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After Rio+20, A cemetery of mangroves and fisherfolks

Nnimmo Bassey

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83356

cc A MThe reality of communities with oil, gas and mineral resources - whether in Nigeria, Ecuador, Philippines or Canada - are the same. All of them face daily assaults on their lives.

Two visits outside the heart of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, marked the highpoints of my visit to that city for the infamous Rio+20 summit.The first was on 14 June with colleagues from the Oilwatch International network and that visit took us to Caxias. This is a community that has had to bear fifty years of toxic assault by petrochemical installations including the Refineria Duque de Caxias (REDUC).

This refinery is the heart of petrochemical factories that dot the Caxias landscape and is the fourth largest supplier of refined petroleum products to the country. Potable water is a problem in this municipality and some folks reportedly rely on untreated water from the refinery.

The locals see the petrochemicals, including a proposed new refinery set to become the largest in Latin America, as developments that excludes the participation of the citizens. They bemoan a dearth of health facilities even as they bear the assault of multiple pollutions from the petrochemicals complex.

MEN AND WOMEN OF THE SEA

The second visit was on 17 June as part of the Rio +Toxic tour to Mage. It doubled as a solidarity visit to the struggling community people at the Guanabara Bay area.

During the visit we met with members of Homens e Mulheres do Mar Association (AHOMAR) – Association of Men and Women of the Sea in the Guanabara Bay. That name did not include women initially, but after years of gender struggles the role of the women had to be duly recognized and acknowledged in the name.

This last visit commenced from a point between the head offices of Petrobras, the Brazilian national oil company, and the offices of the Brazilian National Development Bank known to be a major financier of toxic projects in the country. The bank has a budget larger than that of the World Bank and extends its tentacles all over Latin America and deep into Africa. The bank turned 60 years on 20 June and fittingly holds itself up as the flag bearer for green capitalism.

Life turned unpredictable for the fisherfolks in the Guanabara Bay when Petrobras constructed its pipelines through the Bay. When an oil spill occurred in 2000 it increased the challenges faced by the fisherfolks. The footprint of that oil spill is still visible in the Ipiringa area and the destroyed mangrove is yet to recover. Indeed, the locals call the area the "cemetery of mangroves."

As much as Petrobras has tried to restore the mangrove, the best result is seen only in photos where mangroves planted in pots are photographed before they wilt, according to local sources.

Our team went through various locations in Mage in the company of members of AHOMAR. A rather uncomfortable aspect was that the leader of AHOMAR, Alexandre Anderson de Sousa, had to travel in a police car as it was considered unsafe for him to travel with us in our bus or by any other means. Since 2009, Alexandre and his family have been under 24/7 police protection under the Human Rights Defenders Program of the government. The officers go with him everywhere, everytime.

Perhaps this level of protection is necessary for Alexandre's safety. It could also be a way of ensuring that his activism is curtailed. I found the presence of the cops rather unnerving. But, as Alexandre said, they are living in difficult times and terrain and their struggle is one of survival. Their struggle has been one of ensuring minimal impacts from petroleum installations as well as resisting expansion of the facilities.

Already some communities have been displaced by pipeline construction and their overall fishing grounds has been reduced to about 12 per cent of the area over the past few years. According to the fisherfolks, about 9000 families are involved in the struggle.

According to research done by the department of Geography of the University of Rio de Janeiro, since the oil spill occurred the fishing stock has depleted by 80-90 per cent of what it was in the 1990s. Twelve years after the incident, the stock is yet to return to normal contrary to assurances they had received from Petrobras. They regret that the best fishing grounds are no longer accessible to them but are taken up by oil installations, pipelines and related mega-projects.

In addition, commercial fishing companies use big vessels that destabilize the smaller boats used by the locals. In addition they complain that they get shot at with automatic weapons at times by private security outfit. The objective of the harassment is to stop them from fishing, according to the locals.

"When Petrobras is accused you can be sure there would be no investigations," one of the local leaders told us. "We are being squeezed out of business because we cannot go to the deep seas in our small boats."

DEATH AND DIGNITY

The bay has literally become a platform for Petrobras and sections are fenced off and cannot be accessed by locals. One leader told us: "we are resisting because we have no options. We might live or die. Our death may not result from gun shots, but because our livelihoods have been destroyed." He added, "We are not seeking to be rich, we just want to live our lives in dignity."

The reality of the precarious situation of the AHOMAR activists was underscored by the murder of two of their leaders a few days after our visit. They are indeed denied dignity in life and in death. The shocking news reached the world that:

"Almir Nogueira de Amorim and João Luiz Telles Penetra, artisanal fishermen and members of Homens e Mulheres do Mar Association (AHOMAR) went missing after going out to fish on Friday, 22 June 2012." Further, reports of the brutal murders inform, "Almir's body was found on sunday, June 24th, tied to their boat, submerged close to the São Lourenço beach in Magé, Rio de Janeiro. The body of João Luiz Telles, Pituca, was found on monday, June 25th, with hands and feet tied in fetal position, close to the São Gonçalo beach."

Recalling past incidents, reports have it that in "2009, the men and women of AHOMAR occupied the construction sites of land and sub-sea gas pipelines for transport of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), built by a consortium between two contractors: GDK and Oceânica, hired by Petrobras. This construction is directly making artisanal fishing impossible in the Mauá-Magé beach, Guanabara Bay, where the AHOMAR headquarters is located.

"They anchored their boats close to the pipelines and stayed there for 38 days. Since then, the fishermen are suffering constant death threats. That same year, in May, Paulo Santos Souza, formerly in charge of the association's accounting, was brutally beaten in front of his family and killed with five shots in the head. In 2010, another AHOMAR founder, Márcio Amaro, was also murdered at his home, in front of his mother and wife. Both crimes have never been cleared up."

NIGERIAN GAS IMPORTED AND FLARED

On the way to "the cemetery of mangroves" we saw gas pipelines that had an interesting story behind them. Around 2002 when Brazil had an energy crisis due to reduction in levels of water in her hydroelectricity dams, the country began to import liquefied natural gas from Nigeria. With an improvement in the energy situation the importation continues and the excess gas is simply flared. It can be said that Nigeria, the second biggest flarer of natural gas after Russia, flares at two ends of the pipe: in the Niger Delta and in Brazil.

Another similarity with the messy oil fields of Nigeria is that most of the spills are first reported by fisherfolks. The Petrobras spill of 2000 at Ipiringa is said to have occurred by 1 AM and was discovered by fisherfolks six hours later. The massive spill destroyed a huge swath of mangrove and with it took the bottom off the livelihoods of at least 300 families who used to pick crabs, prawns and other seafoods here.

The toxic tour ended with a standing meeting with the environment secretary of the Mage Municipality. Before that meeting we visited Surui community heavily impacted by an oil pipeline that cuts right through it. Stories of buildings cracked by heavy earth moving machinery during the laying of the pipeline as well as displacement of several families are rife here.

The land acquisition process is quite interesting. According to the locals, Petrobras officials would arrive at your door and offer you a certain amount of money for your property. If you refuse, they leave. But when they come a second time they would inform you that the money they offered has been set aside for you in a special account. In other words, you have no option but to accept their offer. When the officials come a third time, their mission is simple: to evict you from your property.

WE ARE ALL FISHERFOLK

The deaths of Almir, João Luiz, Paulo and Márcio must be denounced in the strongest terms. We cannot stand apart from this assault simply because it is not occurring in our territories. Our realities are not different whether in the oil fields of Nigeria and Ecuador, the mines of Philippines or the tar sand pits of Alberta Canada. Communities with oil, gas and mineral resources are daily being assaulted. The least we can do to defend our common humanity is to stand in solidarity with challenged peoples all over the world and proclaim that: we are all fisherfolk; we are all AHOMAR activists!

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* Nnimmo Bassey is an activist, poet/writer and architect. His is Executive Director of the Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth in Nigeria and Chair of Friends of the Earth International. He also coordinates Oilwatch International. His book, ‘To Cook a Continent’ (Pambazuka Press, 2012) deals with destructive extractive activities and the climate crisis in Africa.
* This article was first published by The Africa Report.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Another popular Intifada in Sudan

Understanding the prospects and challenges

Khalid Medani

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83344

cc M-JThe current protests have clearly demonstrated that after 23 years in power the Bashir regime’s capacity for coercion is weak and increasingly de-linked from the Sudanese people.

While the attention of the Western and Arab media has focused on the historic victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate in Egypt, street protests of a scale not witnessed for two decades continued into their second week in Khartoum and other major Sudanese cities. Anti-government protests, initially led by students from the University of Khartoum, have inspired similar nation-wide demonstrations in al-Obeid, Kosti, al-Gadaref, Port Sudan, Wad Medani, and Atbara.

They began on June 16 with courageous female students at the University of Khartoum’s downtown campus taking to the streets chanting “no, no to higher prices” and “freedom, freedom.” The students initially protested the announcement of a thirty-five percent hike in public transportation fees and called for the “liberation” of the campus from the presence of the ubiquitous National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). Since then, Khartoum and other cities have been sites of daily protests driven by a widening political agenda.

Echoing calls heard in the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, protesters chanted “the people want the fall of the regime,” “we will not be ruled by a dictator,” and “revolution, revolution until victory.” Clearly mindful (and no doubt apprehensive) of the protesters’ slogans referencing the Arab uprisings as well as two previous popular intifadas that have removed military regimes, President Omar al-Bashir quickly insisted that this is “no Arab Spring.”

However, since they began, the protests have expanded in both their geographic reach and their social profile. Moving beyond the middle class campus of the University of Khartoum, protests now include more lower class students from other universities, supporters and activists belonging to the major opposition parties, civil servants, the unemployed and workers in the informal sector.

Moreover, despite the use of teargas, batons and sweeping arrests on the part of the State Security and Intelligence Services, the protests have expanded to include residents in the populous informal settlements and working class neighbourhoods of Buri, al-Ilafoon, al-Gereif, al-Sahafa, al-Abbassiya and Mayo south of the capital.

As the protests continued with greater force into their tenth day security forces, frustrated at not being able to stem the tide of the protests, entered the dormitories of the University of Khartoum’s Faculty of Education and set them ablaze. The students, responding to Bashir's public statement on June 24 describing the demonstrators as ‘saboteurs’, foreign ‘aliens’ and 'rogues' chanted, "we are not rogues, “you will end up dead in a sewage system", referring to how former Libyan leader Moammar Ghadafi was caught before he was killed.

The government’s decision to abolish fuel subsidies and the imposition of a wider austerity package that has resulted in a spiraling inflation rate that peaked at over thirty percent this May sparked this wave of demonstrations. They come on the heels of smaller, albeit persistent, protests that have been ongoing for over a year, in direct response to pre-existing economic policies linked to the secession of South Sudan in the summer 2011. The secession of South Sudan resulted in the loss of two thirds of the country’s oil reserves, leaving Khartoum with a widening budget deficit, a weakened currency, and rising costs for food and other imports.

To make matters worse for Khartoum, land-locked South Sudan shut down its oil production in January after accusing Khartoum of charging exorbitant transit fees for transporting the South’s oil through the Khartoum’s pipeline. Following years of unprecedented oil-exports, which fueled economic growth, wherein some years featured double-digit growth figures, the financial basis that helped maintain the resilience and patronage networks of the regime effectively vanished overnight.

In response, and immediately following the South’s secession, the Bashir regime placed restrictions on the outflow of foreign currency, banned certain imports, and reduced state subsidies on vital commodities such as sugar and fuel. With a budget deficit currently estimated at $2.4 billion dollars, on 18 June 2012, Bashir imposed yet another round of more drastic, and desperate, austerity measures, lifted fuel subsides, and announced the stringent enforcement of higher taxes on capital, consumer goods, telecommunications, and a wide range of imports.

While the current protests are partially inspired by the Arab uprisings, the grievances fueling the protests are decidedly Sudanese. The students and largely unemployed activists confronting the formidable security forces in the streets of Khartoum, members of the professional syndicates, and the leaders of the National Consensus Forces (NCF, an umbrella group of opposition parties) have all argued against the government’s claim that the deep economic crisis is beyond the government’s control and the result of “malicious” traders operating in the informal economy who are smuggling fuel and hard currency at the expense of the Sudanese people.

Instead, they have noted that these macroeconomic initiatives are indefensible, and persuasively cited widely covered corruption scandals of members of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The NCF have also marshalled and publicized overwhelming evidence showing that the bulk of the national budget is allocated to the escalating military campaigns in Darfur as well as the clashes along the borders with South Sudan that began in earnest last April. Moreover, as the local media has noted, at the same time that the regime has imposed deep austerity measures, the NCP announced greater investments in government apparatuses, concerned as it is with sustaining its patronage networks and security apparatus in the context of wide-scale protests calling for the removal of the regime.

Ironically, the influential Vice President Ali Osman Taha blamed the economic crisis on the Sudanese themselves who, as he put it, have been “living beyond their means.” In a country where the majority of families rely on funds from labour remittances sent by expatriate relatives (i.e., Sudanese workers abroad) for their livelihood, Taha angered the protestors further by publicly stating that the tendency of Sudanese to maintain extended families ― where one individual works and ten others rely on his income ― is the real reason that local production and incomes are at such low levels [1]. For its part, the National Consensus Party (NCP), which also includes the Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Islamist Hassan Turabi, and the National Umma Party of former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, has vowed to continue to mobilize street protests to oppose the government’s austerity measures.

SUDAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS: CLARIFYING SOME MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE “ARAB SPRING” DEBATE IN SUDAN

The imposition of macroeconomic policies, inspired and rationalized by neoliberal principles (more than the loss of the South), has sparked the recent protests. However, the magnitude of the protests and organizational strategies utilized therein has clearly been inspired by the protests and transitions in the larger Arab world. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, scholars of Sudan have been near unanimous in declaring that the Sudanese government will “not buckle” to popular protests anytime soon.

Interestingly, while the Arab region has long been viewed as immune to democratization, in the context of the Arab protests, Arab “exceptionalism” has been replaced by “Sudanese exceptionalism” in much of the analysis on Sudan. Following in the lines of scholars of Arab authoritarianism, these analysts insist, with little evidence, that Sudan’s military establishment is beholden to the government just as it has been since Bashir first took power via a military coup in 1989. That is, that the upper ranks of the military and the security forces are still loyal to his rule, that the political opposition is weak and discredited, and that civil society is even more divided than that of Tunisia and Egypt.

These are the very same factors that compelled scholars to predict the durability of authoritarian rule in the Arab world. As one Sudan analyst put it: “there is certainly discontent with the regime, but it’s unclear if enough of the right factors are present to complete the equation in Khartoum [because] protests undertaken thus far have not taken root with a broad section of the population.” [2]

The influential International Crisis Group (ICG) similarly argued that “years of subjugation at the hands of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) have yielded both political apathy and a weak opposition.” [3] In contradiction to the current expansion of protests to all of the major cities in Sudan, the general consensus among analysts is that, in the case of Sudan, the heavy hand of the National Intelligence and Security Services and corresponding fears among the population act to inhibit a genuinely popular uprising.

In reality, in recent years, deep divisions have emerged within the state security forces and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) over the potential pitfalls for Khartoum associated with South Sudan’s secession, the ongoing negotiations with South Sudan’s Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) over the oil rich border regions, and on the conduct of the recent military campaigns in South Kordofan. Indeed, far from representing a unified front as in the early years of the Bashir regime there is increasing dissention within the ranks of the security establishment that has led Bashir to sack several high ranking officials for the sake of his self-preservation.

These divisions were in clear evidence when Bashir removed Salah Gosh, the long-standing director-general of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), from his post in April 2011. Gosh fell out with the powerful presidential advisor of Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP), Nafie Ali Nafie, after the former initiated a dialogue with opposition parties leading to fears on the part of Bashir and Nafi that he was in the process of plotting a coup against the regime.

More recently, on June 24th, in response to the continued spate of protests throughout the country, Bashir issued a decree relieving nine of his top ranking advisers, including six from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), from their positions. The move, part of a countrywide reshuffle designed to revive waning legitimacy for the regime, saw entire regional governments tendering their resignations with the exception of South Darfur State whose government simply refused to step down.

In the case of Sudan, this analysis, like that of Tunisia and Egypt in the past, does not depict the full picture with respect to the prospects of a Sudanese democratic “spring.” The question having to do with whether Sudan will remain resistant to a significant uprising, if not a democratic opening, requires an analysis that takes seriously the pitfalls made by scholars who mistakenly focused on the durability of Arab authoritarianism.

Will Sudan remain resistant to democratization? The answer to this question hinges on an understanding of factors long associated, albeit mistakenly, with the durability of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. These include the fact that Arab countries possess weak civil societies, have middle classes beholden to state patronage for their survival, and opposition political parties, which are either weak (i.e., Egypt and Sudan) or simply non-existent (i.e., Tunisia). However, as the events in Tunisia and Egypt have shown, none of these conditions precluded the move towards the difficult struggle over dismantling the long-standing political, economic and social institutions of authoritarian rule. Indeed, what they have demonstrated is that a weakly organized opposition does not necessarily prevent effective mass mobilization.

What then explains the divergence in Sudan from its northern neighbours? And how can we evaluate the potential for a similar popular intifada leading to another period of democracy in Sudan? For Sudan, the answer is relatively straightforward: it lies in the Bashir regime’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion. As analysts of Arab authoritarianism have usefully demonstrated across the region, when the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy [4].

Conversely, where the state’s capacity of coercion is weak or lacks the will to crush popular protests, the unraveling of authoritarian rule in the Arab world and elsewhere may begin to occur. In the case of Sudan, the current protests have clearly demonstrated that after twenty-three years in power the Bashir regime’s capacity of coercion is weak and increasingly de-linked from the Sudanese people. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), demoralized and weakened from fighting armed insurgencies Darfur and in two southern border states (i.e. South Kordofan and Blue Nile), has so far chosen not to step in against the protesters. At present, the regime is relying on the Police, but most particularly, on the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) to crack down on the street protesters. There are already signs of discontent between the NISS and police forces in the way the security agents are handling the detentions of the Sudanese citizens.

The protestors are well aware of the political and social divisions between the NISS and the police forces, and are clearly banking on persuading elements in the police to sympathesize with their shared grievances against the state. In one of the largest and most significant protests outside the Imam Abdel Rahman Mosque in Omdurman that followed Friday prayers, protestors attempted to enlist the support of the police chanting: “oh police, oh police, how much is your salary and how much is a pound of sugar?” in a clear strategy to persuade the police, the military and members of the government to join the protests as was the case with previous successful intifadas in 1964 and 1985 known as the October and April revolutions. Nevertheless, like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt before them, the protestors and the opposition political parties in Sudan are well aware that the dismantling of a long-standing authoritarian regime will require sustained protests and popular street mobilization that would ultimately, albeit reluctantly, enlist the support of significant elements in the military establishment.

Consequently, in the case of the Sudan, the key question in the context of the current protests is not to ask whether they are of the scale of those in Egypt and Tunisia, but rather to understand the relative strength of the Bashir regime’s capacity for coercion vis-à-vis what is clearly a resurgent and emboldened civil society opposition in the country. What the examples of Tunisia and Egypt have demonstrated is that the answer to this question depends on the state’s fiscal health, the level of international support, and the degree to which the state security sector is entrenched in civil society. As in other Arab countries, taken together, these factors will determine whether the level of popular mobilization and current protests outweighs the capacity of the coercive apparatus of the Bashir regime. In this regard, it is highly likely that the durability of the authoritarian regime in Khartoum will be more short-lived than most analysts have argued. This is due to a number of reasons.

First, the level of international support is extremely low. Indeed, only a few months after Southern secession the United States re-imposed economic sanctions on the Sudan. In combination with the standing ICC’s indictment of Bashir issued in July 2010, this has increased the Bashir regime’s pariah status and has resulted in important divisions within the ruling party. It has also diminished the hopes among some members of the NCP to generate much needed foreign direct investment. Second, following almost a decade of remarkable growth in GDP (real gross domestic product), averaging 7.7 percent annually thanks to oil exports, since 2010 growth sharply declined to three percent even before the secession of the oil-rich South [5].

Sudan’s already depleted oil revenues shrank by a further twenty percent after its main Heglig oil field was damaged and shut down in fighting with South Sudanese troops in April of this year. Consequently, the Bashir regime is suffering from an enormous scarcity of foreign currency with which to finance spending to shore up its support base. It is this grave financial crisis that led to the recent imposition of economic austerity measures leading to the cost of living protests. Perhaps more importantly in political terms, it has also is weakened Khartoum’s capacity to suppress dissent since over seventy percent of oil export revenue prior to South Sudan’s secession was funneled to support the military and popular defense forces in the country.

Third, as witnessed by the protests in Khartoum and throughout the north, a wide cross section of Sudanese have already mobilized in a parallel process to their northern neighbors. In addition, protests that spread to central and northern Sudan have been accompanied by cyber activism spearheaded by the group Girifna (“we are fed up”). In a pattern similar to Egypt and Tunisia, this has maintained the link between Sudanese in the country and the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens in the diaspora. Taken together, these factors have continued to weaken the capacity of the Bashir regime to forestall the call for democratization indefinitely.

The most telling and important reason for the Bashir regime’s diminishing durability is the fact that the hitherto institutionalized security sector is increasingly fragmented and the top leadership is gravely divided. Following the country’s partition, political power is now increasingly centered on Bashir and a close network of loyalists. Moreover, concerned about a coup from within the military establishment, Bashir has purposely fragmented the security services. He has come to rely on personal and tribal loyalties. The formerly strong NCP party no longer has a significant base of social support even among hard-line Islamists [6]. This division was clearly illustrated in 2011 following a much publicized dispute between two of the most influential figures in Bashir’s government: Nafie Ali Nafie and Ali Osman Taha. Nafie (Presidential advisor and head of state security) along with Bashir represent the hardliner faction in the regime, and both have vehemently opposed constitutional reforms. In contrast, Ali Osman Taha (the second vice president) has come into bitter political conflict with the hardliners by calling for inclusion of some opposition parties to help in drafting a new constitution. This significant division in the ruling NCP party, in combination with the country’s international isolation, the deep economic crisis following the South’s secession along with the loss of oil revenue, and persistent levels of popular discontent and mobilization (even if low) are strong indications that Sudan―a country that witnessed two previous popular revolts that dramatically turned the tide of national politics―may find itself drawing important inspiration from its Arab neighbors just as it continues to follow its own path and distinctive “Sudanese” trajectory.

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* Khalid Medani is currently assistant professor of political science and Islamic Studies at McGill University.
* This article was first published by Jadaliyya.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

END NOTES

[1] Magdi El Gizouli, “Sudan: Khartoum-the Political Economy of Bankruptcy, Sudan Tribune, June 23, 2012, p. 3.

[2] Alex Thurston, “Northern Sudan’s Protests Sparked by Egypt and Tunisia, but will they have the same effect?” Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 2011.

[3] Quoted in Jeffrey Gettleman, “Young Sudanese Start Movement,” New York Times, February 2, 2011. For a more cautious analysis that does not directly address Sudan, see Marc Lynch, “Will the Arab Revolutions Spread?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2011.

[4] Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.”

[5] Medani M. Ahmed, “Gloval Financial Crisis Discussion Series Paper 19: Sudan Phase 2”, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London: United Kingdom, February 2010, pp. 1-2.

[6] International Crisis Group (ICG), “Divisions in Sudan’s ruling party and the threat to the country’s future stability,” Africa Report, no. 174, May 4, 2011. Another strong indication of the disunity among the top leadership in Khartoum was signalled by the dismissal of the formerly powerful head of national security, Salah Gosh, from his post in early 2011.

Thoughts for independent Algeria’s 50th birthday

David Porter

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83375

cc WikimediaAlgerians are by nature anarchists. Whether at the level of local daily life or in periodic broader social movements, large numbers of grassroots Algerians over the past five decades have refused to accept the authoritarian and corrupt regime imposed since independence. That struggle continues.

5 July 2012 marks Algeria’s 50th anniversary of national independence from 132 years of the French colonial regime. At the heavy price of a bitter eight-year armed struggle, marked by 300,000-1,000,000 Algerian deaths, large-scale repression, torture and military removal of millions from their homes, this forceful rejection of French control was an immense accomplishment. Algeria’s example of courage, will and sacrifice to gain national liberation from a major Western power was one of the most inspiring and dynamic political models of mid-20th century Third World struggle, well-publicized for many in North America by the writings of Frantz Fanon. Commemorating this achievement at the 50th anniversary is important.

Yet, paradoxically, for most Algerians, it is hard to celebrate. Algerian filmmakers have proposed nearly 150 specific projects to present various aspects of the wartime struggle. But expensive film projects require substantial government funding. As well, a new Algerian law requires government approval of any film on wartime themes in order to "safeguard national memory” (R.N., 2012). Thus, Algeria’s regime has the last say. Given the potential to dramatically portray Algeria’s struggle, outsiders might view such decisions as simple, subject only to criteria of cost and artistic talent.

While such factors are important, heavy political stakes are also at play. Much of the evolution of the national liberation movement, before and during the war, was marked by bitter personal, clan and ideological rivalries deeply implicating many of the chief figures in the Algerian regime (and opposition) from 1962 to the present. As well, the war also involved threats and violence against Algerians not supporting the FLN and attacks by some Algerians against unarmed European civilians. Such issues raise challenges to past and present political legitimacy and to full and honest interpretations of the national liberation revolution itself. It is still contested terrain that the regime, in school textbooks and research authorizations, refuses permission to explore (Blidi, 2012). But how can a people celebrate in unity a national struggle against French colonialism that by now, despite such censorship, is well known also to include, beyond heroism, internal political assassinations, purges, betrayals, attacks on unarmed civilians and manipulations of the base? Similar contradictions, of course, exist in most if not all revolutions, not the least in the American colonies’ struggle for independence from Britain.

Aside from this still bitter politics of history is the fact that the great majority of present-day Algerians were born well after 1962, and have no deep or direct personal identity with that struggle or the wartime dreams that accompanied it. While young Algerians generally share an abstract national pride—witness the delirious grassroots celebrations when Algeria qualified for World Cup championship soccer competition over Egypt in 2010--quite understandably their focus centers on immediate economic, social and political contexts.

Here also the question is posed: what is there to celebrate when 50 years of Algerian regimes have continuously repressed the population, engorged themselves and their political clienteles through massive corruption, failed badly to assure adequate jobs and housing despite huge state petrochemical revenues, imposed a mandatory Arabization educational and linguistic policy and adopted Islamist-appeasing social measures such as the notorious retrograde Family Code? What is there to celebrate when only 20 years ago, the military moved from the background to the fore with a coup d’etat cancelling elections and quickly leading to a decade of horrendous civil war between the military and Islamists, causing the deaths of some 200,000 and heavy psychological scars in the population still close to the surface today?

When I arrived in Algeria in 1965 to carry out field research for an American graduate degree, I was shocked when the first worker I spoke with at the student housing complex told me that if he had known that Algerian independence would turn out as it had to that date, he would never have taken part in the revolution. This deep alienation and de-politicization affecting millions of Algerians because of the post-independence regime continues to the present, producing a constant stream of exiles abroad. For Algerian society, it is a huge and tragic loss of vitality and talent.

Concerning these negatives in the Algerian liberation movement and post-independence experience, the colonial role of France and neo-colonial policies of France and the U.S. must not be ignored. Colonial rule encouraged the fracturing of Algerian society and identity and exploited the land and its people for the economic benefit of a European settler elite and metropolitan France. Despite a pretence that Algeria was not a colony but a set of three départements, as the rest of France, the deep racism and violence at the base of the colonial project constantly violated Algerians’ social, economic and political dignity and well-being, as so well described by Fanon. They led directly as well to the vicious military repression and to the terrorism by many pieds-noirs from 1954 to 1962 that left much of the economy in shambles, encouraged a militarized Algerian leadership and produced a wounded and traumatized population.

In turn, to the present, French and increasingly U.S. (especially after 9/11) governments have provided crucial international support and legitimacy to Algerian rulers, thus greater latitude and stability for the latter’s’ authoritarianism, corruption and social neglect domestically. As well, for many of those willfully neglected and insulted by the regime at the grassroots, political Islamism seemed increasingly the only viable alternative to the regime. But Islamists’ self-serving use of religion for personal and political power, their increasingly violent threats and actions toward secular opponents and toward women greatly contributed over the years—especially during the 1990s—to a polarization of Algerian society which the military, in turn, opportunistically used to justify its own continued rule.

Nevertheless, from a different perspective, Algeria has much to celebrate about the 50 years since independence. From 1962 to the present, many grassroots Algerians have steadily resisted, in a variety of ways, the greed, power schemes and repression from above while simultaneously doing what they could to contribute positively to their society with the limited resources at hand. In the first year of independence and after, thousands of Algerian workers spontaneously and with the encouragement of the nationalist trade union took over operation of modern farms and units in industrial and other realms abandoned by Europeans fleeing to France and set to work to self-manage the grassroots re-booting of the national economy. Though opposed and sabotaged by the military, bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie who resented this growing horizontalist sector of hundreds of thousands and the general challenge to elite power and privileges it represented, many self-management workers struggled for several years to maintain and embrace this attempt at socialism from below.

