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Swaziland: Wither absolute monarchism?

Moses Tofa

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87402

cc R E In Africa’s last monarchy – the kingdom of Swaziland, the major question is: for how long multi-party politics should be construed as incompatible with Swazi tradition, when that tradition is static? It appears that Swazi tradition was not only hijacked by the monarchy but has arrested the development of genuine democratic participation of Swazi citizens

Swaziland has retained and continues to indefinitely retain its controversial status as an absolute constitutional monarchy. It is the only country in Africa with such a ‘distinctly maverick’ political order. The country’s political establishment is regarded by many critics as ‘archaic.’ There is not a vestige of doubt that there is a constant contest between the ancient norms and practices on which the Swazi monarchy is anchored and the progressive forces of democracy and fundamental freedoms which have become the linchpin of the contemporary political order. Swaziland is very rich in a diversity of cultural beliefs and practices which have been subjected to censorious criticism because of their patent incompatibility with contemporary fundamental freedoms. The international community as well as some critical sections of the Swazi community have made many calls for Swaziland to transform to a multi-party state. Contrary to the calls for democratic reforms, the Swazi monarchy has not moved an inch from its traditional position that multi-party politics is ‘divisive’ and ‘incompatible’ with Swazi tradition and therefore ‘undesirable’ in the kingdom. It is important to note that tradition is not static, it changes over time and space and that these changes are not negotiable. That tradition changes is what makes societies progressive.

THE ‘TINKHUNDLA’ SYSTEM

Swaziland is a small Landlocked Developing Country (LLDC) which is located in Southern Africa. It is bordered by South Africa on the north, west and south and by Mozambique on the east. It has a population which is in the region of 1.2 million. Its local language is called ‘siSwati’ and the Dhlamini is the royal clan. Its local currency is called the ‘Lilangeni’ which is pegged at par with the South African Rand. Like Botswana and Lesotho, the country is a former British protectorate. It gained its independence on a multi-party platform through a tortuous negotiated settlement on 6 September 1968 under the leadership of then king Sobhuza II. At independence, Swaziland adopted a Westminster-oriented constitution which provided for multi-party politics on the basis of the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, in 1976, Sobhuza repealed the independence constitution via an arbitrary royal decree which outlawed political parties. He established the ‘Tinkhundla’ system which is the basis of governance in contemporary Swaziland. This system effectively replaced multi-party politics and transformed the country into an absolute monarchy, the status which it retains today.

THE RISE OF MONOLITHIC POLITICS

The Tinkhundla system is based on ancient Swazi tradition and norms. In order to consolidate this system of governance, Sobhuza made Swazi tradition supreme over liberal principles and practices. He died in 1983 and left the country in the clutches of unique monolithic politics. After the death of Sobhuza, there were some fierce disputes over his succession. These disputes threatened to plunge the country into turmoil as different vociferous antagonists took tenacious positions. The outcome of the power struggle was that Mswati III was appointed king in 1986 in order to occupy the position that had been left vacant by his father’s death. The incumbent king has incorporated elements of modern processes of governance as a way of clothing the monarchy with a veneer of legitimacy and democratic virtue. This has created a hybrid political system which consists of badly meshed traditional and modern processes of governance. According to section 82 (1) of the constitution, Swaziland is basically partitioned into four administrative regions. These are Hhohho (this is where the capital city Mbabane is located and where the government ministries are based), Lubombo (this is where the vast of the country’s plantations are located), Manzini (this is the country’s largest commercial and industrial site) and Shiselweni (which is the country’s most impoverished region). Each region is administered by a regional administrator who is appointed by the king using his personal discretion.

THE LAST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY IN THE CONTINENT

In his character as ‘Ingwenyama,’ Mswati is construed by the majority of Swazis as the final custodian and repository of Swazi cultural beliefs and practices. He is the highest political authority in the Kingdom. He holds executive powers and he unilaterally appoints some members of the bicameral legislature, viz. the senate and the house of assembly. The present parliament consists of 65 parliamentarians. Fifty five of these parliamentarians are elected via the popular vote while the remaining 10 are unilaterally appointed by the king. All members of the Swazi parliament are independents because of the prohibition on political parties. The senate consists of 30 members of which 10 are elected by the house of assembly while 20 are appointed by the king. The King also appoints the prime minister and the incumbent prime minister is Barnabas Sibusiso Dhlamini. The prime minister is the head of government. Members of the cabinet are appointed by the prime minister after the king’s approval. Swaziland has been criticised both locally and internationally for being the last absolute monarchy in the continent. The majority view is that absolute monarchism has been outdistanced by liberal principles and practices, especially with the advent of the 21st century.

