Current Issue

Angola's MPs and business dealings

Rafael Marques de Morais

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61246

In a survey of the business activities of six Angolan MPs, Rafael Marques de Morais concludes that the blatant overlap of personal, commercial and governmental concerns 'makes a mockery of the supposed separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary'. These six influential members of the country's National Assembly operate with complete disrespect for the rule of law, Marques de Morais stresses, as part of a broader pattern of institutionalised arrogance.

It has become common practice for Angolan members of parliament to set up commercial companies with members of the government and with foreign investors for personal gain, in the same way that they have done with state contracts. This practice potentially creates situations that prevent them from conducting their duties as parliamentarians, as well as conflicts of interest and influence-peddling. In short, it risks making corruption an institution inside parliament.

On 24 December 2008 the chairperson of the National Assembly, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, promised during the end-of-year celebrations that members of parliament would play a role in monitoring the government’s actions as a contribution to good governance and transparency in the country. While the country awaits the result of such a promise, this article reveals a reality that calls for greater attention and monitoring by the chairperson of the National Assembly and by society at large. It deals with public scrutiny of what parliamentarians are doing while serving as elected representatives of the people.

I present the first six cases of parliamentarians whose business activities and extra-parliamentary roles raise various questions in light of current legislation. This series of investigations, based exclusively on official documents, is intended above all to inform public opinion in a way that will make people aware of how our leaders are using the name and sovereign power of the Angolan people. Whose interests are they serving? That is the question.

This investigation into members of parliament will enable us to keep a closer watch on the moral integrity of those elected representatives who are responsible for keeping the government in check. In due course, Maka will also pose questions about where the immense wealth of some of our parliamentarians comes from.

PUBLIC OFFICE, PRIVATE BUSINESS

On 1 July 2009, Julião Mateus Paulo 'Dino Matross' and João Lourenço signed, as shareholders, a contract with the Angolan state with an initial value of US$103.2 million to establish the Companhia de Cervejas de Angola S.A. (Angolan beer company), whose factory is being built in Bengo province. The Council of Ministers approved the contract hours before it was signed.

While Dino Matross, who is MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) secretary-general and an MP, signed as a private investor, João Lourenço, who is vice-chair of the National Assembly, signed as chairperson of a private company, JALC – Consultores e Prestação de Serviços. The chairperson of the National Agency for Private Investments (ANIP), Aguinaldo Jaime, signed on behalf of the state after the Council of Ministers ratified the contract through Resolution 84/09 on 23 September. The council argued that the contract had been drafted with a view to promoting investments 'that seek to pursue economic and social objectives in the public interest, namely the improvement of people’s welfare, additions to housing infrastructure, increased employment, and the nurturing of Angolan enterprise'.

The other point to be noted about the creation of the beer company is the presence of the Minister of Defence Kundy Paihama as a private investor. Other shareholders are Bevstar, a company registered in Cyprus, and the Angolan companies Colimax, Lesterfield Capital, Real Business, Waygest and Novinvest. The latter has as its main shareholder the lawyer Carlos Feijó, who is legal advisor to the CEO of state oil company Sonangol, and chairperson of the technical committee of the Constitutional Commission.

Quite apart from Companhia de Cervejas de Angola S.A., the same investors were involved together in a glass-manufacturing firm, Sociedade Vidreira de Angola S.A, which invested US$60.6 million in setting up a glass factory in Bengo province. The Council of Ministers approved this investment on 1 July 2009, and Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma sent the contract to ANIP to be formalised. It was signed, hastily, on the same day. Aguinaldo Jaime signed on behalf of the state, while parliamentarians Dino Matross and João Lourenço signed respectively as a private investor and as chairperson of JALC. Defence Minister Paihama again signed as a private investor. The Council of Ministers ratified the deal through Resolution 70/09 on 31 August.

Both investments enjoyed significant exemptions from various tax and customs obligations. The government justified this in terms of bringing investment to one of the country’s most disadvantaged regions. The project nevertheless raises various legal, political and economic concerns.

From the legal point of view, the Statutory Law on Members of Parliament (Lei Orgânica do Estatuto dos Deputados) establishes (Article 20, c) that parliamentarians 'may not participate in public tenders for the provision of goods and services nor in contracts with the state or other public entities'. Dino Matross and João Lourenço thus broke the law governing parliamentarians’ conduct when they entered into a contract with the state. At the same time, by becoming business associates of Defence Minister Paihama, they compromised the separation of powers and their duty as members of parliament to keep a check on the acts of government, in particular, the Defence Ministry. For his part, Minister Paihama, by signing a contract with the state in his private capacity, broke the Law on Crimes Committed by the Public Office Holders (Lei dos Crimes Cometidos pelos Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade): this law (Article 10, 2) prohibits officials from participating in businesses over which they might be able to exert an influence or make a decision in their official capacity. Paihama is a member of the Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers, with the right to vote on business deals of which he is a beneficiary.

At this point we should pause to consider the political ramifications of the abuse of power and the breaking of the law by those who hold public office. Aguinaldo Jaime, while serving as chairperson of ANIP, accompanied the Minister of Hotels and Tourism Pedro Mutinde to the opening of the Hotel Praia-Mar hotel at Ilha de Luanda on Independence Day, 11 November 2009. The US$58 million hotel belongs to Aguinaldo Jaime but was introduced by the minister as a great private initiative 'in the framework of the business opportunities that the country provides'. Aguinaldo Jaime overlaps his public function with his position as managing director of the company Hotel Praia-Mar Ltd, which owns the hotel, contrary to the provisions of the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Holders (Article 10,2) that outlaw the use of public office for private benefit. Therefore, there is no institution capable of providing oversight or advice on the need for transparency and the good management of the government’s actions.

Bornito de Sousa, in his role as the head of the MPLA parliamentary bench, presents us with another serious case. A lawyer of note, he is also chairperson of the Constitutional Commission and a qualified shareholder of the insurance firm, Mundial Seguros. The Banco de Poupança e Crédito, a state-owned financial institution, is the main shareholder in the insurance firm. So the public bank and the parliamentarian are shareholders together in a company of which De Sousa is also chairperson of the general assembly. According to an extensive interpretation of the law, the role of parliamentarian is incompatible with setting up a business venture with a public company, since this reveals a serious conflict of interest. A parliamentarian is meant to keep a check on government actions, including public enterprises. How can a member of parliament fulfil this function when he or she is in partnership with the state? Such a relationship also constitutes a case of influence-peddling, which is defined as corruption by the African Union and the United Nations conventions on corruption, as well as the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Protocol on Corruption, all of which have been incorporated into Angolan law.

Moreover, De Sousa is the majority shareholder in Five Towers International Building and Investments, a company that provides legal advice and unspecified consultancy and auditing, and also does business in areas that include construction, cement sales, advertising and representation of other business ventures. Here De Sousa is the partner of Conceição Cristóvão, vice-governor of the northern Malange province and formerly advisor to the prime minister on regional and local affairs.

Diógenes do Espírito Santo de Oliveira is the chairperson of the Committee on Economics and Finances of the National Assembly, and is also an administrator of Banco Comercial de Angola (BCA), which is 50 per cent-owned by Barclays PLC, through the South African bank ABSA. BCA’s shareholders include parliamentarians Julião Mateus Paulo, Dumilde das Chagas Rangel and Fernando França Van-Dúnem, the ministers of fisheries and of transport, Salomão Xirimbimbi and Augusto Tomás, the governor of Huila province, Isaac dos Anjos, and other prominent government figures.

Article 19(C) of the Statutory Law for Members of Parliament clearly forbids MPs from serving on the board of a private company. Nevertheless, de Oliveira has the support and political protection of his business partners who are also fellow parliamentarians and members of government.

Afonso Domingos Pedro Van-Dúnem 'Mbinda' is the chairperson of Fundação Sagrada Esperança, which was created as the business and social arm of the MPLA. The foundation has received US$25 million from the general state budget every year since 1999, a total of US$250 million. The foundation channels part of these funds into a business venture also created by the MPLA, Gestão de Fundos S.A. According to the contract between the two entities, the fund is intended to provide financial support and pensions for veterans of the struggle for independence, former prisoners of war from the independence struggle, holders of public office in the First Republic (pre-1992), former parliamentarians, officers from the wars of national liberation, and the leaders of political parties that have in any way contributed to independence and democracy in Angola.

The case of Fundação Sagrada Esperança helps to explain the confusion which the MPLA’s leaders and lawmakers are causing in order to serve their own obscure private interests. But we need to put its role in context.

At the MPLA’s fourth congress, in December 1998, the president criticised the high levels of corruption. He took 'the opportunity to praise the outstanding initiative by the MPLA in launching the Present Investments Fund and the Future Pensions Fund'. It was President José Eduardo dos Santos himself who oversaw the setting-up of this private business initiative by the MPLA with public funds transferred to Fundação Sagrada Esperança, and he praised it as among the best of its kind in the world. Yet six years later, in 2004, the Tribunal de Contas (the Angolan state’s financial oversight mechanism) reported (in Acórdão 001/2a Câmara TC/ 2004) that Gestão de Fundos S.A., the company responsible for the funds which dos Santos had praised as among the most advanced in the world, had no accounting procedures in place and that its management had diverted funds to private ends. The then chairperson of the board of Gestão de Fundos S.A., Isaac dos Anjos, was condemned by the Tribunal de Contas, yet the following year he was promoted by the president to become governor of Huila province.

Aside from being a bottomless pit for public funds, Fundação Sagrada Esperança is really a commercial concern. On 2 December 2009, President dos Santos opened the Belas Conference Centre, which belongs to the foundation. The centre, financed by the Sol and Keve banks, is the biggest in the country and was built on a 10,000 square metre site next to what was at the time the presidential compound at Futungo de Belas. Hotels, office blocks and residences will be built on the same site, also as part of Fundação Sagrada Esperança’s commercial activities. During the opening ceremony, the MP Afonso Van-Dúnem 'Mbinda' told reporters that the Belas Conference Centre 'is a modest contribution by Fundação Sagrada Esperança to the government’s efforts to rebuild the country'. A few days later, the MPLA held its VI Congress in the venue.

On the same basis, Fundação Sagrada Esperança is building a 26-storey luxury building on the Luanda seafront, on a budget of €75 million, the origin of which is unknown. Mbinda told the press on 7 October 2009 that the foundation would rent out at least 80 per cent of the building, making it a source of income as well as a headquarters for the foundation.

Although the Statutory Law on Members of Parliament does not make specific provisions concerning the management of foundations, by extensive interpretation one may apply Article 19 (c) and (f) to Afonso Van-Dúnem Mbinda’s role in the management of private companies, given the obvious conflicts of interest. Mbinda, as chairperson of the board of Fundação Sagrada Esperança, manages state funds and controls lucrative business activities. This creates three cases of conflict of interest.

First, it is the National Assembly that approves the General State Budget, including the allocation of funds to Fundação Sagrada Esperança.

Second, despite the non-profit character that is set out in the foundation’s statutes, its pension payments to former soldiers and bearers of high state office are not acts of charity. All the foundation does is to act as an intermediary in the channelling of funds from the state to the pension scheme. According to President dos Santos, the funds are a private MPLA initiative. In reality, they serve to benefit party activists who are selected according to obscure criteria and who receive two pensions, one from the state and the other from the MPLA – both paid for from public funds.

Third, Fundação Sagrada Esperança carries out lucrative business activities, the intentions of which are not publicly known. According to Articles 13 (a) and (c) of the Rules on Associations and Other Institutions, the foundation has a duty, inter alia, to send annual reports and accounts to the government and to co-operate with the state administration in delivering services and in related matters. The Statutory Law for Members of Parliament (Article 20, c) prohibits parliamentarians from participating in state contracts. As a beneficiary of public funds, the foundation has contractual obligations to the state, and as a public-utility institution it is subject to the supervision of the state. Hence, Mbinda is in charge of an institution that is supervised by the state. How can he fulfil his duty as an elected representative of the people in keeping a watch on acts of government? Seen in this way, the workings of the Fundação Sagrada Esperança represent institutionalised corruption, resulting from a collegial decision by the MPLA leadership and the country’s leadership, which are in fact one and the same thing.

Joana Lina Ramos Baptista, the second vice-chairperson of the National Assembly, is also chairperson of the board of Fundo Lwini, owned by first lady Ana Paula dos Santos. Her situation is equivalent to that of Afonso Van-Dúnem Mbinda, and the legal arguments set out in Mbinda’s case apply also to Ramos Baptista. Fundo Lwini is also a public-utility institution and is the second biggest shareholder in Banco Sol, one of the two banks that have loaned Fundação Sagrada Esperança to build the conference centre.

For a better understanding of the tangled web of business deals that involve the MPLA nomenclature, it needs to be pointed out that the main shareholder in Banco Sol, with 45 per cent of the shares, is Sansul, one of the MPLA’s many holding companies, GEFI. GEFI was founded on 21 September 1992. Its founding partners were Fundação Sagrada Esperança and the current parliamentarians Francisco Magalhães Paiva and Carlos Alberto Ferreira Pinto, the president’s legal counsel at the time, António Van-Dúnem, as well as other senior government figures.

Moreover, as a parliamentarian, Joana Lina Baptista is entrusted by the voters to hold the president of the republic and head of government to account for his actions. The fact the parliamentarian is in the employ of President dos Santos’s wife, Ana Paula dos Santos, undermines the dignity of the office she occupies as vice-chairperson of the National Assembly, and her autonomy as an elected official. This conflation of public duties and private interests reveals the practice of influence-peddling for the private benefit of the presidential family, the strengthening of the presidential powers through the National Assembly, and for the personal benefit of the parliamentarian. The African Union Convention (Article 4, 1, f), the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Article 18, a, b) as well as the SADC Protocol against Corruption (Article 3, 1, f) similarly define influence peddling as being a corrupt act, according to Peter Gastrow. These treaties have been incorporated into Angolan law, and Article 321 of the Penal Code provides the penalty range for their application in the courts of law.

CONCLUSION

This short summary of the activities of six influential members of the National Assembly, who are also members of the MPLA Political Bureau (with the exception of Diógenes Oliveira who is a member of the MPLA Central Committee), reveals their arrogance and complete disrespect for the law. This kind of institutionalised behaviour destroys parliament’s ability to keep a check on the actions of government, and makes a mockery of the supposed separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Rafael Marques de Morais is an Angolan journalist and human rights activist. He was awarded the Civil Courage Prize from the Northcote Parkinson Fund in 2006, and runs Maka – Anti-Corruption Watchdog.
* This article was originally published by Maka – Anti-Corruption Watchdog.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

SMS Uprising: Mobile Activism in Africa

Sokari Ekine

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61247

'SMS Uprising: Mobile Activism in Africa' is now available from Pambazuka Press. Edited by Sokari Ekine and featuring contributing chapters from authors such as Juliana Rotich, Ken Banks and Berna Ngolobe, 'SMS Uprising' brings together the experiences of activists using mobile phone technology on the African continent as well as providing understanding of the socio-economic, political and media contexts which activists face. The following article by Sokari Ekine comprises the book's introductory chapter.

As a blogger using the web as an agent of social change, I find the growth of mobile phone use in Africa offers an opportunity to look at the innovative ways this emerging technology is being used by grassroots groups and small and micro NGOs across the continent. I was very pleased to be invited to edit this book by Fahamu as it provided a chance to explore this potential, looking at not only the positives but also the negatives in order to expose the underlying reality. SMS Uprising is significant for many reasons not least because it has been edited by an African woman activist. Often initiatives in Africa are studied by people who are quite distant from the continent or are academics who are remote from the grassroots of the subject under discussion. The book is also unique in giving an insight into how activists and social change advocates are addressing Africa’s many challenges from within, and how they are using mobile telephone technology to facilitate these changes. The examples are shared in such a way that they can be easily replicated – ‘pick this idea up and use it in your campaign!’ The intention is that the information contained within the book will lead to greater reflection about the real potential and limitations of mobile technology. The protests following the Iranian elections, the Mumbai bombings and the G20 summit in London, in which mobile phones played a central role in organising, mobilising, communicating and disseminating information across the world in real time, show the actual and potential power of citizens’ journalism in times of crisis. One single message sent by SMS to Twitter can spread throughout the world in minutes.

For a social justice activist, such research is important not only to understanding the overall technology landscape but also in providing a chance to contribute to a movement that acknowledges and tackles potential problems while interrogating its strengths. There is no doubt that mobile and internet technology is democratising social change in communities across Africa. We must, however, also recognise that technology has the capacity to concentrate power and therefore could be used to reinforce existing power relations.

The introduction of mobile phones in Africa transforms people’s ability to communicate. Unlike in the West, where there was already an existing network of communication through landlines, mobile phones in Africa provide communication where previously there was none. In 2007, it was estimated that there were 300 million mobile phone users – about 30 per cent[1] of the continent’s population.[2] Whilst mobile phone usage continues to grow exponentially[3] and in some countries has reached critical mass, a more discerning reading of the figures is necessary to obtain a picture of the reality. This kind of examination helps to explain why and how mobile phones have been used for social change in some instances and countries, and not in others. For example, the figures do not reveal the number of handsets per person nor, conversely, how many people are sharing one handset. People at upper-income levels particularly, tend to have two phones on different networks and, in some cases, even three or four.

There are also some huge discrepancies between regions and countries as well as within countries – such as between rural and urban populations. The report titled ‘Mobile telephony access and usage in Africa’ shows this clearly. For example, the 2008 subscriber rates for South Africa (87.08 per cent) are around three times that of Nigeria (27.28 per cent) and Kenya (30.48 per cent). Ethiopia is only 1.45 per cent and Rwanda 6.53 per cent.[4] What does seem to affect the diffusion of mobile phone use, as Nathan Eagle points out in Chapter 1, ‘Economics and power within the African telecommunication industry’, is whether or not the telecommunications industry is deregulated. So, for instance, in Uganda where there is much competition, prices are low, while Ethiopia, which remains highly regulated with no competition, has high calling costs.

Technology in itself does not lead to social change. For change to take place technology needs to be appropriate and rooted in local knowledge. People decide why and how a particular technology will be used and, depending on the political and socio-economic environment in which they live, adapt it accordingly. As we shall see from the case studies in this book, there are considerable local innovations and non-instrumental uses of the phone – using phones in ways not intended, that step outside their technological aspects and which attempt to bypass traditional power structures. Firoze Manji describes this process as ordinary people taking control of their destiny rather than technology driving the change:

'Social change is actually driven not by technologies but by ordinary people being able to exert an authority over their own experience and, through common actions, developing the courage to determine their own destiny.'[5]

It is important in the context of this book to point out that the projects and innovations discussed within it do not follow a traditional development model, where technology tends to be shaped by the economic forces that created it. Instead, the social change model is driven by the forces of people’s local needs and is therefore more able to respond quickly and appropriately to specific events and political changes. This means that people at a grassroots level can think about what works for them and how can they use technology to foster social change and collective action.

What makes the mobile phone such a dynamic tool for supporting social change is its sheer range of actual and potential functionality, making it an extremely versatile technology. Erik Hersman, who authors the leading blog on high-tech mobile and web technology change in Africa (White African and the Africa Network: An Idea by Erik Hersman), coined the phrase, ‘If it works in Africa it will work anywhere’, referring to Africa’s many innovative ideas, projects and people.[6] Activists and campaign groups have also chosen to use mobile phones – SMS and video – for mobilising, advocacy, campaigning, social networking, citizens’ journalism and crowdsourcing.[7] Campaigns can be short or long term and planned in advance, but quite often they are spontaneously reacting to an event. For example:

- The International Center for Accelerated Development (ICAD) in Nigeria used mobile phones to bring people together for a rally during the Global AIDS Week of Action campaign, which began in April 2008. ICAD Nigeria also used SMS to mobilise supporters in the Plateau State elections in 2008[8] (see Chapter 4 of this book).
- In 2007 WOUGNET in Uganda used SMS as part of the 16 Days of Activism to End Violence Against Women campaign. 170 messages were sent out in 13 countries across four continents[9] (see Chapter 8).
- In Egypt, activists have used both SMS and the video cameras on their mobile phones to mobilise and expose police torture. One particularly harrowing video showed a 13-year-old boy, Mohammed Mamdouh Abdel Aziz, being tortured by the police. Using video and testimonies, activists have been able to document torture in Egypt thereby giving their claims real credibility.[10]

However SMS or the phone in general is not always the most effective or appropriate technology as Bukeni Waruzi’s paper (see Chapter 11) on using mobiles in the DRC shows – in a crisis writing an SMS takes time. It is far quicker to make a voice call. In another example, the UmNyango project (see Chapter 6) found that women preferred to report domestic violence face to face rather using a phone.

Varying examples must be seen in the context of local infrastructures which impact on usage but at the same time lead to technological and non-technological innovations to overcome constraints. In fact, mobile phones have led to a huge growth in the informal sector with entrepreneurs who support usage such as selling airtime, selling chargers, charging, recycling and repairing phones – nothing is left to waste.[11]

This book aims to provide an examination of the many inventive ways that activism and social change are taking place across Africa and how mobile phones have been co-opted as the primary tool to aid this process. My own research in compiling this book’s chapters leads me to consider a number of questions regarding the context of technology in Africa. For example, who is a user and who is an owner? To what extent are these projects and innovations breaking down traditional and capitalistic hierarchies? How have activists been able to use the technology to really affect change? Is access to a mobile phone and using it for social change more than just a drop in the ocean? Where people use technology to advance movement for change and to empower communities in putting forward information about human rights abuses, electoral abuses, empowering women, etc, are these changes actually sustainable? Given that women are largely responsible for development, particularly in rural areas, and how under-resourced women are, what kind of a resource does a mobile phone give them? From observing and talking to women in Nigeria, it is clear that the purchase of airtime was given a high priority but was also used with much caution. The main complaints were always the cost of airtime and poor reception. This led to people wanting to own more than one handset from different networks – another additional cost. On the other hand, as Christiana Charles-Iyoha points out in Chapter 9, the high level of poverty amongst women undermines women’s role in development and socio-economic transformation as they are excluded from owning a phone and their status often limits even the sharing of a phone within the family.

Another constraint that particularly impacts on women, due to their overwhelming poverty, is the poor electricity supply, which means that to be effective there is a need for two phones. Nonetheless, at least one report found that there was no difference in how men and women used mobile phones and in fact in some situations phones decreased the isolation of women and increased job creation for those selling airtime and other related products.[12]

It would be unethical to write about mobile phones in general, and particularly in an African context, without mentioning the mining of coltan, which is an essential element in the production of the phones. In a report in the UK daily newspaper the Independent, Johann Hari makes a direct link between the increase in deaths and the mining of coltan in the Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), naming Anglo-America, Standard Chartered Bank, De Beers and more than 100 others involved.13 We should therefore be mindful when we read of the huge growth in mobile phone usage on the continent of the major cost in lives and human rights abuses associated with the mining of coltan.

The projects in this book are reliant on external funding and, in many cases, support from multinational service providers seeking profit. By funding mobile phone-based projects, these companies believe that users will want to add value for themselves by using the phone as a general means of communicating, thereby offsetting costs of the funding. But if pricing of airtime and handsets is too high, this may not happen or only in a limited way. Finally, we should approach the technology carefully, as there are pitfalls. For example, by ignoring traditional forms of communication and indigenous forms of organising, people, especially women, can end up being disempowered.

The contributors to this book have been chosen because they offer a comprehensive range of experiences drawn from across the continent. Every attempt has been made to include a variety of voices – activists, organisations, academics and technologists – which provides a range of perspectives in addressing the issues raised above.

Part I provides the political, economic and technological context. Contributors examine the political economy of the telecommunications industry and discuss the possibilities and constraints on future developments and how mobile phones are used. Nathan Eagle (see Chapter 1) offers an overview of the economics and politics of the African telecommunications industry. Not surprisingly, and despite the rapid decline in airtime costs, the mobile phone market in Africa reaps huge profits. China’s position in the market is considerable and in the case of Ethiopia they have taken over the whole telecoms equipment industry. One result has been high airtime costs as well as attacks on personal freedoms in the country. Eagle also discusses the privacy implications of monitoring the data produced by millions of mobile phones:

'Beyond documentation of voice and text-message communication and location estimates based on cellular towers, occasionally mobile operators have additional data about their subscribers, including demographic information, socio-economic status…'

With mobile phones being used to transfer medical data including HIV/AIDS statistics and personal drug regimes, as well as human rights activists using phones for mobilisation and communicaxv Intr oducti on tion, the implications for data privacy, especially in repressive regimes, is worrying.

Christian Kreutz in Chapter 2 analyses future trends for mobile activism and social change in Africa and identifies four potential growth areas. However, he notes that there remain many technological and infrastructural challenges. These include the plethora of low cost phones with few features, which makes internet integration very much a thing of the future. Although airtime and hardware costs have reduced over the past five years, they still remain high enough to present obstacles to the majority of Africans. Kreutz introduces a range of mobile applications and discusses the realities of implementation given the many obstacles. He concludes that technology should only be used if it is appropriate and is the best option, rather than for its own sake.

Ken Banks is the founder of FrontlineSMS, which he describes as ‘a piece of free software which turns a laptop (or desktop) computer, a mobile phone and a cable into a two-way group messaging centre’.

The focus of Banks’s Chapter 3 ‘Social mobile: empowering the many or the few?’ is the need to develop mobile applications for grassroots NGOs and thereby avoid creating yet another North/South divide. This means using a development model focused on creating tools that are available to everyone. Mobile technology solutions should be simple, appropriate and affordable, rather than top–down and capital intensive. This approach creates huge technical, economic and cultural challenges to developers, but is not impossible if one chooses to work with local communities and focus on empowering them.

A book on mobile phones and activism would not be complete without a detailed example of at least one technology tool and a description of the processes behind its ideas and development. Part I concludes with Chapter 4 by Tanya Notley and Becky Faith from the Tactical Technology Collective. Tactical Tech was formed in 2003 with the aim of bringing together the ‘innovative activities’ of human rights advocates in marginalised communities and the open source software movement. Despite being ‘philosophically aligned’ there was little interaction between the two, and the challenge for Tactical Tech was to develop appropriate, open source technology through collaboration with frontline human rights advocates. The chapter discusses the development of one particular toolkit, the Mobiles in-a-box, which is a collection of tools, tactics and guides on how mobile phone technology can be used for campaigns and advocacy. The processes described are a useful model for organisations wishing to embark on a participatory development approach towards social change and activism, with or without the application of technology.

Part II, ‘Mobile democracy: SMS case studies’, consists of practical examples of social change and mobile activism across the continent. The examples vary considerably, from SMS campaigns for a specific purpose to a more generalised use of SMS for advocacy or election monitoring, as an information tool to empower civil society, as a means of social intervention or to monitor and document crises.

In 2004 Fahamu (‘an African activist organisation working for human rights and social justice’) launched a campaign to promote the ratification of the Protocol of the Rights of Women in Africa. In 2005, they then launched another campaign in support of the Global Call to Action against Poverty. The use of SMS in both these campaigns was a strategic choice for Fahamu, who recognised the huge growth in mobile phones (52–67 million at the time of both campaigns) and the potential SMS had for mobilising social justice campaigns.

Redante Asuncion-Reed (Chapter 5) looks at, analyses and assesses both Fahamu campaigns. How we measure and define success is an important issue in any campaign and there is a tendency to focus too strictly on numerical data. Asuncion-Reed makes the point that both campaigns were measured by their consequences and were driven by achieving goals rather than by the number of people who responded through the technology. He then attempts to answer the question as to whether the campaigns achieved their stated goals of mobilising ‘public pressure’ for the ratification of the Protocol on African Women’s Rights and to bring attention to the issue of global poverty.

Violence against women takes place across the world. However, in South Africa it has been aggravated by apartheid, which created a culture of aggression and brutality. The situation is further exacerbated by local patriarchies which discriminate against women in the areas of widowhood, land rights and inheritance laws. Despite constitutional protections in the post-apartheid South Africa, violence against women continues.

'As most studies show, violence against women is a multi-linked variable connecting to, inter alia, patriarchal ‘configuration’ of our society, poverty, illiteracy and general economic exclusion of women, especially African women. Poverty and economic exclusion results in unequal gender relations between men and women which in most cases translate into vulnerability in various ways.'[14]

The UmNyango project (see Chapter 6) sought to address the twin issues of domestic violence and land exclusions. This was done by taking an integrated approach towards providing rural women in KwaZulu Natal (KZN) with timely and relevant information on human rights as well as access to a simple but effective reporting mechanism. UmNyango project manager, Anil Naidoo, examines the potential and limitations of SMS as a tool to empower rural women in KZN. Naidoo’s contribution highlights the point that although technology might be more efficient and present more timely information, it is not necessarily the most appropriate in all situations. This is particularly pertinent to women living under patriarchal systems where they are treated as ‘perpetual minors’. In the case of the women in the UmNyango project, they preferred face-to-face communication when discussing or reporting domestic violence. Other points raised in this chapter are the prohibitive costs attached to mobile phone use and the associated sustainability of funded projects.

The continued political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has meant that the average Zimbabwean has very limited access to information – especially independent news media. Amanda Atwood explores the ways Kubatana has used mobile activism in a variety of campaigns, including during the 2008 Zimbabwean elections (Chapter 7). Kubatana has been at the forefront of developing innovative social and technological solutions to information scarcity and advocacy in repressive political environments. For example, Kubatana’s mobile activism is informed by the exchange of ideas and by fostering two-way communication with Zimbabweans from all walks of life. Another exciting innovation she mentions is the development of the Freedom Fone. One of its features is the capability to go beyond the 160 character limit of SMS. The phone also enables communities to create their own content based on demand as it marries radio-style programming with both mobiles and landline phones. The Freedom Fone is significant not only because of this feature, but also as it is a technology developed in Africa in a country that has been in crisis for the past nine years and where most resources are extremely limited. Another important element of the Freedom Fone is that the idea and development have been led by Kubatana’s technical director, Brenda Burrell.

WOUGNET (Women of Uganda Network) was started in 2000 and is one of the oldest NGOs working with women and ICT in Africa. WOUGNET’s approach to gender and technology is driven by gender inequalities in both urban and rural women’s status as well as in access to ICT, including mobile phones. The network participated in global and African SMS campaigns to raise awareness of violence against women in 2007 and 2008 (http://tinyurl.com/8kaubh), to provide timely agricultural information and to support online discussions on women’s rights and development. Berna Ngolobe, in Chapter 8, offers a gender dimension to the use of ICT including SMS as a way of improving capacity and generally empowering women. She raises issues of patriarchy which lead to women experiencing real disadvantage in education and economic security. Both of these factors impact on women’s access to mobile phones and therefore to participating in SMS-supported advocacy and campaign projects. Nonetheless, Uganda, which is also one of the countries involved in the Village Phone Initiative (http://tinyurl.com/qqd7ks), has taken a liberalised approach to telecommunications which has also led to increased access for women. This has resulted in a plethora of mobile service providers and one of the lowest call prices on the continent, thereby reducing some of the gender barriers that exist elsewhere in Africa.

In ‘Mobile telephony: closing the gap’ (Chapter 9), Christiana Charles-Iyoha, whilst recognising the pervasiveness of mobile phones and the innovative opportunities they have created, avoids the temptation to assert that we are moving towards a ‘digitopia’ particularly where women are concerned. Her chapter addresses gender imbalances, noting that women are largely excluded from accessing mobile phone technology and therefore from engaging actively in the development and social change process. She suggests a number of ways in which these inequalities can be addressed. By examining the factors that create obstacles she presents a number of practical ways of addressing imbalances.

Within 24 hours of the outbreak of the 2008/2009 post election violence in Kenya, Kenyan blogs were posting hour-by-hour reports. On 31 December, there was a complete shutdown of the mainstream media. Erik Hersman of ‘White African’ said:

'The only way to get any up-to-date news for the past 24–48 hours has been through the blogosphere (like Kenyan Pundit, Thinkers Room, Mentalacrobatics), Skype and Kenyan-populated forums (like Mashada). The traditional media has been shut out and shut down for all intents and purposes.'[15]

Within days, the online community and blog aggregator, Mashada, had set up an SMS and voice hotline calling for people to send in local news and opinions on what was happening. This was followed by Ory Okolloh (Kenyan Pundit) who suggested using Google Earth to create a mashup16 of where the violence was taking place and called upon ‘any techies’ out there willing to help create a map of it. This was 3 January and by 9 January a group of Kenyan bloggers had put together a mashup and created Ushahidi, a site for people to send SMS or email reports of acts of violence directly. What the Ushahidi project shows is that if you build a strong community then it is easier to come together in a time of crisis and take action.

Why was the Kenyan blogosphere able to rally in such a positive and productive way in such a short time? What can we learn from their actions that will help others deal with local crisis? These are some of the questions, Juliana Rotich and Joshua Goldstein address in ‘Digitally networked technology’ (Chapter 10).

Bukeni Waruzi’s chapter provides an overview of the use of mobile phones for monitoring and reporting abuses of children’s rights. The Kalundu Child Soldier project used members of local communities including some former child soldiers to monitor and report acts of violence such as from rape, torture and forced marriage. The project is based in the Kivu region of eastern Congo, which is the centre of the violence in the country as militias, multinationals and governments all vie for control of the rich mineral resources such as coltan. It is ironic that the main mineral required to manufacture the mobile phones being used to report human rights abuses is the very mineral which is causing the conflict in the first place.

The contributors in this book come from a variety of occupational backgrounds, a fact that is reflected in the different writing styles and approaches to the usefulness of mobile technology as a tool for social change and advocacy in Africa. While they are all aware of the need to overcome infrastructural, economic and cultural obstacles, they also have a strong desire for social change and have the vision to see what could be possible and how best to achieve this. We are facing increasing amplification of social differentiation – the rich continue to get richer and the poor, poorer. In the face of this inequality mobile phone activism in Africa, as examined in this book, emerges as a powerful force for achieving social justice.

Mobile phones as tools for social change and advocacy are at a relatively early stage of development, but that are growing at an exponential rate, and it is quite possible that within two years the whole landscape will have changed. There are, of course, many other innovative projects and ideas which could have been included if space permitted. There is also the need for more research to fill the vacuum of information that exists such as from North Africa, Egypt and other non-English speaking countries. I am quite confident that there will be an academic exploration of some of the experiences discussed in the book. SMS Uprising is offered as the beginning, and showcases positive examples of what is possible and what can inspire people to use technology to support their actions.

Compiling this book has been a learning experience for me both as an editor and in terms of understanding how mobile telephony is being used in Africa. It has also been a privilege to work with Fahamu, who have been supportive and patient throughout.

NOTES
[1] Obtaining accurate and timely figures for Africa’s mobile telephones is not a precise task as numbers and percentage figures differ, though only marginally. At the end of 2007 there were 280.7 million mobile phone subscribers in Africa, representing a penetration rate of 30.4 per cent (from approximately 50 million, or 10 per cent penetration, in 2002). This is set to reach 580 million and a penetration rate of 95 per cent by 2012. http://whiteafrican.com/2008/08/01/2007-african-mobile-phone-statistics/, accessed 15 May 2009.
[2] (2008) ‘African mobile subscribers surpass North America’, Textually.org, http://www.textually.org/textually/archives/2008/05/019983.htm, accessed 15 May 2009.
[3] Hash (2008) ‘2007 mobile phone statistics’, White African http://whiteafrican.com/2008/08/01/2007-african-mobile-phone-statistics/, accessed 15 May 2009.
[4] Hash (2009) ‘Mobile telephony access and usage in Africa’, White African, http://whiteafrican.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/researchictafrica-ictd2009.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009.
[5] Manji, F. (2008) ‘Mobile activism, mobile hype’, Gender and Media Diversity Journal, no. 4, January, pp. 125–32, http://www.genderlinks.org.za/page.php?p_id=398, accessed 14 September 2009.
[6] Hash (2008) ‘If it works in Africa, it will work anywhere’, White African, http://whiteafrican.com/2008/09/26/if-it-works-in-africa-it-will-work-anywhere/, accessed 15 May 2009.
[7] Crowdsourcing – When citizens working as a collective report on a crisis with real-time news from a particular region or on a particular situation we can call it ‘crowdsourcing in citizen journalism’.
[8] Tactical Tech ‘Using mobile phones to monitor local elections’, Tactical Technology Collective
[9] WOUGNET (2008) ‘16 Days Of Activism: SMS campaign 2008’, http://www.wougnet.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=315&Itemid=29, accessed 15 May 2009.
[10] Tactical Tech ‘Exposing police torture with mobile phone video’, Tactical Technology Collective, http://www.mobiles.tacticaltech.org/Exposingpolicetorturewithmobilephonevideo, accessed 15 May 2009.
[11] Banks, K. (2008) ‘Build it Kenny, and they will come… Mobile telephony and the entrepreneur’, http://www.kiwanja.net/blog/2008/10/mobile-telephony-and-the-entrepreneur/, accessed 27 May 2009.
[12] Nthateng, M. (2008) ‘Mobiles for development or poverty’, Mobile Active, http://www.mobileactive08.org/node/954, accessed 4 June 2009.
[13] Hari, J. (2008) ‘How we fuel Africa’s bloodiest war’, Independent, 30 October
[14] Farouk, F. (2008) ‘UmNyango – a survey of the potential of the short messaging service: exteral evalutation of the Fahamu Umnyango project’.
[15] Hash (2007) ‘Why the internet matters in Africa’, White African, http://whiteafrican.com/2007/12/31/why-the-internet-matters-in-africa/, accessed 28 September 2009.
[16] Hersman, E. ‘Mashups and activism’, http://tinyurl.com/nnu2cx, accessed 23 June 2009. A mashup is a web application that takes two or more sets of data and combines them to create something of added value. The data types could be: maps (Google, Yahoo, NASA), images, video, audio, SMS data, Twitter (micro-blogging platform), personal information, indeed, almost any other type of data you can think of.

The Nigerian bomber and the Obama administration

The roots of terrorism have not gone away

Ama Biney

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61263

cc SarcasmoNigerian-born Umar Farouk Abdulmulltallab’s dastardly attempt to detonate a bomb on flight 253 has profound ramifications for all Africans and the African continent, writes Ama Biney, from tougher security checks for passengers flying from Muslim countries, to providing justification for a greater role for AFRICOM in tackling the ‘alleged global war on terrorism’. But, asks Biney, is increased military intervention an effective strategy for treating the root causes of terrorist attacks and building a safe and secure world for all?

In 1990 I vividly remember a white American customs official asking me at Dallas airport if I was a Nigerian and was I carrying drugs in my suitcase? For him, all Africans looked alike and nationality was unimportant. For me, it simply reinforced that all Africans were likely to be subjected to prejudice, racism and suspicion by certain elements of US officialdom regardless of class, age, or gender. Racial profiling has been around long before 9/11 and now with the arrest of Umar Farouk Abdulmulltallab who dangerously tried to set himself alight on board flight 253 in Detroit on 25 December 2009, his dastardly act has profound ramifications for all Africans and the African continent.

Firstly, to date, the face of the terrorist has been Arab, then Asian (particularly in the UK where a few British Muslims have been involved in terrorist incidents); it is now Nigerian. However, for many Europeans and North Americans who tend to think of Africa as country, Nigerian indiscriminately equals all Africans.

Secondly, since the frightening incident, there have been swift moves to tighten up security in Western capitals, particularly in the US and UK. According to the British Guardian newspaper, the US has announced that passengers flying from 14 Muslim countries considered to have links with terrorism are now set to confront additional security checks. Naturally the list includes Nigeria, as well as Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.[1] In addition, there have been talks of full body scans that some say will be an invasion of privacy and a violation of human dignity – all in the effort to counter terrorism and secure safety and security. But safety and security for whom?

Thirdly, the serious furore created by Abdulmulltallab’s action will further justify the Obama administration’s commitment to AFRICOM’s escalation of the military role of the command in fighting the alleged global war on terrorism (GWOT). Quietly the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, Libya and South Africa – whilst objecting to stationing AFRICOM’s headquarters on their soil – have participated in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership. Such countries will continue to receive millions of dollars in military funding and more so in the light of this incident. Therefore, resistance to AFRICOM must be stepped up.

Fourth, as Africa’s most populous state, Nigeria must deny it is breeding fanatics, though its leadership does not have the courage to speak truth (either publicly or behind closed doors) to US power as to the real roots of terrorism. Whilst much has been made of Abdulmulltallab’s radicalisation in London, terrorists are not born but are made in political, economic and social conditions and in a world of disconnects and contradictions. Who will bell the cat? Who will tell the Obama administration that the GWOT will not be solved by increasing the military-industrial-security and police intelligence of the US and the agencies of those countries said to be a safe haven for terrorists? Who will tell the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown that his proposed conference on Yemen on 28 January to ostensibly fix Yemen is, as Rami G. Khouri aptly says, ‘akin to Tiger Woods offering a course in marriage fidelity?’[2] The problems of Yemen as Khouri points out have historical roots in the British imposed artificial boundaries that created instability in Yemen, alongside the British installed local rulers.

