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Shell in Nigeria: The struggle for accountability

Ben Amunwa

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62358

cc W XBen Amunwa looks at how the settlement of the Wiwa v Shell case affects the ongoing Niger Delta crisis, and the settlement's implications for human rights, environmental justice and the control of resources in the region.

The settlement of the landmark Wiwa v Shell lawsuit in June 2009 marked a small but significant step forward for the dozen plaintiffs involved. They charged Shell with complicity in human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, summary execution, torture and arbitrary detention. The abuses occurred during military crackdowns in the 1990s, when 300,000 of the minority Ogoni people mobilised under the leadership of writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, to protest at the environmental and social devastation caused by Shell, Chevron and other companies in the oil rich Niger Delta. These were some of the largest protests against an oil company ever seen. In response, Shell collaborated with the Nigerian military in a campaign of indiscriminate violence in Ogoniland, culminating in the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists on 10 November 1995.

For the next twelve years, a legal battle was waged in the New York District Court. The plaintiff’s lawyers assembled a substantial dossier of exhibits, including confidential company memos, emails and witness testimony, illuminating the Shell’s complicit role in human rights abuses committed in Ogoniland. Detailed evidence of Shell’s close relationship with the military was finally made public in the wake of the settlement, in which Shell agreed to pay US$15.5 million to the plaintiffs.

Behind the scenes was Osamede Okhomina, an oil executive who does not fit the stereotype. He is from the Niger Delta and holds a Masters in Philosophy from Cambridge University. His company, Energy Equity Resources based in London’s leafy Marble Arch and Victoria Island, Lagos, participated in brokering the settlement of the Wiwa case. EER helped both parties to fashion the Kiisi Trust, a US$5 million fund created by the settlement funds, which ‘will allow for initiatives in Ogoni for educational endowments, skills development, agricultural development, women’s programs, small enterprise support, and adult literacy’.

A short statement from EER released on the day of the settlement reads:

‘Mr Okhomina emphasized… the importance EER places on the creation of trust funds in allowing local communities to directly share in the benefits of oil production … EER believes this approach offers a brighter future for all concerned and it hopes its contribution to the resolution of this case will be seen in this light.’

It probably came as some relief that EER’s contribution quickly disappeared in the media storm that engulfed Shell. Yet the stance of EER, a much smaller oil and gas exploration company, is worth considering.

The use of ‘trust funds’ in the Niger Delta is a newly emerging response to what the UNDP calls the ‘appalling’ development situation, which although limited in scale may hold more potential than the scores of abandoned community development projects started by Shell and other oil companies.

For over a decade, companies have used ‘strategic philanthropy’ to effectively buy the consent of communities where they extract oil and gas. Following the execution of Saro-Wiwa, and the sinking of Brent Spar, Shell realised the need to repair its global image, which led to the invention of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). Today, the failure of CSR in the Niger Delta is an open secret. In 2001, a study of Shell’s community projects showed that out of 81, 20 didn’t exist, 36 were partly successful and only 25 were working effectively.

Despite this, Alice Ajeh, Shell’s international relations manager for Nigeria, based in The Hague, believes that CSR has the answer. When faced with a flood of emails protesting at Shell Nigeria’s practices, she emphasises that Shell spent US$242 million last year on community development – ‘the largest single investment in communities that Shell companies make anywhere in the world.’ During her time at Shell in Port Harcourt, a leaked confidential report for Shell by WAC Global Services found that these payments were ‘divisive’, increasing conflict and violence, rather than benefiting communities.

Assuming that a portion of Shell’s community development projects actually exist and work, they cannot compensate for the illegal environmental and social devastation caused by the company’s routine oil spills, gas flaring and their over-reliance on the Nigerian security forces.

Whilst not all of the regions problems can be attributed to the company, Shell’s activities clearly exacerbate insecurity, corruption and poverty.

Government security forces are routinely on the payroll of international oil companies, and the same forces are responsible for an unknown number of summary executions, killings, torture and detainment. According to local rights monitor the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), as recently as December 2009, armed soldiers securing a Shell manifold in K-Dere in Ogoni tortured a man and his wife, severely beating them severely with gun butts and horsewhips till they vomited blood. These incidents are routinely carried out by security forces paid, fed and housed by Shell.

The Niger Delta is by no means a ‘poor’ economy. Staggering profits are pumped out of the creeks by Shell, Chevron and other companies on a daily basis. The IMF estimates that Nigeria earned US$75 billion in oil revenue between 2004-7. Yet the Delta region is impoverished by decades of record-breaking graft at all levels of the Nigerian political elite, an ongoing theft that is assisted by multinational oil companies and Western banks.

This week, the Metropolitan Police are charging the associates of former governor of Rivers State James Ibori with helping him launder US$30 million between 2005-7. Among his frozen assets are funds from a lucrative deal by Ibori’s company, MEX engineering, to supply houseboats to Shell and Chevron. Scotland Yard suspects corruption in the deal, but the companies deny any wrongdoing. Despite political opposition and an attempt by Conservative MP Tony Baldry to obstruct the prosecution in the UK, the trial is due to take place at Southwark Crown Court in London and could disclose damaging facts about the deal.

With oil companies and all echelons of the Nigerian government largely believed to be mired in corruption, there is a need for more transparent, independent mechanisms to control and trace oil revenues. Trust funds like the Kiisi Trust could provide a pragmatic, temporary means of ensuring that village communities benefit from their resources.

What trusts cannot address is the central injustice of the Wiwa case – the human rights impacts of oil companies. Oil production is still intimately linked to gross violations of human rights. As Saro-Wiwa stated to the panel that sentenced him to death: ‘The military do not act alone. They are supported by a gaggle of politicians, lawyers, judges, academics, and businessmen, all of them hiding…’

The Wiwa case demonstrated the ‘power of memory against forgetting’. As long as companies continue do business at the expense of human rights, they will eventually be exposed, held accountable and forced to make amends.

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* Ben Amunwa is coordinator of PLATFORM’s Remember Saro-Wiwa campaign.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

‘Dead Aid’: A critical reading

Samir Amin

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62386

cc J HarneisDambisa Moyo's 'Dead Aid' fails in its attempt to provide a radical critique of ‘aid’, because of Moyo's unwilingess to conduct it within the framework of political economy, says Samir Amin. ‘The politics of aid, the choice of its beneficiaries, the forms of intervention and its immediate objectives are inextricably linked to geopolitical considerations’, says Samir Amin, yet Moyo does not speak to or critique ‘the central role of aid in the strategy of domination, pillage and exploitation by imperialist capital. Neither does she address the need for a “different aid” based on the solidarity of peoples.’

Dambisa Moyo was no doubt an excellent student. Unfortunately, she is a product of the conventional economics curriculum, which is great if one is to embark on a career at the World Bank, or Goldman Sachs. She attempts a radical critique of ‘aid’ but sadly she is not up to the task, her noble intentions notwithstanding.

‘Dead Aid’ is written in the same style as World Bank ‘reports’ and is extremely boring. Moyo seems to be speaking only to her ‘peers’ (at the World Bank, or Goldman Sachs). She lends a lot of credence to a long list of ‘experts’ from the bank (Jared Diamond, Paul Collier, Dani Rodrik, Przeworski, Bill Easterly, Clemens, Hadji Michael, Reichel, Djankov, Romalho, Burnside, Dollar, Mancur Olson etc) whose works are by and large inconsequential (lacking comprehension of the real world) and at times even ridiculous. They are all very good at developing 'models’ whose conclusions are as senseless as their original premise. She only seems to be familiar with a few blinkered development theorists, like David Landes, whose ‘revelations’ are at best trivial (he concludes, for example, that ‘aid’ tends to benefit a small elite minority). The key question – still unanswered – remains: What strategic political aim does this aid serve?

A critique of aid can only be conducted within the framework of political economy. Moyo clearly abhors this framework, which she considers to be ‘ideological’, and thus ‘non-scientific’. She seems to miss the fact that the issue is about ‘capitalist markets’ (based on the valorisation of capital), and not ‘markets’ per se. She also seems to believe firmly in ideological flights of fancy in which capital-driven growth benefits everybody (what is good for Goldman Sachs is good for everyone).

Her so-called ‘apolitical’ stance is incredibly naive. One of many examples is her reference to Lumumba as a ‘communist leader’ (p. 44 in the French edition). This may be believable, but only to the average television-dulled citizen of the US. An African with even the most fleeting interest in the history of liberation struggles on the continent would balk at this.

With regard to the economic success of ‘emerging powers’ – China in particular – Moyo adopts the World Bank ideology that this is purely as a result of ‘opening up’ (to foreign capital and markets). She does not realise that China’s current success is a product of the radical Maoist revolution that it went through. She cannot understand that China’s refusal to accept the commodification of the world as a necessity (page 216, French edition) – a view that she and every other liberal economist who ignores history has adopted – is the very basis of its success. Historically, European capitalism was based on private ownership of agricultural land, and the dispossession of peasants thereof. This process was aided by the massive waves of migration to the Americas. The people of Asia and Africa could not possibly emulate this migration unless they had access to five Americas to absorb their rural populations. At most, this ‘classic’ capitalist approach could succeed in creating a Lumpenproletariat, inhabiting a world of slums. Did this at any point cross Moyo’s mind? One could come up with many other examples of her ignorance and lack of judgement in this book.

Moyo encourages African countries to further ‘open up’ to international capital – as if they were not already extremely exposed to this (China, on the other hand, exercises more stringent financial controls than any African country). She has considerable faith in the external indebtedness caused by the transfer of state obligations to global financial markets. She also seems to believe in credit rating agencies, all of which are linked to global financial oligarchies. Moyo ignores the fact that within the historical capitalist context, external debt has always been a form of pillage (‘of primitive accumulation’), as any historian of the Ottoman Empire or Latin America would tell you. She does admit, with worrying naiveté, that the debt repayment rates imposed on countries of the South are much higher than those of the dominant countries of North! But even this realisation still does not lead to explore questions of political economy and external debt.

Moyo rails at protectionism by Northern countries, which poses a major obstacle to Africa’s agricultural exports. But she does not question the validity of the defunct theory of ‘comparative advantage’.

In her historical analysis of aid, Moyo does not manage to go beyond the oft-repeated descriptive view of it as a succession of ‘types’: Aid for ‘industrialisation’ (1960s), followed by aid for ‘poverty eradication’ (1970s), then aid contingent upon ‘structural adjustment’ (1980s), and finally aid based on ‘good governance and democratisation’ (since 1990). She does not interrogate the link between this evolution of aid, and the strategic response by imperialist capital to the needs of the time. It is only by exploring this issue of political economy that one understands the perpetuation of aid, and Moyo is unable to do this.

For the 1960s (aid for ‘industrialisation’), she only gives one example: The Kariba dam on the Zambezi river, which we know was built to provide energy to South Africa and Rhodesia, and not to industrialise Zambia (her own country). Let us consider the discourse on good governance, and the condemnation of corruption, which only serves to obfuscate the real issue: The social nature of power (I do not wish to revisit my previous writings on this subject). Once again, Moyo admits that there were considerable gains in the South despite an absence of democracy (here, Moyo cannot conceive of any other possible model than the western blueprint consisting of Multi-partyism and elections) and not because of this (p. 59 of the French edition).

There is nothing in this book that speaks to, or critiques the central role of aid in the strategy of domination, pillage and exploitation by imperialist capital. Neither does she address the need for a ‘different aid’ based on the solidarity of peoples.

Moyo offers a puerile explanation for the intransience of aid: The intense lobbying by those who benefit from it – tens of thousands employed by the World Bank, aid agencies, NGOs etc. She does not consider that this lobby would not be as influential if the aid was not serving the needs of dominant capitalist interests.

To find a true critique of aid, one would need to look elsewhere other than this poor work by Moyo. In this regard, I would recommend the cited work of Yash Tandon.



My critique of aid as it is currently practised is based on my analysis of how it is used by the oligopolies that control globalisation, and that it is also the cause of Africa’s exclusion and marginalisation. This exclusion is therefore in some way built into aid.

The politics of aid, the choice of its beneficiaries, the forms of intervention and its immediate objectives are inextricably linked to geopolitical considerations. Each region of the globe performs a unique role in the globalised liberal system. It is therefore not enough to simply focus on what these regions have in common (deregulation of exchange rates, privatisation and free movement of finances).

Sub-Saharan Africa has been fully integrated into this global system, and is in no way ‘marginalised’, as the perception goes: Foreign trade accounts for 45 per cent of the region’s GDP, compared to 30 per cent for Asia and Latin America. Quantitatively speaking, Africa is therefore more integrated, albeit in a different way.

The Geo-economics of the region are underpinned by two key types of product that define its positioning in the global system:

(i) ‘Tropical’ agricultural exports: Coffee, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, fruit, palm-oil, etc
(ii) Fossil fuels and minerals: Copper, gold, rare metals, diamonds, etc

The first type offers a means of basic ‘survival’ for the local economy, beyond that which is used for subsistence. These exports help finance the state’s public expenditure, and the growth of the middle classes. This category is important to the local ruling class, but not to the dominant global powers. The second group of natural resources, on the other hand, attract a lot more global interest. Today, it is fossil fuels and rare metals. In the future, the continent will be important for the development of agro-fuels, solar energy (when technology enables long-distance transportation thereof) and hydro-energy (again when it can eventually be exported directly or indirectly).

Already we are seeing a beeline towards rural lands earmarked for agri-business. On this account, Africa offers unlimited possibilities. Madagascar is leading the way, having ceded vast areas in the west of the country. Congo’s new rural code of 2008 was the brainchild of the Belgian government and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This new policy will open the way for massive exploitation of agricultural land, in the same way that the mining code allowed for the colonial plunder of the country’s mineral resources. The rural inhabitants will pay the ultimate price. The misery that awaits them will no doubt attract more poverty-reduction aid programmes!

The new phase of history we are entering is characterised by intensifying conflict over the world’s natural resources. The dominant powers seek to reserve the rights to Africa’s natural resources (its ‘useful’ side), to the exclusion of the ‘emerging powers’, whose needs for these same resources continue to grow. The only guarantee that the dominant powers have of exclusive access is through political control, and reducing African countries to mere ‘client states’. Foreign aid plays an important role in achieving and maintaining this.



In a way, one could then argue that the aim of aid is to corrupt the ruling elites. Aid (the donors would have us believe that they have nothing to gain from it!) has become an indispensable part of national budgets, and plays an important political function. It is therefore important that this aid is not reserved for the exclusive use of the ruling elites in government. It must also benefit those in the opposition who may at some point take over the reigns of power. The role of civil society and NGOs is very central in this regard.

The case of Niger, which I have had occasion to study in detail, perfectly illustrates the link between strategic mineral resources (uranium), ‘indispensable’ aid, and the perpetuation of a client state.

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* Samir Amin has been the director of IDEP (the United Nations African Institute for Planning), the director of the Third World Forum in Dakar, Senegal, and a co-founder of the World Forum for Alternatives. He is the author of ‘Aid to Africa: Redeemer or Coloniser?’ available to order from the Pambazuka Press website.
* Translated from French By Josh Ogada
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

REFERENCES

Yash Tandon, Ending Aid Dependence, South Centre, Genève 2008.
Samir Amin, L’Afrique dans le système mondial, Third World Forum; published in English, Helen Lauer (ed), History and Philosophy of Science, Hope Public, Ibadan 2003.
Anna Bednik, Bataille pour l’Uranium au Niger, Le Monde diplomatique, June 2008.
L'aide, instrument de domination, le cas du Niger, Third World Forum.
Samir Amin et alii ; Afrique : Renaissance ou exclusion programmée ; Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris 2005.

Senegal sees dramatic escalation in homophobic persecution

Cary Alan Johnson and Ryan Thoreson

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62380

cc T CInternational pressure on Uganda as the country attempts to pass an anti-homosexuality bill is important, but other nations remain havens of anti-LGBT oppression. Cary Alan Johnson and Ryan Thoreson call for an end to the criminalisation of same-sex relationships that is fuelling homophobia in Senegal and elsewhere.

The global outcry against Uganda's ‘Anti-Homosexuality Bill’ could not be more deafening. Opponents of the legislation have condemned the effort not just to put gays in prison, which is already the law in Uganda, but to further criminalise the ‘promotion of homosexuality’, require that suspected gays and lesbians be turned in to authorities, and to punish some individuals – including those who are HIV positive or those euphemistically called ‘repeat offenders’ – with death.

The governments of Canada, France and Sweden have branded the bill wrongheaded. From Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to President Barack Obama himself, the US, a major foreign donor to Uganda, has made its disapproval of the legislation clear. Usually silent religious leaders, from Anglican and Catholic church leadership to Saddleback church's Rick Warren and other evangelical Christians, have condemned the bill's promotion of the death penalty, imprisonment for gays and lesbians, and the threat its provisions pose to pastoral confidentiality.

The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) executive director Michel Sidibe has expressed deep concern with the bill's potential impact on Uganda's heretofore successful HIV-prevention efforts. And while both the African Union and the government of South Africa have characteristically failed to condemn the bill, several important African leaders, including former president of Botswana Festus Mogae and UN special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa Elizabeth Mataka, have spoken out firmly and forcefully. If the bill passes in this firestorm of criticism, it certainly won't be for lack of unified, unequivocal condemnation.

This vehement response was absent less than a year ago and fewer than a hundred miles away, when the parliament of Burundi amended its penal code to criminalise consensual same-sex relationships for the first time in its history. Nor was it conspicuous when Nigeria considered criminalising attendance at gay-rights meetings or support groups in 2006. Now, horror at the cruelty of these new laws and growing evidence of direct involvement by the US religious right is leading to a subtle, but significant, sea change. Local LGBT (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) and civil-rights movements are finding the voice to condemn these horrible new pieces of legislation and the international community is standing its ground. Last month, the government of Rwanda dropped a proposal to criminalise homosexuality in the face of pressure from rights activists and HIV-service providers inside and outside of the country.

But while condemning new oppressive laws is important, it is just as important – and perhaps more pressing – to take measures to hold governments accountable for the daily violence and lifetimes of discrimination that LGBT people face in the more than 80 countries around the world that continue to criminalise homosexuality and the many more that impose penalties for those who challenge gender norms.

Take Senegal, for instance, where homosexuality has been illegal since 1965. The last two years have seen a dramatic escalation in homophobic persecution and violence, largely unnoticed by the international community and the world media. The country has experienced waves of arrests, detentions, and attacks on individuals by anti-gay mobs, fuelled by media sensationalism and a harsh brand of religious fundamentalism. Police have rounded up men and women on charges of homosexuality, detained them under inhumane conditions, and sentenced them with or without proof of having committed any offence. Families and communities have turned on those suspected of being gay or lesbian. In cities throughout the county, the corpses of men presumed to have been gay have been disinterred and unceremoniously abandoned. As the international community has laudably warned Uganda on the progress of its nonsensical law, arrests on charges related to homosexuality in Senegal – five men in Darou Mousty in June, a man in Touba in November, and 24 men celebrating at a party in Saly Niax Niaxal on Christmas Eve – continue largely unnoticed.

Responding to the homophobic extremism in the Ugandan legislation is hugely important, but it is no substitute for a broad and unequivocal condemnation of sodomy laws and anti-LGBT violence wherever it occurs. When just such a statement condemning grave violations of human rights on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity and calling for the end of criminalisation was brought to the UN General Assembly just one year ago, only 66 of 192 countries voted for it. At the time, the US was not one of them.

Even if the campaign against the anti-homosexuality bill succeeds, homosexuality will continue to be illegal in Uganda – just as it is in Senegal, where the lives of LGBT people are virtually unliveable. The test of our commitment to rights for all members of the human family, including LGBT people, is not whether we respond when the media turns its hot spotlight on a new, extreme piece of legislation. It is whether we are willing to commit our attention, resources, and political will in places like Senegal, where there are no cameras or reporters chronicling the impact of a decades-old law to hold us accountable. While the global sense of outrage at Uganda's bill is inspiring, it will be a missed opportunity if this spirited condemnation of homophobic violence fails to become standard operating procedure.

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* Cary Alan Johnson is the executive director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC). Ryan Thoreson is a research fellow at IGLHRC and co-author of ‘Words of Hate, Climate of Fear: Human Rights Violations and Challenges to the LGBT Movement in Senegal’. The opinions expressed here are the authors' and not necessarily those of the organisation.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Rethinking Jeffrey Sachs and the ‘Big Five’

New proposals for the end of poverty

Jason Hickel

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62351

cc DemoshWhile Jeffrey Sachs has done well to highlight the roles of colonialism, the Cold War and the ‘ongoing political and economic plunder’ in creating Africa’s poverty, Jason Hickel argues that Sachs’ ‘Big Five’ solutions are rooted in the same system that he seeks to criticise: ‘The problem here is that Sachs calls on us to think within a paradigm of aid when we should be thinking within a paradigm of justice.’ Instead, then, Hickel proposes an alternative big five based on this ‘paradigm of justice’: Forgiving debt, protecting resource commons, installing an international minimum wage, democratisation of international institutions and reducing the greenhouse emissions of the West and China. Hickel notes, however, that ‘Implementing these changes would require enormous political will and moral courage… [these solutions] would run up against Western economic interests, and would most likely cut into the profits of those who presently pride themselves on their philanthropy.’

Jeffrey Sachs has become something of a force in international development circles over the past decade. As special advisor to the United Nations’ (UN) secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, former director of the UN’s Millennium Development Project, and a decorated economist at Columbia University, Sachs certainly has much to commend him. And his recognition has been no less outstanding: The publication of his runaway messianic bestseller, ‘The End of Poverty’, bagged him his second showing on Time’s list of the world’s top 100 most influential people.

In 2005 Sachs published a synopsis of his core ideas in a much-vaunted Time Magazine article titled, as boldly as his book, ‘The End of Poverty’: Beautifully written and convincingly argued, this piece still stands as one of the best distillations of his policy propositions to date. But behind the compelling rhetoric – much of which is spot on – some of his basic assumptions about Africa’s poverty warrant serious interrogation.

But first, the good. Sachs opens by offering a tragic run-down of African poverty statistics; a litany of emergencies that can’t but prick our consciences. While it might be tempting to retort that this constitutes an unfair representation of Africa and erases the agency of Africans, I think he does well to sound the alarm, for there is indeed an emergency. And, fortunately, Sachs is thoughtful enough to point out that the poverty of Africans is not somehow due to their allegedly innate inferiority and he dismisses outright the claim that we should blame Africa’s problems on laziness and corruption. He also does well to recognise the troubling legacies of colonial rule and the Cold War and notes that debts imposed by Western ‘development’ agencies continue to shackle African economies by draining government coffers.

Strangely enough, though, Sachs doesn’t let these insights about ongoing political and economic plunder inform the solutions that he proposes for Africa’s poverty. Instead, he calls on Western governments to assume the role of saviour by marshalling sufficient aid to help Africans up the ‘ladder of development’. This strikes me as an ironic distortion of history. How strange that Westerners – be they celebrities, development technocrats, or child sponsors – so easily embrace the role of saviour when so much of the twentieth century has seen Europe and the United States deeply entangled in the role of plunderer. The problem here is that Sachs calls on us to think within a paradigm of aid when we should be thinking within a paradigm of justice.