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Because of the restrictions which have been imposed by the monarchy on democratic freedoms, Swaziland is among the African countries which have a chequered human rights record. According to the 2012 Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa, Swaziland is among the six most imbalanced states in Africa. This imbalance is engendered by its poor performance in human rights and citizen participation in political processes and institutions.

The overall governance status in Swaziland is summarized in the table below.

Source: The sixth Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 15 October 2012.

THE TRAJECTORY OF STATE POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN SWAZILAND

It is difficult to see why king Sobhuza II declared that political parties are incompatible with Swazi tradition when political parties existed in both colonial and post-colonial Swaziland. The Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) was the first main nationalist political party to be founded in colonial Swaziland. It was headed by a distinguished intellectual and a trusted ‘point man’ of King Sobhuza II, DR John June Nquku who was also its founder. However, the party quickly bifurcated due to internal internecine and a splinter party, the Ngwane National Liberation Congress (NNLC) was founded in 1962. The NNLC was founded by a South African trained physician, Dr Ambrose Zwane. It gained ground against the SPP as most of the SPP supporters defected to the NNLC because of discontentment with the leadership style of Nquku. After a failed attempt to gain independence via the vehicle of monarchical values and beliefs, king Sobhuza II move to form the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) in 1964. There were also a number of other political parties which were founded in colonial Swaziland. These were the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP), the Swaziland United Front (SUF), the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC) and the exclusively white United Swaziland Association (USA). Of all the political parties which were founded in colonial Swaziland, the INM became the most popular party as it gained overwhelming support. This is because it largely identified with the needs and aspirations of many Swazis.

The party overwhelmingly won the 1964 and the 1967 elections, winning all the seats in the house of assembly. At independence, Swaziland’s political landscape was dominated by the INM and Sobhuza enjoyed his party’s hegemony. However, by the beginning of the late 1960s, opposition political parties began to gradually mount a challenge to Sobhuza. In the 1972 post-independence parliamentary elections, the NNLC wrestled 3 of the 24 seats from the INM. This development did not please Sobhuza, who has always wanted to completely dominate Swaziland’s political dispensation. Sobhuza started to criticize the independence constitution, particularly its Bill of Rights which provided for fundamental freedoms, particularly the freedom of association. Despite that Swaziland got its independence via political organisation, the King started to abhor opposition politics. In order to secure his interests of becoming Swaziland’s ‘undisputed deity’, he decided that his best bet was to outlaw political parties in the kingdom. He argued that the Swazi constitution has many shortcomings and he enacted the Legislative Procedure Order number 7 of 12 April 1973 in which he authoritatively stated that:

‘The constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good government and for the maintenance of peace and order
The constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country and impediment to free and progressive development in all spheres of life

The constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly undesirable political parties alien to, and incompatible with, the way of life in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political activity; increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society.’ (Mzizi; 2005:30,31).


The Proclamation further stipulated that ‘the constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland which commenced on the 6 September 1968 is hereby repealed.’ After this proclamation the King usurped legislative, judicial and executive powers. The carte blanche with which the king started to exercise control over the affairs of the nation marked a new ricochet in the trajectory of state politics in Swaziland. The King’s action was a classical ‘civilian coup d’etat’ which Swaziland is likely to take some more decades to recuperate from. Political parties were outlawed under the proclamation’s decrees 11, 12, and 13 of 1973 which stipulate that:

11. All political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and ill-feelings within the nation are hereby dissolved and prohibited
12. No meeting of a political nature and no procession or demonstration shall be held or take place in any public place unless with prior written consent of the commissioner of police, and consent shall not be given if the commissioner of police has reason to believe that such meeting, procession or demonstration, is directly or indirectly related to political movements or the riotous assemblies which may disturb the peace or otherwise disturb the maintenance of law and order.
13. Any person who forms or attempts or conspires to form a political party or who organises or participates in any way in any meeting, procession or demonstration in contravention of this decree shall be guilt of an offence and liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months (Mzizi; 2005:30,34).


After this proclamation, political parties, including the king’s INM went underground. The NNLC, which was the major political party during that time, was forced to disintegrate. Leaders of opposition parties began to be harassed and detained without trial as a way of eliminating every remnant of opposition politics in the kingdom.