In 1980 emerged a largely spontaneous wave of massive protest and resistance among the proud Berbers of Kabylia, based on long-standing grievances against regime authoritarianism, its disdain for rich Berber linguistic and cultural identity as well as its neglect of the region’s economy. This “Berber Spring” was the first large-scale political challenge to the regime since the early 60s, inspiring a decade of continuing activism and independent cultural expression by the Berber Cultural Movement and similar upheavals among alienated and oppressed urban residents, especially young people, in Constantine, Sétif, Ghardaïa, Oran, and other locales.

In turn, a similar but larger protest by thousands of young people took place in the capital, Algiers, in October 1988—without an explicit political program, but demonstrating through their choice of targets (government and FLN party offices and opulent retail stores) their contempt for political and economic elites prospering at the expense of most Algerians. This explosion of massive street demonstrations over several days was then repressed by gunfire, arrests and torture and used by the regime to justify and manipulate a partial liberalization of politics and economic policy. In this brief moment of what some referred to as Algeria’s “parentheses democracy,” like the recent Arab Spring, many hoped for a genuine multiparty pluralist political system with respect for free expression and human rights.

A new outspoken human rights league developed in this period along with new media, independent women’s rights groups and autonomous trade unions separate from the regime’s long-standing and largely submissive UGTA union federation. In the end, however, the combination of a growing and increasingly confident and demagogic Islamist movement, including a strong radical component, and manipulation by the dominant military to block genuine democratization culminated in a cancelled legislative electoral process (about to be won by Islamists) in January 1992. What followed was a long nightmare decade of repression, massacres, tortures, assassinations, “disappearances” and rapes committed by both sides.

In 1999, the military selected Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a previously long-standing high regime official, to be president as the regime’s civilian face. Along with a policy of “reconciliation” with disarming Islamists and enforced silence about crimes of both sides, the military (led by the secret police, the DRS) sponsored a new phase of democratic façade. Over the next decade, it permitted periodic local and national elections, a variety of political parties, newspapers, and civil society organizations and limited public critiques of the regime. But elections are notoriously manipulated, while newspapers and parties and other organizations are infiltrated and pressured from above or purposefully multiplied so as to confuse and divert political opposition. Typically public meetings and demonstrations are tightly controlled or banned altogether.

Nevertheless, the human rights league, autonomous trade unions, women’s rights groups and other grassroots organizations continue to survive and to take strong political stands. Elections are boycotted by large numbers, most recently a month ago for the national assembly. In this latter case, the political stakes were especially high after unprecedented strong government appeals through radio, TV, social messaging and supportive imams calling for massive voter participation, thus to demonstrate regime legitimacy and deter “Arab Spring”-type challenges and potential Western intervention. However, the continued habit of boycotts by alienated voters and further appeals for abstention by opposition figures produced another humiliating grassroots rejection of the system. While the regime claimed a 42% participation rate of eligible voters, the lack of transparency in vote-counting and other traditional forms of electoral manipulation led critics to suggest a much lower rate and fraudulent victories. As well, even among those who voted, admitted the government, about 22% of cast ballots were faulty or blank (Mammeri, 2012).

The earlier Kabyle insurrection of April 2001, followed by mass demonstrations and a widespread horizontalist “assemblies movement,” also showed a large-scale rejection of the regime. Responding to long-standing grievances against the government and to local gendarmes’ murder of a young student and deadly attacks on demonstrators, virtually the entire region of Kabylia rose up in defiant protest, besieging police stations with rocks and fire bombs while also burning government and political party offices. Other Kabyles formed local grassroots councils based on centuries-old Kabyle horizontalist principles and confederated together from the bottom up. As well, a million protestors marched on Algiers demanding trials and punishments for the gendarmes, compensation for the hundreds of wounded, acquittal for demonstrators,
programs for social and economic development, and a system of genuine democratic accountability.

This rising massive defiance and spontaneous self-organization threatened to spread elsewhere in Algeria and to mobilize a national uprising against the regime. But events happened too quickly to develop a coordinated national insurrection and the regime repressed marchers before they could reach the center of Algiers. Nevertheless, the self-organized assemblies movement persisted for several years, while mostly refusing and denouncing contact with the unresponsive regime.

During this past decade and across the country, each year sees thousands of more-or-less spontaneous local demonstrations, riots and confrontations with police, frequently marked by rock throwing, burning cars, attacks on public buildings, and roadway blockades. As many Algerians have observed, it is the only way aggrieved young people can gain “dialogue” with oppressive and insulting local officials. More recently, dozens of people have committed protest suicides when persistently blocked by the system from any semblance of decent living conditions and dignity.

All told, Algerians since 1962 continued a post-colonial “national liberation struggle” in many forms. Defiance and resistance to oppression are traditional to Algerians, dating long before (as well as throughout) French colonialism. As Chawki Amari suggested two years ago in El Watan, a leading Algiers newspaper, Algerians are by nature anarchists that Bakunin would have no trouble recognizing (Amari, 2010). Whether at the level of local daily life or in periodic broader social movements, as described above, large numbers of grassroots Algerians over the past five decades have refused to accept the authoritarian and corrupt regime imposed since independence. It is this variegated and continuous “national liberation” movement for grassroots self-determination—against the national bourgeoisie and its foreign supporters—that, as Fanon predicted, continues the struggle begun against the French. It is this struggle which can and should be celebrated. Inevitably, it will continue for years to come—hopefully, with more concrete victories along the way.

Every substantial political upheaval is rooted in millions of individual rebellious attitudes and behaviors nourished anonymously over generations in local and sometimes broader social contexts, until the right conjuncture of economic and political factors permits explosive breaks through existing bonds of oppression. Despite numerous setbacks, the continuous struggle of Algerians for dignity, decent living conditions, solidarity and self-determination, like similar popular struggles throughout the world, is something we can all join in celebrating.


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* David Porter is a SUNY professor emeritus of political science and history and author of Eyes to the South: French Anarchists and Algeria, released last November by AK Press. He can be contacted at davidporter1953@gmail.com

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

REFERENCES

R.N., "Khalida Toumi: La 'sacralité' de Novembre 54 comme outil de censure," Le Matin DZ, 3/16/12.

Amel Blidi, "Chronique d'un fiasco orchestré," El Watan, 4/15/12; Amel Blidi, "Abdelmadjid Merdaci: Qui a peur en Algérie de l'histoire de la guerre d'indépendance?" El Watan, 4/15/12.

Achira Mammeri, “Elections législatives: le rapport de la Cnisel,” tsa-algerie.com, 5/29/12; Said Radjef, “Le 10 mai ou la faillité du pouvoir algérien et de la classe politique,” Le Matin DZ, 6/13/12

Chawki Amari, "Cette terre ingouvernable," El Watan, 3/29/10.

The dynamics of political struggle in Ghana – Part 1

Explo Nani-Kofi

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83360

cc WikimediaPolitics in Ghana has been shaped by the events surrounding the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. Successive regimes have repressed the agitation for popular democracy.

Ghana became independent from British rule in 1957. Ghana also saw its first military coup d’etat on 24 February 1966 led Lt Col E.K. Kotoka to overthrow the Pan-Africanist and socialist-oriented government of Kwame Nkrumah. The politics in Ghana has been shaped by the events of the aftermath of the 24 February 1966 which is now known, from the USA Central Intelligence Agency’s declassified files, to have been organized under the influence of western intelligence agencies.

The dichotomy in future Ghanaian politics was born during the anti-colonial struggle. Right within the leadership of the anti-colonial movement, there emerged the current which aimed at being rooted in the mass of the people and shaping a future independent of Africa’s marginalization on one hand and the current which just wanted blacks to enter into the structures to be left by the colonizers. Things came to a head just before independence when the former carried the slogan – ‘Self Government Now’ – with the latter’s slogan being ‘Self Government in the Shortest Possible Time’. Kwame Nkrumah’s independence declaration that the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African continent gave further clarification to the vision around the former. This dichotomy created tension and conflict between the two currents.

In 1949, the Convention Peoples’ Party emerged to represent the former and the United Party, which brought together various splinter forces, went on to represent the latter. The immediate post-colonial period saw threats of destabilization to the government of the CPP, as early as 1958 a bomb was found an aeroplane on which the Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah was scheduled to travel to India. Call this terrorism at the dawn of the new country. This and other acts led to the passing of the Preventive Detention Act which from experiences round the world today nobody can imagine anything other than such a law in those circumstances. With one current opposed to Africa’s marginalization, this brought in the interests of external forces. As the declassified files of the CIA from the 1960s show, US felt that Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, remained one singular obstacle to USA’s interests in Africa and therefore the CIA played a role in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah as President.

The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah led to an attempt to consolidate the structures left by western colonizers and stop all attempts at introducing new structures which could assist reverse Africa’s marginalization.

Whilst at the level of the state the colonial system was being consolidated there was also mobilization for change. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this dichotomy became visible again. Emmanuel Hansen aptly describes this manifestation in his book ‘Ghana Under Rawlings Early Years’. He wrote: “Among progressive groups and individuals the idea had persisted for sometime that Ghana’s post-colonial problems are such that only a revolution could respond effectively to them. What exactly this revolution was to entail has never been precisely articulated. There is, however, a consensus that it would involve the termination of the control of the local economy by foreign multinational companies, changes in the structure of production and production relations, changes in the class structure of the control of the state, creation of political forms which would make the interest of the broad mass of people predominant and realizable and a programme which would initiate a process of improving upon the material conditions of the mass of the people.”

Hansen wrote further that: “Those who entertained the opposite position that there was nothing basically wrong with the nature of the country’s structure of production or production relations or the nature of our economic relations with western capitalist countries or of the structure of power, class relations or the nature of the state power, and that only certain aspects of its functioning needed to be re formed”. The former position coincides with the former current in the preceding analysis of the anti-colonial struggle and the latter with the latter.

On 31st December 1981, Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings led a coup to overthrow the People’s National Party (PNP) government of Dr Hilla Limann. In a coup speech to the nation, he said: “Fellow citizens of Ghana, as you would have noticed we are not playing the National Anthem. In other words this is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a revolution, something that would transform the social and economic order of this country.
“The military is not in to take over. We simply want to be part of the decision-making process in this country.

“Fellow citizens, it is now left to you to decide how this country is going to go from today …..

“I am not here to impose myself on this country, far from it.

“We are asking nothing more than to organize this country in such a way that nothing will be done from the Council, whether by God or the Devil, without the consent and the authority of the people . . . . .

“I am prepared to, at this moment, face a firing squad if what I’ve tried to do for a second time in my life does not meet the approval of Ghanaians . . . . .

“There is no justice in this society and so long as there is no justice, I would dare say that let there be no peace.”

After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, the first two attempts at civilian rule were short lived. The Second Republic lasted from October 1969 to January 1972 whilst the Third Republic lived from September 1979 to December 1981 before both were overthrown by military coups d’etat. It has been difficult for any of the experiments to match the experience of the First Republic under Kwame Nkrumah. These made the expectations from civil rule so high that they were easily brushed aside by soldiers and greeted with popular support. Initially, the National Redemption Council (NRC) military regime which adopted a pro-Nkrumah posture organizing Kwame Nkrumah’s state burial in April 1972 and mobilized for the Operation Feed Yourself programme appeared quite popular with even some people suggesting that the military should stay in power. This atmosphere was a product of a political build up since 24 February 1966 when Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown and Ghanaians were learning the price of Nkrumah’s overthrow and how enslaved to the west the country had become.

Groups were organized among young students and workers studying and organising around politics similar or close to the vision of Kwame Nkrumah. Literature came in from Convention People’s Party Overseas, based in London, which produced ‘The Dawn’ and Central Union of Ghana Students in Europe which published the ‘Amanee’. Friendship societies with the socialist-oriented countries were also quite active. By 1974, the military regime lost its good will and was being confronted the National Union of Ghana Students and the students movement that they should go back to the barracks. In 1976, the NUGS adopted scientific socialism as its guiding principle and the following year, on 13 May 1977, there was the biggest students’ demonstration ever with the participation of all three universities which was brutally crushed by the military regime and the universities closed. 13 May became the National Students Day. Despite this character of the students’ movement, the Professional Bodies Association and the Ghana Bar Association supported and worked with the students in their struggle against the military regime showing how acceptable Left wing posture had become in the country. In the late 1970s, when I entered university the main forum for mobilization was the Pan African Youth Movement (PANYMO).

The military regime tried to find a way out with the Union Government referendum which it rigged. Forces within the military saw that the mass struggle had pushed their backs so much to the wall that they have no alternative than to leave the scene. Acheampong, the head of the junta, was overthrown through a palace coup and replaced with Akuffo as the head. The newly structured junta lifted the ban on party politics and came up with a transition programme to civil rule. Surprisingly, on 15 May 1979, Ghanaians were informed that some air force soldiers have mutinied in the barracks with the intention of staging a coup and have been arrested and detained by the military authorities. The reaction of most people then was, why some soldiers wanted to bring up another military regime when there was transition to civil rule. Later, these soldiers were brought to trial and it turned out that they were led by one Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings.

During the trial Rawlings attacked the military regime on the issues of corruption, which had been the pillar of the students’ mobilization against the military regime. This made Rawlings popular. Rawlings now appeared to be on the same side with the radical forces in the country although not articulating any clear ideological position. On 4th June 1979, troops broke his jail and released him and took him to the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) to broadcast to the nation that the “boys” cannot taken it anymore and were removing the Supreme Military Council. He next appeared at the University of Ghana to address students where he said he purposely chose 15 May as his day of action to coincide with the anniversary of the 13 May Aluta Day of the Ghana students’ movement. The students led by their SRC President, Kwasi Kamassah, went in bus loads in to town demonstrating demanding that the Supreme Military Council should lay down their guns and surrender to the fighting troops. After the Army Commander, Major General Odartey Wellington, was killed at Police Headquarters in Accra, the SMC government crumbled.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was declared the new government of Ghana with Flight-Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings as chairman and Major Kojo Boakye Djan as spokesman. The AFRC launched an anti-corruption campaign that made it very popular before ordinary people who cheered up seeing people they saw to be corrupt or profiteering being punished or for buying things at prices that they could pay for. The trial of Rawlings and the being chairman of the AFRC made Rawlings very popular in Ghana. After the handing over to the People’s National Party (PNP) regime under Dr Hilla Limann many of the AFRC members went abroad on scholarships. The perception people had from Rawlings remaining in the country wrongly or rightly was that he was committed to stay under the difficult conditions at home like everybody and not run away abroad.

By this time many of the radical forces had grouped into organizations like African Youth Brigade, African Youth Command, June 4 Movement, Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, Movement On National Affairs, New Democratic Movement, Pan African Youth Movement and People’s Revolutionary League of Ghana. Some of the members of the of People’s National Party and the Social Democratic Front also shared sentiments close to the radicals. The registered political parties and main establishment professional parties held positions that could be said to be the Right Wing position.

The PNP regime led by Dr Hilla Liman faced a very difficult situation with the shops emptied by June 4 Era instant control price sales. There was also internal lack of cohesion in the ruling party as even Dr Limann’s leadership was being challenged. Some even were not prepared to recognize him as one of them as he had contested the 1954 Elections against the CPP in Tumu and was also a signatory to the 2nd Republic Constitution which described the Nkrumah Regime / The 1st Republic as a tyranny in its preamble. There was even a court ruling that he was not the leader of the party despite the fact that he was the President representing the ruling party. Later in 1981, the PNP Youth Wing had its national congress where it firmly declared itself ideologically Nkrumaist bringing it in conflict with the leadership of the PNP. The leader of the PNP Youth Wing felt he was wanted and went into hiding. The PNP regime also put Military Intelligence and Special Branch vehicles to follow J.J. Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata 24 hours wherever they were going. Most people in the Left sympathized with those being repressed in this way. Groups of people were circulating leaflets opposing this and calling for a Left-Wing party to bring forces together.

Unknown to them, there were others also plotting a coup as their response to this situation, so on 31 December 1981, when J.J. Rawlings broadcasted to the nation, most of the Left felt that the coup makers had pitched their tent with the Left. The 2nd Battalion of Infantry from Takoradi moved speedily and made a brave attempt to foil the coup leading to fierce fight in which process even some of the coup makers started fleeing. In the absence of a spontaneous support for the coup in the streets, with only about 80 people assembled at Accra Community Centre in support of the coup, it fell on Left-Wing cadres like Kwasi Adu, Judd Quarshie, Eric Bortey, the late Kwame Adjimah and others to go and mobilize people from Labadi and Nungua to add to the numbers for the first public demonstration in support of the coup in Accra.

Apart from the coup announcement, J.J. Rawlings himself had been acting as if he was pitching his tent with the Left, since Kwasi Adu and others invited him to become the Chair of the JFM together with Kojo Tsikata also as a member of the Steering Committee of the JFM. Members of the original JFM behaved as if the coup was their coup as most of the leading members of the JFM knew about the coup plot and some of the members were actively involved in the coup plot. Rawlings also granted an interview to a newspaper known as ‘Nigerian Call’ in August 1981 where he stated that he was not forming any party, not also working with any of the registered political parties but was working with the June 4 Movement, People’s Revolutionary League of Ghana and the New Democratic Movement. A statement like this even meant that the members of these organizations could be implicated in treason if the coup had failed. The same would have gone for other Left organizations who had working relations with these organizations.

This should also explain why the progressive organisations moved actively to help put some structure around what was happening. Apart from mobilizing for the demonstrations, their members were actively involved in putting together the National Coordinating structure of the Students and Youth Task Force. The Joint Coordinating Committee of Progressive Organisations was set which made various proposals for the organization of the defence committees. Some of the members of the PNP Youth Wing organized themselves under the leadership of Ato Austin and Kofi Duku as a component part of the Joint Coordinating Committee of Progressive Organisations. They named themselves Kwame Nkrumah Youth League. The National Leadership of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) was actively co-opted in the process.

All the progressive organisations issued statements supporting, with some statements giving critical support with reservations. The first crack in the progressive organisations emerged when the leadership of the Movement On National Affairs (MONAS) were arrested allegedly for plotting to overthrow the PNDC regime. Kwasi Agbley, Kweku Baako Jnr, Yaw Adu Larbi, Freddie Blay, Stanley Armattoe and Nathaniel Ayivor from the MONAS leadership were detained for various periods up to two years. The activists had accused Kwesi Pratt Jnr as the one who sold them out whilst he said he only passed on some information to the Soviet embassy who later passed it on to the PNDC’s Chief of Security. In the process, there were clashes between the Right and the Left within and outside the regime.

The sharpest conflict emerged around the issue of the Economic and Political direction of the government. The participants around the government could also be divided among (1) the progressive organisations of the Left who were influential in generating ideas in the early days of the regime, (2) The military and civil bureaucracy with the military bureaucracy having more muscle, and (3) people who came around because they supported the coup and therefore saw themselves as followers of the person described as leader of the coup. This division played an important role how the importance of the first group diminished. Another point which was a problem was that J.J. Rawlings was anti-Nkrumah and pro-Kotoka (who overthrew the Nkrumah regime) but the Left felt that Rawlings could be made to come to better appreciate Nkrumah through educating him and that there are genuine criticisms which could be made of the Nkrumah period as even Nkrumah himself makes some of them in his reflections.

The Left united around the National Mobilisation Programme, which was to ensure that the pain the IMF and World Bank prescriptions were neutralized. The Left debate and exchanges from within the PNDC spread into the Armed Forces leading to a confrontation between Alolga Akata Pore and allies taking on the Left position and J.J. Rawlings and forces standing in for the bureaucrats therefore representing the Right. Things came to a head on 28 October 1982 and it is alleged that J.J. Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata left Gondar Barracks that night. Strangely, however, through whichever way this came to be naively interpreted by others victory and take over by Akata Pore. Emmanuel Hansen, wrote, “Later that morning, Accra was thrown into confusion when news was leaked out that the government had been overthrown. It transpired that a zonal meeting of the Accra Defence Committees, one of the cadres had reportedly announced that the government had been overthrown, Jerry Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata had fled and Alolga Akata-Pore had taken control of the government.”

This announcement was alleged to have been made by T. Kodjo-Ababio Nubuor of the People’s Revolutionary League of Ghana which was a component organization of the United Front of JFM and PRLG. There was a tense meeting of the PNDC membership on 27 October where there was a confrontation between Rawlings on one side with Akata-Pore and Chris Atim on the other side on issues of democratic running of the council as well as the political and economic direction of government policy. Among the progressive organisations was the rivalry between the June 4 Movement (later the United Front) and the New Democratic Movement which made divide and rule of the organizations very easy. Rawlings felt that the confrontation at the PNDC meeting, that in Gondar Barracks and the announcement at the Accra Defence Committees meeting were all linked. Nubuor fled the country after the announcement.

On 23 November 1982, there was an attempt to overthrow the PNDC led mainly by Northern officers, and Rawlings took advantage of this coup attempt to remove from within the fold all those he felt were a threat to him. Despite the fact that this coup was investigated and publicly tried, Rawlings framed up cadres in the defence committee structures as being involved in the coup. The NDM took advantage of the rivalry between the group and the United Front and moved in to replace the United Front cadres by 1983. On 19 June 1983, through a jail break coordinated by two of the soldiers associated with old National Defence Committee (Interim National Coordinating Committee), Umar Farouk and Baba Abraham Kankani, a number of those detained escaped and some who were caught while escaping like Kwame Adjimah, Matthew Awar, Dwomoh etc were killed by the PNDC’s Special Commando Unit led by W.O. Adjei Buadi, Agoha and co.

The internal conflict in the PNDC also degenerated into a conflict between Northerners and Ewes. By 1985, the NDM also lost influence and disengaged from the PNDC ending the influence by the organised Left. All the progressive organisations of the period are no more except the African Youth Command which is not as strong as it used to be. The organized Left were committed to building the organs of popular power like the defence committees, people’s shops and other structures introduced to counter the previous ones which gave unfair advantage to the privileged and wealthy ones, and was also committed to National Mobilisation content of the Economic programme. The dismantling of the organized Left meant the absence of organized struggle to strengthen the structures of popular power. The United Revolutionary Front of Ghana was established by those who broke away from the Rawlings regime in 1982-83 and oragnised publishing the Revolutionary Banner before internal problems divided it into a number of factions by 1989. The Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards and the New Democratic Movement also managed to release a number of press statements and had some press conferences till about 1990.

By 1991, opposition to the PNDC reorganized under the banner of the Movement for Justice. The issues of structures of popular power and the National Mobilisation content of the Economic programme were no longer issues around which the opposition was organized. The basis of unity was “Rawlings Must Go” and those who raised the issue that there should be an all inclusive front taking care of those who differed with the PNDC from the Left were treated with suspicion. Even fellow Leftists put out publications with ISBN numbers alleging that others were agents of Rawlings in exile just to incite others in exile against these people at threat of their lives. For example, I was described as a “collaborator of agents of Rawlings” in one such publication edited by Napoleon Abdulai with the article under the piece signed by Nyeya Yen. When therefore the PNDC and forces seemingly close to it set up the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the National Convention Party (NCP), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) many who back in Ghana can be associated with the Left divide in Ghana politics joined this fold. The opposition committed itself to restoring the old order and as such it is not surprising that the Danquah-Busia tradition party of the New Patriotic Party emerged as the dominant force of this front. The struggle for popular democracy cannot be swept away by the 4 Republic arrangement. I will take on the struggle for popular democracy specifically in the next part of this write up.

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* Explo Nani-Kofi is the Director of Kilombo Centre for Civil Society and African Self-Determination in London, UK, and Peki, Ghana, which publishes the Kilombo Pan-African Community Journal and produces the Another World Is Possible Radio Programme currently on GFM Radio, London, UK. He is the Editor of the Kilombo Pan-African Community Journal (www.kilombo.org.uk) and one of authors of African Awakening The Emerging Revolutions, published by Pambazuka Press. He is a member of Counterfire (www.counterfire.org)

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Thoughtlessness and the after-life of neo-liberal democracy

Sokari Ekine

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83361

cc E LSouth Africa is silent as members of the LGBTIQ community are attacked and killed, while Islamist militants are destroying treasured historical buildings in Mali. It is all ‘thoughtlessness’.

SOUTH AFRICA: EMANCIPATORY VISION, NOT LEGISLATION

Over the past three weeks at least seven LGBTIQ people have been murdered in South Africa, in Cape Town, in Kuruman in the Northern Province, in Soweto and in Limpopo. Yet the government, religious leaders, community leaders outside the LGBTI community have remained silent. As Richard Pithouse shows in his article “Can Zuma’s “Second Transition” Take Us Off the Boil?”, the police who are supposed to protect people are themselves part of the violence. [http://bit.ly/P7QNmI]. He gives the example of Khayelitsha township, Cape Town where 11 people have been murdered by vigilante ‘justice’ and where the people no longer have confidence in the police for good reasons.

“They [Human Rights organisations] have also reported that, across the country, the police themselves are engaging in torture and murder on a scale not seen since the 1980s.

“When regular homophobic and vigilante murders more suited to a vision of hell than any conception of a democratic society are considered in the contest of the scale of gendered violence and xenophobia, an evil that is most consistently perpetrated by the state itself, as well as the criminal neglect that leaves children without school books and shack dwellers to confront relentless fires year after year, it’s clear that our society is in serious trouble.

“When state responses to all this are not structured in simple contempt they tend to point to the apartheid and colonial past as the source of all evil. But some things, like the police, or the ways that we are turning on each other, are getting worse and so easy assumption about time being on the side of progress amount to a form of denialism.”

To Pithouse the problem boils down to “a lack of credible emancipatory vision for society as a whole”. It is “persistence and popular protest” that will ultimately force change and not a reliance on an ANC government which has shown itself to be singularly focused on progress through “private advancement”. He provides, as an example, the poor peoples movement:

“We should recall that during the disaster of May 2008 there were no xenophobic attacks in areas under the control of political projects as diverse as Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban and the Merafong Demarcation Forum in Khutsong. What these very different organisations had in common was a sense of a collective struggle for a shared and qualitatively better future and an understanding that that struggle was structured on a vertical rather than horizontal plane. There is a critical difference between fighting for your share of the proverbial cake, or some crumbs from it, and struggling, with others, for a better society.”

At a moment when the murder of lesbian, transgender and gay people is becoming a weekly tragedy and the LGBTIQ movement is left hurt, frustrated and without a collective vision, it might be advised to think beyond legislative solutions such as legal status for hate crimes. After all there are already existing laws to protect the rights of LGBTI people but they, like many other laws, are ignored. Initiatives have to come from below and that includes the search for political allies within transformative movements.

Jaco Barnard-Naude’s post in the South African blog, Constitutionally Speaking [http://bit.ly/LvJ9KX] goes some way to develop Pithous’s argument about the lack of an ‘emancipatory vision’ in South African politics. In “Thoughtlessness and Reflective Judgement in Democracy”, Barnard-Naude sets the landscape for his article with a statement on the “democratic subject” in the age of the blogosphere and Social Networks. A time and space which he likens to a

‘‘kind of afterlife of neoliberal democracy, the permissive society and hyper-technological, so-called “late” capitalism....Under these conditions, everyone is entitled not only to have an opinion, but also to broadcast it across the world.”

In this scenario, reflective judgement ‘thought’ is increasingly replaced by “thoughtfulness”, which Hannah Arendt describes as

“the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ that have become trivial and empty.”

Reading this and being in a moment of self-absorption, I immediately felt Adrendt and the author were speaking to me personally, leaving me feeling slightly panicked and most definitely reflective. My conclusion is that we have all been here at least twice but if we know this is where we are or have been, we can easily find our way to a more enlightened mode of ‘thought’. Feeling is a key word here as it does not always sit with reason. I wish to digress briefly and recount a recent discussion with a friend on the deluge of news and commentary we are all bombarded with daily through blogs, news websites, radio, TV, Twitter, Facebook, Google + and email.

Everything is geared to reading, watching and listening. There is some talking but this is overpowered by the other three actions. I was at my wits end and starting to believe age was catching up with me and I wanted off planet earth. The other fear I had was I might be loosing my ability to observe my natural surroundings. I would no longer see the background of my and the lives of others. My question was, what is the point of all this information if I am unable to act? Worse, and here I don’t wish to imply I know everything but seriously, most of what I read or hear I have heard before not 10, 20 years ago but yesterday. I conclude that the world is repeated a million times over every day. I am worried that, if not careful such feelings could lead to a state of ‘thoughtlessness’ which I am desperate to avoid. Anyone else experiencing these thoughts will find Barnard-Naude’s article useful.

To continue. He points out the political implications of ‘thoughtlessness’ which are a cause for serious concern.