In the wake of 9/11 Americans asked ‘why do they hate us?’ and George W. Bush Junior responded that America’s enemies ‘hate our freedoms.’ Such a simplistic interpretation continues to mislead Americans and misguides the American administration in its solutions to the GWOT. In essence, the causes of terrorism have not gone away. These causes lie in the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian problem remains; Israel continues to occupy Palestine, builds homes on Palestinian land, flouts UN Security Council resolutions; America continues to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan; America continues to covertly support undemocratic and corrupt governments in the world, including in the Arab world (e.g. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have incumbent rulers who have held on to the political reins of power whilst US administrations including Obama who visited the former early in his administration, turn a blind eye). The US continues to maintain some 600 military bases around the world, including the Arab world, which scandalises ordinary Arabs and particularly Muslim jihadists. However, these military bases exist in order to maintain America’s sole superpower status, grip on the oil supplies of the Middle East and to project its domination around the world.

The former head of Israeli military intelligence, Yehoshaphat Harkabi made a critical observation that continues to remain valid. He said: ‘To offer an honourable solution to the Palestinians respecting their right to self-determination: That is the solution to the problem of terrorism. When the swamp disappears there will be no more mosquitoes.’[3] The trouble is the responses of both the US and UK (and other Western nations) are generating more swamps and therefore more mosquitoes. The more troops and personnel that the US and NATO send to Yemen or Afghanistan, the more they are helping to breed more mosquitoes and playing into Al-Qaeda’s hands.

We do not know the reasons that encouraged the young educated 23 year-old Abdulmulltallab to be persuaded by Yemeni operatives to carry out such an act. He hailed from the small town of Funtua in Katsina state, also the hometown of the great Pan-Africanist, Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem. Yet this is where their commonality ends. Whether it was, despite his privileged upbringing, that he considered the disparities and inequalities plaguing the world as intolerable; or that deaths of Iraqis, Afghans, Congolese or any other non-white person is worth less than the death of a European or North American; and/or sheer indoctrination by Islamic fundamentalists, that fuelled his frustration and bitterness whilst producing the mindset and then the decision to carry out such an act – we can only speculate. Yet, nothing morally justifies his heinous action. Meanwhile, we must ask ourselves in the rush to increase military training and intelligence of the Yemeni government by the British and American governments – is this the only response to be pursued? Would such funds not be better spent on increasing the number of jobs, health and education of the poorest Arab country in the Arab world in which there are four guns to every person in a population of an estimated 23 million people?[4]

Senator Joe Lieberman who is chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, recently endorsed the view of an American official based in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The official told Lieberman: ‘Iraq was yesterday’s war. Afghanistan is today’s war. If you don’t act pre-emptively Yemen will be tomorrow’s war.’[5]What level of increased intervention the Obama administration will pursue in Yemen is uncertain. But what is certain is that there will be some level of increased intervention. Yet, such an increased engagement is likely to destabilise the wider region in a similar way that US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq did. Moreover, this time, the dangers of a prospective intervention in the pursuit of the GWOT is that it is likely to be centred on America’s military base in Djibouti where the US has an estimated 2000 troops stationed at Camp Lemonier which hosts the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HA).

In addition to this complex geo-strategic political picture, it is believed that some 200,000 Somali refugees are in Yemen as a result of the ongoing political conflict in Somalia. Some of these refugees are said to have joined Al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, the al-Shabaab Islamists in Somalia are in contact with Al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen. The low-profile and covert approach of the Obama administration needs to be watched closely, as does the negative impact of internationalising Yemen’s multiple conflicts; it is likely to drag Africa – particularly the geo-strategic importance of the Horn of Africa into any future quagmire or worse still, powder keg scenario. Ultimately, on a medium to long term basis, we need to drain the swamp and there will be no more mosquitoes.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Dr Ama Biney is a pan-Africanist and scholar-activist who lives in the United Kingdom.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] Guardian, Monday 4 January 2010, ‘US imposes extra security checks on air passengers from 14 countries’ by Matthew Weaver.
[2] The Daily Star, 6 January 2010, ‘There is wisdom in Yemen, if we seek it’, by Rami G. Khouri.
[4] See 4 January 2010, ‘And Now Yemen’ by W. Pfaff, in International Herald Tribune.
[5] Cited in ‘Threats to Yemen prove America hasn’t learned the lesson of history’ by P. Cockburn, 31 December 2009, Independent News and Media.

The South Africa-Congo concession: Exploitation or salvation?

Khadija Sharife

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61251

cc Congo 2007With tens of millions of hectares of land across Africa auctioned off to corporations and governments in secretive deals, in this week’s Pambazuka News Khadija Sharife takes a closer look at a set of agreements between the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and a group of white South African farmers. Will this partnership come at the expense of local people, Sharife asks, or could it generate models for freeing the continent from food insecurity through the sharing of resources and humanity?

It has been called the 'new Great Trek' by South Africans who remember their history.

Presently, over 30 million hectares in almost 30 African countries have been auctioned to a host of corporations and governments, from China – housing one fifth of the world's population on 8 per cent of the world's arable land – to oil-rich, water-poor Gulf nations. The deals involving these concessions are often cloaked in secrecy but African Business has learnt that they are usually characterised by allowing free access to water, repatriation of profits, tax exemptions and the ability for investors to acquire land at no cost whatsoever, with little or no restriction on the volume of food exported or its intended use, in return for a loose promise to develop infrastructure and markets. However, the terms of the concessions vary from country to country and deal from deal. In some instances, the host country drives a hard bargain and in other cases, the investors call the shots.

As the debate over the whole question continues to rage on, the much-discussed Congo land-lease, granting 200,000 hectares to South African farmers with a further 10 million hectares in the balance, appears to mark a departure from the usual terms underpinning foreign acquisition of fertile land by multinationals. Not only has commercial agriculture on these concessions chiefly been earmarked for domestic use, thus generating food security, but good crop yields possess the potential to reduce outstanding debt in the Republic of the Congo from 70 per cent to 40 per cent of GDP within a year.

Describing the South African farmers, an official from ABSA AgriBusiness, a leader in the financing of the agricultural sector, stated, ‘They are capable of farming without government support, can compete against the best in the world and even with our scarce resources, they produce profitably.’

‘There are three main reasons we are in the Congo,’ stated Andre Botha, president of Agri Gauteng, a division of Agri SA. ‘The first is, of course, to diversify our businesses; the second is to assist local farmers to commercially develop their own land; the third reason is to assist the government of South Africa to fulfil the expectations of the world in stabilising the African continent through the exchange of skills and technology.’

Agri SA, a commercial farmers' association, was initially contacted by the Congolese government in January 2009, with the latter seeking a strategic non-governmental organisation in the form of a professional farmers' union, rather than a political state controlled entity.

The union, a federal organisation formed in 1904, is composed of 70,000 large and smallscale commercial farmers in South Africa. It actively assists members in farm development, corporate liaison, information technology development and transfer, trade, industry, water, land, economic and environmental affairs, as well as labour and training.

‘Our own government and that of the Congo have already established bilateral agreements in 2003, and again in 2005. This was ratified in parliament,’ said Botha.

HEAVEN FOR SOUTH AFRICAN FARMERS

The land has been packaged as 'under-utilised' by Agri SA and the Congolese government, with the latter stating that no Congolese subsistence farmers occupy the land. The Congo's numerous state-owned farms, neglected for 12 years, are situated between two mountain ranges in the fertile Nyari Valley. Despite neglect and the dilapidation of some homes and infrastructure, the bulk of the property, states Agri SA deputy president Dr Theo de Jager, ‘remains in good condition’.

‘For us, it is heaven,’ says De Jager. ‘There is 1,400mm of rainfall per year, with two rainy seasons, the first from October to March, receiving two thirds of the rain. The farmers will move into the houses on the property; the type and size of property allocated depends on the individual business plan (and the commodities) negotiated between farmers and the Congolese government. Chicken farms will require much less space than cassava farms, for example.’

A single dry-land hectare in the Congo, for example, is capable of yielding 10 tonnes of maize as opposed to South Africa's three tonnes. While contracts have already been signed, individual agreements between farmers and the Congolese government will determine selection criteria of allocated land, administrative design, sustained yields and other factors. The final detailed agreements were expected to be signed before the New Year. ‘Initially, during the first tranche, farmers will be required to self-finance projects, however,’ says De Jager, ‘farmers would pay no import duties or tax on equipment, unlike in SA where we are heavily taxed in many ways’. In addition, farmers would be able to repatriate profit to any part of the world, and receive a five-year tax holiday. Over 25 million hectares of land in the Congo remain uncultivated.

‘Many farmers involved in virgin land development for crops such as avocados, bananas and macadamia nuts are very keen because of the Congo's rich soils,’ De Jager says.

Despite South Africa being self-sufficient and a net exporter of food – with agriculture composing 15 per cent of GDP – 90 per cent of the country can be described as arid and semi-arid with very low average rainfall and high variability within seasons, rendering crops vulnerable to drought. Agriculture, possessing strong forward and backward linkages, provides 9 per cent of the nation's employment; the dairy industry, for example, employs 60,000 workers.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANGLE

However, in South Africa itself, it is not the physical climate that has started tongues wagging but rather South Africa's political climate under President Jacob Zuma, and the government's agenda to transfer 30 per cent of South African arable land to the previously disadvantaged majority by 2014.

Presently, just 4 per cent of land has been redistributed since the end of apartheid in 1994, when 90 per cent of arable was possessed by 10 per cent of the population, more specifically white minorities. Is the Congo deal the start of a new wave of emigration by white farmers, mainly Afrikaners, threatened by a possible loss of property rights in the future?

Although the 1,700 interested parties hail from all over South Africa, the flow predominately stems from the Northern and Eastern Cape regions, where land restitution fears have sparked uncertainty about the farmers' future.

‘We are moving into the eleventh year of land restitution. None of the restituted farms have been commercially profitable. My own farm, with 26,000 mango trees, was restituted – today, four trees remain. Some farmers hesitate about investing long term as in the banana industry, renewed every 12 years, because of this fear,’ one farmer claims.

Although South Africa's Department of Land Affairs and Agriculture issued the tough directive of 'use it or lose it' earlier in the year, the Department itself has not accepted the offer of assistance from South Africa's farmers' associations, perhaps lacking the political will to recognise the capacity of the organised commercial farmers union – and their valuable skills.

‘Simply transferring the land – even commanding that the land be made use of – is not enough. Of 103 projects we are working on, 76 are commercially profitable. We have much to contribute and are very willing, but the department has not taken an interest,’ said De Jager.

‘Redistribution is not a threat,’ adds Botha, ‘but a reality that acknowledges disparities in land ownership; redistributed land will remain in the commercial sector to protect our food security.

‘We are a non-racial commercial farmers' association,’ he says. ‘We have no problem with the Zuma government. In fact, it was Zuma who told the country before being elected president that Afrikaners were true South Africans.’

Crucially, the Congo ventures are not core businesses to be based in the Congo but instead, extensions of businesses located in South Africa. Of the 70 farmers that have already embarked on the 'trek', none has sold their SA-based farms.

FOOD SECURITY IS THE GOAL

But if the South African government has not yet awoken to the potential of engaging with Agri SA and similar farmers' associations, many African nations certainly have: Over 20 offers, most recently from Libya and Mozambique, have been extended to South African farmers.

The issue of food security gained critical momentum during 2008, when inflation produced a massive 140 per cent increase in food prices, especially in grains such as wheat, corn and maize, forcing an extra 100 million people below the poverty line. According to a leaked confidential report written by Don Mitchell, a senior analyst at the World Bank, 75 per cent of the inflation was caused by the conversion of arable land to growing crops for biofuels.

For South Africa, food inflation (16 per cent, mid-2009) remains one of the key drivers behind overall inflation, according to the Consumer Price Index for Food (CPIF), allegedly caused by increasingly unproductive restituted land.

But few countries are more food insecure and dependent on imports than the Congo, situated in Central Africa and bordered by Gabon, Angola's Cabinda province, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, the Gulf of Guinea and Cameroon. Over 50 per cent of Congolese citizens are undernourished and living on US$1.25 per day, while healthcare composes just 1.7-3 per cent of public expenditure. Oil accounts for almost 90 per cent of export earnings while food, in addition to equipment, constitutes the bulk of imports, estimated at US$2.7 billion (2008).

‘We receive the land for free. There are no restrictions on exports, but given the prices of food in the Congo, you'd have to be crazy to export anything. Tomatoes imported from France retail for about £10 a kilo in the country,’ says Agri SA's De Jager.

In spite of negative reactions from France, the country's former colonial landlord and primary 'rentier' via trade and the extractive industries, the deal marks one of the first land concessions negotiated between a commercial farmers' union and a state in Africa.

The agreement provides farmers with a 30-year lease, tax exemptions and a further renewable 30 years, subject to committee assessments. The committee is composed of six officials – three representatives from Agri SA and three from the Congolese government.

‘The government offered to provide state security,’ said Botha, ‘but there is no hostility or crime. We were humbled by the welcome of the local people.’

Concerning safeguards in the agreements protecting the investment of South African farmers, Botha revealed the existence of formal government-to-government agreements, ‘in the event that our land is moved or expropriated for any reason, such as the creation of a nature reserve, farmers will be compensated for land, infrastructure and loss of production, the level of compensation depending on the scale of production.’ The jurisdiction for dispute settlements is the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

CREEPING TAKEOVER OF LAND?

But what about compensation for the 'squatters' already occupying and farming the banks of the Congo River, where land has been earmarked for the new 'trekkers'?

How will local farmers be affected by the decision to 'export ownership' of fertile land to foreign private hands? Pakistan has already approved the use of the army in securing concessions, while the Congolese government has no qualms lending farmers the same support.

The Congo deal has come under considerable criticism from some quarters. ‘These types of deals merely provide a politically accepted platform to establish the marketing channels for the private sector to monopolise agriculture and push out small farmers. This is happening all over Africa,’ stated Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss of GRAIN, an NGO promoting sustainable management of agricultural land.

‘Initially, it will be on state farms next to the river, but the trend with other similar deals in Africa is that investors want good infrastructure, access to irrigation - and those are usually the areas that local farmers also prefer. So, displacement is a feature of these deals,’ claims Pschorn-Strauss.

According to the FAO, ‘Many land deals seem to have been settled between the investor and the government in host countries with little concern for whether benefits would trickle down to the local population, insufficient documentation of smallholders' rights prevented them from making any claims… “Surplus” land does not mean that it is unused or unoccupied. Better systems to recognise land rights are thus urgently needed.’

Unfortunately for farmers in Africa, leaders, and provincial and national governments have been all too willing to sell land already inhabited by citizens lacking land titles – often the product of communal customs – with the best land and water resources going free of charge to multinationals, often via secretive development agreements.

This is of special concern for Africa, which remains the world's hungriest continent. With increasingly erratic rainfall affecting 70 per cent of African nations, including countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia, the concept of massive 'land grabs' generates further anxiety.

In Africa, crop and pastureland constitutes the bulk of 'wealth' – estimated at 70 per cent – positioning its economies on the front line of global warming. Tax exemptions granted to multinationals also erode development finance bases, preventing redistribution of revenues into intangible capital – the primary source of wealth for developed nations.

To this end, the UN is in the process of creating a 'code of conduct' regulating terms of agreement and reducing the level of secrecy. ‘In the worst cases, it's fair to say we are looking at neocolonialism,’ said David Hallam of the FAO's trade and market division.

Yet unlike many African nations, the Congo is increasingly urbanised, with some 70 per cent of the country's sparse population residing in the capital Brazzaville and cities such as Pointe-Noire and Dolisie, or along the railway lines connecting urban hubs.

Though the focus of most land concessions is to export the food crops, South Africa's farmers, said Botha, intend to turn the Congo into a net exporter of food to other African nations. ‘This is part of the agreement and it will have a huge impact on the rural areas, generating income through production and employment,’ he says.

But only time will tell whether South Africa's highly skilled white farmers will realise the trapped potential of the Congo and elsewhere, helping to free the continent from food insecurity. If done correctly, this move would signify a break from the legacy of apartheid, toward that of Ubuntu – survival and prosperity through shared resources – and humanity.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared in African Business magazine.
* Khadija Sharife is a journalist and visiting scholar at the Centre for Civil Society (CCS). She is based in South Africa.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News

Pro-transgender development: Challenges posed by religious extremism

Audrey Mbugua

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61244

cc Wikimedia CommonsJust as we should deplore the role of religious extremism in terrorist acts, we must reject extremist intolerance and antipathy towards sexual minorities, argues Audrey Mbugua. Rather than 'surrender your brain' to hate-mongering religious leaders and misplaced fear, Mbugua stresses, we must focus on promoting peace and understanding.

On 11 September 2009, America woke up to watch helplessly as 2,900 of its citizens lost their lives as a result of a series of coordinated suicide attacks by al-Qaeda. Nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners and intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and many others working in the buildings. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington DC. The fourth plane crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania, after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington DC. There were no survivors from any of the flights. The ensuing economic losses wreaked havoc for many in the airline and insurance industries. Jobs were lost across the globe but the resilience of man reversed much of the losses in years to come.

But, I shouldn’t take you readers thousands of miles away. In the 8 August 1998 US Embassy bombings, 212 Kenyans were killed in a bomb explosion at the United States embassy in Nairobi. Over 3,000 were wounded, with hundreds losing their eyesight and limbs. And, as we mourned the dead we sought answers as to why so many Kenyans would die because big brother America had some squabbles with a bunch of brainwashed Muslim radicals. And in our rage, we (like the Americans) lost sight of the root cause of such extremism entrenching more religious-based extremism against innocent civilians.

These and other unmentioned terrorist attacks across the globe are as a result of religious extremism. Religious extremism refers to the use of fear and violence to encourage obedience to religious doctrine or to assert opposition to a scientific truth or community. We mistake religious extremism for ideology but it is an insidious mental illness that feeds on an inexplicable compulsion to kill humanity. Arno Gruen said, 'The lack of identity associated with extremists is the result of self-destructive self-hatred that leads to feelings of revenge toward life itself, and a compulsion to kill one’s own humanness.'[1] So, let's stop sugar-coating religious-based hostility against minorities with sloppy labels as 'doing God’s work'. It is unacceptable in any civilised nation.

It never ceases to amaze me how we ignore the glaring atrocities committed against minorities by a large section of Christians and Muslims in Kenya. We have witnessed Christians stripping transsexual women in Nairobi and Mombasa and denying them access to medical services. Some Muslim extremists threatened to kill the homosexual community in Mombasa on prime-time news in May 2007! But no one dares to stand up and say no to these dreck. And what has religion given back to Kenyans? Misery, bitterness, overpopulation, hatred, suicides, fat cats, poverty, wasted time, wasted lives, unemployment and, of course, empty promises of eternal life. Dawkins (2001) summarised these well with:

'Parenthetically, religion is unusual among divisive labels in being spectacularly unnecessary. If religious beliefs had any evidence going for them, we might have to respect them in spite of their concomitant unpleasantness. But there is no such evidence. To label people as death-deserving enemies because of disagreements about real world politics is bad enough. To do the same for disagreements about a delusional world inhabited by archangels, demons and imaginary friends is ludicrously tragic.'[2]

Bashing lesbian, gay and transsexual Kenyans has become an easy score for preachers and priests. It's been used in congregations across the country. Sadly, Kenyans are a gullible people and their appetite for violence and miracles has turned them to easy prey for people wishing to make a quick buck. I mean, if not rebuking 'demons' these preachers would be working in holy gas stations (as Dawkins would call them), filling gullible Kenyans with hate against innocent transsexual Kenyans and other minorities.

The time has come when sensible Kenyans should stand up and say no to these cheap lines, a time to raise the stakes and demand our 'religious leaders' cease hate-mongering and instigating violence against innocent civilians. The freedom of conscience and religion cannot be limited so as to sooth the turgid egos of people who have a problem discerning fantasy from reality. And for those who have the habit of hearing voices in their heads lying to them that they are God’s vessels (remember Jonah and the whale) to violate the human rights of lesbian, gay and transsexual Kenyans, please seek help. Such distorted views of the world and the habit of hearing voices in one’s head are in most cases symptoms of schizophrenia. It is wrong to compel transsexual, lesbian and gay Kenyans to comply with laws and practices based on religious doctrine. Also, it is hypocritical for Christians to keep reminding us of the atrocities their brothers and sisters in Christ are facing in China, India and Pakistan then go ahead to violate the rights of sexual minorities in Kenya. No, we won’t respect that. Worship whatever you want but stop ruining the lives of fellow Kenyans.

There are numerous reasons why religious extremism is unacceptable. First, it denies people the right to life. For example, transsexual people in Kenya cannot access gender-reassignment therapy in our public hospitals because of religious extremism. Psychiatric co-morbidities such as depression kick in, as well as self-surgeries and genital mutilations. The end result is death. In fact, 50 per cent of all transsexual people who don’t receive medical attention die by the age of 30 years, usually as a result of suicide.

Secondly, religious extremism traps minorities in perpetual poverty and misery. There is nothing as frustrating as having qualifications for a job but then because you are a transsexual person you don’t get employed. Added to this, you are homeless because your parents and relatives have kicked you out of their house (because your gender transition is against their religious beliefs) and with no food and shelter you have to do sex work to survive. Yes, lots of transsexual people in Kenya have to survive by offering sex services so as to get as little as Ksh 100 per action. After making such peanuts getting raped in the streets, you get infected with HIV because you never sought post-exposure prophylaxis because you were scared the police and examining doctor would ridicule you. Life is extremely hard for transsexual people in Kenya and not because we have committed any crimes, but because people around us judge us negatively on top of focusing on non-issues. What link is there between what I have between my legs, my gender identity and how productive I am? And what link is there between what I have between my legs, my gender identity and your priest?

In view of the negative effects of religious extremism there is an urgent need to overhaul our way of thinking and act beyond our superficial view of the world. Why should you surrender your brain to someone just because he told you he is the path to Jesus or God? Please ask him whether there is an alternative path, one that doesn’t involve denying transsexual people access to medical services or beating up gays and raping lesbians in the street. Carl Sagan has stated it succinctly:

'If we can't think for ourselves, if we're unwilling to question authority, then we're just putty in the hands of those in power. But if the citizens are educated and form their own opinions, then those in power work for us. In every country, we should be teaching our children the scientific method and the reasons for a Bill of Rights. With it comes a certain decency, humility and community spirit.'[3]

We need peace-building in our lives. This approach, which is aimed at addressing the underlying conditions which foster extremism, requires activities at two levels. At the macro-social level it requires work toward: a reduction of inequity and oppression; the protection of human rights; the weakening of extremist ideologies; a reduction of militarism, racism and sexism; systems that promote political empowerment, inter-group tolerance, cooperation, and non-violent conflict resolution; democratisation and participatory governance; and the strengthening of civil society. At the micro-social level it requires: a reduction of stereotypes and enemy images; the promotion of empathy, caring and intercultural understanding; and the provision of economic and social support for young people.[4]

The greatest obstacle to this is not how powerful your god is but choosing to be a slave to some religious beliefs and being a puppet for your local pastor, or whoever lies to you that life would be better if some people were denied access to medical services. We all want to develop ourselves for the few years we will be alive and pro-transgender and inter-sex development have to move beyond our government’s lip service to governance and resource allocation, the centrality of which is human rights and should have a trickle-down effect on a transsexual and inter-sex individual in a village in Nyeri or Bondo, in the end bringing about substantive development in our lives. And for the international community, we request that you shift your approach to gender development from an exclusive attention on women and their specific needs to a more broader paradigm that caters for the unique needs of transgender and inter-sex people and the hostile environment they live in as a result of their gender trajectories. The East Africa Sexual and Health Rights Initiative through the UHAI fund has set the pace. We need to see replicas of this in other donor agencies.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Audrey Mbugua is a member of Transgender Education and Advocacy, a Kenyan organisation formed to address social injustices committed against the country's transgender community.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] Gruen, Arno. An unrecognized pathology: The mask of humaneness. Journal of Psychohistory. Vol 30(3) Win 2003, 266-272. Assn for Psychohistory, US.
[2] Dawkins, R. 2001. Time to stand up, http://newhumanist.org.uk/469/time-to-stand-up
[3] Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World
[4] Wessells, Michael (2002). Terrorism, apocalyptic ideology, and young martyrs: Why peacebuilding matters.

Ethiopia: Looking through the glass, brightly

The future of the future country (part one)

Alemayehu G. Mariam

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61243

cc Wikimedia CommonsSharing the faith and optimism of the imprisoned political prisoner Birtukan Midekssa, Alemayehu G. Mariam stresses that Ethiopia's future is in the 'hands, hearts and minds of its people, not in the tea leaves read by the experts'. The battle for Ethiopia's future will be one between 'future-makers' and 'future-takers' Mariam contends, victory in which in the makers will defeat the takers' efforts to oversee a continuation of the past.

'Ethiopia is the country of the future', Birtukan Midekssa would often say epigrammatically. Ethiopia's No. 1 political prisoner is always preoccupied with her country's future and destiny. Her deep concern for Ethiopia is exceeded only by her boundless optimism for its future. For that reason, her maxim echoes not only a manifest general truth, but also makes a profound and complex historical argument that calls for a paradigm shift in the way we understand contemporary Ethiopian politics and envision the future.

To be the country of the future necessarily means not being the country of the past. Birtukan's Ethiopia of the future is necessarily the categorical antithesis of an imperial autocracy, a military bureaucracy and a dictatorship of kleptocracy. Her vision of the future Ethiopia is a unified country built on a steel platform of multiparty democracy. Birtukan would have been pleased to explain her vision and dreams of the future country of Ethiopia; unfortunately, she can not speak for herself as she has been condemned to 'rot' in jail.

As we begin the second decade of the 21st century, it is important for the rest of us to carry on the conversation that Birtukan has so insightfully sparked. She is concerned about Ethiopia's future because she understands that a nation without a clear sense of its future is a nation without a destiny, and one doomed to suffer the scourges of tyranny and oppression. When Birtukan speaks of Ethiopia as the country of the future, she speaks of it in the same way as Dr Martin Luther King spoke of his American dream. He dreamt that one day in the future, America 'will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed … that all men [and women] are created equal'. He dreamt that Americans, despite their bitter history of oppression and injustice, 'will be able to sit down together at a table of brotherhood' and resolve their differences amicably and peacefully. Above all, he dreamt of a future where his 'four children will live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character'.

Birtukan also has a dream that one day Ethiopians will sit together at the table of brotherhood and sisterhood to discuss their historic grievances and current issues, atone for and forgive each other for past transgressions, and in a renewed spirit of reconciliation, compromise and accommodation, forge a common destiny. She dreams of the day when her 4-year-old daughter and the millions of children in Ethiopia will grow up in a country where they are judged not by their ethnicity, tribal affiliation, gender, language, religion, region or wealth, but by their abilities and the content of their character. She dreams of a just and moral society.

Fully accepting and working towards such a future for Ethiopia may sound naïve and idealistic to some given the present grim state of affairs. If the trend projections of the doomsday soothsayers are to be believed, in Ethiopia's future, there is no future. The scientists tell us that Ethiopia will prove to be a poster child for 'environmental determinism' in 40 years. Its population will double to 150 million by 2050, and overpopulation, coupled with large and growing per capita resource consumption and a negative environmental impact, will trigger a complete collapse of society by the middle of the century. These scientists point to evidence of large-scale deforestation and habitat destruction, soil degradation, decline in the potable water supply and water pollution, overgrazing, desertification and so on as the unmistakable present warning signals of future collapse.

The agricultural experts express shock and dismay in the sale and lease of millions of hectares of land to foreign corporations who are set on producing food for export back to their home countries while Ethiopians are dying of massive starvation and famines (officially known in the politically correct phrase 'severe food shortages'). The economists paint an equally dire picture of a country overburdened by debt to international lenders and a local economy in the chokehold of businesses closely allied with the ruling regime, and whose principal capitalisation is derived from the conversion of previously government-owned properties through a bogus privatisation process. With land and key sectors of the economy such as telecommunications under the control or ownership of the regime or its supporters, without a functional financial services sector and youth unemployment in excess of 70 per cent, the practitioners of the 'dismal science' predict a dismal economic future for Ethiopia.

There are even those who predict political implosion long before systemic collapse. A research group with expertise in international crises analysis recently sounded the alarm over 'the potential for a violent eruption of conflict in Ethiopia ahead of the May 2010 elections amidst rising ethnic tensions and dissent'. The international human rights groups and organisations who have extensively documented the regime's sustained pattern of crackdowns on dissent, the criminalisation of civil society groups, the persecution of the independent media, election-rigging and theft, massive rights violations and the implementation of repressive decrees consign Ethiopia to the scrapheap of the most hopeless and wretched nations on the planet. If we are to believe the doomsday soothsayers, Ethiopia is presently in critical triage on life support. They peg its survival without complete societal collapse and political implosion in the first half of the 21st century at much less than 50 per cent.

We must categorically reject the dark predictions of the naysayers and the merchants of doom and gloom. The future of Ethiopia is in the hands, hearts and minds of its people, not in the tea leaves read by the experts. As John M. Richardson Jr said, 'When it comes to the future, there are three kinds of people: those who make things happen, those who let it happen, and those who wonder what happened.' Birtukan belongs in the first category. Because of the enormous sacrifices she has made, she rightly deserves to be called a 'future-maker', as anyone who chooses to join her in her quest for a better future in Ethiopia would be. What makes Birtukan unique is that she understands that if we do not work together actively to shape the future, the past will assuredly shape it for us. Only when the future-makers put their shoulders to the grindstone and do the heavy lifting can we prove the experts wrong and guarantee that Ethiopia's best days are yet to come.

The future of the future country will be decided in a battle between the 'future-makers' and 'future-takers'. We are witnesses to the handiwork of the future-takers today. They have taken everything in the present – the rights of the people, their dignity, their daily bread, their land, their hopes and their dreams – so that there will be no future. They calculate the future to be a continuation of the past, and they will do everything in their power to perpetuate the past into the future. Future-takers worship at the altar of greed and corruption, and for them fairness, decency, generosity and morality are anathema. The battle between the future-makers and future-takers will be waged and decided in the hearts and minds of the people. The future-takers will wage a war of tears and fears. The future-makers will fight back with hope, faith, charity and love.

We should reject the static and deterministic outcomes predicted by the experts, because their assumptions about Ethiopia are fundamentally incorrect. Their analytical models are predicated on a flawed postulate that Ethiopians are fundamentally a weak and desperate people who are passive objects of oppression, charity and pity. We must reject out of hand, and without hesitation, any argument that suggests Ethiopia's future will be sealed in ethnic fragmentation, political dissolution and national self-destruction. We must cast aside any theory that predicts the systemic collapse and the end of a nation whose history dates back 3,000 years. We have been a nation of survivors. We have survived and prevailed over the plague of European colonialism when nearly all of Africa succumbed to it. We have survived recurrent famines of biblical proportions. We have endured conflicts and wars. We have survived autocracy, despotism and kleptocracy. Let there be no doubt: We will survive until the end of time because we are the 'masters of our fate' and the 'captains of our destiny'.

Philosophers and historians speak of a recurrent cycle in human events. Great nations rise and fall. Governments come and go. Leaders change and are replaced. But nations survive because each generation accepts its responsibilities and forges ahead with the enormous tasks of future-building. When Birtukan says Ethiopia is the country of the future, she means to say that this generation of Ethiopians has a rendezvous with destiny. Whether Ethiopia will self-destruct in ethnic fragmentation and strife is not carved in stone. This generation can avert that dark future by working for and promoting ethnic diversity and national unity. A new generation of statesmen and stateswomen could trump the political expediency and machination of those desperately clinging to power. Whether Ethiopia is doomed to ecological collapse is not determined by the inexorable forces of global warming. Carefully planning and prioritisation of societal needs, the implementation of creative policies, public awareness, education and mobilisation could help steer away the Ethiopian nation from the dangerous shoals of ecological calamity.

The future requires responsibility, creativity, endurance and sacrifice. It cannot be left to a few leaders, politicians, intellectuals or experts. If there is one thing to be learned from the recent past, it is that the Ethiopian people know what kind of a future they want. Their verdict in the 2005 elections stands as a final testament for a genuine multiparty democracy. History is also on the side of freedom and the youth. Despite all the setbacks of recent years, the values of democracy, freedom and human rights have taken deep root in the psyche of Ethiopian youth. They will be leading the forward march of Ethiopia into a glorious future. With Ethiopia's future in the hands of her young people, we have cause to be confident and even to celebrate. Let our youth learn from a wise African saying: 'Tomorrow belongs to the [young] people who prepare for it today.'

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Follow Alemayehu G. Mariam on Twitter.
* 'The future of the future country' is a special commentary to be offered in periodic serialised future segments by the author.
* This article was originally published by The Huffington Post.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Ethiopia: Birtukan, Invictus! (Unconquered)

Alemayehu G. Mariam

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61252

cc aheavensOn the one-year anniversary of her imprisonment by Ethiopia’s Zenawi government, Alemayehu G. Mariam pays tribute to political leader Birtukan Midekksa, ‘an ordinary woman irrevocably committed to the rule of law, freedom, democracy and human rights’. ‘The dictators are not afraid of Birtukan,’ writes Mariam, ‘but they are terrified of what she represents: Ethiopia's bright future.’

Birtukan Midekssa condemned to life in prison by a vengeful dictator, but unconquered.
Birtukan thrown into the dungeon of wrath and tears, but defiant.
Birtukan beaten, bludgeoned and bloodied, but unbowed.
Birtukan mocked, ridiculed and disrespected, but gracious.
Birtukan denounced, vilified, strong-armed and manhandled, but unafraid.
Ethiopia under the crushing boots of soldiers of fortune.
Birtukan, Invictus!
Ethiopia, Invictus!

I remember the 29 December 2008. Almost a year ago to the day, the only woman political party leader in Ethiopia's 3,000-year history was manhandled and abducted to prison. Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, founder and former chairman of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, was an eyewitness to the crime. He told the Voice of America that he was having a conversation with Birtukan and another person outside an office building when four unmarked official vehicles stormed on the scene. Approximately 10 armed men got out and surrounded Birtukan. They grabbed and dragged her into one of the vehicles. One of the thugs savagely assaulted the nearly 80-year old professor with the butt of his rifle. In seconds, Birtukan was snatched away to the infamous Kality Prison, and the professor to the hospital.

The facts leading up to the street abduction of Birtukan's are not in dispute. On 10 December 2008 the ‘Federal Police Commissioner’ sent two District 12 policemen to order Birtukan to come to his office. She went thinking that he probably wanted to talk about her political party. He wanted to talk about her pardon which resulted in her release from prison in 2007. She questioned his authority to interrogate her on the matter. He mocked her and she left. On 24 December 2008, the ‘commissioner’ ordered her to appear in his office and gave her an ultimatum: Retract a statement she made in Sweden allegedly denying receipt of a pardon, or face immediate imprisonment.

Birtukan has never denied receiving a pardon. In Sweden where she allegedly denied the so-called pardon in a talk to a small group of supporters, she merely explained the legal and political circumstances surrounding the grant of pardon. In Q'ale (My Testimony), her last public statement issued a couple of days before her abduction, she made full acknowledgement of the so-called pardon:

‘I have not denied signing the document which the elders persuaded us to sign on 22 June 2006 for the sake of national reconciliation. How could it be said that I denied a pardon document I signed, and whose content I accepted? How is that a crime? Where is the mistake?’

The fact of the matter is that Birtukan was granted a bogus pardon for a bogus crime for which she was convicted in a kangaroo court. As it is said, ‘any excuse will serve the tyrant’; and for Zenawi to claim that he jailed Birtukan because she denied receiving a pardon is an insult only to his own intelligence. The real reasons have to do with incapacitating her from running in the 2010 elections, and thwarting her efforts to build a broad coalition of political parties to oppose his dictatorship. No doubt, he takes her outright defiance as a personal slight.

But who is Birtukan Midekksa? Dictator Zenawi not long ago proverbially characterised her to his rubberstamp parliament as a faddish hen that hanged herself. If we must indulge in animal metaphors to describe her, she is best characterised as a lioness fighting hordes of hyenas. She has always defined herself as an ordinary woman irrevocably committed to the rule of law, freedom, democracy and human rights. She understands her adversaries well. Days before her abduction, she told journalist Abiye Teklemariam, founding editor of the independent weekly Addis Neger, (which recently folded following the dictatorship's relentless war on the independent press in Ethiopia):

‘You have to know that they are paper tigers. They are weak, but want to appear strong. They would think caging a woman with a three-year-old daughter who lives under their firm surveillance every day demonstrates their toughness… They forcefully make people hostage to their family and social commitments. They compel you to choose between freedom and family.’

So for anyone who wants to know the real Birtukan, the answer is simple. She is the Lioness of Ethiopia who chose, without the slightest hesitation, freedom over family, country over child; and above all, Mother Ethiopia over the mother that gave her birth. She is an Ethiopian woman of integrity, humility, conviction, principle and intellect. It is a special honour and privilege for me to pay tribute to this extraordinary woman and outstanding Ethiopian political leader on the first anniversary of her unjust imprisonment.

I believe every blessed nation is given by Providence an individual that personifies its suffering and its pain, its present predicament and its future grandeur. Such an individual evolves to become a transformative leader guiding a lost and hopeless nation out of the darkness of discord and strife into the sunshine of freedom, equality and democracy. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela sutured the racially and ethnically torn South African body politics and led his people to a successful multiparty democracy. In India, Mahatma Gandhi rid his country of the plague of colonialism with nothing in his hands but love in his heart and nonviolent resistance in every fibre of his body. In the US, Martin Luther King seared the conscience of Americans and helped them confront the twin demons of racism and discrimination. In Burma (Myanmar), Aung San Suu Kyi has languished in prison for years, yet for every Burmese she stands as a shining beacon of hope and redemption. Ethiopia is blessed to have Birtukan Midekssa who today languishes in prison for standing up to a ruthless and barbaric dictator. She willingly gave up her personal liberty so that her people could one day live in freedom and enjoy the blessings of democracy.

I first met Birtukan on 9 September 2007, when she arrived at Dulles Airport outside Washington, D.C., leading a delegation of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (Kinijit) party to North America. I had the honour of chairing an informal North American coordinating committee for that delegation which included Dr Berhanu Nega, Dr Hailu Araya, Ato Gizachew Shiferraw and Ato Brook Kebede. Their reception at Dulles is now the stuff of legend. Thousands of Ethiopians showed up and filled that cavernous airport. A special airport detail was assigned for crowd control. The motorcade that followed them to their hotel was several miles long. In the nearly one-half century of that airport's existence, nothing so historic, spectacular and triumphant had ever been witnessed. It was a September to remember.

From the very moment I met Birtukan and the delegation, I was impressed by their humility, simplicity, integrity, matter-of-factness and optimism about Ethiopia's future. Many Ethiopians were pleasantly surprised to see a woman leading such an important delegation. Many who met Birtukan in the following weeks deepened their respect and appreciation when they saw that she has a ‘a good head and a good heart [which] are always a formidable combination’ in a leader, as Mandela once noted. In private and in her public statements and speeches, she did not dwell on the past but showed intense concern and optimism for Ethiopia's future. Remarkably, she never showed any bitterness or animosity towards those who had unjustly imprisoned and persecuted her for nearly two years.

Who is afraid of Birtukan Midekssa? Birtukan's maxim is, ‘Ethiopia is the country of the future.’ The dictators are not afraid of Birtukan, but they are terrified of what she represents: Ethiopia's bright future. Birtukan stands for the unity of all Ethiopians and stands against ethnic hatred, division and strife. That petrifies her captors. As Mandela ‘dreamt of an Africa which is in peace with itself’, Birtukan dreams of an Ethiopia at peace and harmony with itself. That sends shivers down the spines of those who have caged her. Birtukan appeals to Ethiopia's youth, who represent over 70 per cent of the population. Her universal youth appeal makes the dictators shake in their boots. Birtukan stands resolute in the defence of the rule of law, the ‘Constitution of Ethiopia’, freedom, democracy, equality, human rights and accountability. That makes her tormentors panic-stricken. As Ethiopia is the country of the future, Birtukan is the shining star rising over the horizon of that future.

Birtukan is in prison, but she is the freest person in all of Ethiopia. She stood up to dictatorship and did not back down. They threw everything at her. They kept her in solitary confinement hoping she would go mad in isolation. They denied her visitation with her lawyers believing she will forget her basic human and constitutional rights. They denied her books, a radio and newspapers, thinking she will feel lost in the dark. They would interrupt her family visits before she finished exchanging smiles, hugs and kisses with her mother and daughter, hoping to crush her emotionally. They would not allow her friends and colleagues to visit her, expecting she will feel abandoned and forgotten. They played every dirty psychological game to humiliate, mistreat and provoke her; and they thought that would break her spirit, weaken her resolve and plunge her into the depths of despair and sorrow. They have spared nothing to make her believe that she will suffer and die alone in prison. But Birtukan survives, and she will survive and prevail. Prison for a true political leader is like fire to steel. Prison makes the political prisoner stronger and steadfastly resolute.

