their success. Similarly in national action pertaining to HIV/AIDS, we will seek to ensure targets and indicators around SGBV and preventative measures taken.

- We will intensify our advocacy to hold accountable all parties to conflict, particularly ensuring that financing for reparations is made by states, international community, non-state actors, responsible multinational corporations and all who ‘benefit’ from conflict and war.

5. Building bridges across sectors and within movements.

- We will use the technological and multimedia facilities available to us to generate public consciousness on the inhumanity of SGBV. We will use our efforts to generate consciousness in the legislative (parliamentary) and public arenas

- We will work to mobilize male parliamentarians, who are already sympathetic to the cause, to draw more men in parliament and in the community into the discussion on and engagement with the problem of SGBV. We call on male MPs to initiate constituency discussions on SGBV.

- We will bring our respective strengths as civil society actors and government actors and fuse these into multipronged, multilevel actions to end impunity for SGBV within our societies.

6. Developing a new cadre of leadership

- We are taking responsibility for the leadership of our communities. We will invest in feminist leadership development at national and community levels for the promotion of women’s rights and welfare. To this end we are committed to a continental target of 50% representation of women in national assemblies by 2015.

- We commit to strengthening women’s leadership capacities to effect change that is pro-women by equipping them with knowledge and skills. We commit to providing autonomous spaces that allow us to continuous set, validate and launch our agenda for ending SGBV.

The waiting must end. Women’s rights movements in Africa have long fought for concrete national actions against SGBV that promote and protect the human rights of all women – including the rights to be free from violence, coercion, fear and impunity. We are determined to see a translation of the rhetoric, policy and legal frameworks into practice.


* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

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Politics at stake: a note on stakeholder analysis

2008-07-31

Mark Butler and David Ntseng

People in government, business, and political and civil society organisations routinely talk about 'stakeholders'. They do exercises in stakeholder analysis to inform their 'strategic planning'. Invariably they use the stakeholder language to advertise claims about the inclusivity of their thinking, their processes, and their practice. The organisation we work with [Church Land Programme (CLP)] was asked recently to prepare an input for a 'stakeholder analysis' for a collegial NGO and this forced us to reflect on why we were so uncomfortable with the very idea. We presented some of our thinking as the basis for discussions at the NGO meeting. It was good that there was a mix of people there including grassroots militants as well as civil society employees.

The note below includes some thoughts we had prepared, as well as things we learned from people at the meeting. It outlines why we conclude that the stakeholder discourse, and the practices that go along with it, are in fact part of an order that functions to exclude and silence. For those at the meeting who came from grassroots formations, it was clear that this approach fitted very much with their analysis and experience. Summarising their key points, it was said that the stakeholder approaches exclude, enslave, silence and demobilise. The combined effect is to try and reduce their struggles to what can be managed within the terms set by the rich and powerful.

STAKEHOLDERS = THOSE WHO COUNT and EMANCIPATORY POLITICS = MADE BY THE UNCOUNTED

By definition, stakeholders must mean those people or groups who are recognised as having a stake in something. Part of CLP's evolving way of understanding the world we're in has meant moving decisively away from the assumption that we get toward good praxis by analysing, and working with, relations with 'stakeholders'. It's not that we think stakeholders don't matter – on the contrary, they constitute 'what is' and they therefore affect a lot of things that people have to deal with. But they cannot constitute spaces for a liberatory politics. The 'stakeholders' are those who are counted and who are qualified to speak – their counting, qualifications and speaking being constituted by and within the terms of the existant order (of 'the police' as Rancier would have it). A liberatory politics is the opposite – it is precisely the disruption of those terms by those who are not counted, not qualified, and therefore, should not be speaking. In short: naming the stakeholders is in order – liberatory praxis is the 'out of order' of those who do not qualify to be stakeholders.
This critique of stakeholder (anti)politics seems to us in line with the analysis of the French philosopher, Jacque Rancier. Luka Arsenjuk, says of Rancier's thinking that he is opposed to kind of politics "that makes decisions on the people, for the people, instead of the people; a politics that holds that in the political order, all sections of the community have been assigned their proper place." The critique in turn finds support in the experience of those whose struggle and are, as a result get 'assigned their proper place' as stakeholders. Mama Rose who is a street trader argued that:

“For us street traders, being a stakeholder is a slavery term. This is because government and big business think for us, plan for us and all we are left with is to fit in their plan and do as we told, even if we feel hurt and oppressed by their plans”.