“On the political implications of thoughtlessness Arendt is clear. Thoughtlessness is what ultimately fuels totalitarianism. Why is it particularly in thoughtlessness that enables totalitarianism? Because thoughtlessness is that which renders or allows evil to become banal, thus unrecognisable, perhaps even unstoppable. This is why Arendt describes the banality of evil literally as ‘thought-defying’............By removing the ability to stop and think, totalitarianism camouflages its evil in such a way that it is performed in a banal, normalistic fashion and thus becomes less and less permeable, less and less interruptible, less and less recognisable as grotesque and abominable.”

The author concludes that the need for thinking especially empathy is an urgent one in South Africa today. Imagine friendships which are beyond the law!

WEAVE: STOP! THINK!

Critiques of colonial mentalities around bleaching and Black hair are two issues worth repeating because despite all the information available people, especially women, continue bleaching and weaving. Chinello - “The Wild Woman in the Cellar” [http://bit.ly/N7lvsh] recounts a conversation with a four-year-old - yes it can start that early!

“Sons/ Daughter: Mama, can you turn my hair into short spikes slicked straight up with gel or long straight hair hanging down like the other boys/girls in the class?

Me: That’s impossible. Your hair is different and beautiful with curls.

Sons/Daughter: Why not? Why can’t my hair be like that?

Me: Because you are of a mixed heritage and this means that you got certain parts of you from papa and certain parts like your great curly hair from mama and one cannot make spikes from curly hair.

Sons/Daughter: Oh really? That’s stupid! It’s all your fault then!”

She fast-forwards to the teenage years when fortunately the children realise the beauty of their hair which can be formed into an afro, braids, dreads, a mohawk - you name it. But where does the denial and rejection of our natural hair and skin colour come from? Using her own childhood growing up in South-Eastern Nigeria she explains:


“It is clear to me that my peers and I were spoon-fed a certain set of values from birth. We were consciously and unconsciously domesticated with the collective agreement that the path to human development lay in striving to be as patriarchally western as possible. This agreement has unwittingly influenced every aspect of our lives; from the adoption of eating processed foods to our taste in music and arts and finally our perceptions of (female) beauty.”

On a positive note, Q-Zine, “Queering Black Hair” by Taijhet Nyobi-Rockett [http://bit.ly/N7mOaH] uses poetry and images in praise of natural Black hair .



I didn’t cut my hair
Je n’ai pas coupé mes cheveux
it was never mine
Ils m’ont vraiment jamais appartenu
I shaved the perm
J’ai rasé la permanente
and rocked my mind
Et j’ai secoué mon esprit
My name no longer fit my head
Mon nom ne m’appartient plus
so I chose what I knew of Africa
instead.
Alors j’ai choisi ce que je connais le mieux d’Afrique.

Worth watching is the beautifully produced animated video “Yellow Fever” by Ng’endo Mukii on subject of skin bleaching. [http://bit.ly/LkMxit]

THE CAINE PRIZE AND ART OF WRITING

Congratulations to this year’s Caine Prize winner, Rotimi Babatunde, for his short story, ‘Bombay’s Republic’. Recently there was a furor on Nigerian social media as Babatunde was accused of plagiarizing the story. [See Pambazuka 586] I hope the award does not renew this ugly accusation which I believe to be wholly unfounded. Black Looks, contributor, aspiring writer and editor of Saraba Magazine, Emmanuel Iduma was interviewed by the Nigerian website “BluePrint” [http://bit.ly/N7oTU7] on his soon to be published first novel ‘Farad’. The questions are rather banal but Emmanuel’s answers are considerate and interspersed with wise observations and humorous reflections the moral of which is do not take yourself too seriously - you may end up looking foolish! On whether hard work or talent makes a good writer:

“But I think your question is whether someone, without what we think of as ‘natural talent’ can write something beautiful, or readable. Maybe I should say anyone can write something readable, but not everyone can write something beautiful. Because not all of us will dare sing in public. Not all of us play football. Not all of us can write something beautiful. It is talent, but never stops there. I even dare say that the non-talented would not even bother to write for more than, say, 5 attempts (and I’ve seen this happen). Talent implies joy in whatever it is that is being done. Not everyone has that kind of feeling.”

On what transformation would his novel will bring:

“Transformation? That sounds like a political word, as if I’m being asked to state my manifesto! Really I didn’t think of it that way, I scarcely had any point to prove. Perhaps I should say that when I was writing, I was thinking of essence. My younger brother, to whom I dedicated the novel, was born with Down’s Syndrome. And I always wondered, as we often do when we’re not literate to know better, how he could be of use to the world. So I was disturbed, wondering how ‘strange’ didn’t mean ‘purposeless.’ I’ve always been deeply interested in questions of essence, and maybe by reading Farad, people would get interested in that word, too. Would that be a transformation?”

Yes, I believe it would. Reading is as much a search for ourselves, a kind of mirror with which we can reflect on our own histories and purpose - without some transformation however small what would be the point?

THOUGHTLESSNESS AND FEAR OF BUILDINGS WHOSE LANGUAGE WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND

In February 2001, the Taliban began the systematic destruction of ancient Buddhas across Afghanistan which included the two known as the Bamiyan Buddhas. For the record only three countries recognised the Taliban government - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The ‘international’ community was outraged but nothing could be done to stop the destruction backed up by Taliban leader, Mullah Omar’s Islamic edict. I only recall this terrible destruction because this week a similar edict was declared by the Ansar Al-Din militants who now occupy Timbuktu. Sometimes I pity God. Ze is used to justify terrible acts against people and history, books and shrines. But then my pity turns to anger as Ze never responds at least not in this life and frankly anything that happens after death is of no importance.

For the past month western media has been full of sensational reports on Mali and the Ansar al-Din reflecting the wests view of Sharia as “barbaric, violent, and misogynist, and its application trivial and arbitrary” [Alex Thurston, Sahel Blog - ]http://bit.ly/LyZ0Pj] Thurston’s rejects the lack of context in these reports and attempts to present a the application of Sharia in a more considered light. It’s really about language thus Ansar al-Dine ‘mix punishment with charity” whilst European governments mix law with social services ie the function of any state.

I accept Thurston’s position that the actions of Ansar al-Dine and the people’s responses are full of contradictions and complexities. The same could be said of the Taliban, al Shabbah or Boko Haram - they use religious texts as justification to kill, destroy and terrorize people. Ansar al-Dine give out charity, mediate the law and restore hospitals to working condition. I accept that these are extremes even in fundamentalists terms but there are parts of me that honestly I want to totally reject these groups and everything they stand for. Many of us are trying to understand the mindset which decides to destroy ancient shrines. Nigerian writer, Teju Cole has written a brilliant piece to help us try to understand the awfulness of these acts.[ Breaking It Down - ]http://bit.ly/Lkd3bM] Cole beings his article by reminding us that destruction of religious shrines, texts and art is not a new phenomena. In the 16th century angry Calvinists destroyed a church and art work in the Flemish town of Steenvoorde. “The Dutch storm of statues” spread to Antwerp and Ghent. Cole also reminds us that destroying buildings is not an easy task. The Taliban had to bring in engineers to help destroy the Buddahas which took two weeks. Cole brilliantly points out the contradictions linked to the “iconoclast’s own psychology”...

“ The theological pretext for image destruction is that images are powerless, less than God, uneffective as a source of succour, and therefore disposable. But in reality, iconoclasm is motivated by the iconoclast’s profound belief in the power of the image being destroyed. The love iconoclasts have for icons is a love that dare not speak its name.”

But as Cole points out, iconoclasm is not just about theology but like other fundamentalists actions there are elements politics and of fear of the dead saints, spirits however one would describe the unknown. A pastor screaming at a young woman to remove ‘the devil’ is him/herself consumed with fear of their own inner contradictions [spirits].

“That which doesn’t speak dumbfounds. After all, who can tell what such objects are thinking? Best to destroy the inscrutable, the ancient, if one is to truly usher in a pure new world.”

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* Sokari Ekine blogs at www.blacklooks.org

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Waiting for helicopters?

Cholera, prejudice, and the right to water in Haiti

Deepa Panchang

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83352

cc P WAid workers’ stereotypes and prejudices about residents of displacement camps in post-earthquake Haiti stem from an acute disconnect between NGOs and the people they are there to work with. These misperceptions have perpetuated deliberate decisions to deny water and sanitation services to desperate survivors.

“Where you stand,” goes an old Haitian proverb, “depends on where you sit.” This article, the second in a series, will examine aid workers’ stereotypes and prejudices about residents of displacement camps in post-earthquake Haiti, stemming from acute disconnect between NGOs and the people they are there to work with. We explore how these misperceptions have perpetuated deliberate decisions to deny water and sanitation services to desperate survivors.

The context is complicated by the transnational flow of both bacteria and aid dollars. Scientists have shown that the cholera pathogen came to Haiti in the bodies of foreign UN troops whose military base was dumping its sewage into a nearby river. The imported disease has claimed more than 7,000 lives and continues to ravage communities across Haiti. Two and a half years since the 2010 earthquake, the country still faces a severe dearth of water and sanitation services, further fueling the epidemic. The crisis is playing out among the nearly 400,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) still living in makeshift camps under tarps or torn tents, an ideal environment for cholera. The situation raises serious questions: why, with billions of dollars in post-earthquake aid and hundreds of humanitarian NGOs in the country, do so many people still lack the most basic of services? What factors are guiding NGOs’ decisions to provide or withhold them?

The first article of this series described how NGOs in Haiti decided to relax humanitarian standards for provision of water and sanitation and to deliberately withhold these essential services in IDP camps, in the middle of the epidemic. By spring of 2011, the WASH cluster (the UN-run group of NGOs coordinating water and sanitation response) had decided to terminate water provision. It had also decided to abandon the international minimum requirement of 20 people per toilet, instead setting a goal of 100 people per toilet. Predictably, cholera surged, as it has done again in the rainy season of 2012. What were NGO officials’ underlying perceptions and attitudes that could lead them to such decisions? Here, we describe more results from a study I conducted in 2011, based on 52 interviews with officials from NGOs and residents of displacement camps.

“EVERYONE STOPPED WAITING FOR AID”

Stopping in the middle of an interview, one camp resident and mother of three looked me squarely in the eye and asked: “Who would like to live under a tent for one year with the heat, sun, and rain falling, water passing under your tent soaking all your clothes? …Do you think anybody would like to live this kind of life?”

People in camp after camp used nearly the same words in describing day-to-day life. While IDP camps have been the main locale for earthquake-affected Haitians to rebuild their lives and communities, this rebuilding has been fraught with suffering. The majority of camp residents I interviewed said they were skeptical they would ever receive more services from NGOs, but they stayed in the camps because the scraps of tents and the fragile communities of interdependence that had emerged were their last resort – their only option for survival. “As of six months ago people stopped waiting for aid and left,” said one camp resident in early 2011. “Those that are here are those who can’t return home, who don’t have anything.”

During the rainy season, most of the homes I sat in leaked water through the makeshift roof and gushed water through muddy gaps between ground and plastic. Many had to be re-hoisted, re-tied, re-sewed, re-hammered after every storm. Although families kept the areas outside their homes tidy, nearby drainage ditches brought all manners of trash and debris as daily gifts. In the majority of camps, respondents stated they had nowhere else to go, and a coordinating agency, the International Organization for Migration’s survey of more than 15,000 camp dwellers concluded the same, stating “94 per cent of people living in camps would leave if they had alternative accommodation.” Part of the difficulty is that 80 per cent of camp residents were renting homes before the earthquake, which made return extremely difficult given the massive post-earthquake surge in rental prices and the bleak job market. [1]

But how did NGO officials perceive the situation?

“WAITING FOR HOUSES, CARS, HELICOPTERS”

In their interviews, foreign officials from NGOs and IOM expressed the belief that Haitians could handle the camp conditions and were simply waiting for handouts. Many officials stated that they viewed signs of day-to-day survival in the camps – such as women selling coffee on the street and families scrounging up building materials from friends – as proof that life was back to normal. Where these efforts may have provided the coffee vendor with enough money to purchase some water for her kids or bought the family an extra week before their shelter collapsed for the fourth time, many NGO officials touted them as “coping mechanisms” which indicated that camp residents were doing fine on their own. One official evoked the racist hypothesis that Haitians were “genetically strong” given the “horrendous conditions” such as “slavery and torture” they had endured over centuries. “You or I would not survive one month in one of those camps,” she said.

IOM officials suggested that a large percentage of displaced people actually had the means to return to their former homes, but remained in camps waiting for NGOs to bestow miracles. They were “waiting for houses, cars, helicopters,” complained one, and “visas to Canada” quipped another. One senior IOM official enthusiastically but incorrectly asserted that only 30 per cent of IDPs were renting homes before the quake, that the majority had land they could return to. Another high-level IOM official, somehow missing the fact that the job market was devastated and rental costs drastically inflated, commented, “We have to be careful because if they had the money to rent before, why now they don’t have it?” Suspicion often won out, with worries that camp residents were systematically conning the system. Many officials I interviewed expressed a fear that camps would persist indefinitely. Since no one has offered residents an alternative, this could be a realistic fear, but one official responded to by retracting services so people would disperse, rather than pushing more vehemently for comprehensive housing solutions.

Officials actually worried about overprovision of services as a “pull factor” into camps. Services “are like a magnet to keep people there,” said one aid worker. Another went as far as saying, “In truth, if you scratch the surface, people find a way to obtain new lodging.” Many officials I interviewed expressed the same opinion, and a few all but stopped short of explicitly labeling camp residents conniving and conspiratorial. This is alarming for a number of reasons. For one, it paints the camps as some sort of cornucopia of services, when in reality most residents continue to struggle for the most basic of needs. It also minimizes the experiences of earthquake survivors living outside camps in conditions desperate enough that they might move to a camp just for a bucket of water every once in a while. In allowing “pull factor” mentality to dilute their commitment to providing services, NGOs could keep water and sanitation out of reach of both camp residents and their desperate neighbors.

In an unfortunately common case of reverse psychology, a management-level official argued that WASH services were sufficient in the camps since “people didn’t riot and there wasn’t mass outbreak of diarrheal disease.” When my research partner raised an eyebrow and brought up cholera, he responded, “Well, that one didn’t happen in the camps, and it hasn’t wiped out camps either.” Although the official admitted that he had not talked to any camp residents, he said, “I think they’re pretty pleased.” Meanwhile, not only have cases been documented in which entire camps dispersed specifically due to cholera, but this should hardly be the minimum qualifier for concern. Another like-minded IOM official’s observation that “When you go to a camp during daytime almost no one is there,” led him to conclude, “they all take back their work they had before.” Although they do not represent the majority, it is telling that such opinions openly exist among key decision-makers in the WASH response who are clearly placing their presumptions above real knowledge of camp conditions.

Mistrust and the idea that camp residents are doing fine have made it all the easier to neglect humanitarian standards and human rights. It is another iteration of how the resilience of a people can be used against them. If they are somehow surviving, the logic goes, they can take more, and make do with less.

Esaie Jean Jules of the Solino Neighborhood Assembly, a grassroots group involved in cholera response, did not mince words in putting the pieces together: “One measure NGOs have taken to get people to leave the camps is to take away provision of water and sanitation,” he said this past April. “It’s been almost six months since anyone has come to de-sludge the latrines, but people are still using them. People do not have access to any other option. There are almost 2,000 people, all who lost their homes in the earthquake, in one of the camps in Solino. They share four toilets. There’s no dignity in that, and when it comes to cholera, it’s a danger.”

“AN AGENDA, A PLAN, A PROGRAM”

There are reasons why NGO officials do not really take to heart the experiences of those living in displacement camps. There is very little dedicated time and space for honest contact and discussion between the two parties. As if in a war zone, NGO rules often restrict their employees from walking on the street, barricading them in offices or air-conditioned SUVs. This is based largely on perceptions rather than reality: Haiti actually has among the lowest homicide rates in the region. Camp residents, in their interviews, often decried these measures as a sign of disrespect and distrust.

Camp residents also told me they have little to no input in the decisions made regarding their own camps. I used a checklist to ask camp committee leaders about their involvement in many steps of the project process. Of these, the only actual role residents were usually allowed in sanitation projects was cleaning the toilets and determining where toilets would be placed. While this seems more like NGOs pawning off the most undesirable or mundane tasks onto camp residents, aid workers described this to us as community “participation.” More active aspects of the project process, such as deciding how to carry out the project or follow-up, designing a system for maintenance, or even deciding how many toilets and what kind, were not up for input by camp residents. While NGO officials described meetings they held to discuss these issues, camp residents countered that they had little actual say in these meetings. They were “obliged” to take whatever they got, however they got it. They had opinions on the way toilets were being installed and maintained in their own camps, and on the system as a whole. They wanted information on how and why the system worked the way it did. But, beyond informing the NGO representative – assuming such a representative showed up, understood them, and relayed the message – camp residents had little means to convey their opinions.

One camp resident summed up the sentiments the majority of residents expressed to me: “[NGO officials] come with an agenda, a plan, a program. They can always find people who are clients for them who help execute the plan. But they don’t meet with the majority of the committee to identify needs.”

“THE MEETINGS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS IN ENGLISH…”

If displaced people have little say in programs being run in their camps, they have even less at the level of aid coordination and management. I asked if camp residents knew about the cluster system, the UN-run meetings where NGOs made decisions regarding not only water and sanitation but also provision of all basic post-quake services. None of the camp residents interviewed from any of the 16 camps knew what the cluster system was. The vast majority of residents reported that they do not receive information about how the UN and NGOs make decisions regarding them.

From our observations, the classic cluster meeting, for at least a year after the earthquake, looked like this: 20 to 30 people crowded around a few tables, some 80 per cent from the US or Europe, speaking in a mix of English and French, communicating through powerpoint presentations and humanitarian aid jargon. The clusters’ exclusion of local people and groups drew criticism in the weeks following the earthquake, as it has after previous disasters elsewhere in the world. Yet this exclusion was so consistent, and the meetings so culturally comfortable to them, that aid workers came to see it as the norm. Several agency officials, in fact, explained that the cluster was not designed for camp residents to be present, that clusters were meetings for NGOs to speak with each other. A few wondered aloud how camp residents could be invited to participate given that the meetings could turn unwieldy, and some argued that the camp residents are in fact represented, since the NGOs speak on their behalf. Only three respondents stated that lack of participation was a real concern for them.

The result is that displaced people are simply not present to express the challenges they face and to advocate for solutions of their own creation. This exclusion was replicated at a number of other levels in post-earthquake decision-making and planning (more on this in the next article).

For most NGO officials, suspicion and misperceptions are not due to ill intentions – many work long hours and aspire to help those in need – but to the extreme disconnect between their institutions and Haitians’ reality on the ground. This, combined with the fact that management-level officials can hold prejudiced, sometimes downright racist beliefs, inevitably spills over into agencies’ decision-making in the form of denial of services and exclusion.

NGOs may claim that they cannot continue providing services indefinitely. Notwithstanding the fact that many are still sitting on (some even making interest on) the funds they raised for Haiti, this is understandable in the long term. But instead of responding by abandoning the people they have assumed responsibility for, they could step up in their role as advocates, pushing for long-term reconstruction and housing policies, for the changes in foreign policy that Haitians are demanding, and for the international community’s follow-through on its pledges. Some groups, such as Doctors without Borders and Partners in Health, have been doing this all along.

What are the solutions that Haitians are asking for? And how can NGOs adopt models that are driven by these demands? The next article will take a look at some of the inspiring examples of community engagement that Haitian grassroots groups are promoting, as well as the exceptional international NGOs that have followed their lead. We also look at how the dynamics I describe here are the continuation of historic trends that often implicate our government, here in the US – down to the reason why cholera was able to gain a foothold in Haiti in the first place.

Sign these petitions telling the UN to take responsibility for introducing cholera into Haiti and to help stop the epidemic: Just Foreign Policy Petition & Baseball in the Time of Cholera [url= Petition]http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1439/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=10401]Petition[/url][/url]
NOTE: Respondents’ names are not given as interviews for the study were conducted anonymously. Esaie Jean Jules was interviewed separately by Alexis Erkert. The study described was part of a Master’s thesis at the Harvard School of Public Health. For a copy of the full paper, contact deepa.otherworlds@gmail.com Special thanks to Professor Stephen Marks and Silvan Vesenbeckh at the Harvard School of Public Health, Professor Mark Schuller at the City University of New York, and Ben Depp for sharing his remarkable photography.

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* Please do not take Pambazuka for granted! Become a Friend of Pambazuka and make a donation NOW to help keep Pambazuka FREE and INDEPENDENT!

Deepa Panchang is the Education and Outreach Coordinator for [url= Other]http://www.otherworldsarepossible.org/]Other Worlds[/url], where this article was first published. She has worked in advocacy for human rights in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

END NOTES

[i] Financial Edge. (2011, April 29). Where's The Next Housing Bubble? and Sasser, B. (2011, March 18). Haiti's housing bubble, more pressing to some than election or Aristide. Christian Science Monitor .



[ii] Schuller, M. (2011). “Met Ko Veye Ko”: Foreign Responsibility in the Failure to Protect Against Cholera and Other Man-made Disasters. Retrieved April 17, 2011 from IJDH: http://ijdh.org/archives/16896



[iii] Lindsay, R. (2010, March 29). Haiti's Excluded. Retrieved April 17, 2011 from The Nation: http://www.thenation.com/article/haitis-excluded

Into Africa: The global war on terror's last frontier

Michael Brenner

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83374

cc E PThe US government’s heightened preoccupation with “terrorists” is out of proportion with the threat these groups actually pose to the United States. So what exactly is America’s military adventures in Africa about?

America’s “war on terror” now has brought us deep into tropical Africa and the Sahel. We learned last week that Washington is engaged in an expansive project to hunt down an array of local “terrorists”, could-be “terrorists” and mayhem makers in general. Nearly all of the numerous groups cited are no more than loose bands incapable of threatening the United States. Most have parochial interests whose focus and attention span fluctuates; they are driven by personal ambitions, tribal animosities, avarice and an appetite for raw power. To suppress them means establishing political order and the rule of law over vast territories, which have known little of either. Yet this is the implied burden the United States has assumed under plans drawn and executed by the three year old United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The Army is in charge with the CIA Operations Division as an auxiliary. The State Department is derogated to a supporting role that involves local public relations and serving up the diplomatic refreshments. A good portion of the work, and the money, is assigned to the mercenary companies of Iraq/Afghanistan fame.

The blanket justification is that al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQM) and al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa (AQHA) are out there plotting against us. These outfits are declared an ideological and political cancer that could spread to other locations. AQM in fact is shorthanded for a ramshackle bunch of loosely connected groups in and around the Sahara who are of no danger to American interests. The latter is code for the fundamentalist al-Shabaab (Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, to give it its full name) in Somalia, which has been fighting a civil war for a decade or more. It has sought to inflate its importance by rebranding itself as an al-Qaeda affiliate. Al-Shabaab officially signed a franchise contract with the al-Qaeda family of enterprises only in February of this year. In the local mix may be a few of the people allegedly involved in the U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania more than a decade ago. Also highlighted by Washington are the eleven American citizens who, it is claimed, have gone over to take part in the tribal wars – although it is unclear why Washington considers that a matter of great consequence.

The COIN reaction to those two insurgencies is the pivot of “Operation Africa.” The heightened importance accorded AQM and AQHA is disproportionate to the danger they pose to the United States. To date, they have not caused the death of a single American. We have killed hundreds of them. Still, the United States has orchestrated a multi-party intervention in Somalia by a half dozen countries including Christian Ethiopia (for the second time). There, as in the Sahel too, the Pentagon provides intelligence, logistical support and training, and the occasional helping hand on the ground. Those programs now have been extended to parts of non-Muslim Africa – the prominent example being the dispatch of a Special Forces team to the eastern Congo to track down Joseph Kony, head of the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army – a bandit gang responsible for numerous atrocities. Kony is a nasty piece of work, but why the United States should be operating a string of forward bases in the heart of moral darkness to liquidate him is another matter.

Somalia in particular has made steady progress moving up the ladder of terrorist worry spots. It is now right up there with Afghanistan and Yemen – surpassing long forgotten Iraq with its still active al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The latter is more potent than any African group: it killed hundreds of Americans, we spent billions trying to crush it, and it is more critically located than the rest. Yet, it is no longer in vogue within Washington counter-terrorism circles. It is barely mentioned, and – in the ultimate disparagement – few if any of its leaders have prices on their heads. One reason for this neglect is that we can do absolutely nothing about them since we have been shown the door by Maliki and had it slammed shut behind us. This thinking amounts to looking for a lost object only under the lamppost because that is where the light is. Compare to Somalia. There, as a sign of al-Shabaab’s new-found prominence, the State Department this week offered $7 million for information leading to the capture of its founder and commander Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed, through its Rewards for Justice bounty program. In contrast, the U.S. had offered only $1 million for Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was killed in a U.S. strike in Pakistan last week and was described by U.S. officials as a bin Laden confidante and al-Qaeda’s second-in-command. Either State suddenly finds itself flush with money or the New al-Qaedas are now valued more highly than Original al-Qaeda for reasons that are a mystery.

The scope of this entire daunting enterprise, as reported in the Washington Post, is breath-takingly broad. Not just in geographical range. It encompasses four categories of activity. One is the training and supply of local forces deemed politically reliable and potentially competent to undertake counter insurgency. There is the ulterior objective of knitting ties with military officers who could be a pro-American political force were their time to come. Egypt is a model; Iraq is not. The second activity is engagement in military operations in the field. Special Forces already have been trekking around the fringes of the Sahara in the company of local constabulary for some time. So too in Somalia and now Yemen – as Obama admitted last Friday. A new wrinkle is the building of a small galaxy of airfields in the bush from which single engine prop planes can undertake surveillance of “enemy” movements. Their value in the age of drones and satellite electronic imaging is unexplained. Perhaps, political conditions are not yet ripe for installation of the necessary high tech support structure. Obviously, though, this crop duster squadron will be manned mainly by mercenary companies.

There is intelligence gathering. This goes beyond operational intelligence or the identifying of bad guy networks. Rather, it covers the political mapping of entire countries, which USAFRICOM visualizes as the basis for long-term American strategy aimed at winning friends and influencing people. Such activities normally fall in the purview of the State Department; this is yet another sign of State being eclipsed by the Pentagon/Intelligence powerhouse that rules American foreign policy nowadays. Finally, there is the element of people to people confidence building ties between Americans and the locals. It is a tactic that carries over from our vain efforts along these lines elsewhere. Never say
“basta!”

The budget is classified; the project’s duration is as far as the mind can imagine. There is one thing that we can be sure of. Operation Africa is self-perpetuating since there will be a steady supply of murderers, extortionists and Islamic radicals in this tormented environment that we never will be able to suppress. Our efforts, moreover, will generate the inevitable anti-Americanism and retaliation such ventures spawn – as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. So why launch this latest enterprise of dubious value? Well, when you have created an USAFRICOM, when you have staffed it with a few thousand personnel, when you have a Special Forces corps numbering 60,000, when you have a vastly expanded CIA Operations Division, and when American strategic thinking is still locked in the auto-pilot mode set in September 2001 – when all these forces are at work, there will be action. Trained to rumble people will not be content doing push-ups while watching the Military Channel. Their superiors will not be content thumbing through Jeune Afrique - and thinking about what they read.

As an updated Paladin calling card might read: Have Gun Will Travel; E-mail: USAFRICOM@US.Gov

Add to the above politicians who live in dread of being accused of being soft on terrorists or on anyone else who dislikes America.

Most of this, of course, has been classified ultra secret. Secret from whom is unclear. After all, the parties in on the secret include: leadership of AQLM and AQHA; the governments of the countries involved – or, at least, their militaries; the African Union “peacekeeping” force in Somalia; UN officials in the region; humanitarian organizations and coffee shop habitués from Ouagadougou to Mombasa. As for Mr. John Q. Public here at home, it looks like he is the only one who cannot be trusted with this ultra secret information.

Japanese spiritual culture is filled with various supernatural demi-gods. Shoki, the demon-slayer, is a favourite. He is depicted in human form with a wild countenance, flying hair and armed with a powerful broadsword. His fierce dedication to purging an array of malevolent creatures is manifest. He is high-spirited and exults in his good works. He is a theatrical figure. Shoki is fabled as returning from Hell with a mission to cleanse the world of Evil – especially as embodied by malign spirits and ghosts. They are legion; indeed, their number seems to grow to meet the demand for ever-more marvellous feats by the fiery protector of the good and virtuous. He is at once guardian and existential reassurance against the menacing forces that surround us. An emotional security blanket. Shoki is here – and there, and everywhere. So rest assured – go shopping.


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* Michael Brenner is a Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. This article was first published by http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/06/20/into-africa/

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

US covers up Rwanda-supported mutiny in Congo

Maurice Carney

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83348

cc US Air ForceRwanda has been involved in hostile actions to destabilize DR Congo over the last 15 years. The US is aware of this but protects President Kagame’s regime to secure its own interests in Africa’s Great Lakes region.

PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Paul Jay in Baltimore.

In the Congo, a report says there is a mutiny going on amongst the Congolese army. This is a report from the United Nations. An interim report or a version of that report was released on Friday, but some of the people that were involved in the committee of experts that wrote that report have leaked that there's more to it, and it has to do with Rwandan interference in the Congo. And if so, that wouldn't be something new.

Now joining us to talk about all of this is Maurice Carney. He's the executive director and co-founder of Friends of the Congo, and he joins us now from our D.C. office. Thanks for joining us, Maurice.

MAURICE CARNEY: Hi. It's a pleasure to be with you today.

JAY: So, first of all, what do we know of the facts of the situation?

CARNEY: Well, the facts as reported by the United Nations and by Human Rights Watch basically state that the mutinous group in the east of the Congo, the rebels that have been destabilizing the country since early spring, where over 200,000 Congolese have been displaced, are being supported by the Rwandan government in terms of training, arming, logistical support. And this is consistent with a pattern over the past 15 years where Rwanda has either invaded the Congo or rebel groups inside the Congo have destabilized the country. In addition to this consistent support over the last 15 years, another staple of over the last 15 years has been the United States covering for Rwanda whenever it has gotten involved in the Congo.

JAY: And why do they?

CARNEY: Well, you know, nations function on interests. Some people say, well, the U.S. is guilty because it did not do enough during the genocide in '94. But the U.S. has strategic and economic interests in central African region, and Rwanda, among a number of other nations in that part of the world, protect and carry out U.S. interests in the region. So whenever Rwanda is called to account by the international community, the United States usually runs interference so that there are no sanctions brought against the Rwandan government.

JAY: And what are the effects on the people living there in terms of what you describe as destabilization?

CARNEY: The effects are devastating. As I shared with you, 200,000 people have been displaced. Really, since Rwanda invaded Congo in 1996, millions of Congolese have perished, hundreds of thousands of women have been systematically raped, Congo's wealth has been looted. So the impact of Rwanda's role in destabilizing the Congo has been tragic for the people of the region and especially the Congolese people.

And this is really the sad part about the whole situation, because it's within the means of the United States to hold its ally accountable, but it has not done so to date. We've had countries like Sweden and Netherlands who have withheld aid from Rwanda because of Rwanda's activities inside Congo. But the United States has yet to hold to account Rwanda.

JAY: What does Rwanda gain? Why is this in Rwandans' interest to so destabilize this section of the Congo?

CARNEY: Rwanda's interests are several-fold. And one, in their destabilizing the Congo, Rwanda is able to continue to benefit from Congo's riches. Both Dow Jones and Bloomberg news have reported Rwanda has gained hundreds of millions of dollars in trading Congo's minerals, its coltan and tin in particular. Bloomberg News said that Rwanda was one of two top traders of Congo's conflict minerals - you know, tin, tungsten, and tantalum.

JAY: But how are they doing this? Are they making deals directly with these mutinous soldiers? Or how are they doing this?

CARNEY: Well, I mean, the rebel groups control mines. They have access to the mines. And they, you know, gather the resources that are mined and are then shipped across the Rwandan border without Congo taxing it; or it's actually smuggled into Rwanda, and then Rwanda sells it to the global market.

JAY: And, now, there's a lot of-. Sorry. Go ahead.

CARNEY: As long as the Congolese state doesn't have full control of over the east of the country and the borders are porous, then it's like an open-air supermarket where Rwanda and Uganda can come in and basically take at will Congo's gold, its tin, its coltan, its wolframite, and trade it in their own countries as if it was produced by Rwanda itself or produced by Uganda. So that's been the pattern since 1996 when both Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo.

JAY: And what's the role of the international mining companies in this conflict?

CARNEY: Well, the roles of the international mining companies are several. One, they purchase the elicit minerals from Rwanda and from Uganda. Two, because you have a weakened Congolese state, they're also able to enter into contracts with that Congo state and benefit tremendously from the natural resources of the Congo.

So there are many beneficiaries. You have the Rwandan government, military officials in Rwanda, multinational corporations, elites in the Congo itself, and they all benefit at the expense of the Congolese people, who are suffering tremendously from the instability that's been fostered and supported by the Rwandan regime.

JAY: Now, when President Obama was Senator Obama, didn't he actually propose a bill or support a bill that would call for more accountability for Rwanda and Uganda? And what's his record on that if that's right?

CARNEY: Yes, he actually sponsored a bill that was passed into law in 2006, signed into law by George Bush, Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act, which was also co-sponsored by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. However, to date, since President Obama's been in office he hasn't acted on that law. There's a particular section of the law that calls on the secretary of state to hold Congo's neighbours accountable, provided that there's sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Congo's neighbours are involved in destabilizing the country. And there's an abundance of evidence. There's more than enough evidence. In fact, I was sharing with you earlier that both Sweden and Netherlands withheld aid from Rwanda because of the evidence that was produced that demonstrated that Rwanda was destabilizing the Congo. So here it is that two European nations that do not have such a law on their books, they're acting. However, the United States has-.

JAY: What is the American attitude, then, towards this UN report? Because if this report actually went public and did contain the things that the leak says it does or should contain, in theory, wouldn't that trigger the legislation?

CARNEY: Well, it should certainly trigger the legislation - not the legislation, the law. It's law. It should trigger the law. And the U.S. response has been shocking, because really this is the situation that we have. We have rebel groups inside the Congo led by one Bosco Ntaganda, who's wanted by the International Criminal Court. So rebel groups hereto were committing crimes, and these rebel groups are been supported by Rwanda. And then we have the United States that's covering for Rwanda. So for all intents and purposes, the United States is supporting rebel groups inside of Congo that are wanted by the International Criminal Court, because they have blocked and delayed reports coming out and covered for Rwanda. Even when the U.S. issued a statement - the U.S. ambassador in Congo issued a statement about the rebel groups, and they didn't even mention Rwanda by name. They said those outside forces that are supporting rebel groups should be held to account. They didn't even mention Rwanda's name. Today even the Rwandan foreign minister was at the United Nations, and the arrogance with which he spoke, as if Rwanda is not involved at all - it's just incredible that the United States is putting its neck out as it is, to be embarrassed in the global community for supporting rebel groups inside the Congo through [its support of] Rwanda.

JAY: Thanks very much for joining us, Maurice.

CARNEY: Al right. Thank you.

DISCLAIMER: Please note that transcripts for The Real News Network are typed from a recording of the program. TRNN cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

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Carter criticises human rights violations by US

Farooque Chowdhury

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83371

cc A H GFormer president, Jimmy Carter, denounces the current US administration for its disturbing and widespread violations of human rights.

Jimmy Carter, former US president, criticised the US administration for ‘clearly violating at least 10’ of the 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He said these violations are ‘disturbing’. Of the violations he mentioned prohibition against ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.

It’s unprecedented! It’s neither Fidel Castro nor Hugo Chavez, neither Moscow nor Beijing, but a former US president accusing the current US president of sanctioning the ‘widespread abuse of human rights’. Mr. Carter has not mentioned Barak Obama, the US president, by name. However, he used the words ‘our government’ and ‘the highest authorities in Washington’.

Mr. Carter made the point by referring the authorisation of drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists. In a New York Times op-ed article titled ‘A Cruel and Unusual Record’ on 25 June he said the ‘United States is abandoning its role as the global champion of human rights’. He mentioned drone attacks on Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

‘Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended’, he said.

‘We don’t know’, Mr. Carter wrote, ‘how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times’. Carter cited recent revelations about the US drone program that allows the highest authorities to track, target, and kill suspected terrorists or militants – including US citizens – without due process or transparent oversight.

Mr. Carter wrote: ‘Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable’. He mentioned that ‘[t]hese policies clearly affect American foreign policy’.

Referring to implications of these drone attacks he wrote: ‘Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organisations, aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior’.

Drone strikes are a fact in the daily life of people of Pakistan. In Yemen and Somalia, it’s a fact also. It’s apprehended that peoples in other lands may have the same experience. The interests of ‘Naked Imperialism’ will determine the extent of drone operation in future. [1]

Citing the New America Foundation estimates, ABC News said in Pakistan alone 265 drone strikes have been executed since January 2009 killing at least 1,488 persons, at least 1,343 of them considered militants.

‘Instead of making the world safer’, Mr. Carter wrote, ‘America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends’.

The Guantanamo Bay detention center and waterboarding issues were not skipped by the former US president. He criticised the US president for keeping the detention center open, where prisoners ‘have been tortured by waterboarding more than 100 times or intimidated with semiautomatic weapons, power drills or threats to sexually assault their mothers’.

‘While the country has made mistakes in the past’, Mr. Carter wrote, ‘the widespread abuse of human rights over the last decade has been a dramatic change from the past’.

Mr. Carter blamed the US government for allowing ‘unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications’.

He condemned recent legislation that gives the president the power to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely, although a federal judge blocked the law from taking effect for any suspects not affiliated with the September 11 terrorist attacks. Mr. Carter said: ‘This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration’.

Citing the events of 11 September 2001, he argued that the policy catastrophes since then have been ‘sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions’ and were made possible by a citizenry, by and large, unwilling to dissent.

‘At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe’, Mr. Carter wrote, ‘the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. He urged ‘concerned citizens’ to ‘persuade Washington to reverse course and regain moral leadership’.

Mr. Carter is keeping his hope on the moral leadership of the US. But, the military-industrial complex has taken it out long ago.

Moral standard is being set by the economic interests that utilise political and military power and manipulate diplomacy to widen and to make safe its domain of accumulation. The system has its own conscience, which is different from human conscience. The system has its own mind, which is different from the human brain. The conscience, the mind, the ethics, the moral standard of the system is political, not apolitical; it’s a-human, a-personal. It’s neither a president nor a group of good-soul senators, not even generals, who determine the moral standard. No state’s moral standard can be personified. Dominating interests determine the moral standards, the ethics, the flight path drones follow and the targets drones make.

Violation of human rights within a state and outside the state has been mentioned by the former US president. How are ‘things’, as he wrote, ‘sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions’? Don’t they have that wisdom that can warn them of the harm the actions might create? Or, that check and balance that can restrain that force? What’s the root of the limitation or failure in prudence and wisdom, or in a check and balance system? Even, the question arises: Why is ‘a citizenry, by and large, unwilling to dissent’? Is it inertia? Why the inertia? Or, is there no space for dissension?

A state’s pattern of behavior in a certain historical period has been revealed by the issues raised by Mr. Carter. These expose a state’s requirements, limitations, etc. Mr. Carter’s criticisms of human rights violations, his yearning for the safety and security of human life cannot be ignored. But these shall not provide any answer to the victims of violation.

What to tell the mothers of the children killed by drones in Pakistan villages? What to tell the children maimed by drones in Pakistan villages? What to tell the old father, who lost his young son, probably the only earning member of the family? What moral standard can bring in peace to these mothers, to these children, to these fathers, who are poor, working people, who know nothing about geopolitics’ great game in the central Asian zone, peak oil, oil pipeline, Western hemisphere designed democracy and its stooges, corporate interests? All geopolitics, all power, all interests turn incapable to bring in solace to the hearts of crying humanity in rural mud houses demolished by drones! Ringing bells of humanity are not within hearing range.

It’s not only a fact in Pakistan or Yemen. Other lands bear also pains of violation and interference. The US is no exception. The question of human rights in the US was raised by the UN more than once.

It was reported that the UN envoy for freedom of expression was drafting an official communication to the US government demanding to know ‘why federal officials are not protecting the rights of Occupy demonstrators whose protests are being disbanded – sometimes violently – by local authorities’. Frank La Rue, the UN special rapporteur for the protection of free expression, told HuffPost in an interview that ‘the crackdowns against Occupy protesters appear to be violating their human and constitutional rights’. ‘Citizens have the right to dissent with the authorities, and there's no need to use public force to silence that dissension’, he said.

It was also reported that the UN was to conduct an investigation into the plight of the US Native Americans. A UN statement said: ‘This will be the first mission to the US by an independent expert designated by the UN human rights council to report on the rights of the indigenous peoples’. Many of the US’ estimated 2.7 million Native Americans live in federally recognised tribal areas overwhelmed with unemployment, high suicide rates and other social problems.
Accusations of human rights violation in the US are now a regular diplomatic event in the Chinese capital. China raises the issue seriously. It has become a part of public diplomacy. Once, only years back, it was only a US monopoly. Now, China has stepped in boldly.

But Mr. Jimmy Carter’s voice is not a part of public diplomacy. He is a dignified personality. It shows dissent within the upper echelon of US society. And, dissent signifies state of governance, understanding, rapport, efficiency of ruling mechanism. So, Mr. Carter’s voice is significant.


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* Farooque Chowdhury is the former editor of Paribesh patra, an environmental periodical (in Bangla). He writes on political, socio-economic and environmental issues and is the author of The Age of Crisis.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

ENDNOTES

1. Naked Imperialism: The U.S. Pursuit of Global Dominance, John Bellamy Foster, Monthly Review Press, 2006

Rwanda: No justice without reparation

What will be the legacy of local and international justice for the 1994 genocide survivors?

David Russell and Juergen Schurr

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83346

cc E FWith the closure of gacaca and the winding down of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), many survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda fear that the injustices they suffered will never be repaired.

On 18 June, President Kagame officially closed gacaca, the traditional community courts that according to the Government handled almost 2 million cases in over a ten year period. Similarly, on 1 July, the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania handed over most of its remaining tasks to the UN International Residual Mechanism after prosecuting 72 cases.

Victims of genocide and crimes against humanity are entitled to reparation, which can mean restitution of their property, compensation for material and non- material damages and rehabilitation of survivors by way of for instance medical and psychological care. In Rwanda, hardly any of the hundreds of thousands of survivors of the genocide have obtained such reparation through gacaca. Nor did the ICTR provide any respite: its rules did not allow for survivors to claim reparation.

Many survivors have found it difficult to move on with their lives in the absence of meaningful justice and most continue to grapple with the financial, medical and psychological consequences of the genocide without assistance from the Government. This is particularly frustrating for survivors who contributed to making gacaca work. Hundreds of thousands of survivors testified before the 11,000 grassroots courts , often at the price of re-traumatisation, yet many feel that they ended up with nothing tangible at the end of that process.

When the Government of Rwanda introduced gacaca in 2001, it promised survivors that a law on compensation would be adopted to put in place a compensation fund, enabling survivors to make claims for damages, such as the loss of a relative. However, the fund was never established. In addition, the vast majority of gacaca judgments, which awarded survivors with restitution or compensation for damaged property were never fully enforced as the vast majority of those held to make amends were impecunious themselves. A recent survey by the Legal Aid Forum based on interviews with over 2,700 claimants shows that compensation and restition awards made by gacaca courts are the “hardest to enforce”, with 92% of all genocide related orders yet to be enforced.

The lack of adequate reparation on a national level is made worse by the complete absence of reparation at the international level.

With mounting dissatisfaction about the ICTR, in 2002, then ICTR President Pillay reminded the UN Security Council that “compensation for victims is essential if Rwanda is to recover from the genocidal experience”. A proposal submitted by ICTR judges to the UN Security Council sought to establish a specialised agency to administer a compensation scheme, but it was never taken up. Instead, the UN General Assembly adopted various resolutions requesting UN agencies to provide assistance to survivors, yet only little has been done to implement these resolutions. Indeed, while about $1 billion has been spent on the ICTR over the past 18 years, the cumulative UN funding for survivors’ organisations in Rwanda providing direct services to survivors amounts to less than $ 250, 000 annually.

The need for reparation will not go away, and both, the Rwandan Government and the UN have a role to play in ensuring that survivors receive what they are entitled to.

Many survivors believe that the Rwandan Government is responsible for establishing a compensation fund to help to compensate survivors where the perpetrators have not been identified. It would also step in to fund awards where perpetrators are too poor to pay compensation themselves. Judgments could then be enforced with the compensation fund, rather than depend on the ability (and often the willingness) of the perpetrator to pay. The Government argues that it is contributing already approximately 6 % of its annual budget to an assistance fund providing health, education and housing services for the most vulnerable survivors and that it lacks the resources to do any more. This assistance is important, but only benefits a small minority of survivors and does not amount to reparation, failing to recognise that repairing the injuries suffered is integral to justice.

Ensuring adequate reparation for survivors in Rwanda will be a daunting task, given the magnitude and the scale of the genocide in 1994, but it is a task that should be carried out. While desirable, creating and financing a national compensation fund will be a challenge. Lessons could be learned from compensation funds established in countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa and Morocco, countries with their own experiences of mass crimes. Some survivors and government officials suggest that sources of funding should include assets from convicted perpetrators, donations from other countries, voluntary contributions and UN funds. IBUKA, the umbrella organisation for survivors, has urged the Government to use profits from the General Interest Programme (TIG), wherein those convicted by gacaca carry out public service work, to contribute to the compensation of survivors.

In a recent report issued by the human rights organisations REDRESS and SURF, it was recommended to establish a national reparation task force to address outstanding issues, in particular identifying past compensation and restitution awards by gacaca. The task force could consult widely with survivors throughout the country, establish criteria for beneficiaries of reparation and recommend forms of reparation that are feasible and adequate for survivors. Any reparation programme could also cover medical and psychological support, in particular following gacaca, where hundreds of thousands of survivors testified, reliving traumatic events. The UN should consider contributing to a national reparation mechanism or, alternatively, it should establish an international or UN trust fund for survivors which could support projects in Rwanda benefiting survivors and build capacity of survivors’ organisations.

To ensure a positive legacy of gacaca among survivors, the Government of Rwanda should ensure that survivors’ needs and rights are met. Similarly, the UN should not abandon survivors after the closure of the ICTR.

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* David Russell is Director of Survivors' Fund (SURF) and Juergen Schurr is Legal Advisor with REDRESS.

* Please send comments to editor[at]pambazuka[dot]org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

Execution of Dambar: Saharawi people demand justice

France-Libertés/Fondation Danielle Mitterrand and Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour L’amitié entre les Peuples

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83340

cc ArribalasqueluchanThe three human rights organisations are deeply concerned about Moroccan refusal to investigate the assassination of a young Saharawi man, Saïd Dambar, who was shot dead in the head by a Moroccan policeman on December 21st, 2010.

Saïd Dambar was 26 years old, a BA in Economics and worked in the occupied city of El Aaiun. He was noted for exemplary behaviour with family and neighbours, outstanding student career, an athlete as well as a worker concerned about the situation of his people.

According to eye-witnesses, Saïd Dambar was leaving an internet cafe where he had just watched a soccer match of the Spanish league when, minutes later, he was intercepted by two plainclothes police officers who asked for his identification. According to the version of eye-witnesses, Saïd did not carry his documentation, which led to a harsh argument with the police; thereupon, and without any provocation or attempted assault, one of the officers drew his gun and fired a shot, hitting him in the forehead.

Moroccan authorities arrested the murderer and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. The Moroccan court refused, nevertheless, to consider the State's responsibility in the crime and especially that the weapon used belonged to the Moroccan police.

There were further anomalies in the trial. The authorities tried by all means to distort the image of the victim. The policeman declared that he and Saïd were friends and were drunk before the crime. This claim was categorically denied by the family, which stated that Saïd was a sportsman and had never been involved in drinking or in using drugs and that he was regularly going to pray in the Mosque.

The handling of the murder is very suspicious and the Dambar family and all Saharawi human rights organizations suspect a cover-up. They Saïd that officials made a series of false declarations since the first day of the crime.

The police pretended that Saïd was alive the first night when they came to inform the family. They arrested the brother of Saïd telling him that the victim had beaten a policeman. When they reached the police station, they changed the story and told him that his brother had been injured by a gunshot and that he was in hospital under close assistance. When he insisted in visiting his brother, he was not allowed to enter the room where the supposedly alive body of his brother was kept for the whole night.

It was only in the early morning that the brother was allowed in and informed that Saïd had died. He succeeded in taking pictures of the dead body with his cell phone. It was obvious that the victim was shot in the forehead.

The Moroccan authorities have consistently failed, so far, to give a comprehensive explanation of the circumstances and facts surrounding this murder. The attempt to silence this crime has reached such an extent that the police are permanently applying pressure and intimidation on the family of the victim to silence them not to claim justice.

The family house was attacked many times by the police. There are videos clearly showing one of these attacks, which have usually been reported by the family to the public, but have never been investigated by the Moroccan justice system. At one attack at least the mother of Saïd was assaulted and injured.

Bureau International pour le Respect des Droits de l’Homme au Sahara Occidental-BIRDHSO, an NGO without consultative status, also shares the views expressed in this statement. Saïd Dambar’s younger brother was denied the right to work last year (2011) unless the family accepted to bury the body of Saïd which they could not have done until now, a year and a half afterward, as it has been and still is kept by the police in the morgue of the Moroccan hospital of Belmehdi, in the occupied capital of Western Sahara, El Aaiun.

The Moroccan authorities refuse to do an autopsy on the body of Saïd Dambar or investigate the crime, so as to establish responsibilities as well as to repair the damage caused to the whole family during the last two years, as the family demands.

The case of Saïd Dambar is just one among many others that need investigation. It has to be recalled that the Moroccan Consultative Council for Human Rights, in a report published in 2010, recognized that the Moroccan State during the seventies has executed people without any trial. That report states the names of: Mohamed Salem uld Hamdi uld Abdellah, Benou Emrabih uld Mohamed, Buzeid Alamin uld Abdellah, Mulud Lahsen Sidiya Mailed, Buleila Omar uld Mahyub uld Buyemaa, Mohamed Nayem uld Lejlifa uld Abderrahman, Hadia uld Mohamed Emabarec Zaidan, Zaid Mohamed Malainin, Hamudi uld Saleh uld Brahim uld Hnini, Lehbib Gala Lahsen Lehbib, Ahmed Lemaadel Mohamed Mehdi, Limam uld Brahim Tayeb and Hamudi Mohamed Lehbib Bairi.

The same report gives the names of some 350 Saharawis who were killed in secret detention camps or in military bases between the seventies and the nineties without giving any clarifications to their families, and without giving them back the remnants of the corpses so as to be able to bury them.

The violations against the Saharawi civilians’ right to life and physical safety are often reported by Saharawi human rights organizations. These NGOs cannot even effectively report or investigate such crimes and abuses because the Moroccan authorities refuse to give them legal registration and target Saharawi human rights defenders; many of them are now in prison, including a group of 22 Saharawis detained since November 2010 in Salé prison waiting for judgment before a military court.

The protection and promotion of human rights in the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara is sadly lacking due to the denial of the right to self-determination for the Sahrawi people exerted by the Kingdom of Morocco.

RECOMMENDATIONS

France-Libertés/Fondation Danielle Mitterrand and Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples:

• urge the OHCHR to open a monitoring office in the non self-governing territories of Western Sahara;

• urge the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to closely examine the case of Saïd Dambar, that the family has already presented to the relevant bodies during almost a year now;

• urge the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association to investigate the practice of the Moroccan authorities towards the Sahrawi human rights organizations;

• urge the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders to investigate the practice of the Moroccan authorities towards the Sahrawi human rights defenders.

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Ghana: Dumase, where river water is poison

Benjamin Tetteh

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83341

cc S TA foreign mining company has polluted the environment so much that the local people have no access to safe and adequate water. And that is not the only mining company killing people in Ghana. The government looks on.

In December last year a group of women in Dumase, a community near Bogoso in the Western Regionof Ghana, blocked the road leading to the site of the mining company operating in the area, Golden Star Resources, to protest the pollution of their only source of water. The police were called in but the women refused to move. They did not leave until officials from the District Assembly came to assure them that their water tanks, which had run out of water for days, would be filled. Months on, the villagers insist they can no longer drink from their streams. As mining continues in the area with assurances that the residents would be relocated.

For many years the people of Dumase have lived peacefully. They have depended on their environment for survival and lived on subsistence agriculture. The main sources of water for domestic use have been streams and smaller water bodies. The Dumase township has long held spiritual and emotional attachments to these water bodies...some consider them sacred gifts that must be protected.

However, things changed 20 years ago when government granted licenses for large-scale mining in the area which has resulted in the loss of all local water bodies.

The main sources of water for Dumase are the Apepre stream, Beenya, and Wurawura - these are all now polluted by mining spillages.

“All our water is polluted. The water turns yellowish when you boil it,” lamented a resident.

Golden Star Resources, a multi-national mining company with operations in six other countries is the only mining firm in this area. It has been blamed for two major reported cases of cyanide spillages here since 2004. In both cases locals said when they raised alarm Golden Star Resources sought to either play down or deny that there was pollution. But the failure of mining companies to accept full responsibility for spillages is not new.

Organizations working with mining communities say local communities will continue that this denial of mining companies leads to locals continuing to use polluted water, which can result in people contracting some serious and sometimes death-threatening ailments…illness that can be avoided if mining companies were honest and about spillages.

The women of Dumase complain they still see traces of heavy metals from the operations of Golden Star in their streams. In 2004 when the first cyanide spillage was reported, the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, asked the local people to stay away from their water bodies. Eight years later the company still advises the locals to stay away from these water bodies.

Public Relations Director of Golden Star Resources, Mrs. Ellaine Kwame said it is still unsafe for the people of Dumase to drink water from the streams.

“You cannot have tailings dam sitting by a stream and say that people should go and drink it. …. For the time being it is not possible to have them drink water from this source,” she said.

However she does not admit that it is the activities of the mining company that continue to pollute those water bodies.

While in Dumase I met two women who said they drank water from the Apepre stream in 2006, became sick and have been living on medication ever since.

One of them, Afia Asantewa, used water from the Apepre stream the very morning of the second cyanide spill, and she blames her current condition on the cyanide.

“I have blood pressure. Every month I go to the hospital. If I don’t get to the hospital on time then my head aches badly as if I would die. We didn’t have this kind of ailments until the water got polluted,” she complained.

SHOCKING RESEARCH FINDINGS

A recent water analysis by the Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis found high levels of heavy metals in the waters at Dumase. By the World Health Organisation’s standards the presence of Arsenic, a toxic chemical, in water should not be more than 0.01 gm/L. But some water bodies have as much as 24 mg/L of arsenic. The researchers say this can cause skin cancer, itchy skin and the black foot disease. And they fear for food crops planted in such conditions.

The research found arsenic levels in cassava in Prestea to be 30.68 milligrams per kilogramme. Compared to WHO standards which are less than 0.003 milligrams per kilogramme, this is far above the level for human consumption. Mining and environmental group, WACAM, also points out that Dumase is part of the nation’s food and fruit basket so the quality and safety of its produce should be of concern to all Ghanaians.

While in the area, some of the concerned women of Dumase take me on a long walk to see the area where Golden Star Resources has its tailing dam, an area the locals call Nankafa. We spend over an hour trekking the long windy farmland to the tailings dam where waste water from the mine is dumped.

From the dam I walk past a security post pretending I’m going to fetch water for my fellow farmers. Less than 20 metres from the security post are traces of seepages from the dam flowing right into the stream. Water seeping through the tailings dam into the Apepre stream is visibly different. The women farm in this area and they see this seepage regularly. They accuse Golden Star of polluting their water without making any effort to stop it. Instead the company tells them to stay away from their water bodies, without providing them with adequate alternatives.

“When will this company stop polluting our water?” one of them asked.

TACKLING THE PROBLEM

But Golden Star Resources is trying to deal with the situation. The company has provided four large water tanks for the town, which has a population of 4000. But the women here say the water is insufficient and it is not available regularly.

“We have four tanks in the town and only one tanker brings a single load of water to distribute to all four tanks. That’s not sufficient for the whole community. This has resulted in fights and people have hurt each other, even pregnant women get beaten. Government must save us from this trouble,” a worried woman indicated.

Some women and children have to trek long distance to get to the tanks.

Executive Director of WACAM, Daniel Owusu Koranteng, says Ghana’s mining law gives a blank check to mining companies to treat water bodies anyway they like with impunity.

“When you go into the minerals and mining Act- section 17 it allows a company, of course with some license from the water resources Commission, that they can impound, obtain and divert and do many things with water. That is close to a blank check…”

He adds that mining companies in Ghana have based their argument on this clause in the mining law to pollute water bodies in their areas. And often all you see is a sign post warning communities to stay away from local water bodies. There are dozens of these notices spread across Ghana’s mining communities.

Ghana’s Evironmental Protection Agency, the EPA, has not made any definite statement about the water quality in Dumase. But for the past three years the EPA has been rating the performances of mining companies in the country. Termed “AKOBEN” the rating has caused unease in the mining industry since its inception. It rates the performance of mining companies in seven key areas: from legal issues through the environment to corporate social responsibility.

So far, Golden Star Resources failed to impress in the two ratings released in 2009 and 2010. The 2011 result is not out yet. For both years, the company was rated RED, on compliance with environmental quality standards and toxic releases. In the words of the EPA: The company has NOT complied with the environmental quality standards for toxics.