Mandela said, ‘In my country we go to prison first and then become President.’ I shall argue that Birtukan is just doing what is required of all great leaders before they are called for duty in the service of their country. When Mandela was sentenced to life, he did not waste his time in prison crying over his fate; rather, he used his time to prepare himself for his future leadership duties in bringing all South Africans together. It is the natural occupation of all great imprisoned political leaders to use their time in prison to prepare for the solemn duties that await them. I do not doubt that Birtukan is doing that right now. But political prisoners are the ultimate survivors. As Mandela said, it is an essential condition of survival for the political prisoner to believe that good will in the end triumph over evil. Mandela was written off for decades by his tormentors, but his name was at the tip of every freedom-loving South African's tongue. It was in prison that Mandela learned to understand and even empathise with his hateful persecutors. He honed his negotiating skills in prison and developed infinite patience and perseverance in his pursuit of equality and justice for all in South Africa. Like Mandela, Birtukan is undergoing necessary training in prison before she is called to perform her solemn duties of state.

Birtukan does not see the struggle for freedom, democracy and human rights as a short-term effort. She knows in every fibre of her body that it will take time and enormous effort to purge the poison of ethnic politics from Ethiopian society. She knows it will not be easy to establish and practice the principle of the rule of law in a land that has suffered for so long under the immoral creed of might makes right. Birtukan understands that it will take a massive effort to build working coalitions, partnerships and alliances to forge a strong multiparty political system. She knows it will take all of Ethiopia's youth to build bridges from the north to the south and east to west. But Birtukan also knows that she will be ready for these challenges when she is called to report for duty.

In his recent diatribe on Birtukan, Zenawi said that she became the proverbial faddish hen believing that powerful people in the West would get her out of jail quickly. The dictator apparently believes that Birtukan is ‘too much of a darling’ for the West and stealing the spotlight from him. The fact is that Birtukan never put much stock in diplomats or Western pressure to help her personally or to bring about fundamental change in Ethiopia. Though she understood the need to build support in the international community, she knew very well that all of the heavy lifting has to be done by Ethiopians:

‘I thought that diplomatic battle was a major part of the non-violent struggle. In politics, as they say, a week is too long. I have learnt my lessons. This is our fight. We ask them to join the fight for freedom and justice. We ask them to live up to their rhetoric and supposed creed. But we don't beg them. This is our fight, not theirs. They would come running when they think they think that we have won it... We have to stop overemphasising their value… They like winners. They have strategic objectives, which only winners can help them achieve. We should show them that we are winners, not beggars.’

Zenawi becomes apoplectic at the mention of Birtukan's name. His hackles go up and he could hardly contain his rage and antipathy towards her. Taking a chapter out of the book of Burma's dictator, General Than Shwe, he recently told a press conference, ‘There will never be an agreement with anybody to release Birtukan. Ever. Full stop. That's a dead issue.’ On this point, he is right. As Mandela said, ‘Only free men (and free women) can negotiate; prisoners cannot enter into contracts.’ Birtukan is a political prisoner and cannot negotiate an ‘agreement’ for her freedom. She will also never beg for her freedom. ‘Ever. Full stop.’ Period!

Don't cry for Birtukan, Ethiopia! ‘The truth is she never left you. She kept her promise. Don't keep your distance.’ The dictators will do everything to break her spirit, torment her body and make her life in prison a living hell. Mandela told his Apartheid tormentors, ‘You may succeed in delaying, but never in preventing the transition of South Africa to a democracy.’ The dictators may succeed in jailing Birtukan and thousands of others for however long they want and victimise and dehumanise them; but they will never, never be able to keep Ethiopia ethnically fragmented and its people at war with each other so that they can cling to power. Nor will they be able to permanently stave off the triumph of freedom, democracy and human rights from that ancient land.

On a personal note, I thank Birtukan for inspiring me and many others like myself to be involved in the struggle for human rights and democracy in the country of our birth. The courage of her convictions refreshes us every day like the pure mountain spring water. For all Birtukan Midekssa has done and tried to do, and in the spirit of eternal gratitude, I dedicate to her William Ernest Henley's poem, ‘Invictus’ (Unconquered). Nelson Mandela had this poem written on a piece of paper which he kept in his cell to uplift his spirit over the long years of incarceration. I trust this poem will uplift Birtukan's spirit as much as it did Mandela's.

Invictus

Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.

In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.

Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the Horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll.
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul.

Birtukan, stay strong! The ‘night that covers’ you will not last forever. Darkness always turns into light.

William Ernest Henley

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared in The Huffington Post.
* Alemayehu G. Mariam is professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Why Zenawi betrayed Africa's trust in Copenhagen

Selam Beyene

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61254

cc aheavensEthiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s desire to secure nomination as Africa’s spokesperson on climate change was primarily as a means to earn legitimacy among western powers and to 'ensure their tacit assent' as he prepares 'to violently thwart' the aspirations of the Ethiopian people for democracy in the May 2010 elections, writes Selam Beyane in this week’s Pambazuka News. It was thus ‘a foregone conclusion’, argues Beyane, that ‘Zenawi would forgo any viable long-term international accord for a short-term gain.’

African diplomats, most of who had brashly stood by Zenawi when he violently crushed a pro-democracy movement in 2005, naively expressed shock and incredulity at his betrayal of their trust at the recent Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. [1,2]

As heralded by this and numerous other authors before the ill-fated conference, Zenawi had a sinister agenda when he successfully lobbied corrupt African diplomats in Addis to get the nomination as a spokesperson for Africa.[3,4,5]

The dictator has been in serious desperation to get the attention of the West after he lost the cover of ‘War on Terror’ that he had successfully exploited to enjoy the full support of the Bush Administration and other Western powers. Despite his atrocious record of crimes against humanity, corruption and the suppression of basic human rights, these powers looked the other way when the dictator massacred peaceful demonstrators in the aftermath of his humiliating defeat in the elections of 2005, and propped up his tyrannical rule with billions of dollars in aid that he plundered with no accountability and squandered on expensive lobbying campaigns to thwart congressional measures intended to promote democracy and good governance in Ethiopia.[6]

To the furtively resourceful tyrant, a visible position at the climate change conference was hence the only hope of getting the attention the West, and especially that of the Obama administration, whose rhetoric of democracy and social justice had sent terrifying signals to the despot.

With the spectre of the 2005 massacre still haunting him, Zenawi saw the position endowed upon him by African diplomats as a valuable tool to earn legitimacy among Western powers and to ensure their tacit assent as he prepares to violently thwart again the aspirations of the Ethiopian people for democracy in the upcoming May 2010 elections.

In view of the mounting evidence pointing to his atrocities, he has also been frantically seeking means of garnering the sympathy of the West in the likely eventuality of charges for his crimes against humanity.[7] Betrayal of members of the African Union, an institution that has proven a loyal subservient to him, was therefore an effective measure toward that end without any adverse consequence.

With the dwindling financial aid, thanks in part to the irrelevance of his ploy as an ally in the War on Terror, and, more generally, to the impact of the global economic downturn on the capacity of donor nations to squander money on the dictator, a quick source of hard-currency, however meagre, was also a matter of great urgency for the dictator. The lofty goals of the nations of Africa, in whose names he earned visibility, were therefore expendable in the eyes of a dictator, whose track records as a leader are characterised by myopic self-interest, ethnocentrism, poor governance, corruption and environmental degradation.

It was thus a foregone conclusion that Zenawi would forgo any viable long-term international accord for a short-term gain, and that he would easily agree, as he has reprehensibly and egoistically done, to the reduction of the billions of dollars from what African leaders had agreed or to the 2°C commitment that many campaigners claim would threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Africa.[8]

If the Obama administration engages in the discredited Bush-era diplomacy, sacrificing its hallmarks of social justice and democracy for short-term diplomatic expediency, then it has not learned the bitter lessons of its predecessors. To the chagrin of many Ethiopian supporters, the White House confirmed, as reported in the Los Angeles Times:

‘… He [President Obama] expressed his appreciation for the leadership role the Prime Minister [Zenawi] was playing in work with African countries on climate change, and urged him to help reach agreement at the Leaders summit later this week in Copenhagen. For his part, Prime Minister Meles stressed the importance of success in Copenhagen, and the need to find ways to make suitable progress on the mitigation, adaptation, and the provision of finance for the developing countries.’[9]

The people of Africa in general, and of Ethiopia in particular, hailed President Obama, when he declared:

‘America will not seek to impose any system of government on any other nation – the essential truth of democracy is that each nation determines its own destiny. What we will do is increase assistance for responsible individuals and institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance – on parliaments, which check abuses of power and ensure that opposition voices are heard; on the rule of law, which ensures the equal administration of justice; on civic participation, so that young people get involved; and on concrete solutions to corruption like forensic accounting, automating services, strengthening hotlines, and protecting whistle-blowers to advance transparency and accountability.’[10]

If good governance, transparency and accountability are the guiding principles of American foreign aid under Obama, then it is hard to envisage that the president has not digressed from the path of justice when he initiated a dialogue with a dictator who has some of the worst records of any leader in each of the stated parameters.

We do agree with the president’s affirmation: ‘We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning…’[11]
Accordingly, it is high time for the Obama administration to live up to its professed ideals and to make a new beginning in dealing with dictators. We trust the Obama administration would have the courage and wisdom to depart from the discredited policies of yesteryear when long-term stability took backseat to short-term diplomatic pragmatism.

As widely reported, no sooner had Zenawi received the nod of the West, at the expense of the trust of Africa, than he ordered his kangaroo court to sentence to death potential opponents on trumped up charges.[12] He has intensified his attacks on the free press, as evidenced by the recent flights of respected journalists out of the country, and has effectively silenced all political dissent. He has kept credible political opponents, like Birtukan Midekksa, in prison and is using mafia-like tactics to intimidate and frustrate opposition groups.[13,14,15,16]

To avoid another humiliating defeat in the capital and other cities and towns in the May 2010 elections, every eligible voter employed by the government or runs a major private enterprise is under duress to sign up as a card-holding member of Zenawi’s party. In the rural areas, where farmers are at the absolute mercy of the dictator to till the land or get access to fertilisers, opposition groups are completely shut out to rule out any credible threats to the despot.

Ethiopians in the diaspora have a historic responsibility to ensure that Zenawi does not use his newly-earned notoriety to garner Western support and tacit acquiescence as he embarks on his vicious campaign to violently thwart once again the aspiration of the Ethiopian people for democracy in the upcoming elections. They should continue to mobilise their resources and influence the Obama administration and other Western powers from becoming accomplices in the evil gambits of the tyrant.

Opposition leaders should come to the realisation that there is no more pressing matter, or nobler cause, or greater party agenda than the need to stand in unison and salvage Ethiopia from the cancerous tyranny of Meles Zenawi and his repressive machinery. The deliverance of the people can become a reality only when the leaders are prepared to forfeit egotism, party loyalty and petty bickering, and are determined to fight to the end, paying the ultimate consequences, with an enemy that may project vacuous invincibility and power, but has in essence no longevity or resilience.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Dr Selam Beyene is an Ethiopian human rights activist based in the United States. He writes on democracy and good governance in the Horn of Africa.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] http://itsgettinghotinhere.org/
[2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SanrX-0pq5w&feature=player_embedded
[3] http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/11401
[4] http://www.ethiomedia.com/course/4591.html
[5] http://www.mcgillreport.org/zenawi
[6] http://harpers.org/archive/2007/07/hbc-90000631
[7] http://www.ethiomedia.com/course/the_anuak_massacre.pdf
[8] http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/climate-change/copenhagen-accord-4.30pm.pdf
[9] http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2009/12/obama-dials-for-copenhagen-deal.html
[10] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/obama-ghana-speech-full-t_n_230009.html
[11] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/04/obama-speech-in-cairo-vid_n_211215.html
[12] http://www.ethiomedia.com/course/us_on_ethiopia.pdf
[13] http://www.ethiomedia.com/course/4605.html
[14] http://addisvoice.com/article/ethiopian_paper_quits_under_gove.htm
[15] http://www.ethioguardian.com/news.php?extend.3318
[16] http://addisvoice.com/article/government_fails.htm

On the Copenhagen climate change conference: Voices from Africa

Zahra Moloo

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61258

cc mookEWhile world leaders and NGO delegates from around the world converged in Copenhagen for the 15th UN climate change conference, thousands of activists, writers, academics and artists gathered at Klimaforum, an alternative climate summit. Here people were given a space to meet, discuss and create radical solutions to climate change.

The following audio piece [mp3] features interviews with representatives of different countries across sub-Saharan Africa who were at Klimaforum. Wahu Kaara of the Kenya Debt Relief Network provides a critique of the UN climate change conference and addresses the significance of the Copenhagen mobilisation for movements in Kenya; Demba Moussa Dembélé, from the Jubilee South campaign in Senegal, talks about the need for sufficient funds to flow from the North to the South to compensate for ecological and climate debt; Julia Agwu from the University of Nigeria in Nsukka gives an analysis of gender and climate change and the impacts of climate change on women in Nigeria; and finally, Mabule Mokhine of the Greenhouse People's Environment Centre in Johannesburg explains the process by which land dispossession in South Africa was consolidated at the end of the apartheid and the need for collaborations between global grassroots movements.

-
BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Zahra Moloo is an independent journalist from Kenya who focuses on mining and environmental justice issues. She is currently based in London, UK.
* For more information, please see the People's Protocol on Climate Change, Jubilee South, EarthLife Africa, The Greenhouse Project, Klimaforum, Climate Justice Action and Indymedia Denmark.
* This is an independently produced audio piece, which previously featured on Wednesday 30 December 2009 on the Amandla! radio show at CKUT 90.3FM radio station in Montreal, Canada.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Building a democratic political culture

William Gumede

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61256

cc South African Tourism‘Many liberation and political movements that valiantly opposed authoritarian regimes often behave in markedly undemocratic ways when in power themselves’, writes William Gumede. In an extract from a new book of essays, ‘The Poverty of Ideas’, Gumede explores the challenges South Africa faces in making the transition from an independence movement political culture to a democratic political culture.

Many liberation and political movements that valiantly opposed authoritarian regimes often behave in markedly undemocratic ways when in power themselves. One of the reasons why many such movements in Africa and developing countries fail to sustain quality democracy is that they are unable to change successfully from a liberation or independence movement political culture into a democratic political one. It is now clear, following the staggering post-liberation disappointments, that it is not a given that progressive liberation movements which fought for democracy will necessarily foster a democratic political culture when in power.

One way of measuring whether a democracy is of the lasting sort is to determine whether a democratic political culture has developed. On paper, South Africa has a model constitution, elaborate democratic institutions and public watchdogs, and it holds regular elections without opponents bludgeoning each other. Supposedly, we should be able to conclude that South Africa has a democratic political culture. Not yet. It is often mistakenly assumed that to have democratic institutions in place or to conduct regular ‘free and fair elections’ is tantamount to a mature democracy.

The importance of a democratic political culture cannot be overstated. In fact, political culture ‘determines the type of government institutions, how authority is vested in government, who is given authority and power in society and government, who is allowed to participate in policy- and decision-making and how citizens hold their leaders accountable’.[1] Whether the political culture is democratic or not will have an impact on how citizens experience the entire political system (the executive, legislatures, bureaucracy, judiciary, political parties and civil groups), the political process (the behaviour of parties, groups and individual citizens) and the policy-making process.[2]

Although a democratic political culture is not easy to define, its obvious characteristic is that it sets ethical norms and standards of behaviour for governments, organisations and individuals. David Paletz and Daniel Lipinski argue that political culture ‘consists of widely held shared, fundamental beliefs that have political consequence’. ‘It constrains the actions of politicians and public officials: even if inclined otherwise, they usually refrain from taking positions or from implementing policies that blatantly violate the elements of the political culture’[3] – even if they want to act otherwise. On evidence, the countries that neglect to build a democratic political culture often slide back into ghost democracies, of which Zimbabwe is a good example.

THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

Progressive intellectuals can play a very important role in building democratic political cultures, not least by attempting to change what Gramsci called ‘the deep culture, ideologies and mentalities of our (political) culture’,[4] which may undermine the building of a quality democracy. The very first task in this is to encourage dialogue on common problems, one of the most important aspects of democracies.[5] The American scholar Cornel West sums it up neatly: ‘No democracy can survive without that culture of criticism and dialogue and discussion and debate and contestation ... It is about Socratic questioning, accountability, answerability and responsibility.’[6] Deliberation, discussion and debate are crucial for citizens to be able to evaluate government policies and actions. Discussing public issues helps citizens to form opinions where they might otherwise have none. Furthermore, it offers democratic leaders better insight into public concerns than elections do.

Jürgen Habermas put deliberation at the centre of the democratic decision-making process.[7] Free discussion among citizens is essential if the rule of ‘the people’ is to be a reality. It encourages the participation of ordinary people in decision-making and so makes them part of public action to transform their societies. As Amartya Sen argues,[8] public dialogue enhances respect for pluralism and an attitude of tolerance for different points of view and lifestyles. Yet conducting a dialogue within society is not easy. Indeed, the larger and more diverse a society, the more difficult it becomes to hold such public dialogue. The corollary is that the larger and more diverse the society, the greater the need for deliberative dialogue.[9]

Extensive public dialogue and debate are crucial in working out the kind of values that are important in our new democracy. So freedom of expression and discussion are required not only in pinpointing economic and social needs, but also in deciding on what needs should have priority and what demands should receive attention. It goes without saying that critical thinkers are much needed in new democracies, as Socrates was in ancient Athens.

FROM PAST AUTHORITARIAN CULTURES TO DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ONES

Past political cultures do influence the building of a new democratic one. As South Africa comes from a violent, authoritarian past, a democratic political culture, like all new democratic institutions, will have to be carefully built from scratch. South Africa began its democracy in 1994 with different political traditions. Apartheid culture was not democratic, even if it pretended to conduct its affairs within the semblance of racial democracy. Although liberal organisations working in the system argue that they themselves were democratic in spite of the undemocratic context, their operations were circumscribed by the rules of the apartheid system. Liberation movements, although waging an honourable liberation struggle, were also in part tainted by their opposition to a brutal regime: They had to become more undemocratic, by centralising decision-making and so on, to fight the apartheid government more effectively.

During liberation struggles, decision-making is necessarily left in the hands of a few. Dissent and criticism are seldom allowed lest they expose divisions within the movement, which could be exploited by the enemy. But if non-criticism continues during the first crucial years of power, it becomes entrenched as part of the political culture. In the early years of liberation, governments often operate as if under siege. Critics are marginalised, making criticism almost impossible later, or are seen as racists or ‘traitors’ in the pay of imperial powers or former colonialists. And so, when the UK or Australia attacked Robert Mugabe’s government, for instance, most African neighbours fell silent, not wanting to be seen supporting their former masters. In a similar way many intellectuals prefer to reserve their misgivings about government policy rather than face being placed in the camp of the ‘neocolonialists’.

As African liberation movements came to power, their supporters were ready to overlook their shortcomings. The feeling was that a new, popularly elected democratic government needed to be given an extended chance. Liberation movements were seen as the embodiment of the nation as a whole. Similarly, during the first years of democracy in South Africa, criticism of the ANC by its supporters was muted. There was also the fear that criticising the government would give ammunition to powerful opponents. But this was a grave mistake. All governments must be kept on their toes. Once criticism is withheld, it becomes difficult to be critical later. It also makes it easy for governments to isolate those who criticise it – even if most of them sugar-coat the criticism so as not to offend – and denounce them as in the camp of colonial powers, unreconstructed whites, the unpatriotic or the ‘ultra-left’,[10] as critics of the Mbeki government were labelled.

Alarmingly, quite legitimate criticism of the ANC government has been portrayed as disloyal, the critics being labelled racists or enemies of the state. This has often led to the withdrawal of intellectuals from public debate. During Mbeki’s administration, senior ANC leaders demanded, quite wrongly, absolute loyalty to the president or the state or government as a prerequisite for promoting a national consensus. Dissent, difference of opinion or even mild constructive criticism was not tolerated. Those that did so were denounced as ‘forces connected to the old apartheid order to undermine the state and liberation movement’.[11]

Take, for example, the government’s initial inaction in the face of the AIDS pandemic. Mbeki embarked on a fatal policy of denial. Many ANC supporters knew he was wrong but kept quiet, in case they were seen as supporting Western governments or big international pharmaceutical companies bent on perpetuating Africa’s underdevelopment. When William Malegapuru Makgoba, the head of the Medical Research Council, questioned this policy, senior ANC leaders, including Essop Pahad, minister in the President’s office, and the former Northern Province premier, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, launched a bitter personal attack on Makgoba. Pahad and a group of senior cabinet ministers summoned Makgoba to a meeting where he was pressured to recant his ‘dangerous’ views. A barrage of abusive letters against Makgoba followed. One threatening letter contained 22 pages of abuse and was signed by Ramatlhodi. He accused Makgoba of ‘betraying his race’ and of not being a ‘real’ black person. Makgoba stood firm. But many other intellectuals were less courageous and, fearing similar treatment, simply fell silent.

Another case in point was the exclusion from the SABC of political commentators deemed critical of the government. This not only demonstrated the intolerance of the broader political culture, but also showed just how much criticism had been devalued. But intolerance of different viewpoints is not only the preserve of the ANC. Ahead of its 2007 national conference, the South African Communist Party brutally crushed dissent and sidelined internal critics. The SACP treasurer, Phillip Dexter, was suspended for a year for mildly suggesting that the party’s leadership was intolerant and Stalinist. As this instance showed, the party’s or the state’s leadership often speaks ‘for the people’ or ‘in the national interest’ because, so the argument goes, it was elected by ‘the people’. Those critical of the leadership are then cast as not part of ‘the people’ or working against the national interest. Opposition parties are equally intolerant, if not worse. The DA MP Raenette Taljaard came under the lash when she differed with the party’s leader, Tony Leon, and the IFP’s secretary-general Jiba Jiyane was packed off to political Siberia when he stated that the party’s leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was a dictator. The PAC has become so intolerant internally that it is virtually extinct.

In the climate prevailing under the Mbeki government where critical viewpoints were looked upon disparagingly, the president’s weekly online column in ANC Today was not in fact a good thing. Instead of encouraging debate as Mbeki hoped, the column actually killed off any discussion, as many ANC members looked on his weekly online missives as ‘authoritative pronouncements’ (in the words of the respected ANC thinker Raymond Suttner) that carried the weight and legitimacy of the highest office in the country. It would have been political suicide for any loyal ANC cadre to express a contrary opinion. Leaders who explain themselves and can be questioned, instead of merely issuing diktats and introducing policies beyond criticism, are far more likely to be followed than those who discourage dissent and crush debate.

During Mbeki’s reign critical intellectuals often faced having their reputations turned into shreds by the smears, innuendoes and sheer meanness of the presidential inner circle and their sycophantic hangers-on. As a result, many progressives bit their tongues. Yet no reasonable debate on policies can take place in a situation where those who propose alternatives are seen as the enemy who need to be annihilated and destroyed. Such self-imposed censorship as prevailed during the Mbeki era comes at a cost to a developing society like South Africa, where every innovative idea matters: As a result good policy ideas do not enter the public debate and bad policies are not sufficiently scrutinised. In the end it is society – mostly the poor – that pays when bad policies fail. The cult of the leader in liberation movements all too easily lends itself to the belief that criticisms of the leader are an attack on the movement and its legacy. This is akin to the belief, described by Isaiah Berlin as a ‘terrible and dangerous arrogance’, that our leaders ‘have a magical eye which sees the truth’, that ‘our leaders alone are right’ and that ‘others cannot be right if they disagree’.[12]

Members of liberation movements defer too readily to leaders and as a result many African countries famously retained colonial-era ‘insult laws’ under which criticism of the president (including, in Zimbabwe, poking fun at him) can attract a lengthy jail sentence. For another thing, liberation leaders often wrongly try to portray criticisms of them and government policies as an attack on the legitimacy of the liberation struggle – which they are patently not. Then again, the cult of the leader often incorporates the view that because he ‘delivered’ the people from bondage into freedom, he is entitled to stay in power. Those who have done most of the sacrificing are not even considered. This is perhaps why, when in power, leaders of liberation movements can be so callous to the people they govern. Finally, the cult of the leader, which encourages uncritical deference, also undermines the emergence and consideration of alternative ideas, policies and innovations. The leader becomes the font of all new policies and exerts a monopoly on policy-making.

In a democratic society, on the contrary, there are no know-all leaders to whom citizens should uncritically defer. Nor are there political truths, whatever their source, that cannot be questioned. It is not a given that the ANC leadership will act in the interests of the people or the Constitution or democracy. Of course it is not the intellectual’s role to offer another unquestioned ‘truth’, but to suggest alternatives, to make comparisons, to question orthodoxies, to interrogate motives, so that an informed debate on public issues can take place.

The deadly consequences of conformism and censorship South Africa needs to cultivate a political culture that encourages disagreement and does not penalise those who depart from the prevailing orthodoxy. In a culture of silence and fear, there is the very real risk that leaders will not receive the information they require to make good decisions. When members of the ANC feel free to differ from the President or the party leaders, society is likely to hear a wider range of opinions, and better decisions may result. On the other hand, policy errors are most likely to occur when people are rewarded for conformity.

A climate of free expression and tolerance of dissent protects against false confidence and the inevitable mistakes of planners in both the private and public arenas.[13] If there had been more openness and discussion, for example, on the government’s market-friendly economic policy, Gear, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, opposition to it might have been less and the costs to society of implementation might have been lower. Indeed, the economic and political consequences to society of muzzling or silencing dissenting voices can be huge. Again, if more senior ANC leaders had questioned the Mbeki government’s controversial AIDS policies, antiretroviral drugs might have been made available at state hospitals much earlier, thousands of lives would have been saved and the devastating social consequences of the AIDS pandemic could have been reduced.

But often, political leaders contend through sophistry that the policies they adopt or their actions are actually those democratically endorsed either by the party or by the electorate. This is not always the case. In other situations government leaders argue that there is no alternative to a particular policy course. Here it is the intellectual’s role to show clearheadedly the possibilities, expose the deception and bring the truth before the public. When a restrictive political environment allows for only one official view or policy, it is the intellectual’s role to provide alternatives.

At the same time, governments are quick to avoid taking responsibility for their mistakes. In South Africa, the lack of service delivery or its poor or tardy implementation has been blamed by government leaders on mysterious agents provocateurs – unreconstructed whites from the old regime, big business or foreign imperialists – yet incompetence and mediocrity are often at the heart of these failures. It is the intellectual’s role to reveal such scapegoating and easy excuses for failures, to provide ‘critical intelligence’,[14] and, like Frantz Fanon, recognise that ‘exploitation can also wear a black face’.[15]

Self-censorship and government censorship of intellectuals and activists not only undermine democracy, but give political leaders unfettered power over information, which they can manipulate, withhold or release selectively. Governments have powerful incentives to be secretive.16 ‘If effective democratic oversight is to be achieved, then the voters have to be informed: They have to know what alternative actions were available and what the results might have been.’[17] But secrecy allows corruption to flourish. In a climate of secrecy, there is a premium put on information: Instead of being openly available information, it can be traded. A tender or procurement from government can be treated in this way. And since the information is bought, those with money can influence government decisions, whereas those without cannot. As Joseph Stiglitz argues, secrecy ‘raises the price of information’.[18] It allows special interest groups or those with money to dominate politics and discourages those without – the majority.

As Amartya Sen argues,[19] the rulers of a nation are often insulated in their own lives from the misery of the common people. They can live through a national calamity without sharing the fate of the victims. If, however, they face public criticism, they might have a strong incentive to take action or deal with the problems of the poor and vulnerable. Often, these are the sectors that are excluded from public dialogue, because they are marginal or voiceless and lack power or access to power. They could also assume a position of silence, as a way of protecting themselves from those more powerful.[20] In South Africa, because of the high levels of inequality and unequal access to key public forums, important opinions are easily shut out because those holding such opinions are too poor to influence party leaders or gain access to institutions such as the media or parliament.

Often grassroots protest against policies has been quarantined into zones where it has little effect on the political process. In the end, the ‘marginalised’ feel the need to use extreme actions to get their voices heard, risking even further alienation from the centres of power. All too frequently the bottled-up frustration of those ignored spills into violence. This is one way of subverting the policy consensus. Another is for intellectuals and citizens to create civil forms of alternative space, in the hope that new centres of discussion and deliberation will compete with the consensus and challenge the status quo.[21]

The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), launched by activist intellectuals, is one example of a mass-based organisation founded to contest the official and party view on AIDS. For its part, the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) has been active in defending freedom of speech, adroitly using many of the democracy’s new watchdog institutions (in spite of the lame duck nature of some). Both TAC and the FXI have used the courts – as a new democratic space – to challenge the official consensus and break it. However, many older social movements have not been so successful. The campaign for a basic income grant, for instance, has not made headway against the official, consensus view about the need for a social net for the poor.

INTELLECTUALS IN CIVIL SOCIETY

There is always the danger that intellectuals in civil society will, after liberation, join the government en masse, as happened in South Africa in 1994, or that those who remain outside will immerse themselves in the technical details of policy. In the 1980s South African civil society developed a large cadre of organic intellectuals, whether in the trade union movement, alternative think-tanks or the universities. However, after 1994 many progressive intellectuals in South Africa were ‘demobilised’, by being offered jobs in government, often on condition they did not speak against the government or the party. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, two leading democratisation scholars, argue that it is common, once democracy has been achieved, for leaders to argue that civil society, having played its historic role, should be ‘demobilised so as to allow for the development of normal democratic politics’.[22] Many ANC leaders argued similarly in the early 1990s, when they called for the United Democratic Front – the most vibrant civil movement that took root in South Africa in the 1980s – to be collapsed.

One cannot have a democratic political culture unless there is a vibrant, diverse and critical civil society. Often in societies coming from authoritarian regimes, in which civil groups were the mainstay of democratic opposition and resistance to the undemocratic state, new democratic leaders are eager to ‘demobilise’ civil movements. Many of South Africa’s progressive intellectuals were before 1994 based in civil society. Civil society is important, not only in helping the government to deliver social services, but in providing criticism as one of the checks and balances in the system of government. They help keep the government accountable. Even more so, they ‘give citizens experience in the art of political association, increase their civic competence, stimulate participation in electoral politics, recruit and train new political leaders, generate democratic norms and values, and accumulate social capital’.[23] By making government responsive and accountable, and decision- making more inclusive, a diverse and critical civil society actually builds the democratic state.[24] Furthermore, an independent, critical civil society can provide alternative information, to enlighten citizens so as to make their participation in the democratic process more effective, and to influence the agenda of the government. Especially if parliament becomes the rubber stamp of the executive, it is important that opposition voices outside parliament – of civil groups, community groups and local leaders – should not be ignored or even intimidated by the state.

But many critical civil society groups in South Africa have been demonised, in the case of the Treatment Action Campaign as being in the pay of ‘imperialists’ or multinational business interests. The National Land Committee member and Landless People’s Movement activist Andile Mngxitama was suspended by the NLC board for making ‘anti-government’ statements. So, too, was the NLC’s director, Zakes Hlatswayo, for ‘failing’ to reprimand Mngxitama. Moreover, some intelligence agents – whether rogue or legitimate is still unclear – were sent to the offices of the LPM for good measure. Similarly, when the Anti-Privatisation Forum embarked on a series of marches, the spymaster Vusi Mavimbela demanded an interview with one of its leaders, Trevor Ngwane. Mavimbela personally interviewed Ngwane at the group’s downtown Johannesburg office to warn him of the consequences of embarking on protest action.[25]

In spring 2005, Mbeki launched a tough attack on non-governmental organisations, claiming they were manipulated by foreign donors.[26] He questioned whether most of South Africa’s NGOs were independent. Mbeki’s statements came after local civil society groups, ahead of the African Union’s peer review of South Africa, demanded greater representation on the panel reviewing the country’s state of governance. Since Mbeki’s views carried considerable influence, his over-generalised criticisms clearly undermined the credibility of NGOs.

But this was not the first time that the government took on NGOs. In a speech to the ANC’s national conference in December 1997, Nelson Mandela made a scathing attack on civil groups, accusing them of working with foreign donors to undermine the government and its development programme. He claimed they had no right to criticise the government because they did not have popular constituencies or broad-based membership. But as three NGO activists argued at the time: ‘In our free and open democracy, NGOs and other organs of civil society have the right to criticise government when they believe it is not abiding by the letter and spirit of the law, and where it is not adhering to its constitutional obligations. In our political context of one-party dominance and a largely ineffective parliamentary opposition, it should be acknowledged that political pluralism rests heavily with the voices from below expressed through a diverse range of NGOs and other civil society organisations.’[27]

A new generation of intellectuals based in civil society has more recently emerged on the wave of grassroots and community protests and agitation for greater government accountability, better service delivery and an end to official corruption. The civil society battle against the government’s short-sighted AIDS policies has also helped groom a new set of intellectuals and activists. And intellectuals in the women’s movement have emerged as a result of the increasing marginalisation of women in society, despite the Constitution’s emphasis on gender equality. It was women intellectuals in civil society that protested the loudest against Jacob Zuma’s sexist views during his rape trail, while leading government members – both men and women – maintained a sphinx-like silence.

NEW THINKING REQUIRED

When African liberation movements came to power, the intellectuals that were part of the movement were often required to ‘provide the materials and justifications of already defined policies’,[28] no matter how poor the policies were. Harold Wolpe made a brilliant case study of how in Frelimo, the ruling liberation movement in Mozambique, ‘intellectual work took the priorities of the party as a point of departure’. The problem is that intellectuals always had little relative autonomy – unless their research was in line with ‘already defined policies’ – and when the movements came to power, the little they had was quickly done away with. Intellectuals all too readily concede the ‘monopoly’ of ideas to party leaders and the liberation movement itself. As Alberto Melucci once said, ‘intellectuals who claim to represent the good conscience or the true ideology of a movement have always participated in preparing the way for the advent of the Prince, only to end up as either its victims or his courtiers’.

But in a democracy, new or established, intellectuals need to provide ideas about how to deal with critical issues and develop alternative frameworks of thinking. They need to ‘construct and reconstruct our political vocabularies’[29] to suit changing contexts and environments. However, some intellectuals are fixated with the ‘correct’ interpretation of politics or history, arguing that if one holds the ‘correct’ ideology all problems will magically melt away. This is true of the SACP’s theory of national democratic revolution (NDR), which clearly does not suit current conditions, yet many left intellectuals stick to it, even if it does not make sense of the reality on the ground. The NDR has become a substitute for thinking critically about solutions to the problems of our politics, for engaging in critical introspection. The question is how to come to terms with the market, in new and innovative ways, and how to bring about a quality democracy. Instead, the SACP clings to the outdated notion of a two-stage national democratic revolution in which the first stage will be a democracy set up by the national liberation movement (the ANC) and the next stage will be socialism. Contrast this rigidity with the thinking of the Communist Party of India, which has argued that the battle ‘against globalisation would require an engagement with the existing world realities’.

VALUES, ETHICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Not only is South Africa in desperate need of new thinking and new policies but also in need of a renewal in values, morals and ethics. While the ANC is good at articulating hard political values, it is unable to deal with the soft values that hold the social fabric of society together. This is where intellectuals have a role to play. Old forms of authority in South Africa are dysfunctional. The bonds that held communities together are disintegrating. In black townships many who could have provided moral leadership have moved to the suburbs, often living behind high walls. Leading ANC figures have become obsessed with gaining patronage, power and resources for individual gain rather than for the common good. Political power is seen as a way to wealth rather than a public duty. In reaction to critics, government leaders often indignantly maintain that apartheid was more corrupt. But this is not the issue. The Constitution calls for us to uphold the vision of a society based on equality and social justice, one imbued with certain values. If the country’s leaders do not take the Constitution seriously, it is difficult to see how ordinary citizens can be expected to internalise its values.

Since 1994, more than ZAR280 billion has been spent on black economic empowerment, but the beneficiaries are mostly black oligarchs well connected to the ANC leadership. There has been no serious effort to compel them to create jobs or make socially productive investments, given that BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) money is a politically sponsored ‘handout’. Yet in the middle of a fiscal surplus, the proposal for a basic income grant for the poor was dismissed by the finance minister Trevor Manuel as a form of ‘entitlement’. It was left to Archbishop Tutu to point to the moral decline when he remarked that leaders ‘glibly on full stomachs speak about handouts to those who often go to bed hungry’. The dream of a caring and compassionate society that many fought for during the liberation struggle has now evaporated. Giving money away to the BEE tycoons, while shouting ‘entitlement’ if the poor demand a basic income grant, is the height of hypocrisy and is at the heart of the collapse of moral values. It is the intellectual’s role to promote a caring, compassionate society based on social justice, in which the poor and vulnerable are cared for. As Frantz Fanon argued, a new humanism should form the basis of a democratic political culture.

ENTRENCHING A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE

Most of Africa’s parties are internally undemocratic, their leaderships ossified and controlled by small elites, with power, patronage and government spoils divided among competing factions based on pork- barrel interests, ethnicity, class or region. Either the outgoing leader handpicks someone to succeed him to consolidate the power of his faction or he is ousted by the leader from another faction. Competition within these ruling parties is mostly about which faction can beat the other in order to gain control of dispensing largesse to their members, rather than about renewing government, society or the economy. The ANC is the dominant political force in South Africa. This means its internal practices also dominate South Africa’s entire political system. If the ANC’s internal way of doing things is strongly undemocratic, South Africa’s political system will also become undemocratic. A party that operates internally along undemocratic lines is unlikely to be able to promote democracy outside. If internal rules to ensure transparency, accountability and inclusiveness are not enforced within the ANC, it is unlikely that they would be enforced at broader political levels. The reality is that at many levels ANC structures have become patronage machines to reward friends and allies, through government tenders, contracts and appointments. There appears to be a lack of courage to do the right thing: To fire those who are responsible for mismanagement and corruption, even if they are allies and friends, and to appoint those whom we may disagree with politically, who come from a different background, but who have the skills that will help pull our people out of grinding poverty.

Liberation movements are not like ordinary parties. They are almost church-like: membership means adhering to a set of rules. The ANC needs to transform itself into a wholly democratic organisation. Its members, supporters and activists must play a more active role in keeping the ANC democratic and holding its leadership accountable. The first thing is that the party must become more inclusive and participatory, in decision-making, leadership elections and policy-making, from branch and provincial to national executive levels. In all this, the contribution of progressive intellectuals to the democratisation of the ANC and, by extension, the country is crucial.

Making the internal political culture of the ANC more democratic is a prerequisite for entrenching a democratic political culture in South Africa. An essential part of such a democratic culture is the concept of ‘self-enforcing constraints on the limits of power’.[30] Sadly, many liberation movements that fought authoritarian rule in developing countries argue, once they assume power, that they should have unlimited power as a government. ‘Did the apartheid regime not have unlimited power?’ some often ask. But a quality democracy means there are limits to state authority, and those limits must be enforced. Strong legislatures – parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils – are needed to give ordinary citizens a say in policy-making, especially when opposition parties – as in South Africa – often do not speak to the majority. Parliament should hold the executive accountable, for example on service delivery. The government itself must police the rights set out in the Constitution.

However, legislatures in South Africa are weak, and public representative are often more interested in pleasing party bosses and the executive. For example, ANC MPs rarely criticise the government, and when individual MPs bravely stick their heads out, they are often chopped off. The threat of redeployment to a lowly position somewhere else is often an effective deterrent. Opposition MPs look towards their seniors with the same boot-licking impulses. For this, South Africa’s proportional electoral system is in part to blame. Voters have no say in who goes into parliament, only in the parties they represent, and have no recourse to recall those MPs sleeping on the job.

It is the intellectual’s role not only to explain their democratic rights to ordinary citizens, but to help inculcate the idea that there should be limits to the authority of the state. The truth is that very few liberation movements set much store by building strong, independent and democratic institutions. Instead, the prevailing political culture – a legacy of our past – encourages conformism, deference to and uncritical trust in leaders, and unquestioned loyalty to tribe. Given the ANC leadership’s insistence on uncritical loyalty, it is no wonder that many government leaders think that because they are elected, they are all-powerful, untouchable, and able to do what they like. But these attributes are anathema to building a diverse, vibrant and quality democracy, which requires questioning citizens who insist on accountability from those elected.

A democracy must also embed the culture of political institutions. Not the least important of these are the public auditing and oversight bodies.[31] Depressingly, South Africa’s Chapter Nine institutions, which are supposed to keep the executive in check and protect ordinary citizens from arbitrary action and state neglect, have been pliant and overly deferential to the executive. What is astonishing is that in February 2007 the public protector, Lawrence Mushwana, complained to parliament that his job was being ‘obstructed’ by the criticism of opposition parties and the media to the extent that his institution’s oversight role, particularly of the executive, had weakened, and that it was not protecting citizens against callous politicians and public servants or poor service delivery. Quite rightly, Kader Asmal, chairperson of parliament’s oversight committee, called Mushwana to order. The fact remains that many of the so-called watchdog agencies are under poor leadership, defer too readily to the executive, and are hostile to public scrutiny. They also have had to contend with attacks by the government. A few years ago the presidency lambasted the South African Human Rights Commission for its socioeconomic report in which it criticised the slow delivery of social services, and ominously reminded the body that the executive holds the purse-strings.