Sachs’ proposals for the end of poverty focus on beefing up and streamlining aid by encouraging Western governments to keep their promises of charity. He claims that Africa needs just a paltry 0.7 per cent of US GDP (gross domestic product) in aid to eliminate extreme poverty in Africa. This money would go to what Sachs calls the ‘Big Five’ of African development interventions:
Boosting agriculture with new technologies, fertilisers, and pesticides;
improving basic health through anti-malarial bed nets and essential medicines;
investing in education through free school meals and expanded vocational training; bringing power to villages for water pumps, grain mills, and school computers; providing clean water and sanitation to prevent disease.

Sachs holds that these interventions would provide the necessary conditions that Africa requires to overcome structural poverty and get onto the first rung of the ‘development ladder’. But while no one would disagree that his proposals are important and well-intentioned, it strikes me that they obscure far more than they reveal about the reasons for Africa’s poverty. Working within his charity paradigm, Sachs completely dismisses the notion that the problem has to do with the global political economy; in fact, he self-consciously avoids discussing politics altogether. This perspective leads him to perceive Africa’s poverty as a static state, a consequence of their ‘unlucky’ inheritance of an unkind climate conducive to the spread of tropical diseases. But the poverty of Africa is no more ‘natural’ or ‘given’ than is the wealth of the West; the two are intimately interconnected. The problem is not that Africans cannot reach the first rung of the development ladder themselves; the problem is that they are actively prevented from doing so. For more than a century Africa has been and continues to be purposefully underdeveloped.

As part of his work with the Millennium Development Project, Sachs sought to discover the reasons for Africa’s poverty by visiting rural villages where he personally witnessed the ravages of hunger, AIDS, and malaria up close in the lives of everyday people. His experience with poor farmers and undernourished children led him to think up his Big Five solutions. The problem is that his choice of field sites confined him to only one side of the cause-effect equation: The villagers taught him much about the effects of structural poverty but little about its causes. Instead of visiting villages, he should have dropped in on the boardrooms of in-country multinational corporations, where he could have channelled his charitable energies into exposing the loopholes in their mineral contracts and demanding that they restructure their wage standards. Take the oil-rich Niger Delta, for example. 70 per cent of Nigerians in the region live in extreme poverty, subsisting on less than a dollar a day. By contrast, the starting salary for a Chevron engineer in the area tops US$175,000 and the company has walked away with millions in revenue already. In the context of such vicious plunder, Sachs’ plan to save dying Africans by handing out bed nets and fertilisers amounts to a slap in the face.

Instances like this can be multiplied ad nauseum. Take the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Canadian negotiators recently convinced the DRC government to barter away mineral concessions worth some US$120 billion to China in exchange for a paltry US$6 billion of infrastructural development. Why are the Congolese people so desperately poor when they’re literally sitting on a goldmine? Because – as with European colonialism – their mineral profits are being siphoned by first world corporations that can get away without paying them the real price of the commodities they extract or the labour that digs them up. Africans don’t need aid, they need fairer trade arrangements.

But back to Sachs. Let’s just imagine for a moment that his dream came true, and the US did in fact commit to giving 0.7 per cent of its GDP in aid for education, healthcare, agriculture and so on. That would be wonderful indeed. But it wouldn’t stop the US, Europe and China from plundering many times more than that amount in artificially cheap African labour and resources each year. In effect, then, Sachs’ plan means dispensing bandaids with one hand and vicious beatings with the other. This strategy will almost inevitably leave Africans shackled to their poverty for centuries to come, bed nets or no bed nets.

According to Sachs, the international donor community should be thinking ‘round-the-clock’ about how to roll out his Big Five interventions all across Africa. But with the broader context of Africa’s plight in mind, perhaps they should instead be thinking round-the-clock about how to halt the plunder of Africa’s resources by Western corporations and government actors. And that’s something they can do without ever leaving their shores. In terms of concrete strategies, here are five alternative proposals for ending poverty in Africa.

1) Forgive debt without conditions. The history of African indebtedness to Western banks is deeply troubling. After having been ravaged by colonial mis-development for nearly a century, newly independent African nations desperate for funds sought aid from the World Bank and the IMF under neo-liberal conditionalities that suffocated their economies. Today, most African countries spend vastly more of their budgets on servicing the interest on their debts than they do on healthcare and education, for example. In a context of relentless debt, aid simply makes no sense.

2) Protect the resource commons. The rich natural resources and minerals of each African country should be considered the common property of its citizens. Multi-national corporations that exploit these resources should be made to give back a fair share of revenues according to publicly transparent and democratically ratified contracts and concessions. Models of this exist already: The US state of Alaska, for example, owns all its natural resources and distributes extraction revenues through rural development initiatives and annual checks to each citizen. The yield from fairer revenue sharing would be many times more than the aid that Africa gets today.

3) Install an international minimum wage law. Multi-national corporations that seek cheap and abundant African labour should be made to pay wages pegged to the cost of local basic living standards. This should be recognised as a matter of fundamental human rights. The US and Europe expect companies to pay their citizens minimum wages; why should they not insist on the same treatment for Africans? If such a law were extended internationally, this would eliminate the ‘race to the bottom’ effect that comes from seeking competitive advantage in countries that allow for easy labour exploitation.

4) Democratise international institutions. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is controlled almost entirely by first world economies whose representatives hold all the bargaining power in the negotiation of trade agreements, most of which are concluded in closed rooms from which representatives from developing nations are barred. If my conversations with Africans have yielded one refrain, it’s that they would prefer a fair voice at the WTO over any amount of Western aid. The West casts itself as the messiah of democracy to the rest of the world; it’s time to put the rhetoric into action. The same goes for the UN, where powerful countries hold disproportionate decision-making power and exercise veto rights over the wishes of the general assembly. Africans deserve the right to participate meaningfully in the decisions made by international institutions.

5) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While first world economies, such as the United States and China, pump the overwhelming majority of the world’s carbon emissions into the atmosphere, it is underdeveloped countries that bear the brunt of the burden of climate change. Rising tides, drought, and desertification are responsible for much of Africa’s poverty today. First world economies should have to bear the real costs of their industrialisation through compensation to those who suffer its effects. This is not a matter of aid, but of justice, and an important first step in creating disincentives for pollution. There is nothing ‘natural’ about the hostile climates that many Africans have been faced with recently; desertification and drought can be stopped.

Implementing these changes would require enormous political will and moral courage. After all, the sort of solutions I’ve proposed would run up against Western economic interests, and would most likely cut into the profits of those who presently pride themselves on their philanthropy. But what if Sachs, Bono, Madonna and the rest could manage to channel the massive momentum and money that they have mobilised for charity to tackle instead the structural issues I’ve listed above? Then change would happen, and rapidly. Only with these broader interventions in place will Sachs’ vision for an end to poverty be realised.
I have argued here for a shift in the mentality of charitable Western donors from a paradigm of aid to a paradigm of justice.

No one has captured this sentiment better than Frantz Fanon, one of Africa’s greatest intellectuals. On the question of aid, he offers the following very pointed words: ‘Colonialism and imperialism have not settled their debt to us once they have withdrawn their flag and their police force from our territories. The wealth of the imperialist nations is also our wealth. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. The riches which are choking it are those plundered from the underdeveloped peoples. So we will not accept aid for the underdeveloped countries as ‘charity’. Such aid must be considered the final stage of a dual consciousness – the consciousness of the colonised that it is their due, and the consciousness of the capitalist powers that effectively they must pay up.’

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* Jason Hickel is a researcher at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and an instructor and doctoral candidate in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Virginia.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

South Africa: The personal is political

Why public interest in Zuma’s private life is justified

Dale T. McKinley

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62359

cc K KendallNo human being is going to be perfect when it comes to always aligning their personal principles with their public words and actions, writes Dale T. McKinley, but we should ‘expect those who are in positions of political and societal leadership to be what they claim to be – leaders’.

Just over a month ago the legendary Dennis Brutus passed away. He became a legend for so many across South Africa – and indeed the whole world – not simply because of his exquisitely crafted poetry of passion and his never-ending activist commitment to justice and equality for all, but precisely because he lived a life of principled consistency. The content of his public legend was umbilically linked to the character of his personal example. Simply put, Dennis practiced what he preached.

As Dennis so regularly and effectively pointed out, the same cannot be said for the vast majority of those in our national and global society who, very self-consciously and publicly, hold various positions of societal leadership and/or enjoy high levels of public attention. For these political leaders, capitalist class mandarins, assorted celebrities and the like, the idea – not to mention practice –of a principled consistency that links the personal to the public (read: political) appears to be about as foreign as intelligent debate is to the ANC Youth League. Therein lies the rub.

On the one hand, no individual human being, regardless of their public position and social status, is going to be perfect when it comes to always aligning their personal principles with their public words and actions. We all make mistakes, take bad decisions and have our own contradictions. The vast majority of people understand and accept this as part of our individual and collective struggles of life and, on the whole, we are very forgiving of ourselves and others in this regard.

On the other hand though, we should, and most often do, expect those who are in positions of political and societal leadership to be what they claim to be – leaders. By its very nature, such an expectation is inclusive – i.e. the (private) individual and the (public) position are not mutually exclusive, they reflect and imbibe one another in the most direct of ways.

Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk are prime examples. Both of these leaders, with widely varying degrees of success, sought to persuade the public that they were ‘men of principle’ who could be trusted to practice what they preached regardless of where, when or how they did so. Not surprisingly then, the entirety of their lives came under intense public attention and scrutiny, without which there could be no sustained examination of their claim and thus affirmation or rejection of the trust sought. The same scenario, in various forms and intensities, has played itself out with all subsequent key political leaders/figures. Indeed, it is a crucial, if unstated, part of the societal ‘deal’ that informs all meaningful claims to democratic representation and leadership.

The main ‘problem’ arises when such public leaders/figures (alongside their organisations, closest follows and sycophants) demand, from the very public that gives and sustains their status and position, a conceptual and practical separation of cause and effect, source and destination. In effect, to de-link their words and actions as individual human beings (read: ‘private lives’) from their words and actions as social and political human beings (read: ‘public lives’). It’s a ruse as old as the Magaliesberg hills and predictably, one that continues to be energetically and regularly propagated here in South Africa. Whether it’s the pseudo-sophisticate version of a Ray McCauley or the decidedly more streetwise version of a Julius Malema, it all adds up to the same false binary.

When employed by senior and well known political figures/leaders, the ruse has a great deal more social weight and impact and is most often accompanied by extensive media coverage and vigorous debate amongst the public – and for good reason. All such political figures/leaders, in one way or another, stake a large part of their claim to public leadership, and accompanying social position, on a foundation of personal principles. And so it is that when the words and/or actions of some of our political leaders throw into serious question, or appear as a fundamental violation of, the principles upon which they themselves have built and staked their leadership, we most often find ourselves in the middle of a recurring conflict about the private and the public.

Early last year, when deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe’s (out of wedlock) relationship with a woman was widely covered in the media, the ANC almost immediately issued a statement decrying the ‘intensification of focus into the private lives of senior ANC leaders, to sow further confusion’. It went further and angrily stated that, ‘there can be no justification for this type of invasion of the privacy of any individual by the media …we stand by our Deputy President (and) his private life has nothing to do with the way he runs the country or how he executes his tasks as the ANC Deputy President … that is his own business.’

More recently, the ANC responded similarly to the intense public exposure of, and debate around, President Jacob Zuma’s fathering of a child with a woman who is not one of his numerous wives. It argued that Zuma’s relationships were ‘a personal matter’ and that, ‘as the ANC, we have always made a distinction between people's personal affairs and their public responsibilities.’ The Communication Workers Union chimed in by stating that, ‘what happens in President Zuma’s private life is none of our business including the State … we should demand with our fists clinched high that the media stays out of the bedroom.’ Zuma himself, besides claiming that he had taken ‘personal responsibility’, publicly requested ‘that the dignity and privacy of the affected individuals in this matter be respected.’

Leaving aside a range of other important considerations in relation to the conduct of, and subsequent defence of that conduct by these political leaders and their organisations – such as unequal power and gender relations, the manipulation of ‘culture’ and risky sexual behaviour – the bottom line is one of principled consistency defined by collective and self respect and dignity. This cannot be differentially constructed and applied simply because of societal positionality, simply because some personal conduct is politically problematic or vice-versa.

All public figures/leaders who want to be respected and to have their dignity affirmed must respect and dignify those who are in their lives, whether that be at the individual or collective levels. Sorry, but you can’t have it both ways. The personal is political.

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* Dale T. McKinley is an independent writer, researcher, lecturer and political activist based in Johannesburg.
* This article first appeared in the The South African Civil Society Information Service (www.sacsis.org.za).
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Zuma polygamy drama: Anti-feminist myths addressed

Pumla Gqola

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62362

cc W E FMuch has been said in the media and private conversations on the latest revelations of the South African president’s paternity of a child ‘out of wedlock’. Pumla Gqola counters some of the anti-feminist arguments put forward by defenders of Jacob Zuma’s choices.

Myth 1: It is a private matter.

Jacob Zuma is not a private citizen, but the president of the country and his sex and love life have implications for the rest of us. He pledged loyalty to certain principles, and it is the duty and right of the citizens to question his office when he is seen to transgress or jeopardise these same principles.

Beyond the constitution, principles and other legal issues, however, there is no rule that citizens and institutions of a democracy can only question (or generally speak on) some things and not others. Free speech is one of the bases (and basics) of democracy.

When citizens think the president speaks with forked tongue on gender equality, on HIV/AIDS (risk/prevalence), on consistency, etc, this is not a private matter. When citizens’ taxes pay for an increasingly expensive presidential family, they have every right to speak their minds on the matter.

Myth 2: Zuma can either have multiple partners and be subjected to criticism OR choose one partner and escape public scrutiny.

This is binary logic – which never gets us anywhere. The point of the matter is not whether in a feminist republic we’d force Zuma to choose one wife or banish him. (We’d probably banish Zuma for many more reasons, least of which his preference for multiple partners. There’d be equitable multiple partner relationships in the Feminist Republic.) The heart of the matter is that Jacob Zuma is a public, elected official and an ADULT, which means that he can do pretty much what he likes – apart from commit a crime, be caught and be convicted in a court of law (all together) – but he has to take responsibility for his choices, deal with the consequences of his actions, and be grown up about it. Non-feminists could be forgiven for expressing the sentiment behind the saying ‘just be a man about it’, although not for its formulation.

This feminist wishes the president would stop acting like a helpless child who has no decisions, no choice and no mind of his own. We don’t have to agree on what the best choices are, or on why they are made, but addressing the issues instead of creating never ending smokescreens (culture, privacy, unavailability) would merit more respect.

Myth 3: Zuma’s critics romanticise monogamy, his defenders romanticise polygamy.

Debates on single versus multiple partners are such old hat for most feminists that many of us are at a loss for words when forced to explain why anti-feminist rhetoric insists on equating feminist critique of Zuma with a feminist celebration of monogamy. Are you kidding me?

Feminists have been arguing that monogamous heterosexual families were very often at the heart of patriarchal exploitation of women’s sexual, emotional, economic, pyschological, reproductive and intellectual labour for centuries.

Feminists have also said (again over and over again – across history and continents) that such homes/families/households are the battleground when white supremacist hetero-patriarchies exert violence – hence the devaluation and legalised separation of African/Amerindian/Native American/Asian families in slavery, colonialism, apartheid, etc.

Feminists have insisted that most women experience rape and other forms of violence from their intimate male partners in officially/formally monogynous contexts (and this has been a basic feminist premise for at least 50 years). Feminists said institutionalised monogynous heterosex is about controlling women, containing women’s sexual desire, and policing women’s reproduction.

African feminists especially have said that most monogynous heterosexual relationships benefit the man (to put it mildly) at the expense of the woman in it, and that multiple partner relationships can be about much more than oppression.

Some feminists say the institution of marriage is inherently patriarchal, so the ‘out of wedlock’ thing is not an issue in and as of itself. It’s the larger context of disregard for the dangers that come with infinite sexual relationships in a time of AIDS that is the problem.

Again, much creative, experimental, public essay, academic, op-ed writing and other knowledge exists on the interesting ways in which multiple-partner relationships can be affirming and interesting spaces for women. Yes, many feminists also disagree with some of the above, but it’s patriarchally inconvenient to deal with any of the above.

Myth 4: The issue is polygamy’s legality and validity, both of which are under attack.

All the people who are saying ‘it is my culture’ to practice monogamy mean it is their culture for a man to have many women as partners – polygyny. They are also saying that their culture is static and we should all respect it without question, even if and when it speaks for us too. But, as feminists we insist that if it is ours too, then we can question, change, lay claim to it, question how it is being misrepresented. Every single proponent of the ‘culture’ plus ‘polygamy’ argument that I have read in the South African news, seen or personally debated on radio, television or new media platforms has refused the same courtesy to women with multiple partners, whether these partners be men, women, intersex and/or trans-people, or a combination. So, they’re saying ‘it is my culture to practice polygamy’ but what they mean is ‘it is my culture to enter into polygyny’. And there is nothing specifically African about polygamy – people all over the world choose it.

Myth 5: It’s ‘unfair’ to focus on Zuma and leave the women who are his partners alone in public criticism.

When one of these women is an elected public official, she will be subjected to as much scrutiny from those of us who think that public responsibility matters. But so far, the women that Jacob Zuma has relationships are not elected officials – save for Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who married and divorced Zuma. These other women are private citizens of interest and are therefore not obliged to act.

Myth 6: Feminists ignore that women choose to enter into polygynous relationships.

See comments under ‘Myth 3’. There is nothing automatically feminist about either monogamous or polygamous relationships. Women will choose relationships with differing degrees of choice, given that we live in a patriarchal, and therefore unequal, world. Not all women are feminist. No oppressive system has ever succeeded without the complicity and active support of members of those classes/groups it seeks to oppress. This is part of why the personal is political.

Myth 7: An apology deserves automatic acknowledgment and forgiveness, which is really the only way to deal with offered apologies in life.

Would that not just be fantastic? Then we call all go home to that great la la land that Ray McCauley lives in, where all of us are Christians, and those of us who are Christians subscribe to the same gold gilded version he does. And there’d be no powerful oppressive institutions like white supremacy, patriarchy, Islamaphobia, imperialism, etc, because everything would be about individual pain and acknowledgement. This way, the only institutions we’d recognise would be the ones led by conservative men, who tell us to shut up unless we listen to them justifying the validity of those other power matrices that supposedly don’t exist.

And no, I am not ‘the feminist spokesperson’. I don’t think we need one – we are all our own spokespersons. Women – whether they are feminists or not – are often not taken seriously in this country. Often what we say – and even our differences – are generalised, as though we are a mass with one mouth. This is patriarchy’s work – finish and klaar. The fact of the matter is that a variety of criticisms have been directed at President Zuma, but none of the variety is addressed in those who jump to his defence.

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* Pumla Dineo Gqola is a feminist blogger, associate professor of literature at the University of the Witwatersrand and author of ’What is slavery to me: postcolonial/slave memory and post-apartheid South Africa’ (Wits University Press).
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Elections in Sudan: Chaos before stability

Savo Heleta

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62385

cc S O KSavo Heleta analyses Sudan’s current political situation and asks how suitable and feasible the planned April 2010 elections are. He argues that the Sudan’s current state, with so many unresolved issues, would complicate an election and ‘would not lead to pluralism and democracy, but rather to instability, further polarisation and post-election chaos’. Furthermore, Heleta holds that the current election plan is so complex that its success is questionable, particularly given the extent of illiteracy in the voting population: ‘As currently planned, the elections would be a logistical nightmare for any country, let alone Sudan, leaving too much room for post-election manipulation of votes.’ Heleta colncludes that elections in Sudan need to be either postponed until after the 2011 people’s referendum or simplified and focused on executive positions only.

In the present situation, with so many issues unresolved around the country, Sudan's complicated national elections would not lead to pluralism and democracy but rather to instability, further polarisation and post-election chaos. As currently planned, the elections would be a logistical nightmare for any country, let alone Sudan, leaving too much room for post-election manipulation of votes. The elections need to be postponed until after the 2011 referendum or simplified and held only for executive positions at this time.

Sudan's first multi-party elections in over two decades are planned for 11 April 2010. As stipulated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the north-south conflict – one of the bloodiest and longest on the African continent – the elections would give a chance to Sudanese to freely choose their own representatives for the first time since 1986. The elected officials would then be able to work on making unity attractive to the southerners who will vote in the self-determination referendum in January 2011 whether to remain in a united Sudan or form an independent country.

Edward Thomas notes that the elections were seen as ‘a means to ensure that the CPA has a popular mandate and that it is subjected to a review by the many groups that were excluded from its drafting.’[1] Interestingly, during the negotiations that led to the CPA, the northern National Congress Party (NCP) and southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were not in favour of holding national elections during the interim period. The elections were imposed on the parties, reflecting the wishes of the international actors involved in the peace talks, particularly the United States.[2]

When the CPA was signed in January 2005, the elections – a key milestone in the peace process – were planned to take place in 2008 or no later than July 2009. That would give the people in Sudan between two and three years to experience life under some form of democratic and representative rule. With the elections now scheduled for April 2010, almost at the end of the CPA interim period and less than a year before the southern referendum, one must ask whether the complex and expensive elections are necessary at all. If Sudan proceeds with the elections, can they be free, fair, transparent and credible? Will the elections lead to pluralism and democracy or plunge the country into post-election instability and chaos?

CENSUS DISPUTES

The NCP and SPLM, the two signatories of the CPA, are still in a deadlock over the population census conducted in 2008. The census results were to define electoral constituencies, affecting the number of parliamentary seats for which each Sudanese state would be eligible. The SPLM rejects the census claiming ‘the NCP bloated figures for the north, especially for “Arab” tribes in war-torn Darfur, which then reduced the south's proportion of the population.’[3]

As Rebecca Hamilton writes in Foreign Affairs, if one is to believe the most recent census, the ‘Arab’ nomadic population in South Darfur has increased by 322 per cent since 1993, despite drought, displacement, loss of life and conflict that ravaged this part of Sudan in the 1990s and most notably since the Darfur conflict broke out in 2003[4]. At the same time, the ‘African’ population of Darfur has either remained the same or decreased.

CAN THE ELECTIONS BE FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE?

Can the April elections be free, fair and credible in the eyes of the ordinary Sudanese? Gerard McHugh from Conflict Dynamics International notes that, ‘if undertaken in a transparent, inclusive, and fair manner, elections will provide an unprecedented opportunity for participation by political parties, civil society constituencies, and voters in the political affairs of the country.’[5]

Many huge obstacles still exist to holding free and credible elections in Sudan. According to a report on Sudanese electoral framework by Democracy Reporting International, ‘the general human rights context in Sudan is not conducive to democratic elections. Beyond the grave human rights violations of the Darfur conflict and the significant violence in Southern Sudan, there is little political pluralism and media freedom in the north.’[6]

In the next few months, Omar al Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party (formerly known as the National Islamic Front) are expected to do anything to stay in power. After they had marginalised, neglected and terrorised the majority of Sudanese for two decades, it is unlikely they will now have a large following in the country, despite their claim[7].