In both years, Golden Star’s overall rating was RED, which was defined by the regulator as having not fulfilled the requirements of LI 1652, and creates risks from toxics and hazardous wastes mismanagement and discharges. This Legislative Instrument relates to the Environmental Impact Assessment.

AN EPA LAPSE?

Some civil society organisations have criticised the EPA for not taking a step further to penalize mining companies who flout these basic legal regulations, and thus exposing the environment and citizenry to poisonous chemicals. So as it is the “AKOBEN” or rating is only serving to name and shame companies that do not stick to mining standards....beyond this there is no further action.

It is worth mentioning that so far no mining company in Ghana has performed any better, according to the ratings. In 2009, out of 11 companies selected, 8 were rated red and 3 yellow. A yellow rating means satisfactory compliance. In 2010 two companies, Abosso Goldfields, a subsidiary of Goldfields, based in the Western Region, and Newmont, Kenyase in the Brong Ahafo Region scored Blue, out of 11 companies. Blue means Good. Green is Very Good, and Gold- Excellent. No company has got a Green yet...and it appears most of them are very far from Gold.

The situation in Dumase has now become dire, says Mr. Koranteng of WACAM, a fact confirmed by District Chief Executive for Prestea Huni Valley, Robert Cudjoe. He says the state of the community does not allow government to make any long-term plan for the township.

He adds that the current water supply to Dumase is not adequate.

“The Assembly would wish to get them one or two mechanized bore-holes but since very soon they will move from the place that has been our hindrance. Concerns have been raised that the water they provide is not adequate…”

And the DCE laments the precious man-hours his outfit spends attending to social concerns from mining communities. For the about 15 or so minutes that I spent in his office the DCE received at least three phone calls with mining-related issues. I had expected to hear him talk about the district’s swelling revenues from mining. But no, he rather tells me his district is not benefiting much from mining activities here. He says mining is the greatest threat to the peace in the area.

“Everyday you wake up to receive a complaint from a mining community against a mining company… almost every day there’s an issue to be resolved,” he said.

CRACKS IN BUILDING

Water is not the only concern of the people of Dumase. There is also the issue of noise from blasting and dust pollution. Mr. Dei Nkrumah, a middle-aged man showed me rocks on his compound, rocks he said were hurled into his home from the mining pit, by the force of blasting.

“We are suffering from blasting. Where my bed is (there are) lots of cracks. You see the new building there (the part that has collapsed) is due to their blasting.”

There is also the problem of dust constantly pouring into the community from the mine.

A SICK PEOPLE

Already, there are reports of rising cases of respiratory infections from places like Dumase.

The nearest major health facility is in Tarkwa. And each time a person falls sick here the patient has to make a long trip on the rough and dusty road from Dumase to Tarkwa.

The taxi on which I travelled on my first visit to Dumasi all windows closed to avoid the dust on the road; there was no air conditioner in there. And we had to cope with the heat from the blazing sun in a condition nearing suffocation.

I checked with the authorities at the Tarkwa government hospital. Dr. Jack Galley is the Municipal Health Director. Like most parts of Ghana Malaria is the leading reported case reported. But he admits the hospital staff group most fever cases as malaria, including typhoid and common cold. But of more concern to him is the rising case of dust-related diseases.

“In 2009, about seven per cent of the cases that we saw were upper respiratory infections. In 2010, it was 8 per cent. And in 2011 we saw about 11.7 per cent.”

And it appears a more serious form of acute respiratory tract infection, mostly present in mining areas, called silicosis, is also on the rise here. The chronic disease caused by long exposure to dust affects the lungs and makes breathing an uphill task.

“We have silicosis as also a problem. It is confined to mining areas or dusty environment,” he said.

The Chief of town Nana Kwabena Pong took me to the outskirts of the community, about 150 metres away. From here we could see serious mining going on…heavy equipment digging the earth and heavy-duty trucks busily hauling gold ore from the pit.

Nana told me the location of the mine is too close to the town, and government must halt the operation of the mining company here, until the fate of the people of Dumase is known.

“Before we leave here we will all get sick. Some of my people will even die…” he lamented.

For now, residents of the Dumasi can only pray for action…Action to save them from looming danger.

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Uganda: Thugs attack villagers who say their land was stolen

Oil in Uganda

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83345

cc C CMonths after the central government tried to quell land speculation in oil-rich Bunyoro by suspending the issue of new land titles, ‘Oil in Uganda’ visited Kasenyi, on the north eastern shores of Lake Albert, and unearthed a tale of double-dealing and thuggery seemingly abetted by district leaders and security officials.

Eriakimi Kaseegu, the Kasenyi Local Council One Chairman, revealed that community land – including the plot where Tullow Oil’s Kasemene 3 well is located – was fraudulently sold by “outsiders” and that the community’s efforts to investigate the sale were met with violence and arbitrary arrests.

“In 2010, one Kahwa Franco, a rich Mugungu who stays in Kampala, bought land from two Congolese residents who did not even own it. Local leaders had allowed them to settle some time back because the area was largely uninhabited, although useful for grazing. However, these Congolese took it upon themselves to do a deal with Kahwa, who reportedly then sold off a chunk of the land to Tullow Oil,” claims Eriakimi.

In the living room of his small, grass-thatched house, Eriakimi passionately described the events that followed, when locals learned that land had been sold off to outsiders.

“We summoned the so-called sellers to a village meeting, where they admitted selling the land. One of them, Benja Tepolo, even revealed that he had sold the land where the oil well is situated for about one million shillings ($400). They then bowed to pressure from the villagers to refund the money and repossess the land. However, a week later we learnt that they had defied the directive of the meeting and refused to refund the money.”

In 2011, Eriakimi says, he heard that Kahwa was planning to fence off the land. In April of this year he was astonished to receive a letter from the Buliisa Town Council informing him that they were coming to inspect and fence “Kahwa’s” land the following month. The letter requested him to inform the villagers and mobilise them for a meeting with the town council officials.

“I wondered how the council could refer to the community’s land as Kahwa’s!” Eriakimi exclaims.

On May 2, council officials arrived for the proposed meeting. However, no sooner had it started than people armed with sticks, bows and arrows descended on the eighty or so villagers, beating and dispersing them.

“A group of about thirty men, a mixture of Congolese and Bagungu, started beating up people. One John, a Mugungu from Wanseko, appeared to be commanding the group.”

The Bagungu people, estimated to number around 30-40,000 in total, are indigenous to Buliisa District, and live mainly by fishing.

ENTER THE POLICE

Shortly after the violence had started, Eriakimi says, the Resident District Commissioner, Florence Beyunga, arrived on the scene in the company of the District Police Commander and several police officers.

“The attackers seemed to know the authorities were coming, because just as they [the authorities] were about to reach, John ordered his men to hide their weapons. Rather than rescue us, the police started beating us too, arresting those they thought were ring-leaders.”

Eriakimi and two others were arrested, taken to Buliisa Police Station, and then transferred to Masindi Police Station.

“It was a horrible experience. I was suffering tuberculosis but the police who arrested us would not even allow me to drink water or make a short call along the way to the police station. I almost urinated on myself,” says Eriakimi.

He says that he was detained for five days after which he was taken to court in Masindi and released on bail. The cases against him and one other villager were later dropped, but a third man is still required to report to court monthly.

Eriakimi adds that many people were beaten by police but feared to report this because they believe that the police are agents of Kahwa.

INFORMATION VACUUM

After narrating his ordeal, Eriakimi led ‘Oil in Uganda’ on a tour of the area. Five minutes drive past uncultivated bush took us to the Kasemene 3 well site, where about two acres of land have been fenced off. Uniformed employees of Tullow Oil were going about their daily business, excavating the area using a grader. Several trucks were parked in the complex, while some of the workers were having lunch.

A security guard approached and asked what our business was, to which Eriakimi replied, “I am the LC 1 Chairman of this area, but I don’t know exactly what you are doing inside there. I can see that you are digging up soil but I don’t know whether the waste you will generate will be harmful to our health.”

A friendly exchange with the guard then ensued, with the guard telling us that many people come to the site, some with “wrong intentions.” However, our chat was abruptly ended by a tough-looking and evidently higher-ranking security guard, who instructed our new friend to go back to work and stick to his role. “You want to go beyond your scope?” he asked him, as he noted down the number plate of our hired vehicle.

As we continued our tour, we asked Eriakimi if all the land we were passing had been sold. He said he did not know. “All I know is that we have lost our land,” he replied.

It was not possible to establish exactly how much land was bought by Kahwa and others.

But the anxiety and anger of the local population was perfectly clear. People in this area no longer know who “owns” the land they live on. They have lost their sense of security, with the nagging fear of eviction perhaps lying in the future.

NOT MUCH COMMENT

‘Oil in Uganda’ contacted Tullow Oil in Kampala and the Buliisa District Land Board in order to clarify the ownership of the land where the Kasamene 3 well is sited, but was unable to elicit a satisfactory answer.

Tullow’s Corporate Communications Manager in Uganda, Cathy Odengo, emphasised that Tullow leases, rather than buys, land in the areas of its operations, but said that Tullow is not “mandated” to disclose who it leases land from. In an emailed response she wrote that: “We would recommend that you approach the Buliisa District Land Board as the appropriate authority to prove land ownership of land in the area.”

Tundulu Sabiiti, Chairman of the Buliisa District Land Board, said in a telephone interview that he could not comment, adding only that: “Those land arrangements are between government and the company. You ask them.” When asked whether he had heard of Kahwa Franco, he hung up.

GROWING CONFLICT?

Meanwhile, some local observers believe that land conflicts in the area are growing.

Alice Kazimura, who runs a charitable organisation, Kakindo Orphans Care, near the site of Tullow’s Kasemene 1 well, says that land sales are on the rise as more and more local people seek to mint money from selling “idle” land.

“Initially it was only some few tycoons like Kahwa who were buying land,” she told ‘Oil in Uganda’. “But now the local people are involved and it has turned clans against each other. They grab each other’s land.”

She added that some opportunistic people claiming to have been born in the area are now surfacing, saying that their forefathers were buried there and so they are entitled to land.

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* This article was first published Oil in Uganda.

Nigeria: Government forcibly removes 25,000 families in Port Harcourt

Social and Economic Rights Action Center

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83353

© SERACAbonnema Wharf Community demolished by the Rivers State government in flagrant disregard of judicial process.

© SERACThe Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) strongly condemns the on-going demolition of Abonnema community by the Rivers state government. The invasion and destruction of the homes, properties and businesses of residents of the community without the due process of law is callous, unjust, illegal and a reckless affront to constitutional governance.

On Wednesday June 27, 2012, at about 6.00 am, the Rivers state government’s demolition squad assisted by heavily armed police and other security forces invaded the Abonnema Wharf community located on the Port-Harcourt waterfront. Without warning, bulldozers began to tear down homes and other structures in the community as residents that were rudely awakened by the violence fled in utter consternation. Residents that attempted to salvage personal properties were brutally beaten by members of the demolition squad. The demolition continued until about 7 pm.

At the time of this press statement on June 29, 2012 the Rivers state government has continued its ruthless forced eviction of the Abonnema Wharf community destroying several hundred homes, properties and livelihoods of an estimated 25,000 families without any safeguards or resettlement.

The demolition of Abonnema community is being carried out in flagrant disregard of judicial process. On behalf of the community, SERAC obtained an order of interim injunction restraining the Rivers state government from destroying the community on November 11, 2011 in Jim George & Others vs. The Executive Governor of Rivers State & Others (Suit No. PHC/2286/2009). A ruling on a contested application of the government to vacate the interim order of injunction was fixed for July 2, 2012.


© SERACDespite the pendency of this lawsuit and a subsisting order of interim injunction, the Rivers state government has proceeded, lawlessly, to destroy the community.
The government’s suggestion that Abonnema Wharf is being demolished in order to rid the community of criminals is as unconscionable as it is absurd. Nowhere in the laws of Nigeria is demolition authorised as a crime fighting strategy. This is yet another pitiful excuse to justify the indefensible action of the government.


At the core of the decision to destroy Abonnema Wharf community, like it destroyed Njemanze and other waterfront communities in 2009, is Governor Rotimi Amaechi administration’s unbridled quest to acquire prime waterfront lands in favour of private businesses for upscale entertainment and other investments. Under the guise of public-private partnerships, the government has continued to utilise taxpayers’ resources and state instruments to advance the parochial interests of its affluent business collaborators to the extreme detriment of desperately poor citizens of the state. Since his inauguration, Governor Amaechi has vigorously pursued a land grab policy that has resulted in the painful displacement of hundreds of thousands of poor citizens.


© SERACForced eviction entails the removal of people from their land and homes against their will and without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protections. The forced eviction of Abonnema Wharf constitutes a brazen violation of the human rights to adequate housing, dignity of the human person, private and family life, fair hearing and, indeed, the right to life as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other human rights instruments.

SERAC demands an immediate end to the ongoing demolition of Abonnema Wharf community. We further demand an end to the violence and brutality that is being perpetrated against innocent citizens of the community.

We strongly urge the government of Rivers State to immediately provide emergency shelter and other services to the displaced population, and take expeditious steps to provide adequate compensation or resettlement to affected residents.

We further urge Governor Rotimi Amaechi to observe observance of the rule of law in dealing with these populations, and to bring his strayed administration back on a path of constitutional democracy.

CONTACT

Felix Morka Executive Director Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC)
Plot 758, Chief Thomas Adeboye Drive, Omole Phase 2, Isheri, Lagos, Nigeria. P.O. Box 13616, Ikeja-Lagos, Nigeria, Tel: 234-1-7646299, E-mail: info@serac.org; seracnig@aol.com Website: www.serac.org

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The bitter taste of honey

Abdulrazaq Magaji

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83347

cc J WA deficit of transformational leadership, dwindling economic fortunes and increasing violence have turned the vast plains of Northern Nigeria into a bastion of despair.

The increasingly impoverished people of northern Nigeria are waking up to the stark realization that the sweet taste of democracy could turn sour if you are unlucky to have the right hands in the kitchen. Northern Nigerians have never had it so bad: democracy is in the air, yet many of them will swear they will welcome the devil’s alternative. Here, we are talking of the alternative available to a distressed and poverty stricken people who are constantly harassed by red-eyed misfits who believe taking human lives is the only visa they need to go to paradise. And just before you say Boko Haram, remember this is peace time and the north is not at war; it is not even contemplating one, but the number of guns in wrong hands would have made Osama bin Laden jump out of his skin. More money, thanks to increasing earnings from oil, is being pumped into northern Nigeria but, like the guns, they end in a few, wrong hands. Democracy? Like hell! Afro beat king Fela Anikulapo Kuti once re-defined this sweet nine letter word: he called it demon crazy and we all laughed. To the average northern Nigerian today, Fela is a prophet!

Let’s begin the story by taking a cursory look at the composition of the Nigerian federal government headed by President Goodluck Jonathan. The vice president, president of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chief Justice of the Federation are all from the north. What this means is that, in the event of President Jonathan dropping dead today (God! Please, forbid it!), a northerner is on queue to succeed him. Let’s extend this a bit more: in the unlikely event of the top four government positions becoming vacant today, it is taken that, anyway it is juggled, a northerner is still on queue to constitutionally take up the position of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The dominance does not end there, as the Inspector General of Police, National Security Adviser, Chief of Naval Staff and Head of the Civil Service of the Federation are all northerners. Apart from this northern dominance, the north has majority members in the two houses of the national Assembly. The picture gets clearer against the background that northerners, either as elected or unelected leaders, have ruled for thirty seven of the nation’s fifty two years of independence. Poser: has this dominance been of any benefit to the north and northerners?

It is not being suggested that these prominent northerners constantly breathed down the neck of President Jonathan for unfair allotment of developmental programmes in the north. What is being suggested that some northern political leaders have constituted themselves into clogs, preferring to jostle for position. Recently one prominent northerner, Alhaji Mustapha Haruna Jokolo, a retired military officer and deposed Emir (Amir or, Leader) of Gwandu in the north western state of Kebbi, took one long at the picture and unsettled many on the vast northern plain with his verdict: ‘Political power has been a curse to the north and northerners.’ His reason? ‘ If we had responsible northerners in public office, there is nothing the president can do without consulting the north, and the president will not be able to rule effectively without consulting the north.’ And his solution, military style, is: ‘The north should forget the presidency in 2015.’ Arrows have not stopped flying towards the man from the political class in a region that have lost its hitherto firm grip on what it hitherto took for granted: political power. Bereft of real power at the centre, it had long contented itself with playing second fiddle on the economic anyway. Northern political leadership (read governors of the nineteen states that make up the north) is now in complete disarray, and the people are paying a heavy penalty for the loss.

Left-leaning politician Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa, former governor of old Kaduna state in north-western Nigeria, holds a similar view. But while not admonishing northern politicians to ‘forget the presidency’, the leader of the radical People’s Redemption Party, PRP, excuses northern politicians from efforts to resolve the crisis in the north; he says they concern themselves more with jostling for political positions and, in any case, they are guilty of being ‘criminally indifferent to the plight of their people.’ The man should know; thirty years ago, he was removed from office for attempting to reverse the status quo when he defied the entrenched northern feudal oligarchy and courageously embarked on pro-poor programmes aimed at reversing stifling principles and policies that breed illiteracy, poverty and underdevelopment in northern Nigeria.

Such harsh views cannot be dismissed off-handed. It is taken that deficit of transformational leadership is a national malaise, but it must also be taken that it is more magnified in the North. Today, the north is grappling with deficit of transformational leaders, which has continued to widen the gulf between the few rich and the majority poor and pauperized the majority of the people. A majority of northerners in leadership positions, both at the state and federal levels, either do not understand or appreciate the burden of leadership or, where they do, they merely go into office to amass wealth. To ensure their continued stay in power, most of the so-called leaders device divisive and dangerous means of founding and funding militia groups, the result of which has been the proliferation of gun and dagger-wielding youths across the north. These glue-sniffing hoi polloi of society have turned full circle: in the name of pressing a hazy religious agenda, they bomb pubs and churches alike, kill unarmed worshippers, carry out dare-devil raids on banks, silence Muslim and traditional leaders who dare condemn their style, or force them to clam up and force journalists to continue to steal glances across their shoulders. And steadily, northern Nigeria is competing for space with Somalia on all credible human development indices.

Figures produced by the official National Bureau of Statistics, NBS, for 2011 are frightening. For instance, average unemployment rate for the nineteen states of Northern Nigeria is 27.9%, which is higher than the national average of 23.9%. What this means is that about one out of every three adult employable citizens in the North is unemployed. Northern Nigeria has an estimated population of 83 million, out of which forty million pass for a working population. A total of twenty seven million of the forty million working population of the region is unemployed. The problem of high unemployment in the region has significantly contributed to the high poverty rate, which the NBS estimates at 73.8% for the three geo-political zones that made up the 19 states in 2011. This is higher than the national incidence of 69%, which means that more than seven out of every ten citizens in the North are poor. In other words, an estimated 61 million of the eighty three million residents are poor. High unemployment and poverty rates are partly a reflection of low economic activities.

This, in many respects, has translated into low internally generated revenue, IGR, for all the state governments in the region, on account of which the total IGR for the 19 states for 2010, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report released in March 2011, was N92.1 billion. Compared to total personnel cost of N245.7 billion, internal revenue generation capacity for the nineteen northern state governments can only meet thirty seven per cent of personnel cost commitment. Taking into account the contentious minimum monthly wage of N18,000 or $120, which came into effect in March 2011, the internally generated revenue of the nineteen northern states may meet no more than fifteen per cent of personnel cost commitment.

The criminal neglect of agriculture, mineral resources and other non-oil economic activities for easy oil money from the federal government has aggravated this situation, as the federal allocations are hardly directed towards reviving infrastructure, capital projects, empowering the populace or investment in non-oil sectors of the economy. After all, the relatively easy art of sharing oil-driven monthly federal allocations has killed whatever initiative is left in a rudderless leadership to even contemplate other means of internally generating revenue. In the place of creativity, monthly allocations which run into billions of naira are brazenly shared among a few,and in most cases where they are seen to be spent, large chunks of the allocations are expended towards recurrent expenditure and unproductive ventures such as allocation of free Hajj and Umrah pilgrimage seats,distribution of rams and other essential commodities to those who ordinarily can afford them.

Some governors regularly cause stampedes by openly throwing money in the air for their subjects to scramble for. Pity! The crass neglect of education, despite the seemingly huge resources committed to it, especially in the last four decades, has contributed to the backwardness of the north and reinforced its image as a major drawback to the nation. Not even the recent and unusual admission by one prominent northern political leader that the free education embarked upon by the government of the defunct Western Region was the tonic that gave South Western Nigeria a good head start has informed the need for a reversal of steps by an increasingly clueless leadership.

This dependence on oil revenues, which has done little to benefit the average Northerner, has firmed the impression of Northern Nigeria as, in local parlance, a big for nothing entity, and northern Nigerians as parasitic and unproductive; a lazy people that have become a liability of sorts and a huge embarrassing albatross around the neck of their compatriots. This impression is not about to end, especially in the foreseeable future, considering the apparent cluelessness on the part of most political leaders in the north, even though a cursory look at recent history of Nigeria puts the lie to this impression. Until the oil boom era, the north did not only contribute handsomely to the commonwealth, but the political leaders of the First Republic had the foresight and lacked the kleptomaniac instinct; they had been able to use available resources to execute laudable projects. Indeed, a significant part of the resources that transformed Lagos and which facilitated the exploration of oil came from the famed groundnut pyramids of the north. But who cares? So, at what point did the north miss the bus? And what is to be done if the north is to avoid the hammer that is dangerously swinging on its head?

Those who blame present and past governors of northern states have a point. Governors, more than any other set of public office holders, are better placed to rejuvenate the north; they have a firm grip on billions accruing to their respective states from federal allocations. Because of this, they determine who gets what. They decide who gets elected into national and state legislatures. The result has been a huge debt profile, which, according to the Debt Management Office DMO, stood at US$834,600,888.72 or N129,363,137,751.60, representing 39.2% of the total debt of the country’s thirty six states as at December 31, 2011. According to the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, RMAFC, the northern states combined took some N1,502,551,340,400.06 from the federation account between January, 2009 and December 2011, representing 56.53% of the total allocations to all the 36 states of the federation.

Expectedly, a large chunk of the amount was expended on personnel and recurrent commitments, with a larger chunk used to service false life-styles, aside from the criminal looting of funds to prosecute the next electioneering campaigns. A combination of greed and avarice has blinded most of the governors, who appear incapable of doing what is right. Yet, like bad workmen, the game has always been buck-passing, as several northern leaders have turned ‘unfavourable federal allocations’ into a pastime to explain their low or non-performance.

Early this year, Mallam Lamido Sanusi, governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, opened the floodgate when, armed with figures to support his claims, he fingered inequality in federal allocations as the cause of the poverty-driven violence in the north. Alarmed critics were preparing to pick holes in Lamido’s submission, epidermic as it sounds, when some northern governors gave currency to it. Hear Dr. Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu, the self styled chief servant of Niger state in north central Nigeria and Chairman of the so called Northern Governors’ Forum: “The north today is in a very grave situation where illiteracy, poverty and general backwardness are on the rise in the face of unfavourable federation allocation structure, in which the northern states are at a great disadvantage.’ Strange, but what the Chief Servant shied away from was to mention how he has been addressing growing ‘illiteracy, poverty and general backwardness’ with the few Naira notes his state collects as a monthly allocation. Rather, from his first day in office, Governor Muazu Babangida Aliyu embarked on an ambitious state-wide programme of erecting huge designer billboards carrying his photographs, to advertise and celebrate hollowness. A common joke around town is that the way things are, Niger state may soon boast of more billboards than educational institutions.

The spurious claim that the north gets an unfair share of federal allocations, even if it holds water, is defeatist. It is a claim that could make the first premier of the defunct Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, squirm in his grave, and would certainly embarrass him if he were alive. If truth be told, Sir Ahmadu Bello could not have dreamt of changing the face of the north as a parasite on the wealth from rubber and cocoa plantations of the south. He did not abandon his people to a life of pervasive illiteracy, poverty and general backwardness in the hope of shifting the blame to others, as is the case today. Those who invoke the name of the late Sir Ahmadu Bello to score cheap political points forget that, to his eternal credit, the late Sardauna never relied on free cash from the south to develop the north. Unlike his teary eyed, ever complaining, ever murmuring and ever insinuating successors, at no point was Sir Ahmadu Bello reported to have complained, either in private or public, of lop-sided or unfavourable allocations hampering his developmental programmes. Some of those who worked with him are there to bear witness.

There is a way out. From the look of things, the present policy of thirteen per cent derivation is the culprit. And since it has reduced northern political leaders to perpetual complainants, perhaps, the nation should adopt relevant sections of the 1963 Republican Constitution, which adopted a policy of 50 per cent derivation. This way, the complaining northern leaders will have no option but to sit up, look inwards and quit blaming others for their criminal non-performance. After all, the former policy, which was the brainchild of Sir Ahmadu Bello’s northern People’s Congress, NPC, brought out the ingenuity in the late Sardauna, who increasingly looked inwards to raise the resources to make the great strides recorded by his northern regional government. Northern leaders need to realize that their boring swan song of lop-sided and unfavourable federal allocations only serve to reinforce the image of northerners as a lazy, unproductive and parasitic lot.

It is for these reasons that some northerners have continued to carpet numerous meetings, called supposedly to explore the way forward, as a waste of precious time; mere jamborees and politically motivated talk shows with no bearing on aggrieved Northerners. Is someone listening? Certainly not! Presently, the northern governors have given themselves a blank cheque to produce the next President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Last May, the governors resolved to be united, with the aim of producing the (next) president. Because of their bottomless pockets, some of them have even floated mushroom organizations, ostensibly to promote and defend interests of the north and northerners, but which many know are mere smoke screens to promote their presidential ambitions. As to be expected, such misplaced ambitions will only worsen the plight of the people, considering the amount of state resources being stashed away to prosecute their campaigns.

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* Abdulrazaq Magaji, writer, journalist and former history lecturer, lives in Abuja and can be reached at magaji777@yahoo.com

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Who was Emperor Haile Selassie’s mother?

Elyas Mulu Kiros

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83342

cc WikimediaPolitics, ethnicity and religion have always been interwoven in Ethiopia, which is why Haile Selassie never wanted to reveal the full identity of his mother.

“Who was Emperor Haile Selassie’s mother?” is the title of this Amharic article. This is a controversial topic that many Ethiopians feel uncomfortable to talk about due to its political heaviness. The article discusses how the emperor and writers of his biography never revealed his mother’s full name or her photograph in public during or after his reign, deliberately due to the sensitivity of the issue.

Why was it sensitive and why was the mother’s identity hidden from the public unlike the emperor’s father? Simple answer: Because her religious and ethnic identities would have been obstacles to Haile Selassie’s ascent to power. In addition, the emperor’s mother had no royal lineage, but his father Ras Makonnen was a general and governor himself whose parents, though they had mixed heritage, were descended from nobility, which helped the emperor claim the throne.

According to the article: 1) The emperor’s mother had a mixed ethnic background, just like many Ethiopians; she was half-Gurague and half-Wara Iluu; thus, far from the then dominant ethnic group, or ruling class, the Amhara. 2) Her father was a Muslim. Orthodox Christianity was the de-facto official religion at the time.

Think of President Barack (Hussein) Obama for a second and how the US media and the Republicans play with his middle name and mixed background, especially when he visits conservative states. That was, perhaps, the kind of scrutiny that the Emperor wanted to avoid when he guarded his mother’s identity.

The emperor’s mother was called Yeshimebet Ali Gamcho. Yeshimebet is a Christian/Amharic name; Ali is Muslim; and Gamcho is ethnic/non-Amharic.

Why is it relevant to talk about this topic today? In order to fully understand the ongoing political quagmire in Ethiopia and to devise some kind of meaningful solution, one must put the present in a historical context, as Professor Markakis recently argued in an interview. One can use the past like a mirror to reflect the present on it so one can see a clearer future.

Interestingly, both the current Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the former Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam also come from a mixed background. Fortunately, after Mengistu assumed power he never had to worry about his ethnic origin, at least in public (though in private people did call him “baria,” derogatory word, which means slave, because of his very dark skin). Colonel Menigstu purposely mobilized the country under socialist mantra, advocating “one people, one country,” attempting to quell proponents of ethnic nationalism and to secure his power brutally, which he eventually failed.

On the other hand, Meles Zenawi, whose mother was Eritrean and father Ethiopian, isn’t as fortunate as Mengistu, dealing with his mixed identity. His mixed background can be seen as standing on a land mine. Even though he was born and raised in Ethiopia, his opponents constantly accuse him of favoring his mother’s country, Eritrea, instead of the country he rules.