Even more so than the watchdog bodies, the judiciary plays a vital part in the constitutional dispensation. The judiciary’s role is not only to constrain the power of the state, but also to ensure the rule of law. It is important that the judiciary is independent, adheres to constitutional values, and does not suffer interference. Of course South Africa’s judiciary must become more representative of the country’s diverse population and adopt a value system in line with the democratic Constitution. Although the ANC has said that it is not about to alter the constitutionally entrenched principle that the judiciary should be independent, there are some worrying signs. The proper functioning of South Africa’s constitutional democracy depends on an independent judiciary. Another cause for concern is the collapsing of the divisions between party and state. In their attempts to transform the societies they inherit, leaders of liberation movements often fuse their parties with the new state to form a kind of ‘party-state’, with the movement and the party becoming one and the same. There is no firewall set up between the party on the one hand and the executive, legislature and public institutions on the other. In fact, independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party, and not only are the heads of these institutions ‘deployed’ there by the party, but once in office they are expected to defer to the party leadership. Before he was appointed ANC spokesperson, Carl Niehaus admitted in November 2008 that there was ‘an expectation that the party line and leadership should be followed blindly, and that the judicial and democratic institutions of the state should merely be instruments to carry out ANC policy’. Yet a constitutional democratic system demands a clear division between party and state.

Moreover, most independence and liberation movements see themselves as the embodiment of the ‘people’, speaking for the whole nation, and the leader as the tribune of the ‘people’. This means that decisions taken by the party leadership, often out of pure self-interest, are regarded as being in the national or public interest. Former Western Cape ANC leader Ebrahim Rasool once remarked that ANC leaders failed to understand that the ANC is only the ‘driver of the nation’ and not ‘the nation itself’.

The collapse of the proper boundaries between party and state can have dangerous consequences. In his landmark 2008 judgment in the Zuma case, Judge Chris Nicholson was critical of the Mbeki government’s manipulation of public institutions for political ends. In this case it was the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority at stake. Similar concerns surround the state intelligence agencies. In view of our violent past, it is essential that civil liberties are protected and that there be public oversight of the intelligence, security and military agencies. When community protests began to mushroom across the country in 2005, the intelligence minister, Ronnie Kasrils, ordered an investigation, blaming agents provocateurs whom he sought to fish out. The danger in situations like these is that the intelligence agencies are used to settle political scores within the ANC or to sideline and discredit legitimate critics. The ANC’s hoax e-mail scandal, in which intelligence operatives fabricated e-mails to destroy the careers and reputations of political rivals and critics, was another instance of the danger that state institutions can be used to sideline critics within and outside the ANC.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

One of the other great challenges facing intellectuals as well as the wider society is the need to cobble together a new South Africanness after three or more centuries of colonialism and apartheid. The great African scholar Mahmood Mamdani[32] has observed that the Achilles’ heel of many African post-independence and liberation movements has been their difficulty in constructing an inclusive concept of citizenship.

To start with, countries such as South Africa, with its politically divided and economically inequitable past, obviously cannot find a solution in a nationalism based on a shared culture, as is often assumed in Western models.[33] South Africa’s democracy is based in fact on a compromise between different groups and an acceptance of our differences. The diversity and inequality bequeathed by both colonialism and apartheid means that modern South Africanness cannot but be plural and inclusive. There cannot be a single definition of who is a South African or even an African. Nelson Mandela’s statement in the dock during his political trial neatly put it that South Africanness cannot be defined in relation to a majority community. In his own autobiography Mandela appealed to the best of African traditions, culture and custom to argue that ‘a minority was not to be crushed by a majority’.[34]

The important discussion document prepared for the ANC’s 2007 national conference, Building a National Democratic Society, argued that in the quest for nation building, South Africa must create a new ‘national democratic identity’.[35] According to the document, nation building would be achieved by securing a ‘social compact of common interests’ and by promoting ‘a common sense of South Africanness and shared responsibility for a common destiny’. Thabo Mbeki’s presidency was in part based on building South Africanness out of a ‘project of common development’.[36] Mbeki rightly attempted to weave together a new South African identity centred on a ‘national consensus’,[37] which rested on an inclusive democracy, core shared values and empathy for the vulnerable cutting across the racial and political divide.

Yet during Mbeki’s administration South Africa seemed to move further away from the sense of a shared national purpose. Many of the President’s allies retreated into ‘nativism’, seeking an exclusive definition of who is an African, which overrode the Constitution’s core definition in terms of multiple identities, diversity and inclusivity. By allying himself with the ‘nativists’, Mbeki diluted his own Nehruvian idea that there can be no retreat into some mystical African past and undermined the belief that the nation will have to be built as a mosaic of the best elements of our diverse histories and cultures. Dividing the nation into natives and non-natives is just a step away from reimposing an ethnic criterion for South Africanness – a kind of retribalisation of South African society. Nativism frequently sees transformation of society as merely involving the replacement of white faces with black, rather than something more thoroughgoing – the development of a new democratic ethos in line with the Constitution. Such a wrong-headed approach to transformation can only undermine efforts at nation building.

In this spirit, some have wrongly called for the Africanisation of public institutions rather than their democratisation. The Cape judge president, John Hlophe, has argued, for instance, that South Africa’s laws must be ‘Africanised’ to make them more ‘relevant’. Of course, he is right when he argues that the judiciary must be ‘transformed’, by making the bench more representative of the country’s population and the laws of the country more ‘accessible’ to the masses.

However, what is still lacking is the full democratisation of the judiciary and the real transformation of the law. Simply concentrating on putting black judges on the bench who issue similar conservative judgments to their white colleagues cannot be construed as transformation.

Hlophe’s own behaviour has come in for criticism. Because he has insisted that the allegations against him are fuelled by white racism, most black colleagues have remained silent out of reluctance to criticise him because they have also experienced racism in the workplace and fear giving legitimacy to the more hardline white critics of transformation. Yet South Africa won’t be able to move forward unless we are able, in Hlophe’s case, to separate individual wrongdoing from the merits of the struggle for transformation of the judiciary. At the same time, we need to recognise that the very cause of transformation may be undermined by those using it to advance personal ambition or to deflect attention from personal shortcomings. In this way the legitimate need for transformation, already an emotionally and politically charged issue in South Africa, is set back.

As the Hlophe debacle reveals, the progressive intellectual must look beyond racial solidarity that supports often undemocratic practices. The American scholar Cornel West warns against the pitfalls of what he calls a resort to black ‘authenticity’ politics, whereby every issue is reduced to ‘racial reasoning’. In this kind of thinking, black intellectuals readily question somebody’s black credentials: ‘Is he or she really black’, ‘Is he or she just black on the outside?’[38] Instead West argues that the public intellectual must ‘replace racial reasoning with moral reasoning, to understand the black freedom struggle not as an affair of skin pigmentation and racial phenotype but rather as a matter of ethical principles and wise politics’.[39] Appeal to nativist or black authenticity often demands that people close ranks behind very dubious personalities and sometimes undemocratic politics. It is a seductively easy way of closing one’s eyes to difficult moral and ethical choices.

If in the early years after liberation, criticism and dissent are not tolerated and a new democratic political culture is not quickly established, ruling parties will either adopt the ways of the state they inherited – especially if, as in South Africa, it was inherited intact from the colonial or apartheid government – or fall back into their limited habits of democracy from the liberation struggle era. Once either of these cultures is entrenched it is very difficult to create a new democratic political culture. Failure to create a democratic culture after liberation often opens the way for a return to autocracy, a reversion to a narrow nationalism and tribalism. This has bedevilled many post-independence attempts by African and developing countries at building democracies. If this happens, citizens will soon feel alienated and eventually lose trust in the democratic political system. Already in South Africa there are worrying signs that many citizens have withdrawn from political activities, some have resorted to expressing their unhappiness violently, while others have become cynical. None of these is good for the democratic spirit. The task of the public intellectual in South Africa is both grave and daunting.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This is an extract from The Poverty of Ideas, edited by William Gumede and Leslie Dikeni and published by Jacana Media (ISBN 978-1-77009-775-9).
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] Ruth Lane, ‘Political culture: residual category or general theory?’, Comparative Political Studies, 25, October 1992, pp. 362–87; and David L. Paletz and Daniel Lipinski, ‘Political culture and political communication’, Working Paper 92, Barcelona, 1994.
[2] Peter Gross, ‘Media and political society in Eastern Europe’, in Mass Media and Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Media Development 1, WACC, 2002 (see www.wacc.org.uk)
[3] Karol Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe (Hampton Press, 2006).
[4] Andreas Saugstad, ‘Cornel West and the struggle for social transformation’, Goinside.com, 28 March 2002.
[5] Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, Civility and Subversion: The Intellectual in Democratic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1.
[6] Cornel West, ‘Nelson Mandela: great exemplar of the grand democratic tradition’, in Xolela Mangcu (ed.), The Meaning of Mandela (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2004).
[7] Jurgen Habermas, ‘Three normative models of democracy: liberal, republican, and procedural’, in Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds.), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 135–44.
[8] Amartya Sen, ‘Indian democracy and public reasoning’ (http:// hinduonnet.com), p. 1.
[9] Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a universal value’, Journal of Democracy, 10, 3, 1999.
[10] ANC, Briefing Notes for the ANC National Working Committee (‘Briefing Notes’), April 2002.
[11] ANC, Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics Discussion Document for the 52nd ANC National Conference, February 2007.
[12] Quoted in Tony Leon, ‘Buds of promise in political landscape despite rough winds’, Business Day, 7 August 2009.
[13] Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 210.
[14] Goldfarb, Civility and Subversion.
[15] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1968).
[16] Dennis Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[17] Joseph Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life, Oxford Amnesty Lecture, Oxford, 27 January 1999, p. 7.
[18] Ibid. p. 11.
[19] Sen, ‘Democracy as a universal value’.
[20] Peter Golding, ‘The communications paradox: inequality at the national and international levels and the communications media’, in Pradip Thomas and Rohoram Nain (eds.), Communication and Development: The Freirean Connection (Hampton Press, 2004), pp. 33–44.
[21] Indymedia says they were formed for people and opinions that do not have access to the airwaves, tools and resources of the mainstream media. See their website: http://southafrica.indymedia.org
[22] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
[23] Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? The Imperative of Consolidation, Working paper 237, March 1997.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Interviews with Trevor Ngwane, Andile Mngxitama, Dale McKinley and Zakes Hlatswayo, August 2002.
[26] Terence Smith, Ismail Davids and Glenn Hollands, ‘Mbeki’s attacks on NGOs undermine civil society’s right and duty to criticise’, Cape Times, 25 October 2005.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Michael Burawoy, From Liberation to Reconstruction: Theory and Practice in the Life of Harold Wolpe, The Wolpe Lecture, 22 July 2004.
[29] Goldfarb, Civility and Subversion, p. 1.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] See chapter by Mahmood Mamdani in this volume.
[33] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1999).
[34] Mary Benson, Mandela: The Man and the Movement, revised edn (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
[35] ANC, Building a National Democratic Society.
[36] Ibid.
[37] ANC, Strategic and Tactical Approaches to the Opposition: ANC NEC Discussion Document, September 2004.
[38] Cornel West, Race Matters (New York: Beacon Press, 1993).
[39] Ibid.

The Left’s challenge is the new poor

William Gumede

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61257

cc theimpressionist.co.ukThe ever-rising poverty, joblessness and homelessness in South Africa may actually weaken the Left – the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – within the African National Congress (ANC) family, rather than strengthen their influence, writes William Gumede in this week’s Pambazuka News.

The conventional wisdom among Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and (South African Communist Party) SACP strategists, and many other commentators, in business, civil society and opposition parties, is that exploding poverty should naturally strengthen the power of the Left within the African National Congress (ANC) tripartite alliance. Yet the reverse may actually hold true.

In fact, despite the central role COSATU and the SACP played in the ‘Zunami’ that swept Jacob Zuma into the Union Building and Luthuli House, both these organisations of the Left are in real danger of losing so much influence that by the end of the Zuma presidency they may end up only as a lobby group within the ANC.

Rising poverty may actually strengthen populist, and tribalist and narrow nationalist politics in South Africa, rather than Left or progressive politics.

One of the costs of severe mass poverty is mass alienation, mass family breakdown, mass breakdown in individual self-esteem, especially in our country, where self-worth is now increasingly measured in how much money one has. Mass poverty may also cause mass rejection of democracy as solution to problems. In the South African context, in moments of crisis, people often seek solace in tradition, tribe, identity and patriarchy, to affirm, gain dignity or self-respect. These frequently are translated into over-assertions of African or blackness, or ethnicity expressed in over-emphasis on Zulu-ness or Xhosa-ness as the main source of identity. This can be manifested against those seen as the ‘haves’, whether whites, business people, foreigners, or the new black middle class. Socially, these are deeply conservative sentiments. Yet, at the same time, those alienated because of poverty may readily support radical changes normally associated with ‘Left’ positions.

The reality is that rising poverty in South Africa is changing society and its politics also, opening up a gaping hole at the centre of South Africa’s politics. Many of the current political parties, social movements and democratic institutions, are not attuned to these changes, even if they profess in rhetoric to be so. The spontaneous community protests against lack of government service delivery, corrupt and indifferent public officials, are a case in point. It caught many organised civil groups and parties by surprise. The South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), supposedly an organisation fighting on behalf of local communities was spectacularly absent. In fact, rapid changes in society, associated with increased poverty, and alienation – and the SANCO leadership’s inability to respond to this – are partially to blame for the organisation being on the verge of extinction.

Some populist leaders in the ANC with a more developed political antenna have already exploited these changes in society, caused by mass poverty. They have made their platform adopting supposedly left positions such as ‘nationalisation’, when it comes to economics; but combining it with social conservatism, approving of polygamy and virginity testing; and adopting muscular policies to deal with social problems, such as the ‘shoot-to-kill’ and ask questions later policy to bring down crime. The typical populist program is combining militant economics, social conservatism and muscular policies to deal with social ills, with regularly attacking ‘elites’, whether white or black or business, and when doing so, using the language, slogans and songs to legitimise it.

For COSATU leaders the dangers should be obvious. Increasing poverty and job losses will reduce the membership base, coherence and strength of COSATU. Most of those who lose jobs are typical trade union members. The poor – jobless, homeless, rural peasants and young, are now in electoral terms the overwhelming majority. With a smaller base, the trade union federation will face the danger of becoming a ‘labour aristocracy’, of organising only a small working class base who has jobs.

The SACP is organised as an elite movement, with a relatively small membership, typically trade unionists, students and those working in civil society. As more and more South Africans become poorer, the membership of the SACP, many also become unrepresentative of the majority mass poor.

Unless the SACP and COSATU dramatically refocus, modernise and change strategic direction, their influence may decline, rather than increase. To adapt to the changes, COSATU may have to start operating more as a social movement. It must now focus specifically on organising the unemployed, rural poor and youth. It will also have to play a bigger role in agitating for housing, public transport and dealing with crime, and consumer rights, for example. This will be new territory, which may demand different kind of organising skills.

At the same time the SACP will have to turn itself into a mass party, with mass community, youth and rural branches. A mass-based SACP, and a social movement COSATU, will not only have to provide answers on economic and political issues, but also progressive answers to the difficult questions of individual alienation, family breakdown, establishing a more caring male identity, how to achieve genuine gender equality, and how to find a balance between tradition and democratic values. Unless COSATU and the SACP make the crucial adjustments now, they will cede influence to the populists and narrow nationalists in the future.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared in the Sowetan.
* William Gumede is co-editor (with Leslie Dikeni) of the recently released Poverty of Ideas.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News

The Iron Wall: Egypt's role in the Gaza blockade

Uri Avnery

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/61242

cc Wikimedia CommonsFollowing the Egyptian government's refusal to allow activists from all over the world to travel to Gaza from Cairo, Uri Avnery highlights the country's increasing commitment to honouring Israeli wishes around the blockade of the Gaza Strip. While Egypt has previously turned something of a blind eye to the supplies funnelled to Gaza via underground tunnels, this situation is about to change through the construction of an 'iron wall'. Why a country historically considered as the leader of the Arab world is prepared to do this likely lies in its own decline, Avnery contends, with President Hosni Mubarak obliged to follow US – and by extension Israeli government – wishes with a view to shoring up Egypt's own influence and power.

Something odd, almost bizarre, is going on in Egypt these days.

About 1,400 activists from all over the world gathered there on their way to the Gaza Strip. On the anniversary of the 'Cast Lead' war, they intended to participate in a non-violent demonstration against the ongoing blockade, which makes the life of 1.5 million inhabitants of the Strip intolerable.

At the same time, protest demonstrations were to take place in many countries. In Tel-Aviv, too, a big protest was planned. The 'monitoring committee' of the Arab citizens of Israel was to organise an event on the Gaza border.

When the international activists arrived in Egypt, a surprise awaited them. The Egyptian government forbade their trip to Gaza. Their buses were held up at the outskirts of Cairo and turned back. Individual protesters who succeeded in reaching the Sinai in regular buses were taken off them. The Egyptian security forces conducted a regular hunt for the activists.

The angry activists besieged their embassies in Cairo. On the street in front of the French embassy, a tent camp sprang up which was soon surrounded by the Egyptian police. American protesters gathered in front of their embassy and demanded to see the ambassador. Several protesters who are over 70 years old started a hunger strike. Everywhere, the protesters were held up by Egyptian elite units in full riot gear, while red water cannon trucks were lurking in the background. Protesters who tried to assemble in Cairo’s central Tahrir (liberation) Square were mishandled.

In the end, after a meeting with the wife of the president, a typical Egyptian solution was found: 100 activists were allowed to reach Gaza. The rest remained in Cairo, bewildered and frustrated.

While the demonstrators were cooling their heels in the Egyptian capital and trying to find ways to vent their anger, Binyamin Netanyahu was received in the president’s palace in the heart of the city. His hosts went to great lengths to laud and celebrate his contribution to peace, especially the ‘freeze' of settlement activity in the West Bank, a phoney gesture that does not include east Jerusalem.

Hosni Mubarak and Netanyahu have met in the past – but not in Cairo. The Egyptian president always insisted that the meetings take place in Sharm-al-Sheikh, as far from the Egyptian population centres as possible. The invitation to Cairo was, therefore, a significant token of increasingly close relations.

As a special gift for Netanyahu, Mubarak agreed to allow hundreds of Israelis to come to Egypt and pray at the grave of Rabbi Yaakov Abu-Hatzeira, who died and was buried in the Egyptian town of Damanhur 130 years ago, on his way from Morocco to the holy land.

There is something symbolic about this, the blocking of the pro-Palestinian protesters on their way to Gaza at the same time as the invitation of Israelis to Damanhur.

One may well wonder about the Egyptian participation in the blockade of the Gaza Strip.

The blockade started long before the Gaza war and has turned the Strip into what has been described as 'the biggest prison on earth'. The blockade applies to everything except essential medicines and the most basic foodstuffs. US Senator John Kerry, a former candidate for the presidency, was shocked to hear that the blockade included pasta – the Israeli army in its wisdom has designated noodles as a luxury. The blockade is all-embracing – from building materials to school children’s copy books. Except for the most extreme humanitarian cases, nobody can pass from the Gaza Strip to Israel or the West Bank, nor the other way round.

But Israel controls only three sides of the Strip. The northern and eastern borders are blocked by the Israeli army, the western border by the Israeli navy. The fourth border, the Southern one, is controlled by Egypt. Therefore, the entire blockade would be ineffective without Egyptian participation.

Ostensibly, this does not make sense. Egypt considers itself as the leader of the Arab world. It is the most populous Arab country, situated at the centre of the Arab world. Fifty years ago the president of Egypt, Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, was the idol of all the Arabs, especially of the Palestinians. How can Egypt collaborate with the 'Zionist enemy', as Egyptians called Israel then, in bringing 1.5 million brother Arabs to their knees?

Until recently, the Egyptian government had been sticking to a solution that exemplifies the 6000-year-old Egyptian political acumen. It participated in the blockade but closed its eyes to the hundreds of tunnels dug under the Egyptian–Gaza border through which the daily supplies for the population were flowing (for exorbitant prices, and with high profits for Egyptian merchants), together with the stream of arms. People also passed through them – from Hamas activists to brides.

This is about to change. Egypt has started building an iron wall – literally – along the full length of the Gaza border, consisting of steel pillars thrust deep into the ground, in order to block all tunnels. That will finally choke the inhabitants.

When the most extreme Zionist, Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, wrote 80 years ago about erecting an 'iron wall' against the Palestinians, he did not dream of Arabs doing just that.

Why are they doing it?

There are several explanations. Cynics point out that the Egyptian government receives a huge American subsidy every year – almost US$2 billion – by courtesy of Israel. It started as a reward for the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. The pro-Israel lobby in the US Congress can stop it any time.

Others believe that Mubarak is afraid of Hamas. The organisation started out as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, still the main opposition to his autocratic regime. The Cairo–Riyadh–Amman–Ramallah axis is poised against the Damascus–Gaza axis that is allied with the Tehran–Hizbullah axis. Many people believe that Mahmoud Abbas is interested in the tightening of the Gaza blockade in order to hurt Hamas.

Mubarak is angry with Hamas, which refuses to dance to his tune. Like his predecessors, he demands that the Palestinians obey his orders. President Abd-al-Nasser was angry with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO – an organisation created by him to ensure Egyptian control of the Palestinians, but which escaped him when Yasser Arafat took over). President Anwar Sadat was angry with the PLO for rejecting the Camp David agreement, which promised Palestinians only 'autonomy'. How dare the Palestinians, a small, oppressed people, refuse the 'advice' of big brother?

All these explanations make sense, yet the Egyptian government’s attitude is still astonishing. The Egyptian blockade of Gaza destroys the lives of 1.5 million human beings, men and women, old people and children, most of whom are not Hamas activists. It is done publicly, before the eyes of hundreds of millions of Arabs, a billion and a quarter Muslims. In Egypt itself, too, millions of people are ashamed of the participation of their country in the starving of fellow Arabs.

It is a very dangerous policy. Why does Mubarak follow it?

The real answer is, probably, that he has no choice.

Egypt is a very proud country. Anyone who has been in Egypt knows that even the poorest Egyptian is full of national pride and is easily insulted when his national dignity is hurt. That was shown again a few weeks ago, when Egypt lost a football match with Algeria and behaved as if it has lost a war.

'Consider that from the summit of these Pyramids, forty centuries look down upon you', Napoleon told his soldiers on the eve of the battle for Cairo. Every Egyptian feels that 6,000 - some say 8,000 – years of history look upon him all the time.

This profound feeling clashes with reality at a time when Egypt’s situation is getting more and more miserable. Saudi Arabia has more influence, tiny Dubai has become an international financial centre, Iran is becoming a far more important regional power. Contrary to Iran, where the ayatollahs have called upon families to limit themselves to two children, the Egyptian birth-rate is devouring everything, condemning the country to permanent poverty.

In the past, Egypt succeeded in balancing its internal weaknesses with external successes. The whole world considered Egypt as the leader of the Arab world, and treated it accordingly. No more.

Egypt is in a bad situation. Therefore, Mubarak has no choice but to follow the dictates of the US – which are, in fact, Israeli dictates. That is the real explanation for his participation in the blockade.

When I spoke today at the demonstration in Tel-Aviv, after we had marched through the streets to protest against the blockade, I refrained from mentioning the Egyptian part in it.

I confess that I liked the people I met during my visits to Egypt very much. The 'man in the street' is very welcoming. In their behaviour towards each other there is an air of tranquillity, an absence of aggression, a particular Egyptian sense of humour. Even the poorest keep their dignity in crowded and often miserable conditions. I have not heard them grumble. In all the thousands of years of their history, Egyptians have risen in revolt no more than three or four times.

This legendary patience has its negative side, too. When people are resigned to their lot, this may prevent economic, social and political progress.

It seems that the Egyptian people are ready to accept everything. From the pharaohs of old right down to the present pharaoh, their rulers have faced little opposition. But a day may come when national pride will overcome even this patience.

As an Israeli, I protest against the Israeli blockade. If I were an Egyptian, I would protest against the Egyptian blockade. As a citizen of this planet, I protest against both.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

What we learned from Dennis Brutus’ troubadour politics

Patrick Bond

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/obituary/61250

Dennis Brutus died at the age of 85 on 26 December 2009, battling cancer, climate change and capitalism.

Poetry and Protest was the title of his autobiographical sketches and verse (published in 2006 by Haymarket of Chicago and the University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, edited by Aisha Karim and Lee Sustar). I asked Brutus, what links these two central aspects of your life? He replied, ‘The role of the troubadour.’

Travelling from court to court during the Middle Ages, the troubadour was Southern Europe’s sage, a wit whose satirical songs offered some of the most creative expressions of love for life and people.

Too often, though, Brutus’ poetry reflected such acute pain, suffering and above all anger at the court’s ruling elites – surgically delivered, at times breathtaking, at times didactic, at times counterposing society and nature with dramatic insight, capable of breaking free from accepted form – that his internal punning and literary references were typically lost on followers who were first and foremost political junkies (like myself).

Trying to keep up with the octogenarian after his 2005 move to Durban dazed even the most Brutus-addicted staff at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society – where he was honorary professor and our visionary guru – and UKZN Centre for Creative Arts, for which he served as a fixture at their famous Time of the Writer and Poetry Africa festivals.

At least one overarching impression sings out from the cacophony of warm memories: The Brutus philosophy that genuine liberation – not the half measures won in 1994, when class apartheid replaced racial domination in South Africa – represents a war to be waged on many fronts because as one battle is won and many more usually lost, there are still others on the horizon that make an engaged life fulfilling, that keep the fires of social change desire burning long into the night.

No South African threw themselves more passionately into so many global and local battles. But from where did the indomitable energy emerge?

In his youth, Brutus was radicalised in part by the denial of opportunities to play sports across Port Elizabeth’s neighbourhoods. He was restricted to competitions in the black townships, hence his first campaign was for athletic fairness. This was an entry point into revolutionary politics, initially with the Teachers League and then the Congress movement centred on Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress.

By 1968, Brutus had lobbied sixty Third World countries to boycott the Olympics if the white South African team participated, and thus defeated the notorious International Olympic Committee leader, Avery Brundage, a man who was pro-Berlin in the 1936 Nazi games, pro-Salisbury after Ian Smith took over in 1965, and very pro-Pretoria at the Mexico Games.

In the process, Brutus received deep battlefield scars, suffering bannings (both personal in 1961 and affecting most of his poetry until 1990), a 1963 police kidnapping in Maputo followed by a near-fatal shooting outside Anglo American’s central Johannesburg headquarters during an escape attempt, imprisonment and torture from 1963-66 at Johannesburg’s Fort Prison and on Cape Town’s Robben Island (he was next door to Mandela much of the time), and alienating times in exile from 1966-1991.

It was partly his infinite mischievousness that prevented exile from wearing Brutus down. Former Bureau of State Security agent Gordon Winter called him ‘one of the twenty most dangerous South African political figures overseas.’

He was extremely effective. At the 1971 Wimbledon tournament, Brutus disrupted a semi-final match played by Cliff Drysdale, winning acquittal for his deed from the House of Lords. Other pranks with a bite included the weed killer he and local students poured onto the rugby pitch to spell out ‘Oxford Rejects Apartheid’ just as a key match began, forcing cancellation. This followed a march of 18,000 Londoners against racist sport, which compelled the Springboks to cancel their 1970 tour.

Such fun never quite washed away the bitter taste of apartheid. The residue lingered long after, especially when a former sports-boycott opponent, Ali Bacher, won membership in the South African Sports Hall of Fame, because the cricket administrator ‘organised international rebel tours in the early 1980s.’

Brutus was on the verge of induction at the same December 2007 ceremony, but upon mounting the stage, he handed back the statue, announcing, ‘I cannot be party to an event where unapologetic racists are also honoured, or to join a Hall of Fame alongside those who flourished under racist sport. Their inclusion is a deception because of their unfair advantage, as so many talented black athletes were excluded from sport opportunities. Moreover, this Hall ignores the fact that some sportspersons and administrators defended, supported and legitimised apartheid.’

Such deep principle led Judge Irving Schwartz to declare, ‘There is no question that Professor Brutus has made himself hated by just about every [white] South African.’ Schwartz rebuffed Reagan Administration efforts to expel Brutus from the United States in 1983.

Those three decades in the US spent teaching at leading universities (Northwestern, Pittsburgh, Dartmouth, Swarthmore and others) gave Brutus opportunities for high-profile support to every crucial – even if frustrated – lefty struggle: Ending the unfair incarcerations of Philadelphia poet Mumia Abu Jamal, American Indian Movement leader Leonard Peltier and Guantanamo Bay prisoners, halting sweatshops, imposing Boycott Divestment Sanctions on Israel, building Burmese solidarity, opposing Washington’s militarism by following Thoreau’s lead and refusing to pay a portion of his taxes, and attempting to prosecute George Bush for war crimes.

Without much if anything to show for these efforts – aside from his role in the successful Navy-Vieques protest against weapons testing on the Puerto Rican island – what did Brutus do, then, upon returning to South Africa? In 1998, he and Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane inaugurated Jubilee South Africa to demand rejection of inherited apartheid debt, which Trevor Manuel’s finance ministry was dutifully repaying, and to then launch the World Bank Bonds Boycott, aimed at defunding Washington’s nerve centre of free market ideology.

Brutus and Soweto activist Trevor Ngwane initiated the latter campaign at the 16 April 2000 Washington protests against a Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting. At the world’s largest private pension fund, TIAA-CREF, Brutus then persuaded trustees to divest World Bank bond investments, just as he had twenty years earlier during the anti-apartheid struggle.

And three months before the infamous Battle of Seattle at the World Trade Organisation summit in November 1999, Brutus provided a major rally this accurate premonition: ‘We are going to set in motion a movement and a demand and a protest around the world which is going to say no to the WTO and it is going to start right here in Seattle!’ The WTO never recovered.

Indeed, as recently as last April, the IMF also looked down and out – losing major borrowers, operating in the red and retrenching a tenth of its economists – until Manuel spearheaded a US$750 billion bailout by the G20, infuriating Brutus. As Brutus put it in 2001, ‘Manuel seems to be in the pockets of the World Bank and IMF. He is doing their dirty work in South Africa and covering up for them by being the token African chair on their board. Legitimising the global corporate agenda they support. I believe this is criminal. As the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, we are facing a global economic divide as profound as the racial divide which separated South Africans. This is global apartheid.’

Other SA-based campaigning included leadership in protests numbering 10,000 against the UN’s World Conference Against Racism in 2001 – for failing to include Zionism and reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid on the agenda – and 30,000 against the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, because of the UN turn to water privatisation, carbon trading and similar market-environmental strategies.

Brutus was subsequently the highest-profile plaintiff in the lawsuit filed by Jubilee and the Khulumani Support Group for apartheid reparations, fighting not only three dozen corporations which made profits and interest in SA prior to 1994, but also the Mbeki regime which sided with the Bush regime and capital. Last October, Pretoria finally reversed that position, to Brutus’ satisfaction, and in a visit to his bedside two days before Brutus died, Ndungane reported progress in negotiations. A few months earlier, Brutus was cheered by news that under similar pressure, Shell Oil coughed up reparations in the Ken Saro-Wiwa case.

Over the past two years, Brutus led Durban demonstrations at the US Consulate against Washington’s Islamophobic travel ban on academic Adam Habib (founder of our Centre for Civil Society), against the Israeli ambassador’s visit and Durban port trade with Israel, and against forced removals associated with the 2010 World Cup. He was active in Zimbabwe and Tamil solidarity, and a variety of other local eco-social justice struggles.

Brutus was usually labelled ‘ultra-left’ by centre-leftists in the ruling party and Communist Party. ‘Dennis the Menace!’, roared Mbeki aide Essop Pahad in a 2002 statement to The Sowetan just before the big Johannesburg protest march: ‘We cannot not allow our modest achievements to be wrecked through anarchy. Opponents of democracy seek such destruction.’

The democratic destruction of Mbeki’s AIDS, macroeconomic and municipal privatisation policies was Brutus’ agenda. He was pleased that Treatment Action Campaign activists, trade unions and communists made impressive headway, kicking Mbeki out by mid-2008.

But it was his international vision that he is most remembered for, testifies Shalmali Guttal of Focus on the Global South: ‘He was always sensitive, inspiring and so supportive of even the smallest acts of resistance to imperialism, racism and exploitation that we felt powerful listening to him, and confident that we could change things.’

According to Nairobi-based Action Aid staffer Brian Kagoro, ‘He often reminded us that poverty was not a gift from God, or the result of some misfortune but rather the curse of a global political and economic system that rapes the environment, destroys humanity, shreds dignity, shatters freedom and shuns equality. We had the privilege of benefiting from his wisdom, candour and relentless humour in the several training sessions that he conducted for us on global justice issues. Comrade Dennis was as outstanding performing a one-man play of Karl Marx as he was penning out poetry on social justice.’

And as Noam Chomsky recounted last week, Brutus was ‘a great artist and intrepid warrior in the unending struggle for justice and freedom. He will long be remembered with honour, respect, and affection, and his life will be a permanent model for others to try to follow, as best they can.’

Then they will follow Brutus into myriad political battles, as in this 1978 self-effacing description:

‘I will be the world’s troubadour
if not my country’s
Knight-erranting
jousting up and down
with justice for my theme
weapons as I find them
and a world-wide scatter of foes

Being what I am
a compound of speech and thoughts and song
and girded by indignation
and accoutred with some undeniable scars
surely I may be
this cavalier?

Cavalier? A better characterisation is the title of another Brutus poetry collection – Stubborn Hope (1977).

Endurance is a passive quality,
transforms nothing, contests nothing
can change no state to something better
and is worthy of no high esteem;
and so it seems to me my own persistence
deserves, if not contempt, impatience.

Yet somewhere lingers the stubborn hope
thus to endure can be a kind of fight,
preserve some value, assert some faith
and even have a kind of worth.

Following a major event in Cape Town on 6 January , further memorials for Dennis Brutus will be held in San Francisco (8 January), Washington and Philadelphia (10 January), Port Elizabeth (14 January), Benin City (16 January), New York (17 January), as well as in Durban, Johannesburg, London, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Western Massachusetts (to be announced); for more information see Centre for Civil Society.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* A short version of this article was published in the Johannesburg Sunday Independent, 3 January 2010.
* Patrick Bond directs the UKZN Centre for Civil Society, and like thousands of US students during the 1980s, was politicised by Brutus.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Dennis Brutus: ‘An ironclad sense of solidarity’

(1924-2009)

Patrick Bond

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/obituary/61249

INSTITUTIONS

ANTI PRIVATISATION FORUM (Johannesburg): ‘Comrade Dennis was always on the side of the oppressed and remained true to his principles in fighting for an anti-capitalist South Africa and world. His pen and his voice were always a thorn in the side of the rich and powerful, whether here or abroad, and were constant reclaimers of our collective consciences and humanity. In the ten years since the formation of the APF, comrade Dennis was a regular source of solidarity, encouragement and lively debate. He never shirked from joining the fight against narrow nationalism, ethnic chauvinism and gender oppression and always had a word of affirmation for his fellow comrades.’

FREE BURMA CAMPAIGN SOUTH AFRICA (Johannesburg): ‘Comrade Dennis is always forefront of the powerless.’

COMAFRICA (Rio de Janeiro): ‘“A Luta continua!” Este slogan tão conhecido em nossa língua portuguesa e que se incorporou, no âmbito das lutas de libertação nacional, a várias línguas da África Austral, com a sua sonoridade do nosso vernáculo, bem caracteriza a obra de Dennis Brutus e sua vida, cuja divulgação nesta língua merece continuar.’

CRICKET SOUTH AFRICA (Johannesburg): ‘He was jailed and banned from public life in South Africa during this struggle, but this did not diminish his commitment to bring about non-racialism in sport and democracy for his nation.’

JERICHO NATIONAL AMNESTY MOVEMENT (New York): ‘Dennis was one of those former political prisoners who never once forgot what it was like to spend time behind bars, or the significance of working for the release of political prisoners world-wide. We must pay our respects to one who never left others to languish inside prison walls. His was a principled for freedom of all people. Free ‘em all.’

JOHN BROWN LIVES! (New York): ‘Brutus gave the keynote address for John Brown Day in May 2002 at the John Brown Farm State Historic Site, in the shadow of the twin ski jumps built on the outskirts of Lake Placid for the 1980 Winter Olympics. Brutus acknowledged the righteousness of Brown’s cause and saluted his courage in the struggle for freedom, though he did not support all of his methods in the struggle to end 19th-century chattel slavery.’

JUBILEE SOUTH (Buenos Aires): ‘Jubilee South is fortunate to have been able to drawn on Dennis’ multiple talents and commitments since our founding 10 years ago. He was a significant presence not just in the fight against apartheid debt, and for reparations, but in the struggle always against all forms of debt domination, ecological debt, climate debt, mining, water and privatisation debts – “AMANDLA!” he cried, “A LUTA CONTINUA!”

JUBILEE SOUTH AFRICA (Johannesburg): ‘Perhaps, the most prominent ideas upheld by Dennis belonged in the sphere of political economy. He was such a formidable critic of the role played by debt in the economics and human rights of the people of the world that he was one of the founders of Jubilee South Africa in 1998. He has been its most active patron ever since, joining the organisation in its strategising, campaigning, educational activities and action on the streets. He was also active in the international Jubilee movement and thought it was of prime import that the oppressed people of the world should find a rallying call for themselves in the World Social Forum. When he was already bed ridden, he expressed his strongly felt concerns at the capitalist system as an enemy of Mother Earth and that the great powers were organising a fraud in Copenhagen. He urged the organisations of the oppressed to put up such a counter pole to them in that conference as would recall the events of Seattle at the end of the last century. Without him, our movement is that much poorer. It is now the duty of those he has left behind to live up to the glorious example he has set.’

NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY (Port Elizabeth): ‘Professor Brutus never stopped in his quest for a humane society, and indeed became even more active in the post-apartheid period to campaign for social justice for the poor in South Africa as well as poor people across the planet as we are grappling with the negative effects of neo liberal globalisation. We have learnt immensely from his extraordinary life as a teacher, political activist and poet. NMMU is honoured to have been able to bestow a honorary doctorate on Professor Brutus in 2009, as a mark of our esteem for his distinguished record in service of democracy and human rights.’

NEW UNITY MOVEMENT (Port Elizabeth): ‘We salute his memory and dedicate ourselves anew to striving for the more humane, and just socialist order in which he so fervently believed.’

PATERSON SECONDARY SCHOOL (Port Elizabeth): ‘Paterson is proud to have played a role in his high school education and was blessed to have had him back some years later as educator. Brutus will forever be remembered in the history of Paterson High. He penned the lyrics of our school song and, together with his poetry, his legacy will live on.’

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (Pretoria): ‘[His] contribution to the struggle against apartheid and passion for social justice and human rights for all mankind has left an indelible mark in South Africa and the international community. As we celebrate his lifework as a South African poet and political activist let us remember that Brutus’s poetic license was first and foremost inspired by the quest for the restoration of human dignity and achievement of a better life for all.’

SOUTH AFRICA NON-RACIAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (Port Elizabeth): ‘The South African sport boycott owed much to his fierce commitment and relentless organising, from his founding of the Coordinating Committee for International Recognition in Sport (1955) to the South African Sports Association (1958) and its successor, the South African Nonracial Olympic Committee.’

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS INDABA – KZN (Durban): ‘The world will be a little less friendly, a little emptier but we know that he will live forever in the minds and hearts of those who knew him.’

SPLIT THIS ROCK POETRY FESTIVAL (Washington): ‘Split This Rock mourns the passing and celebrates the life of Brutus, who shared his prophetic vision with us as a featured poet at Split This Rock’s inaugural festival in March 2008.’

THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL (Durban): ‘We are deeply saddened by the loss of one of this university’s greatest figures, a poet whose work will be celebrated forever, and whose wisdom in so many campaigns for social justice will be sorely missed. A profoundly humane and sympathetic individual, full of love and caring for those around him, and for those who suffer anywhere and everywhere, he was a moral beacon at a time when so many have drifted from social and environmental awareness to pursue selfish ends.’

UKZN CENTRE FOR CREATIVE ARTS (Durban): ‘A true gentleman, frontline intellectual, grandmaster activist, great poet, and a very kind human being. The Centre for Creative Arts has been privileged to know Dennis personally and honoured to provide platforms for him within our Poetry Africa and Time of the Writer festivals where his conscientising articulations have inspired and motivated so many.’

WORCESTER STATE COLLEGE (Massachusetts): ‘Brutus was a beacon of hope for human rights. The entire campus community and lovers of freedom everywhere will miss his great spirit. We are so very fortunate to be the permanent home of his books, papers and journals.’

INDIVIDUALS

Tina Abreu: ‘Our best tribute will be to continue campaigns and fight for causes he believed in and illuminate others with his insights.’

Lionel Adriaan: ‘I was a pupil of Dennis at Paterson High School in the late 50s. I had the good fortune of playing table tennis with him. I also witnessed his skill in the field of jive during his leisure time and was often worried that he would break his thin legs. His favourite “swear” word often used for the difficult, troublesome and simply dumb pupils was MUGWUMP!’