Rancier himself says:

"There are two ways of counting the parts of the community: The first only counts empirical parts - actual groups defined by differences in birth, by different functions, locations, and interests that constitute the social body. The second counts 'in addition' a part of the no-part. We will call the first police and the second politics.

... there is politics inasmuch as 'the people' refers to subjects inscribed as a supplement to the count of the parts of society, a specific figure of 'the part of those who have no-part.'

...Politics exists as a deviation from this normal order of things. It is this anomaly that is expressed in the nature of political subjects who are not social groups but rather forms of inscription of 'the (ac)count of the unaccounted-for.' The 'poor,' ... does not designate an economically disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category of peoples who do not count, those who have no qualifications to part-take..., no qualification for being taken into account” (Ten Theses on Politics).

Ironically of course, notwithstanding the claims of liberal apologists (including those on the left in civil society) for the inclusivity of the “stakeholders + state” machinery, that machinery actually really excludes nearly everyone by now - if inclusion meant more than managing them and their opinions! As Alain Badiou has it: “Today the great majority of people do not have a name; the only name available is 'excluded', which is the name of those who do not have a name. Today the great majority of humanity counts for nothing”.

Mr. Ndlovu, who is a street trader activist stated:

“we are being used under the banner of being stakeholders. Whenever the government makes a policy they consult us individually and say different things to us. Having caused enough chaos among us, they say they have consulted stakeholders. Whereas those among us who are not well learned they are often ignored”.

EMANCIPATION IS NOT A 'DELIVERABLE'

For our context, it is for these sorts of reasons we agree with the analysis of Michael Neocosmos that the terrain of (anti)politics established by, and in relation to, the state project is essentially dead. At a certain level, so many people's experience and analysis shows this to be so – the list of un-met expectations of what the state promises and consistently fails to deliver is so long, that most people really do feel deep anger or despair. But the space where the possibility of actual emancipation emerges, is constituted in the moment when people's movements and actions proceed from the brutal truth that “we are on our own” and move forward only once they have clarified that we are finished with (anti)politics of the state project. In a similar way, Franz Fanon observed so long ago that:

“To educate the masses politically does not mean, cannot mean making a political speech. What it means is to try, relentlessly and passionately, to teach the masses that everything depends on them; that if we stagnate it is their responsibility, and if we go forward it is due to them too, that there is no such thing as a demiurge, that there is no famous man who will take responsibility for everything, but that the demiurge is the people themselves and the magic hands are finally only the magic hands of the people” (The Wretched of the Earth, 159).

This break is decisive – it is a movement from illusion to truth. The illusion is that the state project as a vehicle for delivery is also the vehicle for human liberation (an illusion absolutely necessary for perpetuating the tyranny of the liberal democratic rule). Truth is in the insight that the reinvention of politics through the out-of-order actions of the uncounted on the principle of a genuine, living democracy (that everyone really matters) is the meaning, means and content of human emancipation. On the basis of that insight, people first announce their humanity and, as a consequence, make explicit their prescriptions on the state. Perhaps from that point on, they may establish a sequence of politics and action where they are 'stakeholders' – but they must first (or at least simultaneously through their action/struggle) make everyone see that they are precisely those with no stake in what exists! It is their status as non-stakeholders that explains the contempt and disregard of the rich and powerful and that makes the people's reclamation of humanity and dignity so scandalous that it cannot but be out-of-order and unable to be accomodated without a rupture to the existing order.

In our own searching for a better praxis, we have concluded that we only find a certain kind of human freedom and solidarity in and through our connection with politics defined as the disruption of the order of the existant by those who are excluded - and in working with the processes that flow from, and that remain in fidelity to, these moments. The clear implication is that, to define our own praxis on the basis of a stakeholder analysis would be to inevitably inscribe our praxis as part of the existing order – precisely the dead-end that we needed to break with!

So we needed to clarify for ourselves: what can it mean to make a contribution to a 'stakeholder analysis'? What is more important?:

- to try to list those groups, classes, categories that make up 'what is'; to analyse what they are doing or trying to do; to make informed guesses about who's likely to win and lose what given the current balance of power ?;

OR

- to analyse 'what is' by showing how all these different groups and 'forces' are in fact simply part of a moribund system of unfreedom, stultification, oppression and exploitation – even though some of them imagine themselves as part of its opposition?;

- perhaps to try and describe what we have learned about 'what is' from the perspective of the politics of those who are not, those whose politics would establish something actually new and liberating?.

WHO COUNTS?