What is more problematic is: Meles is also blamed for favouring his father’s ethnic group, the Tigrayan community that brought him to power in collaboration with other ethnic groups that sacrificed thousands of youth during the armed struggle against the Mengistu regime. Opponents of Meles say he has created a ruling class that uses the Tigrayans as a power base — a power base that also includes members of the satellite parties of other ethnic groups that make up his Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party.

Because of Meles Zenawi’s mixed background and uncontested stay in power, those who oppose him question his legitimacy to rule Ethiopia. His authoritarian rule aside, questioning his Ethiopian-ness is sort of similar to what the birthers in the US say about President Obama whose father was Kenyan.

In Ethiopia, politics, religion and ethnicity (or provinciality) have always been interwoven. The trio together has played a major role in shaping Ethiopia’s history. During the monarchy, religion, particularly Orthodox Christianity, was the uniting force, upon which the kings legitimized their kingship. The royals, even if most had a mixed ethnic background, traced their lineage only to Christian nobles who rarely embraced their diverse ethnic identities, other than claiming to be either Amharas or Tigrayans in public.

Later, in the socialist revolution, the church was stripped of its power to influence national policy, but it still remained powerful enough that the socialists barely messed with it. After the revolution, ethnicity took religion’s place as a means to fight against the Mengistu dictatorship, to unseat the dictator through armed struggle, and to introduce a new system of governance that based itself entirely on ethnicity, hence, its name ethnic federalism, which has helped Meles to rule for twenty plus years.

Today’s opposition parties that want to get rid of the Meles government are equally affected by ethnicity, divided and disorganized mainly due to their failure to find a common ground — some of them want the full implementation of ethnic federalism, while others want to completely bury it. Religion, though now in the background, is still influential since majority of Ethiopians are deeply religious. One example is the recent clash between the government and the two major religious groups (Muslims and Orthodox Christians) — both groups have demanded the federal government to stop trespassing on their spaces.

Ethiopians who are unsatisfied with the current system have yet to find a common voice to come up with a better alternative, an alternative that leaves no room for ethnic loyalty and ethnic hegemony, but at the same time that guarantees the protection of both individual and group rights — rights to have fair economic and political opportunity, for example. What is lacking most is compromise — the emergence of moderate politicians who have realistic goals and can easily cross between party lines for the common good. What we have instead is extremism — too many extremists from here and there who only want to choke one another if they get a chance.

Disregarding the needs of Ethiopia’s diverse groups and without developing Ethiopian solutions for Ethiopian problems, simply copycatting abstract ideas from other countries, will be practically fruitless as past and present experiences demonstrate. Whatever works in other nations doesn’t necessarily mean it will work in Ethiopia, unless customized to fit local needs.

The solution for Ethiopia’s unresolved political problems lies in the causes of the problems. And one of the primary causes has always been the competition for power and control of resources among ethnic elites. As a remedy, think of something like a vaccine — a curative substance for a disease, prepared from the causative agent of the disease — which means establishing a genuinely representative form of government that almost every citizen can welcome, unlike the present system that lets one party win 99.6% of seats in parliament. The diverse groups in the country must feel they have equal voice or fair representation in the national or federal government, both as leaders and followers, regardless of their population size, big or small.

Furthermore, increase the literacy rate; empower local self-governance systems that have been proven effective; internalize democratic principles; build strong institutions that secure democratization; abide by the constitution; create an environment of trust; encourage innovation in business and technology; fight poverty; let there be equal opportunity for any person anywhere in the country; never suffocate an individual or a group; allow freedom of expression and enjoy the freedom responsibly; respect and tolerate diversity (ethnic, religious, or free thinking); reward merit; say no to cronyism or nepotism; then expect a different kind of Ethiopia where the future generation will worry less about identity politics, but more about economic security, the arts, the environment, science, and technology.

Had Ethiopia achieved that before, perhaps the emperor would have embraced his mother’s identity in public, never hiding it to protect his power; perhaps the Colonel would not have sought revenge against those who called him “baria” due to his dark skin; perhaps the Prime Minister would have been considered as a legitimate leader by all; perhaps the country would have avoided authoritarian governments altogether; and perhaps most educated Ethiopians who live abroad would have happily returned to build their homeland. Perhaps …

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* Elyas Mulu Kiros blogs at http://www.kweschn.wordpress.com

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A derrota do Ocidente na Líbia e o seu declínio ideológico

Jean-Paul Pougala

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83354

cc BRQ NetworkO Professor universitário camaronês estabelecido na Suíça efetua mais uma análise da guerra na Líbia e das suas consequências ideológicas.

Quando em 19/03/2011 a França lançou suas primeiras bombas sobre Trípoli, vários elementos concordantes estavam reunidos para poder se afirmar tratar-se de verdadeiro suicídio político do Ocidente. Primeiramente porque a mentira final para o pretexto de declarar guerra à Líbia era grande como um elefante. Em segundo lugar porque o Ocidente não dispõe dos meios financeiros para declarar guerra ao planeta, e o pior é o fato de que seus dirigentes ainda ignoram isso. Assim passa-se muito facilmente da usura da credibilidade pelo Ocidente ao ridículo ante os olhos dos novos países emergentes que já tomaram a bandeira da articulação da liderança mundial. Enquanto em Paris, Londres e Washington acumulam-se as mentiras sobre a guerra na Líbia por ventura por um só instante ocorre o questionamento sobre o impacto devastador dessas inverdades sobre a imagem e a credibilidade do Ocidente em Moscou, Pequim ou Brasília?

Quando em 28/07/2011, mais de quatro meses após o "hold-up" fracassado sobe a Líbia, Paris e Londres repetiram uma operação já experimentada na crise da Costa do Marfim visando recuperar as Embaixadas da Líbia no intuito de ocupá-las com os pretensos "representantes da revolução líbia", isso não representa prova cabal da desordem política de uma classe política destrambelhada? Parece uma navegação às cegas de toda uma geração de líderes políticos sem ideal e sem ideias inovadoras, mais ocupados em multiplicar as manobras de diversão para encobrir sua profunda incapacidade de antecipar e obter os elementos de resposta à ansiedade e à angústia de toda uma população que não sabe mais com que molho ela será comida neste século XXI de líderes políticos ineptos e fundamentados em receitas ultrapassadas, de Varsóvia a Washington com passagem por Londres, Roma e Paris.

VIOLÊNCIA DIPLOMÁTICA

A ocupação da Embaixada da Líbia em Paris e em Londres é ato de mal concebida violência diplomática que expõe o súbito pânico daqueles que têm a responsabilidade dessa guerra inútil, e tal fato nos convida a formular uma pergunta nesse momento certamente direcionada a Paris e a Londres: existe um meio de se perder uma guerra sem perder a honra? A resposta é NÃO. O Dr. Moussa Ibrahim, portavoz do governo líbio apresenta uma constante nas suas conferências para a imprensa. E sobre esse ponto pode-se lhe dar razão no sentido de que na Líbia o Ocidente faz a guerra segundo o calendário, segundo o tempo, de acordo com o caderno de acusações às autoridades líbias e não o inverso. O Dr. Moussa sempre disse depois de sua primeira conferência no mês março de 2011 que a guerra era feita para durar parque a Líbia esperava ser invadida de um dia para o outro, e então organizara um sistema de defesa do país, não com base num exército do tipo clássico, mas no padrão dos clãs. E o mínimo que se pode dizer é que de todos os atores presentes na famosa caverna de Platão é o Ocidente que entra em guerra sem preparação, pois se baseia em informações errôneas e pratica monstruosidades como o massacre de crianças líbias; assim como pratica a pesca em águas territoriais líbias em plena guerra, pirateando também um petroleiro líbio em 04/08/2011 em alto mar e reconduzindo-o ao porto de Benghazi, exatamente como fazem os piratas somalianos: o Ocidente é este prisioneiro mantido na caverna o qual jamais viu o dia e sonha com sua própria sombra projetada sobre o muro graças à luz de um mundo mais globalizado, uma realidade que essas travas não possuem. E isso se aplica à política de um país ou continente, pois não há mais sabedor no sentido platônico do termo. Os líbios, ao contrário, mesmo sob chuvas de bombas do Ocidente, conseguiram sua ascensão dialética no sentido de se içar para fora da mesma caverna, sentindo na passagem o brilho do sol o qual tiveram a coragem de olhar com toda a face para sair dessas trevas. E os resultados não se fizeram esperar: enquanto no campo dos rebeldes ocorreu o salve-se quem puder rumo a Benghazi e, em 6 de agosto de 2011, a maioria dos membros do CNTfugiu em direção à Turquia após massacrar 120 civis que pretendiam se dissociar deles para retornar a Kadhafi, no lado do governo, em Trípoli, viu-se ao contrário 10.000 voluntários se juntarem ao exército líbio no prazo de três dias, isso depois que o Ocidente anunciara a iminência da tomada de Trípoli pelos rebeldes – submetidos, bem entendido, à lavagem cerebral. -- Porém isso causou um efeito bumerangue e, no lugar da esperada deserção de militares, foram os civis que se ofereceram ao exército como instinto de resistência do povo face à agressão externa.

TURBILHÃO DA CRISE

Observadas as experiências afegãs e iraquianas e visto o conteúdo da resolução 1973 da ONU que proíbe a ocupação do solo e tendo em conta a situação tribal líbia, como pensará o Ocidente em sair desse conflito sem se ridicularizar aos olhos do planeta Terra ao anunciar ao mundo que, para ele, o sucesso ou fracasso dessa guerra se resumiria à morte ou à vida do líder líbio? E o pior de tudo isso e o que nos prova que o avião do Ocidente (envolto num turbilhão de crise financeira aguda e sem via da saída viável) não possui qualquer piloto a bordo é essa unanimidade de sustentação da classe midiático-política europeia -- da extrema direita à extrema esquerda -- a uma guerra que até criancinhas podem predizer que jamais será vencida, pois o homem que se deseja matar é amado e seguido por todo o seu povo. Se a democracia possuísse um sentido não seria a Kadhafi e ao povo líbio que o Ocidente deveria atacar. Como num jogo eletrônico, um caçador deixa a Europa, percorre 1.000 km para ir lançar uma bomba que custa 300.000 euros sobre um alvo onde os indicadores norte-americanos creram haver visto a silhueta que parecia a do líder líbio. Equívoco! Era um hospital para crianças. E esta pequena parte do jogo por vídeo custou a vida de 38 crianças líbias. O piloto pode retornar à base, convicto de haver cumprido sua missão. Bravo! Bravo ao parlamento francês que aplaudiu unânime esta forma de barbárie porque quando se trata do bolo africano, tanto em França quanto na Grã-Bretanha, não existe mais direita ou esquerda, não existe mais UMP, nem PS, existe a APU, a Associação de Predadores Unificados: a questão é que no século XXI esqueceu-se de lhes despertar de seu longo sono colonial para, então, explicar para eles que o mundo mudou e que a juventude africana muito politizada e já imunizada contra o sono dogmático da religião não se deixará levar como seus inocentes pais.

No duplo atentado de Oslo e Utoya na Noruega, com a morte de 70 adolescentes inocentes que militavam justamente por um mundo melhor, um mundo de compreensão e respeito mútuo, o euro deputado italiano Mario Borghezio exprime sua solidariedade pelo assassino Anders Breivik sem que isso suscite a mínima indignação no seio da União Europeia. Trata-se de uma União deveras ativa para apontar os africanos maus; maus quando se recusam a submeter seus países. Hoje um euro deputado pode se alegrar com a morte de dezenas de crianças europeias (norueguesas) sem que isso incomode a União Europeia que, oficialmente, se preocupa tanto com a sorte dos cidadãos líbios. Para se compreender o grau de agravamento do declínio do Ocidente, observe-se que em 2000 Viena aumentara as sanções diplomáticas como forma de protestos europeus contra a aliança entre os conservadores austríacos de Wolfang Schüssel e o FPO, partido de extrema direita dirigido então pelo sulfuroso Jörg Haider.

PERSONALIZAÇÃO DO ÓDIO

Em 2000 dentre os 15 países de União Europeia de então 13 eram governados por partidos de esquerda. Hoje os 27 países são quase todos dirigidos por partidos de direita e extrema direita que fazem do ódio aos não-brancos o ponto central de seu programa político e chegam até a torná-lo o tema principal nas suas campanhas eleitorais. Isso por fim resultou na realidade de que hoje a União Europeia é a personificação das ideias de Anders Breivik, ou seja, o ódio àqueles que não são brancos, isto é, todos aqueles que não sejam de origem europeia. O desdém e desprezo com os quais os europeus se comportaram ontem na Costa do Marfim ao humilhar um presidente democraticamente eleito ao trocá-lo por um homem detido e dócil, bem como a postura adotada hoje na Líbia no sentido de decretar que um presidente e toda a sua família devem deixar seu país nos mostram como eles detestam a nós, africanos. Por que não mostram o mesmo despeito contra a Síria, contra Miaman onde uma candidata vencedora das eleições foi aprisionada, onde os monges são assassinados sem que o TPI tome qualquer medida. Como eles nos detestam! Toda a Europa entrou em crise devido à chegada de algumas centenas de refugiados tunisianos a seu território enquanto que a própria Tunísia acolhia em silêncio 1 milhão de refugiados vindos da Líbia devido à guerra provocada por estes mesmos europeus contra a Líbia.

E o que é ainda mais surpreendente em tudo isso: como explicar que os líderes políticos europeus que chamo de SUPERMENTIROSOS decidam impunemente vir nos bombardear, promovendo encontros fora da África para deliberar sobre nosso destino sem que haja o mais vago protesto da parte dos chefes de Estados africanos presos a um medo infundado, pois o Ocidente, ensandecido, não possui mais os meios de exercer qualquer pressão sobre quem quer que seja na África. Isso porque a empresa colonial do Ocidente na África acabou. Como previra Adam Smith quando, durante muito tempo, habitua-se ao usufruir de vantagens indevidas cria-se uma "normalidade" que, a bem do fato, é artificial. E o dia no qual aqueles que por ignorância e ingenuidade renunciaram a seus direitos e a suas vantagens para permitir esta situação artificial saírem da sua ignorância será um momento muito duro, muito duro para aquelas nações que houverem construído sua normalidade sobre a miséria dos outros. E não será a guerra contra a Líbia que mudará a rapidez desse declínio, dessa lenta descida em direção ao inferno econômico.

AONDE VAI O MUNDO?

Os mestres do pensamento, do Renascimento europeu a Sartre, desapareceram porém não foram substituídos. Hoje os filósofos europeus não são mais mestres do pensamento e sim mestres do plágio, à la Botul. Antes mesmo de servir para governar o mundo multipolar do terceiro milênio o pensamento talvez tenha de ser reinventado. Mas como chegar a isso quando a metástese do dinheiro invadiu e poluiu todo o Ocidente? Se o Ocidente que levou 3 séculos para inventar e desenvolver o humanismo falhou na sua criação, por que China e Brasil poderiam fazê-lo melhor? O futuro nos responderá. Porém o que constato e me consola é o fato de que na China a filosofia ainda possui um sentido; lá os políticos não estão a serviço das multinacionais como no Ocidente e sim as multinacionais a serviço do Estado. Os líderes parecem possuir um mínimo de ética em política; trata-se do confucionismo aplicado à própria concepção de política no lugar das bombas da OTAN para a extração de algumas gotas de petróleo da África. As autoridades chinesas orgulham-se de anunciar que sua política externa segue os princípios de um discípulo de Confúcio chamado Mo Tseu, o mesmo que criou o conceito de amor universal. Mo Tseu, nascido em 479 e morto em 381 antes da era cristã, sustenta que quando se ama demais sua família surge a tentação de roubar seus vizinhos e que quando se ama demais seu país e nada mais que seu país existe a tentação de se declarar guerra a outros países por motivos fúteis. A 23 séculos Mo Tseu sustentava que aqueles que desejam resolver os problemas humanos com a guerra são loucos e deve-se desconfiar seriamente deles caso não se deseje correr em direção a uma verdadeira catástrofe da humanidade inteira.

A crise do Ocidente se traduz portanto pela falta de pensadores, pela falta de sabedores, pela falta de guias e de intelectuais engajados. O rei dinheiro devastou tudo a sua passagem. Os ocidentais tornaram-se o que a filósofa Jacqueline Russ designou com o termo de "nômades culturais", pois não sabem mais para onde vão, e menos ainda onde vão dormir amanhã. Trata-se de uma navegação de curta visibilidade em todos os âmbitos. As decisões mais graves são do tipo epidérmico, como a entrada em guerra com a Líbia. Nos séculos das luzes foram os filósofos europeus que denunciaram seus governantes por banditismo de Estado. Hoje são os filósofos franceses, italianos e ingleses que incitam a entrada em guerra com a Líbia porque lá há um ganho material a se obter. Esses filósofos e humanistas ocidentais são tão mostram-se tão exigentes para com os direitos humanos na Líbia, contudo parecem totalmente amnésicos sobre a situação na Síria, no Yémen, em Miamã, no Coreia do Norte, pois lá nada há para se retirar. Hoje é a esquerda política europeia pretensamente progressista que incita a utilização de armas para dobrar a vontade de resistência dos mais fracos do mundo para, assim, lhes impor o pensamento único do servilismo internacional em vigor.

PILHAGEM

Como teriam reagido os intelectuais europeus, os "verdadeiros sabedores" a 150 anos face à agressão em curso contra o povo líbio? A resposta vem da mui bela carta que Victor Hugo escreveu em 1861 para denunciar outra agressão feita pelos mesmos, França e Grã-Bretanha, contra a China e mais exatamente na pilhagem do célebre Palácio de Inverno de Pequim. Hugo escreve ao capitão de Napoleão responsável por essa expedição, o capitão Butler, para, assim, se disassociar desse suposto troféu da vitória da França de Napoleão sobre a China sem defesa. Ele escreve:

Hauteville House, 25 de novembro de 1861

(...) Imaginai não se sabe qual construção inexprimível, alguma coisa como um edifício lunar, e tereis o Palácio de Verão. Construais um sonho com mármore, jade, bronze, porcelana; emoldurai-o em madeira de cedro, cubrai-o de joias, encortinai-o de seda, façai-o então santuário, o harém, a citadela, colocai lá os deuses, os monstros, envernizai-os, esmaltai-o, dourai-o, recubrai-o, fazei construir por arquitetos que sejam poetas os mil e um sonhos das mil e uma noites, acrescentai jardins, lagoas, jorros d'água e de espuma junto a cisnes, íbis e pavões; suponhai,numa palavra, uma espécie de caverna deslumbrante da fantasia humana com figura de templo e de palácio... Este monumento estava lá. Para criá-lo foi necessário o lento trabalho de duas gerações. Esse edifício que possuía a enormidade de uma cidade fora construído pelos séculos, e por quem? Pelos povos, pois o que constitui o tempo pertence ao homem. Os artistas, os poetas, os filósofos, eles conheciam o Palácio de Verão; Voltaire fala dele. Dizia-se: o Partenon na Grécia, as Pirâmides no Egito, o Coliseu em Roma, Notre-Dame em Paris, e o Palácio de Inverno no Oriente. Se não se podia vê-lo, sonhava-se com ele. Afigurava-se como espécie de impressionante obra-prima desconhecida, vislumbrada de longe num crepúsculo misterioso, como uma silhueta da civilização asiana sobre o horizonte da civilização da Europa.

Essa maravilha desapareceu

Um dia, dois bandidos entraram no Palácio de Verão. Um deles o pilhou; o outro incendiou-o. A vitória pode parecer uma ladra. Uma grande devastação do Palácio de Inverno foi deflagrada em parceria entre os dois vencedores. Existe o desejo de misturar em tudo isso o nome de Elgin o qual possui a propriedade fatal de lembrar o Partenon. O que se fez no Partenon fez-se também no Palácio de Verão, e de forma mais completa e maior, de maneira a nada deixar. Todos os tesouros de todas as nossas catedrais reunidos não igualariam esse esplêndido e formidável museu do Oriente. Lá não havia somente obras de arte, lá havia acúmulos de joias. Grande conquista, bom proveito. Um dos dois vencedores encheu seus bolsos; vendo isso, o outro encheu os seus cofres; e assim voltaram à Europa, abarrotados e risonhos. Esta é a história de dois bandidos.
Nós, europeus, nós somos os civilizados, e para nós os chineses são os bárbaros. Eis o que a civilização fez à barbárie.

Diante da História um dos dois bandidos se chamará França, o outro se chamará Inglaterra. Porém eu protesto, e vos agradeço por me dar tal oportunidade; os crimes daqueles que governam não são culpa daqueles que são governados; algumas vezes os governantes são bandidos; os povos jamais.

O império francês embolsou a metade dessa vitória e hoje dissipa, com uma espécie de ingenuidade de proprietário, o esplêndido acervo do Palácio de Verão.
Eu espero que chegue um dia em que a França, liberta e purificada, devolverá esse botim à China espoliada.

Trata-se de uma pendência onde existe um roubo e dois ladrões, eu o constato. Esta é, caro senhor, a medida de aprovação que dou à expedição à China.

Victor Hugo

A experiência dramática do fiasco do Ocidente na guerra de Biafra deve lhe ensinar a saber perder uma guerra para assim não fazer vítimas inúteis. Matar os filhos e netos de Kadhafi até exterminar toda a sua família só destruirá a moral dos políticos ocidentais incompetentes e sem visão de futuro, os quais desencadearam uma guerra sórdida que não deveria acontecer. Da mesma forma a cumplicidade e o silêncio dos intelectuais europeus diante das atrocidades de seus dirigentes políticos na Costa do Marfim ontem e na Líbia hoje deve servir de alerta sobre o que a Europa se tornou aos olhos do mundo.

ESTE TEXTO FOI PROPOSTO A VOCÊ POR PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Não se limite apenas a repassar os artigos de Pambazuka! Torne-se também um amigo de Pambazuka e faça uma doação AGORA para ajudar a manter Pambazuka LIVRE e INDEPENDENTE! http://www.pambazuka.org/fr/friends.php


** Jean-Paul Pougala é um escritor camaronês. Ele também é professor de Geopolítica na Universidade da Diplomacia em Genebra, na Suíça. Este artigo é o 4º sobre a Líbia. Os três outros precedentes encontram-se no site www.pougala.org -pougala@gmail.com

*** Envie seus comentários para editor@pambazuka.org ou comente on line pelo site de Pambazuka News

A dimensão internacional do conflito no Congo oriental

Gary K. Busch

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/83355

cc E POs lucros e riquezas obtidos pela exploração dos recursos naturais do Congo Oriental continuam a alimentar a violência, a pilhagem e o sofrimento da população congolesa.

O território africano que abrange Uganda, Ruanda e a República Democrática do Congo (RDC) tem estado praticamente em guerra desde 1995. Mais precisamente num estado de guerra entre esses Estados. Isso desembocou em exércitos nacionais, milícias, grupos de “defesa civil”, pilhagens, saques e sequestros de crianças, estupros e assassinatos. Essas práticas não se excluem mutuamente, pois quase todas essas categorias contém a maior parte senão a totalidade das espécies de sociopatas. A esse contexto pode-se acrescentar as “forças de paz” das Nações Unidas cujas medidas de deficiências sociais refletem aquelas da população a qual supostamente deveriam manter em paz.

As guerras no Congo Oriental custaram a vida de milhões de congoleses que pagaram o preço de viver num país muito rico, onde todas as gestões são omissas com suas instituições civis em falência, quando estas existem. Essas guerras, concentradas principalmente no Congo Oriental (Norte e Sul de Kivu e Maniema), envolveram nove nações africanas e afetaram a vida de 50 milhões de congoleses.

Entre agosto de 1998 e abril de 2004 aproximadamente 3,8 milhões de pessoas perderam a vida por morte violenta na RDC. Depois de 2004 esta cifra quase dobrou. Boa parte desses mortos se deve à fome ou às doenças resultantes da guerra, bem como a execuções sumárias e à captura entre os grupos. Milhões de pessoas foram desterradas e procuraram asilo em países vizinhos. O estupro ocorria em toda a parte.

Desde 1996, a guerra e o genocídio da vizinha Ruanda transpuseram as fronteiras da RDC. As forças das milícias hutus de Ruanda (interahamwe) foram ajudadas por tropas francesas da Operação Turquesa para escapar de Ruanda. Isso permitiu a criação de campos de refugiados hutus na RDC repletos de fugitivos da Interahamwe. Não é de se surpreender que isso atraísse a atenção dos tutsis (os baniamulengues) na suposição de que esses campos hutus baseados na RDC não permitem ataques contra Ruanda.

Em outubro de 1996 as forças patrióticas ruandesas (FPR − as forças de Kagame) penetraram na RDC com uma coalisão armada liderada por Laurent Désiré Kabila, conhecida pelo nome de Aliança das Forças Democráticas Para a Libertação do Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Kabila foi colocado no poder após a destituição de Mobuto em maio de 1997. Ele se declarou Presidente, consolidou seu poder e o da AFDL e mudou o nome do país para República Democrática do Congo (RDC). Os militares da RDC foram renomeados Forças Armadas Congolesas (FAC). Enquanto as FAC sw reorganizavam, as tropas ruandesas cuidaram da segurança no Leste. Elas foram confrontadas então com diferentes milícias em competição:

– A milícias étnicas hutus dos interahamwe, originárias principalmente de Ruanda as quais combateram o governo dominado pelos tutsis em Ruanda;
– Os membros hutus das antigas Forças Armadas de Ruanda, considerados responsáveis pelo genocídio dos tutsis em 1994 e que também combateram o governo de Ruanda;
– Os mau mau, uma difusa organização de tradicionais forças de defesa congolesas que combateram o fluxo de migrantes ruandeses;
– The Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) [A Aliança das Forças Democráticas] composta de expatriados ugandeses e sustentada pelo governo do Sudão o qual combatia o governo de Uganda, E
– Vários grupos hutus em Burundi que combatiam o governo de Burundi dominado pelos tutsis.

Ao longo de 1997 as relações entre Kabila e seus antigos aliados (Museweni em Uganda e Kagame em Ruanda) se deterioraram. Em julho de 1998 Kabila ordenou a saída de todas as tropas estrangeiras em território da RDC. Elas, porém, recusaram sob o argumento de que as tropas congolesas eram incapazes de defender interesses dos antigos aliados ante os grupos de exilados que operavam no Congo Oriental. Em 2 de agosto de 1997 foram deflagrados combates em toda a RDA, encasião em que as antigas tropas ruandesas se “amotinaram” e novas tropas ruandesas e ugandesas entraram no Congo. Kagame mandou suas tropas atacarem Kinshassa a fim de destituir Kabila, na esperança de que seus aliados tutsis de Banyamulengue – novo grupo rebelde apoiado por Kigali e conhecido pelo nome deRassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) [União Congolesa pela Democracia] tomaria o poder. Pouco depois Museweni criou um grupo rebelde chamado Movimento pela Libertação do Congo (MLC) com o propósito de lutar pelos interesses de Uganda, e então enviou milhares de soldados ugandeses ao Congo. Essa campanha foi impedida por tropas angolanas, nanibianas e do Zimbabwe as quais intervieram em apoio à RDC.

No entanto esta situação deixou O Congo Oriental (onde acontecia a guerra) nas mãos dos ugandeses e ruandeses, caindo alguns setores também no controle dos mau mau e de Burundi. Isso gerou uma situação em que as forças de ocupação dispuseram de tempo para a pilhagem das riquezas do nacionais da RDC. Numerosos relatos e documentos atestam que, a partir de 1997, uma primeira onda de “novos homens de negócios”, falantes apenas do inglês do kinyaRuanda ou do kiswahili, iniciaram suas operações no Congo Oriental. O roubo de gado, de café em grãos e de outros recursos começou a ser relatado com frequência.
Quando, em agosto de1998, eclodiu aguerra, os oficiais superiores ruandeses e ugandeses e seus associados já possuíam profundo conhecimento sobre o potencial em recursos naturais, em especial do coltan [mistura de dois minerais: columbita e tantalita] e da sua localização na RDC.

A decisão ugandesa, tomada em agosto de 1998, de entrar em guerra era defendida pelos oficiais superiores veteranos do Congo Oriental durante a primeira guerra e que lá haviam calculado o potencial das riquezas. As forças ugandesas mostravam grande interesse em ocupar as regiões onde há ouro e diamentes. Em setembro de 1998 essa pilhagem foi atribuída ao irmão de Museweni, o general Salim Saleh (nascido em 14 de janeiro de 1960 com o nome de Caleb Afande Akandwanaho), homem ávido por dinheiro, traficante de drogas, ladrão e explorador. Salim Saleh criou uma companhia que transformaria a RDC Oriental num território de barganha pelos recursos naturais. O projeto jamais se materializou nesta forma, porém tornou-se uma pilhagem pura e simples com o beneplácito do presidente ugandês Yoweri Museweni.