ELECTIONS WITHOUT CONTEST: SWAZILAND’S TINKHUNDLA SYSTEM

In order to consolidate his position that opposition political parties are ‘alien’ to the Swazi way of life, Sobhuza II immediately appointed a Royal Constitutional Review Commission (RCRC) in 1973. The primary objective of the commission was to delve into ways in which Swazi cultural values and practices could be manipulated in a way that they can form the basis of the country’s monolithic constitutional order. In 1978, the king enacted the Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order which formed the basis for the present-day Tinkhundla system (see Motsami; 2012:1). The Tinkhundla system was established in and through the spirit, letter and context of the 1973 proclamation. The 1973 proclamation, coupled with the Tinkhundla system, imposed on the people of Swaziland a seemingly bogus Swazi identity which has become the lifeblood of the monarchy.

Swaziland has a bifurcated political architecture that is characterized by ancient forms and processes of governance which are badly meshed with modern ones.According to section 79 of the Swazi constitution, ‘the system of government in Swaziland is a democratic, participatory, Tinkhundla-based system which emphasises devolution of state power from central government to Tinkhundla areas and individual merit as a basis for election or appointment to public office.’ Section 80 (3) stipulates that the Tinkhundla units or areas are ‘inspired by a policy of decentralization of state power’ and that they ‘are the engines of development and the central pillars underpinning the political organization and economic infrastructure of the country through which social services to the different parts of the Swazi community are facilitated and delivered.’

The Tinkhundla system effectively replaced the multi-party system. Under the system, those who contest for public office are bound to do that in their personal capacity and not as ambassadors of political parties or any other form of political association. Traditional authorities, particularly chiefs are the linchpin of the Tinkhundla regime. These authorities play a concrete role in vitiating dissent and entrenching the monarchy in a changing context. Purported Swazi cultural values, norms and beliefs are used via the Tinkhundla regime to make the monarchy a ‘sacred cow’ which is scarcely accountable to the Swazi nation for its actions of commission and omission. The concept of separation of powers does not exist in the Tinkhundla system primarily because the head of government is appointed by the head of state (the king). The head of government is therefore not accountable to the Swazi community but to the king maker who determines the duration of the appointment (Joubert, Masilela, and Langwenya, 2008: 28). Swaziland is therefore a classical case of fusion of powers. Chiefs are expected to ensure that the people who live within their area of jurisdiction continue to be loyal to the monarchy.

They act as ‘Swazi’s cultural old guards’ whose chief objective is to perpetuate the cultural principles, values and practices on which the monarchy is built. The Tinkhundla regime is therefore entirely the king’s watchdog. The chiefs are responsible for the administration of communal land as well as the allocation of land and they directly report to the king. Subjects who participate in politics are often victimised by the responsible chief and in some cases they can even be evicted from their community. In order to divert their subjects’ attention from politics, the chiefs often keep them occupied by requiring them to participate in community projects and royal functions like umhlanga (reed dance), incwala (Swazi’s annual ‘national prayer’ which takes place at the king’s palaces, lusekwane (an equivalent of a reed dance but is exclusively attended by young boys and it culminate in the killing of a bull by the regiments using bare hands) and kuhlakula (weeding). The chiefs are required constitutionally to convene a meeting at least two times a year in their respective regions.

In order to ensure that the chiefs are accountable to the king and that they serve to propagate his interests, the chiefs are appointed by the king via his sole discretion. Swaziland has experienced some chieftaincy disputes because some Swazis maintain that the position of a chief should be inherited and not necessarily appointed by the king. There is also the Council of Chiefs whose tasks include advising the king on issues relating to Swazi custom and chieftaincy. This council consists of twelve chiefs from the country’s four regions and they are appointed by the king (section 251 (1) of the Swazi constitution). Chiefs have recently been involved in the recruitment of personnel in the Swazi National Army. They can recommend individuals from their chiefdom to be recruited in the army. The argument here is that they are more informed of the capabilities of their subjects because they interact with them regularly.

The chiefs are appointed by the king and most of them are either the king’s relatives or those who pay entire allegiance to the king. For example, in 2000, Mswati arbitrarily depose chief Macetjeni and Kamkhweli and appointed Prince Maguga Dhlamini, who is his brother and this occasioned serious disputes in which the deposed kings refused to recognised Maguga. Mswati is superfluously rich King with 13 wives and his lavish lifestyle has engendered controversy and criticism in the country and beyond. The Forbes Magazine estimated Mswati’s wealth to be worth above US $100 million yet more than two-thirds of the Swazis live in brutish wretchedness. In April 2011, concerned Swazis reacted against Mswati’s abuse of taxpayers’ money to buy a private jet, to build new royal residences for his wives, to fund the reed festival and to purchase ‘royal vehicles.’

CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE SWAZI CONSTITUTION

The constitution is the linchpin of any political order. Since the 1973 decree which nullified the independence constitution, Swaziland has been operating without a written constitution. Between 1973 and 2006, the monarchy used the 1973 decree, the Tinkhundla system and Swazi cultural beliefs and practices to govern the country. As time passed, operating without a constitution became more and more unsustainable. Swazis began to express their discontentment with this situation. Pressure mounted on the monarchy from pro-democracy sections of the Swazi community and the international community at large regarding the need for a constitution. In response to the discontentment, the king decided to establish the Constitutional Drafting Committee in 2002, a step which led to the enactment of a new constitution in the kingdom. The constitution of Swaziland was signed by the King on the 26 July 2005 and entered into force on the 8 February 2006. The entering into force of the Swazi constitution brought the widespread optimism among the majority of Swazis and sections of the international community that a new era had dawned in the country. The Swazi constitution looks very attractive but it has some unresolved contradictions. Like any other democratic constitution, the Swazi constitution provides for a range of democratic freedoms including the freedom of assembly and association. Section 25 states that:

(1) A person has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
(2) A person shall not except with the free consent of that person be hindered in the enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, that is to say, the right to assemble peacefully and associate freely with other persons for the promotion or protection of the interests of that person.

However, despite this provision, the permissibility of political parties in Swaziland remains uncertain. If this provision is properly interpreted, one can arrive at the conclusion that political parties are permissible under the constitution. However, the constitution is silent about political parties despite that it recognises the freedom of association. Swaziland does not have a legislative framework which regulates issues of political parties such as membership, registration, and access to funding. The death of this legislation points to the position that opposition political parties are illegal in the kingdom. It is clear that the draconian 1973 proclamation remains intact and continues to form the basis for Swaziland’s monolithic political system. This is because there is no provision in the constitution which revokes the proclamation. The monarchy is hostile to political parties such that in January 2011, the king’s private secretary Samuel Mkhombe and a member of the king’s advisory council, Mathendele Dhlamini were fired following their attempt to resuscitate the INM. What makes the confusion regarding the permissibility of opposition politics in Swaziland is that in February 2011 the Attorney General (AG) issued a statement implying that political parties are permissible or can operate in the country but only that they cannot form a government.

It appears the freedom of association referred in the constitution is constricted to organisations such as the church, community based organisations and interest groups. One cannot divorce the freedom of association from the freedom to form or join political parties because this freedom forms the linchpin of the freedom of association. When it comes to the freedom of association, Swaziland presents a classical case of a country with a self-defeating constitution which is the epitome of constitutional bankruptcy.
Section 63 of the Swazi constitution stipulates the duties of citizens and some of the duties are to ‘promote democracy and the rule of law” and to “combat misuse and waste of public funds and property.’ This is misleading because it is difficult to see how citizens can promote democracy in a state where they are not allowed to form or belong to political parties. This is because popular participation in the political processes and institutions of a country forms the basis of democracy and political parties are the vehicle of popular participation. Democracy is also characterised by the ability of the citizens to make their government accountable. This is important in the combat against the embezzlement of public funds. Political parties and interest groups play a major role in this regard. Swazi’s inbreeding constitution is exacerbated by other instruments which arbitrarily oppress democratic freedoms such as the Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA).

One of the political objectives of Swaziland as stipulated in section 58 (1) is to be ‘a democratic country dedicated to principle which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance.’ It is difficult to see how this objective can be pursued in the context where political organisation is banned and where legislations such as the STA are used to suppress civic liberties. The Swazi constitution deifies the king by giving him excessive powers and the prerogative to use his personal discretion in governing almost every aspect of the country.

THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM ACT (STA)

King Mswati III assented to the STA on 7 August 2008. The objective of the STA as stipulated in this instrument is to ‘prevent, fight, and suppress terrorist activities’ in keeping with the letter and spirit of the United Nations. On 14 November 2008, the government declared some organisations ‘terrorist entities’ under the STA. These organisations include PUDEMO, the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the Swaziland People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) which is based in South Africa. These political organizations are known for their agitation for the democratization of the kingdom. Their activities cannot in any way be construed as acts of terrorism. The instrument is also use to suppress the activities of civil society organizations which are critical of the monarchy. It should be noted that the global fight against terrorism is premised on the human rights movement. It seeks to ensure that innocent people are not arbitrarily deprived of their lives through the infamous acts of terrorist organisations. It also seeks to safeguard the rights of people who are suspected of being terrorists or members of terrorist organisations. There is overwhelming evidence to support the view that the promotion of human rights is at the depths of the global strategy to combat terrorism. Paragraph 85 of the Outcome Document of the September 2005 World Summit Declaration states that:

‘We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with international law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.’