Lawrence Africa: ‘I was in his English Class at Paterson High school in 1959 and 1960, and owe him much: “Now I understand what he tried to say to me, how he suffered for his sanity...”’

Biko Agozino: ‘He achieved a lot more in those final years than he could have achieved in exile, at least judging by all those honorary doctorates that our Baba Dolphin gathered, compared to the sterile chlorinated pool that he resisted being deported from when the wild sea was still ruled by apartheid sharks!’

Chadwick Allenbaugh: ‘A beacon in my memory with his enduring spirit, infectious laughter, unrelenting sharpness, his great appreciation for sport and chess, and humble service and true leadership for causes greater than one person, yet courage to stand… to act… to speak and prove one person can and did make a difference for many far beyond himself, his loves, his country.’

Isaac Otidi Amuke: ‘A name that to me meant resilience, you inspired many all over the world, you took the right position of the writer/poet in society, spoke the talk and walked the walk.’

Farouk Araie: ‘A political icon and legend. He was an Ajax defying the lightning of despotism and an ardent foe of racism. He also taught us not to be subservient at the cost of liberty. He was the intrepid vindicator of what he conceived to be the absolute rights of those whose cause he espoused.’

Graham Bailey: ‘Dennis would want us to celebrate his life by learning from and mimicking his leadership, indefatigable energy, and total commitment to the ongoing struggles.’

Azwell Banda: ‘I first met Dennis through his poetry, when I was in high school, in Zambia. He took pride of place among some of Africa’s greatest writers such as Cyprian Enkwensi, Elechi Amadi, Chinua Achebe, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Wole Soyinka, and so on.’

Nnimmo Bassey: ‘Dennis was such a huge inspiration. He lived his life to the full. Always at the forefront of the struggle. Never gave up hope!’

Walden Bello: ‘Dennis was a beacon to all of us. We will all sorely miss him.’

Alexander Billet: ‘Reading Brutus’ poetry tells you just about all you need to know. A man of deep compassion, an ironclad sense of solidarity, someone whose formidable way with words never managed to overshadow his love for humanity. Kind, upbeat and friendly, whose words and actions were firmly rooted in the belief that ordinary people can change the world.’

Dean Birkenkamp: ‘Dennis and his wife lived in Boulder for about two years during the 90s, when he was visiting professor at the University of Colorado. After a talk he gave at the Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, he said simply, “Can you run over with me to the Hill? We might be able to catch the last few minutes of the memorial for Allen Ginsberg.” After we entered the theatre, what I hadn’t expected was that he dart straight up to the stage and jump up on it, as the MC recognised him and announced that Dennis would now deliver the final poem and eulogy of the evening. Never a dull moment with Dennis! He surely was one of the most determined activists who ever graced the planet.’

Briggs Bomba: ‘He lived a full life and his works will continue to inspire our struggles. I am very thankful that we were able to video skype Dennis into Busboys and Poets for what was his last Washington DC performance.’

Ruy Braga: ‘Dennis will be remembered among us, Brazilian socialists, as a WONDERFUL comrade.’

Marcelle Brinkhuis-Abrahams: ‘Our signed first edition of Poetry and Protest will be treasured. The writings therein resonate profoundly.’

Lisa Brock: ‘He was the person who got me quickly involved in the struggle against apartheid in Chicago when I was a graduate student. I will never forget him.’

Horace Campbell: ‘The spirit of Brutus will live among all those who strive for peace and justice.’

Noel Cabangon: ‘How he fought for justice has inspired most of us and we shall never waver. He will remain in us in all our struggles.’

Fantu Cheru: ‘Dennis had for many years enriched our lives and kept us to our principles.’

Noam Chomsky: ‘It was with great sorrow that I learned of the passing of Dennis Brutus, a great artist and intrepid warrior in the unending struggle for justice and freedom. He will long be remembered with honour, respect, and affection, and his life will be a permanent model for others to try to follow, as best they can.’

Tony Clarke: ‘I will never forget that incredible evening several of us spent last May with Dennis at his bedside – reading poetry, swapping stories and sharing analysis – sprinkled with bursts of laughter into the wee hours of the morning.’

Barbara Levy Cohen: ‘I was a student at the University of Denver when he first came to the States and taught there. It was an honour to have been taught by Dennis and to know him and to stand alongside him for human rights.’

Robert Compton: ‘A true humanist with a heart of gold and a razor sharp mind.’

Dan Connell: ‘I am certainly glad to have travelled with him intermittently as we launched the hybrid humanitarian agency/solidarity committee project we named Grassroots International in 1983. Dennis’s contribution was the depth and breadth of his political vision and personal commitment, never separable, always inspiring. It was just so last year when he visited my class in African politics at Simmons College.’

Imani Countess: ‘On 18 September the New York-based War Resisters League awarded Brutus a Peace Award for his life-long advocacy. Despite failing health, Brutus was involved in a lawsuit against US oil and automotive corporations for reparations to victims of apartheid. In accepting the award, Brutus urged activists “to fight back, to save our planet…” I had the privilege of co-hosting that programme. I have long been inspired by Brutus’ work; his poetry is honest and moving.’

Demba Moussa Dembele: ‘The passing of Brutus is an immense loss to the international social movement and especially to the progressive African movement. He was a model of modesty and simplicity, like all great men or women.’

Sarah Dionne: ‘I am a former student from the University of Ottawa. I really loved his poetry, and will now treasure my copy of Poetry and Protest even more.’

Desmond D’Sa: ‘A giant amongst men, a principled man, a fighter for the poor, a soldier for the oppressed, a father to us all. Hamba kahle.’

Stuart Easterling: ‘Dennis came, more than once, to the meetings of the Palestine solidarity organisation at the University of Pittsburgh. At the end of these kinds of meetings, as activists know, everyone takes a handful of posters for the next meeting from the pile. Dennis would of course do the same. Except I also remember seeing Dennis, more than once, painstakingly putting them up around campus. At the Boston Social Forum, at a massive plenary session, a fellow African, upon realising Dennis was there, was clearly overcome with excitement and was ushering him up to the platform. Dennis spoke about the conditions in the “new” South Africa. He spoke of the history of struggle in that country, and how so many people’s hopes had been dashed. And at the end of his brief remarks, he simply began repeating: “We Will March Again. We Will March AGAIN. We WILL March AGAIN. We Will MARCH AGAIN. WE .. Will March .. AGAIN.” He repeated those simple words, beautifully, as a poet, and as an agitator. The air in the room was absolutely electric. I don’t remember how long he did this. But I will never forget it.’

Comrade Fatso (Samm Farai Monro): ‘My heart is sore for the loss of an amazing comrade. He lived a long life and left a powerful legacy of struggle and poetry. Our show last night was dedicated to him. Much respect to a great man.’

Bill Fletcher: ‘Perseverance, dedication and eloquence made him not only a hero for the South African freedom struggle, but for all those who struggle for social justice.’

Sandy Gauntlett: ‘From someone who was very active in the Halt All Racist Tours campaigns here and especially in the 1981 Springbok Tour campaign, let me express my deep sorrow. People like Dennis were an inspiration for so many people to fight back around the world that it is impossible to truly judge the impacts of their lives. Kia Kaha (be strong).’

Lars Gausdal: ‘Personally, I had the honour of attending some of his lectures last year in Durban. His engagement and commitment over the years has and will serve as motivation for a activist-rookie as myself.’

Jakes Gerwel: ‘His contribution to the struggle against apartheid and his efforts to bring about social justice in the world are appreciated and will be remembered for many years to come.’

Amy Goodman: ‘His life encapsulated the 20th century, and even up until his final days, he inspired, guided and rallied people toward the fight for justice in the 21st century. Many young activists know Brutus not for his anti-apartheid work but as a campaigner for global justice, ever present at mass mobilisations against the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – and, most recently, although not present, giving inspiration to the protesters at the UN climate summit in Copenhagen. He said, on his 85th birthday, days before the climate talks were to commence: “We are in serious difficulty all over the planet. We are going to say to the world: There’s too much of profit, too much of greed, too much of suffering by the poor. ... The people of the planet must be in action.”’

Selim Gool: ‘After teaching in PE Dennis came to Cape Town/Western Cape and met “the intellectuals” of the NEUM/anti-CAD fraternity and became a left-wing socialist, left them and joined the ANC (“Alliance”) of Stalino-Nationalists and then fought with them later for their horrible lies and corruption, stealing of state monies and ARMS DEAL spending etc, and later, fought for a Good Leftist Socialist Programme, so let us NOT forget this comrades!’

Nadine Gordimer: ‘A freedom fighter who never thought it necessary to give up being an intellectual, but combined both.’

Sandile Gumede: ‘Remember when him and CCS Staff were demonstrating outside US Embassy, Durban, against Professor Adam Habib’s refused entry to the US. I couldn’t believe there’s a person who puts his life in line for another being.’

Vineeta Gupta: ‘Dennis always seemed so timeless that news of his passing away almost sounds like a false rumour.’

Shalmali Guttal: ‘He was always sensitive, inspiring and so supportive of even the smallest acts of resistance to imperialism, racism and exploitation that we felt powerful listening to him, and confident that we could change things. His own political history was/is already proof of that.’

Susan Gzesh: ‘I was Brutus’ lawyer in 1983 when we began his ultimately successful bid for political asylum. Due to the Reagan administration’s good relations with the South African apartheid regime, they did not want Brutus, a capable opponent of apartheid, staying in the US to embarrass them – particularly if he was staying because the US granted him asylum and, by implication, stated that the South African regime persecuted its opponents. Brutus won his case for asylum because the anti-apartheid movement was able to create a political climate in which it would have been impossible for the US government to deny that Brutus would have been persecuted had he been returned to South Africa. The asylum case provided a vehicle for activism and public education on apartheid – with Brutus as its poetic, brilliant centre.’

Kate Heney: ‘It was a pleasure and an honour to have met this brave and brilliant man during our studies in May at the CCS.’

Michael Friedman: ‘Dennis was a truly consistent fighter for equality in South Africa.’

Doug Henwood: ‘Aside from his great political work, I was always moved by what a warm and good human being he was.’

Larry Hildes: ‘A wonderful poet, amazing organiser, and a great human being. I first met Dennis at Northwestern back in 1984 when the anti-Apartheid struggle in the US began to pick up steam. During the many weeks we occupied the plaza of the Administration Building trying to force the university to withdraw its investments from companies doing business in Apartheid South Africa. Dennis, who was the in the English Department would come out after his classes were over for the day, and talk about his struggle and the struggle overall, and read poetry as the sun went down.’

Joseph Hutchison: ‘A short, compact, self-contained man with grey Einsteinian hair, he read poems about systemic and individual brutality in a quiet voice that only made the horrors more vivid. He also read tender love poems and aphoristic, philosophical verses, poems of exile and celebration – all burning in the shadow of his vast sadness.’

Monika Idehen: ‘I had the great privilege of knowing him and the pleasure to hear him call me a friend.’

Brian Kagoro: ‘Brutus’ life journey was incredible, his contribution to humanity and global justice is only matched by a handful of living legends. He often reminded us that poverty was not a gift from God, or the result of some misfortune but rather the curse of a global political and economic system that rapes the environment, destroys humanity, shreds dignity, shatters freedom and shuns equality. We in Action Aid International had the privilege of benefiting from his wisdom, candour and relentless humour in the several training sessions that he conducted for us on global justice issues. Comrade Dennis was as outstanding performing a one-man play of Karl Marx as he was penning out poetry on social justice. Hamba Kahle Qhawe le Africa!’

Deniz Kellecioglu: ‘Millions of people inspired by his words and person. Much respect.’

Michael Kohn: ‘A pivotal figure in the anti-Apartheid movement. He was a critical thinker who forged a strategy on how to bring the horror of Apartheid to world attention. Everywhere he went and lectured, he sparked a divestiture movement, often forcing colleges to divest their endowments from companies doing business in or with South Africa.

Brutus’ work did not go unnoticed by the South African government, who listed him in a secret memo as one of the most dangerous people to the Apartheid regime. Shortly after the Reagan administration began, Brutus found himself facing deportation. In the spring of 1982 we organized a sell-out Pete Seeger benefit concert at Northeastern University, raising funds for his legal defence and mobilising thousands of people for his support.

Along with Chicago’s Northwestern University community, we led a letter-writing campaign producing over 50,000 personal letters of protest delivered to the INS hearing judge and to the State Department. The Senate passed a resolution offering Brutus US citizenship. Brutus turned away the offer: ‘I am in involuntary exile. It would be a compromise for me to take permanent residence anywhere until I can go home.’ Instead, he put the Apartheid regime on trial and was granted political asylum. Stephen and I remained in close touch and often collaborated with Dennis who, in 1988, signed became a founding board member of the National Whistleblower Center. He remained on our board until his death. Dennis understood the power of whistleblowers and the importance of protecting them. One of his dreams was to spread whistleblower protections throughout the world, especially to his native South Africa.’

David P. Kramer: ‘May the very full life that he lived continue to inspire you in all that you do.’

Grace Kwinjeh: ‘I shall always remember your comfort and inspiration in UKZN during my time of despair, recovery, no greater mentor than you.’

James Kilgore: ‘He showed us there was an alternative to aging gracefully or with bitterness. He aged with fire!! What a spirit and inspiration – a militant for all ages.’

Richard Lapchick: ‘Brutus came to the United States 40 years ago as a visiting poet at the University of Denver, where I was a graduate student focusing on international race relations. I met him at a Friday evening reception held for him by George Shepherd, my dissertation chairman. My two main passions were sports and fighting racism, but before meeting Brutus, I had not seen a way to combine the two. I went home and wrote a new proposal to study the effects of apartheid in sport in South Africa and the international response. I did not sleep for two days. My original dissertation proposal on the racial factor in American foreign policy took six months to write and get approved. This one took three days to write and was approved that week by my committee, which eventually included Brutus.’

Christopher Lee: ‘My favorite poem of his is “Sharpeville.” I use it for teaching often and have a copy permanently posted on my office door.’

Llewellyn Leonard: ‘I had the honour of personally meeting and speaking to him in 2007 during my time as visiting scholar at the Centre for Civil Society. Professor Brutus was an inspiration to all those around him, especially the youth, which he inspired through his prolific speeches for action against corporations, government and other forms of domination. I clearly recall the talks he gave to students at UKZN in 2007 to support workers striking at the institution against poor working conditions, against increases in student fees, including against bureaucratic management at the university. I could see that his ability to mobilise people for action arose from his personal experience, guiding us as fatherly figure in that same fortitude.’

Mariette Liefferink: ‘Brutus was held in the highest esteem by all who knew him.’

Monica Martins: ‘My condolences in the name of those who make the Nationalities Watch research group and World Tensions journal.’

Emmanuel Massawe: ‘I read one of his poems in my high school studies in Tanzania. I met him in South Africa in 2007. We talked and I shared with him the insights I got from his poem. He was very friendly, talkative and approachable.’

Fatima Meer: ‘I admired Dennis all my life and at this moment my mind goes back to his energetic involvement at the Northwestern University where I had the supreme honour of running behind him as he sped up and down the el to meet his extramural class, which he was holding downtown at the end of a full university day. Dennis was a fearless fighter against oppression, against tyrants who sought to exploit and destroy the poor and the powerless, and those who sought to profit from the labour of the people.’

Matt Meyer: ‘Dennis and I worked closely together when he was named president of the Vieques Tribunal (roughly ten years ago). An international Gandhian conference in India at the end of January will surely raise Dennis’ name, words, and poetry. Truly in every corner of our fragile but resilient earth, Dennis will be celebrated and remembered, as his legacy will continue to inspire millions.’

Sammie Moshenberg: ‘Hamba Kahle – your gentle soul and strong leadership shall be missed.’

Rethabile Mosile: ‘Poems he wrote while in prison on Robben Island are mainly why I write poetry.’

Rogate Mshana: ‘We mourn for this giant of justice, a man who gave all his life for the marginalised and the downtrodden.’

Branny Mthelebofu: ‘My wish is to see his name honoured in the world, that is the reason I was so close to him through film-making. I have learned many things from him and will share his knowledge with the rest of the world.’

Mojalefa Murphy: ‘Having been sentenced to serve time on Robben Island, he had a criminal record that disqualified him to enter Canada, a prohibition that somehow did not apply to former President Nelson Mandela and others! The liberal politicians in our constituency had then suggested that he obtain a letter of recommendation from Mandela and present it to the nearest Canadian embassy in the US. When I related this suggestion to Dennis on the telephone, he laughed and explained that he would find it very difficult to reconcile his political position in respect of the post-1990 neoliberal South Africa and a possibly humiliating request for support from one of its principal architects to deliver a strong message of opposition!’

Mshai Mwangola: ‘I first fell in love with his writing when a school kid, and decades later, when I did get the chance to meet him, was relieved to not to be disillusioned. Even then, he was all fired about coming to Nairobi for the World Social Forum, less interested in resting on all laurels than in fighting the new battles.’

Jayaram Nair: ‘An extremely disciplined human being and was not influenced by greed like many from the liberation movement. He stood his ground and was never ashamed to say his piece when it mattered. There are few from the struggle that can take credit like Dennis.’

Ilse Schreiber Noll: ‘I will miss him. We had collaborated on several artist books over the years and I admired Dennis for his generosity and kindness and strong ideas.’

Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe Junior: ‘Brutus was a poet of unbested refinement and the most delicate of aesthetic sensibilities among Africa’s major poets of the twentieth century. I once sat right beside him at a conference in Philadelphia when, within the fleeting moment of ten minutes, Brutus penned and edited a poem and handed it over to me and another attendee, seated to his left, to peruse, while proceedings were at full-throttle. As a person, the renowned sonneteer was soft-spoken, reflective and uncharacteristically reticent for a formidable anti-Apartheid firebrand.’

Yunus Omar: ‘We are reminded of the immensely powerful public stance taken by Brutus on the occasion of his intended induction into the SA Sports Hall of Fame. Hopefully the call made by Brutus on this, and other occasions, will be actualised, i.e. to convene fora (in the arena of sport, et al) that will lay bare the injustices of the past as they continue to be re-articulated in extraordinary ways in the present.

Jowi James Otieno: ‘He helped shape our understanding and appreciation of poetry and especially its role in the quest for justice for the downtrodden.’

Shailja Patel: ‘I was moved and honoured that Dennis always took the time to respond to emails, to mentor and support my work. The experiences of Dennis that I will hold and carry forward:

- His generosity of spirit and largeness of heart. Expressed constantly in his encouragement of, and genuine interest in, younger poets
- His unquenchable energy. He could – and frequently did – out-toyi-toyi activists 50 years younger than him :-)
- His tenacity and discipline of purpose. He showed up, year after year, decade upon decade, in the face of every setback, betrayal and defeat. He never, ever gave up on his vision of justice. Safiri salama, Dennis. Tutatambuana.’

Colin Penter: ‘There are some people whose lives inspire the rest of us to never lose our voice on social justice and human rights.’

Heather Petros: ‘Ustawi organisation, started by myself and other African women, invited him to Seattle several times. I was very fortunate to know him as a friend, father in struggle. Personally I feel Africa just lost its voice.’

John Pilger: ‘I was so honoured to meet Dennis last year, finally. He was a giant of a human being who changed the world in so many ways. His tenacious humanity inspired so many to go on and not let the bastards win in the long run. I salute you, Dennis!’

Daniel Pink: ‘The person who gently urged me to apply what I’d learned in class to endeavours outside of poetry, was my professor – an extraordinary poet. Brutus cut an imposing figure in the seminar room. He had a rich voice, a sprawling beard, and a thick mane of hair. A stature that I’d never encountered, as well as a certain ethereal quality.’

Peter Rachleff: ‘I was tickled to imagine him performing Marx himself in several stagings of Howard Zinn’s “Marx in Soho.” Who, I wondered, could be more appropriate, could embody the old radical better than this old radical? I thought of Dennis’ hair and beard as having waited decades to be ready for this role. No need for make-up! Dennis’ sweetness just filled whatever room he was in.’

Vinod Raina: ‘His solidarity in defence of justice anywhere in the world was spontaneous, and infectious; his sense of compassion immense. The best tribute to him, of course, would be to celebrate his life by doing more vigorously what he did best – resist all forms of injustice and stand up for the downtrodden.’

Eva Range: ‘During the time I spent at the CCS, Dennis embodied so much the spirit of the CCS, he was its mentor.’

Marcus Rediker: ‘A world-wide mover and shaker. You could never be sure at any given moment which continent Dennis was on, what particular cause of justice he was taking up.’

Paul Saoke: ‘A son of the world and very famous here in Kenya through his books.’

Berend Schuitema: ‘With Dennis around we always felt the immediacy of the struggle and the certain belief that not only is our other world possible, but already in the making and arriving sooner than we may think. Dennis you are more than an icon – you have become larger than life and we will always be proud of you!’

Laurence Shoup: ‘I have always admired Dennis, and was fortunate enough to know him briefly when I was a graduate student at Northwestern University in the early 1970s, we protested the war together, among other things.’

Khadija Sharife: Dennis’s thoughts will always be one of those whose footsteps dance across the landscape of my mind; poetry and life in motion, because he could, with the fire and dignity that characterised him even as confronted the dementors, head on. Always head on (we drove them away, he would say, clenching his fist). And because I lived up the road, and was quiet enough (at the right times) and noisy enough (when the silence became shadows), he opened the door at all hours, of his memories, his past, his hopes, and my own, and I who had spent too many hours sitting on the curb, watching life go by car length by car length, was let in (we already know each other, he’d said). Now his is the voice of all the poets, Auden and Yeats and Okri ...and Brutus.’

Ari Sitas: ‘My generation grew up with Letters to Martha, matured to play soccer in bad conscience and will continue making it hard for empire until it vanishes.’

Issa Shivji: ‘Dennis has left a rich heritage – immeasurable contribution – unwavering commitment – fighting to the last – and enjoying it – a man of the era of liberation.’

Charlene Smith: ‘I appreciated the way you embraced us all as friends and would give gifts of poetry, but most of all how you embraced every aspect of life and truly loved.’

Lamont B. Steptoe: ‘I am deeply grateful that I knew and worked with him for as long as I did. His legacy is a brilliant crystal struck by the sun, blinding in its glare.’

Debra Stoleroff: ‘I met Dennis in 2004 when he spoke at a peace and justice/anti-war conference here in Vermont. After the conference he continued to write and support the work I do. His efforts were greatly appreciated.’

Yash Tandon: ‘He has left behind a good, humane legacy and a challenge to us all.’

Neil Tangri: ‘Condolences to us all on the death of one of our leading lights. I hope he saw us through the worst of times.’

Ernestine Tewah: ‘He will fondly be remembered always.’

Alice Thomson: ‘We will mourn the loss of this wonderful soul and celebrate the gift of his life.’

Simon Wachira: ‘The world is one sage poorer.’

Archbishop Desmond Tutu: ‘When we needed the support of the international community to end the vicious system of racial oppression called apartheid, we had to have eloquent advocates to tell the world our story and persuade it to come to our assistance. We had none more articulate than Brutus, our wonderful poet-campaigner. We owe him an immense debt of gratitude.’

Shannon Walsh: ‘The humility and huge heart with which he moved through the world touched so many people, and will continue to remind us that we can really change the world. We will not disappoint his memory.’

Peter Waterman: ‘Dennis provides us with an exceptional model – the social movement activist who does not “take power” (i.e. is not taken by power) once the revolution “succeeds” but who continues to build power from outside and below.’

David van Wyk: ‘Brutus has passed and left an indelible mark on our national consciousness.’

Vincent Zepp: ‘Dennis made all of us feel like we were his best friend and the time spent with him was always a gift comprised of wisdom and laugher. We’ll not see another like him.’

Dave Zirin: ‘I had the privilege to interview Brutus extensively three years ago about why he came to see sports as an arena to fight for justice. His answer was, “I have come to learn.” Typical Dennis: Refusing to be anything less than blunt and provocative. I asked him whether he agreed with me that sports could still be a lever to change the world. Instead of cheerleading the notion, he said to me, “My own sense is that sports has less capacity now to change society then it had before. For instance, the degree that sports has become commercialised. The degree that your loyalty is no longer to a club like it used to be because guys are bought and sold like so many slaves…The other thing that really scares me is the way that sport is used to divert people’s attention. Critical political issues in their own lives. Their living conditions. The Romans used to say this is the way to run an empire. Give them bread, give them circuses. Now they don’t even give you bread and the circuses are lousy…” As people are criminalised in Vancouver to make way for the 2010 Olympics, as the poor are dispossessed in the name of the 2010 World Cup, we should proudly claim Dennis’s well-worn place at the march, never allowing those in power the comfort of indifference.’

MEDIA:

Associated Press: ‘A distinctive figure in old age with his flowing white hair and beard, engaged in protests against world financial organisations and in calls for action against global warming.’

Daily Nation (Nairobi): ‘An outstanding capacity to trigger virtually every sensory impulse. His poetry was marked by brevity; often dense but always full of sentimental emotion surprising us by linking things we have never experienced with everyday feelings such as fear, anger, mirth, love.’

Financial Times: ‘Few poets, through both words and action, can have achieved in their lifetimes the political impact of Dennis Brutus. Indisputably among Africa’s leading poets.’

Independent (London): ‘With his trademark long white hair and beard, he was a relentless campaigner on climate and apartheid reparations, even as he battled prostate cancer.’

Morning Star: ‘His family said Brutus lived his life in the service of justice, peace, freedom and protecting the planet. “He remained positive about the future, believing that popular movements will achieve their aims.” It is with this sense of optimism that he will be best remembered.’

New York Times: ‘Brutus was an outspoken critic of South Africa’s embrace of capitalism and remained deeply sceptical about racial attitudes long after apartheid had dissolved.’

Progressive: ‘An imposing figure, with a rich and distinctive voice, who bore the scars of apartheid nobly. Thank you, Dennis Brutus, for fighting the good fight, and for underscoring the triumph of tenderness.’

Sunday Independent: ‘Most followers will find his legacy of politico-literary contributions reason to adopt the title of another Brutus poetry collection: Stubborn Hope.’

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Patrick Bond is Director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

They were giants too

Marion Grammer

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/61260

While I appreciate that not every South African intellectual can be mentioned in your ultimate paragraph ‘The South African Intellectual Tradition’, I am still surprised that you make not a single mention of the many so-called ‘coloured’ and Indian intellectuals who were so prominent during the Apartheid years, though sadly less so in the current post-Apartheid period.

One giant who immediately springs to mind is Richard Dudley, the great educator, who passed away this year. Others were and are Ben Kies, Goolam Gool, Helen Kies, Victor Wessels and Hosea Jaffe, to name but a few.

These people made enormous contributions to the intellectual life of many, especially amongst the youth. They shone light during a period of stultifying darkness and through their untiring efforts were subjected to banning orders, detentions and other forms of harassment.

It is telling and disturbing that in the rewriting of recent South African history, hardly any mention is made of these people and the movements they started and contributed to. They were truly intellectuals of the highest order.

Celebrity intellectuals and social movements

Ann Eveleth

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/61261

Good work Leslie! I look forward to reading the book when it becomes available here. Since returning to the belly of the beast recently after 14 years in SA, and especially after my experiences with the misadventures of certain intellectuals in the social movements there, I have been struggling to imagine how our generation can ever actually change anything, given the predominance of so many ‘celebrity intellectuals’, etc among the so-called ‘new’ social movements of our era.

It has often seemed to me that so much of the debate around the 'role of the intellectual' in SA, while stepping off from a correct concern around the 'anti-intellectualism' of many leading political actors and institutions (including the media), tends to dissolve into a highly self-referential project that ends up negating what is most valuable about the true intellectual, in the sense that Said refers to it. I think there is a huge crossover too between most of the 'celebrity intellectuals' and 'commercial intellectuals', and perhaps many more combinations of ways that the various charlatans pervert the role of intellectuals.

For me, the lack of engagement with some of Cabral's work, especially the question of 'class suicide', lies at the heart of the problem. There is much more to say about the issues raised by this excerpt, but for now I will just express my gratitude at this new contribution to what has become an often tired debate in the SA context.

Considering these questions at this time from a different location, I often wonder if SA is not in danger of losing its political discourse to an Amerikkkan-style 'spectacle of the commentator'.

Migration is not a bilateral issue

Ronald Bruce St John

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/61259

Emanuela Paoletti has done a thorough job of dissecting a long-standing and complex issue, highlighting both its genesis and impact. She rightly notes that the issue is not only a bilateral one between Italy and Libya but also multilateral in impact in that it affects numerous Saharan, Sahelian, and African states. In so doing, she notes the full extent to which the migrant issue has been used by both Italy and Libya to advance other foreign and domestic issues. In particular, she emphasises that Gaddafi's treatment of it puts at risk his ambitions to lead a United States of Africa.

How to enjoy 'Tropical Fish'

Why I love Doreen Baingana

Chielo Zona Eze

2010-01-06

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/61245

Every once in a while you read a book that opens a whole new world to you. Or, it confirms, in a very subtle manner, some ideas that want to take shape in your mind. Such a book never allows you to rest; it literally comes to roost in your head at the most unsuspecting times. One such book is Doreen Baingana’s collection of short stories, 'Tropical Fish: Stories out of Entebbe'.[1]

I stumbled upon the book by chance when I was designing a course for my undergraduate class in post-colonial African literature. I remember taking it up, ignoring the hype in the blurb and then flipping through the pages. Captivated by the brilliant titles of the stories, I sat down and read one of them in a swoop, 'Green Stones'. I was blown away by the surefootedness of the writing and the narrator’s control of the world she shares. So, it became one of the required books for the course. And what luck I had.

What I observed about the writing was just one of the many virtues in the collection which some of my students (what a smart bunch they are) also observed. It was one of my most enjoyable classes so far. The stories in 'Tropical Fish' practically taught themselves, by which I mean that I didn’t have to explain much. I didn’t even have to try the time-tested Socratic Method with the goal of goading students to ideas in the book. The students came to class armed with questions and interpretations and ideas and, ach, please read this book.

And me? Why do I love this book so much? It solidly confirmed what I have always known about Africa, and provided me with new vistas for understanding my continent and its peoples and cultures: Africa is complex, and so are Africans. This shouldn’t be news, for human beings everywhere are; every individual is a web of infinite possibilities that can never be mastered. She is a work in process.

Doreen Baingana’s 'Tropical Fish' is a collection of loosely connected stories in which Christine is either the protagonist or at least a major character. Baingana, I think, undertakes a radical redefinition of identity in the age of global capitalism; she understands that the African post-colonial world goes beyond, in fact ignores, the gaze of the empire, and unhinges African identities from their autochthonous underpinnings.

Now to some of the stories in detail. In 'Tropical Fish', the story that lends the collection its title, Christine is a naïve but inquisitive college girl. She meets and falls for Peter, an English expatriate, who exports rare Ugandan tropical fishes. Their liaison comes to a seemingly inevitable end when Christine becomes pregnant and aborts the child without telling Peter before doing so. Not that Peter feels offended. Quite the opposite; he does not even register the abortion as an event. The complex web of Christine’s attraction to Peter is illuminated by an understanding of her life and desires. Christine sees herself as trapped in her native culture; a culture in which women are sold into arranged marriages. Even with her degrees, she laments she would be 'worth exotic cows'. In contrast to a life marked by 'eating roasted maize for lunch; getting debts and kids', Christine enjoys for the moment 'bubble bath', the 'lovely warm green froth that was a caress all over.'

It might be a bit disturbing that Christine appears insensitive to the very fact that she is liaising with one who is intent on robbing her people blind; she has given away herself to the white man, who is there specifically to exploit and deplete the country of its precious tropical fishes. The old colonial paradigm of white colonisers and African co-conspirators is touched upon.

What amazes me here is that Christine does not claim to be a victim here. Rather, she is part of the exploitation machinery that has taken hold of her country. She is aware of her having lost her innocence. It is true that Christine regrets having her 'legs spread open before kind men poking things' into her. She realises, however, that it is a conscious decision on her side: 'I let them.' She rebuffs self-pity. It even appears liberating that she loses her innocence here. Her loss of innocence is representative not only of Africa’s loss of innocence in history, and her participation in the ongoing exploitation of the continent by outsiders. It is however remarkable that, rather than play the victim, Christine courageously bears the consequences of her decisions because she has acknowledged her agency in all of the happenings around her. This, perhaps, seems more important to her as a morally conscious member of her society. The awareness that she is not merely an innocent bystander in the corruption of her society is, to me, the beginning of a deep moral awareness. She rejects the cloak of victimhood with the knowledge that there is no other way to usher in a new era of responsibility. It is like the Catholic mea culpa.

As if obeying the Abegyenda proverb – 'Those who travel, see' – Christine finds herself in Los Angeles ('Lost in Los Angeles'). She makes an interesting encounter in the city. In a café, during an open-mic poetry reading, she meets a young woman, Lightfeather, who claims to be Native American and who takes an instant liking for Christine because of her being African, black, in America. Christine is suspicious of Lightfeather and her moral persuasion. Her suspicion becomes explicit as Lightfeather’s refrain about victimhood and oppression peaks in her claiming ownership of America: 'This is my people’s land, you know', she says. Christine does not let it go unchallenged: 'Mine too', she says.

We are forced to rethink our conventional understanding of the world when a Ugandan immigrant challenges a putative Native American’s claim of ownership of America. But the challenge is not hollow. Rather, it calls for a closer consideration of the obvious moral or cultural tendencies, namely, Lightfeather’s attempt to weave solidarity based on victimhood.

Christine in a way challenges Lightfeather and us to construct our solidarity on something that is the universal, raw humanity of the other, and not because he or she belongs to my group. Perhaps no portion of Baingana’s text expresses this as clearly as the last couple of paragraphs in 'Questions of Home' – the last of the stories in the collection – do. Christine goes back to Uganda. Initially she observes Uganda nearly in the same way a tourist would, with apprehension. But even while many things appear strange to her she calmly resolves to carve out a home and to make meaning out of the strange old world, knowing that it is not going to be easy. She knows she has to conquer this strange world with the same moral arsenal that helped her survive in Los Angeles. Beautiful!

The first sentence of the last paragraph – 'the dark was closing in' – indeed reflects Christine’s initial doubt. She is not happy with her condition and she 'could hardly see now as the last blood-red streaks across the sky turned indigo'. Given this condition – darkness closing in, and the fact that she can hardly see – her 'deep sigh' becomes more than significant. It is a sigh of acquiescence. At the same time, it is also a sigh signalling a readiness to dig deep within her. The metaphor of her digging 'deep down into this mud with her bare hands until she couldn’t remove it from her fingernails' entails some positives. Digging one’s hand into mud is a call to become human, hence one is consciously reaching to the humus. It is while tilling and cultivating the soil that Christine can mould it the way she wants. And tilling it at first suggests becoming one with it by merging with it 'like day had smoothly become its opposite, night'.

In Christine, tilling the soil replaces being sprung from it (autochthony); it places emphasis on doing rather than on being. Beyond this, however, it is important to highlight the philosophical weight of the greyness of the moment in which day becomes night or night becomes day. It is in this uncertainty that the binaries between the different worlds Christine has experienced are erased. In fact, she had long realised that different worlds have already begun to merge into one another. She notes that the locals themselves have created new words from English ones. 'The word she had heard the whole day were like that too: Queenzi, Leeke, cente', adaptations of the English words queen, lake and cent.

They signal the birth of a new world resulting from the contamination and mixing of different worlds. Thus Christine’s condition is like a new 'language formed by old ones running underneath and over one another. An ever-changing in-between.' The in-between state of modern reality is nothing more than what Kwame Anthony Appiah identifies as contamination, an absence of purity. What is in-between, of course, lacks categorical definitions or pigeonhole. The in-between sees the world as becoming.

I love writers who do things with their stories. Baingana is one of them; she understands that no story is innocent. She is a clever wizard who conjures a world of possibilities in the reader’s mind with her deft manipulation of words and images. In so doing, she midwifes a discourse that seeks to broaden the African worldview, a discourse that places greater emphasis on global solidarity.

Oh, did I remember to say that I am ready to make her the queen of my village in Nigeria? Oh yes, she is. A Queenzi Africana.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Doreen Baingana's 'Tropical Fish: Stories out of Entebbe' (2003) is published by Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
* Chielo Zona Eze teaches English and anglophone African literature at Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago. His blog can be found at africanliteraturenews.blogspot.com.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES
[1] Doreen Baingana, 'Tropical Fish: Stories Out of Entebbe', Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003

Nigeria in the eye of the storm

Dibussi Tande

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/blog/61262

The new year began with a lots of hand wringing, soul searching and even outright anger in the African blogosphere over Umar Farouk Abdul-Mutallab’s Christmas day attempt to bomb a Delta/Northwest Airline over Detroit, and the subsequent inclusion of Nigeria on the US terrorist watch list along with 13 other countries.

Heal Nigeria takes a contrarian view to argue that Nigeria the US has legitimate reasons for placing Nigeria on the watch list:

'From the public perspective, it seems that 150 million people have now been ‘criminalised’ because of the nefarious act of a single individual. However, for anyone to think that US govt reaction was just because of Umar AbdulMutallab’s terrorist expedition smacks of naiveté.

'It is common knowledge that religious extremism has been on the sharp rise in Nigeria. We all know of the famous Boko Haram killings. Also, just two days after the US terrorist attempt, hundreds of lives were lost in Bauchi State to religious riots (Kalo Kato). The nation also witnessed incessant bombing of oil pipelines in the Niger Delta. The combination of religious extremism in the North and armed militancy in the Niger Delta underlines the failure of our national security…

'It is convenient for our leaders to say Umar’s action was an isolated case, and not representative of behaviour of 150 million Nigerians. But there is no doubt that the US govt will be deeply concerned about the failure of the Nigerian govt in dealing with the local religious extremism. Who knows if the Boko Harams are actually al-Qaeda sympathisers? Who knows if some of the extremist organisations in Nigeria are affiliated to the al-Qaeda or Hezebollah of this world? It’s been alleged that some of the Niger Delta” militants were trained in Libya (!).'

Politics Africa shares the view that religious extremism in Nigeria is at the root of the current crisis:

'Successive Nigerian governments have closed their eyes to radicalization and fundamentalism all over the country from both Christianity and Islam to the detriment of the nation.

'Perverse interpretations of these religions have seeped into the minds of our people and now we see the crystallized result in the form of Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab…

'It is time that our leaders pay attention to the radicalization of religion in all parts of our country and build an impenetrable wall wholly separating Church, Mosque, and State.

'It is high time we address the “money making organizations” in the South who rather than preach the true gospel, aid and abet corruption by receiving donations from openly corrupt public officials…

'When are we going to have brave Northern leaders who realize that “one nation bound in freedom” has no place for a separate Sharia Law especially since Chapter I, Part II, Section 10 of Nigeria’s constitution clearly prohibits the adoption of any religion as a state religion.

'How many innocent men, women and children must be killed before known extreme clerics are curtailed so as not to produce more Umar Abdul Mutallabs who shame Nigeria?'

In Notes from Atlanta Farooq A. Kperogi writes about the 'anxiety and unease that Nigerians in the diaspora now feel' after the failed bombing attempt:

'Now, because of the isolated, misguided action of one crazed, fanatical, spoiled brat who has spent more time outside Nigeria than he spent in it, all Nigerians are labeled potential terrorists - at least for now. So no longer will the perception of me as an “African” or “Nigerian” Muslim conjure notions of tolerant, non-violent Islam. In my own case, I share the same first name with the would-be terrorist. My luck can’t get any tougher than this.

'I started feeling the pangs of this ill-luck rather early. My American friend who invited me to his home for a Christmas dinner joked that I would now henceforth always have to introduce myself to Americans by saying, "I’m Farooq from Nigeria and I’m not a terrorist."

'But this isn’t even a joke any more. On December 27 a Nigerian passenger on a Delta/Northwest flight was harassed and detained at the Detroit Metro Airport because he allegedly spent too much time in the toilet and was therefore assumed to be brewing some terroristic machinations. The poor man was most probably even a Christian. But he nonetheless committed a new crime in America: flying while Nigerian… You know, stereotyping is a great timesaver; it enables lazy people to rush to quick judgment without the pesky encumbrance of nuance and factual information.'

Sarpong Obed argues that the Western media is using the failed bombing to tarnish Africa’s reputation:

'The Senior Editor of Veterans Today writes that Nigeria, Central Africa Republic and Ghana are rich grounds to plants the seeds of terrorism. How Gordon Duff came by this conclusion still amazes me still. Ghana is a fertile ground to grow terrorists? Domestically, security in Ghana is managed by the state. This has an added advantage unlike Mr. Duff's home country, the United States, where security is in the hands of private companies and that includes security at airports.

'What Mr. Duff should know is that the United States is also a potential hotbed for homegrown terrorism. Before Mr. Duff, and many other writers in the West like him, duff up Africa, they should peep in their own backyard. They should look at how they are empowering terrorists and potentials terrorists to find cause and motivation in their evil acts.