Ainda que pretendessem demonstrar preocupação pelas questões de segurança na RDC, os oficiais superiores possuíam claramente uma agenda fechada no sentido econômico e financeiro. Alguns meses antes que a guerra eclodisse em 1998 o general Salim Saleh e o filho mais velho do presidente Museweni haviam visitado o Congo Oriental. Um mês após o início do conflito, o general James Kazini achava-se igualmente envolvido em atividades comerciais. Ele já conhecia os setores mais lucrativos e organizara imediatamente os comandantes locais para que servissem seus interesses econômicos e financeiros.

Ruanda não estava fora desse processo. O Banco do Comércio Desenvolvimento e Indústria (BCDI) sediado na capital Kigali funcionava como centro dos acordos financeiros. Esse era iniciamente o canal por onde fluíam todos os rendimentos ruandeses e ugandeses resultantes do engajamento desses países nas questões da RDC. Quando a guerra eclodiu, Ruanda conservou esse canal, enquanto Uganda fundava seu próprio sistema. Quando as hostilidades se iniciaram, a extração de minerais se acelerou, sem se levar em conta a segurança e os métodos racionais de extração.

Em setembro de 1999 o comandante local da UPDF exigiu a extração de ouro das galerias de Gorumbwa nas quais foi feito o uso de dinamite. A galeria demoronou causandoa morte de grande número de mineiros congoleses. Alguns meses mais tarde os soldados ugandeses, vindos para a exploração das minas, contraíram doenças respiratórias. Quando os comandantes locais foram informados sobre os perigos dessas atividades, eles estimaram que o número de mortos e doentes se situava em nível aceitável.

Durante anos os congoleses da região haviam praticado a mineração com métodos artesanais para o seu próprio benefício. A novidade dos novos métodos reside no fato de que agora muitos foram utilizados como “trabalhadores que se pode persuadir” para a extração de ouro, diamante e coltan. Na localidade de Bondo, na província de Equador, adolescentes e rapazes entre 12 e 18 anos foram recrutados pelo ex-vicepresidente Jean-Pierre Bemba. Os ugandeses aliados formaram os recrutas e fizeram com que estes compartilhassem a ideia de que o exército ugandês era um “exército de desenvolvimento” determinado a melhorar as condições de vida do cidadão comum. Após uma hora de exercícios físicos eles eram enviados às minas para extrair ouro em benefício dos ugandeses e de Bemba.

Em Kalima, o comandante Ruto da FPR arregimentou duas equipes locais de congoleses para a extração do coltan. Esses congoleses trabalhavam sob a guarda de soldados Ruandeses fortemente armados. No distrito noroeste de Kilo Moto, rico em minerais, os comandantes ugandeses da região e alguns dos soldados que vigiavam os diferentes pontos de entradas das minas permitiam e encorajavam a população local a extrair o minério. O trato entre os soldados e os mineiros era o de que cada mineiro entregaria um grama de ouro por dia na entrada/saída da mina. Em média cerca de dois milhões de pessoas aceitavam essa concessão seis dias por semana. Tratava-se de negócio bem organizado e que fluía sem atritos. Em média eram entregues 2 kg diários de ouro a pessoa que liderava essa rede [em cada mina].

Outra forma de extração organizada desse minério pelas forças de ocupação implicava na importação de mão-de-obra. As forças de ocupação recrutaram trabalhadores de seu próprio país, fornecendo segurança e logística. Ruanda, em particular, utilizou prisioneiros para a extração do coltan, em troca de redução de pena e de quantidade limitada de dinheiro para a alimentação. Só na região de Numbi de Kalehe, ao Sul de Kivu, trabalhavam nada menos do que 1.500 prisioneiros ruandeses. Esses detentos foram vistos na extração do coltan, sob a guarda de soldados ruandeses.

A exploração ilegal de recursos naturais não se restringia aos minerais e produtos agrícolas. Ela também revelava o viés das transações financeiras, das taxas (cambiais) e do emprego de mão-de-obra barata. Os bancos e as seguradoras locais de Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunie e Gbadolite encontravam-se em relação direta com Kigali ou Kampala. Um sistema de coleta de impostos – Forçado até o constrangimento em alguns casos – foi maquinado entre MLC, RCD-[ Acrônimo de Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie = União Congolesa Pela Democracia]-ML e RDC-Goma junto a seus homônimos ugandeses e Ruandeses já estabelecidos. Segundo palavras dos rebeldes, essas taxas serviriam para “financiar ou sustentar o esforço de guerra”.

De fato parte dos fundos arrecadados era enviada a Kigali (no caso da RCD-Goma). No caso dos antigos RCD-ML e MLC, não somente uma parte das taxas era enviada a Kampala, mas também alguns coronéis tiravam proveito desse fluxo. Nas zonas de Búnia e de Bukavu a população protestou, fez manifestações e denunciou essa prática abusiva. Nas regiões controladas por Bemba, um camponês que transportasse óleo de palma na sua bicicleta deveria pagar uma taxa pela carga. No setor da extração mineral as coisas podiam acontecer de três maneiras: (a) taxas individuais para soldados para o próprio benefício, (b) taxas para as pessoas de região organizadas pelos comandantes Ruandeses e ugandeses e, (c) por cidadãos estrangeiros através da proteção do exército ou de um comandante.

Este foi o sistema de exploração da RDC referentes a seus recursos humanos e riquezas minerais apesar dos acordos de paz assinados em Lusaka, os quais deveriam findar guerra. Os exércitos beligerantes foram substituídos pelos senhores da guerra e pelas milícias cujo sistema de exploração assumiu a forma da pilhagem, do estupro e do assassinato. A maior parte desses grupos tem afinidades com os governos de Ruanda e de Uganda os quais gerem os aspectos físicos do marcado das riquezas exportadas. Ruanda sustentou “rebeldes” como os senhores de guerra Laurent Nkunda e Bosco Ntanganda. Estes foram os maquinadores da pilhagem contínua do Congo por Ruanda. Outros fazem o mesmo em Uganda. Eles operam em total impunidade.

Assim indivíduos responsáveis por atrocidades sem fim são protegidos. Dentre eles vale citar: Yoweri Museweni, Salim Saleh, Paul Kagame, James Kazini, Moses Ali, James Kabarebe, Taban Amin, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Laurent Nkunda, Bosco Ntanganda, Meles Zenawi, além de uma longa lista de pessoas cuja culpabilidade não deixa qualquer dúvida. Muitos dentre eles são reconhecidamente culpados por repetidas atrocidades. Bemba finalmente compareceu ante o TPI [Tribunal Penal Internacional]. Contudo a razão disso recai mais na sua oposição política a Kabila Junior e à Républica Centro Africana do que a seus desmandos no Congo Oriental.

Em teoria as Nações Unidas têm equipes pacificadoras na RDC, como é o caso da MONUC(Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo [Missão da Organização das Nações Unidas na República Democrática do Congo]), as quais devem manter a paz. Após o 1º de julho de 2010 a MONUC foi renomeada Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation em République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO [Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização na República Democrática do Congo]). O saldo da MONUC não é dos mais impressionantes. Nas palavras de um general do Zimbabwe: “Eles são como tetas na barriga de um touro. Eles estão lá, mas não servem para nada!” As duas razões inerentes à sua falta de sucesso são as seguintes:

(1) no início eles contavam com a presença de militares franceses sediados na região do Ituri os quais recusavam deixar a cidade porque dois oficiais franceses haviam sido mortos por rebeldes já na primeira ronda,
(2) porque esses militares esperavam que as forças Ruandesas assumissem a coordenação da luta contra os rebeldes, em vez de apoiá-los sob o pretexto de ajudar a MUNUSCO. Esse programa não ofereceu maiores perspectivas aos congoleses. A bem do fato muitos “pacificadores” aderiram, por sua própria conta, aos estupros, pilhagem e assassinatos. Alguns foram sentenciados e repatriados. Sua presença na RDC aumenta o medo da população.

Enquanto esse conflito prossegue, o mundo volta seu olhar para outra batalha na região: a luta contra o Lord’s Resistence Army (LRA [Exército de Resistência do Senhor]). O LRA é uma organização ugandesa de reputação sanguinária. A reação do governo de Uganda tem sido igualmente brutal. Em setembro de 1996 o governo desse país implementou uma política de deportações forçadas da etnia acholi para campos de pessoas expatriadas no distrito de de Gulu. Depois de 1996 essa imposição se estende, englobando toda a população acholi de quatro distritos – um milhão de pessoas. Esses campos de deportados caracterizam-se por uma das mortalidades mais altas do mundo, com cerca de mil mortes por semana segundo estimativas. O LRA se apoderou da maior parte dos víveres dos acholis deportados, subjugados, expulsos de suas casas e cujas famílias vivem agora nos campos de deportados.

Joseph Kony (nascido em 1961) encabeça o Lord’Resistence Army. Ele declarou que o LRA conduzirá uma campanha política, militar e espiritual para o estabelecimento de um governo teocrático em Uganda, baseado nos dez Mandamentos. Essa milícia afirma que Deus lhe envia espíritos para comunicar diretamente a Kony a sua missão. O LRA adquiriu reputação de violência sem limites contra a população de várias nações, inclusas as de Uganda, RDC e Sudão. Estima-se que ele cooptou e forçou aproximadamente 60 mil crianças a combater a seu lado e que também forçou mais de dois milhões de pessoas ao êxodo após o início da rebelião em 1986. Entre 1996 e 2001 houve muitas tentativas internacionais em favor da paz e para interromper o rapto de crianças por estes radicais. Todas fracassaram no que tange à cessação dos raptos, estupros, bem como ao fim do uso de crianças como soldados e à violência contra civis, incluso os ataques aos campos de refugiados. Após o atentado de 11 de setembro, os Estados Unidos declararam o LRA um grupo terrorista e Joseph Kony um terrorista.

Após o fracasso das negociações de paz ao fim de 2008, o Conselho Nacional de Segurança norte-americano autorizou o AFRICOM (Comando Militar para a África) a apoiar operações militares contra o LRA (numa das primeiras operações do AFRICOM publicamente reconhecidas), onde presumivelmente essa milícia se encontre agora no Congo. O AFRICOM treinou as tropas nacionais e forneceu 1 milhão de dólares como manutenção financeira à “Operation Lightning Thunder” (Operação Relâmpago Trovão) – um esforço conjunto das forças ugandesas, congolesas e do Sudão do Sul em território congolês as quais lançaram uma operação em dezembro de 2008 visando “eliminar a ameaça representada pelo LRA”. De acordo com as Nações Unidas, essa operação ocorreu “sem avaliação do terreno no que concerne à proteção dos civis”. Após período de três meses a missão fracassou. O LRA se espalhou e exerceu represálias contra a população congolesa. Mais de mil pessoas foram assassinadas e mais de 200 mil deportadas.

Essa batalha contra o LRA deve ser vista como a continuação das batalhas no Congo Oriental. Em outubro de 2011, o Presidente norte-americano Barack Obama autorizou o deslocamenteo de uma centena de homens especializados das forças norte-americanas para a África Central. Elas ajudarão as forças regionais a retirar Jopeh Kony e seus tenentes “do campo de batalha. Ainda que as forças norte-americanas estejam equipadas para o combate, elas se limitarão a fornecer serviço de inteligência, conselhos e assistência às nações parceiras. Elas não se engajarão no combate com a LRA a menos no caso de situação de autodefesa”, afirmou Obama numa carta ao Congresso.

Não há dúvida de que o LRA é organização condenável, sociopata e praticante de comportamentos brutais. Entretanto as pessoas que articulam o combate contra o LRA (Yoweri Museweni e Paul Kagame) cometeram e continuam cometendo crimes igualmente graves e também ataques da natureza similar, especialmente contra os refugiados ao longo da fronteira do Congo Oriental. Todavia, pela prontidão em fornecer mercenários para a “guerra contra o terrorismo” e para a proteção das novas indústrias petrolíferas emergentes nos seus países e em toda a região, eles são até festejados e recompensados pelo governo norte-americano. Por infortúnio essa é a mesma região onde o LRA pratica suas atrocidades e precisamente onde foram descobertos novos e importantes lençóis petrolíferos.
O que motiva o interesse do Ocidente na região é a descoberta de petróleo nas bacias dos rios do Lago Albert no Quênia e em Uganda. A guerra entre o Sudão e o Sudão do Sul tornou imperativa a necessidade de se encontrar rota alternativa para canalizar o petróleo em direção aos portos do Oceano Índico visto que o oleoduto do Sudão é inacessível. Todas essas rotas passam através do território ocupado por contingentes do LRA (restam menos de 600 combatentes). Essa luta contra o LRA serviu de pretexto para que os Estados Unidos dessem continuidade à sua política de formar exércitos africanos de mercenários para prosseguir seu combate “ao terrorismo global” no Sudão, na Somália, no Iêmen e no Quênia. Os Estados Unidos fornecem armas, instrutores e meios de comunicação aos exércitos de Uganda e Ruanda para o combate contra o LRA e para a luta contra os inimigos dos norte-americanos na Somália. Lementavelmente isso permitiu aos ugandeses e aos Ruandeses o saque do Congo Oriental sob o pretexto do combata ao LRA.

Em 2009 a companhia Heritage Oil descobriu petróleo em Uganda. Descobertas subsequentes ocorreram também no Quênia. Em maio de 2012 esse país anunciava a descoberta de um segundo lençol petrolífero economicamente viável após mais dois meses de prospecção, bem como importantes reservas na remota região do Lago Vitória. O Quênia torna-se assim a última nação africana a se juntar ao grande boon petrolífero africano em seguimento às descobertas em Uganda e na RDC. Até Ruanda e Burundi aproveitarão esse maná, graças à East African Community (EAC [Comunidade do Leste Africano]).

A EAC pode contar com um futuro energético ainda melhor após as descobertas no Quênia, pois após as descobertas nesse país pode se acrescentar as reservas substanciais encontradas em Uganda e o gás natural localizado na Tanzânia. Existem igualmente explorações nas profundezas do Logo Kivu em Ruanda. O Sudão do Sul, com suas grandes reservas em petróleo, pleiteia tornar-se membro da EAC. Também na Somália foram localizados grandes campos petrolíferos e de gás natural.

A África é o principal continente do mundo na frequêcia de descobertas de reservas substanciais de petróleo e gás. Um relatório conjunto do Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento, da União Africana e do Fundo Africano de Desenvolvimento mostra que, ao final 1980, as reservas petrolíferas africanas aumentaram em mais de 25%, enquanto as de gás natural se elevaram em 100%.

Este “novo horizonte” petrolífero e gasífero atraiu os grandes tubarões da indústria petrolífera internacional como a Chevron, a Shell, a Exxon, a Total e os gigantes petrolíferos chineses. Os processos de extração e refinamento exigirão o gasto de verbas imensas, dinheiro este que os africanos não possuem. Existe uma simbiose entre as atividades dos “Big Oils” e a África. As grandes companhias petrolíferas possuem o dinheiro e a África tem o petróleo e o gás ainda não explorados e, é muito importante ressaltar, os militares para proteger os futuros investimentos.

Os Estados Unidos não contam com apoio público para o envio de tropas de combate para o leste e o centro da África. Esse país, todavia, dispõe do equipamento, das verbas e dos instrutores para a criação de uma força que age por [sua] procuração na região. Num caso desses o fato de ter um inimigo em comum, como o LRA, constitui um gancho oportuno para a vinculação de uma política comercial. O LRA não precisa ser forte. Ele deve ser considerado como algo inerentemente mau e totalmente fora de qualquer limite. E ele corresponde a tais critérios. Os interesses norte-americanos e as ambições militares de Uganda e Ruanda coicidem e seus dois exércitos recebem imensas verbas para agir por procuração para os norte-americanos. Museweni e Kagame são festejados no Ocidente apesar de suas atividades na República Democrática do Congo.

Esta política de pilhagem ilimitada no Congo Oriental, caracterizada pela constância da miséria, da pobreza, do medo e da violência pelos e contra os congoleses pode perdurar. Os congoleses voltam a formular a pergunta que Tiberius Gracchus fizera à Tribuna do Povo: “quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (“quem vai nos proteger dos nossos protetores?”)

ESTE TEXTO FOI PROPOSTO A VOCÊ POR PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Não se limite apenas a repassar os artigos de Pambazuka! Torne-se também um amigo de Pambazuka e faça uma doação AGORA para ajudar a manter Pambazuka LIVRE e INDEPENDENTE!
http://www.pambazuka.org/fr/friends.php

** O Dr. Gary J, Busch é um sindicalista internacional, um acadêmico, um homem de negócios e um consultor em questões políticas e comerciais. Texto traduzido do inglês para o francês por Elisabeth Nyffennegger, e do francês para o português por Attila Blacheyre.

*** Envie seus comentários para editor@pambazuka.org ou comente on line pelo site de Pambazuka News

Mangaung municipality must be held responsible for flames of xenophobia in Botshabelo

Democratic Left Front and Botshabelo Unemployed Movement joint press statement

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83365

Rather, Botshabelo informal traders and other unemployed people must direct their anger at the Mangaung municipality. We call for sustained mass action to expose failed service delivery, corruption and how the municipality’s policies maintain apartheid geographies and continue the systemic marginalisation of the unemployed. The BUM is now undertaking local mobilisation and public education against xenophobia in Botshabelo.

The BUM and the DLF condemn the Mangaung municipality for its attack on informal traders. This attack amounted to the municipality destroying wares sold by local traders as it removed them from the Fourways Mall in Botshabelo. This was ostensibly in the interests of public order and health. In this regard, the BUM and the DLF reject the flawed logic of the Mangaung municipality. Informal traders play a crucial role in building some semblance of a local economy from which they eke out a dire living for their families. What informal traders require from the municipality are fiscal resources and appropriate policies that can effectively support and grow their economic activities. Instead, the municipality subjects informal traders to stigmatisation, ridicule and the violations of their basic human rights. The same municipality would not dare to break into an illegal shop run by a local white person in the centre of Bloemfontein.

The BUM is actively mobilising the unemployed in Botshabelo in support of the demand for the Right to Work to be constitutionalised. Concretely, this must mean that every unemployed person must get guaranteed work, income and skills training for a minimum number of days per year. There is enough public work to provide such guaranteed employment to the large numbers of the unemployed. Such public work includes housing construction, plumbing, electrical work, mechanical work, cleaning and maintenance of public facilities, road construction and maintenance, food gardens and preparation for schools and crèches, the separation and recycling of waste, agri-processing, and so on. In addition, our long-term campaign against unemployment in Botshabelo also requires the municipality to scale up the conversion of homes, public buildings and commercial buildings so that they use less energy and water so that a local renewables industry can develop. It is only such systemic change in the local economy that can effectively deal with xenophobia.

ENDS

(The BUM is an affiliate of the DLF).

FOR COMMENTS, CONTACT:

- Khokhoma Motsi (BUM & DLF), 073 490 7623
- Mazibuko K. Jara (DLF), 083 651 0271

Material support required for occupation

Democratic Left Front press statement: Appeal for tents and mobile toilets for occupation of ward councillor’s office

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83368

The community of Zakheleni want to use the occupation to turn the office into a people’s office that meets and services the needs of the local people. For the occupation, the UPM and AbM appeal for material support (tents and mobile toilets). The DLF appeals to all who can heed this call to provide the material support requested by the Zakheleni community. The community has also organised a mass clean-up of the office and its surroundings.

This occupation is being prepared as a potential follow-up to a meeting between the community and representatives of the eThekwini Region of the ANC, the chairperson of the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality Housing and Infrastructure Committee (Nigel Gumede) and of the Department of Safety and Community Liason. This meeting is a response to ongoing community struggles for service delivery, housing, employment, access to land and the recall of Nomzamo Mkhize as a ward councillor. However, this Wednesday meeting will not end mass mobilisation and pressure on the eThekwini municipality. The community has decided that to ensure that the Wednesday meeting is fruitful and its outcomes implemented, it must prepare for the planned peaceful and disciplined occupation.

ENQUIRIES:

- Bandile Mdlalose (Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement secretary-general), 031 304 6420, Fax: 031 304 6436, Email: bandy.mdlalose@gmail.com, Cell: 071 424 2815
Website: www.abahlali.org
- Bheki Buthelezi (UPM & DLF), 072 639 9893

- China Ngubane (R2K & DLF), 072 651 9790
- Mazibuko K. Jara (DLF), 083 651 0271

www.democraticleft.za.net

Rio Tinto announced as early front runner for the Greenwash Gold

Sponsorship protests escalate as Dow & BP targeted in the same day

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83359

Protests against Olympic sponsors have been intensifying with protests against Dow and BP taking place on the same day. At the Camden Roundhouse, an uninvited theatre group took the stage before the BP-sponsored performance of Comedy of Errors took place, while in Trafalgar Square, Drop Dow Now took part in an international protest coordinated with groups in India, US and Canada against the involvement of Dow Chemical in the games.

Richard Solly of London Mining Network said: ‘Rio Tinto has provided nearly all the metals for the Olympic Medals from mines in Utah where local residents have accused the company of creating so much pollution that it is contributing to premature deaths and respiratory diseases. You can’t pretend to have “the greenest games ever” when you’re working with such a dirty and disreputable company like Rio Tinto.’

Emily Coats from the UK Tar sands Network said: ‘BP has just launched another shiny advertising campaign to continue to obscure from the public its devastating operations in the Gulf of Mexico, Alberta tar sands and pristine Arctic. With one month still to go before the Olympics we're hoping to see this world-class climate criminal surge into the lead and win the Greenwash Gold medal.’

Colin Toogood of the Bhopal Medical Appeal said: ‘Dow Chemical have been refusing to accept that their wholly-owned subsidiary, the Union Carbide Corporation, is wanted on the criminal charges of culpable homicide for the Bhopal Gas Disaster. We cannot understand why the Olympic organisers continue to defend Dow Chemical when these are the facts.’

Meredith Alexander, the ex Olympics ‘ethics tsar’ who resigned over controversies surrounding Olympic sponsorship said:

‘The London Olympics belongs to all of us; athletes, spectators and Londoners alike. That's why it is so disappointing that Lord Coe is ignoring people's concerns about unethical Olympic sponsors. He does not want to hear about BP's investment in the most polluting form of oil, the environmental problems that come with Rio Tinto's medals or the fact that Dow Chemical is the company now responsible for the Bhopal tragedy.’

For more information/comment, contact:

- Richard Solly, London Mining Network, contact@londonminingnetwork.org, 07929 023 214

- Colin Toogood, Bhopal Medical Appeal, ColinToogood@bhopal.org, 07798 845074

- Emily Coats, UK Tar Sands Network, emily@no-tar-sands.org, 07807095669

NOTES:

You can see the Greenwash Gold campaign at www.greenwashgold.org

You can see the Greenwash Gold videos at www.youtube.com/greenwashgold

The 'emotional' new ad campaign from BP aims to highlight the work from behind the scenes staff such as road sweepers, tea ladies and groundsmen. See: http://bit.ly/M0LhkA

More information about the BP intervention at the Roundhouse can be found at http://bit.ly/MWerPW and a video of the performance can be seen at http://youtu.be/KL-x4bD2AXI

- More information about the Drop Dow Now protest can be found at http://bit.ly/LQH68U

Solidarity and indignation over Kinshasa expulsions

La Vía Campesina

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83373

Kinshasa, 30/06/2012

We, men and women, peasant leaders and members of La Via Campesina in austral, eastern and central African countries, specifically D. R. Congo, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, South Africa and Zimbabwe, gathered in Kinshasa from 27th of June to 4th July, to discuss key issues faced by peasants and landless people in the region, to define our struggle's strategies within the neoliberal landscape, and to define our role and future at the heart of the world's largest peasant movement, La Via Campesina, hereby express our indignation with the Congolese migration authorities for the expulsion of our great comrades and friends Alberto Gomez, a Mexican peasant leader, and Fatimatou Hima, from the Plateforme Paysanne du Niger, both members of the La Via Campesina International Coordination Committee, upon their arrival at the Kinshasa airport in the evening of the 29th of June and of 1st of July.

Alberto travelled for 24 hours to reach Congo, to bring his support and experience, on behalf of all the Via Campesina peasant leaders, to us the movement's African members. He was forced to return to Mexico in the same plane he has arrived in, without even being given the time to communicate with us or to rest, as well as the friendly methods used by the Congolese immigration authorities.

All the administrative procedures were observed to make sure Alberto would be granted a “flying” visa, a type of visa which as far as we know, only exists in DRC, for which any person whose country of origin has no D. R. C. embassy is required to pay 250 USD in advance, in addition to paying 60 USD for an airport visa upon their arrival in D. R. C. The national authorities, namely the President of the DRC, the Prime Minister, the Governor of Kinshasa City, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development and the General Director of Migration had been officially informed of the organization of the regional meeting of La Via Campesina for the Africa 1 region. On her side, Ms. Hima had a valid visa issued by the Embassy of DRC in Rome.

For us there is no doubt that Alberto and Fatimatou, and through their persons the whole movement of Via Campesina, was victim of an arbitrary action from the part of an agent of the Congolese General Migrations Directorate, who did not even try to understand the situation or to listen to the members of COPACO who had come to the airport to find a solution to this situation. In the 29 evening, a member of COPACO was even threatened of being arrested on the spot. On July 1, another member of COPACO, has been arrested several hours by police for trying to reach Ms. Hima who was still with Congolese immigration officers.

By the present message, we also wish to express our full solidarity with Alberto and Fatimatou, and sincerely apologize for the absurd and inhumane attitude of some agents representing our government and therefore representing us in governmental institutions.

We can imagine the moral and psychological violence that such an act represents for human beings, especially activists and citizens of the world such as Alberto and Fatimatou, who came to Congo as friends and in a spirit of solidarity among peasants of the world. In the case of Alberto, we can also imagine the physical discomfort of travelling 48 hours non-stop sitting on a plane. We know the sacrifice Alberto was making with this trip before it even started, especially considering all the activities he had been involved in throughout the previous days in Brazil while attending the RIO+20 Summit as a member of the international delegation of La Via Campesina.

At this stage, we refuse to see this situation as a political act aimed at preventing peasants of Africa and the world from articulating their strategies toward the achievement of food sovereignty and social justice, even though such incident has clearly had such an effect.

Today more than ever, the African peasants gathered in Kinshasa are determined to fight for transparent public institutions, free from arbitrary actions and corruption, which will no longer allow for unlawful acts such as the ones our comrades and friends Alberto Gomez and Fatimatou Hima have just been a victim of.

GLOBALIZE THE STRUGGLE! GLOBALIZE HOPE!

--
La Via Campesina

Via Campesina is an international movement of peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers. We are an autonomous, pluralist and multicultural movement, independent of any political, economic, or other type of affiliation. Born in 1993, La Via Campesina now gathers about 150 organisations in 70 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas.

International Operational Secretariat:
Jln. Mampang Prapatan XIV no 5 Jakarta Selatan, Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Tel/fax: +62-21-7991890/+62-21-7993426
Email: viacampesina@viacampesina.org

Sudanese detainees enter second month of hunger strike amid serious health concerns

Press release

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83370

Tarik Adam Rhama and Ali Abdullah Ahmed began their strike on 22 May in Campsfield IRC (Kidlington, nr. Oxford) but have since been moved to Harmondsworth. Tarik reports that he was subject to torture while imprisoned in Sudan, while a medical examination could not show conclusively that Ali is over 18. Both should therefore fall under UKBA’s category of ‘persons considered unsuitable for detention’. Their state of health and the fact that neither of their removals is imminent argue further for their release.

Both men are non-Arab Darfuris and are therefore classed by current case law as being at risk of persecution should they be returned to Darfur; Tarik was arrested in 2008 in Khartoum and believes he would be killed if he were to be returned to Sudan. His father is from the Tunjur tribe and his mother is from the Nuba mountains, a region whose
inhabitants are currently the target of considerable persecution at the hands of the Sudanese government; upon his arrival in Dover in March 2012, he was immediately detained, then moved to Campsfield, where he began his strike after being in detention without indication of when he might be released for over two months.

There are further complaints relating to inhumane treatment and lack of medical care in detention; an independent doctor’s report described observations of Ali’s vital signs taken by the detention centre during his strike as ‘sporadic’. At one point, staff at Harmondsworth ignored Tarik's request for a lower bed when he complained that after 30 days of only water he was too weak to climb up to the top bunk bed he was allocated. He is not receiving regular attention from a doctor, but only from a nurse, despite extreme stomach pain and stabbing pains in his chest, as well as back pain from a pre-existing condition. He cannot walk without difficulty or speak loudly. He is not kept informed of what will happen to him.

Access to legal advice with appropriate translation has also been very infrequent. At over 30 days into his hunger strike, although legal appointments had been conducted with translators present, they had been Algerian or Iraqi rather than speakers of Sudanese Arabic.

Campaigners have vowed to continue calling for both men’s release; demonstrators in London on 30 June participating in one of a number of protests around the world against Sudan’s NCP regime on its 23rd anniversary will also be encouraged to contact the Home Office in support of the hunger strikers’ pleas.