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 26 September 2008, Mswati said that the Swazi parliament had ‘recently promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act.’ He said that the country ‘joins the rest of the world in condemning all forms and acts of terrorism’ and that it ‘support efforts for the full implementation of the global counter-terrorism strategy in order to send out a clear message to all perpetrators of terrorism” (Amnesty International, 2009:5). What distinguishes the United Nations’ framework for combating terrorism from the STA is that the latter serves to violate human rights in ways which purport to promote them. The definition of a ‘terrorist act’ under this instrument is so elastic that even any act can potentially be regarded as an “act of terrorism,’ even singing in public. It is important to distinguish political violence from terrorism. In a society where the state is not responsive to the needs and aspirations of citizens and avenues of dialogue are virtually closed, people have a tendency to resort to violent means. These include protests which may turn violent depending largely on how the state responds to them. Swaziland offers a good example of a state in which the avenues of dialogue as far as the need to introduce multi-party politics is concerned are virtually non-existent. Having been frustrated by the apparent dearth of such avenues, progressives have resorted to mass protests as a means of registering their discontentment. To call protests (even in cases where they may turn violent) acts of terrorism would be itself an act of terrorism of all acts of terrorism.

Swaziland has ratified a number of international human rights instruments. It is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which it ratified on 6 March 2004, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which it ratified on 07 April 1969, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which it ratified in September 2005, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) which it ratified on 15 September 1995. By virtue of being a party to these international and regional human rights instruments, Swaziland has the obligation to abide by the provisions of these instruments. Not only that some provisions in the STA are incompatible with the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms but the instrument’s salient purpose is to oppress dissent. The instrument can be characterised as a ‘human rights coup.’ It negates the commitment which Swaziland has made when it ratified international human rights instruments.

It is clear from the Swazi context and the texts of the STA that this instrument is used by the monarchy as a smokescreen behind which to arbitrarily suppress political agitation, particularly opposition politics. The 1973 royal proclamation and the STA are some of the instruments which demonstrate the willpower of the Swazi monarchy to openly manipulate certain values and principles in order to maintain power.

WHICH WAY SWAZILAND?

Since the 1973 unilateral proclamation by king Sobhuza II which banned political parties in Swaziland, the Swazi monarchy has largely been able to convince the Swazi community that political parties are “unSwazi” and “inherently divisive”. This is what Iqbal noted:

‘The autocracy has for decades successfully convinced the majority of the populace that since the country has always been a kingdom, a tradition rooted in Swazi culture,... the concept of the political party and even basic democratic principles are “alien” and therefore incompatible with tradition.’ (Iqbal: 2011)

This ‘imposed identity’ has managed to deeply permeate the social and political fabrics of the Swazi community. The monarchy has managed not only to sustain but to reinvent and reanimate this identity in the face of an overwhelming tide of change which is contrary to it. It has also survived because unlike other Southern African countries, Swaziland has been and continues to be largely ‘invisible’ to the international community. This is because the country largely finds itself on the periphery of the attention of the international community partly because ‘it is not of strategic international interest.’

The monarchy’s efforts to clothe itself with the facade of democracy through the adoption of bogus democratic instruments such as the Tinkhundla system and the 2006 constitution demonstrates that it is aware that there is need to constantly give Swaziland’s monolithic political order new life. However, the situation in which Swaziland finds itself is comparable to a prisoner’s dilemma. This is because the monarchy is faced with the challenge to strike a balance between the progressive forces of democratization and the ancient Swazi norms and practices on which the monarchy is built. There is no doubt that the incumbent King Mswati III is still largely popular and considered a legitimate and uncontested leader of the monarchy. For example, the publisher of the ‘Times of Swaziland’ newspaper, Paul Loffler, stated that:

‘Swaziland does not need democracy. We have never had genocide, we have never nationalised farms, our municipalities run like clockwork, the cities are clean, there are no potholes-or not many and we have little violent crime.’ (The Sunday Times, 05 June 2011).