They control, however, all spheres of life in the north – the government, police, intelligence and security services, army, paramilitary forces, as well as state TV and radio and business and financial institutions. Even though using state resources for electioneering is forbidden by election law, no one should be surprised if the NCP uses all of the above to its advantage. Jort Hemmer argues that due to its ‘control over the economy and state apparatus’, the NCP has ‘sufficient financial means to buy off potential adversaries, as well as the necessary tools to manipulate the electoral process and ensure victory.’[8]

This election is a chance for Bashir to finally gain some legitimacy after 21 years in power, which he took in a military coup in 1989. The NCP leaders knew very well that they never had a chance of taking power through elections; that's why they took it by gun, ‘representing the interest of the military-security establishment and Islamist pan-Arab agenda.’[9]

In 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bashir for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. President Bashir and his inner circle know that the only way to stay out of jail is to remain in power by any means: ‘Khartoum's security cabal and NCP operators are sufficiently powerful that they can thwart any plan if their core interests are not taken into account.’[10] Opposition parties and local and international observers have already alleged widespread fraud, vote buying and forged papers during the registration for the elections[11].

Richard Cornwell, Africa expert at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, says we should expect some form of vote rigging by both the NCP and SPLM, but that there is every chance these will not be allowed to get out of hand. He thinks both the NCP and SPLM have too much to lose if things go horribly wrong[12].

One of the key post-CPA reforms was to be the removal or at least significant change of the strict security laws introduced after a group of army officers, led by Bashir and inspired by Sudan's Islamists, took power in the 1989 coup. This and other repressive laws, according to Abdullahi Gallab, gave the regime ‘ultimate power over all aspects of human life, welfare, discipline, and punishment’[13].

The ‘reformed’ law passed in December 2009 – thanks to the dominance of the NCP in the national parliament – gives Sudan's intelligence and security services the same wide-ranging search, arrest and seizure powers. The only substantial change in the new law is that it shortens the amount of time suspects can be held in detention. Those who oppose the NCP argue that the reforms of Sudan's security laws do not go far enough and threaten to undermine freedom of speech and national elections[14].

The SPLM and opposition parties fear that the security forces will ‘arrest anyone campaigning against the NCP and Bashir’[15]. If the opposition parties cannot freely campaign across the country without fear of being arrested and detained in the regime's jails and famous ‘ghost houses’[16], it will be very hard to call the upcoming elections anything but a sham and fraud.

NO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY

Since 1989, people in Sudan have had no right to publicly voice their disagreements with the Islamist regime in public gatherings, protests, rallies and demonstrations. The NCP does not allow this because it knows very well the power of Sudanese popular uprisings. Despite being as powerful and ruthless as the current regime, two previous military dictatorships – of General Ibrahim Abboud and General Jafaar Nimeiri – were toppled by the ordinary Sudanese in peaceful protests on the streets of Khartoum and other cities in 1964 and 1985 respectively.

At the beginning of December 2009, despite the regime's ban, hundreds of members of northern opposition parties and the SPLM gathered in front of the National Assembly in Khartoum to peacefully demand electoral reform. In response, police fired tear gas and rubber bullets and beat the protesters with batons, arresting hundreds of them. Among the arrested were some leading SPLM politicians[17].

This crackdown on the opposition took place despite the freedom of expression, association and assembly guaranteed in Sudan's interim constitution. ‘The right of organising and forming political parties, demonstrating, and freedom of expression are all embedded in the interim constitution,’ which the NCP has accepted and signed, according to Sudanese legal expert Mohmoud Shaarani[18].

In mid-December 2009, Salah Ghosh, Omar al Bashir's adviser and former head of national security in Khartoum, announced that the central government would not allow any public demonstrations in the country, saying conditions were ‘not suitable for this form of expression’[19].

The NCP regime has also imposed significant limitations on the media. According to the Article 26 of Sudan's Journalism and Press Publication Act, journalists should ‘refrain from disseminating any matter that contradicts religion, good beliefs, traditions... [should] respect and protect public moralities and good conduct... [and] not violate core principles of public attitude.’ With such law in place, the regime's spin doctors and judges can take any news report covering campaigning by the opposition parties that is critical of the government and can claim it goes against the law. Sanctions for infringement of the act range from apologies to fines to criminal liability[20].

If Sudanese cannot fully exercise their political rights and freely express opinions and disagreements with the current Islamist regime, how can anyone in Sudan and around the world expect free and fair campaigning and elections?

DARFUR AND SOUTH SUDAN

Many internally displaced people (IDP) from Darfur have refused to be counted in the 2008 population census or to register for the elections in their current places of residence. Democracy Reporting International found that the IDPs don't want to ‘vote in their place of current residence but rather for candidates contesting elections in the place of their origin, as they may have a stronger nexus there and may wish for an opportunity to have a say on its political future.’ Sudan's Election Act, however, does not make any specific provisions for voting by millions of IDPs in their places of origin[21].

Those in the Darfur region, where some 20 per cent of Sudanese – who have registered and would like to vote – live, will probably not be able to participate in the elections due to insecurity. The only group that will benefit, if the millions displaced by the current regime don't vote, are the NCP and Omar al Bashir. Not only is it that the national elections cannot be called credible without the Darfurian vote, but excluding Darfur from the electoral process could lead to more fighting and human suffering and even to serious calls for partition and self-determination of the neglected and marginalised province.

South Sudan will also face immense problems related to the elections. It is very likely that the SPLM – former rebel movement still in the process of transforming itself into a political party – will try to sideline other parties by any means[22]. It is also possible that the SPLM, the dominant force in the south, will use the resources of the government of South Sudan (where the SPLM controls 70 per cent of the institutions) for election campaigning, thus putting other political parties at a huge disadvantage.

Analysts claim that over the years, some politicians across the south have exploited ethnic and tribal divisions among communities ‘in an attempt to shore up their constituencies and consolidate control before the polls’[23]. As the elections approach, such manipulation could lead to violence in the volatile and diverse region. Other major problems in Southern Sudan are ‘an extremely fragile security environment’[24] in many areas, poor transport and communication infrastructure and very limited voter education among the population, most of which is illiterate and will be voting for the first time ever in April.

COMPLICATED ELECTIONS

Security, freedom of speech and assembly and potential for vote rigging are not the only issues threatening the credibility of the elections. Some analysts think that the elections are not logistically feasible, calling them ‘the most ambitious and complicated in Sudan's history’[25].

Using a mix of majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems, about 17 million registered Sudanese will be voting for the president of Sudan, National Assembly, president of the government of Southern Sudan, Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, and governors and assemblies for the 25 states of Sudan. In the north, voters will have to cast eight separate ballots. In Southern Sudan, ‘where the UN reports a literacy rate of 24% (only 12% for women), voters are being asked to complete 12 separate ballots’[26].

The election administration will have to ‘design, print and accurately distribute 1,268 different types of ballots to the electoral districts, in a country [the largest on the African continent] where many state capitals are not easy to reach and only have limited access to electricity and communications. The multiple ballots will be sorted and counted in polling stations, many of which will have no electricity and might lack suitably trained polling staff.’[27]

To show how long it may take to cast ballots in South Sudan, United Nations Development Fund for Women organised a mock voting process with women in one village in 2009 and found that it took close to 45 minutes for each woman to cast 12 ballot papers. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Khartoum, on average, ‘an educated person will need 36 minutes to vote and an illiterate person could take twice as long because they would require assistance.’[28]

Not only that the elections are not logistically feasible, but their complexity[29] leaves too much room for post-election manipulation of votes. This, in turn, can lead to bloodshed.

WHAT AFTER ELECTIONS?

Post-election counting of the votes could take a month or more given the large number of ballots and possible complaints by the parties. There is also a potential for having to organise second rounds for presidents of Sudan and South Sudan and state governors in case no candidate wins over 50 per cent plus one vote. During this time, Sudan could face numerous claims of vote rigging, protests and violence.

What will happen after the votes are finally counted and no party wins the majority on the national and north/south levels, which is the most likely scenario? Will Sudan enter a period of peaceful coalition building, power sharing and credible and functioning civilian democracy? Or will history repeat itself and the elections will lead to unstable coalitions, fighting over power, human rights violations and yet another coup for ‘national salvation’, as has happened time and again in the past?

It is important to note that since the 1956 independence, Sudan has held a number of elections, but ‘no multi-party election has ever produced a stable government’[30]. Alex de Waal writes that ‘democratic elections have not led to stability in the past and are unlikely to do so in the future.’[31] There are many reasons for this, some of them being the sectarian nature of Sudanese politics and the inability of any party to win majority in the elections.

Even if the NCP loses power in the April elections and accepts the results without fighting, one of the major problems any new government in the north would face is ‘how to de-NCPify Sudan after the NCP government is removed’ and have control over the country and its institutions, as Andrew Natsios puts it. He rightly asks what to do with ‘one to two million Sudanese who together have been controlling all levels of the state for two decades, hundreds of thousands of agents and informants in the security and intelligence apparatuses and a growing industrial complex’ fully controlled by the NCP[32].

WAY FORWARD

If the elections proceed as planned, the African Union, UN and the wider international community need to take serious interest and send election observers. The observers should not be in Sudan only for the elections, but need to closely follow the campaigning process which starts in February to ensure fair access to the state media by all political parties, transparency of the electoral process and freedom of speech and assembly.

International Crisis Group (ICG) analysts argue that Sudan is not ready for elections in April and recommend that the elections should be postponed until November 2010. They think the parties in Sudan need more time to work on ‘outstanding major pre-electoral CPA benchmarks’, such as ‘legal reforms guaranteeing basic freedoms of expression, association and movement and demarcation of the 1956 North-South border’. In addition, they argue that ‘before free and fair elections can be held in Sudan, time is needed to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement.’[33]

While ICG is correct that the parties in Sudan need more time to work on many outstanding issues, it is hard to see the point of holding elections in November 2010, only a few months before the southern referendum.

The purpose of the first post-CPA elections in Sudan was to give the people a chance to experience life under representative and democratic government and give a chance to elected politicians to ‘make unity attractive’ to the southerners. With the elections now scheduled for April 2010, almost at the end of the CPA interim period and less than a year before the southerners vote in the self-determination referendum, the elections need to be postponed until after the 2011 referendum or simplified and held at this time only for executive positions: president of Sudan, president of South Sudan, and state governors.

Time has run out to ‘make unity attractive’ in Sudan as it will probably take a few tense months of vote counting, possible second rounds for presidents and state governors and contesting of the results so that there will be no time to make any meaningful difference before the referendum. Another reason for the postponement of the elections or voting only for executive positions is the fact that, in the case of southern secession, many of ‘the elected institutions would loose their relevance to a degree’[34] and new elections would be needed in both the north and south again in or after 2011.

In the present situation, with so many issues unresolved around the country, Sudanese national elections would not lead to pluralism and democracy, but rather to instability, further polarisation and post-election chaos. Jort Hemmer thinks that ‘in Sudan's current complex and volatile environment, elections appear more likely to undermine than contribute to stability.’[35] Furthermore, as they are currently planned, the elections would be a logistical nightmare for any country, let alone Sudan, leaving too much room for post- election manipulation of votes.

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* Savo Heleta is a PhD candidate in development studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. He is the author of ‘Not My Turn to Die: Memoirs of a Broken Childhood in Bosnia’, AMACOM Books, New York, March 2008.
* The author writes this paper in his personal capacity.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES:

[1] Edward Thomas, 2009, ‘Against the Gathering Storm - Securing Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Chatham House, p.20
[2] Jort Hemmer, ‘Ticking the Box: Elections in Sudan’, Clingendael Institute,September 2009, p.3
[3] ‘Political deadlock threatens Sudan's 2010 elections’, Reuters, 3 November 2009
[4] Rebecca Hamilton, ‘Sudan's Empty Election’ Foreign Affairs, 24 December 2009
[5] Gerard McHugh, ‘National Elections and Political Accommodation in the Sudan’, Conflict Dynamics International, Governance and Peacebuilding Series, Briefing Paper No. 2, June 2009, p.3
[6] ‘Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Sudan’, Democracy Reporting International, November 2009. p.19
[7] A sign of NCP's desperation came at the end of January 2010, when the party asked the SPLM to withdraw its candidate for Sudanese presidency and support Bashir's candidacy. See ‘Bashir party “backs former Sudan civil-war enemy”’, BBC, 28 January 2010
[8] Jort Hemmer, ‘Ticking the Box: Elections in Sudan’, Clingendael Institute, September 2009, p.15
[9] Ibrahim Elbadawi, Gary Milante and Costantino Pischedda, ‘Referendum, Response and Consequences for Sudan - The Game between Juba and Khartoum’, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4684. July 2008, p.5
[10] Alex de Waal. ‘The Wars of Sudan’, The Nation, 19 March 2007, p.20
[11] ‘Sudan's elections need credible monitors: Britain’, Reuters, 13 January 2010
[12] Interview with Richard Cornwell, 22 January 2010
[13] Abdullahi Gallab, 2008, ‘The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan’, Hampshire, Ashgate, p.133
[14] ‘Sudan passes security bill despite protests’, Reuters, 20 December 2009
[15] ‘Sudan security law threatens free poll – SPLM’, BBC News, 21 December 2009
[16] After the 1989 coup, hundreds of members of ‘student groups, unions, professional associations and political parties faced arbitrary arrest and disappeared in 'ghost houses' and prisons where they were tortured or killed.’ See ‘God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 39, 2002
[17] ‘Sudan SPLM arrests spark southern unrest’, BBC News, 7 December 2009
[18] ‘Sudan: Khartoum Law Reform Protests - Opposition Says Heavy-Handed Government Response to Demonstrations Highlights Need for Change’, allAfrica.com, 15 December 2009
[19] ‘Sudan: Abuses Undermine Impending Elections’, Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2010
[20] ‘Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Sudan’, Democracy Reporting International, November 2009, p.38-39
[21] ‘Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Sudan.’ Democracy Reporting International, November 2009. p.45
[22] At the beginning of February 2010, Miraya FM, a radio station operated by the United Nations Mission in Sudan, reported that ‘harassment and intimidation toward opposition parties in South Sudan have cast a dark shadow over a decree that guarantees freedom for all political parties to conduct activities.’ See ‘Opposition political parties continue to face harassment in southern Sudan’, Miraya FM, 6 February 2010
[23] ‘Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan’, International Crisis Group, Africa Program Report No.154, 23 December 2009, p.13
[24] ‘“There is No Protection” - Insecurity and Human Rights in Southern Sudan’, Human Rights Watch, February 2009, p.15
[25] Elwathig Kameir and Alex de Waal, ‘The 2010 Elections in the Sudan: Landmines on the Road to Democratic Transition’, Social Science Research Council Blog: Making Sense of
Sudan, 8 April 2009
[26] Rebecca Hamilton, ‘Sudan's Empty Election’, Foreign Affairs, 24 December 2009
[27] ‘Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Sudan’, Democracy Reporting International, November 2009, p.7
[28] Ruth Omukhango, ‘South Sudan: Complicating the Vote for Women’, Inter Press Service,12 September 2009
[29] For more info on the complexity of Sudan's elections, see Gerard McHugh, ‘National Elections and Political Accommodation in the Sudan’, Conflict Dynamics International, Governance and Peacebuilding Series, Briefing Paper No. 2, June 2009
[30] ‘Elections in Sudan: Learning from Experience’, Rift Valley Institute, 2009, p.9
[31] Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan: What kind of state? What kind of crisis?’ Crisis States Research Centre, April 2007, p.19
[32] Andrew Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur - Sudan's Slide Toward Civil War’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008
[33] ‘Sudan: Preventing Implosion’, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 68, 17 December 2009
[34] Sudan's interim constitution provides only for the continuation of the presidency and National Assembly in case South Sudan becomes independent. See ‘Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Sudan’, Democracy Reporting International, November 2009, p.6
[35] Jort Hemmer, ‘Ticking the Box: Elections in Sudan’, Clingendael Institute, September 2009, p.25

Tear down the stone wall of secrecy

Alemayehu G. Mariam

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62355

cc UNDPWhile Ghana appears to be taking steps to make its natural resources sector transparent, accountable and open to public scrutiny, Alemayehu G. Mariam sees Ethiopia slipping further the other way. Mariam understands Ghana’s background in the sector is by no means clean, but he believes the very different attitudes of its new presidency should be an example to Ethiopia and the rest of Africa. He finds Ethiopia instead shrouded in secrecy over its farmland and borderland deals with Sudan.

It has been said that Africa’s natural resources – oil, diamonds, minerals – have often proven to be sources of woe, suffering and misery rather than wealth, prosperity and progress for the people of the continent. What should have been a blessing for Africa’s poor has become a curse of corruption, malfeasance and bad governance. Could Africa’s new-found wealth in farmlands prove to be a curse once again? If so, how could it be averted?

Last week, Ghanaian vice president John Mahama contended that transparency, public accountability and scrutiny are necessary to ensure the proper use of natural resources in Africa. Speaking to an international conference in Accra on the public’s right of access to official information, Mahama announced that ‘information on all contracts on the oil find [in Ghana] would be made known to the citizenry for public scrutiny.’ He explained that ‘Lack of access to information will create a gulf of confidence between government and the governed, breed mistrust, suspicion, corruption and lack of faith in the building blocks of democracy… It is against this background that the government of Ghana has started publishing all information on contracts on our oil find.’ Mahama praised Ghana’s media for its dogged investigative role in promoting transparency and accountability in government contracting. He topped off his speech by declaring that ‘legitimate governments would not withhold information from the citizenry’. Ex-president Jimmy Carter praised Ghana’s effort at transparency and reported that ‘President Mills also told [him] a third of the [oil] revenue will be put away for posterity, a third will be invested into education to benefit future leaders and a third will go directly into national treasury for current expenses.’

Recent oil and gas exploration deals in Ghana have been mired in serious allegations of corruption and criminality. In 2007, Ghana announced it had discovered offshore oil reserves with the potential to produce more than 2 billion barrels of oil by 2030. In 2004, the Ghanaian government signed an oil exploration agreement with various companies whose activities are now under official scrutiny. Last March, the newly-elected president, John Evans Atta Mills, pledged to make public all past and future gas and oil exploration agreements.

There are many disturbing questions surrounding the 2004 oil exploration agreements. The fact that the government concluded the complex agreements with the companies in weeks has raised questions about the thoroughness of the negotiating process. The agreements, concluded without parliamentary approval or formal cabinet-level review, have led to allegations of cover-ups. More red flags were raised when it came to public light that certain key players in the oil deals had close associations with the former president John Kufuor, but little or no prior experience in the oil business. One of the co-owners of the company awarded an exploration contract was a physician in the United States (US) who was later appointed ambassador in various European capitals by Kufuor. Little is known about the identities of the individuals or the financial backers of the companies who received the sole-source exploration contracts. Few details are available to the public on production and distribution rights, payments to the government and share transfer agreements between investors and the various companies involved. One of Ghana’s leading media outlets commented: ‘The sweetheart deals in the oil sector, which spotted powerful oil barons, whose footprints leads to the office of former President John Agyekum Kufuor, is about to turn sour… with the ‘Kufour boys’ about to face 25 criminal charges, [for actions] bordering on criminality [including] blatant falsification of public records in a mad rush to control Ghana’s black gold…’

Transparency and effective public access to information on official decisions and the decision-making processes are cornerstones of international law and the constitutions of most countries. Article 13 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) – ratified by Ethiopia on 27 November 2007 – requires signatories to ensure ‘transparency and effective public access to information’. Article IV of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Resolution on the Adoption of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2002), provides that ‘Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the public good and everyone has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly defined rules established by law.’ Article 29 (3) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia guarantees an all-inclusive duty of disclosure of official information that meets the test of ‘public interest’: ‘Freedom of the press shall specifically include the following… (b) access to information of public interest’. Article 29 is bolstered by Article 12, ‘Functions and Accountability of Government’, which sweepingly mandates: ‘The activities of government shall be undertaken in a manner which is open and transparent to the public…’

For the past couple of years, there have been many questions raised concerning the Ethiopian dictatorship’s numerous foreign ‘investment’ deals involving millions of hectares of farmland[1] and a border agreement with the Sudan[2]. Except for those who secretly concluded the so-called farmland ‘leases’ or sales, or signed the border ‘demarcation’ agreement with the Sudan, the negotiation processes and the complete text of the agreements remain shrouded in a veil of secrecy behind a dense fog of official cover-ups, hush-ups and whitewashes. None of the deals and agreements has been subject to public scrutiny. There is, however, sufficient evidence gathered by independent sources that raises many disturbing questions about the negotiation process and the terms and conditions of the farmland and borderland deals.

According to a study by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the official reports of the dictatorship with respect to the magnitude of the land deals lacks credibility[3]: ‘In Ethiopia, for example, enquiries at the state-level Oromia investment promotion agency found evidence of some 22 proposed or actual land deals, of which 9 were over 1,000 ha, in addition to the 148 recorded at the national investment promotion agency. It is possible to speculate that state-level agencies in other Ethiopian states may also have records of additional projects, and that some land acquisitions may not have been recorded at all… For example, in Ethiopia information about the land size of many deals proposed or concluded in 2008 was missing…’

There is further evidence to suggest official under-recording and misclassification to conceal the true nature and scope of the land ‘leases’ or sales. The FAO/IFAD report states: ‘An investment by German company Flora EcoPower in Ethiopia was reported to involve 13,000 ha (hectare), while it is recorded at the Ethiopian investment promotion agency for 3,800 ha only.’ Moreover, the dictatorship intentionally misclassifies the lands ‘leased’ or sold to the foreign ‘investors’ as vacant ‘wastelands’ (that is unoccupied by anyone or just wilderness) in an effort to conceal the fact that inhabited lands are part of a grand land giveaway scheme to foreign ‘investors’.

The FAO/IFAD report specifically points out: ‘In Ethiopia, for example, all land allocations recorded at the national investment promotion agency are classified as involving ‘wastelands’ with no pre-existing users. But this formal classification is open to question, in a country with a population of about 75 million, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas. Evidence collected by in-country research suggests that at least some of the lands allocated to investors in the Benishangul Gumuz and Afar regions were previously being used for shifting cultivation and dry-season grazing, respectively.’

On 21 May 2008, Meles Zenawi publicly described his agreement with Omar al-Bashir as follows: ‘We, Ethiopia and Sudan, have signed an agreement not to displace any single individual from both sides to whom the demarcation benefits…We have given back this land, which was occupied in 1996. This land before 1996 belonged to Sudanese farmers. There is no single individual displaced at the border as it is being reported by some media.’