Perhaps first we must remember the inappropriateness of a civil society or NGO elite sitting around discussing and analysing 'stakeholders' – inappropriate because it still assumes that the real agency for change is located in this civil society. In the liberal and neo-liberal discourses of this civil society, what are counted as the stakeholders are the 'interest groups' who engage with (and include) the state. From our experience, the typical stakeholder list would be something like: labour, business (black and white, big and small), churches, universities, womens organisations, 'communities', political parties, the media, NGOs, and so on. In our discussions at the meeting, Rev. Willem said: “It seems that the poor and excluded are perpetually being fragmented by the authorities in the name of being stakeholders”.

Underpinning this approach has to be the rule that there are grounds for the justification of each stakeholder and each interest group's voice. But this reduces all 'politics' to the management of partial claims within the ambit of the terrain of the state. A proper politics is the opposite – it exists only in the universal truth claims implied in the political actions of those who have no 'place', no justification. Thus in Neocosmos' rendering of Badiou:

“an emancipatory politics is universal and not linked to any specific interest, it is 'for all' never 'for some'. It follows we can say that for Badiou emancipatory politics does not ‘represent’ anyone: 'Politics begins when one decides not to represent victims [...] but to be faithful to those events during which victims politically assert themselves [...] Politics in no way represents the proletariat, class or nation [...] it is not a question of whether something which exists may be represented. Rather it concerns that through which something comes to exist which nothing represents, and which purely and simply presents its own existence" (Michael Neocosmos “Civil society, citizenship and the politics of the (im)possible: rethinking militancy in Africa today”).

It would be more appropriate to recognise that these questions can only be answered in specific contexts of specific people's struggle. When those who suffer it lead self-initiated action/s against it, then part of that process might presumably look something like a 'stakeholder analysis'. But the stakeholders that matter in that analysis would be those that actually affect the real situation of the people and that actually feature in the thinking and analysis of that situation by the people.

It might be possible to try and make some very tentative notes about what the kinds of stakeholders that do seem to feature in many such struggles at the moment in our context. Of necessity, what we hint at here is incomplete. Nonetheless, it seems to us that what people fairly consinstently name in this regard are what we might call the apparatus of the liberal democratic state – including its armed wing/s. (It is noticeable that this conclusion is systematically ignored, mis-read and/or ridiculed by all the elite observors, commentators, analysts and practitioners – including those of the Left.) The most common targets of critique and rebellion are thus: local councillors, local government (and often too, the provincial – less often, national government), local activists and fora of the political parties, the police. Then there is a layer of stakeholders that, often together with players in the preceding list, shape local spaces of democratic discussion and politics – especially elites who oppress the majority (whether these are purely political elites tied to the parties or those with very localised economic interests – e.g. shacklords, landowners, etc – or those with power derived from other resource bases like formal education, connection with mainstream churches etc.) Perhaps another layer of stakeholders that seems to emerge again and again are those from civil society, who try to mediate and control the relation between people's action and the state project – lawyers, churches, NGOs, Left activists, etc..

Fanon stessed that “The nation does not exist in a programme which has been worked out by revolutionary leaders”; it is created by “the muscles and brains of the citizens”. Abahlali baseMjondolo President, S'bu Zikode, has articulated a powerful extension of this idea in his commentary on a discussion of globalisation in the University of Abahlali baseMjondolo (i.e., a learning space constituted and populated by shack-dwellers) during September 2007. Regarding globalisation, Zikode said:

“It was clear to all that you have to approach it from the bottom, start small in a form like struggling against Baig, Mlaba etc, because in no ways you can jump into the World Bank while failing to identify a close enemy that you can see, touch, an enemy that denies us a right to life. Thus as much as all debates are good, fighting only by talking does not take us much further. Sometimes we need to strengthen our muscles for an action debate, that is a living debate that does not only end on theories [Zikode 2007]."

Indeed, as Fanon insists: “we must rid ourselves of the very Western, very bourgeois and therefore contemptuous attitude that the masses are incapable of governing themselves”.

Under current conditions then, emancipatory politics can only be initiated by those who are not stakeholders. The basis of any decent politics that is faithful to the universal principles elaborated in their thinking and struggles is that everyone counts (i.e., the opposite to what currently obtains). What kind of analysis could be done under that assumption? Surely not an analysis by elite analysts of the stakeholders who currently count? Surely only by and with those who speak and act out-of-order?

Even if we began with an idea that presumes everybody is or should be somehow a stakeholder of the state system (on the democratic basis that they are here and are human), we still reduce politics and people to the idea that they are recipients of something that the state will 'deliver' to them (a toilet, freedom, whatever). This is the deadening impact of both the 'human rights' and 'basic services' discourses – both of which, when app