The redeeming feature of the Swazi monarchy is that it is largely characterized by peace as compared to many of Africa’s ‘multi-party’ states. Swaziland has never experienced a humanitarian catastrophe such as those which took place in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya. This is one of the chief reasons as to why many Swazis believe in the monarchy. However, there are basically four constituencies in Swaziland as far as the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy is concerned. The first constituency consists of the die hard conservatives or traditionalists. viz, those Swazis who believe that the king’s legitimacy should not be questioned and even that he should not be made accountable for his actions of commission and omission. This position is largely based on the conception that the king always makes the right decisions for the Swazi community. It is also premised on what this study elects to refer to as ‘hijacked nationalism.’ The constituency consists of chiefs and other traditional leaders, government officials (particularly high ranking ones), and members of the Liqoqo. These groups support the king primarily because of the benefits which are derived from that support. It also consists of the ordinary Swazis who, through years and years of the propagation of the position that opposition politics is ‘alien’ to the Swazi nation by the monarchy, have come to religiously believe in that position. Some members of this constituency are prepared to pay with the last drop of their blood in defence of the monarchy.

The second constituency consists of gradual liberalists. These are Swazis who believe that the absolute monarchy should be Swaziland’s permanent political order. However, due to factors such as corruption, the monopolization of the political kingdom by the Dhlaminis’, poor governance in areas such as food security and HIV/AIDS, this constituency believes that the monarchy should be reformed but not radically. The major element of this reformation is to ensure that it is all-inclusive. This constituency also believes that the monarchy can also be reformed via the adoption of pieces of legislations which prioritizes the aspirations and needs of the people of Swaziland, excluding the agitation for dismantling the monarchy. However, this constituency is not vocal. It tends to constrict its aspirations to mere reveries.

The third constituency consists of ‘progressive’ liberalists. This consists of those Swazis who are convinced that opposition politics should be allowed to operate in the country but the monarchy should be preserved. They also believe in the need for Swaziland to promote other democratic freedoms within the framework of the monarchy. The final constituency consists of radical liberalists who believe that Swaziland needs to be disembarrassed of the absolute monarchy and replace it with a democratic and competitive political dispensation.

The position which is taken in this article is that history is the most difficult thing to defy, especially when it has changed. There is not a vestige of doubt that history has earnestly changed such that it is becoming increasingly difficult and hardly justifiable to sustain a political dispensation like that which obtains in contemporary Swaziland. This is primarily because Swazi’s absolute monarchy is premised on a ‘shifting edifice,’ that is, cultural norms and practices. It is in the nature of societies and culture to change over time and space and this is not negotiable.

That culture is not static is what makes societies progressive. There is no doubt that there is a strong link between cultural change and development. The Swazi tradition on which the monarchy is premised is increasingly becoming a major impediment to the realization of the aspirations of the Swazis, particularly the freedom to form and belong to political associations. However, the Swazi monarchy is only sustainable via the maintenance of the status quo as far as the monarchy-purported Swazi cultural values, norms and practices are concerned. Swazi’s cultural practices are not unique in Africa.

The difference is only that some African leaders did not capitalize on tradition to impose an identity on the people with the view to entrench themselves in power. It can be said that the Swazi monarchy manipulated tradition just like many incumbents in Africa manipulate elections in order to maintain power. However, the wind of democracy and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms has outdistanced political systems which are founded on ancient norms and practices such as a monarchy, let alone an absolute monarchy like Swaziland. This is what Phiri had in mind when he argued that:
‘From this distance, the problem of Swaziland is thus the status of the monarchy. The issue here is not openly the legitimacy of the King, but whether in this modern era (an age of political and structural transformations, and the respect for basic human rights) he should continue enjoying the archaic and traditional privileges that previously defeated communities reserved for sovereign potentates during the last two centuries.’ (Phiri as Cited by Bohler-Muller and Lukhele-Olorunju; 2011: 3).

It is becoming increasingly patent that the monarchy’s entrenched position that opposition politics is contrary to traditional Swazi norms and beliefs has reached a ‘tottering and faltering’ point at this point in history. The only question remaining is not whether the monarchy will come to a dead end but when will it do so because it cannot be permanently sustained. There shall definitely come a point at which Swaziland will transform to a multi-party state, voluntarily or via an unstoppable wind of change. One of the many areas in which history is known to be foolproof is that when it has changed, it does not matter how long a certain establishment has been in place. This is one way in which the successes of the Arab Spring can be explained.