Zenawi insists on keeping the actual agreement shrouded in absolute secrecy. There is no reason whatsoever why the border agreement should not be made public in its entirety. If the agreement is made public, it will either provide support to Zenawi’s claims or negate them, demonstrating that he is misrepresenting facts. The cloak of secrecy surrounding this agreement raises many questions: Why isn’t the text of the formal agreement between the two countries available for public scrutiny? What are the specific terms and conditions concerning the border demarcation lines and the rights of individuals living along the border made public since then that would be the best evidence of the vicarious representation of them made by Zenawi? Why wasn’t the agreement ratified by the House of Peoples’ Representatives as mandated by the Article 55, Section 12 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia which states: ‘House of Peoples’ Representatives… shall ratify international agreements concluded by the executive’? What conceivable ‘national security’ exceptions apply to an agreement which has been a subject of public commentary and explanation by the head of the dictatorship? What conceivable justification exists to keep secret an agreement that merely marks the international borders of the two countries and protects the rights of the population in the border?

The simple point is that the runaway farmland and borderland giveaway deals need to be publicly scrutinised to ensure transparency, detect corruption and criminality and to make certain that private interests (sweetheart deals) have not overtaken the public interest, or secret deals are not made to harm the Ethiopian national interest.

Mr. Zenawi: Tear down the stone wall of secrecy around your farmland and borderland deals! The Ethiopian people have a right to know, and you have a compulsory legal duty to ensure that they have ‘access to information of public interest’. (See, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 29 (3) (b) and Article 12, Section 1 – ‘government activities must be open and transparent to the public; Article 13 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003), ratified by Ethiopia on 27 November 2007.

‘Legitimate governments would not withhold information from their citizenry.’ Ghanaian vice president, John Mahama

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* Alemayehu G. Mariam, is a professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino and an attorney based in Los Angeles.
* This article was first published in The Huffington Post 16 February 2010.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES:

[1] http://www.ethiomedia.com/adroit/2420.html
[2] http://abbaymedia.com/News/?p=1458
[3] http://tiny.cc/Zh5A3 See pp.40-1,62,78-80

Zimbabwe's transitional justice programme targets diaspora

Stephen Marks

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/62353

cc WikimediaStephen Marks unravels the ‘predictable tensions’ between the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum’s initiatives for a transitional justice programme and the Unity Government’s Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration. While the two bodies agree that Zimbabwe is not yet in a post-conflict situation – rather it is in a state of ‘weak transition’ – views on the ability of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) to provide for the victims of human rights violations are very different. On the one side, Sekai Holland, who heads the organ, has faith in the GPA. She argues that it may be flawed, but has ‘a history’ and she believes that this history must be seen and spoken about by Zimbabweans ‘in all its beauty and ugliness’. On the other side, the NGO Forum believe that the aspirations on the GPA have not been consummated: It is, they argue, ‘an agreement that favours Mugabe, and he is failing to implement it’.

Zimbabweans in Europe are being targeted by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum to make their input into the Forum’s Taking Transitional Justice to the People programme.

Originally launched in the eight constituencies most affected by human rights violations, the programme aims to consult and educate – on the nature and processes of transitional justice – Zimbabweans who have gone through periods of state-sponsored and politically motivated violence in their lives. These aims were explained by the Forum’s executive director, Abel Chikomo, last week to a meeting in London’s Chatham House.

But there are predictable tensions between NGO Forum activists and the parallel initiatives launched by Sekai Holland, minister for national healing, reconciliation and integration in Zimbabwe’s ‘inclusive government’.

Holland heads the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, a government body set up under the Global Political Agreement (GPA).

She explained that this body wants to work with the Forum to make clear where the organ is coming from and avoid friction with NGOs. But NGO Forum representatives at the Chatham House meeting were clearly sceptical of the way that the GPA was working out in practice.

Holland admitted that those who had to implement it would read the GPA differently. For her, it was something that had taken years to achieve, as a result of much work by several parties, including the Movement for Democratic Change’s (MDC) 2006 decision to launch ‘a peaceful campaign to get ZANU/PF to the negotiating table’.

‘It is weak and flawed but it has a history’, she said of the agreement. It was Mugabe’s resort to intimidation and torture, which had led the African Union (AU) forcing Mugabe to talk, she claimed. Zimbabwe was not yet in a post-conflict situation, but in a ‘weak transition’.

Sekai Holland puts great store by the provisions of Article 7 of the GPA which she believes create an ‘enabling environment’ for change. She points to the provision that the parties will ensure ‘equal treatment for all and work towards equal development for all’ including the ‘equal development of all regions’. This, she says, includes Matabeleland, Midlands and Manicaland.

Other clauses provide that ‘consideration’ will be given to setting up a body to advise what measures are necessary for victims of conflict and call for a ‘climate of tolerance and respect’. There are also provisions for involving the diaspora.

Some clearly see this as general ‘motherhood and apple pie’ talk. But not Holland, who insists ‘this empowers you to draw up a programme’ and who points out that the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration is charged with identifying sources of violence and solutions. In the 1980s Mugabes articulations of reconciliation were welcomed. But, she says, there were no mechanisms to deal with ‘the consequences of 95 years of colonialism and previous wars and conquests’. She sees ‘all this history’ as a cause and believes traditional chiefs have ‘the key to much of this’.

Zimbabweans, she maintains, must be enabled to talk about this ‘in all its beauty and ugliness’. To this end the organ will be organising a meeting at Midland State University to bring together different disciplines and scholars to talk through ‘what happened in history’ – a process she compares to social services dealing with a traumatised family, or to dealing with the medical and psychological needs of torture victims.

In more conventionally, political terms the organ will, she says, work towards a national code of conduct leading to an act of parliament, covering a range of issues: from respect by all ministries for the rule of law, land reform to the dismantling of the ‘machinery of violence’.

But for human rights lawyer Gabriel Shumba, director of the Zimbabwe Exile Forum, there was only one point of agreement with Holland – that Zimbabwe was not yet in a post-conflict situation. The ‘noble aspirations’ of Article 7 had still not been consummated, he insisted. The pledge of equal treatment for all and fair development of all regions was not happening. The measures for healing were being processed through political parties and there was no mention of justice.

And why did the mention of the diaspora refer only to the skilled? For healing to take place it would be necessary to ask why four million left. The fundamentals were redress and justice to prevent recurrence, followed by reconciliation. Forgiveness was easy from an armchair. But the environment that gave rise to atrocity was still in place, with those responsible still roaming the streets. Meanwhile progressive forces were disempowered, as the agreement did not recognise those who were not party to it.

Had the MDC’s compromises taken away the possibility of raising issues of transitional justice? Would the MDC be compromised by association with the ‘environment of impunity’ in the country? The transitional justice programme would enable the diaspora to work with the process, including the organ. It would be launching a programme for this in March, with the minister’s cooperation.

The NGO Forum was working within the GPA. But, according to Okay Machisa, a board member of the Forum and director of the Zimbabwe Association for Human Rights, the GPA is ‘an agreement that favours Mugabe, and he is failing to implement it’.

He sees the Forum’s role as one ‘to provoke the community into defining its input’ – as for example by promoting the theatre drama ‘Healing the Wounds’ which had already staged 30 productions and a film version. It included first-hand victim narratives of torture and should be used by the Ministerial Organ as evidence. He was happy the organ was prepared to work with the NGO Forum. But the grass roots had to define the process.

In spite of the caution from the NGO sceptics, Holland was optimistic. She had consulted widely about whether the MDC should stay in the GPA despite the setbacks. Women’s organisations in particular had told her that the security situation was better under the GPA, and their message was ‘stay in but fight better’.

For her the lesson was that ‘we must learn to use our traditional methods of dealing with bullies. Every African in Shonaland and Matabeleland is a born mediator. ‘I’m sorry’ has an extraordinary power in our culture. Change in Zimbabwe has never come from outsiders telling us what to do.’

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* Stephen Marks is a freelance writer and researcher, specialising in development and human rights issues.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Film screening: 'Burden of Peace’

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/Announce/62384

Hope and despair on the postcolonial campus

John Otim

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/62349

cc AfromusingThe inheritance of the colonial university was the postcolonial state’s most ‘prized possession’, writes John Otim. Fifty years on the colonial mission and principles have disappeared from Africa’s universities: ‘Good’, states Otim, ‘But nothing has been put in its place. In the vacuum, the regime of marks, grades and the final certificate at the end takes centre stage… The university has become big business.’ Otim ends, though, with a quiet assertion: ‘Not all is lost yet on the postcolonial campus. There are pockets of excellence, gifted professors and students of real promise dedicated to the new Africa. There is a battle raging between the good, the bad and the ugly.’

Scholars today generally agree that Africans were among the early makers of human civilisation, including developments in science and learning. Paradoxically, the modern African university is distinctly the creation of the colonial state.

Today, in terms of development and advancement regardless of whatever criteria used, Africa lags far behind. The writer and broadcaster, Ali Mazrui has referred to the African predicament as the case of the Garden of Eden in decay, a place that once had it all but has now lost all.

African universities, now grown tremendously in numbers in the last decade and a half, betray little or none of the vibrant traditions that once animated the continent and that to some extent still permeates rural life in Africa. To arrive suddenly in the middle of a Nigerian village festival is to have a taste of this.

The African university today, whether Senegalese or Malian, has roots not in the rich traditions of Africa, but in Africa’s immediate colonial past. For the neocolonial university is a direct descendant of the university that colonialism erected at the moment of its dispossession of the defeated continent.

Unlike ancient Timbuktu or medieval European universities the colonial university – as it took shape at Ibadan, Legon, Makerere and Fruah Bay – represented no flowering of learning, no celebration of culture. It was limited in scope and scale. It admitted a handful of students, offered few carefully crafted courses taught by colonial professors. The student had no idea of his African spirit.

Colonial professors were what they were, distinguishable hardly from the colonial administrators in town hall. Both had been to college together. Now both were in Africa living the same colonial life in an unjust, unequal, racially divided society.

Though its creators could never admit of it, the mission of the colonial university was the reproduction of the colonial state and the promotion of colonial culture. Postcolonial scholarship makes this point very clear.

History, geography, literature and science were marshalled in the interests of empire. Colonies were forever. Colonial culture was not European culture either. It was something infinitely inferior, something purposely designed to cultivate the attitude of inferiority in the colonised.

Within its limitations, however, the colonial university functioned admirably. Immaculate facade bestowed the grace of a metropolitan campus. The university radiated serenity, civility, wholesomeness. Within its four walls you forgot you were in the colonies. Within its charmed corridors the colonial professor became again the man of learning that he really in many instances was.

Even so, the colonial university was not a marketplace of ideas. It was, in real terms, a retailer of carefully processed, carefully regulated and rationed items of knowledge assembled with care for the colonies. There were exceptions. Some brilliant scholarship was produced.

On the eve of independence, the postcolonial state inherited the colonial university. The inheritance proved its most prized possession. So critical was the hunger, so acute the thirst for knowledge in the colonies. Under empire so starved had been the population for education and for information. To the extent that the writer Chinua Achebe has said of the colonial university that it was the only good thing colonialism did in Nigeria. In spite of itself, the colonial university allowed some light through.

In the immediate post colony, the new president became the new chancellor of what had now become the national university, but it was national in name only. Nothing pleased the president more than when he appeared in full academic regalia and presided over convocation ceremonies on graduation day. A man of style, the ancient monkish apparels made him look good. At those moments, the president was a man in love. It was as though the Beatles sang for him:

I am in love for the first time
Don’t you know it‘s gonna last
It’s a love that lasts forever

By the powers conferred upon me, I confer upon all those whose names have been read, the degree of bachelor of science. Then again: By the powers conferred upon me, I confer upon all those whose names have been read, the degree of bachelor of arts. And so on. Finally the ancient royal drums break the monotony. Choice virgins take to the stage… the African thing, always a celebration, always and the dance. Conrad got this right.

Smart in their new uniform the new postcolonial army strikes the band. The brand new anthem of the postcolonial state exudes its distinctive aroma. Everything was new. The people themselves, the vast majority of them young people, looked very new. Cliff Richard sang for them. Young world shouldn’t be afraid… tomorrow because it’s tomorrow, it sometimes never comes.

The ceremonies were conducted in a postcolonial culture saturated with the music of modern pop. This was the new force, poised to take off from where the last colonial governor had left off. Empire was in safe hands. Diamonds are forever. As the sun went down the smell of vintage wine was everywhere. The neocolonial city was in celebration.

Escorted by the former colonial sergeant, now the major general, the president, days later, dutifully appears on parade grounds at the barracks. The occasion: the passing out parade for new officer cadets. But these were nothing compared to campus ceremonies that attracted just about the entire city, including tourists and city babes in their scores and hundreds. The army thing was nothing at all. It was the loser’s game at the finals.

Observers believe this was the reason the military hit ruthlessly and mercilessly on academia and civilians alike once it wrenched control of state power. In one country the military actually occupied the campus and abducted and killed the vice chancellor along with a couple or so of students for good measure. I will deal with you.

In the days before the ascendance of the military, the state naturally proceeded to multiply its most prized possession. So acute was the hunger for knowledge. There was a need for men and women of learning in all manner of fields. There was a need for all manner of technical skills. In the postcolonial state everything was lacking and in short supply.

The state genuinely longed for progress and desired development and prosperity for its people. Public corruption, such as we know it today, had not yet taken hold. The spirit to move mountains was present those days. Even taxi drivers exuded it, feeling as though they owned the new independence, as they ferried passengers around town, merrily playing the latest tunes on their Japanese players.

But at the old colonial university, it was business as usual. The old colonial professors continued to do the same things they did before. Some among them grew contemptuous. The idea of independence for the natives, the audacity of it annoyed them. They vented their anger on students. Look at you, they told the uncomprehending freshmen students.

Look at you. In the villages they would be giving you wives now and a spear and a hoe. Here in this white man’s enclave we are giving you books, pen and paper. Look at you. See me Lakayana with my spear. Look at you. The professor assumed a Conrad posture. The natives were welcoming us, cursing us, who could tell.

But the neocolonial student was beside himself and really quite beyond insults. ‘Say what you like, all things love me.’ In my father’s house there are many rooms. The neocolonial city with its mansions, parks and gardens beckoned. Brand new models from the factories of Europe smiled at the student through spotless shop windows, manned by stylish European women.

The neocolonial student was like a young man set upon a hill and the riches of city displayed before him. If you will but kneel before me all these will be yours. The stakes were high; the neocolonial student regurgitated. At the end of the day the neocolonial student received the degree.

Convocations were a prayer ceremony at the shrines. By the powers conferred upon me, I confer upon you… the new young graduate got the goodies. The sense of new powers was sweet. For those whom fate had so positioned, life in the postcolonial world was as good as any. Say what you like all things love me.

Even as it routinely graduated students, the postcolonial university faced daunting challenges, its fine façade notwithstanding. It needed and quickly too, to lift the university away from its old colonial limitations. It needed to avoid falling into the trap of new post colony limitations quickly piling up in the capital like sand dunes. But above all, the postcolonial university needed to quickly put in place the culture of the university.

And more fundamental, the postcolonial university needed to reconnect to the old spirit and traditions of the university, the traditions that had become universal, that had made possible the free spirit of enquiry and learning typical of the great universities of Europe and the United States. Traditions that had animated places like Harvard, Cambridge, Princeton, Yale and Venice, name it.

Nearly five decades on since independence, the question has arisen more forcefully. How have African universities faired in the intervening years? Calling, calling, calling African universities… the spirit of old Africa was shouting from across the void… calling, calling Africa.

In the mid-nineteen seventies a famous African statesman famously declared at Addis, during the African Summit: Africa has come of age. Throughout Africa this was the age of the coup d’etat.

How could Africa come of age without its universities? Was that the example of Japan? Is it now the example of the new India or the new China? Without its universities where would Europe be?

The little known and even less read novel, ‘Marks on the Run’, published in the year 2002 at the Ahmadu Bello University, where I teach, offers some clues. It does so in a way none other has attempted. There is very little debate in Africa about African universities. You are unlikely to encounter anywhere this kind of polemics.

Although its author is far from being a great man of letters and in many ways lacks the gift of a writer, Marks on the Run does manage somehow to let you into the world of the postcolonial university, in a mode that says ‘this is it’.

The old colonial campus is no more. In its place stands a huge edifice, hurriedly put together. Hundreds and thousands of students attend but many have no idea why they are there. To be sure the old colonial professor is gone, nobody there talking disgustingly about spears, bows and arrows. This is good.

But there are lecturers and professors on campus who know next to nothing about their disciplines. Those who know something are gone or if still there, are quite overwhelmed. Classes are huge, dormitories overflow. Living conditions for students are appalling. Rented accommodation in town is worse. The place is a calamity waiting to happen.

The old colonial mission of ‘for the glory of empire’ that guided learning and the curricula, is gone. Good. But nothing has been put in its place. In the vacuum, the regime of marks, grades and the final certificate at the end takes centre stage. It is wielded through the combined dictatorship of lecturers and professors.

The university has become big business. Fake businessmen hunt for contracts. A growing number of lecturers find here a place for marking time and making quick dough. For the majority of students, the university has become a place for picking easy grades and unearned diplomas, a far cry from the rigor and discipline of the colonial university.

Not so long ago, a professor said to me: ‘Here no one earns their degrees. We dash them.’ Dash means to give out. In the novel, learning and things intellectual take a back seat; money and sex get to replace ideas as the mode of academic exchange.

But don’t go away. Not all is lost yet on the postcolonial campus. There are pockets of excellence, gifted professors and students of real promise dedicated to the new Africa. There is a battle raging between the good, the bad and the ugly. ‘Marks on the Run’ by Audee T. Giwa, a one-time lecturer of the Ahmadu Bello University, is a report from the war zone.

Perhaps it is not unrelated that of late I, myself a lecturer of the Ahmadu Bello University, have fallen victim of assassination bids on campus in circumstances that bare the hallmark of an insider job. I carry on my forehead, the Harry Porter mark, a sign that You-Know-Who has been after me. The Dementors have entered the campus.

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* John Otim is a lecturer at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Kenya’s government must be accountable to the people

L. Muthoni Wanyeki

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/62363

cc DemoshImpunity in Kenya is ‘so deeply entrenched that it has become a sort of public office entitlement or perk’, writes L. Muthoni Wanyeki. But as yet another corruption scandal rears its head, Wanyeki calls for a more ethical response from the government, which demonstrates concern for how the public’s money is used.

Kenya’s debate around corruption with respect to education and maize illustrates, once again, just how seemingly impossible it is to do the right thing and how cynical many public officers have become.

In both scandals, the debate followed the predictable cycles: Initial denial; pressure from the domestic public; pressure from the international public; half-hearted capitulations in the form of promises of investigations; investigations; the release of an array of names of public officials; calls for going beyond strictly legal accountability to political accountability; refusals to accept the same – and then the tedious allegations of political motivations in those calls.

But the existence of such motivation doesn’t change the fact that eventually we must move to a more ethical response that shows concern for how the public’s money is used.

Such a response would, ideally, go something like this: Accusation or revelation; the institution of immediate investigations from the highest levels; followed by the equally immediate voluntary removal of those at the highest levels to generate confidence in the investigative process; and then what should be the normal course of the law.

But this being Kenya, impunity is so deeply entrenched that it has become a sort of public office entitlement or perk.

This thinking followed the aftermath of the 2007/8 political crisis, where accountability for what happened with the presidential elections was neatly swept under the carpet.

The thinking has been somewhat shaken up by the failure of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Elections Violence (CIPEV) to follow the Independent Review Commission’s (IREC) route – waiting for the decision of the pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

There are two ways to look at the situation.

We can feel angry at our executive’s and our parliament’s failure to get a grip on the situation and institute a credible national process for criminal justice at all levels, or we can be happy that, at the very least, the unfolding of the CIPEV and ICC processes has clearly shaken up the expectation of impunity as an entitlement and a perk of public office.

But behind all of the public smooth-talking and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, there is a real sense of shock that this has not simply gone away, petered out in the never-ending stream of public office abuses and insanities.

This is a good thing. But still, we need to be concerned at the alacrity with which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pursuing the African Union’s position with respect to granting the African Court of Justice criminal jurisdiction.

Realistically, it will be a long time before the African Court can offer credible criminal justice to the continent.

But politically, a decision that it should can – and most definitely will – be used to complicate any ICC role with respect to the Kenyan situation.

We should also be concerned with the consequences of an ICC take-up, most notably with respect to witness protection.

The proposed amendments to the Witness Protection Act go some way to expanding the scope of protection to more than whistle-blowers but they fail to address the role of the attorney general’s office in determining who is worthy of protection – or how to best ensure impartiality of those of our security agencies in providing such protection within the country.

These two problems (and there are more) make the proposed agency insufficient with respect to handling any witness protection needs that may arise in connection with criminal justice proceedings for Kenya’s post-elections violence.

Accountability, it is true, comes at a cost. But that cost should not be at the expense of the survivors and victims.

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* This article first appeared in The East African.
* L. Muthoni Wanyeki is the executive director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Twenty years of freedom: What we can learn from Nelson Mandela

Horace Campbell

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/62366

February 11, 2010 marked twenty years since Nelson Mandela walked out of Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town, South Africa. Mandela was a leader of the African National Congress (ANC), who had been incarcerated for 27 years for opposing the unjust system of apartheid. Nelson Mandela was freed by a social movement; the Mass Democratic Movement of South Africa – comprising of students, workers, religious leaders, grassroots women, community organisers, gay and lesbian activists, and cultural workers. This network of activists bore the brunt of the repression of the illegal regime but their prolonged popular struggles delegitimised the system of apartheid.

Apartheid was a system of oppression based on capitalism, white supremacy, and militarism. In order to stay in power, the apartheid war machine, like an armed locust, destroyed the whole region of southern Africa, with more than two million lives lost and US$80 billion worth of damage. The struggle against the destructive machinery of apartheid consisted of four nodes: 1) The Mass Democratic Movement; 2) The diplomatic and political work of the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and other liberation movements; 3) The frontline states of southern Africa led by Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, and Mozambique; and 4) The international campaign of sanctions to isolate South Africa. These four elements of the struggle created an international movement, and were all-important. It must be stated that the stature of Mandela was equal to the sterling work of the people’s movement inside South Africa. The international campaign of sanctions was just as important as the war in Angola, where the Cubans and the Angolans defeated the apartheid war machines at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, leading to the collapse of apartheid. One must also point to the continuous sacrifices of the youth, the generation after Soweto, who never gave up the fight.

NELSON MANDELA IS AND WAS NOT A MESSIAH

It is important here to note that Mandela rejoined the movement that ended apartheid. The ANC and PAC were unbanned and it was during the negotiations for the next four years where the formal structures of apartheid were dismantled. This formal dismantling of the system of oppression was marked by the ascendancy of Nelson Mandela to becoming the first democratically elected president in South Africa. After Nelson Mandela was swept to power in 1994, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was based on a compromise between the old white ruling elite, who needed to open up the country to international investment, and an aspiring layer of black businessmen who hoped to enrich themselves in the process. This compromise was sealed by the elevation of those members of the burgeoning black empowerment forces who accepted the doctrine of neo-liberalism. The international media worked hard to elevate Mandela as a messiah seeking to place him above the grassroots forces who had borne the brunt of the long and painful struggle. This media acclaim was also meant to demobilise and de-politicise the youth. To undermine the importance of the long struggles there were many books that proclaimed that Mandela had performed a ‘miracle’ as if singlehandedly, he ended apartheid.