'Mark Doyle of the BBC while interviewing the Nigerian minister of information appeared to have hinted that Abdul Mutallab was not properly screened at the airport in Lagos…

'Indeed, reports are rife that Abdul Mutallab did not go through passport checks at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam and that he probably was assisted. No Western media is looking at this issue. After all, it is only in Africa that inefficiency and discrepancy is genetic. It cannot happen anywhere in Europe or America.'

Scribbles from the Den commemorates the Republic of Cameroon’s 50th independence anniversary by republishing a Time Magazine report from 1960 which captures the mood that prevailed when the country became independent on January 1, 1960:

'The first of Africa's six new nations to get its independence in 1960 celebrated its beginnings last week with half the country in a state of emergency.

'On the morning of the first day of independence, terrorists killed five people in the capital of Yaounde, and the foreign dignitaries who streamed in by air at Douala the day before could see the ruins of the control tower ransacked by another insurgent gang. In six months of struggle 22 whites have died—more than were killed in a similar period during the Mau Mau war in Kenya—and 500 or more Africans.

'Responsible for most of the slaughter are the exiled leaders of a dissident political party banned in 1955, who are working to undermine 35-year-old Premier Ahmadou Ahidjo's fledgling government. The party is led by Dr. Felix-Roland Moumie, who has been issuing Czech pistols to Bamileke tribesmen. Just back from Moscow, Moumie operates from his refuge in nearby really independent Guinea. His followers hide in the hills or attack from across the border in the neighboring British Cameroons.'

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Dibussi Tande, a writer and activist from Cameroon, produces the blog Scribbles from the Den.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa discourse

Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong

2010-01-07

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/61253

An international discourse of China-in-Africa has emerged, particularly in Western countries with dense links to Africa: the US, UK and France. While China’s presence in Africa should be critically examined, interest in it in the West is skewed by elite perceptions of China as a rival for resources and influence in Africa and as a rising power, with the tone of the discourse far more negative than that accorded the Western presence in Africa.

The discourse is partly about how China’s presence is a ‘bad influence’ on governance in Africa.[1] A concomitant idea is that China’s activities obstruct Africa’s development, a contention that fits in a right to development framework.[2] A New York Times editorial exemplifies how the discourse plays out in Western media; its title, ‘Patron of African Misgovernment,’ refers to China.[3] It states that if African countries put natural resources in hock to the PRC, China will write them big checks, without questions about corruption or authoritarianism. China is said to engage in ‘callous yuan diplomacy,’ enjoy ‘an ugly partnership’ with the ‘genocidal’ Sudan government, and have Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe as its ‘favorite,’ contributing to Zimbabweans’ lack of free elections and ‘sane economic policies.’ The Times avers that China is pushing the poorest African workers deeper into poverty by flooding Africa with cheap goods and lending to African states without insisting on standards that Western states purportedly promote through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Times also expressed outrage at a PRC company’s exploitation of Zambian miners.

The essence of the discourse then is to cast PRC policies in Africa as promoting human rights violations or ‘colonialism,’[4] while implicitly comparing them invidiously with high minded US and Western practices. Some PRC activities in Africa do violate the human rights of Africans – not in ways that Western elites claim, but in much the same manner that Western policies do, through disadvantageous terms of trade, the extraction of natural resources, oppressive labor regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common features of the modern world system. These are practices that China’s elites used to denounce, but now come close to extolling as dynamic capitalism. For example, in 2007, a PRC international publication ran an article by Jian Junbo, a scholar from Shanghai’s top-ranked Fudan University on charges of ‘Chinese colonialism’ in Africa. He recognized that ‘more and more companies from China are entering Africa, but they simply focus on profits regardless of their harmful influences on African society, such as environmental pollution, excessive development and exploitation of local labor.’ Jian nevertheless argued that the path taken by China is ‘consistent with the logic of market capitalism-liberal trade’ and makes China not a colonialist, but ‘a successful capitalist in Africa.’[5]

The discourse should not be inverted by arguing that China’s presence in Africa is positive and the West’s negative or that problematic Chinese activities in Africa are justified because abuses are shared with the West. The analysis of China-Africa should invoke neither a ‘win-win’ nor dystopic representations; rather, the trees of China’s behavior should be seen as part of a world system forest and the discourse examined using comparative analysis. Our arguments are threefold: 1) given the world system, it is difficult to assess the pluses and minuses of China-in-Africa as a single phenomenon; 2) as a player in the world system, China in Africa has more in common with the West than is usually acknowledged; 3) there are nevertheless notable differences between Western and Chinese presences in Africa; many derive from China’s experience as a semi-colony, its socialist legacy, and its developing country status, features which together make PRC policies presumptively less injurious to African sensibilities about rights than those of Western states.[6] In what follows, we focus on PRC activities in Africa often denounced as harming African interests, particularly trade and investment. We also examine why the China-in-Africa discourse has emerged as it has and African responses to its main tenets.

AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT AND CHINA’S IMPORTS

China-Africa trade is rising sharply. Only US$3 billion (b) in 1995, it was $55b in 2006, balanced slightly in Africa’s favor. In 2006, China’s trade with Africa was merely 3 per cent of its US$1.76 trillion foreign trade. By 2008, China’s trade with Africa totalled $107 billion, now distinctly in Africa’s favor, but China’s foreign trade had reached $2.56 trillion, making trade with Africa still only 4 per cent of its total trade.[7] In 2006, China had been in third place, behind the US and France, among Africa’s trade partners, while by 2008 China had leapfrogged over France, but still behind trailed the US, with $140 billion of trade. China asserts that its trade is responsible for 20 per cent of Africa’s economic growth.[8]

The discourse concerns both China’s imports from and exports to Africa. On imports, it focuses on oil and charges that China fosters Africa’s dependence on earnings from raw materials. A Canadian scholar has noted the frequent assertion that ‘Beijing’s demand for African oil and other raw materials has inevitably helped to perpetuate Africa’s reliance on oil exports and, in so doing, further prevent the growth of more labor-intensive industries, such as agro-business and manufacturing.’[9] As we will discuss below, the US now relies more heavily on African oil than oil from any other region.

Ten percent of Sub-Saharan African exports went to China in 2005, by 2007, the figure was 13.4 per cent. Five oil and mineral exporting countries accounted for 85 per cent of PRC imports from Africa. In 2004, oil and gas were 62 per cent of Africa’s exports to China, ores and metals 17 per cent, agricultural raw materials 7 per cent. In 2009, oil, gas and minerals accounted for 86 per cent of such exports.[10] This profile is not unusual: apart from South Africa, the continent’s manufacturing is largely confined to textiles and clothing, which China also produces in abundance. In fact, oil accounted for 80 per cent of 2005 US imports from Sub-Saharan Africa; apparel was less than 3 per cent, with minerals most of the remainder. Petroleum products accounted for 92 per cent of the value of goods imported under the US’s preferential African Growth & Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2005. The figure was still 92 per cent in 2008, when 88 per cent of overall US-Africa trade (AGOA and non-AGOA) was in petroleum products .[11]

About 47 per cent of the oil China consumed in 2006 and 50 per cent in 2008 was imported. PRC imports in 2006 were 6.8 per cent of the world oil trade and supplied 12 per cent of all energy China consumed, coal, hydropower and nuclear power being major sources of Chinese energy consumption.[12] China’s 2005 oil imports from Africa provided 4 per cent of China’s energy needs. Of the 31 per cent of PRC oil imports from Africa, Angola’s share was 14 per cent, Sudan’s 5 per cent, Congo (B)’s 4 per cent, and Equatorial Guinea’s 3 per cent.[13] African oil supplied 14.5 per cent in 2006 and 16 per cent in 2008 of all the oil China consumed, not much different from US imports from Africa of 13.2 per cent of all oil it consumed in 2006?, imports that provided 5.2 per cent of US energy needs.[14] China imports oil largely to fuel its production: 70 per cent of its demand is for industrial uses, while 70 per cent of US demand is for motor vehicles.[15] In 2009, China’s special envoy on African affairs put these figures in perspective when he noted that China receives 8.7 per cent of Africa’s oil exports, while the European Union and the US each take 33 per cent. China’s premier also stated that China’s investment in Africa’s oil and gas industries amounted to one-sixteenth of the total global investment in these industries.16 China thus hardly dominates Africa’s oil markets. The China-in-Africa discourse however presents the PRC as aspiring to be the chief taker of African resources and interested in Africa only on that account.[17]

China does participate in an exploitative business: historically, the price of oil and other globally-traded primary products, relative to that of industrial commodities, have been significantly determined by asymmetries in political power.[18] Apart from ‘unequal and disparate exchange’ that affects oil and primary products generally,[19] oil is capital intensive, creates few jobs, is environmentally damaging and corrupts producing states. People in oil-rich regions, such as southern Sudan and Nigeria’s Niger Delta, receive so few benefits from their patrimony that violent conflict has ensued.[20]

China is in Africa for oil because 80 per cent of the world’s proven conventional (non-tar sands, non-shale) oil reserves are state-owned and account for two-thirds of oil production. Most remaining reserves are sown up by Western oil firms.[21] China takes oil in Africa differently than Western states: it often packages oil deals with infrastructure project loans.[22] From the 1970s, developed states and international financial institutions (IFIs) largely abandoned African infrastructure projects, which also receive little private and almost no public-private financing.[23] International investment in infrastructure in Africa amounted to 4 per cent of all such investment outside North America from 1992-2003, even though lack of infrastructure is blocking Africa’s development.[24]

China has worked on African infrastructure for four decades and is becoming its pre-eminent infrastructure builder. The World Bank (WB) estimated that as of mid-2006, China’s Export-Import Bank infrastructure loans to Africa were over $12.5b. In 2007, this bank pledged $20b in infrastructure and trade finance loans related to Africa over the next three years (typically tied to the participation of Chinese contractors), on top of the $5b China-Africa Development Fund, announced in 2006 at the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, to encourage PRC investment in Africa.[25] While G8 finance ministers have criticized China’s loans, on the ground that a ‘lend and forgive cycle’ should be avoided, NGOs point out that only $2.3b of the additional $25b in aid pledged to Africa by rich countries in 2005 has been delivered.[26]

China’s approach to acquiring oil in Africa is exemplified in the China-in-Africa discourse by a 2004 agreement with Angola. The discourse fixes on it because the deal involved infrastructure loans to the corrupt Angolan government, unaccompanied by a requirement to report how funds are spent. The initial loan of US$2b was to be used for railroad repair, road building, office construction, etc. It was to be repaid with oil from a former Shell Oil block that generates 10,000 bpd. The block had been sought by the largest Indian oil firm, but secured by China because of its infrastructure loan, which was set at 1.5 per cent interest, to be recouped over 17 years, including a 5-year interest-free period. It reserved for Angolans 30 per cent of the value of infrastructure contracts paid for with its funds; the remaining 70 per cent was open for bids, although most contracts have likely gone to PRC firms.[27] The interest rate was later lowered to 0.25 per cent. By 2007, China had lent Angola at least $6b for infrastructure projects.[28]

The Angolan and other PRC loans elicited from WB head Paul Wolfowitz, the UK government, and the IMF comments that PRC activities threaten to plunge Africa into deep debt. The US Treasury termed China a ‘rogue creditor.’[29] Africa remains, however, in a Western-created ‘debt trap,’ owing more than $300b and paying significant interest.[30] Yet, as US Africanist Deborah Brautigam has noted, China ‘regularly cancel[s] the loans of African countries, loans that were usually granted at zero interest [and] without the long dance of negotiations and questionable conditions required by the World Bank and IMF.’[31] For example, a highway opened in 2006 between Ghana’s two major cities, Accra and Kumasi, was built with a PRC no-interest loan.[32]

OECD researchers have concluded moreover that increased PRC activities in Africa have not deepened corruption among African governments.[33] China’s leaders know corrupt officials will siphon off part of their infrastructure loans, but its packaged loans are less likely than Western aid to being drained by corruption. As a Hong Kong journalist has noted, because China’s loans and aid are tied to infrastructure projects, that is, a large portion of the funds are allocated directly to contractors, ‘corrupt rulers cannot somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes.’[34] A close US observer of PRC activities in Africa has argued that China’s aid is more effective than Western aid because much is used for ‘hydroelectric power dams, railroads, roads and fiber-optic cables, which have the potential to benefit ordinary people, no matter how corrupt the regime under which they live.’[35]

Despite promoting a rhetoric of transparency regarding African oil-producers, Western states have not bound their citizens and corporations. Bids for oil blocks in Africa typically feature ‘signature bonuses,’ paid to governments, which often run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Foreign oil firms know host governments skim off large shares of what the companies pay. In a rare instance of disclosure, Western oil firms told the IMF that they paid $400m in 2001 for an Angolan oil tract, but the Angolan government claimed it received only $285m.[36] Presumably the difference went into the pockets of government officials.

Angola’s state oil company and president’s office control oil earnings. Investigators have traced hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and bribes paid by Western multinationals to Angolan officials’ private offshore accounts. Most multinationals refuse to publish what they pay to secure oil rights. Western governments do not compel oil firms that are their own citizens to make disclosures, but ‘ask the tiger for its skin’ (yu hou mo pi), as the Chinese say, by demanding corrupt governments publicize their own corruption.[37]

Western policy interventions have not actually diminished the resource curse.[38] A group of African scholars have argued that transparency is insufficient as a means to end oil-related corruption, which cannot be dented as long as African officials and the (mainly Western) oil executives who corrupt them tolerate such criminality. Their actions can hardly be policed through the UK government’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), because it is voluntary and puts the onus of disclosure on African governments.[39] The NGO-promoted campaign to require firms to Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is aimed at mandatory disclosure by publicly-traded natural resource companies, but not non-traded or state-owned firms. PWYP has been successfully resisted by most Western oil companies, especially US firms.[40]

Western media often cite the WB-Chad agreement to ameliorate the resource curse and spur poverty alleviation as a successful external policy intervention to curb oil-based corruption. In exchange for a modicum of WB financing to build the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline -- the largest private sector investment in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Chad has since 2003 deposited in a London bank most royalties from Exxon-Mobil and other pipeline operators. Foreign overseers monitor the account and disperse funds to Chad, mainly for poverty alleviation programs. When the pipeline was built, the oil prices were low and multinationals unwilling to risk building it without WB backing. A study has found that the WB-Chad pact is ‘a unique one-off event determined by a particular set of historical circumstances that no longer hold.’ With high prices and tight supplies, oil firms no longer need WB approval for projects. The WB-Chad pact is also judged to be very limited in geographical scope and duration and unlikely to do much to alleviate poverty.[41]

The China-in-Africa discourse will likely continue to focus overwhelmingly on oil in discussing PRC imports from the continent. American analysts particularly see the US as strategically competing with China for African oil.[42] By 2007, Africa was supplying 24 per cent of US daily oil imports, ahead of the Middle East’s 18.6 per cent and in 2009, Africa was still supplying 24 per cent of US oil imports, more than was the Middle East.[43] The US government estimates African oil production will grow 91 per cent in 2002-2025, while global production will grow 53 per cent. Armed forces in a newly established US Africa Command will have as a main task protecting US access to oil.[44]

US prominence in taking African oil is accompanied by its backing authoritarian rulers in almost all oil producing states.[45] Sudan is a partial exception: the US cooperates with and protects Sudan’s military and intelligence leaders, but opposes its Islamist politicians.[46] US elites use that partial exception and PRC involvement in Sudan’s oil industry to keep the discourse focused on China’s supposed ‘scramble for oil,’ even though China is still far from capable of competing with Western firms for control of African oil[47] and much oil that China takes from Africa, including Sudan, is not brought to China, but traded on the open market.[48]

AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT AND CHINA’S EXPORTS

China’s exports to Africa have also been sharply criticized -- portrayed as low quality goods which poorly serve consumers and foster the decline of African manufacturing.[49]

In much of Africa, many basic consumer items are expensive imports from developed countries, yet because poor infrastructure and corruption in Africa create high production costs, these are often cheaper than locally-made goods.[50] Chinese goods are cheaper than both and thus appeal to grassroots Africans. PRC goods in Madagascar are 2-3 times cheaper than local or imported goods.[51] As more Chinese invest and trade in Africa and compete with each other, prices fall. In the Congo capital, Kinshasa, PRC merchants first sold shoes at US$12 a pair; as more Chinese arrived, the price fell to $6.[52] In Ghana, as more PRC bikes were imported, the price fell from $67 to $25 in two years.[53]

If the affordability of PRC imports benefits grassroots African consumers,[54] there are in any case only seven countries that receive a significant share (5-14 per cent) of their imports from China.[55] Basic consumer goods do not predominate among PRC exports, but rather ‘machinery, electronic equipment and high- and new-tech products.’[56] A UK government study found that in only one African country, Uganda, are basic consumer goods more than a fifth of the value of all goods imported from China and that PRC imports into Africa mainly displace imports from elsewhere and have little effect on local production.[57] The PRC government recognizes that some exports are of poor quality. Many Chinese goods are brought to Africa by private Chinese or African entrepreneurs whom the PRC government does not control. It nevertheless has ‘in place stringent measures to ensure that its goods meet all the minimum quality standards for exports [and] a ministry to ensure low quality goods are not exported.’[58]

While most Chinese exports to Africa do not displace existing local producers, PRC exports to the world also have not had the commonly asserted crushing effect on African exports.[59] The Export Similarity Index, a measure of overlap between the value of products countries export, is only 4 per cent for China and the whole of Africa and almost exclusively involves textiles and clothing (T&C).[60] The China-in-Africa discourse features a constant stream of charges that China is gutting African T&C production.[61]

China’s T&C exports to Africa began to rise sharply around 2003, but in many African countries, the T&C industry had long been in decline. In Ghana, T&C employed 25,000 people in 1977, but only 5,000 in the year 2000.[62] In Zambia, 25,000 people worked in T&C in the 1980s, but only 10,000 in 2002. During the 1960s and 1970s, many African countries practiced import substituting industrialization, raising T&C employment to 20-30 per cent of formal sector jobs. By the 1980s and 1990s however, when most African countries had lost their ability to service their debt, the IFIs insisted that they open up to foreign goods, de-industrializing some countries, particularly with regard to T&C.[63]

WB/IMF-mandated structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were the actual gravediggers of African T&C production. The influx of second-hand clothing from developed countries particularly reduced domestic markets for African T&C producers.[64] Kenya in the 1990s, for example, opened up the textile sector to second-hand (mitumba) and new garments from the US and EU, whose increased subsidization of their cotton farmers also shrunk the Kenyan cotton industry, reducing supplies to Kenyan T&C producers. Neo-liberal reforms in Kenya raised the cost of electricity and other inputs, making it still more difficult for T&C firms to produce at low prices. While mitumba distribution came to involve 500,000 Kenyans, the country’s T&C industry, which in the early 1980s employed 200,000, nearly collapsed. Up to 70,000 factory and mill jobs alone were lost.[65] By 2004, even with the effect of the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), less than 35,000 people worked in the export-oriented Kenyan clothing sector.[66]

Meanwhile, by 2001, a vast growth in Chinese T&C exporters began.[67] Despite strong competition, PRC-based firms’ share of world T&C exports grew from 9 per cent in 1990 to 24 per cent in 2005.[68] T&C exports accounted for 70 per cent of China’s 2006 $177b global trade surplus.[69] From 1974, the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) restricted China’s T&C exports to developed countries. The 1994 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) kept MFA quotas until January 1, 2005, after which African T&C exports to the US initially fell 20 per cent. In several countries, T&C employment dropped sharply in 2005-2006,[70] predictably due to ‘relatively high utility and transportation costs and long shipping times to the US . . . lower productivity and less skilled labor than Asia, and . . . fewer sources of cotton yarn and higher-priced fabrics than China and India.’[71]

Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, and South Africa have featured in the China-in-Africa discourse as especially hard-hit by Chinese competition. Yet except for South Africa their industries were already in extremis by 2000. Their eventual outcomes are also at odds with the discourse of the PRC as gravedigger of Africa’s T&C industry. In Lesotho, almost all T&C bosses have been foreign (mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong) and employ most of the country’s formal sector workers. In 2006, they re-branded themselves producers of ‘ethical clothing’ for the US market, allowing almost full employment recovery.[72] In Madagascar, which lost 5,000 of 100,000 T&C jobs in 2005, the industry found a niche in higher-end T&C, held its own in 2006, and was expected to grow in 2007-2008. Madagascar’s T&C exports in fact grew by 3 per cent in 2005-2007 and again employed 100,000 workers by 2009. Its output actually accounted for 25 per cent of all non-petroleum AGOA imports into the US from Africa.[73] Moroccan textile exports began to recover as producers moved up the value chain and oriented themselves to just-in-time production for the European market, 50-60 per cent of whose requirements cannot be fulfilled by an exporter as far away as China.[74]

Chinese President Hu Jintao and South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki touch a crystal ball to launch the China South Africa economic trade and cooperation website at the Union building in Pretoria February 6, 2007.

In 2003-2006, S. Africa’s T&C industry purportedly shed 55,000 jobs, 18,000 of them since late 2004. Besides the influx of PRC products, the rand appreciated 50 per cent in 2002-2004, making South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland exports more expensive.[75] South African T&C firms also cannot source cheap Asian fabric for goods sent to the US at AGOA preferential tariffs.[76] South Africa’s T&C industry suffers from little capital investment and poor management. Its growing informalization has led to deskilling and compromises in quality.[77] The employment effect of the influx of PRC T&C goods should also be put into a wider context. A University of Johannesburg economist has shown that the availability to South African retailers of cheap Chinese T&C imports has greatly increased employment in the retail sector, which is the main contributor to South African GDP. The increase in retail jobs due to increased purchases of Chinese T&C imports more than compensates for T&C production job losses.[78] In any case, China fixed quotas for 2007-2008 on 31 types of T&C exports to South Africa. South Africa’s government opined that would reduce PRC imports by a third and create roughly the number of jobs lost since 2003. [79] The PRC government also agreed to finance a $2.5 million South African T&C training program and will ‘mak[e] preferential loans available to South Africa in modernizing its textile industry if it is needed.’[80]

A balance of positive and negative impacts for China’s exports to Africa is not easily drawn. Yet, as to the T&C industry, the balance is less negative than the discourse makes out. Its fixation on Africa’s T&C industry is non-comparative and lacks historical context, as China did not contribute to the steep decline in African T&C through SAPs, while Western states have yet to restrict their used and new clothing exports to Africa.

AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AND CHINA'S INVESTMENTS

Most foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Africa come from Europe, along with South Africa and the US. These countries together account for more than half of Africa’s FDI inflows. China had only $49 million in FDI in Africa in 1990 and $600m in 2003. Its FDI stock in 2005 was $1.6b, of $57b in global PRC FDI. In 1979-2000, the most recent years for which figures are available, 46 per cent of PRC FDI in Africa went to manufacturing (15 per cent to textiles alone), 28 per cent to resource extraction, 18 per cent to services (mostly construction) and 7 per cent to agriculture. The PRC has said it will encourage investment in Africa’s industrial processing, infrastructure, agriculture, and natural resources.[81]

Investment that PRC firms have realized or pledged to Africa is increasing so quickly that it is thought to have reached $11.7b at the end of 2006 and includes manufacturing, trade, transportation, and agriculture. The existing stock of Chinese investment in Africa reached $7.8b in 2008, with $5.5b of direct investment (realized or pledged) made in that year. Direct investment in the first nine months of 2009 reportedly increased by 77 per cent over the amount invested during the same time period in 2008.[82] China will likely soon be a the? main source of FDI for Africa, especially as PRC government entities offer tax incentives, loans, credit, and ready access to foreign exchange for enterprises that undertake FDI activities abroad.[83]

Investments thus also figure in the China-in-Africa discourse.[84] Even more than with trade, the discourse is narrowly focused; its primary focus has been on only one investment by one Chinese SOE, among the more than 800 major PRC enterprises in Africa, 100 of them large SOEs.[85] Western media have devoted hugely disproportionate attention to the Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA) Chambishi copper mine.[86]The upshot of these reports is that ‘the Chinese’ are Africa’s super-exploiters.

The question of whether Chambishi involves extraordinarily oppressive conditions is considered but not fully answered in a 2007 report by two Zambian NGOs. It argues that privatization is the main cause of the sharp deterioration in Zambian miners’ conditions. The report also notes NFCA is commonly claimed to be the worst investor in Zambia’s Copperbelt; the Indian company, Vedanta, is judged next worse, and that ‘Swiss, British, South African, Canadian, and other investors typically labeled ‘white,’’ are said to be the best. The report adds that ‘the debate is clearly informed by racist assumptions . . . and a fair sprinkling of frequently repeated urban myths.’[87]

NFCA’s purchase of the defunct Chambishi mine in 1998 restored operations and boosted employment from 100 to 2,200 (of 39,000 miners in Zambia).[88] The mine however was the site of an April, 2005 dynamite plant explosion that killed 47 Zambian workers. During a 2006 wildcat strike over payment delays, two protestors were shot. Few of the mine’s Zambian workers have permanent pensionable contracts, in contrast to its 180 Chinese employees. NFCA initially made it hard for unions to represent its contract workers, but later relented so that nowover 80 per cent of workers are unionized. It also initially paid the lowest wages among private mining firms in Zambia. There are eleven Chinese, but only one Zambian, senior manager. Mining families had free health care when the mine was Zambian state-owned, but now find it hard to access mine hospitals. Although many miners and their families suffer from HIV/AIDS, there is little preventative health care. The townships where miners live have been poorly serviced.

Until recently, Zambia’s government largely ignored conditions in the mines. More recently, it threatened to punish NFCA and other owners who act ‘outside the normal’ and ‘put the Government to ridicule.’ In 2006, the lowest paid workers’ wages were increased, but were still only about the minimum wage. [89] In any case, many Zambians find conditions at all mines to be much worse than before privatization and blame the government for having acceded to WB demands to rapidly turn over the mines to multi-nationals. Indeed, the WB and IMF made release of a half billion dollars of balance of payments support conditional on Zambia’s quick completion of privatization.[90]

The NGOs’ report states that among Zambian mines there is ‘plenty of poor practice, particularly at Metorex,’ a white South African firm that owns 90 per cent of the Chibuluma mine, where it carries out exploitative activities detailed in the report.[91] A Canadian firm, First Quantum Metals (owner of the Kansanshi mine) and Metorex have resisted Zambian government efforts to raise royalty rates to 2.5-3 per cent, to better support education and health programs. Most foreign mining firms now pay what are likely the lowest royalty rates in the world.[92] Metorex, which earned the highest mining profits in Zambia in 2006,[93] First Quantum, and Vendanta (owner of the large Konkola mine) all pay 0.6 per cent royalties and a 25 per cent corporate tax rate. NFCA, however, pays 2 per cent royalties and 35 per cent taxes.[94] In 1992, when copper was $2,280 a ton, the state-owned mines provided more than $200m to Zambia’s treasury. In 2004, with copper at $2,868 and the same level of production, the now foreign-owned mines provided only $8m. In contrast to the pre-privatization years, these mines now also generally have no linkages that enrich local communities. Only a minority of firms run health and education services for employees and their families.[95]

The Chambishi copper mine owners are harsh exploiters, but a hierarchy of relatively good white bosses, worse Indian mine operators, and super-exploiting Chinese is misleading.96 PF head Michael Sata, running for president in 2006, said he would drive out the Chinese, Indians and Lebanese, who he called ‘infestors.’[97] Sata received funds from Taiwan and said he would recognize it in place of the PRC. He visited Taiwan after he lost the race, while some of his followers attacked Chinese-owned shops in Lusaka.[98]

The Chambishi mine is by no means the largest Chinese-owned enterprise in Africa. A private, Chinese-owned conglomerate in Nigeria, with which many PRC SOEs partner in manufacturing and construction, has 20,000 employees, including many Nigerian managers.[99] There are several large PRC-owned factories in Africa, e.g. the Urifiki Textile Mill in Tanzania, with 2000 workers, and shoe and textile factories in Nigeria that employ 1000-2000 workers.[100] Chambishi, however, has been burned into the minds of those exposed to the China-in-Africa discourse.

A comparative study would likely reveal that both PRC and Western enterprises in Africa have oppressive conditions. It should be noted however, that PRC investments in Africa are much less profitable than those of Western countries.[101] The WB has observed that Africa provides ‘the highest returns on foreign direct investment of any region in the world.’[102] In the 1990s, these returns averaged 29 per cent and have since risen. They are much higher than returns of US foreign affiliates elsewhere, for example.[103] Yet, returns for PRC foreign affiliates in Africa are low compared to PRC businesses in other regions. Unlike much Western investment in Africa, most PRC investments are equity joint ventures with African enterprises, who share in profits. Most are small and medium size enterprises producing for African markets.[104] PRC firms are often flexible in responding to African development plans. For example, in 2007, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) banned cobalt concentrate exports. Chinese firms that previously bought concentrate quickly moved to set up DRC plants to produce copper cobalt alloy.[105]

PRC investments seem also to concentrate less in natural resource extraction and more in infrastructure and manufacturing than Western investments. In part this is because Western countries ‘ha[d] all but abandoned big infrastructure and industrial ventures in Africa decades ago, deeming them unprofitable or too risky.’ .[106] Only 10 per cent of the $22b of US FDI in Africa in 2005 was in manufacturing.[107] Some 83 per cent of US FDI is in five African states. Apart from South Africa, US FDI in the other four states is overwhelmingly in oil and differences exist between Western oil firms and PRC parastatals: Shell and other ‘majors’ have been in Nigeria for a half-century, but that oil-producing giant must import most gasoline it uses, while in Sudan PRC firms have built a structure for exploration, production, refining, transport and sales.[108] China National Petroleum Company claims to have ‘provided jobs to more than 100,000 Sudanese while contributing to other employment sectors as the oil industry has grown.’ [109]

The China-in-Africa discourse in the West for the most part insists that Chinese have particularly positioned themselves to exploit Africa and Africans; for example, by supporting authoritarian rulers in countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe.[110] Several Western states, however, directly support despots by providing military assistance and legitimacy. In fact, US assistance to African rulers for purchases of US arms and the training of African states’ military forces has increased significantly under the Obama Administration.[111] China is thus not likely to fare worse than the West in an evaluation of how foreign investments impinge on development and human rights in Africa.

CONCLUSION

The modalities of trade examined for development implications commonly involve the import and export of goods. There is also trade in money and people however. Western, but not PRC, banks have traded secrecy and interest to the exporters of 40 per cent of Africa’s private wealth.[112] Western states trade citizenship for the skills of professionals, especially doctors and nurses, trained in, but now largely lost to Africa.[113] These forms of trade likely impinge as much as commodity exchange on Africans’ right to development.

The main problem with the China-in-Africa discourse is not empirical inaccuracies about Chinese activities in Africa,[114] but the de-contextualization of criticisms for ideological reasons. Some analyses positively cast Western actions in Africa compared to China’s activities; others lack comparative perspective in discussing negative aspects of China’s presence, so that discourse consumers see a few trees, but not the forest. Such analysis reflects Western elite perception of national interests or moral superiority as these impinge on ‘strategic competition’ with China.[115] Many analysts scarcely question Western rhetoric of ‘aiding African development’ and ‘promoting African democracy,’ yet are quick to seize on examples of exploitation or oppression by Chinese interests.[116]

To comprehensively interrogate Chinese and Western activities in Africa is to question a global system that has in many respects de-developed Africa and into which China is increasingly integrated. Failing that, one is left with little more than a binary between a Western-promoted new ‘civilizing mission’ on behalf of Africans and activities of the ‘amoral’ Chinese, who refuse to fully endorse that mission by not adopting trade and investment practices wholly compliant with neo-liberalism. China, after all, can and does throw this binary back in the face of its proponents by portraying the West as seeking a new tutelage for Africans and China as eschewing the role of intermeddler, while promoting ‘win-win’ trade and investment. So too do many Africans.[117] The popularity of features of China’s presence in Africa, compared with that of the main Western states, goes well beyond elites.[118] The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked Africans in ten countries to compare the influences of China and the US in their own countries. In nine of the ten countries, by margins of 61-91 per cent, African respondents said Chinese influence was good. These percentages substantially exceeded those for the US. [119] One important implication of the Chinese presence in Africa then is that Western states and firms may need to engage in greater self-reflection about their own presence in the continent.

The China-in-Africa discourse can be expected to become increasingly heated, especially with regard to the effects of PRC trade and investment on development, as its audiences weigh competing claims. Those who follow the discourse as it is played out in Africa itself can already detect that many Africans are wary of attempts to cast it in Manichean terms. By 2009, there had also been at least one instance in the mainstream Western press of presenting a more balanced view of Chinese activities in Africa.[120] Many Africans moreover are now rejecting any effort to use the discourse to distract from the reality of Africa’s continued subordination within a world system that builds in exploitation and other systematic violations of rights.

Barry Sautman is associate professor, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research concerns ethnic politics and nationalism in China, as well as China–Africa relations. Yan Hairong is an anthropologist in the Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and author of New Masters, New Servants: Migration, Development, and Women Workers in China (Duke University Press, 2008). Their joint publications on China-Africa links include East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, Africa, the West and ‘Colonialism,’ Maryland Monograph Series in Contemporary Asian Studies no. 186 (2006); ‘Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,’ African Studies Review 50(3): 75-114(2007); ‘Fu Manchu in Africa: The Distorted Portrayal of China’s Presence in Africa,’ South Africa Labor Bulletin 31(5): 34-38(2008); ‘African Perspectives on China-Africa Links,’ China Quarterly 199:729-760 (2009). This article is an updated and revised version of ‘The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment, and the China-in-Africa Discourse,’ Pacific Affairs 81(1):9-29 (2008).