It also explains the success of the Libyan revolution. That history is sure to impose consequences when one defies it is what Gaddafi failed to realise when he decided to invoke his military mantle with the view to face out the Libyan revolt. Having presided over Libya for close to half a century, Gaddafi became entirely convinced that nothing can depose him from the presidency. Contrary to this conviction, he eventually died a brutish and ignoble death after his capture by ‘cockroaches and rats’, the terms which he used to refer to the revolutionaries. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia are possibly making themselves victims of a changed history.

There already exists a sizeable and growing constituency of Swazis who have become disaffected with the monarchy and are committed to disembarrass Swaziland of this type of political establishment. This ‘liberated zone’ is slowly but earnestly growing and it has the support of the international community because it seeks to promote internationally valued norms of democracy and human rights. This is a ‘liberated zone’ in the sense that it has dissociated itself from the norms and practices which are being used by the monarchy to suppress democratic freedoms. Force can be used to suppress the physical aspects of the “liberated zone” but the values, principles and norms of the zone cannot be chained or reversed but can only be delayed.

However, while it is desirable (because it is inevitable) for Swaziland to transform to a multi-party state, it is important to interrogate how such a transition could possibly be effected. This is because a transition from an absolute monarchy to a multi-party state in itself does not guarantee that Swaziland will transform into a peaceful, democratic and progressive state. If poorly managed, the transition can engender unprecedented political, social and economic problems in that country. Such a transition cannot be expected to take place overnight. It should be preceded by broad democratic reforms which will form the basis for state politics and society in post-monarchy Swaziland. Such reforms may take time to be implemented especially when the political will to do so is impoverished.

There are basically two ways in which Swaziland can be transformed to a competitive and democratic political system. The first one (which is likely to be acceptable to the monarchy) is to maintain the monarchy in the context of multi-party politics. This occurs when political parties are allowed to exist and vie for public offices. However, the king and the Ndlovukazi will continue to play an important role in Swazi politics. The only difference is that the king will have to be divested of executive powers. He will become a ceremonial one but he may retain the power to accent to legislations in the context of a balance of power system. In this political order, there will be an executive head of state who is elected via the ballot. The position of the king will continue to be hereditary and the king and the Ndlovukazi will continue to be
the highest custodians of Swazi cultural values and practices.

This system is capable of ensuring that Swaziland retains its cultural tradition within the context of a modern democratic state. This appears close to the nature of transformation which the International Crisis Group (ICG; 2005:1), proposed when it maintained that Swaziland should be transformed into a constitutional monarchy which is characterised by:

• The elimination of all vestiges of the 1973 state of emergency, including removal of the king’s arbitrary powers over the legislature and judiciary as well as his right to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet;
• Legalization of political parties
• A directly elected house of assembly with oversight of royal spending and an elected prime minister as head of government;
• Codification of traditional law and its reconciliation with common law, and appointment of an independent judiciary by an impartial judicial commission, and
• Civilian oversight of professional security forces.

The second approach is a radical one. It calls for the dismantling of the entire institution of the monarchy root and branch and the introduction of multi-party politics. This option is difficult to achieve (especially through dialogue) because of the nature and degree of the change involved. What should be understood about multi-party politics is that there is nothing inherently bad about it. It just requires leadership to respect the will of the people. The problem comes when incumbents want to maintain a stranglehold on power when the popular will has shifted. This is not a problem which can be attributed to multi-party politics. It tends therefore to be misleading to say that multi-party politics is divisive as the Swazi monarchy has maintained.

Whichever form of transition the people of Swaziland may elect to effect; dialogue should be at the centre of the transition. Swaziland does not need to implement any transition via a civil war like the case of Libya. It is important to engage the king at a highly intellectual level with the view to influence him to effect a transition which is in the best interest of the people of Swaziland. The major role in any transformation in Swaziland should be played by progressive local actors. However, progressive local actors in Swaziland have received very little international attention and support. The international community, particularly South Africa, SADC, the African Union, and the European Union has a role to play in any political transformation which might need to be implemented in Swaziland. The role would be to influence the king through dialogue and the imposition of sanctions (where and when necessary) and also to give financial and other forms of support to progressive local actors.