Mandela offered a new vision of politics and one of his principal contributions was the embrace of reconciliation instead of revenge and to introduce the spirit of ‘ubuntu’ to international politics. The elements of ubuntu include forgiveness, willingness to share, common humanity, and reconciliation. Ubuntu was translated from the philosophical level to practical politics when South Africa established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is important to stress these major contributions because Mandela wanted to move past the politics of revenge, stressing restorative justice over retribution. The TRC was imperfect in many ways and this imperfection was nowhere more manifest in the fact that one of the primary architects of biological warfare against blacks is walking free in South Africa today. Project Coast is one chilling reminder of how far the apartheid system would go to save capitalism. However, it is not too late to correct the imperfections and to continue to promote the politics of truth.

Mandela sought to make a break with the recursion of apartheid form of relations among South Africans. He remembered the African traditions of forgiveness as well as Gandhi’s philosophy of peace, which says that an eye for an eye makes everyone blind. We were hoping that the United States would have learned from Mandela, and that its leaders would learn something from ubuntu. This would have prevented the world from embarking on the foolish and destructive ‘war on terror.’ However, for these ideas to take root, the mobilised peoples must again be in motion. The international movement for peace, justice and reparations have a lot to learn from the revolutionary doctrine of ubuntu.

SOUTH AFRICA TODAY

Nelson Mandela made four major contributions to African politics. First, he was against genocide, and shamed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into repealing its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states. He spoke out forcefully against genocide at his first OAU summit in 1994. Second, Mandela demonstrated that no African leader should keep themselves in power beyond their legally established term. Third, he became a staunch supporter of peace and social justice in Africa and in all parts of the world. Mandela was a forceful opponent of the occupation of Iraq and of Palestine. Finally, as earlier stated, he popularised the principle of ubuntu into international politics. Together with Desmond Tutu and the movements for peace in South Africa, Mandela spoke out against the unilateral military actions of the United States. Mandela opposed the idea of a US Africa command.

The leaders of southern African states seem to have forgotten this principle. Today, most liberation leaders of southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, have discredited the guiding principles of the liberation that the people fought for. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in South Africa itself, where one leader manipulated and obfuscated the question of the source of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Moreover, the political party of Mandela has degenerated to the point where there is no clear leadership to oppose xenophobia.

Since 2008, we have had repeated incidents of Africans attacking Africans in South Africa. The leadership of South Africa has so soon forgotten how their fellow Africans joined forces to vigorously fight against apartheid. The ANC as a political party is torn between its revolutionary, radical past and the present leadership that concentrates on getting rich. Yet, the people of South Africa continue to organise; the spirit of the Mass Democratic Movement is still there with the people organising against the neoliberal policies of the government. These people are waging a struggle for healthcare, electricity, clean water, decent housing, cleaning of toxic dumps, and better living conditions.

MANDELA WAS NOT AN ANGEL

As a leader who was head of a government, Mandela could not escape the degeneration associated with the ANC in power. The embrace of the ideas of privatisation and liberalisation meant that the government supported the classes and social forces that held power under apartheid. More damaging, it was under the Mandela period when the sordid arms deal was negotiated. Billions of dollars were spent on weaponry when there was no conceivable foreign military threat and when the real threat to the consolidation of democracy was the exploitation of the working people. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) carried forth the work of defending the rights of the poor workers and demonstrated against the warped priorities of the ANC. Instead of houses, schools and clinics being built, instead of money to tackle AIDS, South Africa bought submarines. The capitalists moved in South Africa through their nongovernmental organisations and local non-profit allies to demobilise the people. But the struggle has only heightened since Mandela stepped down as president in 1999. If Thabo Mbeki was arrogant and aloof from the suffering of the people of South Africa, the real state of the ANC today is best reflected in the personal and political soap opera of Jacob Zuma.

THE SPIRIT OF UBUNTU TODAY

We honour Nelson Mandela for his contribution to the liberation of Africa. We also want to salute those forces from the grassroots liberation forces who have continued the struggle for social justice and system change. In the midst of a major capitalist depression, when the brunt of this crisis is felt by people of African descent and poor people, it is timely that we remember Nelson Mandela and his contributions to politics through the principle of ubuntu. This question of ubuntu is particularly relevant as we confront the condition of our brothers and sisters in Haiti who have just been faced by an unspeakable tragedy. More than ever, we need the concept of common humanity. We have to organise from every location to change the system that demeans our humanity.

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* Horace Campbell is peace activist who is working to realise the dream of the late Tajudeen Abdul Raheem of building African unity by 2015.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Bar hopping for Zuma

Azad Essa

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/62361

I know nothing about pubs and bars, except of course what Hollywood has taught me. This means my idea of bars, save a couple of visits with friends, is really imprinted with the image of depressed sods and reconciliatory drinks before going home to the government, the all-knowing-gun-toting-barman, and the drop-out college barmaid serving drinks.

However, when I was asked to check out if scores of angry, muscled workers in blue overalls, boots and tattoos would be gathering around a television, cursing, chanting, clunking over-filled glasses of beer as South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma delivered the historic State of the Nation Address, I knew it was not going to be like the movies.

The state of the nation address, usually delivered in parliament on a weekday morning, was moved to 7pm, with a live broadcast, presumably so the public could watch South Africa’s goons hit the red-carpet.

But who knows? Perhaps people would stop pub brawls, step out of the brothel, or off the treadmill and listen to our president remind us of our state. I walked into my first bar, hoping a lonely, one-time stripper would whisper ‘What can I get you, stranger?’, as I’d go on to seduce her with words about real men not needing a hard drink. (Hmm, but then what are you doing in the bar, if not to drink?)

The bar I walked into had a power failure.

‘The barman is over there, somewhere. He is so f****** black you won’t see him,’ a trim silhouette sitting on a plastic chair pointed ahead.

An empty room: The whites of roaming eyes, the shimmer of the usual suspects in glass fridges, their glamorous green and gold wrappings reflecting the last moments of the sun’s life.

‘Howzit,’ I say to the bulkier silhouette across the bar.

He grunts back.

‘Do you have a television here… tonight is the state of the nation addr…’

‘I know what he’s going to tell us,’ screams a voice behind me. ‘He is going to tell us how he is going to use our money to support his 52 children and his ten wives!’

‘F*** the state of the nation speech!’ he continues.

I order a coke. The barman gives me a sprite. I lift myself onto a barstool. And spin around to face the voice. Like they do in the movies.

‘This Zuma guy won’t last long. If he carries on like this, the ANC will pull an Mbeki on him. They will get rid of him,’ says the mystery man sipping on a tinted bottle at a table adjacent to me.

‘You know Deevi,’ his voice croaks. ‘This country is not getting any better. Everything is in a state of corruption. In some years, Deevi, this country will be taken back by the white man; I think I better move to Botswana or Uganda.’ His croaks turn into a drunken slur.

Deevi, presumably the guy opposite him, nods his head.

‘Every year they have state of the nation speech at 10am, you know why they suddenly changed it… you know why?’ he asks his little audience.

‘How you know all this?’ Deevi asks

‘I read the paper, watch the news,’ he replies.

He doesn’t tell us why.

A sub-station had apparently taken out the electricity in the entire area and the barman had no idea when power would return.

My new friends were entertaining, but sitting in the dark here was not going to help me much. I bid them goodbye, jump into my car and race to another suburb.

Switching on the radio to listen to the live broadcast, I am greeted with, ‘We seem to have lost the signal from inside parliament…’

I chuckle at the peculiar start to my evening.

As the radio signal improves, I drive past an up-market café and notice three huge LCD screens showing a bunch of Italian men sprinting after a football.

I drop by and ask the manager if he would change from the sports channel to the speech.

He complies, adjusts the volume slightly, but not above the middle-class din presiding over over-priced supper.

Zuma’s mouth moves, slowly. I lip-read ‘job creation’ and ‘poverty’; I look around and not a soul has even noticed the president’s presence.

‘Do you want to keep watching?’ the manager asks me.

Is this what the speech meant to us? Lip service?

I smile. I decline. I race back my car. One more place, I think to myself.

Back in my vehicle, Zuma reminds us how far the nation has come, how the Mandelas sacrificed their lives for justice, that 480,000 jobs have been created through the Expanded Public Works Programme despite the fact that 900,000 jobs have been lost in the recession. 900,000 jobs that probably were not there in the first place, I cynically think to myself.

I look out my window, as I roam the streets looking for my last place of rest.

It is around 730pm, not yet completely dark. The semi-busy streets, with workers and vagabonds hanging about, mirror the murkiness of an awkward twilight. A couple of junkies sit on the pavement at a street corner, their demeanour unflattering. The coffee shop and restaurant above also broadcast soccer – from a different league – on their television screens.

En route I pass by a string of busy gourmet burger and pizza joints, a bar with an LCD screen facing the street, flashing a fashion catwalk or music video. On air, Zuma tentatively advocates five-year plans to improve housing, and health and decrease crime; it is as if the same worlds are ceremoniously spinning in opposite directions.

I walk into the next bar, and order a ginger ale. Three men sit beside me, huge glasses of gold liquid on the table-top before them.

I acknowledge their company by simultaneously raising my eyebrow, slightly nodding my head and lifting my drink in their general direction.

They nod back.

‘Heard they showing the state of the nation speech tonight,’ I say to all three of them.

‘Tonight?’ one replies

‘Yeah, tonight. I think it’s now,’ another replies.

The third guy just stares at me, dryly, sipping his beer.

I ask the bar-lady to change the channel.

‘I think we’d rather stick to the sports hey,’ she declines.

‘I suppose we can do that,’ I say to the man beside me. ‘Zuma is only talking about our future.’

The bar-lady laughs. The two men also laugh. The third man keeps staring. With less than ten minutes now left before this historic speech ends, I decide it's time to give up.

I check the emails on my phone. Excerpts of his address were already in my inbox. In a couple of hours there would be a plethora of write-ups, comment, analysis and the usual dramatics surrounding a speech of this nature.

I watch Mancini score some goals as part of a promo for AC Milan.

I pick up my glass and join the others in drowning their sorrows.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared in The Africa Report.
* Azad Essa is a journalist based in Durban. He blogs at thoughtleader.co.za.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Kenyan gays appeal to government for protection

Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK)

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/62370

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights…and are entitled to all the rights and freedoms, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, and religion, political or other opinion. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person….No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment… All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. UDHR Arts. 1 – 7.”

These are fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which Kenya is a signatory.

The members of the Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya are appalled at the behaviour of the people of Mtwapa, Kilifi, but more especially by that of the provincial administration and the police. The five arrested people committed no crime, and we demand their immediate release.

We are also concerned that the media in Kenya continues to play a big role in inciting the public to take matters in their own hands. We understand the media especially in Mombasa called upon residents to ‘stand against the pollution of culture’. In the supposed gay wedding publicised in the media, there are glaring inconsistencies that the media should have investigated before broadcasting the news.

We would also like to point out the following basic truths relating to this case (Gay Marriage):

1. It is not a crime in Kenya to be homosexual. While engaging in sex “against the order of nature” is a crime, being gay or living a gay lifestyle is not. People cannot be arrested on suspicion of being homosexual. How pray we ask, do homosexuals look like? What are the distinctive characteristics of homosexuals, and why would they be criminalized on the basis of these characteristics?

2. Same-sex marriages in Kenya are a non-entity; they therefore cannot be a crime. If two friends of the same sex wish to commit in friendship to one another, such commitment is not a marriage, and even if they regarded it as such, the Government has no obligation to regard it as a marriage since marriage is between members of the opposite sex.

3. The Action by the Kilifi District Commissioner and the heavy contingent of the police makes one wonder about the government priorities. This is a district drowning in drugs and the large number of drug addicted youths accompanying the police is proof enough. Yet instead of arresting the drug lords and drug pushers the police chose to arrest five hapless youths engaged in HIV Vaccine research project.

4. In a country with less than 5000 doctors, is taking suspected homosexuals for medical examinations to prove homosexuality the best way to utilise this limited human capital? A visitor to any of our district hospitals would be most saddened by the way we allocate, priority work for our doctors.

5. Lastly, National HIV programming has recognized stigma and discrimination as important drivers of the HIV pandemic both within the sexual minorities and the general population. Men who Have Sex with Men – MSM contribute 15.2% of all new infections in Kenya. Of these, 60% are engaged in heterosexual relationships. When will the Kenyan people realize that enforced heterosexuality leads to further HIV vulnerability of the entire society and in no way cures people of their homosexuality?

The Gay and Lesbian Coalition members, including the membership from Mombasa call on the government to give protection to all Kenyans including the sexual minorities, and to prevent State agents and 3rd parties from meting violence on minority populations.

We therefore call on the Government to move with speed to decriminalize homosexuality so that we can begin to educate the society on the evils of discrimination against sexual minorities.

We urge the media to desist from making inflammatory statements that may put the lives of gay people at risk.

We also call upon the religious leaders in Kenya to appreciate that compulsory heterosexuality is not the way to enforce their religion. GALCK members are willing to enter into dialogue with them, and if they truly have a cure for homosexuality, then we are most happy to take it, BUT NOT UNDER CONDITIONS OF DURESS.

Statement Signed for the GALCK members by

David Kuria

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* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

‘Mugabe and the White African’: An exercise in dangerous help

Blessing-Miles Tendi

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/62357

A new documentary portraying a white Zimbabwean farmer’s struggle to resist the unlawful seizure of his land by a senior Zanu PF politician is undermined by its lack of ‘historical and political context’, writes Blessing-Miles Tendi.
The documentary ‘Mugabe and the White African’, directed by Lucy Bailey and Andrew Thompson, is an intimate account about Michael Campbell, one of the few white farmers left in Zimbabwe since Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF began a violent land seizure programme in 2000. It portrays the 75 year-old Michael’s struggle to resist the unlawful seizure of his Mount Carmel Farm by Nathan Shamuyarira, a senior Zanu PF politician. In 2008, Michael, assisted by his son in law Ben Freeth, successfully challenged Mugabe before the South African Development Community (SADC) international court, charging his government with human rights violations and racial discrimination. The documentary is an emotionally charged depiction of the court case, and does not spare the viewer bloody footage and violence. ‘It resonates internationally because it is about big issues of human rights. It is about humanity and you do not have to understand Africa to get it’, co-director Bailey has explained.

It is precisely Bailey’s belief that ‘you do not have to understand Africa’, from which the documentary’s primary shortcomings emanate. Zimbabwe is not Africa and Africa is not Zimbabwe. The documentary lacks historical and political context. Land and race are important themes in the documentary but not once is the Lancaster House Independence Agreement (1979), which perpetuated racially biased land distribution in independent Zimbabwe, mentioned. We are exposed to the emotional anguish of Ben’s British parents, living in the county of Kent in South East England, as they agonise over their son’s safety on Mount Carmel Farm – but Britain’s role in Zimbabwe’s land problem is never referred to. The documentary shows us that Mugabe implemented a racist land reform programme in 2000 but we are not told why and how it took him 20 years to become a racist. Mugabe did not just wake up a racist one fateful morning in 2000. The documentary needed to at least mention the challenging nature of racial reconciliation since independence, because it is the unravelling of reconciliation that informs the anti-white behaviour the film depicts.

Bailey and Thompson go out of their way to demonise Mugabe. When the documentary’s title first appears on the screen it is all in white. Suddenly the word Mugabe begins to slowly drip with what appears to be blood. The word Mugabe is soon coloured red completely, while the colour of the rest of the title is unchanged. ‘Horror movie or searching documentary’, I wondered to myself. Mugabe’s oft quoted out of context statement that if redistributing land from whites to blacks makes him a Hitler in Western eyes then let it be, and let it be ‘tenfold’ he adds, follows not too long after that. We are even shown a newspaper headline that reads ‘we are like Jews in NAZI Germany’, words presumably uttered by a besieged white farmer. Mugabe and Zanu PF are guilty of horrendous human rights violations, but they are not Hitlers nor is Zimbabwe remotely like Nazi Germany.

The voice of someone spewing anti-white rhetoric is made to reverberate in the background at opportune moments in the documentary. The voice is hellish, black, evil and unmistakably Mugabe’s. In contrast the Campbell and Freeth families are presented as God-fearing, forgiving and compassionate. This juxtaposition furthers the good versus bad, demon versus angel distinctions that have characterised popular debates about Mugabe. He is a failed leader, guilty of misgovernance; but crude juxtapositions with the ‘good’ white farmer inhibit nuanced popular debate.

The film lacks focus on the plight and hardships of other races. Black farm workers are constantly in the background. When they do come to the fore they are mute. ‘If I lose (the farm) we all suffer. We are in this together’, Ben remarks to a black farm worker who mostly nods his head and smiles. ‘Pray for me. I will bring you blankets’, Ben tells a group of black farm workers before he leaves for the SADC court in Namibia. Again the black farm workers do not speak. They smile, nod their heads and walk away under the rising Zimbabwean sun. The black farm workers noticeably wear tattered clothes and their houses, always in the background of course, are of an inferior standard to those of the white landowners. The relationship between the black farm workers and the white landowners passes off as paternalistic and patronising. Whenever black farm workers and white landowners are filmed together in moments of compassion there is a palpable unease between them, a contrived empathy, and the fact that power relations are skewed in favour of whites is apparent.

‘Mugabe and the White African Male’ is a more apt title for this documentary, because the voices of women are secondary. They have no agency. This is a documentary about white male courage in the face of Zanu PF’s violent black males. For instance, there is little on the contributions of Angela, wife to Michael, and her daughter Laura, wife to Ben, to the resistance. And yet women are heroines too because when the brave men are away in Namibia fighting court battles with Mugabe’s lawyers, Laura and Angela courageously hold the fort against Shamuyarira’s pugnacious and ever lurking farm invaders. As for black female farm workers, these do not even nod their heads and smile – they are simply invisible.

In the documentary Ben asks, you can be white and American, you can be white and Australian, so why can you not be white and African? Bailey and Thompson intended Ben’s question to be a central one to the documentary, which is surprising given its problematic nature. Part of establishing white American and white Australian identities in America and Australia involved nearly exterminating the non-white Native Americans and Aborigines respectively; claiming indigenous peoples’ land and forging white identity over many generations by subjugating and writing non-whites out of the history of those countries. America and Australia are the worst examples Ben could ever have cited. Becoming ‘African’ is not about economic integration alone – something many white Zimbabweans never grasped. It is also about social, residential and political integration, and about learning local languages.

In the documentary the Freeth and Campbell families are distinctly white Europeans in Africa who claim to be white Africans based on their right to own land. Never are they captured speaking in any of the local languages. They speak English only – even to the black farm workers. We are not shown inter-group marriages by their family members or by the neighbouring white farmers who appear in the documentary.

In a separate documentary by Hopewell Chinono called ‘A Violent Response’, which is about violence in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections, Michael Campbell comments on the Mount Carmel Farm violence by saying, ‘My faith in the African as a ruler in Africa has been shaken. I do not believe that any of them are capable of ruling themselves. Democracy is a joke’. Angela is shown wilfully nodding her head as he opines. Were Bailey and Thompson so gullible to fall for Michael’s ‘I am a white African’ pretensions or did they conveniently choose to omit the unpalatable reality that colonial attitudes endured in independent Zimbabwe? What makes ‘Mugabe and the White African’ a dangerous documentary is not so much its content but Bailey and Thompson’s belief that they are actually ‘helping’ the people of Zimbabwe by having made this documentary.

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* Blessing-Miles Tendi is a researcher and freelance writer on contemporary Zimbabwean politics.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

China: A hyena out to con Africa?

A response to 'Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa discourse'

Julius Gatune

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/62388

'Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa discourse' is a great article and very well balanced. Provides the great context that most people do not have when analysing Africa-China relations.

The idea that could be added is the victim mentality that informs any analysis of Africa. We see Africa as a hapless victim or even child that will be exploited if not protected by her ‘parents’. China is portrayed as the hyena out to con and cheat Africa. This is particularly the patronising attitude that Africa must seek to change.

China is just another hardworking hyena that is looking for a meal. If Africa is the antelope in the global jungle it must learn that just because the leopard is beautiful does not make it less dangerous than the hyena.

Much as the hyena is discredited in fairly tales at the expense of the noble lion. China must act before this perception gets accepted as reality.

Hickel is right about the technocrats

A response to 'Africa, geology and the march of the development technocrats'

Michael

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/62387

For sure profit, power and the modern version of law of the jungle albeit in the global political economy: ‘comparative advantage’ are regularly invoked as justification to finance wars to access and extract raw materials cheaply with little regard for the socio-economic rights and benefits that should ‘under normal’ conditions accrue to the ‘substrate communities’ and countries in Africa in particular.

Speaking from a South African experience there are three issues that stand out: Type, level and depth of poverty and unemployment, the greatest income gap internationally despite lessons from SAPs and the most recent financial crisis amidst some of the greatest natural resources and cash available. Yet a country such as South Africa lags far, in broader terms, behind in socio-economic development than a country the size of South Korea which has far fewer natural resources as economic base should one wish to only look at that variable.

The issue of agency and power is selectively glossed over or dumped onto the ‘losers’ substrate-communities/ countries laps in the global political-power-economic stakes. The proponents usually exonerate themselves from any form of culpability or complicity.

Why didn’t you mention the sanctions?

A response to 'Statement on the first anniversary of the Government of National Unity'

Mike

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/62390

It is astonishing to me that Pambazuka news could publish a comment ‘Statement on the Occasion of the first anniversary of the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe’ (2/2/10) without mentioning the impact of the ten years of sanctions.

I visited Zimbabwe in 2007. The people were great. I never felt threatened or not secure. However, it was obvious that the people of Zim were struggling economically, primarily because of the immoral, illegal and racist sanctions imposed by the UK & US.

This is a crime against the people of Zim and humanity.

Shame on Pambazuba for this malicious oversight!

EDITORS’ COMMENT: Thank you for writing. We should remind you that Pambazuka News is a platform for diverse perspectives on social justice. Your admonishment needs to be directed to the authors rather than at Pambazuka News. Not everything we publish represents our viewpoint.

Yar’Adua has NOT improved democracy

A response to 'How Yar'Adua has improved Nigerian democracy'

Beauty

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/62389

So, just because horses did not go insane and devour each others' meat while they are still alive when Yar'Adua handed over (or did he?) does not mean he improved Nigerian style democracy.

Is the title ludicrous? Yes, it is. I do not see any of the arguments here supporting the title.

In fact, on the ground, in Nigeria and abroad, Yar'Adua and his absence appeared to have had the reverse effect. Nigeria has become irrelevant. What does that mean? Go figure.

EDITORS’ COMMENT: When one reads the article and not just the title, you realise the intended irony of the title.

Zuma scandal will hurt the ANC

A response to 'Shift flawed leader aside or suffer the consequences'

Peter Townshend

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/62391

I totally agree with William Gumede's article'Shift flawed leader aside or suffer the consequences' and it was my thought as well when the scandal first erupted. Jacob Zuma should move back to the ANC and the vice president to president. He’s much more presentable and reliable when it comes to matters affecting public life.