The Asia-Pacific Journal, 52-3-09, December 28, 2009.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Barry Sautman is associate professor, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Yan Hairong is an anthropologist in the Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
* This article first appeared in The Asia-Pacific Journal, 52-3-09, December 28, 2009.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] See Maxi Schoeman, ‘China in Africa: the Rise of a Hegemony?’ in China and Africa: Partners in Development and Security? Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, Aug. 23, 2007.
[2] Ironically, the discourse is most developed in the US, yet the US stood alone in refusing to recognize a right to development when the United Nations adopted it in 1998. ‘US Votes Against Development as Basic Human Right,’ Inter Press Service (IPS), Dec. 10, 1998.
[3] ‘Patron of African Misgovernment,’ New York Times (NYT), Feb. 19, 2007.
[4] See, e.g. Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘In Africa, China’s Expansion Begins to Stir Resentment,’ Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Feb. 2, 2007.
[5] Jian Junbo, ‘China’s Role in Africa,’ Beijing Review 6:15 (February 8, 2007).
[6] The US government has noted the appeal of China in Africa. James Swan (Dep. Ass’t. Sec. of State), ‘Remarks to Columbia University’s Third Annual China Symposium,’ Apr. 20, 2007; Darren Taylor, ‘African Respect for Chinese Expatriates Grows,’ VOA News, May 8, 2007.
[7] Robyn Dixon, ‘Africa Holds Attractions for China Leaders.’ Los Angeles Times (LAT), Jan. 31, 2007; ‘China,’ Mbendi: Information for Africa, 2007; ‘Foreign Firms are Driving our Surplus,’ Xinhua (XH), March 12, 2007; ‘Goodwill Gives Obama Added Leverage in Africa,’ Reuters, July 9, 2009; ‘China SOEs Move to Fill Africa Investment Gap,’ Business Daily Update, June 16, 2009; ‘China Says Export Slide Deep,’ United Press International (UPI), Aug. 13, 2009.
[8] ‘World must do more for Africa, China’s Premier says,’ Agence France Presse (AFP), May 16, 2007.
[9] Hany Besada, ‘China in Africa – a Reliable Friend?’ Taipei Times, March 25, 2007:8.
[10] Harry Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier (Washington: World Bank, 2006):11-12, 81; ‘Africa Trade Profile,’ Africa News, July 21, 2009; ‘Continent Must Engage China with Win-Win Strategies, Mmegi (Gaborone), Oct. 20, 2009; ‘AGOA’s Poor Show Blamed on Issues ‘Unique’ to Continent,’ The East African (Nairobi),July 6, 2009. Some 21 per cent of PRC imports of cotton and 26 per cent of imports of diamonds came from Africa in 2005. About 15.4 per cent of Africa’s exports of logs went to China. Ron Sandrey, ‘The African Merchandise Trading Relationship with China,’ Inside Asia, 2006 (3-4):8-10.
[11] US Department of Commerce, U.S.-African Trade Profile (Washington: International Trade Administration, 2006): 1, 2; ‘US Trade Preference Programs,’ CQ Congressional Testimony, Nov. 17, 2009; ‘Reforming African Economies Continue to Reap Benefits,’ US State News, Sept. 7, 2009;
[12] ‘Analysis of China’s Energy Import and Export,’ XH, Mar. 19, 2007; ‘China Oil Demand Seen at 7.01 mln bpd,’ XH, Nov. 10, 2006; ‘China’s Thirst for Energy Complicating Global Policy,’ Petroleumworld.com, Jan. 18, 2006; ‘China Oil Dependence Sparks Concerns,’ Radio Free Asia, Jan. 5, 2009.
[13] Erica Downs, China (Washington: Brookings Institution 2006):31. Similarly, Nigeria accounts for 11 per cent of US crude imports. ‘US Warns of Al-Qaeda Attacks,’ This Day (TD) (Nigeria), September 7, 2007.
[14] B. McKenna, ‘Don’t Expect ‘Energy Independence’ to Clear the Air on Climate Change,’ Globe & Mail (Toronto)(G&M), Jan. 30, 2007 (US imported 60.3 per cent of oil it consumed in 2006); David Bird, ‘Africa Tops Mideast for US Crude,’ Houston Chronicle (HC), Feb. 25, 2007 (22 per cent of 2006 US oil imports from Africa).
[15] David Nason, ‘Troubled Waters Over Oil’s Future,’ The Australian, June 20, 2005.
[16] John Ekongo ‘China and Equal Partner to Africa,’ New Era (Namibia), May 6, 2009; ‘Full Text of Chinese Premier's Press Conference in Egypt,’ XH, Nov. 10, 2009.
[17] See, e.g., Peter Brookes, ‘Into Africa: China’s Scramble for Influence and Oil,’ Heritage Lectures No. 1006 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2007):2; Hamish Macrae, ‘We Fail to Work with China at our Peril,’ The Independent, Feb. 14, 2007:32.
[18] See Bassam Fattouh, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing System: a Critical Assessment,’ in Robert Mabro (ed.), Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006):41-100.
[19] Peter Custers, ‘Unequal Exchange and Poverty in African Countries Exporting Primary Commodities.’ European Conference of People’s Global Action. Sept. 2, 2002.
[20] Terry Lynn Karl, ‘The Social and Political Consequences of Oil,’ in Cutler Cleveland (ed.), Encyclopedia of Energy (San Diego: Elsevier, 2004). Angolan oil creates twice as many jobs per million boe (barrels of oil equivalent) in the US than in Angola. Keith Myers, ‘Petroleum, Poverty and Security,’ (London: Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper 2005):6.
[21] Lynn Cook, ‘Big Oil Hashes Out Issues with State-Run Firms,’ HC, Sept. 17, 2004.
[22] In the period 1956-2005, China provided US$44 billion in low or no-interest loans to African states for 900 infrastructure projects. ‘China Looks to Africa with an Eye to Reaping Financial and Political Gains,’ Associated Press (AP), June 18, 2006.
[23] Robert Shephard, et al., ‘Financing Infrastructure in Africa,’ Gridlines No. 13 (Sept. 2006):2.
[24] Tony Elumelu, ‘Obstacles and Opportunities to Financing Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: the UBA Experience’ (Washington: UBA 2006); United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 (New York: UN DE&SA, 2007):105.
[25] ‘Financial Collaboration a New Focus in China-Africa Economic Cooperation,’ XH, May 17, 2007; ‘China’s Emerging Role in Africa,’ Grid Lines (Washington: World Bank, s.d.,2008?). By mid-2007, China’s Exim Bank had provided more than $13.2b in loans for Africa-related projects; those still outstanding were 20 per cent of the bank’s business. ‘Briefing: Asia Banking,’ Asia Pulse, July 30, 2007. The loans went 40 per cent to the power sector, 20 per cent to transport, 12 per cent to telecom, 4 per cent to water and 24 per cent to multi-sector commitments. Broad (2005):275. Most of the $20 billion pledged in 2007 will finance exports of Chinese ‘high-tech’ products used to build infrastructure in Africa. See Wang Jian-Ye, What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa? (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2007):10; ‘The Export-Import Bank of China.’
[26] ‘G8 Raps China for Lending $20b to Africa,’ United Press International, (UPI), May 21, 2007. When debt relief, which the G8 regards as aid, is eliminated from calculations, G8 aid to Africa declined by 2 per cent from 2005 to 2006. Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Empty Promises,’ South China Morning Post (SCMP), Apr. 24, 2007. China does not consider debt relief as aid. Darren Taylor, ‘Chinese Aid Flows into Africa,’ VOANews, May 8, 2007.
[27] ‘Angola: Oil Backed Loan Will Finance Recovery Projects,’ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Feb. 21, 2005; IRIN, ‘Angola: Cautious Optimism for 2005,’ Jan. 14, 2005; ‘Angola/China: an Example of South-South Cooperation,’ Angolan Press Agency, Mar. 25, 2004; Cindy Hurst, China’s Oil Rush in Africa (Washington: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security 2006):10.
[28] Lucy Corkin, ‘Angola Flexes New-Found Muscle,’ Business Day (BD)(South Africa), Mar. 23, 2007; Gill, ‘China’s Expanding Role . . . ,’ 2007:9. A reviewer has informed us of unpublished information that China’s loans to Angola total as much as $13b.
[29] ‘China-Africa Ties Come Under Fresh Scrutiny,’ The Nation (Kenya), December 12, 2006; ‘Beijing Summit: Implications for Africa,’ TD, Nov. 5, 2006; Michael Phillips, ‘G-7 to Warn China over Costly Loans to Poor Countries,’ WSJ, Sept. 15, 2006:A2.
[30] ‘It’s Trade Not Aid that will Lift Africa from Poverty,’ East African (Kenya), November 8, 2005. Sub-Saharan Africa paid $8.3b in interest in 2003; George Kerevan, ‘So we all Take to the Streets. Will it Work?’ Scotsman, June 2, 2005. Until 2005, countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia, were spending as much as 40 per cent of their national budgets on debt repayment. ‘Debt in Africa,’ Mbendi.
[31] Deborah Brautigam and Adama Gaye, ‘Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?’ Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 14, 2007. Former WB economist William Easterly has argued that debt relief presents a moral hazard by encouraging relieved countries to expect additional relief after future borrowings. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Of course, because China has so far consistently provided debt relief to African states, does not guarantee it will continue to do so.
[32] ‘Chinese Investors Outpace Indians, British in Ghana,’ AFP, June 17, 2006.
[33] Andrea Goldstein, et al. China and India: What’s in it for Africa? (Paris: OECD 2006):53.
[34] Frank Ching, ‘Cosy Ties, but China Needs to do more for Africa.’ Business Times. July 13, 2005.
[35] Jennifer Brea, ‘China’s New Scramble for Africa,’ American.Com: a Magazine of Ideas Online.
[36] ‘Signing On,’ Petroleum Economist, Oct. 2004:1.
[37] John McMillan, ‘Promoting Transparency in Angola,’ Journal of Democracy 16:3 (2005)155-169.
[38] See John Ghazvinian, Untapped: the Scramble for Africa’s Oil (New York: Harcourt 2007).
[39] Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: the Dirty Politics of African Oil (New York: Palgrave 2007): 217-218. While China is said to have no regard for transparency, Baroness Whitaker stated in a House of Lords debate that due to its connections with international organizations, ‘China may be interested in supporting the principles of EITI,’ ‘Africa: Chinese Investment,’ Lords Hansard, Feb. 6, 2007: Column 670. Any evidence?
[40] Afeikhena Jerome, et al., ‘Addressing Oil Related Corruption in Africa: Is the Push for Transparency Enough?’ Review of Human Factor Studies 11(1) (2005):7-32. Ethiopian Premier Meles Zenawi has stated that ‘it would be wrong for people in the West to assume that they can buy good governance in Africa [which] can only come from inside . . . [China] does not in any way endanger the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africa because only those that were home-grown ever had a chance of success.’ ‘Ethiopia: PM Opposes ‘Neo-Liberal’ Economic Reforms,’ Africa News, Feb. 17, 2007.
[41] Scott Pegg, ‘Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project,’ African Affairs (AA) 105/418 (2005):1-25.
[42] Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘China’s Africa Strategy,’ Current History 105 (691) (2006):219-224; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, ‘The African ‘Oil Rush’ and American National Security,’ Third World Quarterly 27:4(2006):22-35; Gregory Kane, The Strategic Competition for the Continent of Africa (Carlisle PA: US Army War College 2006); Donovan Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2007).
[43] ‘U.S. Military to Help Secure Oil,’ Vanguard (Nigeria), May 22, 2007; ‘The Oil Need that Fuels US ‘Outreach’ in Africa,’ Washington Post (WP), May 28, 2009.
[44] Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: the Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependence on Imported Oil (New York: Metropolitan, 2004):144; Lauren Ploch, ‘Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa,’ Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2007.
[45] See, e.g., Paul Lubeck, et al., ‘Convergent Interests: US Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of Nigerian Democracy,’ International Policy Report, Feb., 2007:10. After the rigged 2007 Nigerian election, the US stated that Nigeria is a strategic partner and it would continue to work with it. Constante Ikokwu, ‘US: Nigeria Still Strategic Partner, Despite Election Flaws,’ TD, May 19, 2007.
[46] Paul Moorcraft, ‘Strange Bedfellows in Khartoum,’ BD, June 22, 2007; Greg Miller, ‘U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning It,’ LAT, June 11, 2007 (US-Sudan intelligence ‘liaison visits every day’); US State Dep’t, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2007 (link) (Sudan is ‘a strong partner in the war on terror’). China has supplied 20 per cent and Russia 40 per cent of Sudan’s arms imports. Mark Bromley and Andrea Goldstein, ‘What China Model can do for Africa,’ Financial Times (FT), Feb. 16, 2007. France and other states also arm Sudan, F. William Engdahl, ‘Darfur: Forget Genocide, There’s Oil,’ Asia Times, May 25, 2007. On China’s role in persuading Sudan to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur, see Jonathan Holslag, ‘China’s Diplomatic Victory in Darfur’ (Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2007). Despite Darfur, after the 2005 Khartoum-southern Sudan peace deal, US oil firms have renewed their interest in Sudan oil. Matthew Chen, ‘Chinese National Oil Companies and Human Rights’, Orbis (Winter 2007):41-54. India, which partners with China and Malaysia in developing Sudan’s oil, supports Sudan’s position on Darfur. Luke Patey, ‘A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behavior of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan’ (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006):37.
[47] Jedrezej George Frynas and Manuel Paul, ‘A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and Business Perspectives,’ AA 106:423(2007):229-251. Some 95 per cent of oil produced in Africa’s largest petro-state, Nigeria, is generated by five Western companies: Shell, Exxon, Chevron, Total and Agip. Ibid.
[48] Darren Taylor, ‘Concerns Mount about Chinese Oil Interests in Africa,’ VOANews, May 3, 2007; Nicholas Freeman, The Dragon on the Nile: China’s Pursuit of Energy Security in Sudan (Annapolis: US Naval Academy 2006): 79.
[49] Michael Wines, ‘China’s Influence in Africa Arouses Some Resistance,’ NYT, Feb. 10, 2007:3; ‘Frankenstein in Africa: China Sets Out to Destroy Africa’s Manufacturing Sector,’ Jan. 1, 2007.
[50] ‘Zambia to Initiate Campaign to Boost Local Products Consumption,’ XH, Aug. 16, 2005. Nigel Harris, The Return of Cosmopolitan Capital: Globalization, the State and War (London: Taurus, 2003). Many African countries similarly cannot compete with Latin American states in the production of items like T-shirts. See Uma Subramanian and Matthias Matthijs, ‘Can Sub-Saharan Africa Leap into Global Network Trade?’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4112 (2007).
[51] ‘Africa a Frontier of Opportunity for Expanding China,’ AP, February 8, 2007; Catherine Fournet-Guerin, ‘New Chinese Immigration in Antananarivo,’ Chinese Perspectives, No. 67 (2006):45-57.
[52] ‘Zhongguo Geti Shangren Taojin Feizhou: Jianku Chuangye Ganshang Gan Gan’ (China’s Individual Entrepreneurs’ Gold Rush in Africa: Hardship in Building a Business; Dare to Think Dare to Do), Renmin Wang correct?, Aug. 17, 2005.
[53] ‘Is the Awakening Giant a Monster,’ The Economist, Feb. 13, 2003.
54 These consumers are not limited to purchasers of basic commodities. Many African businesses buy Chinese goods, often machinery, inputs to production, and wholesale commodities. See, e.g. ‘How Chinese are Taking Over Kampala’s Business Hub,’ New Vision (Uganda), May 2, 2007.
[55] Jane Kennan and Christopher Stevens. Opening the Package: the Asian Drivers and Poor-Country Trade (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 2005):2.
[56] ‘China to Promote Trade, Economic Links with Africa in 2006,’ XH, January 6.
[57] Chris Edwards and Rhys Jenkins, The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade Liberalisation on Poverty in Africa (London: UK Department for International Development, 2005):28-29, 38. Such studies of course cannot take into account smuggled goods, in which the proportions of consumer and non-consumer goods are uncertain.
[58] Nick Thiong’o, ‘China Unveils Move to Curb Sub-Standard Exports,’ Kenya Times, Nov. 23, 2006. China’s Ministry of Commerce has ordered PRC firms in Africa to hire local workers and meet international safety standards. Gill and Riley, ‘The Tenuous . . .,’ 2007:47. The PRC State Council has issued ‘Nine Principles to Encourage and Standardize Enterprises Overseas Investment’ requiring PRC firms overseas to abide by local laws, protect labor rights and the environment and practice corporate social responsibility. Stephen Marks, ‘The Summit in Beijing,’ Pambazuka News, Dec. 14, 2006.
[59] This is not to argue that in some sectors and with regard to certain potentialities, the impact is not significant. See Raphael Kaplinsky, et al., ‘The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa,’ April 2006.
[60] Robert Devlin, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007): Table 5.5.
[61] See, e.g., Karen Palmer, ‘Asian Imports Gutting African Textile Trade,’ SCMP, Dec. 14, 2005:9. Africa’s 2003 T&C exports were worth US$2.3b, less than one percent of a $400b world trade. ‘How Many Will Closure of Textile Company Affect?’ New Era (Namibia), Jan. 22, 2007.
[62] Peter Quartey, ‘The Textile and Clothing Industry in Ghana,’ in Herbert Rauch and Rudolph Traub-Merz (eds.), The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006):135-146. By March, 2005, the industry only employed 3,000. Ibid, p. 136.
[63] Rudolf Traub-Merz, ‘The African Textile and Clothing Industry: From Import Substitution to Export Orientation,’ in Rauch and Traub-Merz, The Future . . ., 2006:9-35. The 2001 film T-Shirt Travels shows that after the 1991 opening of Zambian markets to trade in second-hand clothes, every clothing factory closed. See this link. Claims have been made that Chinese goods destroyed the textile industry in Zimbabwe. ‘’Cheap Chinese Goods Destroyed Zim Economy,’’ The Namibian, August 28, 2007. The head of the International Textile Garment and Leather Workers Federation pointed out in 2004, however, that ‘in Zimbabwe some 20,000 textile and clothing jobs have disappeared directly or indirectly due to imported used clothing from the West.’ ‘Western Charity Undermines African Textiles,’ New Internationalist, no. 373 (Nov. 2004):1. T&C manufacturers in Zimbabwe attributed de-industrialization to second-hand clothing imports, the impact of Western-imposed structural adjustment programs and drought. Simone Field, The Internationalisation of the Second-Hand Clothing Trade: the Case of Zimbabwe, unpub’d PhD diss., Coventry University, 2000:301.
[64] Second hand clothing was 26.8 per cent by value of Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports in 2003. Sally Baden and Catherine Barber, ‘The Impact of the Second Hand Clothing Trade on Developing Countries,’ Oxfam Briefing Paper (2005):5.
[65] ‘Social Forum Best Placed to Question World Order,’ East African Standard (Kenya) (EAS), January 22, 2007; Gloria Otieno, Trade Liberalization and Poverty in Kenya: A Case Study of the Cotton Textiles Subsector (Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2006).
[66] Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, ‘Dangling by a Thread: How Sharp are the Chinese Scissors?’ (Brighton: IDS 2006):vi.
[67] Duane Newman, ‘Duane’s World,’ BD, December 4, 2006; Mills Soko, ‘SA Can Cut Lessons from Chinese Cloth,’ BD, Oct. 19, 2006.
[68] ‘Lesotho Shows Textile Woes are About More than China,’ BD, July 1, 2006. About one third of China’s textile exports are made by ‘foreign’ (mostly Hong Kong or Taiwan) -owned firms. ‘E-TV Interview with Charge d’Affaire Mr. Zhou Yuxiao,’ PRC Embassy, South Africa, April 13, 2006; Mills Soko, ‘The Lessons of China’s Rag Trade Revolution,’ Cape Argus (S. Africa), Feb. 1, 2007.
[69] ‘Poorer Nations Feel China’s Weight,’ International Herald Tribune (IHT), Apr. 3, 2007:14.
[70] Gumisai Mutume, ‘Loss of Textile Market Costs African Jobs,’ Africa Renewal 20(1) (2006):18-22; Kaplinsky and Morris, ‘The Impact . . .’ 2006:34.
[71] John Miller, ‘Nike to the Rescue? Africa Needs Better Jobs, Not Sweatshops,’ Dollars & Sense, Oct. 21,2006.
[72] ‘Textiles No Longer Hanging by a Thread,’ IRIN, July 3, 2006; Stephanie Hanes, ‘Hey, Nice Clothes, But are They Ethical,’ Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 13, 2006:1; ‘Textile Producers Get a Boost from Trade Bill . . ,’ allAfrica.com, Dec. 12, 2006.
[73] Ralaivelo Maminirinarivo, ‘The Textile and Clothing Industry of Madagascar,’ in Jauch and Traub-Merz, The Future . . . 2006:178-192; ‘A Nice Fairy Tale,’ Economist, Dec. 9, 2006; ‘International Textile Markets Rushing on for Eco-Friendly Fabrics,’ World Trade Review, Apr. 1-15, 2007; ‘Madagascar: Outlook for 2007-08: Economic Growth,’ Economist Intelligence Unit, Mar. 7, 2007; ‘Community of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Deputy Secretary General Stephen Karangizi Testifies Before House Ways and Means Sub-Committee,’ Fair Disclosure (FD) Wire, Nov. 17, 2009; ‘Business Presses Administration for Quick Madagascar AGOA Business Decision, ‘ Inside US Trade, Oct. 30, 2009.
[74] ‘Moroccan Textiles Manufacturers . . .’ Reuters (TV), Mar. 28, 2007.
[75] Traub-Merz, ‘The African Textile . . .,’ 2006:17, 25. S. Africa’s unions estimated 60,000-70,000 jobs lost, but the University of Cape Town School of Economics found only a third of that number disappeared; other jobs were informalized. Dave Marrs, ‘Chinese Textile Quotas a Case of Too Little, Too Late,’ BD, Nov. 13, 2006.
[76] Kaplinsky, ‘The Impact . . .,’ 2006:13. About 85 per cent of cloth used in African apparel exports to the US is made with Asian, mainly Chinese, fabric. ‘AGOA Forum 2006: Stakeholders Seek Ways to Broaden AGOA Opportunities.’
[77] ‘Lesotho Shows . . .,’ 2006. See also Kaplinsky, ‘The Impact . . .,’ 2006:13, 26.
[78] Lumengo Bonga-Bonga, ‘China Can Help Revive the African Textile Industry,’ Univers ok? Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2006. Interview with Prof. Bonga-Bonga; Johannesburg, Aug. 1, 2007.
[79] ‘Quotas on Chinese Textile-Clothing Imports Start,’ China Monitor (South Africa) No. 14 (Jan. 2007):16. Quotas were eased from March, 2007 because some T&C manufactures could no longer get fabric from China, leading to job losses quotas were intended to prevent. Mathabo Le Roux, ‘Minister Rows Back on Chinese Imports,’ BD, Mar. 29, 2007:1. South African unions did however deem the quotas a success. ‘High Hopes as New Talks Start in Clothing Industry,’ Business Times, May 13, 2007. Yet, predictably, the gap left by restricting PRC T&C was filled by imports from other countries. Ethel Hazelhurst, ‘Imports from China Fall, but Products Take Detour to SA,’ Star, Sept. 3, 2007.
Don Ross, ‘Let Quotas on Clothing and Textile Imports Die,’ The Star (Johannesburg), May 28, 2008.
[80] ‘China to Make More Efforts to Help Africa Develop Textile Industry,’ XH, Oct. 18, 2006; ‘E-TV Interview . . . 2006.
[81] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation (New York: United Nations, 2007):12, 19, 51, 56-57.
[82] ‘China Plays Increasing Role in Continent’s Development,’ IPS, May 17, 2007; Chen Deming, ‘Cooperation Benefits All People,’ Business Daily Update, Nov. 9, 2009; ‘China-Africa Cooperation Builds on Africa’s Capacity: Chinese Premier,’ XH, Nov. 8, 2009.
[83] UNDP, Asian Foreign . . . 2007:55-56.
[84] See, e.g., Brautigam and Gaye, ‘Is Chinese Investment . . ..,’ 2007.
[85] ‘Africa to be More Attractive for Chinese Investors,’ XH, Feb. 3, 2007.
[86] See, e.g., Trofimov, ‘In Africa . . .’ 2007; Olin Freeman, ‘Africa Discovers Dark Side of its New Colonial Master,’ Sunday Telegraph, Feb. 4, 2007; Robyn Dixon, ‘Africans Lash Out at Chinese Employers,’ LAT, Oct. 6, 2006; Roy Carroll, ‘China’s Goldmine,’ Guardian, Mar.28, 2006.
[87] Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls: Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia’s Copper Mines (Lusaka: Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia and Catholic Centre for Justice, Peace and Development, 2007).
[88] Christian Aid, A Rich Seam: Who Benefits from Rising Commodity Prices (London: CA, 2007):21.
[89] Dixon, ‘Africans Lash . . . ,’ 2006. On NFCA claims of furthering a ‘social responsibility plan’ among miners and future spending plans see ‘Zambian Councilor Praises Chinese Investment,’ XH, July 14, 2007; ‘Chambishi Mines Launches Social Responsibility Plan,’ Times of Zambia (TOZ), July 10, 2007; Interview with Prof. John Lungu, Copperbelt University, July 14, 2008.
[90] John Craig, ‘Putting Privatization into Practice: the Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 30:3 (2001):389-410; Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . . 2007:21.
[91] Fraser and Lungu, For Whom . . ., 2007:48.
[92] Charlotte Mathews, ‘Metorex Ramps Up its Copper Exposure,’ BD, Feb. 5, 2007; ‘Zambia: Conflict Looms Over Revision of Mineral Tax,’ IPS, Nov. 15, 2005.
[93] ‘State Gets $71 Million Tax from Mines,’ TOZ, Feb. 22, 2007.
[94] Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . ., 2007:22. Strikes occurred at the Konkola and Kansanshi mines in the summer of 2007 and resulted in the firing of strike organizers at the latter. ‘FQMO Fires Four Kansanshi Miners,’ TOZ, July 27, 2007; Andy Blamey, ‘Lost Output from Strikes around 39,000 mt: Barclays,’ Metals Week, August 6, 2007.
[95] Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . .: 24.
[96] Western media often quote a politician who expounds that hierarchy. Guy Scott, a white farmer, ex-Minister of Agriculture, and secretary general of the opposition Patriotic Front (PF), has said ‘People are saying: 'We've had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse, but the Chinese are worst of all.'‘ Chris McGreal, ‘Chinese Influx Revives Colonial Fears,’ Guardian, Feb. 9, 2007.
[97] ‘Zambia Opposition Chief Files Complaint Over Amin Comparison,’ AFP, Sept. 17, 2006.
[98] Amos Malupeng and Brighton Phiri, ‘Sata Visits Taiwan,’ The Post (Lusaka), Feb. 6, 2007.
[99] Ni Yangshuo. 2006. ‘Servir d’intermediaire pour Faciliter les Rapports entre la Chine et le Nigeria’ (To serve as an intermediary to facilitate rapport between China and Africa), Chinafrique. No. 10;
[100] UNDP, Asian Foreign . . . 2007:59-60; Craig Timberg, ‘From Competitors to Trade Partners,’ WP, Dec. 3, 2006.
[101] It is often supposed that state-owned PRC construction firms in Africa accept a low profit rate because they receive subsidies, but construction firms’ profits in China average only 2-3 per cent. ‘High Debt Rate, Price War Haunt China’s Construction Industry,’ XH, Mar. 21, 2007. The question of whether Chinese firms also generally receive an advantage in obtaining construction contracts in Africa on projects financed by China has not yet been resolved.
[102] World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington: WB, 2003):95.
103 Ernest Harsch, ‘Foreign Investment on Africa’s Agenda,’ Africa Recovery 17:2 (July, 2003):12-16; ‘Encouraging Businesswomen in Africa,’ 2002, (profitability for US affiliates in Africa 25 per cent in 1997, but 12 per cent worldwide).
104 UNDP, Asian Foreign . . ., 2007:57-59. China is also building large smelters in other African countries, e.g. Zambia and Egypt. ‘How China is Cementing Resources Globally,’ Asia Pulse, Aug. 20, 2007; ‘CITIC to Construct Smelter in Egypt,’IHT, September 12, 2006.
[105] ‘China Cobalt Firms Mull Congo Plants After Export Ban,’ Reuters, May 9, 2007.
[106] Shashank Bengali, ‘An African Building Boom Made in China,’ Star Tribune (Minneapolis), Sept. 18, 2006:13A;
[107] James K. Jackson, ‘US Direct Investment Abroad: Trends and Current Issues,’ Congressional Research Service, 2006:3
[108] US Department of Commerce, ‘US-African . . . ,’2006:13. For statistics on Western oil firms’ African investments, see He Wenping, ‘Zhong Fei Guanxi Fazhan Chudongle Sheide Shenjing’ (Whose Nerve has the Development of China-African Relations Touched), Shijie Zhishi No. 19 (2006): 30-32.
[109] ‘Good Man in Africa,’ China Daily, May 11, 2007.
[110] See, e.g., Kevin Kerr, ‘Into Africa: Commentary: China’s Tentacles Reach Throughout the Continent,’ MarketWatch, Jan. 9, 2007; Will Hutton, ‘Does the Future Really Belong to China?’ Prospect (Jan. 2007).
[111] William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, ‘Militarization of U.S. Africa Policy, 2000-2005,’ World Policy Institute Arms Trade Center; Daniel Volman, ‘Obama Moves Ahead with Africom,’ The Zeleza Post, Dec. 13, 2009. The 2007 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database (link) indicates that the total inventory value (TIV) of US arms sold to 12 African states from 1997-2006 was US$6.415 billion, while the TIV of Chinese arms sold to 13 African states in the same period was $564 million.
[112] ‘African States Urged to Maintain Stability,’ EAS, May 6, 2004; Nick Mathiason, ‘Western Bankers and Lawyers ‘Rob Africa of $150bn Every Year,’’ Independent, Jan. 21, 2007, p.1; Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, The Other Side of the Coin: the UK and Corruption in Africa (London: AAPPG, 2006):20; ‘$11.5 Trillion Siphoned Offshore,’ Public Agenda (Ghana), Mar 10, 2006.
[113] On the African brain drain to developed states and the training of African professionals in China, see Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, ‘Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,’ African Studies Review 50:3 (Dec. 2007).
[114] An example is the notion that China dominates Sudan and Zimbabwe, while protecting their regimes against a Western drive for ‘democracy and human rights.’ See Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West and ‘Colonialism’ in Africa (Baltimore: University of Maryland Series on Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 182, 2007); Schoeman 2007.
[115] A US official has stated, ‘To say that the subject of ‘China in Africa’ fascinates the US government and private sector is something of an understatement.’ Claudia Anyaso, ‘Remarks at the China in Africa Today Seminar,’ US Department of State, March 6, 2007. The U.S. House subcommittee on Africa vice-chair has said, ‘China's increasing engagement in Africa is a concern, and we need to focus on it before Beijing becomes fully established.’ Kathy Legget, ‘China’s Expansion into Africa Poses New Challenges for the US,’ WSJ, March 30, 2005:1. China in Africa figures in US discussions of a non-Western challenge to US hegemony. See Steven Weber, ‘A World with the West,’ National Interest (July-Aug. 2007). Half of respondents to a poll of 7,500 Americans indicated they regard China’s influence in Africa as a ‘great threat’ or ‘threat’ to US national interests. ‘UPI/ZogbyPoll: China’s Influence in Africa,’ UPI, July 27, 2007.
[116] While aid policies are beyond this paper’s scope, China, a developing country, gave Africa $5.5b in aid from 2000-2006, according to Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. Africapractice, The Impact of the Chinese Presence in Africa (London: Africapractice 2007):8. Some 44 per cent of China’s foreign aid is devoted to Africa; less than 1 per cent of the US aid budget is spent in sub-Saharan Africa. ‘Comoran President Praises China-Africa Cooperation as Model,’ XH, Oct. 23, 2006; Torcuil Crichton, ‘When it Comes to Africa, Bush has More on his Mind than Aid,’ Sunday Herald (Scotland), June 12, 2005. Until 2008 and the election of the Guomindang’s Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president, there was competition between the PRC and Taiwan for recognition by African states. By that year, only four African states recognized Taiwan and since then there has been a PRC/Taiwan ‘diplomatic truce’ which has suspended the erstwhile competition. ‘Minister Francisco H.L. Ou from the Taiwan Foreign Ministry Gives a Talk at National Cheng Kung University,’ Research Express 8:10 (May 22, 2009).
[117] See, e.g,, ‘China Means Well in Africa – Ngatjizeko,’ The Namibian, Apr. 3, 2007; ‘A Scramble for the Continent that We May Not Gain From,’ EAS, Mar. 27, 2007..
[118] See Emma Mawdsley, ‘China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power,’ Geography Compass 1 (2007):1-17; Paul Moorcraft, ‘Why Beijing is Winning in Africa.’ BD, Feb. 2, 2007.
[119] Global Unease with Major World Powers (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2007):45.
[120] David Pilling, ‘Africa Builds as Beijing Scrambles to Invest,’ FT, Dec. 10, 2009.

‘Slow pace’ in GPA talks worries South Africa

2010-01-08

http://www.swradioafrica.com/news050110/gpa050110.htm

South Africa has expressed frustration over the slow pace of talks aimed at ensuring a definitive solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Lindiwe Zulu, the international relations advisor to President Jacob Zuma, told Talk Radio 702 in Johannesburg they were not happy with the slow pace of the talks.

Cote d'Ivoire: President pardons 100 female prisoners

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yl95g4e

The President of Cote d'Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo has signed a pardon decree to free about 100 female prisoners in the West African country.

Ethiopia: Plans afoot to boost maternal health

2010-01-08

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3341

United Nations agencies and Ethiopian health officials have developed a comprehensive two-year work plan to boost maternal and newborn health and survival in the Horn of Africa nation, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has announced.

Global: Financing for Development and Women Rights: a critical review

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ygtlv3f

This publication from WIDE reviews the current debates about development, as well as the background for this new aid architecture, and analyses the international frameworks for financing for development and women rights, as well as governments´ commitments for resources. It also summarises and analyses all the contributions to the aid effectiveness agenda from a gender perspective.

Global: Women & International Criminal Law

Special issue of the International Criminal Law Review - Call for papers

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/61275

The International Criminal Law Review invites submissions for its 2010 special issue entitled “Women and International Criminal Law,” to be guest-edited by Diane Marie Amann, University of California, Davis, School of Law; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Temple University Beasley School of Law; and Beth Van Schaack, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
The International Criminal Law Review invites submissions for its 2010 special issue entitled “Women and International Criminal Law,” to be guest-edited by Diane Marie Amann, University of California, Davis, School of Law; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Temple University Beasley School of Law; and Beth Van Schaack, University of Santa Clara School of Law. The Special Issue is dedicated to Judge Patricia M. Wald, a pathbreaker in international criminal law who has served as Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a Judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a member of the Iraq Intelligence Commission, Co-Chair of the American Society of International Law Task Force on the International Criminal Court, and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Open Society Justice Initiative.

This special issue is devoted to the topic of women and international criminal law. The majority of the articles have been solicited from prominent academics and practitioners in the field of international criminal law and feminist jurisprudence, such as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Prof. Jenny Martinez, Dean Martha Minow, Prof. David Luban, Prof. Leila Nadya Sadat, Prof. Naomi Cahn, and Lucy Reed. The editors have also reserved several slots for submissions in response to this call to papers. Submissions should be inspired by this theme statement:

Special Issue Theme: Women & International Criminal Law

The law, it has been noted, “has not always served women well.” The critique extends readily to international law. Until very recently, women were absent from the processes of international law formation and enforcement, and invisible within substantive law reflective of the male experience. Mirroring the public/private divide running through much of law and society, the law, and those with the power to use it, tended to treat all forms of gender violence as opportunistic, peripheral, or private crimes reflecting personal motives and desires unconnected to issues of international importance. Thanks to the tireless work of committed advocates, jurists, and diplomats, international criminal law now treats many forms of gender violence as prosecutable offences against the physical and mental integrity of the victim. With the promulgation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the voluminous jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the law now sanctions the prosecution of gender crimes as war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and the predicate acts of genocide.

Women have stood front and center to push these developments. Other international institutions often are dominated by men. Yet women have served in top posts in all of the modern tribunals, as Presidents (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Navanethem Pillay, and Renate Winter), Registrar (Dorothée de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh), Chief Prosecutors (Louise Arbour and Carla Del Ponte), Deputy Prosecutors (Fatou Bensouda), Gender Advisors (Patricia Viseur Sellers and Catharine MacKinnon), and in many other judicial, prosecution, defense, and administrative capacities. The tribunals are approaching gender parity in staffing, although women remain concentrated in the lower professional grades.International criminal law is thus one area of international law in which women have made headway in terms of substantive law and institutional access; still, significant obstacles remain to ensure a robust system of gender justice in the face of continued violations.

The field of international criminal law nears a watershed moment, as ad hoc tribunals wind down and the International Criminal Court becomes fully operational. This opportune time invites reflection on whether international criminal law should be considered a feminist project. Accordingly, this volume offers sustained study of how international criminal law affects women and how women have affected international criminal law. We welcome submissions on the following topics:

* Can, and has, international criminal law improved the material conditions of women’s lives and promoted the dignity of women?
* Is participation in international criminal justice liberating and transformative, or alienating and regressive?
* What legal reforms, procedural devices, advocacy strategies, and institutional arrangements can be employed to ensure that women experience the former and not the latter?
* Does fixation on criminal penalties constrain imagination and implementation of other ways to respond to the needs, demands, and aspirations of women in situations of armed conflict, mass violence, abuse, and repression?
* How have women - as activists, victims, lawyers, and perpetrators - changed the field?
* How has the gender jurisprudence advanced, or impeded, the development of international criminal law?
* Has international criminal law changed the way we think about violence against women?

This volume looks beyond sex crimes to consider multiple ways that women experience war and repression, as agents of change, as victims, and as perpetrators. The study adopts critical perspectives to challenge conceptual boundaries - between and within public international law, international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and international human rights - that tend to eclipse the intersectionalities of women’s identities and to fragment women’s experiences with violence, based upon whether violence occurs in a time of war or peace, whether it occurs at home or in a detention center, or whether the perpetrator is a state actor or a private person. Our hope is that the new perspectives presented in this collection will advance our thinking about gender and international law across a number of disciplines. We welcome your participation in this historic effort to examine the impact of international criminal law on women, and vice versa.

Special Issue Logistics

The volume will be published in spring 2011. Judge Wald and other contributors will present their works at a roundtable hosted at the American Society of International Law’s Tillar House in Washington, D.C., on October 29, 2010 - days before the tenth anniversary of the first U.N. Security Council resolution on Women, Peace and Security.

To ensure anonymity in the selection phase, please submit a solid draft essay or article, in the range of 5,000 to 10,000 words, with all identifying information redacted, to Kathleen A. Doty, by way of an e-mail attachment in Word format (kadoty [at] ucdavis [dot] edu), by April 15, 2010. Please note the paper’s title (which should match exactly the title of the redacted paper) and your name and contact information in the body of the e-mail.

Once papers have been selected, they will be subject to a full edit and peer review in advance of the October roundtable. The final draft of the paper will be due no later thanMarch 1, 2011, and should adhere to the International Criminal Law Review style sheet, which is available at http://www.brill.nl/AuthorsInstructions/ICLA.pdf

About the Editors

Diane Marie Amann is Professor of Law and Director of the California International Law Center at King Hall, University of California, Davis, School of Law; a founding contributor to the IntLawGrrls blog, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/; and a Vice President of the American Society of International Law. Her scholarship examines the interaction of national and international legal regimes in efforts to combat atrocity and cross-border crime.

Jaya Ramji-Nogales is Assistant Professor of Law at Temple University’s Beasley School of Law; a regular contributor to IntLawGrrls blog; and a member of the Board of Legal Advisors to the Documentation Center of Cambodia. Her scholarship examines transitional justice mechanisms, and includes the volume Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian Courts (2005), co-edited with Beth Van Schaack.

Beth Van Schaack is Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law and Visiting Scholar (2009-2010) at the Center on Democracy, Development & The Rule of Law, Stanford University, as well as a regular contributor to IntLawGrrls blog. Prior to joining the law faculty, she was Acting Executive Director and Staff Attorney with The Center for Justice & Accountability, San Francisco, and a law clerk with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Her scholarship is in the area of international criminal law, and she is the co-author with Ron Slye of a leading casebook and hornbook on the topic.

Malawi: Women fight harmful cultural practices

2010-01-08

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=49683

An experience which Belita Simpokolwe went through in December last year remains deeply etched in her memory. "Sometimes I fail to concentrate in class when these things come back to my mind," laments 13-year-old Simpokolwe, a grade six pupil at Kawale Primary School, in the northern Malawi district of Chitipa.

South Sudan: Women's eyes on the collective prize

2010-01-08

http://www.ipsterraviva.net/europe/article.aspx?id=8198

January marks the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended a bitter north-south civil war in Sudan. With important elections scheduled for April, women are debating and fighting for an expanded role in the new institutions of government.

Chad: Paying for fallout of landmines, UXO

2010-01-08

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87667

More than half of Chad’s nine million people live near sites potentially contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) or landmines, according to the national demining centre. The government says more than 100 people are killed or wounded every year by landmines or UXO; aid organizations cover the bulk of medical care and rehabilitation for mine victims, according to NGO Handicap International.

DRC: Use of child soldiers 'particularly abusive,' UN expert testifies

2010-01-08

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7ZGUCL?OpenDocument

Children cannot consent to their own exploitation, making the use of children in warfare "particularly abusive," a top United Nations official has said at the trial of a Congolese warlord accused of enlisting child soldiers.

Global: France to set up new court to investigate genocide

2010-01-08

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8445629.stm

The French government has announced that it will set up a new panel to try cases of genocide and war crimes committed in France or abroad. The new court would speed up the way genocide cases are tried where the suspect is on French territory but the process involves several jurisdictions.

Rwanda: Genocide fugitive arrested in Malawi

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ykz8crg

Malawian authorities have arrested Charles Bandora an ex- senior official of the former Rwandan ruling party, MRND, indicted by the Prosecution for Genocide. Bandora, a former businessman in Ngenda, Kigali, faces charges that include; Genocide, complicity in Genocide, conspiracy to commit Genocide, extermination, murder as a crime against humanity and organized crime.

Zimbabwe: Government halts sale of contorversial diamonds

2010-01-08

http://zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=6330&cat=1

Zimbabwe has halted a controversial sale of 300 000 carats of diamonds, but blamed bureaucratic hold-ups rather than a scandal over rights abuses by the military in the diamond fields.

Zimbabwe: Integrity of Human Rights Commissioners queried

2010-01-08

http://www.swradioafrica.com/news080110/integrity080110.htm

The appointment of the former chief immigration officer, Elasto Mugwadi, to the new Human Rights Commission has come under fire, following revelations of a spate of injustices he perpetrated during his time in government.

Chad: Tackling FGM in refugee camps

2010-01-08

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87651

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Chad is identifying pregnant women in refugee camps who have had their genitalia cut, in order to better prepare for potential complications, according to UNHCR and its medical partners. The exercise is part of efforts in the camps to tackle the health fallout of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) as well as prevent new cutting.

Ethiopia: Asylum seeker released after a year in Egyptian prison

Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/61272

Medhine is an Ethiopian Asylum seeker; she spent more than a year in the Egyptian Prison for illegal entry to Egypt. During her one year of detention, she lost her young daughter, who was suffering from severe diarrhea and vomiting. EFRR handled this case and tried to release her through submitting several cases to the office of the High General Prosecutor and National Council for Human Rights asking for her release.
Medhine is an Ethiopian Asylum seeker; she spent more than a year in the Egyptian Prison for illegal entry to Egypt.

During her one year of detention, she lost her young daughter, who was suffering from severe diarrhea and vomiting. EFRR handled this case and tried to release her through submitting several cases to the office of the High General Prosecutor and National Council for Human Rights asking for her release.

Additionally, EFRR submitted a complaint to the Special Rapporteur on Migrants at Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In response to the complaint, EFRR Chairman was contacted by the Egyptian Authority regarding this case.

This Morning the office of the High General Prosecutor informed EFRR that the Egyptian Authority is going to release Mrs. Medhine. In response, EFRR sent a Lawyer to follow the procedures needed for release. The Egyptian authorities took Mrs. Medine form El Quanater Prison (where she was detained) to El Mogmaa as the last step for her detention where she will be released.

EFRR is pleased to thank all the National and International NGOs who helped in Mrs. Medhine’s case.

Algeria: Striking employees injured during a clash with police

2010-01-08

http://www.afrol.com/articles/35049

Several heavy goods vehicle workers have been injured during a clash with riot police in the capital Algiers while holding a protest to demand better wages and benefits

Zimbabwe: Teachers threaten strike over pay

2010-01-08

http://www.swradioafrica.com/news080110/teachers080110.htm

Teachers have threatened to go on strike if their salaries are not raised to US$600 per month from the current US$150. The President of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) Takavafira Zhou said their members would not turn up for work next week if they received no clarification on how much they will be earning. Ever since Finance Minister Tendai Biti presented his budget in December last year, there has been no word on how much teachers would earn.

Emerging powers news roundup

Stephen Marks

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/emplayersnews/61269

CHINA IN THE WORLD

China's state-owned banks have become a main engine of the global recovery, financing the construction of copper mines, purchase of airplanes, expansion of retail stores and other projects even as their U.S. and European counterparts scale back lending.

Over the first nine months of 2009, new lending by Chinese banks has injected $1.3 trillion into the world economy, according to statistics from the People's Bank of China, which functions as China's central bank. The beneficiaries have included U.S.-based Southwest Airlines, the Netherlands' Aercap airplane leasing company, Civil Aviation Authority in Dubai, and Foster's brewery and Woolworths supermarket chain in Australia.More


Beijing's methods to censor the Internet may well run afoul of its World Trade Organization commitments, claims the Wall Street Journal.More


Gold's allure seems to be growing further in China with the nation soon set to surpass India as the biggest consumer. China is already the largest gold producer in the world with an output of around 282.504 tons in the first 11 months of 2009. That figure represents a 14.6 percent increase over the same period in 2008.More


Indians living in border areas neighbouring China are beginning to envy fast-paced development brought by Beijing to the point of regretting being Indian, a senior member of India's ruling Congress party has warned. More


Britain and other Western countries risk running out of supplies of certain highly sought-after rare metals that are vital to a host of green technologies, amid growing evidence that China, which has a monopoly on global production, is set to choke off exports of valuable compounds. More

CHINA IN AFRICA


Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi kicked off his official tour of five African nations and Saudi Arabia on Tuesday, aiming to cement China's strategic partnership with Africa. The African leg of the tour will last from Jan. 6 to 12, continuing to Saudi Arabia on Jan. 12 and 13.More


China’s investment in Africa in the first nine months of the year, excluding financial investments, rose 77.5 percent to $875 million, the Ministry of Commerce said. In October China’s first-half investment in Africa rose 78.6 percent to $875 million. More


The Chinese government says its Navy does not need a supply base in the Gulf of Aden to support ships operating against Somali pirates.

The Defense Ministry responded to a recommendation from Yin Zhou, a retired admiral now working at the Navy's Equipment Research Center, China Daily reported. In a brief statement, the ministry said at-sea supply and the use of bases set up by other countries is sufficient. More




Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki claimed that China has committed to help develop a second port in the East African nation, which is expected to start being built this year. Construction of the port at Lamu on Kenya’s northeast coast forms part of a $22 billion project announced by the government in April 2008. It includes a railway line, a highway linking neighboring Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Rwanda to Lamu and three airports, according to Kenya’s Transport Ministry. The port at Lamu will be bigger than the Kenya’s existing facility at Mombasa. More


But Yang Jiechi, China’s foreign minister, said in Kenya on Wednesday that his government was urging Chinese enterprises – many of which are state-owned – to “explore the possibility of co-operation with the Kenyan side on such projects”. According to the Financial Times he indicated that no firm financial commitments could be made until China had seen the results of a feasibility study that is currently under way. The port and transport corridor could provide a new export route for Chinese oil from Sudan. More


The Chinese government is fast-tracking modalities to reduce trade imbalances with Kenya as it seeks to cement bilateral ties between the two countries, according to Chinese envoy to Kenya, Mr Deng Hongbo. According to the Economic Survey 2009, Kenya exported goods worth Sh2 billion in 2008 but imports from mainland China stood at Sh63 billion. The Chinese envoy said his government was making conscious efforts to bridge the gap. More


Chinese companies top the list of companies registered in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ghana, the CEO of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) has said. Mr. George Aboagye said the FDI component of the estimated value of the companies registered during the period under review was GH¢339.32 million while the local currency component amounted to GH¢24.88 million.