All other Sudanese men who maintained the hunger strike started on 22 May have now been released. The latest to be released was Mohamed Suliman Tagal, who was released last week after the Home Office were no longer able to claim that his removal was imminent. Many of the same factors applicable in Mohamed's case are also present in Tarik and Ali's cases. Campaigners say this is a further demonstration of the arbitrary nature of immigration detention and UK Border Agency decision making.

ENDS

Suez's appeal against judgement on the film FLOW rejected by French court

Gabriella Zanzanaini

Food & Water Europe

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83349

Dear allies and colleagues,

We received some good news this week.

In 2010, a French court rejected a defamation lawsuit brought by Suez Environment against the documentary film FLOW. It also required Suez to reimburse certain legal fees incurred by the defendants, in this case, the Franco-German TV channel ARTE and the distributer of the film - Celluloid Dreams.

Not content with the judgement, Suez went to the Court of Appeals to appeal the decision and once again last week on 27 June 2012, the court rejected the appeal and ruled in favour of the defendants. This reaffirms that multinationals cannot use their power to silence us.

We applaud the court for its commitment to upholding the rights of the media to scrutinize the activities of multinational corporations, especially when those activities compromise the ability of millions of people around the world to access a vital commons.

On another note, we now await more information on the European Commission's investigation into price fixing by Suez, Veolia and Lyonnaise Des Eaux, further adding to their chec

World Bank sanctions Oxford University Press

OUP engaged in corrupt practices impacting education projects in East Africa

World Bank

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/83350

PRESS RELEASE

WASHINGTON, July 3, 2012—The World Bank Group today announced the debarment of two wholly-owned subsidiaries of Oxford University Press (OUP), namely: Oxford University Press East Africa Limited (OUPEA) and Oxford University Press Tanzania Limited (OUPT) - for a period of three years following OUP’s acknowledgment of misconduct by its two subsidiaries in relation to two Bank-financed education projects in East Africa.

The debarment is part of a Negotiated Resolution Agreement between OUP and the World Bank Group. In May 2011, investigators from the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) approached OUP about potential misconduct in Africa. Following this, OUP conducted an internal investigation into its operations and reported its findings to INT.

“This debarment is testimony to the Bank’s continued commitment to protecting the integrity of its projects. OUP’s acknowledgment of misconduct and the thoroughness of its investigation is evidence of how companies can address issues of fraud and corruption and change their corporate practices to foster integrity in the development business. In this case, working with the Serious Fraud Office also demonstrates the scope of collective action in deterring corruption impacting the progress of development,” said Leonard McCarthy, World Bank Integrity Vice President.

The two companies made improper payments to government officials for two contracts to supply text books in relation to two World Bank-financed projects. As a result, OUPEA and OUPT will be debarred for three years and OUP will receive a conditional non-debarment. In addition, in order to remedy part of the harm done by the misconduct, OUP has agreed to make a payment of US$500,000 to the World Bank as part of the Negotiated Resolution.

Under the Agreement, OUP and its related undertakings, including OUPEA and OUPT, commit to cooperate with the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency and continue to improve their internal compliance program. The debarment of OUPEA and OUPT qualifies for cross-debarment by other MDBs under the Agreement of Mutual Recognition of Debarments that was signed on April 9, 2010.

Land grabbers and food robbers: A review of two books

Robin Palmer

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/83357

© Pambazuka PressA review of: (1) Fred Pearce, The Landgrabbers. The New Fight over Who Owns the Planet, Eden Project Books, London, 2012, pp.xii + 388, £20; and (2) GRAIN, The Great Food Robbery: How corporations control food, grab land and destroy the climate, Pambazuka Press, Oxford, 2012, pp.164, £14.95.

Rotimi Babatunde wins 13th Caine Prize for African Writing

Jenny Casswell

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/83358

The Chair of Judges, Bernardine Evaristo MBE, announced Rotimi Babatunde as the winner of the £10,000 prize at a dinner held this evening (Monday, 2 July) at the Bodleian Library in Oxford.
Bernardine Evaristo said: “Bombay's Republic vividly describes the story of a Nigerian soldier fighting in the Burma campaign of World War Two. It is ambitious, darkly humorous and in soaring, scorching prose exposes the exploitative nature of the colonial project and the psychology of Independence.”

Rotimi Babatunde’s fiction and poems have been published in Africa, Europe and America in journals which include Die Aussenseite des Elementes and Fiction on the Web and in anthologies including Little Drops and A Volcano of Voices. He is a winner of the Meridian Tragic Love Story Competition organised by the BBC World Service and his plays have been staged and presented by institutions which include the Halcyon Theatre, Chicago and the Institute for Contemporary Arts. He is currently taking part in a collaboratively produced piece at the Royal Court and the Young Vic as part of World Stages for a World City. Rotimi lives in Ibadan, Nigeria.

Also shortlisted were:

• Billy Kahora (Kenya) ‘Urban Zoning’ from ‘McSweeney’s’ Vol. 37 (San Francisco, 2011) www.mcsweeneys.net

• Stanley Kenani (Malawi) ‘Love on Trial’ from ‘For Honour and Other Stories’ published by eKhaya/Random House Struik (Cape Town, 2011) www.randomstruik.co.za

• Melissa Tandiwe Myambo (Zimbabwe) ‘La Salle de Départ’ from 'Prick of the Spindle' Vol. 4.2 (New Orleans, June, 2010) www.prickofthespindle.com

• Constance Myburgh (South Africa) ‘Hunter Emmanuel’ from ‘Jungle Jim’ Issue 6, (Cape Town, 2011) www.junglejim.org

The panel of judges is chaired by Bernardine Evaristo, the award-winning author of six books of fiction and verse fiction. Her new novel, Mr Loverman, will be published by Penguin 2013. She is a literary critic, teaches creative writing at Brunel University and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and the Royal Society of Arts.

Alongside Bernardine on the panel of judges this year are cultural journalist Maya Jaggi, Zimbabwean poet, songwriter and writer Chirikure Chirikure, Associate Professor at Georgetown University, Washington DC Samantha Pinto, and the Sudanese CNN television correspondent Nima Elbagir.

Once again the winner of the £10,000 Caine Prize will be given the opportunity of taking up a month’s residence at Georgetown University, as a Writer-in-Residence at the Lannan Center for Poetics and Social Practice. The award will cover all travel and living expenses. The winner will also be invited to take part in the Open Book Festival in Cape Town in September 2012 and events hosted by the Museum of African Art in New York in November 2012.

Last year the Caine Prize was won by Zimbabwean writer NoViolet Bulawayo. She has subsequently been awarded the highly regarded two-year Stegner Writing Fellowship at Stanford University, in the United States and her debut novel, We Need New Names, is forthcoming from Little, Brown in North America and Chatto and Windus in the UK.

Previous winners are Sudan’s Leila Aboulela (2000), Nigerian Helon Habila (2001), Kenyan Binyavanga Wainaina (2002), Kenyan Yvonne Owuor (2003), Zimbabwean Brian Chikwava (2004), Nigerian Segun Afolabi (2005), South African Mary Watson (2006), Ugandan Monica Arac de Nyeko (2007), South African Henrietta Rose-Innes (2008), Nigerian EC Osondu (2009) and Sierra Leonean Olufemi Terry (2010).

-Ends-

Dates for the Diary
The 2012 Caine Prize winner will be in conversation with Nii Parkes, Jose Eduardo Agualusa and Dinaw Mengistu, in the Southbank Centre’s Level 5 Function Room on Tuesday, 3 July at 6.30pm. A seminar on African Writing will also be held on Wednesday, 4 July at 1pm at the Anatomy Museum, King’s College London. Rotimi will also take part in an event at Manchester Art Gallery on Thursday, 5 July at 8pm, part of the public programme for We Face Forward: Art from West Africa Today.

Notes to Editors
The Caine Prize, awarded annually for African creative writing, is named after the late Sir Michael Caine, former Chairman of Booker plc and Chairman of the Booker Prize management committee for nearly 25 years. The Prize is awarded for a short story by an African writer published in English (indicative length 3,000 to 10,000 words). An “African writer” is normally taken to mean someone who was born in Africa, or who is a national of an African country, or whose parents are African.
The African winners of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Wole Soyinka, Nadine Gordimer and J M Coetzee, are Patrons of The Caine Prize, as is Chinua Achebe, winner of the Man Booker International Prize. Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne is President of the Council, Ben Okri OBE is Vice President, Jonathan Taylor CBE is the Chairman and Ellah Allfrey OBE is the Deputy Chairperson.
The stories written at Caine Prize workshops are published annually alongside the Prize’s shortlisted stories by New Internationalist (UK), Jacana Media (South Africa), Cassava Republic (Nigeria), Kwani? (Kenya), and this year’s new co-publishers: Sub-Saharan Publishers (Ghana), FEMRITE (Uganda), and Bookworld Publishers (Zambia). Books are available from the publishers or from the Africa Book Centre, African Books Collective or Amazon.
The New Internationalist edition was published on 1 July 2012. (ISBN 978-1-78026-074-7 print; ISBN 978-1-78026-075-4 ebook)
The Caine Prize is principally sponsored by The Oppenheimer Memorial Trust, the Booker Prize Foundation, Weatherly International plc, China Africa Resources, CSL Stockbrokers and Miles Morland. Other funders include the British Council, The Beit Trust, The Thistle Trust, the Royal Overseas League and Kenya Airways.

For further information, photos or to arrange interviews, please contact:

Jenny Casswell
Raitt Orr & Associates
Tel: 0207 836 4644 / Mob: 07796 131447
jenny@raittorr.co.uk

Follow us on Twitter (@CainePrize), Facebook and www.caineprize.com
Read our blog http://caineprize.blogspot.co.uk/

Global: June taxcast now available

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/podcasts/83233

http://bit.ly/MO2E59

Nigeria: Nigeria and the 4th Republic

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/podcasts/83231

http://bit.ly/KNLiSw

South Africa: Land reform and the constitution

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/podcasts/83441

http://bit.ly/L9JqZj

Sudan: History, political developments, and current affairs

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/podcasts/83456

http://bit.ly/MbSNZT

Barclays scandal

Gado

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/cartoons/83369

The Dead Horse Theory

The unfailing productivity study for govenments

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/cartoons/83351

The tribal wisdom of the Plains Indians, passed on from generation to generation, says that: "When you discover that you are riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount."

However, in government more advanced strategies are often employed, such as:

1. Buying a stronger whip.

2. Changing riders.

3. Appointing a committee to study the horse.

4. Arranging to visit other countries to see how other cultures ride dead horses.

5. Lowering the standards so that dead horses can be included.

6. Reclassifying the dead horse as living-impaired.

7. Hiring outside contractors to ride the dead horse.

8. Harnessing several dead horses together to increase speed.

9. Providing additional funding and/or training to increase the dead horse's performance.

10. Doing a productivity study to see if lighter riders would improve the dead horse's performance.

11. Declaring that as the dead horse does not have to be fed, it is less costly, carries lower overhead and therefore contributes substantially more to the bottom line of the economy than do some other horses.

12. Rewriting the expected performance requirements for all horses.

And, of course...

13. Promoting the dead horse to a supervisory position.

Zimbabwe: Diamonds fund parallel government

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/zimbabwe/83461

http://bit.ly/MQf3Im

Africa: Countries step up campaigns ahead of AU elections

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/aumonitor/83490

http://bit.ly/OPcmWQ

Global: Lessons learned on land and women's legal empowerment

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/83442

http://bit.ly/N7AEL4

Morocco: Campaign links youth veiling with child abuse

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/83249

http://bit.ly/ModoK4

Sudan: In Sudan, women set the spark

2012-07-03

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/83312

http://bit.ly/OgNtmy

Burkina Faso: Lawyer vows to pursue Sankara's killers

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83330

http://bit.ly/Nl9z4y

Egypt: Morsi orders review of detained protesters cases

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83243

http://bit.ly/Oc0WvM

Global: Trends in international corporate accountability

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83484

http://bit.ly/Ne35pr

Kenya: Research programme accused of discrimination

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83439

The Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI)-Wellcome Trust Research Programme is facing discrimination charges brought by six former employees. The group, dubbed the KEMRI six, are accusing the programme of exploiting African employees, impeding their career development, and giving preferential treatment and pay to researchers from developed countries. They also allege their work was stolen and given to researchers from developed countries. Many consider the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme to be a model North-South partnership, praising its substantial support of African researchers. But others criticise what they perceive to be a failure to promote African scientists, or to involve them in setting research agendas. According to scientists in Africa and Europe, partnerships between rich and poor nations often generate tensions.
http://bit.ly/Ne30me

Mali: ECOWAS call on ICC over 'war crimes'

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83447

http://aje.me/Mc67YN

Morocoo: Condemnation of human rights harassment

2012-07-03

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83309

http://bit.ly/N5fjh3

South Africa: Demand for boycott of Israeli products

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83324

http://bit.ly/MIxXQS

Sudan: Call to release arrested protestors

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83331

http://bit.ly/KTcRtP

Uganda: Space for civil society shrinking in Uganda say national and global CSOs

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/83241

http://bit.ly/QTb9NI

Global: Groundbreaking report finds widespread failure to protect LGBT refugees

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/83239

http://bit.ly/MNeZHV

Global: The refugee map of the world

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/83235

http://bit.ly/MO6fzT

Kenya: Refugee turns web designer in world’s largest camp

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/83436

http://bit.ly/NQJfxm

South Sudan: Israel deports 190 more asylum seekers

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/83329

http://bit.ly/Mw3zts

Africa: Motivations for slum dweller social movement participation

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/socialmovements/83334

http://bit.ly/P7IHJA

Global: Growing gaps in decent work for young people

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/labour/83466

http://bit.ly/MUt1se

Swaziland: Government fails to jail strike leaders

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/labour/83246

http://bit.ly/NdUVMA

Africa: The failed index from hell

2012-07-03

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83311

http://bit.ly/OgMene

Algeria: 50 years of independence marked

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83452

http://bit.ly/NbZhoB

Angola: Concerns over poll preparations

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83451

http://bit.ly/NzHZAE

Angola: Court rejects 18 parties ahead of elections

2012-07-03

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83310

http://bit.ly/P4aZWD

Egypt: President reverses parliament dissolution

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83476

http://bit.ly/RLzLbA

Libya: Liberals claim early election lead

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83449

http://aje.me/MatsQ9

Libya: Protesters storm election commission office in Benghazi

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83244

http://bit.ly/OYSwKP

Sudan: Opposition politician Kamel Omar arrested

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83470

http://bbc.in/NBrTXp

Sudan: Tear gas fired at university demo

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/83474

http://bit.ly/LIrVMu

Kenya: Kenya looking abroad for stolen cash, seeks cooperation

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/corruption/83335

http://bit.ly/PchZk9

Africa: Report says Southern Africa’s development is not integrated

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83232

http://bit.ly/LYZol8

East Africa: Natural resources scramble threatens minorities, says report

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83236

http://bit.ly/LRb2U8

Global: IMF providing 'political cover' on Eurozone meltdown

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83467

http://bit.ly/MQloUf

Global: Shields and swords

Legal tools for public water

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83328

http://bit.ly/M5L9wp

Global: The World Bank, changed actions or rhetoric?

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83327

http://bit.ly/Mw0ObD

Namibia: South Africa stifles local dairy industry

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/83228

http://bit.ly/NULAIL

Ghana: Reject World Bank health report, say NGOs

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83475

http://bit.ly/LaMd4t

Global: Criminalization of drug use fuelling HIV

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83433

http://bit.ly/PAQvoF

Global: More milk and meat at a healthy price

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83435

http://bit.ly/PARsgL

Nigeria: Bridging the north-south maternal death divide

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83434

http://bit.ly/Ne1TmL

South Africa: PHC success relies on CHWs being able to do more

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83464

http://bit.ly/LXUY17

South Africa: Ten years later, a judgment that saved a million lives

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83465

http://bit.ly/LXVdcL

South Sudan: Desperate struggle for health care in world's newest nation

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/83443

http://bit.ly/LzEw9g

Liberia: No policy for pregnant school girls

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/education/83454

http://bit.ly/LX21Ht

South Africa: Dysfunctional education system keeps apartheid alive, says Vavi

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/education/83489

http://bit.ly/PEPWKw

South Africa: Textbook crisis statement welcomed

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/education/83339

http://bit.ly/Ny7qAo

Tanzania: Three experiments to improve learning

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/education/83336

http://bit.ly/P84m4k

Global: Register gay groups; allow free assembly, urges Maina Kiai

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/lgbti/83238

http://bit.ly/N3DAr4

Global: South Africa and Brazil demand UN action on gay rights

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/lgbti/83471

http://bit.ly/Oosnzl

Uganda: Case against cabinet minister opens

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/lgbti/83444

http://bit.ly/MapOWd

Global: Reflections on Rio+20

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/environment/83237

http://bit.ly/MN1pkS

Global: Rio+20 'disappointing to many'

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/environment/83469

http://bit.ly/NTqcm4

Kenya: The controversial jatropha stumbles in Kenya

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/environment/83332

http://bit.ly/KTdhjZ

Kenya: Unesco rejects danger listing for Lake Turkana

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/environment/83457

http://bit.ly/LIhx7x

Africa: Agricultural land grabs remain above pre-2005 levels

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/land/83333

http://bit.ly/NxAisx

Congo-Brazzaville: Changing climate affects farmers on the Congolese coast

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/land/83325

http://bit.ly/LY4rrl

Global: The EU and the global land grab

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/land/83472

http://bit.ly/M9TSLA

Global: US farmers continue to fight Monsanto’s ‘seed police’

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/land/83462

http://bit.ly/NiZYgi

Uganda: Thugs attack Buliisa villagers who say their land was stolen

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/land/83242

http://bit.ly/KVPq7V

Global: New report on the dangers of Genetically Modified Foods

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/food/83463

http://bit.ly/MUrfYd

DRC: Community radio journalist detained

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83430

http://bit.ly/NQG48Z

East Africa: High-tech censorship on the rise

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83240

http://bit.ly/LeMR1Y

Egypt: activists, media to protest tortured journalists taken to court by military

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83248

http://bit.ly/OZ9Z5X

Egypt: Ruling against filmmaker condemned

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83429

http://bit.ly/MNQ8VX

Gambia: Detained editor convicted of contempt of court, released after paying heavy fine

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83326

http://bit.ly/Lmd136

South Sudan: Civil liberties and the world's youngest country

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83437

http://bit.ly/LzBdiz

Southern Africa: Misa launches annual media freedom report

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83431

http://bit.ly/LWR0Wy

Togo: Attack on journalist condemned

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/83468

http://bit.ly/N96OFS

Burkina Faso: Children toil in gold mines

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/welfare/83448

http://aje.me/OLpqfR

Ghana: Move to end child labour

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/welfare/83247

http://bit.ly/NVT3Hh

Africa: AU security panel discuss African terror strategy

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83323

http://bit.ly/KZCygX

Africa: Union targets mining giant Rio Tinto in Africa

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83482

http://bit.ly/Ni8vwo

DRC: 'Conflict gold' trade continues in face of US law

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83245

http://reut.rs/OZ4eoN

DRC: Rebels seize towns in east

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83445

http://aje.me/L25OPw

Ethiopia: Sudan and South Sudan in verbal peace pledge

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83446

http://aje.me/NbPlLM

Mali: Regional moves to shield Mali north from Islamic fighters

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83337

http://bit.ly/LYvvGV

Nigeria: Gunmen attack central Nigerian villages

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83477

http://bit.ly/LBrdW0

Rwanda: UN report links Rwanda to Congolese violence

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83453

http://bit.ly/L2cQ6M

Somalia: Fighting displaces thousands in Middle Shabelle

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83432

http://bit.ly/M7ugyR

Sudan: Government accused of double standards

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/83455

http://ind.pn/L2dW2D

Africa: Women rival men in cash transfer

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/internet/83473

http://bit.ly/NhXT0y

Madagascar: Online research network launched

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/internet/83440

http://bit.ly/PAXdLg

South Africa: ‘Zimbabweans in SA take to free messaging service’

2012-07-08

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/internet/83450

http://bit.ly/N7L25F

Right to Know, Right to Education newsletter

2012-07-04

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/enewsl/83338

http://bit.ly/LYDYK8

Call for proposals: Africa in the information society era

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)

2012-07-09

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/592/CODESRIA MWG on the Information Society.pdf

Scholarship for students in financial need

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/fundraising/83372

South Africa: Masters, doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships

Programme on the Study of the Humanities in Africa of the Centre for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/courses/83458

The PSHA encourages scholarship that rethinks foundational categories of culture, identity, nation and citizenship through critical reflection on the humanities and postcolonial modernities. The fellowship awards are aimed at fostering critical dialogue in an academically engaged and supportive environment on the key themes of the PSHA.

In 2013 the PSHA will be involved in discussions on the broad theme of the subject of the humanities. We invite applications working on questions of political subjectivity and the politics of the governed, the history and theory of the humanities and social sciences in the global south, aesthetics and politics, the humanities in the age of techné, cities in transition, critical heritage studies, and the anti-racisms of the university.

SELECTION PROCESS

Selection of candidates will be based on the strength of academic achievement and commitment to the intellectual outlines of the PSHA and the CHR. Successful candidates will become Andrew W. Mellon Fellows of the CHR. Those selected to this prestigious fellowship programme will be required to participate in a reading programme with other recipients of the grant and faculty members.

Successful candidates will be required to be present on campus during the relevant academic semesters unless granted leave by the fellowship board. All Postdoctoral fellows will be required to produce at least one peer-reviewed journal article, which when published should contain appropriate acknowledgement of the University of the Western Cape. Postdoctoral Fellows are also required to show substantial progress towards publication of a monograph. The Centre for Humanities Research at UWC, to which fellows will be affiliated, offers a supportive scholarly environment for pursuing research and academic exchange. The centre hosts a weekly seminar series where prospective candidates can present their research and solicit feedback from an interdisciplinary forum of academic staff and graduate students. Fellows are required to participate fully in the seminar series. The centre also provides office accommodation and access to the UWC – Robben Island Museum Mayibuye Archive collection. Through participation in the Centre’s activities and programmes, postdoctoral fellows will contribute to the shape of graduate studies by making available, through participation in the Centre’s programmes and through publication, the most recent scholarly discussions and debates.

FELLOWSHIP AWARDS

In 2013, the Programme will offer fellowships at the postdoctoral level in disciplines associated with the humanities. The post doctoral fellowship is valued at about R160 000 per annum. Masters approximately R84 000,00 over two years, and doctoral awards R270 000,00 over three years. The renewal of master’s and doctoral fellowships will be based upon a supervisor’s report of satisfactory progress. The awards cover a monthly stipend which can be used to cover travel costs, accommodation and basic research expenses. The awards may be supplemented with National Research Foundation research grants.

APPLICATIONS

Postdoctoral applicants are required to submit a letter in which they provide a motivation, a plan of work should the fellowship be awarded, a two page statement on how the specific research project enhances the study of the humanities in Africa, a curriculum vitae, three letters of recommendation from academic referees (to be sent directly to the CHR), a writing sample consisting of an extensive research project or publication, preferably in a peer reviewed journal, and a copy of their academic transcript. They will be selected by a panel of core faculty associated with the PSHA and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts. Candidates applying for the master’s and doctoral fellowships should supply a three to four pages proposal on planned research, a chapter from a previously examined thesis, a letter of motivation, curriculum vitae, academic transcript, three academic letters of reference and a brief one page statement of interest in the broader study of the humanities.

The fellowship cannot be held concurrently with other fellowships without permission of the Director of the CHR and all recipients of grants will be required to fulfil the obligations of the programme.

Closing date: Applications and referees' letters must reach the Selection Panel on or before 15 October 2012. The Selection Committee may request an interview with applicants. Incomplete applications will not be reviewed.

Applications must be posted to Ms. Lameez Lalkhen, Centre for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape, Private Bag X17, Bellville, 7535. No electronic applications will be accepted. However enquiries and referees letters may be electronically sent to llalkhen@uwc.ac.za

Telephonic enquiries may be directed to (+27) (0)21-959-3162.

Global: Building peace infrastructures

2012-07-05

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/publications/83376

http://bit.ly/MXYVQP

Rethinking Unequal Exchange: the Global Integration of Nursing Labour Markets

New release from the University of Toronto Press

2012-07-09

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/publications/83459

These structural forces are reconstructed historically, beginning circa 1950, through the instances of the United States of America, Canada, and the Philippines – the first countries in the world to begin using and producing temporary migrant nurses. The worldwide dismantling of trade unions, from the early 1980s, is linked to increased employer demand for temporary migrant nursing labour in countries of the global North – a theoretical link not typically made in studies of labour migration.

Given that markets for nursing and domestic labour were among the first to shift from functioning on a national scale, to integration on a global scale, it is further argued that world stratified production and distribution of caring labour is a new form of unequal exchange and budding trend in the restructuring of world capitalism.

This study of nurse migration is unique in its use of the world historical approach, as exemplified by the work of Giovanni Arrighi, Samir Amin, and Saskia Sassen. In this study, the world historical approach allows for a large-scale mapping and analysis of seemingly unrelated national processes underlying international nurse migration of the late twentieth century. This departs from the descriptive format of most studies of health labour migration which focus on the specifics of individual countries of origin or destination.

Additionally, it is the only study of international health migration which locates temporary labour migration within the long time frame of historical capitalism, characterized by North-South violence, coercion, and uneven development. Finally, together with world historical analysis, this study employs tools of socialist feminist political economy and Marxian economics.

To date the subject of late twentieth century nursing labour migration has not been broached by Marxian, socialist feminist, or world systems analysts. Given growing international policy discussions around the global nurse shortage, brain drain, rising global inequality, and the role of remittances in development, a critical analysis of nursing labour migration is timely and needed.

As Samir Amin states in the foreword of the book, “The ability to combine several elements, time frames, and layers of analysis is surely not unrelated to Salimah Valiani’s multiple vocations as multidisciplinary academic researcher, trade union based policy analyst, and advocate.” With over a decade of experience working in the international economic justice and trade union movements, Valiani’s study comes from a unique perspective combining academic research methods with policy questions and ‘insider insight.’

Campaigner – North Africa

Amnesty International

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/83230

£34,032 per annum
Central London

About the role

We’re looking for a Campaigner to contribute to our campaign against human rights violations in North Africa. Working at the International Secretariat, you will contribute to a range of projects, including Amnesty International’s response to the momentous changes in North Africa witnessed in 2011 and 2012. You will act as a focal point, providing advice and support to our worldwide membership, including devising campaigning strategies, preparing written and other campaigning materials and providing research support.

About you

You will have excellent communication, campaigning and research skills and a demonstrable commitment to human rights. Ideally you will also have specialist knowledge of North Africa and experience of campaigning in a membership organization. While there is no line management responsibility, you will participate in coordinating the work of the team. Along with English, fluency in Arabic or French are essential; it would be highly desirable if you were fluent in both Arabic and French.

About us

Our aim is simple: an end to human rights abuses. Independent, international and influential, we campaign for justice, human rights and dignity wherever they’re denied. Already our network of almost three million members and supporters is making a difference in 150 countries. And whether we’re applying pressure through authoritative research or direct lobbying, mass demonstrations or online campaigning, we’re all inspired by hope for a better world. One where the human rights of everyone are respected and protected everywhere.

For further information about this and our other current vacancies, and to apply online, please visit our website www.amnesty.org/jobs

Closing date: 18 July 2012.

CVs will not be accepted.

East Africa: Journalists in exile 2012

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/83234

http://bit.ly/Nns726

Regional Campaign Coordinator – MENA

Amnesty International

2012-07-02

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/83229

£41,124 per annum
London

The human rights situation in the Middle East and North Africa is currently a significant focus of Amnesty International’s global campaigning. Use your experience as a campaign strategist and your expert knowledge of human rights in the region to inspire worldwide action on what have become high-profile issues.

About the role

Spotting opportunities for action, you will lead on the development of regional strategies for human rights change, as well as co-ordinating their implementation by a variety of different actors within Amnesty International’s global movement. You will also provide expert advice on campaigning in and on the region to support the work of country specialists.

About you

An experienced strategic campaigner, you will have both a specialist knowledge of human rights, political and social issues in the Middle East and North Africa region and know how to harness a variety of campaigning tools to effect change. You will have excellent communication skills allowing you to discuss complex strategic thinking orally and in writing in both English and Arabic. Knowledge of other regional languages, such as Persian and French, is an advantage.

About us

Our aim is simple: an end to human rights abuses. Independent, international and influential, we campaign for justice, freedom and truth wherever they’re denied. Already our network of over three million members and supporters is making a difference in 150 countries. Whether we’re applying pressure through powerful research or direct lobbying, mass demonstrations or online campaigning, we’re all inspired by hope for a better world. One where human rights are respected and protected by everyone, everywhere.

Closing date: 15th July 2012.

For more information and to apply, please visit www.amnesty.org/jobs

Fahamu