This scandal will most definitely hurt the ANC, as not one black person who I’ve spoken to, or who spoken to me, condones it and are embarrassed about the whole affair.

In most other developed countries, as the highest person in the country, he would have resigned on his own initiative, or be forced to resign by his party. If this had happened here, our country’s reputation would have been restored in the international community. I don’t think an apology is enough because of his status.

I liken this incident to Hansie Cronjie’s incident of match fixing in cricket. He came clean, apologised and asked for forgiveness in a most genuine way. Most South Africans forgave him, but he was still stripped of his captaincy and banned from the sport.

Something like that should have happened to JZ, but I suppose that politics just isn’t cricket!

Good luck to Nigeria

Dibussi Tande

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/blog/62352

George Ngwane calls on South Africa’s ruling elite to go beyond the euphoria of the 'Mandela Moment' and begin implementing his vision for South Africa:

'Nelson Mandela’s vision for South Africa was one of racial equality and racial reconciliation. It was also one of social harmony and equal opportunities especially informed by the appalling living conditions of black people whose future and destiny had been sacrificed on the altar of systemic apartheid. Sixteen years of black rule have still to record a balance sheet that emboldens the black ghetto squatters’ spirit of better life and economic renaissance. The new black political and economic elite needs to connect among themselves and then with the teeming masses that hunger for change. Granted that sixteen years are not enough to overturn decades of predatory racism; granted that democratic development still eludes even countries that are counting fifty years of nominal Independence; granted that it often takes many years to “reach the mountain top of our desires after having passed through the shadows of death again and again”. Still there is a case for the leadership to begin to switch off the Mandela moment and address the bread and butter issues that preoccupy the ordinary citizen. Sporadic expressions of xenophobia by black South Africans on ‘strangers’ are sometimes social constructs caged in regime frustrations. Frustrations that are welled up against a background of great expectations and legitimate hope; frustrations that are reminiscent of those years when their bodies were shields for whips and their souls targets for bullets; those frustrations are in search of a more creative channel and a more cooperative power dynamics.'

Nigerian Curiosity revisits the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of Goodluck Jonathan’s appointment as the interim President of Nigeria:

'Although foreign governments like the United States have congratulated Jonathan on his new position, the manner by which he became acting President has opened many more constitutional questions yet to be answered. According to Senate president, David Mark, legislators chose to rely on a January 12th 2009 telephone interview allegedly given by Yar'Adua to the BBC Hausa Service. Yar'Adua's pronouncement that he would have to wait to recover in order to return to Nigeria was interpreted as an admission of a prolonged absence. That absence thus required the use of the "necessity doctrine" to give the Vice President executive powers.

'Unfortunately, the "necessity doctrine" is raising criticism. Many point out that this approach could be used to promote distasteful measures that would sacrifice Nigerian democracy. Additionally, it has been pointed out that the ‘necessity doctrine’ should otherwise have been the basis for Presidential impeachment as provided for in Section 144 of the Constitution, something the legislators were clear to avoid. However, it is now appears that in an effort to ensure that their act was legal, legislators are considering the impeachment clause, and an additional option that would require the federal Executive Council to make a declaration that would open the path to Yar'Adua's formal step down.'

One Africa
http://onafrica.maneno.org/eng/articles/zix1265727758/
Still on Nigeria, One Africa questions whether Nigeria will soon become the new Pakistan as the US pursues continues its global campaign against terrorism:

'It seems then, that although the rhetoric is no longer there, the war-on-terror strategy continues to be a central piece for US foreign policy under President Obama...

'If last summer the US' Secretary of State could be hinting at a possible collaboration between Nigeria and the US to deal with these matters of strategic concern, then this need for close co-operation is more than likely to have increased following the failed Christmas Day bombing of an airplane in Detroit by the Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Furthermore, this whole episode took place among a serious leadership crisis - or rather power-vacuum - in Nigeria which still continues given President Yar'Adua's continued absence from the country for over two months...

'This growing concern has even led an "intelligence official in AFRICOM" to affirm "that Northern Nigeria could become like Western Pakistan" (AC 53,3), which in my mind leads to the follow-up question: Could Nigeria be the next Pakistan? I am totally ignorant about the specifics of US foreign policy decision-making or about the details of US-Nigeria collaboration, but given the growing strategic weight of Nigeria on both the energetic and counterterrorism fields, could this country - like Pakistan - become a (borrowing a fashionable economic term): a country "too-big-to-fail", which will require closer attention, and intervention from the US?'

Nii’s Rejoinder lambasts the decision of the Volta River Authority (VRA) to increase consumer energy tariffs in order to make up for the failure of major corporations to honor their energy bills:

'Admittedly the VRA says that it can no longer sustain its operations from the regular returns paid by loyal consumers. The Authority is therefore pressing for an anomalous 150% increment in tariffs, as it appears that the big companies are reluctant to pay their huge debts that have run the authority into a financial distress.

'Therefore the urgent solution being proffered is to shift the burden on to masses of the country while the mining companies and industries are left free. It’s so unfair that household consumers will have to suffer for the inefficiency of VRA to mobilize its debts from defaulting companies. By common sense understanding, the situation suggests that mining companies are having a field day in Ghana at the expense of the ordinary larger majority of Ghanaians (no apologies for my bias against Mining Companies). So much gold, diamond and other resources that these companies mine out of Ghana every year, they pay next to nothing using our energy for free while repatriating abnormal profits to their foreign owners and entities who have turned Ghana into a client state. This is undoubtedly draconian and sinister to say the least.'

Scribbles from the Den publishes excerpts of an article on Donatien Koagne, the legendary Cameroonian swindler who conned many African Heads of State out of millions of dollars in the 1990s before being jailed in Yemen where he reportedly died a couple of weeks ago:

'He took Marshal Mobutu for fifteen million dollars. Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso lost forty million dollars to him. Sassou, Etienne Eyadéma of Togo, several high officials of Gabon, Tanzania and Kenya, a member of the Spanish government and an ex-operative of the Israeli Mossad were bamboozled as well.

'Koagne has been linked to a wide range of illicit practices – drug dealing, money laundering and trade in controlled substances (blood diamonds, uranium), among others. The means he used to defraud Mobutu and his colleagues, however, were something else altogether. The modus operandi was a fabulous con job, a sham money-multiplication scheme involving a top-secret potion allegedly concocted by the United States Department of Treasury for use in the manufacture of dollar bills.
Eventually, Donatien was caught. He fell prey to the Yemeni police, following yet another con in which he took a high-ranking member of the local police for two million dollars. While the story of his arrest is an extraordinary one, the tale of manifold attempts made to extract him from Yemen is still more remarkable. The identity of his would-be rescuers is telling. First among them were the French secret service, which, at one point, devised a plan oddly reminiscent of the Rainbow Warrior affair... '

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* Dibussi Tande, a writer and activist from Cameroon, produces the blog Scribbles from the Den.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Beijing Consensus: No strings attached?

Khadija Sharife

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/62364

For the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Africa has a counterweight, and the United States a rival: China. Similar to the Soviet Union, China approaches rulers of resource-rich countries through the ethos of brothers-in-arms rather than client states. The Chinese have a word for this: ‘Guanxi’, encompassing everything from pull to networking, indicating a great commitment to friendship rather than business.

Certainly, China does not appear to subscribe to the United States' gunboat democracy, recently noted in the 53-country military presence of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), an engagement strategy which aims to securitise the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea using the moral vocabulary of peacekeeping. Better yet, there is none of the stigma associated with former colonial landlords such as France, facilitating the entrance of an emerging superpower free of any colonial shadows. Instead, Beijing, currently Africa's most crucial source of trade and investment, valued at over US$100 billion, is lauded as Africa's saviour despite Western nations crying foul play.

But how different from perceived Western predation is guanxi really? To what extent is the Beijing Consensus distinct from the Washington Consensus? For starters, both worldviews discern Africa through the prism of resources. In 2009, for instance, 88 per cent of the United States' total imports from Africa were petroleum products, constituting 24 per cent of US oil imports, ahead of the Middle East, while 86 per cent of China's Africa imports are composed of oil, gas and minerals.

China's primary points of traction – Angola and Sudan – are characterised by state brutality, thanks to misused resource revenues generated from oil. As China's deputy foreign minister stated, ‘Business is business.’ That geostrategic control of oil resources largely drives foreign policy in the East and West is not surprising: 80 per cent of the world's oil reserves are controlled by states and there is a 92 per cent correlation between rising arms sales and oil. Predictably, underdeveloped and often militarised states dependent on oil rents, such as Gabon (78 per cent), Congo (85 per cent) and Angola (95 per cent), are politically and economically independent of, and disconnected from citizens. Over 30 per cent of China's oil imports come from Africa.

China perpetuates this resource curse composed of enclave industries, by indirectly facilitating the immunisation of states from accountability and citizen-generated taxes, the source of more than 35 per cent of state budgets in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. While developed countries rely on skilled citizens' taxes for a significant portion of state finance, African citizens are unnecessary impediments to the life of regimes.

China's take averages 10 per cent of Africa's total oil exports, in contrast to the United States and EU's take of 30 per cent. But unlike the latter, Beijing's expansion allows authoritarian states to gain distance from informed Western citizens' solidarity groups, willing and able to access vast stores of information and generate campaigns to mobilise dissent around crucial issues such as the gross socio-ecological degradation of the Niger Delta, Nigeria's chief source of oil.

The deliberate information isolation of China's own citizenry recently captured headlines across the world in the Google-versus-Beijing battle. Yet pundits appeared to have misdiagnosed Beijing's intention, not so much to block bad news out, but to intensively incubate general lack of interest in the outside world through the lack of relevant information.

Thus, despite Beijing permanently affecting African nations, Africa barely makes a dent in China, save for distant, positive and superficial glimpses, catalysing xenophobia and racism at both sites. Yet politically this domestic policy is externally complemented by the fact that as a one billion strong developing nation with a GDP per head of US$6,500, Beijing, estimated to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy in 2010, mimics the language of the world's working poor, as heard in Copenhagen when Beijing demanded more carbon emissions for the sake of the right to development (at the expense of small islands and Africa, the continent on the frontline of climate change).

The argument may ring false. After all, China's brutal suppression of political and civil rights undermines the crowning contribution and glory of Western civilisation: Political and civil first-generation rights, designed to protect individuals and minorities. (For China's religious minorities such as the Muslim Huis, ethnic Tibetans and the oppressed of neighbouring oil-rich Burma, China's West-bashing reminds us of the slogan ‘Talk left, walk right’.)

But while Chinese citizens remain unable to effect political change, Beijing's disregard of individualised rights was tacitly exchanged for collective material rights – that is, the right to social and economic development and realising human needs such as access to housing, education, electricity and waste sanitation as human rights.

The dramatic increase in living standards since 1981 is largely due to China experiencing the world's greatest known poverty reduction, contributing 166 per cent to global poverty reduction through lifting over 600 million Chinese out of poverty.

This success related to material-based rights resonates deeply with former colonies, exploited and marginalised not as minorities, but as majorities. Fifty years after liberation, it resonates in Africa, where many believe that immaterial rights – such as freedom of speech – are derisory if not accompanied by capacities supplying the water needed to sustain life.

Beijing's Stalin-red capitalist centrally administered economic policy complements the structure of African regimes – specifically dictatorships, perceived by China as stable investment climates, that is, beyond the reach of citizens.

Peddling this policy both domestically and abroad, Beijing emerges in Africa as: A rising superpower that has closed the door on individual rights-based market democracies, focusing instead on collective rights-based development; a resource-seeking state willing to sustain short-term losses for long-term gain; and finally, a global creditor actively disengaging from Washington's structural adjustment discipline noted for imposing export-oriented economies designed to finance debt contracted by African regimes.

Beijing's preferred method of accessing resources is the barter system, which cleverly identifies systems desired by African elites, extractive and construction Chinese agendas alike: Infrastructure geared to selectively develop resource-rich nations. Infrastructure, on the receiving end of 79 per cent of investments, averaged just four per cent in contracted funds five years prior to China's entry.

This system, trading resource-targeted development (such as ports, railways, mining facilities and mega-dams) for access to resources is two-pronged: First, it allows for Beijing, through policy banks such as China Export-Import Bank (extending over US$24 billion on easy terms) to ensure that Africa's resources and China's finances are returned to sender through the almost exclusive development by China's state-owned firms. Additionally exported to Africa are materials, skilled and unskilled labour, and guaranteed contracts utilising loans.

This enables Beijing to secure business and set price-tags in exchange for low-interest loans, exact massive fiscal and para-fiscal subsidies, as well as circumvent the Africa risk, the assumed default tendency of African regimes to engage in corruption, thus limiting the flow of funds back into regimes. By engaging a policy of non-interference, another throwback to the Soviets, Beijing superficially reconfigures perceived power differentials.

For Africa, fast becoming one of the world's most important oil drums, China's expanding footprint has delivered infrastructural developments, including much needed roads, railways and ports, in addition to hospitals and schools. But this comes at great socio-ecological cost, as China Exim, for instance, requires only that Sino-entities comply with the ecological standards of host countries (badly regulated, under-resourced and staffed, subject to corruption and characterised by enforcement). China's own development reveals a nation hosting 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities, with 70 per cent of rivers heavily contaminated.

Amid the simmering conflict related to logging, pollution, riots against China's dumped textiles and electronics, harsh working conditions and residential apartheid (via Chinese enclaves), there are noted exceptions, including China Exim's suspensions of loans earmarked for Gabon, for violating socio-ecological standards. But these are few and far between. Beijing's perceived willingness to listen is negated by the financing of despots like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, lethal economic policies and forced peace.

That China's counterweight to the West is invaluable for African rulers there is no question. But the benefits of the Beijing Consensus are empty of justice and real development when held against the backdrop of an Africa that is militarised, limited in agency and to a large degree externally sustained as the resource colony of yet another foreign empire.

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* Khadija Sharife is a journalist and a visiting scholar at the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) based in South Africa
* This article first appeared in The Economist.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Tanzanian president sees bright future for relations with Turkey

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/62356

Kikwete will travel to Ankara and İstanbul this week upon the invitation of President Abdullah Gül. Ahead of the visit, Kikwete received Turkish journalists at the presidential palace in Dar es Salaam, where the Tanzanian president noted that bilateral relations with Turkey had developed significantly since Gül visited the African nation last year.

He expressed hope that his own trip would give further impetus to this process. Inviting the Turkish business community to invest in Tanzania, Kikwete said: “We’ll be waiting in Tanzania for businessmen who want to benefit from the quota and customs-free trade opportunities my country offers with both the United States and the European Union.”

Looking ahead to his planned visit, the president commented on the agenda for the trip. “We’re going to meet with both the president and the prime minister, and we’re going to sign around four or five agreements. I think that during my visit our relations will see some serious development. And I’m very much looking forward to seeing İstanbul,” he said.

“I think we have done all that is required to be done to increase this momentum [following Gül’s visit]. After the president’s visit, the Turkish Embassy was opened, and the ambassador came -- that’s the biggest thing you can do to give momentum to the growth of the relationship between two countries. At the same time, there were many exchanges and visits by ministers and officials both from Turkey and Tanzania. I think the next biggest step will be my visit to Turkey. Again this will add momentum to the development of our relationship,” Kikwete said.

Speaking about the aims of the trip, the president said boosting bilateral relations was the primary goal. “And that’s why we expect to sign some agreements that are going to strengthen these relations. As Tanzania and Turkey, first of all we are trying to develop our political relations. Our relations are good, but the visit will make them better. Discussing areas of cooperation and where we can support each other in the international arena will be another topic.

One of the other areas is, of course, economic relations. We want to see more investment from Turkey and Turkish businessmen. We want them to come, visit and invest in Tanzania, and we also want to increase trade,” he said.

Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete will pay an official visit to Turkey on Thursday.

Kikwete described the trade volume between the two nations, which stands at an annual $60 million, as “too little,” saying: “We can do more and much better than that. Tanzania has things to sell Turkey, and Turkey has things to sell Tanzania. So I think this is an area which we’d like to see discussed seriously to come to an understanding to promote investment between our countries.”

ECONOMIC CRISIS CAN LEAD TURKISH BUSINESSPEOPLE TO TANZANIA

Asked what potential Tanzania had to offer Turkish businesspeople looking for new opportunities in the wake of the global economic crisis, Kikwete emphasized the myriad options available in his country, highlighting in particular its natural resources. “Tanzania is strong in the mining sector. We have gold, cobalt, iron... We have every mineral that exists on earth. Tanzania has every kind of mine, and there are plenty of them. Uranium, gold, diamond, coal, nickel... Everything is here. Mining is an area in which there really is great opportunity,” he said, noting that raw materials abound in Tanzania.

“I know Turkey is strong in the textile industry. We produce a lot of cotton, for example, but it needs to be processed. Turkish businesspeople can come and invest in the textile sector here, producing all sorts of textiles. All they need to do is come and prepare products for sale,” he said, indicating that the manufacturing and processing sectors were ripe with opportunity.

“We have plenty of raw materials, agricultural raw materials,” he said. “These are among the other areas Turks may be interested in investing in. You can conduct any kind of agriculture in Tanzania. We have the asset of 46 million of hectares of agricultural area, but only 5 million hectares are being utilized now. … If we could get at least another 5 million hectares in use, [this would be a major opportunity].”

Kikwete highlighted Tanzania’s advantageous position with regard to trade agreements, saying: “Due to quota-free agreements, the US and EU markets, Japan, China, Australia -- all the biggest markets of the world are open to us. At the same time, Tanzania is a member of the Eastern African Community [EAC -- Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi]. With a population of 140 million, this in itself is a great opportunity,” he said.

“We have the ability to export to the EU and the US without quotas or duties. The EU and the US are waiting for products to arrive from us. At the same time, we, the five nations of the East African Community, signed an agreement to ensure the customs-free circulation of products among ourselves. That is to say, someone investing in Tanzania doesn’t just have access to our population of 43 million, but also has the opportunity to sell products without paying customs to five countries and a total 140 million people,” he said. Kikwete also noted the advantageous position of the Port of Dar es Salaam, pointing to its status as a regional transit hub for import and export activity.

‘TURKS ARE GOOD TOURISTS AND EDUCATORS’

Kikwete praised Turkey, calling it a nation advanced in education, science and research. He said both countries stand to gain much from improved bilateral relations. The Tanzanian head of state noted the importance of the work of Turkish companies, especially Turkish-run schools, in the development of ties, describing the Feza Schools group’s work in particular as exemplary. “I think Feza Schools are amongst the best schools in Tanzania. On past exams, 31 of their students scored very well, and none of their graduates fail the examinations. Next year they are planning to open a university, which is very much welcomed,” he said, noting that the group is currently searching for a suitable location. “If we can have more and more of these schools, our children will receive a better education.”

Kikwete also said cultural and educational exchange had enhanced Turkish-Tanzanian relations. “We have a number of people who have studied in Turkey. Ministers, parliamentarians... They are adding good value to the two countries’ relations.”

Inviting the Turkish public to travel to his country, Kikwete said: “We have many tourist attractions in Tanzania. The people of Turkey are good tourists. So I would like to see the Turkish people making Tanzania one of their important tourism destinations. There is so much to see and enjoy in Tanzania, something very different from what the Turkish people are used to seeing.

“There are big opportunities in the tourism sector. We have great parks and beaches here -- what is required is more hotels and more operating businesses,” he said, encouraging investment in the Tanzanian tourism industry.

Speaking about the activities of Turkish firms, the president described Turkish Airlines’ (THY) plans to begin flights to Dar es Salaam as a positive development. “That means more tourism, which means improved relations,” he said.

TANZANIA: AN ISLAND OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

African countries are mostly known to Turkish audiences for conflicts or frequent coups. Located in East Africa and on the coast of the Indian Ocean, Tanzania is not like other African countries in many respects. With its long experience of stable democracy and respect for diversity, Tanzania stands out in its region. Dozens of ethnic groups and practitioners of different religions live in peace and harmony in Tanzania. Although Muslims and Christians account for roughly one-third of the population each, there is no all-Christian or all-Muslim political party. All political parties have members from different religions or tribes.

Tanzania’s President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, who is Muslim, will pay an official visit to Turkey on Thursday. Five bilateral agreements are expected to be signed during his visit, which comes after President Abdullah Gül’s trip to Tanzania last year. Kikwete is scheduled to meet with both Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his stay.

Accompanying Kikwete on his trip are 55 businessmen who will meet with 300 Turkish businessmen at a Turkey-Tanzania Business Forum to be organized by the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) on Saturday in an effort to seek opportunities to boost the annual trade volume between the two countries, which currently stands at around $60 million. Tanzanian Foreign Minister Bernard Membe, Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing Mary Nagu and Zanzibar Tourism, Trade and Investment Minister Samia Suluhu will attend the forum.

The Tanzanian delegation will perform Friday prayer in Sultanahmet (at the Blue Mosque) and visit the Eyüp Sultan Mosque in İstanbul. Kikwete will be accompanied by his wife and will be presented with an honorary doctorate by Fatih University for his contributions to the development of bilateral relations.

Kikwete has high hopes for the potential of Turkish investment in his resource-rich country, including in the agricultural, mining and textile sectors. Tanzania is currently constructing production centers in free trade zones near its ports, a sign of increased investment in the country as both China and India have thrown their hats into the ring, eager to take advantage of Tanzania’s relative stability and abundance of resources.

Kikwete is aware of the achievements of students attending the country’s four Turkish schools and has an active interest in plans for a Turkish university to open.

Turkish-Tanzanian relations have recently been solidifying: Turkish Ambassador to Tanzania Şander Gürbüz has started work in the newly opened embassy, and with Turkish Airlines (THY) recently launching direct flights to Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania has the potential to become a cornerstone of Turkey’s African initiative.

By Emrah Ülker

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Emrah Ülker is Mananging editor of Today's Zaman. This article was first published on Feburary 18, 2010.
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Zoellick on his Africa tour

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/62367

* What is your view on the World Bank working with Chinese companies which have had a large presence on the African continent in terms of infrastructure projects?

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK: We welcome China's investment into Sub Saharan Africa. We think that it has potential to build infrastructure, create additional jobs and possibly create some new investment possibilities in the manufacturing sector. We have wanted to work with both Africa and China.

It doesn’t do Africa much good if China comes in and brings Chinese workers. So we have tried to suggest ways that this investment can be more productive and create more jobs. In the case of the DRC, where China came and had a very large infrastructure and mining project, we worked with both the Chinese and the DRC government. We were able to do that effectively with both parties. I have had a number of occasions to talk to everyone of them from Premier Wen Jiabao, but particularly with most of the ministry of commerce officials. In Ethiopia, there are two Chinese companies that have come to try to build a new industrial zone.

* What about co-operation between the World Bank and China on infrastructure or manufacturing for export in African countries?