Speaking at a press conference in Accra, he said while Chinese companies record the highest number of companies in the country, South African companies top the list of countries with the largest value of investments in Ghana in 2009. More


African Minerals, the Aim-listed exploration group, with prospective iron ore assets in West Africa, has sold a 12.5 per cent stake in the company to the Chinese state-owned China Railway Materials Commercial Corp (CRM), a steel trading firm. The deal, worth £152.6m, will also see CRM agree to buy between four and eight million tonnes of iron ore each year from African Minerals' mine at Tonkolili in Sierra Leone, over at least the next 20 years. More

ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA


António Pires de Lima, head of the Portuguese drinks group Unicer, finally won permission to build a brewery in Angola last month. Richard Lapper reporting in the Financial Times from Luanda, claimed that the €100m deal encapsulated ‘an intriguing historical twist: his country’s re-engagement with its rapidly growing former African colony’.

Unicer’s investment confirms Portugal’s position as Angola’s single largest source of foreign capital outside the oil sector, with more than $1bn (€694bn, £625bn) channelled into the country since the beginning of 2007. More


Slashing emissions in coal-dominated South Africa will require an overhaul of national policies as well as significant funding, a new study finds. The study of private-sector investment in South Africa's electricity sector finds that early efforts to enhance and promote both energy efficiency and renewable energy "have failed to have any large-scale effects. Capacity in renewable energy, the study found, "is lacking at every stage of the technology cycle, from research and development to installation and maintenance."

Currently, South Africa contributes about 1.1 percent of global emissions, according to the most recent 2005 data from the World Resources Institute. Per capita, it emits an average 9 tons of CO2 per person, almost on a par with the European Union and about double the sub-Saharan average of 4.5 tons. More

OTHER EMERGING POWERS IN AFRICA


India’s Vice-President Hamid Ansari is visiting Zambia, Malawi and Botswana in a trip being hailed as breaking new grounds in India’s engagement with Africa.
India’s total trade with Africa is an estimated 39 billion dollars, according to a Ministry of External Affairs official. Ansari listed a possible extension of Indian lines of credit to “one or two big projects” in Zambia. On the upcoming trip to Botswana, Ansari hoped to source directly from the Botswana’s diamond mines instead of relying on prices set by a “monopoly”. India is the largest importer of uncut diamonds and Botswana the largest producer. More


Brazil’s annual trade with Africa has jumped from $3,1bn in 2000 to $26,3bn last year, a rate of growth outpaced only by China, which has seen two-way commerce soar tenfold this past decade to $107bn.More


BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS
* Stephen Marks is research associate and project coordinator with Fahamu's China in Africa Project.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Kenya: China pledges funds for infrastructure

2010-01-08

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8444882.stm

China says it will give a $7m (£4.4m) grant to help fund infrastructure development projects in Kenya. The announcement came at the start of the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's latest Africa tour.

Angola: New constitution expected in 2010

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ybp6bks

Angola is to use the first quarter of 2010 to adopt a new constitution for the country, announced the president of the National Assembly, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos.

Cote d'Ivoire: Konan Bédié announces manifesto for election

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yecnwrp

The candidate of the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) for the next presidential election, Henri Konan Bédié, has outlined his manifesto for the election saying he has identified '10 major challenges' likely to lead the country to prosperity.

Guinea: General Konaté vows peaceful transition

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ya85q3h

The acting chairman of the Guinea's junta, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), General Sékouba Konaté, has vowed to create 'a new peaceful transition authority' that will soon set dates for elections.

Madagascar: Government warns of crackdown

2010-01-08

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/838062/-/124x0p8z/-/index.html

Madagascar’s government has said it will crack down on opposition leaders and their supporters, who reject plans for elections, if they provoke further civil unrest.

West Africa: Nigerians in diaspora write to Saudi king over Yar’Adua

2010-01-08

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/838058/-/124x0pxz/-/index.html

Nigerians in the diaspora have written a letter to Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud on the continued absence of President Yar’Adua from the country, demanding true information on the state of his health.

Global: UNESCO delays new prizes after Equatorial Guinea uproar

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/y9okcu6

UNESCO is suspending a life sciences prize sponsored by Equatorial Guinea, and is to review procedures for prizes it endorses, following bitter protests about the US$3 million endowment. The UNESCO-Obiang Nguema Mbasogo International Prize for Research in the Life Sciences was agreed by the organisation's member states in November 2008 "in recognition of scientific achievements that improve the quality of human life".

Africa: UN budget boost for Africa missions

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/y8topye

A top UN official has revealed the world body's intention to boost its missions in Africa and beyond as a result of an unexpected increase in its budget for this year.

Benin: Solar-powered irrigation a shining success

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/y9ywk7x

Solar-powered irrigation systems can boost food and income levels in rural Sub-Saharan Africa, researchers have found. Irrigation is known to reduce poverty in Asia, they wrote in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences this week (5 January), but the success of the technique is not well-documented in Sub-Saharan Africa.

West Africa: Cameroon puts brain drain into reverse

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yk7gwfb

Cameroon is reversing its scientific brain drain by boosting the salaries of university academics. The early signs are that a government fund of 4.2 billion Central African francs (almost US$9.5 million), created in early 2009, has increased the number of scientists and stabilised the research environment.

Zimbabwe: Economy crippled by political uncertainty

2010-01-08

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=49905

The Zimbabwean government has been working hard to attract international investors to revive the country’s failing economy. Success on this front in 2010 may hinge on the coalition government convincing investors their capital will be secure.

Earlier treatment averting higher medical costs in South African cohort

2010-01-08

http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/4767F494-52B8-4255-99A1-533424729F85.asp

Starting treatment earlier, at a higher CD4 count, and being in care six months or longer before starting ART, is associated with lower treatment costs during the first months of antiretroviral tretament, according to an analysis of the direct health care costs of treating over 10,000 HIV-infected adults in a private HIV care programme in southern Africa, published in the December 1 edition of PLoS Medicine.

Guinea-Bissau: Growing use of contraception saves lives

2010-01-08

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33375

A growing understanding of the role of family planning and the spread of contraception use resulting from greater access to reproductive healthcare is helping to save lives in Guinea-Bissau, according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Kenya: The fringe benefits of male circumcision rollout

2010-01-08

http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87640

In November 2008, Kenya launched an ambitious national voluntary male circumcision drive, which aims to have more than one million men circumcised by 2013 The government's effort is largely concentrated on Nyanza Province, where fewer than 50 percent of men are circumcised and the HIV prevalence is 15.4 percent, about twice the national average. A recent rapid results initiative saw more than 35,000 Nyanza men circumcised within a six-week period. The circumcision programme provides voluntary counselling and testing for HIV and routine STI tests to all men who seek the services.

South Africa: HIV stigma persists

2010-01-08

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=49904

HIV-related stigma and discrimination remain a key concern in South Africa, despite the multitude of HIV awareness campaigns that have been launched by government and civil society organisations throughout the years, health experts say.

Zimbabwe: Government proposes to increase people on Treatment for HIV/AIDS

2010-01-08

http://zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=6328&cat=2

The government of Zimbabwe is aiming to increase the number of people on antiretroviral drug therapy for HI/AIDS to 300,000 this year from 180,000 at present, according to Health Minister Henry Madzorera.

Somaliland: School enrolment up

2010-01-08

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87609

School enrolment has risen sharply in Somalia's self-declared independent region of Somaliland since 1991, raising the literacy rate from 20 percent to 45 percent, education officials have said.

Zimbabwe: WOZA demand changes in education system in 2010

2010-01-08

http://wozazimbabwe.org/?p=607

Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) has launched a report on the state of education in Zimbabwe entitled ‘Looking back to look forward - education in Zimbabwe: a WOZA perspective’. The recommendations contained in the report form the basis of WOZA’s current campaign on education.

Malawi: Defenders of gay couple arrested

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yjleho6

Three human rights workers involved in the defense of the famous Malawi gay couple have been arrested, according to a release from the UK-based Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) equality group, OutRage! The couple are in police custody and face a maximum imprisonment of 14 years.

Southern Africa: Homophobia heightens in Swaziland

2010-01-08

http://sexgenderbody.com/content/homophobia-heightens-swaziland

On the 29th of December 2009 a lesbian woman and human rights activist, Thuli Rudd, also known as Thulani, was arrested on her way back home in Swaziland at the border from South Africa. She was charged with the murder of her partner, the late Pitseng Vilakati whose body had been found on Tuesday the 22nd of December 2009.

Uganda: Minister says gay death penalty 'unnecessary'

2010-01-08

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8448197.stm

A Ugandan government minister has said that a proposed law which includes the death penalty for some homosexual acts is "not necessary".

Uganda: The strange geometry of an anti-gay rumpus

2010-01-08

http://www.nickyoungwrites.com/?q=node/59

Uganda is making global headlines again, this time with a proposed law to execute citizens found guilty of ‘aggravated homosexuality.’Nick young explores the broader gender implications.

Global: Immigrants riot in Italy amid racial unrest

2010-01-08

http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6070H520100108

Thousands of immigrants protested against racism in a southern Italian town on Friday, after a night of rioting that was sparked by an attack on African farm workers by a gang of white youths.

Africa: Managing Africa’s water in a changing climate

2010-01-08

http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/climate-change&id=45594&type=Document

Nearly one-third of all water-related disasters occur in Africa. The second issue of Joto Afrika considers the relationship between climate change, the greater incidence of extreme weather events, such as drought and flooding, and the increasing scarcity of water on the African continent.

Africa: The scramble for land in Ethiopia

2010-01-08

http://farmlandgrab.org/10097

The World Bank, the IMF and the Ethiopian regime annual development reports have highlighted on Ethiopia’s higher GDP growth rate over the past 10 years, yet the UN development index and other indices [Misery Index] that measure the well-being of people have declined both absolutely and relative to many other African countries. The paradox of acute poverty and declining well-being of Ethiopians is found in various parts of the country and is pervasive across demographic groups.

Call for cases on land rights and the right to food

2010-01-08

http://farmlandgrab.org/10111

In order to collect information for his next report, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food launches a call for information on cases that illustrate the links among security of land tenure, access to land, and the right to food. He also intends to organize regional consultations.

Global: Three approved GMOs linked to organ damage

2010-01-08

http://www.choike.org/2009/eng/informes/7742.html

In what is being described as the first ever and most comprehensive study of the effects of genetically modified foods on mammalian health, researchers have linked organ damage with consumption of Monsanto's GM maize.

Global: Three-quarters of hungry are rural poor

2010-01-08

http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49920

Climate change, associated with a four-fold increase in natural disasters in the last decade, and the growth of world population, which is expected to reach nine billion by 2050, pose new challenges for aid initiatives like those of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP).

Global: 10th Annual Freedom of Expression Awards

Last call for nominations

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/61273

Index on Censorship is the UK’s leading organisation dedicated to the promotion of free expression worldwide. In March 2010, we will be holding our 10th Annual Freedom of Expression Awards and would like to invite you to submit nominations for the categories below. Please note that the deadline for nominations is 15th January 2010.
Index on Censorship is the UK’s leading organisation dedicated to the promotion of free expression worldwide. In March 2010, we will be holding our 10th Annual Freedom of Expression Awards and would like to invite you to submit nominations for the categories below. Please note that the deadline for nominations is 18th January 2009

The aim of the awards is to recognise
* High quality work that defends and promotes freedom of expression.
* Work that was created or took place during 2009 and reflects current and salient issues.
* Work that represents global spread and gender balance.



The nominations must demonstrate:

* Original perspectives of freedom of expression.
* Depth of purpose, impact and courage and possibly be carried out in hostile environments or contexts.
* Not already recognised by other awards in the UK, so providing real added value to new work.

JOURNALISM AWARD: Recognising investigative journalism of dogged determination across a range of media including print, online, radio and television, taking into consideration impact, originality and revelation.

NEW MEDIA AWARD: Recognising innovation and original use of new technology to circumvent censorship, fostering debate, argument or dissent.

LAW AND CAMPAIGN AWARD: Recognising lawyers or campaigners who have fought repression, or have struggled to challenge political climates and perceptions. Special attention is given to people using or establishing legal precedents to fight injustice.

PUBLISHING AWARD: Recognising publishers who have produced a book that has been censored, or where its publication runs a demonstrable risk of encountering censorship in whatever form.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOMINATION FORM



I would like to nominate the following individual/organisation:

………………………………………………………………………………...

Category

Journalism ¨ New Media ¨ Law and Campaigning¨ Publishing ¨

This nominee deserves to win because (max 100 words) ………………......

…………………………………………………………………....................................

…………………………………………………………………………………..............

…………………………………………………………………………………………...


Your Name: Your E-mail:

Date:

Global: 2009 leaves one of worst records for targeted killings of journalists - IFJ

2010-01-08

http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/12964.html

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has called for more action from governments and the United Nations to protect media as it announced a grim total of 137 journalists and media personnel killed during 2009.

Mauritania: IFJ condemns arbitrary detention of journalist

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ybn3d2h

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has condemned the unlawful, arbitrary and unjustified detention of Hannevy Ould Dehah, Director of Taqadoumy website in Dar Nahim prison in Nouakchott, after he had served his term.

North Africa: Libyan bloggers tackle racism, corruption

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yznzpwh

This week, Libyan blogs addressed several thorny issues including racial discrimination, corruption and the responsibilities and freedom of bloggers.

Somaila: Somali journalists lauch their own union

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/61265

Somali prominent journalists in Mogadishu have for the first time officially launched a new Press Freedom Group.Somali Foreign Correspondents Association (SOFCA), after meeting at Nasahablod hotel in Mogadishu.
Somali prominent journalists in Mogadishu have for the first time officially launched a new Press Freedom Group.Somali Foreign Correspondents Association (SOFCA), after meeting at Nasahablod hotel in Mogadishu.


After we had realized that we work in the world’s most dangerous country we have decided to come together discuss about our safety and establish this Union.


The Union is promising to defend the freedom of the press. It also promised to push for a change in some of the views that the international community and the journalists’ rights defenders world wide have had about Journalists working on the ground.


The Union wants to change a wrongly believed idea that all journalists in Somalia are represented by a particular group or individual at international meetings, work shops, and forums for media support centers and donors.


The union members believe that there is nothing that could prevent Somali Journalists to have more than oneUNION with the leadership of well-known journalists and good professionals.


“There is certainly no reason on earth why Somali journalists on the ground cannot have their own professional union,” said Seynab Abukar, a reporter for Radio Voice of America, based in Mogadishu. “We are happy with our new union,” Abukar said.


“A mistake, if there is any, can only be a mistake, when you refuse to correct it,” said Abdi Samad Abdulkadir Mohamed Olad Hassan, the chairman for the newly established press freedom group SOFCA.

“This is a delayed progressive step taken forward and the union will at least help us to help each other, I am happy with it,” said Mohamed Sheikh Nor, a photographer for AP news agency.
This union has been established to show the solidarity of more than 50 journalists, mainly, those whose bylines always appear on the international headlines by taking the risk and showing bravery to carry on their jobs.


“The aim is to speak for the voiceless and seek support for our colleagues on the ground, when they need us and face either physical problems or morale damage due to the ceaseless conflict that always affects their jobs and freedom of speech,” Olad said.


This union is none profit with a voluntary advocacy for the welfare, safety and freedom of the journalists and will be always ready to alert the world about Journalists problems timely with details.
The union’s target is to help whole-heartedly free media, democracy, transparency and insuperable advocacy to prevail in Somalia particularly and the whole world in General.


By (SOFCA)

Somalia: Death, displacement, detention and violence perpetrated against media

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/61274

The 2009 was a year of darkness, death, displacement, detention and violence against journalists and the entire media fraternity in Somalia, according to the annual report unveiled by the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ).
The 2009 was a year of darkness, death, displacement, detention and violence against journalists and the entire media fraternity in Somalia, according to the annual report unveiled by the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ).

In the year alone, a total of nine (9) journalists were killed either in the line of duty or in targeted brutal attacks by enemies of media freedom, making Somalia the most dangerous place for a journalist in Africa.

According to the report, also, a total of 12 journalists were wounded and 15 others arrested in a systematic and well coordinated affront against the media in the horn of African country. Another 100 journalists received death threats.

The Annual Report on Press Freedom Violations, Somalia's most authoritative publication produced in Somalia on the state of media freedom and rights of journalists, covers southern and central regions, Puntland and Somaliland. The report, this year, documents media deaths, journalists wounded, media practitioners arrested, ransacking of media houses and constant death threats which have sometimes led to journalists fleeing into neighbouring countries in fear of their lives.

“2009 became an outlandish and harrowing year as a wave of fiendish killings, arrests, death threats and intimidations against journalists reached incomparable level in the known history of Somali journalism,” the NUSOJ Annual Report on Press Freedom Violations, says in part.

The ensuing oppression and viciousness claimed the lives of media executives, reporters, photojournalists and cameramen who were all working with electronic media and also resulted in unparalleled level of journalists wounded and arrested, continues the report titled “War on Journalism in Somalia: Death, Displacement and Desolation”. Seven out of the nine journalists killed were murdered in Mogadishu. One was killed in Afgoye and another one in Beledweyne towns.

“Assassins’ bullets are felling journalists in cold-blooded murder while anger from warring sides is increasingly directed against journalists and media outlets for their coverage of events and issues related to the political and security situation,” said Omar Faruk Osman, NUSOJ Secretary General.

“The past twelve months stand out as the darkest and deadliest period for journalism Somalia. The work and life of journalists have become worthless and dispensable while attacks against journalists continue unrestrained. Many of the killers are known but there is no justice for their victims,” Omar added.

Besides the targeted assassinations, media professionals were also caught in the middle of combat zones. Warring sides in southern Somalia regard professional journalists who are dedicated to reveal the truth as either double agents or sympathizers of insurgents or radicals. Journalists in southern regions are unwilling to step into many parts of the south for fear of their safety. This has blacked these areas from news, allowing untold atrocities to go on unreported. Journalists are exposed to numerous risks in travelling to these areas on authentic reporting assignments.

With all these painful statistics, the question is why the media in Somalia is targeted. “The death-dealing attacks on the media are happening as a result of their fierce desire for professionalism and independent reporting and their refusal to kowtow to the authorities and insurgents who are hell-bent on bringing about all sorts of heartbreak,” said Omar.

Media deaths, threats and wounds had driven many journalists outside the country or have turned many into internally displaced people while those that remain in the country, especially in the southern and central regions, were forced to practice self-censorship. Many journalists in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Jowhar, Kismayu and Beledweyne hardly question the information provided by particularly armed groups. “Several media houses have taken refugee in entertainment, steering clear of airing news and current affairs programming,” he said.

“Continuing fighting between the Transitional government forces and Islamic insurgents, lack of capacity of the Transitional Federal Government to ensure law and order as well as peace and stability; political wrangles within the TFG, elections crisis in Somaliland, selective exercise of rule of law in both Somaliland and Puntland, undue misuse of power by the Puntland administration, the fragmentation of insurgent forces, and Al-Shabaab consolidation of control in at least 10 regions have all contributed considerably to the deepening crisis against the media,” Omar added.

This fierce cruelty against media community has “resulted in a steady stream of journalists escaping from Mogadishu in search of safety elsewhere. Independent-minded and reputable journalists face a stark choice to either flee the country for their security or risk death for their journalism work.

In Puntland, physical violence and misuse of law caused speedy increase of media attacks. Journalists are accused and attacked for threatening security or propaganda against the leaders of the Puntland. Critical and independent reportage was branded as a danger to “security”, “rule of law”, and the “dignity of leaders”. Journalists complained of the total disrespect of Puntland constitution law by the Puntland Intelligence Service and police forces.

NUSOJ states that overt and covert repressions against the media in Puntland are well orchestrated. With all the efforts to make peaceful transfer of power to the new president of Puntland, attacks and intimidation remain common in these northeastern regions of Somalia.

In the course of 2009, repression and violence against media in Somaliland persisted and multiplied. The suppression reached its peak during the elections crisis, when Somaliland authorities and their cronies intensified stamping out journalists who file unfavourable reports.

“Last year’s monstrous crimes against journalists in Somalia are a constant reminder to us and to the world community of journalists that we must redouble our efforts in the fight against wanton violence and injustice. We will persevere in our struggle for change, to secure respect for media rights and for the protection of journalists,” Omar said.

“We will continue to call on governments as well as international and regional partners to take urgent action to stem the tide of severe crimes by pressurising local authorities to recognise and live up to their human rights obligations. Our aspirations are clear – we will continue to rally our journalists, media executives and wider civil society in order to seek justice, challenge repressive acts, name and shame perpetrators and, above all, give a voice to all journalists, in particular those living and working under conditions of unfairness, fear and constant cruelty,” Omar declared.

For More information, please contact:

Mogadishu: Mohamed Ibrahim Isak
Mobile: +252-1-5889930 / +25250491999

Nairobi: Ahmednor Mohamed
Mobile: +254 711 867202

--
For further information, contact:
National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ)
Taleex Street, KM4 Area, Hodan District,
Mogadishu, Somalia, tel/fax: +252 1 859 944,
e-mail: newsletter@nusoj.org
Internet: http://www.nusoj.org

Tunisia: Calls rise to create fund for jobless

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yezetdd

As Tunisian lawmakers mull the 2010 budget, many politicians, labour leaders, and ordinary people are calling for the creation of a national fund to help the unemployed.

DRC: UN backs offensive to protect civilians

2010-01-08

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33422

A controversial United Nations-backed Government offensive against rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), during which Congolese soldiers are alleged to have committed massacres and gang-rape, has been replaced by a new UN-supported operation with a central focus on protecting civilians.

DRC: Villagers form ‘militia’ groups in response to LRA offensive

2010-01-08

http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/12974.html

United Nations human rights teams are warning of increased weapon trafficking in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo as armed villagers form units in response to killings, rapes and kidnappings carried out by the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Kenya: UN sends help for 30,000 flood victims

2010-01-08

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33425

The United Nations is sending health care kits and other supplies for 30,000 victims of massive flooding in Kenya, where thousands of others are feared to be at risk if heavy rains persist.

Somalia: 20 killed, 40 wounded in battle

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yaq822l

At least 20 civilians were killed on Thursday evening and 40 others wounded after mortars and artillery shells hit the capital Mogadishu, according to eye witnesses' account. The deadly clashes erupted after Islamist insurgents fired at the presidency building, residents told AfricaNews.

South Sudan: Jonglei’s tribal conflicts

2010-01-08

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6452&l=1

This latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines violent conflict that has claimed several thousand lives in 2009. Inter-tribal fighting, while not a new phenomenon, has taken on a new and dangerously politicised character, with the worst violence in and around the vast, often impassable state of Jonglei.

Sudan: 139 killed in clash

2010-01-08

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/838068/-/124x0p2z/-/index.html

Armed Nuer tribesmen killed at least 139 members of a rival tribe in an attack in a remote area of southern Sudan, an official has reported.

West Africa: Sierra Leoneans reflect on war

2010-01-07

http://tinyurl.com/ygj8n9e

On January 6th, 2009, Sierra Leoneans commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Revolutionary United Front rebel invasion of Freetown, the capital. The invasion which attracted a long overdue international intervention in the civil war was one of the bloodiest and most destructive battles. For over a month, RUF rebels, ECOMOG peacekeepers and militia loyal to the government of Tijan Kabbah fought for the control of Freetown.

Africa: Bridging the digital divide through open access

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yl3pvyk

Publishing scientific findings and accessing the research of others is an essential part of the academic process, particularly to encourage debate and foster innovation. But many research institutions in Africa cannot afford to subscribe to many scientific journals, making it hard for scientists to keep up with research, writes Joseph Musakali.

Cameroon: Illegal telco operators: The most reasonable option

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ye5cmlr

In 1995, Cameroon initiated a restructuring process in the telecommunications sector. Placed among the least-connected countries in Africa (ranked 179th out of 206 countries classified by the International Telecommunication Union), the Telecommunications Regulation Agency (ART) was established to ensure healthy competition between operators at the time of this restructuring.

Global: A2K4: Access to Knowledge and Human Rights conference

February 12-13, 2010

2010-01-08

http://yaleisp.org/2009/11/a2k4/

Access to knowledge (A2K) is about designing intellectual property laws, telecommunication policies, and technical architectures that encourage broader participation in cultural, civic, and educational affairs; expand the benefits of scientific and technological advancement; and promote innovation, development, and social progress across the globe.

Tanzania: Public workers to undergo ICT training

2010-01-08

http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/current1.html#computing

The University of Dar es Salaam Computing Centre (UCC) has launched a two-year project on capacity building on the effective use and management of information and communication technology in the public sector.

Zimbabwe: IT to improve in five years

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/yeck9jr

Zimbabwe hopes to improve on its technological sector in the next five years. Technology Minister, Nelson Chamisa, said the country is embarking on a technological revolution path and drastic changes would soon be realized.

DRC: Militarization of mining well-entrenched

AfricaFocus Bulletin Dec 22, 2009 (091222)

2010-01-08

http://www.africafocus.org/docs09/gw0912.php

"The illicit exploitation of natural resources is not a new phenomenon in eastern DRC. It has characterised the conflict since it first erupted in 1996 and has been well documented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations Panel of Experts and Group of Experts, journalists and others. Twelve years on, the patterns remain the same, and despite abundant evidence of these activities, no effective action has been taken to stop this murderous trade." - Global Witness

CODESRIA interntional conference

Academic freedom and the social responsibility of academics and researchers in Africa

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/courses/61277

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is pleased to announce the organisation of an international conference on “Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa: What are the new challenges?”.
CODESRIA
International Conference
Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa: What are the new challenges?
March 9-11, 2010, Oran (Algeria)

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is pleased to announce the organisation of an international conference on “Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa: What are the new challenges?”. This conference comes within the framework of CODESRIA’s Academic Freedom Programme. It is aimed at taking stock of the progress of academic freedom in Africa over the last three decades, assessing the status of the fundamental rights of citizens in African countries and taking a look at the prospects that seem to emerge. This meeting is organised for the community of academics and researchers in Africa and the Diaspora, with particular interest in the issues of academic freedom. It will hold on March 9-11, 2010 in Oran (Algeria).

The Academic Freedom and Human Rights Programme has been established in CODESRIA since the early ‘90s. The initiatives developed have enabled it to be at the forefront of the fights that are being conducted for nearly two decades now for the defence of academic freedom and the social responsibility of African academics and researchers. The starting point of this programme was the adoption, in November 1990, of the Kampala Declaration (Uganda) which states, among others, that “Every African intellectual has the right to pursue intellectual activity, including teaching, research and dissemination of research results, without let or hindrance subject only to universally recognised principles of scientific enquiry and ethical and professional standards”. Since the Kampala Conference, CODESRIA has developed a great deal of activities, including: support to research, the publication of research results and the regular organisation of conferences in African countries, to discuss and review the constraints and progress relating to the issues of academic freedom in African universities. Besides, these conferences were often an opportunity to review the reforms undertaken or undergone over the last two decades by African higher education and research institutions.

Since the Kampala Declaration, the debate on issues pertaining to academic freedom has been prevailing in academic circles, and its importance no longer needs to be demonstrated within the African academic and research community. However, the debate on the concept of Academic Freedom or its content is still topical. While some advocate a return to more orthodox and restrictive approach/definition of academic freedom, defining it as a right and a duty that must be exercised in the university space, others apprehend academic freedom as a concept related to the exercise of citizenship and, consequently, in a perspective of defence of the freedom of expression of citizens. The question is then posed to know which option is the more relevant in the African context.

At the same time as the setting up of this programme in 1994, African political systems have experienced real advances. Many advances have been achieved in particular in the field of Human Rights, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the press. African societies have become much more allergic to arbitrary actions and talks. The evolution of the African public sphere towards greater tolerance for wider diversity of opinions and points of view no longer needs to be demonstrated. These spaces themselves have become plural, configuring a host of places in which citizens can freely take stands on the life of the city. The tendency for the status of Human Rights on the continent to improve is real, even though there are still many efforts to do, in particular on structural-type issues. We still witness, despite the prohibition, infringements of academic freedom by the political powers who are supposed to ensure compliance with the texts in force. Consequently, university researchers continue to be pursued for having expressed opinions that were critical or contrary to those of the powers that be or of the established social order.

Besides, over the last decades, higher education institutions and African universities have experienced, and continue to experience, deep changes. Important reforms were made at all levels of the system and in virtually all countries. Among the major elements usually considered as the causes of these deep changes and transformations are:

(i) The globalisation of the economy, trade, finances, services, labour, etc.
(ii) The increasing role of knowledge production, the dissemination and evolution of technology as a key to any development;
(iii) The tremendous progress of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their decisive role in emergent societies based on knowledge (accompanied by progress in cognitive science and learning theories);
(iv) The new relationships that are developing between higher education, the State, the market and society as a whole;
(v) The constant social and political changes towards the protection of human rights for democratic and more equitable societies;
(vi) The evolution of demographic trends at the global level.

Globalisation and the revolution of information and communication technologies further complicates the issue of violations and standards, insofar as they provide opportunities of training and education services at a more global level. The autonomy of universities then becomes more and more relative. In this context, one can wonder whether the rules of the game, established among others by the WTO, can give an account of the complexity, or are fair for all actors involved in the process.

These global-level transformations are at the basis of a transition process that touches other subsectors and areas. This transition imposes new requirements to which universities have to respond by diversifying the subjects and the courses delivered. Higher education thus shifts from a strictly national system to an increasingly cross-border system. Consequently, in many African countries, the tendency is increasingly a decline in public education to the benefit of private education. The conditions of knowledge production in general and the rights of academics and researchers in particular remain, among so many others, the major challenges to meet.

This movement, which is not uniform, has made it possible to widen the space allocated to intellectual freedom, even if, in some countries, the hold of political power over society in general and the different forms of expression of citizenship is still so obvious.

As concerns the social responsibility of academics and researchers, there still remains a lot to be done. Indeed, when referring to the critics made by students, it appears that many academics do not fulfil their most fundamental responsibilities. The fact that some academics tend to privilege consultancy to the detriment of other responsibilities that are incumbent upon them as teachers and educators raises issues of ethics to which adequate responses must be found, so as to safeguard the interests of the institution as well as the freedoms of the faculty. The existence of a system that allows assessing teachers’ performance and the quality of their service provision is lacking in most African universities. Thus, to the old challenges that persist are added new ones, resulting from the transformations undergone by the higher education system those last two decades.

The conferences organised or carried out with support from CODESRIA generally focused on the reform of higher education in Africa. Yet, in the field, one of the major challenges is to combine university reforms with the issue of academic freedom. The reforms actually include not only a technical component, but also aspects relating to the content and format of the programmes. Therefore, better monitoring of these reforms proves to be necessary, especially from the point of view of academic freedom. That’s one of the reasons why we believe there is need to think over a widening of the competences of the academic freedom programme, to include issues related to higher education reform in Africa so as to build our capacity to understand well the reform processes.

It is important, therefore, to review the road travelled in the area of academic freedom and to draw lessons from this. This will enable the Council to assess the relevance of the instruments and strategies that were developed and put in place some fifteen years ago. The interest of such an exercise is in particular to readjust those instruments and/or adapt them to the new needs. The conference will also be an opportunity to revisit key issues related to the different academic freedom research approaches, concepts and tools and the social responsibility of academics and researchers.

People wishing to participate in this meeting must send to CODESRIA the abstract of their communication on the general theme of the conference. Abstracts should be e-mailed to the CODESRIA Secretariat by January 15, 2010 at the latest. They should include the title, the author’s contact information and affiliation, and should not exceed one page written in 12 points “Times New Roman” font, single spacing. An independent selection committee will review the applications and the selected authors will be invited to submit the final version of their communication for the conference byFebruary 15, 2010 at the latest. The selected candidates’ participation fees will be covered in accordance with the procedures and scale fixed by CODESRIA.

The abstract proposals, final communications and possible questions should be sent to:

CODESRIA
Programme sur Liberté académique et droits humains
Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV
BP : 3304, CP : 18524, Dakar, Sénégal
Email: academic.freedom@codesria.sn
Site web: http://www.codesria.org/

Ghana: Youth Inclusive Financial Services Two Week Course

2010-01-08

http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/smdp/Ghana-main.html

Don't miss this excellent opportunity to learn how to respond to the emerging youth market in sub-Saharan Africa through the development of Youth Inclusive Financial Services. This two week course will be offered at the Sustainable Microenterprise and Development Program (SMDP) Ghana in Accra from March 15-26, 2010.

MA in International Labour and Trade Union Studies - Ruskin College

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/courses/61271

MA in international labour and trade union studies
Start: October 2010
Full-time (12 months) OR
Part-time (24 months)
Limited scholarships available
For over a hundred years Ruskin College has provided trade unionists and political activists with the knowledge and skills to campaign for social change. The College is now recruiting to its MA in international labour and trade union studies which starts in October 2010. Ruskin attracts UK and international students from trade unions, NGOs, UN agencies, political organisations and civil society bodies.

‘The MA has broadened my understanding of union revitalisation and
examples from unions in various parts of the world that have embarked on
strategies and actions to confront and arrest union decline and crisis’
- Ariel B. Castro (Full-time MA student 2008-09) Senior Specialist for Workers’ Activities, ILO Sub-Regional Office for South Asia


The MA is available on a full-time (12 months) and part-time (24 months basis) and is accredited by the Open University (OU).

This cutting-edge post-graduate course provides learners with the framework to critically analyse global challenges to organised labour. A stimulating and dynamic educational environment challenges learners to engage with theoretical and practical responses to these challenges and devise their own radical solutions. Full-time students are offered a placement with a trade union or NGO organisation within the UK.

To find out more about MA before applying contact
MA Programme Co-ordinator
Ian Manborde – imanborde@ruskin.ac.uk

For details of MA open days and to apply contact:
ILTUS Administrator
Liz Mathews – lmathews@ruskin.ac.uk – 01865 517820

A highly limited number Chevening scholarships are available to overseas students. For more information go to: www.ruskin.ac.uk/study/finance/scholarships/

For the MA structure and content please visiti our Website

AwaaZ Issue 3/09 - Non Violence for Change

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/publications/61281

AwaaZ Issue 3/09 - Non Violence for Change


Cover Story: Is Non-cooperation a mattress against the bullet?
AwaaZ Issue 3/09 - Non Violence for Change


Cover Story: Is Non-cooperation a mattress against the bullet?





Never before in Kenya’s independent history has it been more urgent to resolve conflict and achieve peace with justice. This simple truth is recognised nationally and internationally – the taxing question is: ‘how?’
The aftermath of the 2007 general election made it very clear that we cannot just depend on our leadership as it is constituted at present to deliver the ‘promised land’; weak submission or violent reaction will only damage us further. Kenyans have practised nonviolent forms of protest over the years but these have generally been sporadic and disorganised. In this cover story, AwaaZ takes a look at nonviolence – its successes and its failures – starting with Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha movement, its practice in the lands of Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King, Jr, and in Kenya.
Nonviolence is a process of converting hearts and minds by demonstrating the better ways of using education, communication, democracy, and active nonviolent persuasion. This third way enables even those who are few in numbers or poor in material resources to stand up for their rights with moral strength and dignity.

AwaaZ Magazine
P O Box 32843 - 00600
Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: 020 2063405, 0722 344900, 0733 741085
Email: editors@awaazmagazine.com
Website: AwaaZ
AwaaZ is environmentally responsible. It recycles, reduces and reuses all its material

The International Criminal Court and Tructh Commissions: Two sides of the same coin?

Dr. Yav Katshung Joseph

2010-01-08

http://tinyurl.com/ycqyqrt

This book attempts to scrutinize the relationship between criminal justice system and those of non-punitive approaches based on the principle of complementarity and discuss future ways in order to build a bridge across them. Dealing with atrocities many countries in the world have started to look more for mechanisms which deal with acknowledgment, forgiveness and reparation or/and reconciliation.

South Africa: Gender and Local government field officer - Gender Links

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/61267

Gender Links, a Southern African NGO based in Johannesburg specialising in gender, media, women’s rights and governance, seeks the services of an experienced individual to serve as a field officer for its gender justice and local government programme in South Africa. The main task of the incumbent, who will be based in Johannesburg, will be to work with local councils, partners and stakeholders to develop gender and gender violence (GBV) action plans for local councils as well as providing backstopping and support to these councils.
Gender Links, a Southern African NGO based in Johannesburg specialising in gender, media, women’s rights and governance, seeks the services of an experienced individual to serve as a field officer for its gender justice and local government programme in South Africa. The main task of the incumbent, who will be based in Johannesburg, will be to work with local councils, partners and stakeholders to develop gender and gender violence (GBV) action plans for local councils as well as providing backstopping and support to these councils.

Tasks:
- Receive training in and serve as facilitator for local government gender and GBV action plan work;
- Arrange logistics and manage budgets for district level workshops;
- Facilitate district and local level workshops;
- Develop gender actions plans for local councils;
- Provide backstopping and ongoing support to local councils;
- Collect best practices in ending gender violence for the Gender Justice and Local Government Summit and Awards;
- Monitor and evaluate the success of the country programme.

Skills:
- Social science academic qualification or relevant work experience;
- A strong grounding in community work or work at the local government level;
- The ability to organise and mobilise at the local government level;
- Strong networking skills;
- Good training, facilitation, management and report writing skills;
- Good administrative and inter personal skills;
- IT proficiency;
- Flexibility to travel regularly and extensively in country;
- At least five years working experience;
- Proficiency in local languages would be an advantage;
- A background in NGO, gender and advocacy work would be an advantage.

General conditions:
The above post is for an initial period of two years, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. Competitive remuneration packages will be offered, commensurate with the qualifications and experience of the successful candidates. Applications, including a sample of written work and a reference from a local / community based organisation, must be submitted by close of business (COB) Friday 15 January 2010.

A letter of motivation, CVs and references should be sent to: hrandadmin@genderlinks.org.za or fax 27 (0) 11- 622 4732. For further enquiries phone Vivien Bakainanga on 27 (0) 11 622 2877. Only short listed and successful candidates will be contacted.

ACCOUNTS ASSISTANT
Gender Links, a dynamic Southern African NGO that promotes gender equality through its media, justice and governance programmes, seeks to fill the post of Finance Assistant for an initial two year period.

Tasks:
The successful candidate will be expected to perform the following duties:
- Checking financial reports from offices outside South Africa
- Process payments and reconciliations
- Data entry
- Lodging SARS returns
- Banking and cash flow management
- Dealing with service providers
- Assist with management and donor reports
- Assisting with preparation for audit

Skills:
The successful candidate will be expected to have:
- A recognized accounting qualification
- At least three years experience in NGO environment
- Experience in managing multiple donors and reporting requirements
- Proficiency in pastel, excel and other key financial software
- Experience with the Cats banking system
- Excellent IT skills

GL is an equal opportunity employer and encourages applications from the SADC region. Competitive remuneration packages will be offered, commensurate with skills and experience. More detailed information on these posts can be found on www.genderlinks.org.za or by phoning Vivien Bakainanga on 011-622-2877. Please submit a CV, references, to hrandadmin@genderlinks.org.za or fax 011 622 4732 by 15 January 2009. Late applications will not be considered. Only short listed candidates will be contacted for interviews.

South Africa: Gender and media programme manager - Gender Links

2010-01-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/61266

Gender Links, a dynamic Southern African NGO based in Johannesburg that promotes gender equality in and through the media, seeks to fill the post of Gender and Media Programme Manager on an initial two year contract basis. All applications must be received by close of business on Friday 15 January 2009. Late applications will not be considered. Candidates from within the SADC region are welcome to apply. GL is an equal opportunity employer.
Gender Links, a dynamic Southern African NGO based in Johannesburg that promotes gender equality in and through the media, seeks to fill the post of Gender and Media Programme Manager on an initial two year contract basis. All applications must be received by close of business on Friday 15 January 2009. Late applications will not be considered. Candidates from within the SADC region are welcome to apply. GL is an equal opportunity employer.

Tasks
The successful candidate will be expected to:
- Manage all of GL’s gender and media research and policy projects including implementation and financial accounting.
- Oversee GL’s media training portfolio.
- Assist in conceptualising and fund raising for future work to promote gender equality in and through the media.
- Contribute to the development of high quality publications and to the growth of the Gender and Media Diversity Centre.
- Participate in seminars, debates and knowledge creation on gender and the media in the region.

Skills required
- Masters degree in media studies or equivalent qualification.
- At least five to eight years experience working in the media or a related field in the SADC region and knowledge/working experience of the region.
- Track record of commitment to gender equality and diversity in the media.
- Excellent research, writing and presentation skills.
- Excellent programme management skills.
- Excellent IT skills and knowledge of how to use this tool to leverage research, policy and training.
A competitive remuneration package will be offered, commensurate with skills and experience. Please send a letter of motivation, CVs, a sample of your writing and references to: hrandadmin@genderlinks.org.za or fax: 011-622-4732 . For further enquiries phone 011-622-2877. Only successful candidates will be contacted for interviews.

Fahamu