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK: We may at sometime look for opportunities to co-invest with China. Sometimes we may try to help and work with the local government to build the infrastructure. In some cases it is goods that are for export and need to have the customs procedure to be able to move quickly, eliminate corruption or bureaucratic mishandling. If you look back at the growth of East Asia, starting with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, south East Asia and China, they have used the model of basic manufacturing before you move out to the value addition chain. I am not saying this is going to happen overnight, but you can see in South Africa. This is going to occur elsewhere particularly if we combine it with the building of sub-regional markets. The EAC has made some significant headway of this. If you are a landlocked country like Rwanda or Uganda it is even more important because you need access to the ports, you need railways systems, you need a road system, and you also need the software development. Last year when I was visiting Uganda, I went to a border post with Kenya where we helped use some information technology and a new system to reduce the clearance time of trucks from two days to less than two hours. We have issued a report about logistics cost and logistics ranking and tried to figure out how we can support this. I know the big issue in Uganda is creating electricity. We have been involved with Bujjagali dam and we are looking at other projects.

* Why are you insisting too much on the development of new technologies for Africa when we have other priorities like infrastructure and agriculture?

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK: What has been striking is that over the past ten years there has been almost US$ 60 billion of private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa in ICT. And if we had had such a session ten years ago, I think people would have thought this would have required government investment. They could never imagine volumes of such amounts. You have seen individuals like Mo Ibrahim create whole new businesses and opportunities. The way the World Bank is in this environment is multiple. We try to work with countries to set up the right policy environment. On whether the African leaders are willing to boost ICT, it varies. President Kagame of Rwanda has been a real leader in using telecommunications technology not only as a business but also as a service opportunity for government.

* What special financing is the World Bank providing for IDA countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis?

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK: Since the crisis began across all our facilities, we have done about US$88 billion worth of activity. We are in the midst of the recovery, that has risks and uncertainties and some of it may be slower growth. We are in the process of trying to work with our shareholders to increase our capital so that we can continue to do more and be able to expand. Developing countries are now a source of growth.

* You said that you came to Africa to listen and learn; does this signify a shift in World Bank policy to Africa?

ROBERT B. ZOELLICK: On my very first trip to Africa when I had just come into the bank, I went to West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa and on each stop I had a chance to meet a number of different ministers from the countries of the region. The message was surprisingly similar and that was that what countries wanted was energy, infrastructure, regional integration, and the global markets and they also wanted a healthy private sector. Since that time I think the result has been an increase in the possibilities of agriculture. So our relationship with clients is that sometimes we share research and knowledge from other countries around the world. So I believe that to be effective, we need to try to understand what our clients want.

By Patrick Kagenda

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This interview was first published in The Independent on 17 February, 2010
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Indian and Chinese investors making a play for Africa

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/62369

In the past week, Indian and Chinese investors have unveiled plans for their biggest investments in African telecoms to date. India’s Bharti is in exclusive talks with Zain to buy the latter’s operations in sub-Saharan Africa for US$10.7 billion. And a consortium including China Unicom is the highest bidder for Nigeria’s fixed and mobile incumbent, Nitel.

If the Bharti-Zain deal goes ahead it will not only mark the beginning of one era but also the end of another, as Zain will quit sub-Saharan Africa after being one of the biggest and expansionist players on the continent over the past few years. (Zain is not planning to sell its operations in Morocco or Sudan, which it classifies as Middle East units.)

Saad Al Barrak, who has championed the company’s expansion across the Middle East and into Africa as Zain’s talismanic CEO since 2002, has resigned, though he remains CEO of Zain’s Saudi Arabia unit.

For Bharti, which in 2009 was thwarted for the second year in a row in its efforts to merge with South Africa’s MTN, the takeover of Zain Africa would give it a substantial and long sought-after presence in the fast-growing African mobile market. Other moves by Indian operators into Africa have been quite low-key: Essar has launched a GSM network in Kenya and has acquired Warid’s assets in Congo and Uganda; Reliance has a license in Uganda; and Tata is a backer of South Africa’s Neotel.

Bharti, which is India’s largest mobile operator through its Bharti Airtel unit with 118.86 million subscriptions at end-2009, will be hoping that it can take advantage in Africa of the business model that has brought it great success in its home market. Bharti’s business model is based on outsourcing much of its operations so that it is lean and efficient and can operate profitably despite India’s very low ARPU levels, of about US$5 per month. In 2009, Bharti Airtel recorded a net profit of US$1.6 billion and a net profit margin of 22.9%.

On Zain’s part, the drive to sell is being led by the Kharafi group, the largest private investor in Zain, which has decided it is time to cash up its investment. Kharafi also seems to have tired of the mixed results that Zain has had in Africa.

Zain Africa accounted for about 38% of Zain group’s revenues in the nine months to end-3Q09, but the Zain Africa operations as a group made a net loss of US$111.6 million over that period. Seven of the 15 Zain Africa operations were loss-making. Zain Nigeria alone accounted for 16% of Zain group revenues in the nine months to end-3Q09 – but the Nigerian unit posted a net loss of US$88.3 million in that period.
In that context, the US$10.7 billion price ticket for Zain Africa seems quite steep. But Bharti would be acquiring a large portfolio of operations and it might well be able to use its Indian experience to substantially improve on their performance.

However, Bharti will also have to master numerous local factors if it is to succeed in Africa. And Bharti has not had huge experience of operating outside India, as it only recently made forays into Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Network-sharing, which is an important part of the Bharti recipe in India, is barely evident in Africa. But Bharti may be able to take a lead in popularizing network sharing on the continent.

Chinese vendors, led by Huawei and ZTE, have become increasingly prominent as network equipment vendors in Africa, but that has not been matched by Chinese operators. A few years ago, China Mobile was tipped as a possible buyer of Millicom, but no deal was reached.
Now China Unicom, China’s No. 2 mobile operator, is part of the New Generation consortium that has offered US$2.5 billion for a 75% stake in Nitel. Again the price seems steep, at US$1.5 billion more than the next highest bid, and substantially more than the US$500 million that Nigerian conglomerate Transcorp agreed to pay in 2006 for a 51% stake in Nitel in an earlier privatization that has since been revoked. In addition, Nitel’s mobile unit, M-Tel, is barely operational.

But Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and its largest single mobile market. New Generation also stands to acquire Nitel’s stake in the SAT-3 undersea cable and a terrestrial backbone as part of the deal.

As two South-South engagements stand ready to proceed (Bharti and China Unicom’s moves into Africa), a third – Zain’s involvement in Africa – is in retreat.

But Zain may benefit from the opportunity to concentrate more closely on its Middle East operations.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Matthew Reed is a principal analyst at telecoms.com parent Informa Telecoms & Media. This article first appeared in Telecoms.com
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Kinshasa’s missing millions

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/62382

Over US$23 million in signature bonuses payable on China’s $6 billion Sino-Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines) deal with the Kinshasa government have been stolen according to a probe by a commission set up by the National Assembly. The stolen monies were part of some $50 mn. that Chinese companies were due to have paid to Congo’s mining parastatal, Gécamines, the Commission Economique et Financière reported in late January. These findings follow growing concerns in recent weeks about the accountability of natural resource deals by Chinese companies in Angola and Kazakhstan. Ahead of national elections in 2011, Congo’s President Joseph Kabila is demanding better value for money: more jobs for Congolese workers and fewer imported Chinese workers.

The Commission said that Chinese contractors in the Sicomines consortium, which includes the China Railway Group and Sinohydro, paid $50 mn. Commission President and ruling party member Modeste Bahati Lukwebo criticised the collusion of some senior officials in Gécamines with ‘local justice officials in Lubumbashi’. This complicity ‘facilitated the loss of $23,722,036 of the $50 mn. intended for Gécamines,’ claimed the report, signed by five deputies of the Assembly. The $50 mn. is just a part of the $350 mn. entry fee that the Chinese consortium agreed to pay for signing the $6 bn. ore-for-infrastructure joint venture deal which was concluded on 22 April 2008 by Minister of State for Infrastructure Pierre Lumbi Okongo, China Railway’s Li Changjin and Sinohydro’s Fan Jixiang.

The deal gave the Chinese companies access to mining concessions which hold 10.6 mn. tonnes of copper and 626,000 tonnes of cobalt, which are currently estimated to be worth $100 billion, in exchange for the construction of railways, roads, schools and hospitals. The Chinese consortium added a new partner in July 2008, giving China Metallurgical Group a 20% stake. The Sicomines joint venture formed by the Congolese and Chinese parties is now controlled by China Railway (28%), Sinohydro, Gécamines and China Metallurgical Group (20% each) along with Congo Simco (12%), which is a joint venture between the state-owned Entreprise Minière de Kisenge Manganèse and Gécamines.

The Commission complained that Pierre Lumbi had refused to be interviewed. Other bodies under Lumbi’s authority, including the Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux (ACGT), which oversees the large Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, also refused to appear before the Commission. The Chinese companies were prepared to meet Commission members, but referred most questions to company officials who are in China or to the Kinshasa government itself. The Commission has not accused Sicomines of wrongdoing in the missing $24 mn., but instead blames the Congolese government and Gécamines management. The investigation is nonetheless embarrassing for the Chinese parties, who risk further political and public scrutiny of the Chinese deals with Kabila’s government.

The importance attached by the Presidency to relations with China and to the Sicomines deal is shown by the sidelining of the Foreign Ministry: officials responsible for Asian affairs claim to have very little information about developments regarding the agreement. The ACGT and the Bureau de Coordination et de Suivi du Programme Sino-Congolais (BCPSC), the two agencies established under the Ministry of Infrastructure by presidential decree to manage the Sino-Congolese collaboration, do not readily share information with the rest of the government.

Disagreements on the construction side of the Sicomines deal are intensifying. Clause 11.2 specifies that the Chinese parties shall to the greatest extent possible turn to Congolese companies for the contracting of infrastructure work and equipment. This should ensure technology and skills transfers but, according to a manager of the BCPSC, it has not been properly run. There have not been many opportunities for such subcontracting, and there is little interest from the Chinese side.

There are problems in the mining side of the Sicomines agreement. The feasibility study for the mines is ready and the next step is to build a hydroelectric plant near Busanga in Katanga to supply electricity. Sinohydro put in a bid for the dam’s construction, but it was judged too high and the ACGT/BCPSC may launch an international tender if it does not lower its price. ACGT and BCPSC directors claim that the balance of power has changed.

The Congolese shareholders say that they are getting tougher in negotiations. Before, they had to ‘close their eyes’ to certain details, such as feasibility studies carried out by the same company that would later implement the project, a practice that led to overestimating of costs. Since November 2009, the quality control assignments of all infrastructure projects within the Sicomines framework have been subject to international tendering.

Although the implementation of the Sicomines agreement is moving ahead, several projects involving Chinese companies or finance have stalled. One of those deals is the biofuels project involving the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE. In 2007, when the Memorandum of Understanding between ZTE and Congo’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock farming was signed, it was estimated that the biofuels project, worth $1 bn., would require 3 mn. hectares of oil palm plantations in Equateur, Bandundu, Orientale and Kasai-Occidental provinces. In 2008, 250 hectares of fertile land were offered to ZTE. The Agriculture Minister has twice received delegations from ZTE to discuss this. The last time was in March 2009, but three years after the MOU nothing has been done and according to the Ministry of Agriculture ‘nobody talks about it anymore’.

The large-scale development of national telecom networks (AAC Vol 2 No 6) has slowed down. The cable stretching between Moanda and Kinshasa was completed in December 2009 by China International Telecommunication Construction Corporation. Clear plans for the extension of these fibre-optic networks across Congo were outlined by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, but no binding agreement has been signed.

The second telecom project by Huawei was delayed by the widening of the Boulevard du 30 Juin (see Box) by China Railway Engineering Corporation. Huawei’s deadline was originally December 2009 but has been extended to February 2010. On plans to expand the telecoms project to the capitals of the other ten provinces, Huawei has put in a request to the Posts Ministry for the project’s continuation and the response is due later this year.

Africa-Asia Confidential reported in 2009 that talks were underway with the China Development Bank and Sinosure to finance four universities and the renovation of N’Djili airport, as well as the road leading there, in Kinshasa. The contractor was supposed to be Changda Highway Engineering Corporation. None of these projects had materialised because the CDB did not accept the concessions offered to them in Potopoto in Katanga and had pulled out of talks in late 2009. The CDB was the financier behind Sinosure, so the deal involving the latter also fell through.

Cooperation with the CDB has so far been unsuccessful. Initially, Kinshasa had asked China Export-Import Bank to finance Congo’s infrastructure development in what became the Sicomines deal. The CDB rejected the mineral concessions on offer then, too. We hear that CGCD is conducting its own talks with the CDB, hoping to revive the deal. Meanwhile, CGCD representatives are still in Kinshasa, working on a Chinese government-backed road restoration project in a residential area close to the Université de Kinshasa.

CGCD’s strategy is part of a trend among Chinese companies in Congo. There is certainly business to be had, and given the distance, representatives enjoy a degree of freedom vis-à-vis their head offices. They can thus take on extra business without necessarily providing headquarters with all the details, which means opportunities for extra revenue.

BCPSC officials claim that Chinese partners to the Sicomines agreement misuse the exemption from import taxes. The company then uses its less expensive building materials to carry out projects outside of the Sicomines deal.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article was first published in the February issue of Africa-Asia Confidential
* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Pambazuka News 134: Les hauts et les bas de la campagne contre l'homophobie en Afrique

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/summaryfr/62368

Court orders halt to Marange mining operations

2010-02-19

http://zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=6425&cat=1

Zimbabwe's Supreme Court has ordered two government mining firms to stop operations on British-owned diamond mining fields plagued by human rights abuses, state newspapers have reported. The case was brought to the court by British-based African Consolidated Resources (ACR) in a bid to win back its mining rights which were suspended in 2006. The government is appealing a court ruling returning the fields to ACR.

IMF to meet over Zimbabwe's voting rights

2010-02-19

http://zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=6427&cat=1

The International Monetary Fund's board will consider whether to restore Zimbabwe's IMF voting rights in a meeting on Friday, an IMF spokesman said on Thursday. By reestablishing Zimbabwe's voting rights -- which would allow the country to take part in IMF decision-making again -- the international community would be sending a strong signal of support for policies of the new unity government led by President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai.

Zimbabwe: EU imposes another year of sanction

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88127

The European Union's decision to extend sanctions against Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and senior members of the ruling ZANU-PF party was endorsed by a leading human rights organization.

Zimbabwe: One year on, reform a failure

2010-02-18

http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/02/12/zimbabwe-one-year-reform-failure

Zimbabwe's power-sharing government has made no real progress in implementing political reforms and ending human rights abuses after a year in office, Human Rights Watch has said. The government has demonstrated little political will or capacity to enact meaningful changes to improve the lives of Zimbabweans.

Burundi: Female ex-combatants picking up the pieces

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88006

By age 15, Annonciata Nduwimana was an accomplished fighter for Burundi's opposition Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) and knew how to kill in battle. "My father was killed, accused of sheltering rebels. We [her mother and two elder brothers] then fled to Bujumbura to seek safe haven," she said.

DRC: Girl child soldiers less likely than boys to be freed - UN

2010-02-19

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33761

Despite efforts to end the use of child soldiers in the war-torn east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), youngsters are still being recruited within the ranks of both the rebels and the national army, with girls at particular risk of becoming sex slaves and less likely to be released, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said.

East Africa: Women want visibility in regional union

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsterraviva.net/europe/article.aspx?id=8354

As the East Africa Community (EAC) gradually moves towards a political confederation, women’s rights groups from the five member states are pushing for an East African Protocol on Gender and Development to bridge the gender gaps within the integration process.

Global: Fight FGM harder, activists urge EU

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=50359

With hundreds of thousands of girls and women believed to be at risk of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Europe, rights groups have mounted a campaign to get EU leaders to stop what they see as a barbaric and dangerous procedure. FGM – an umbrella term for procedures involving partial or total removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons – has been condemned by governments, rights groups and health organisations across the world.

Global: Hidden Herstories: Women of Change

2010-02-19

http://www.hiddenherstories.org/index.php

"Hidden Herstories: Women of Change" is a youth-led heritage project which looks at 4 influential women who haven't had their rightful place in the history books. 20 young people from west London have set out to right this wrong; using their film-making and writing skills, they have made a one hour documentary and published a magazine. The film exposes the plights and determination of Octavia Hill, Amy Ashwood Garvey, Claudia Jones and Jayaben Desai. For more information on these women, click below to view the 28 page magazine featuring contributions from Tristram Hunt, Jenny Bourne, Nzingha Assata and Marika Sherwood.

Mauritius: Plea for more female candidates

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=50388

Sandhya Boygah considers herself a victim of male-dominated politics. In 2007, she was asked by her party, the ruling Labour Party, to step aside and allow a man to stand for the elected post she sought.

Southern Africa: Women traders demand support

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=50394

Support for regional trade is one of the cornerstones of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). But the focus has been on large scale trade in goods and services, ignoring one important group trading throughout the region.

Togo: First female presidential candidate withdraws

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsterraviva.net/europe/article.aspx?id=8355

Brigitte Kafui Adjamagbo-Johnson, head of the opposition Democratic Convention of African Peoples party, is Togo's first female presidential candidate. But she has withdrawn from the electoral process.

Botswana: Bushmen denied right to vote

2010-02-19

http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/5557

Over 400 Bushmen were denied the right to vote in Botswana’s 2009 general election, with five Bushman communities inside the Central Kalahari Game Reserve omitted from the electoral register.

Egypt: Two youth activists arrested

2010-02-18

http://tinyurl.com/ydmmeja

Ahmed Maher and Amr Ali, both leaders in the April 6th Youth Movement, were arrested in the early morning on 16 February as they were driving home from a meeting regarding the welcoming reception planned for Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Mohamed Elbaradei, who many activists are calling on to run for presidency in Egypt's upcoming election. Maher and Ali were stopped at a security checkpoint, forced out of their car, and taken to jail.

Egypt: UNICEF study finds millions of children still live in poverty

2010-02-19

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33816

Millions of Egyptian children continue to live in poverty, despite recent gains made for young people, particularly on the legislative front, a study commissioned by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has found.

Global: Human Rights Summit 2010

2010-02-19

http://www.humanrightssummit.org/

More than 100 human rights advocates, dissidents and government officials will gather in Washington, DC February 17-19 for a groundbreaking summit to tackle global challenges to fundamental freedoms of expression and association.

Guinea: No impunity for massacre, says ICC

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8521642.stm

International prosecutors have promised there will be "no impunity" for anyone suspected of taking part in the killing of Guinean activists last September. The International Criminal Court's Fatou Bensouda, who is visiting Guinea, told the BBC victims' families would have justice.

Kenya: Landmark ruling says tribe’s eviction for nature reserve illegal

2010-02-19

http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/5574

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has recommended that the Endorois tribe in Kenya be given back its land, after they were evicted from it to make way for a nature reserve in the 1970s.

Kenya: Samburu demand police withdrawal

2010-02-18

http://tinyurl.com/ykb9u3r

Cultural Survival is appealing to Kenyan government authorities to halt police operations in Northern Kenya, where Indigenous Samburu villages have suffered brutal police attacks over the last year.

Central Africa: Refugees flood Congo-Brazzaville

2010-02-19

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/02/201021610587716372.html

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Congo-Brazzaville has said it is expecting more displaced people to pour in from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. The UNHCR said that more than 120,000 refugees are already crammed into camps in Congo-Brazzaville and Central African Republic.

Eurpoean summer school - Universite de Bruxelles

2010-02-19

http://www.ulb.ac.be/assoc/odysseus/Summer2010UK.html

The aim of the Summer School is to provide its participants with an comprehensive understanding of the immigration and asylum policy of the European Union from a legal point of view. The programme is organised by the "Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe", founded with the financial support of the Odysseus Programme of the European Commission and co-ordinated by the Institute for European Studies of the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

Global: International Summer School in Forced Migration

2010-02-19

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/index.html?teaching_summer

The Refugee Studies Centre’s International Summer School fosters dialogue between academics, practitioners and policymakers working to improve the situation of refugees and other forced migrants. It provides the time and space for them to reflect on their experiences and to think critically about some of the aims and assumptions underlying their work.

Horn of Africa: Ethiopia opens fifth camp for Somali refugees

2010-02-19

http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/55866/2010/01/16-165246-1.htm

The Ethiopian government and United Nations have opened a new refugee camp for thousands of Somalis fleeing violence in the Horn of Africa country. Somalia shares its northwestern border with Ethiopia, which has experienced a growing influx of Somalis over the last three months.

South Africa: South Africans say no to Eskom's R29 billion World Bank loan

2010-02-19

http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.11773.aspx

Communities, environmental groups, academics and NGOs are calling on the World Bank to cease and desist from a proposed loan of R29 billion ($3.75 bn) to Eskom. If this loan – which may come up for a Board vote in March or April – goes through, poor South Africans will have to bear the burden of Eskom’s debt and the World Bank’s cost recovery programme, and climate change will intensify.

Chad: Prices hike, teachers strike

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88144

Teachers demanding more pay to face higher food prices entered the third day of a nationwide strike. The government has called their demands "illegal" and "unjustified", because the "high cost of living is a general problem that does not concern only [the teachers' union]", said Employment Minister Fatimé Tchombi.

South Africa: COSATU threatens strike over workers' rights

2010-02-19

http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE61I09520100219

South Africa's largest labour federation COSATU has threatened to call a general strike in October if the government does not take steps to improve workers' rights. The union said the use of employment agencies, mostly by foreign companies to source temporary labour, denies workers the the rights they are entitled to under South Africa's labour laws.

Emerging powers news roundup

2010-02-19

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/emplayersnews/62463

Emerging Actors’ Africa News Round-Up

China

South Africa’s rand weakened after China toughened bank regulations
More

Tanzanian first lady commends Chinese community's contribution to local development More

African expatriates savor festival China
More

Togolese president greets Chinese on lunar New Year
More

Ecobank and Bank of China partnership to boost trade
More

Chinese-owned NFC Africa Mining reinstated 79 miners suspended for suspected sabotage at its Chambishi copper mine in Zambia
More

How will Chinese culture influence Africa?
More

China Unicom in bid for stake in Nigeria's Nitel
More

The Arab and African countries can benefit from the Chinese expertise in agriculture More

China Unicom denies involvement in Nigeria bid More

India

Zain to ink $10.7 billion Africa deal with Bharti More

Kuwaiti telecom Zain accepts $10.7 billion offer for Africa unit from India's Bharti Airtel More

Bharti Bid May Revive Indian Appetite for Overseas Takeovers More

Jet Airways to operate direct flights to South Africa More

Indian drug makers worried by East Africa’s legal proposals
More





General News

Intra African Trade Is Critical More


BRIC to discuss coordination expansion at April summit More

Tanzania is planning to move to court to stop the US and Brazilian governments from patenting a sorghum gene isolated from Tanzanian farms More

Global oil giants continued their efforts to get access to Uganda’s untapped oil reserves estimated at 2 billion barrels More

With $2.5bn, New Generations Emerges NITEL¹s Preferred Bidder More

Oil deal 'damaging for Uganda environment' More

Over 300 international investors are expected to attend the Pan-African Investment Climate Summit in Harare More

Governments and companies can help boost Africa investment
http://www.wealth-bulletin.com/portfolio/alternatives/content/1058043611/

South Africa may join Brazil in imposing a tax on short-term foreign-capital inflows More

Expanding Saudi trade-ties with foreign countries More

EASSy cable lands in South Africa More

Mauritius changes rules to target funds growth More

South Africa Uniquely Placed To Call Iran Out Over Abuses More

How Africa is Becoming the New Asia More

Algeria is getting a makeover More

Zimbabwe/Morocco: Morocco to Host Anoca Games More

Workers vent anger over imports More

Côte d'Ivoire: Talks intensify to ensure elections remain on course

2010-02-19

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33810

The top United Nations envoy in Côte d'Ivoire is holding intensive talks with all sides in the divided West African country to ensure that last week’s dissolution of the Government and the independent electoral authority does not affect repeatedly delayed elections, currently slated to be held next month.

Kenya: No crisis, says President Mwai Kibaki

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8522471.stm

Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki says his country is not in crisis, despite repeated reports of a bitter power struggle among the nation's elite. Mr Kibaki acknowledged there had been a "heated debate" but said Kenyans should not be worried.

Niger: African Union condemns military coup

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8523573.stm

The African Union has condemned a coup in Niger, where soldiers have detained President Mamadou Tandja. AU chief Jean Ping said he was watching developments "with concern" after a day of gun battles culminated in a takeover led by Colonel Salou Djibo.

Sudan: DRDC Report on the 5th Population Census

2010-02-18

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/470/Sudan.pdf

The coming 12 months are very critical for the political history of Sudan. Two landmark events in the country’s history will take place. In April 2010 Sudan is expected to organise the first multi-party general executive and legislative elections after more than 20 years of authoritarian military rule. In January 2011 the people in Southern Sudan will exercise, in a popular referendum, their right to self-determination and decide on the future of the country. This DRDC report is documenting for some aspects of Sudan’s 5th Population and Housing Census and drawing attention to key areas of weaknesses of the census operation.

Sudan: Elections in a volatile climate

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88167

Officials are appealing for calm during the campaign period ahead of upcoming historic elections in April as insecurity remains a major concern in Southern Sudan. Electoral campaigning in the highly charged contest opened on 13 February, two months before three days of polling from 11 April, with the results due a week later.

Africa: Africa, geology and the march of the development technocrats

2010-02-19

http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1861/1/

'Environmental determinism’ – the theory that Africa’s development has been hindered as a result of ‘the environmental conditions that Africans inhabit’ – does not accurately explain Africa’s poverty. Environmental determinism is both ahistorical and apolitical: "Poverty is not a problem of nature, it is a problem of power." To tackle the real issues behind Africa’s slow development and poverty would mean to go against Western economic interests and to radically change the world system in which we exist.

Global: EU countries set to break promises

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsterraviva.net/europe/article.aspx?id=8357

In 2005, the 15 governments that comprised the EU before its eastward expansion the previous year undertook to allocate at least 0.51 percent of their gross national income to development aid by 2010. But estimates published Feb. 17 project that the average aid allocation given by these countries this year will be just 0.48 percent of income. As a result, the amount being given by wealthy countries to poor ones will be 21 billion dollars less this year than the amount foreseen in 2005.

Global: Global employment trends 2010

2010-02-19

http://www.eldis.org/go/country-profiles&id=50323&type=Document

Even though the global economy appeared to start growing again during the closing months of 2009, labour markets showed little sign of improving. The number of unemployed persons is estimated at 212 million in 2009, representing an increase of almost 34 million over the number of unemployed in 2007, with the bulk of this increase occurred in 2009.

Global: IMF economic policies under fire

2010-02-19

http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-565940

While the political agenda at the IMF is shifting back to mandate and governance reform, there are growing calls that the Fund needs to fundamentally rethink the monetary and fiscal policies it demands of borrowers if the institution is to retain legitimacy and renew its mandate.

Mozambique: ‘The war ended 17 years ago, but we are still poor’

2010-02-18

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/470/mozambique.pdf

In a paper to be published in the March issue of the academic journal Conflict, Security & Development, Joseph Hanlon argues that Mozambique poses some stark questions for development cooperation. In particular, "Current economic management strategies mean that a growing group of young people are leaving school with a basic education but no economic prospects. Will ‘marginal’ youth in towns and cities pose a threat of political and criminal violence? Can peace be built on poverty and rising inequality? Are elections and expanded schooling enough when there are no jobs?"

South Sudan: Aid failure harm development

2010-02-19

http://www.panos.org.uk/?lid=31080

The World Bank has pledged to speed up funding for South Sudan after acknowledging that the slow delivery of aid was hindering the region's development. Government officials and development groups have criticised the organisation for distributing only 188 million US dollars out of the 524 million US dollars given by Western donors

Africa: Africa plans leap into drug R&D

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/yzsldkg

African ministers, health researchers and pharmaceutical industry representatives began meeting today to discuss how to boost drug innovation and production on the continent. The African Expert Meeting on Pharmaceutical Innovation in Africa — taking place in Pretoria, South Africa this week (18–20 February) — aims to encourage African policymakers to act to boost drug development and access to essential medicines.

Africa: Pregnancy rates rise in women after beginning ART

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/yk88uxz

The chance of becoming pregnant not only increased over four years of antiretroviral treatment, but was almost 80% higher for HIV-infected women who began antiretroviral therapy than for HIV-infected women not on treatment enrolled in the Mother-to-Child Transmission Plus (MTCT Plus)-Initiative in seven sub-Saharan countries, report Landon Myer and colleagues in a study published in the February online edition of PLoS Medicine.

Africa: Prompt start to ART essential - studies

2010-02-19

http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88168

Many HIV-positive African patients are starting treatment too late for it to be effective, new scientific studies have shown. Studies from South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe presented at the 17th Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections in San Francisco (ending 19 February), all found late enrolment of patients on life-prolonging antiretroviral treatment (ART) to be a significant barrier to treatment programmes.

Benin: Insecticide beats DDT in early trials

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/ydljw9m

Malaria researchers in Benin say they may have found a replacement for DDT in areas where mosquitoes are resistant to common insecticides. Indoor residual spraying (IRS) of insecticides is a major part of malaria control. But worries over toxicity and environmental persistence have led to calls for DDT to be phased out, and mosquitoes are growing resistant to widely used pyrethroid insecticides. Alternatives are expensive and short-lived.

Kenya: Condom conundrum puts prisoners at risk

2010-02-19

http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88117

The Kenya Prisons Service has won praise for its HIV programmes, including education, testing and the provision of anti-retroviral drugs to prisoners, but specialists say unless the issue of unprotected sex is addressed, HIV transmission will continue unchecked.

Rwanda: Efforts to contain HIV/AIDS among teens slacken

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=50315

Eighteen-year-old David Kimenyi* is sure he infected his girlfriend with HIV. They had unprotected sex many times, even after he discovered he was HIV-positive. "I am afraid that I would have infected my girlfriend with HIV/AIDS," he said.

Rwanda: New HIV awareness drive targets prisoners

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88152

Rwandan health authorities have embarked on a campaign to sensitize the country's prisoners - considered high risk for HIV – on how to protect themselves from contracting and transmitting the virus.

South Africa: Health Department approves new HIV treatment guidelines

2010-02-19

http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20032640

The national health department has signed off new HIV treatment guidelines, bringing South Africa in line with international best practice and removing a drug responsible for a wide range of side effects. The new guidelines were finally signed off last week after a meeting last November with the provinces, donors, HIV clinicians and other HIV experts.

South Africa: New ARV tender taking shape

2010-02-19

http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20032641

The health department is redesigning the new ARV tender in the hope of procuring cheaper antiretroviral medicine amid claims that South Africa is paying around 30% more than the global rate for the drugs.

South Africa: One-quarter died on HIV treatment waiting list in Free State province

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/yjptuwd

Almost a quarter of patients eligible for HIV treatment in South Africa’s Free State province died before getting it, a further 13% disappeared from the healthcare system and 5% were still on a waiting list, according to a review of three years of progress in the province’s public sector antiretroviral treatment (ART) programme.

Zimbabwe: "Small House, Big House" showing soon on TV

2010-02-19

http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88169

A new Zimbabwean short film on multiple concurrent sexual partnerships (MCPs) runs for just 24 minutes, but the producers are hoping that its message will last much longer. The film, "Big House, Small House" is the latest offering from the OneLove Campaign, which works to reduce HIV prevalence and MCPs in 10 southern African countries. The title refers to the colloquial expression "small house", used to denote long-term, illicit sexual relationships in Zimbabwe.

Africa: Poor governance jeopardises primary education in Africa

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/yldxjla

Transparency International (TI), the global leader in the fight against corruption, will release Africa Education Watch: Good Governance Lessons for Primary Education, a new report on education in seven African countries on 23 February. Despite ten years of international efforts to provide universal basic education, the report shows that poor management and lack of training is compromising the delivery of quality basic education. The report documents a broad range of problems, from deficient or non-existent accounting systems to illegal fees.

Global: Education for all: reaching the marginalized

2010-02-19

http://www.unesco.org/en/efareport/reports/2010-marginalization/

Education systems in many of the world's poorest countries are now experiencing the aftershock of the global economic downturn. The 2010 Education for All Global Monitoring Report, released on 19 January, argues that the crisis could create a lost generation of children whose life chances will have been irreparably damaged by a failure to protect their right to education.

Africa: Bishops react against state homophobia in Uganda

2010-02-19

http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/13444.html

The bishops of the so-called 'Province of the Anglican Church of Southern Africa' has issued a strong statement raising concerns about the dire human rights consequences of Uganda's proposed new law, which will ban homosexuality, and even make it punishable with the death penalty. Read the full statement below.

Kenya: Academic institutions discuss homosexuality

2010-02-19

http://www.mask.org.za/article.php?cat=kenya&id=2500

Despite arrests presently rocking the Kenyan gay community, human rights institutions recently held the first ever Public Lecture on Sexual Minority Rights aiming to address the rights of gays, lesbians and bisexuals among students and members of faculties of different academic institutions in Kenya.

Kenya: Gay wedding' suspects freed

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8520906.stm

Kenyan police have released five people arrested for planning a "gay wedding" north of Mombasa, saying there was no evidence to prosecute them. But police spokesman Martha Mutegi told the BBC the men had been advised to leave the area for their own safety and to avoid angering the local community.

South Africa: Methodists dismiss gay minister

2010-02-19

http://www.mask.org.za/article.php?cat=southafrica&id=2503

A number of South African Methodists are angry and upset about the ruling that a well-liked minister must be "defrocked" because of her gay marriage. Reverend Ecclesia de Lange of Cape Town married her life partner in December and was suspended by the church in January.

Uganda: Gay-porn stunt 'twisted'

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8522039.stm

A Ugandan clergyman's decision to show gay pornography to his congregation has been labelled as "twisted, homophobic propaganda" by a gay rights groups. Behind the Mask says the stunt, by anti-gay Pastor Martin Ssempa, equated homosexuality to paedophilia.

Africa: Call for environmental films - EFFA 2010

2010-02-18

http://www.effaccra.org/index.php?option=com_artforms&formid=1&Itemid=56

Environmental Film Festival of Accra is currently accepting films and videos made about the environment or about issues around the environment throughout the world. We also accept films and videos that explore the relationship between the environment and other socio - economic, political and cultural themes. Whilst we give preference to films about Ghana and Africa, we screen highly acclaimed international films. Films should preferably depict positive and realistic images and can be of any genre - drama, comedy, horror, adventure, animation, romance, science fiction, experimental, etc.

East Africa: Rwanda to host World Environment Day celebrations

2010-02-19

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33794

Rwanda will play global host to celebrations for the 2010 World Environment Day, observed annually on 5 June, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has announced.

Global: Bangladesh government against climate aid via World Bank

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88122

Bangladesh has voiced strong opposition to plans by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to provide close to US$100 million in climate change aid - because of its delivery through the World Bank.

Kenya: Climate change 'a blessing' for western farmers

2010-02-19

http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/60167/2010/01/16-103802-1.htm

Western Kenya's Lugari district has long been a maize-growing area. But worsening drought, believed linked to climate change, has made the region's once-reliable staple an increasing risk. "When I planted maize, the rains disappeared when the maize had reached knee height. The whole farm dried up and I had nothing for food. My children could not go to school because I relied on maize as a cash crop also," said Dan Asembo Shaban, a farmer and a father of five.

Uganda: Oil deal 'damaging for environment'

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8520005.stm

Uganda's environment is being put at risk by a secret deal between the government and a UK oil firm, a lobby group has said. The pressure group Platform said Tullow Oil had framed a deal with no provision for the environmental or social impact of oil extraction in Uganda.

Africa: Africa’s land and family farms – up for grabs?

2010-02-19

http://farmlandgrab.org/11144

Over the years many Big Ideas have been imposed on Africa from outside. The latest is that the region should sell or lease millions of hectares of land to foreign investors, who will bring resources and up-to-date technology. None of the blueprints has worked, and African farmers have become increasingly impoverished. It is time for Africans to turn to their own histories, knowledge and resources.

Global: UN database exposes land rights gender gap

2010-02-19

http://www.panos.org.uk/?lid=31086

The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has launched a new online database that exposes the widespread gender gap in land rights around the world. The Gender and Land Rights database allows users to produce comparative reports on several different statistics, such as the total number of women landholders and rural households headed by women, in almost 80 countries

North Africa: Egypt offers 50,000 acres of farmland for agri-products

2010-02-19

http://farmlandgrab.org/11213

Egypt will invite bids in March for 50,000 acres of land in North Sinai for agro-business projects, the agriculture minister said yesterday. Egypt said this month it planned to lease farmland for agro-business projects during 2010 but was waiting for the agriculture ministry to allocate suitable plots.

West Africa: Bringing jobs, energy to Sierra Leone or another African land grab?

2010-02-19

http://farmlandgrab.org/11205

It’s the largest agricultural investment ever in the West African nation of Sierra Leone—and a Swiss firm is behind it. Addax Bioenergy, based in Geneva, just signed a deal that will allow it to produce 100,000 cubic meters of bioethanol from sugar cane within the next two years alone.

Southern Africa: Snapshot of food security

2010-02-19

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88014

Economic conditions in most southern African countries declined as a result of the global recession, pushing many more people towards greater food insecurity. According to a new food security update which focused on some southern African countries, food prices have risen and are still climbing in several countries.

DRC: New media council lacks transparency

2010-02-19

http://tinyurl.com/ygqexm6

Journalistes en Danger (JED) has praise as well as concerns for a new media law passed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 31 December 2009. The law covers the "composition, powers, organisation and functioning" of the broadcasting and communication council (Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel et de la communication, CSAC).The entire text of the law was read aloud on national radio on 2 January 2010 by an advisor to the President.

Egypt: Press freer, but still fettered

2010-02-19

http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=50319

Not long ago an editorial like the one that appeared in the independent Al- Dustour newspaper this week might never have made it into print. In his weekly column, entitled 'Fraud for the benefit of Egypt', chief editor Ibrahim Eissa accuses Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak of systematically and meticulously rigging elections and referendums to perpetuate his rule.

Global: Governance and the media - A survey of policy opinion

2010-02-19

http://www.comminit.com/en/node/292487/348

This report sets out to provide a fresh analysis of current thinking and practice about the role of media in relation to governance outcomes. Specifically, the aim was to discover from first principles - and without attempting to prove any particular thesis - what current thinking about media and governance is among a number of high level thinkers and policy makers from the governance, media and development communities.

Mozambique: MISA-Mozambique unveils findings on constraints to press freedom

2010-02-18

http://tinyurl.com/yk8wjvm

One of the findings on a study done by MISA-Mozambique on behalf of UNESCO on the landscape of media development in Mozambique is that Mozambique has a political and legal framework that is generally favorable to freedom of expression, and to pluralism and diversity in the media, although constraints still persist in the practical application of media-friendly laws and policies. The findings were launched at a conference on 10 February 2010 in Maputo.

Zimbabwe: Privately-owned newspaper "The Zimbabwean" harassed

2010-02-19

http://www.ifex.org/zimbabwe/2010/02/18/madzimure_mutandiro_charged/

Reporters Without Borders condemns the Zimbabwean authorities' repeated harassment and intimidation of "The Zimbabwean", a privately-owned newspaper that is edited in Britain and printed in South Africa.

Central Africa: Following the mineral trail: Congo resource wars and Rwanda

2010-02-19

http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1864/1/

The Rwandan government and its military have largely been suspected by a UN Panel of Experts, human rights organizations and independent journalists, of financially supporting a number of violent militias that have destabilized the eastern Congo region to illegally traffic millions-of-dollars worth of minerals such as coltan, gold, and cassiterite. These minerals are then brought from neighboring Congo into Rwanda for eventual sale on the international market.

Cote d'Ivoire: Police fire on protesters

2010-02-19

http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE61I0FK20100219

Security forces in Ivory Coast fired live bullets and tear gas to disperse hundreds of protestors in Gagnoa on Friday, wounding dozens, sources said from the southern town. A source at the hospital, who asked not to be named, said dozens of people were being treated there, mainly for gunshot wounds.

Somalia: Surge in violence sparks alarm

2010-02-19

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33774

The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia expressed grave concern today at the latest spike in violence in the capital, Mogadishu, which has killed at least 80 civilians and forced more than 8,000 others to flee their homes since the start of the month.

Somalia: US aid rules in are impossible, says UN envoy

2010-02-19

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8520035.stm

The US has imposed impossible conditions on aid agencies in Somalia, a UN envoy to the country says. Humanitarian co-ordinator Mark Bowden said the US was trying to ensure that aid was not diverted to Islamist insurgents fighting the government.

Global: The I-Factor: Information access key factor in movements for democracy

2010-02-19

http://www.comminit.com/en/node/305614/348

From The Huffington Post, this article by Internews President David Hoffman discusses the possibilities for increasing the spread of information and communication technology (ICT), "the I-Factor", in light of recent democratic movements. He criticises the effects of the "proselytizing of Western-style democracy by the former [United States (US)] president" in dealing with authoritarian regimes directly threatened by the rhetoric of democracy promotion.

Uganda: Experts ask for lower mobile bandwidth costs

2010-02-19

http://www.wougnet.org/cms/content/view/485/1/

Experts in mobile communications have urged Uganda’s operators to reduce the cost of mobile broadband to increase the penetration of mobile phone-based services among people. Cheap mobile broadband is also a major incentive for the growth of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) firms.

Zimbabwe: Demystifying "Sanctions" - AfricaFocus Bulletin Feb 16, 2010 (100216)

2010-02-19

http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/zim1002.php

The European Union formally decided on February 15 to lift restrictive measures against 6 individuals and 9 companies in Zimbabwe that were previously subject to travel bans and asset freezes, but continued the measures for another year on the majority of the 203 individuals and 40 companies on the list.

Botswana: Minority Rights and Indigenous Peoples Media skills training - March 2010

2010-02-18

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/courses/62383

This five-day training, offered by Minority Rights Group International (MRG), aims to equip minority and indigenous peoples activists (individuals and NGOs) with media skills to generate their own information and to interact with local, regional and international media especially in the European Union.
Minority Rights and Indigenous Peoples Media Skills training in Botswana

Start Date

March 22, 2010

End Date

March 26, 2010

Location

Gaborone, Botswana


Event summary

This five-day training, offered by Minority Rights Group International (MRG), aims to equip minority and indigenous peoples activists (individuals and NGOs) with media skills to generate their own information and to interact with local, regional and international media especially in the European Union.

Specific aim

· To build the capacity of minority and indigenous NGOs in the region to generate their own media material and to interact with European Union based and other international media.
· To develop contacts between community NGOs and European Union and other international journalists to provide better focus on indigenous and minority issues in relation to MDGs.

The course includes the following topics:

Theme Analysis
-- Analysing key issues that currently affect the specific minority/indigenous communities, which the participants represent.
--How to identify the International human rights standards that directly relate to the issues affecting indigenous and minority communities
-- How to identify community stories/ issues that would be of interest to EU and other international audiences.
-- Analysis of ways in which foreign audiences gather information on minority and indigenous communities e.g TV, internet social networking tools and sites etc.
-- How to determine the timing of stories to match major international newsworthy events.
-- How to Include gender focus in media stories,
--How to include other groups who often experience intersectional discrimination e.g. those with disabilities, HIV/AIDS etc.
-- How to make and build media contacts with the EU media

Technical Training
-- Training on effective use of still and video cameras
-- Training on recording and editing audio and video segments for online use
-- Training on using the Internet to get messages out to a wider media audience via pod-casts or download feeds.
-- Training on writing press releases, conducting interviews, responding to interviews by foreign and local journalists, using blogs and diary notes, analysing media content.

-- Training on observation of libel laws and avoiding damage to reputation.

On-line media for advocacy

Using social networks for advocacy.

Registration Information

Full sponsorship including travel and accommodation is available to 18 participants (10 local participants from Botswana and 8 international participants from Africa). However, those interested and can sponsor themselves are welcome to participate.

For a registration/application form and details of the training, please contact MRG using the contact details below.

Contact

Mohamed Matovu

mohamed.matovu@mrgmail.org
Minority Rights Group International, Africa Office
Lujjumwa House, Ggaba Road
P.O. Box 31607 Kampala, Uganda

Tel: +256 312 266832 (Office)
+256 782 748 189 (Mobile)

Peace, Security and Development Fellowships for African Scholars

2010-02-18

http://tinyurl.com/yf7pgod

CSDG, King's College London/ALC, is pleased to announce a call for applications for the Peace, Security and Development Fellowships for African Scholars starting September 2010. The Fellowships are over 18-month period and comprise a rigorous training programme on peace, security and development, which includes a 12-Month Master's (M.A) programme at King's College London and an attachment to an African University.

South Africa: Vrije University Amsterdam - NRF Desmond Tutu doctoral programme

2010-02-18

http://www.nrf.ac.za/call/index.stm

Vrije University (VU) Amsterdam has established the Desmond Tutu Programme in honour of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond M. Tutu. This Programme focuses on the theme Youth, Sports and Reconciliation and aims to strengthen the co-operation between VU Amsterdam and South African Higher Education Institutions.

South African Association of Political Studies conference

2010-02-18

http://www.saaps.org.za/info/cfp2009

The University of Stellenbosch will be hosting the bi-annual conference of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS) in Stellenbosch from 1-4 September 2010. The Theme for the Conference is Democracy in the First Decade of the 21st Century

The 2010 Moremi Initiative for Women’s Leadership in Africa

2010-02-18

http://www.moremiinitiative.org/milead-fellow-summer.php

Moremi Initiative for Women’s Leadership in Africa is pleased to announce its call for applications for the 2010 Moremi Leadership Empowerment and Development (MILEAD) Fellows Program for young African women leaders. The MILEAD Fellows Program is a one-year leadership development program designed to identify, develop and promote emerging young African Women leaders to attain and succeed in leadership in their community and Africa as a whole.

Fahamu