ENDNOTES

Bohler-Muller, N. and Lukhele-Olorunju, P. August 2011. ‘Swaziland: The Last Gape of an Absolute Monarch?’ Policy Brief No 54, Africa Institute of South Africa. Johannesburg: EISA.
Iqbal, Z. 2011. ‘Swaziland: The forgotten land of avarice.’ Available at: http:/www.iijd.org/index.php/news/entry/Swaziland-the-forgoten-land-of-avarice/ (Accessed 20 February 2012)
Joubert, P. Masilela, Z. and Langwenya, M. 2008.’Consolidating Democratic Governance in the SADC Region: Swaziland.’ EISA Research Report No. 38.
Motsami, D. ‘Swaziland’s Non-Party System and the 2013 Tinkhundla Elections: Breaking the SADC Impasse?’ Institute for Security Studies Situation Report, Pretoria. 15 August 2012
Mzizi, J. B. 2006. ‘Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland.’ Research Report No 18, Johannesburg, EISA.
Amnesty International, 2009. ‘Suppression of Terrorism Act Undermines Human Rights in Swaziland.’ Amnesty International Publications and International Bar Association.
International Crisis Group, ‘Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking.’ Policy Briefing No 29, Pretoria, Brussels. 14 July 2005.
International Trade Union Confederation, ‘Swaziland: The repressive side of an absolute monarchy.’ Union View No 3, May 2009.
*Moses Tofa is the author of ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Metaphorical Metamorphosis: Memories from the Experiences of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire.’ He is a political analyst and a Peace, Security and Development Scholar with the African Leadership Centre.

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Diversity and inclusion

Do NGOs practice what they preach?

Fairouz El Tom

2013-05-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87395

cc A There is a clear disjunction between the world NGOs seek to create, and the world their governance structures reproduce

Diversity and inclusion are important to almost all non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Beyond this recognition, to what extent do NGOs adequately reflect these values?

To find out, I chose to look at the Executive Boards of the 2013 Top 100 NGOs, a list of what the Global Journal considers to be the most impactful, innovative and sustainable NGOs. I looked at Executive Boards because they are the supreme governing body of an NGO. Their decisions determine the organisation’s direction and policies, and eventually its impact on the people it serves. Board membership is therefore vitally important. (For details, see methodology )

What emerged?

HEADQUARTERS AND ACTIVITY

There is an almost exact mirror image between where NGOs are headquartered and where the people they serve live. Close to three quarters (72 percent) of the NGOs are headquartered in the Western World: however, more than three quarters of their activity (79 percent) takes place in the Majority World, over one third in Africa (32 percent) alone.




SOCIAL PROFILE

Taken as a body, most of the surveyed NGOs work for populations that are predominantly non-European and relatively poorly educated; most also promote gender equality and women’s empowerment. Yet their own leaderships are primarily composed of Western educated male graduates of European origin.





SELECTED PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

In different ways, the NGOs surveyed promote ideals of justice and social progress. Yet over half have Board members who are affiliated with companies that invest in, or provide legal, marketing, or other services to the arms, tobacco and finance industries.




ANALYSIS

The figures reveal a clear disjunction between the world these NGOs seek to create, and the world their governance structures reproduce.

By appointing Boards that are predominantly of European origin (66 percent overall; 77 percent for Western NGOs), they perpetuate values that assume ‘whiteness’ is superior to ‘blackness’ and attitudes tainted by a Western-saviour myth. The very low number of Board members from Africa (5 percent) is particularly troubling, because more than one-third of projects take place in that region. Of the 40 organisations that conduct more than one-third of their work in Africa, 22 (55 percent) have no African Board members.

The representation of women may appear to be less alarming, but the ratio of women is still relatively low. Furthermore, 65 percent of female Board members are of European origin—a figure that rises to 75 percent among Western NGOs. This reveals the importance of intersectionality; in this instance, if they wish to be inclusive and diverse, NGOs need to consider gender and ethnicity.

Given the ethnic composition of these Boards, it is not surprising that most of their members graduated from Western universities. Many of those of non-Western origin have also attended Western institutions. Although the value of higher education and the excellence of many Western universities are undeniable, the NGOs surveyed are almost completely reliant on Western knowledge paradigms, though they work in many areas of the world where other systems of thought are strongly present. Through this choice, they inevitably exclude points of view that are relevant or vital to the work they do or the people they serve.

In sum, the leaderships of these NGOs have a social profile that is at least at odds, and probably incompatible, with their ideals and mission. Some social bias was understandable in the historical context in which international NGO activism formed in the last century; that time is past. If NGOs are to realise their ideals of justice and social reform in today’s highly mobile, diverse, information rich world, they need to draw on skills and experience from across the globe. To do their jobs, Boards need to be adequately diverse, representative, and well-informed: at present, those surveyed are manifestly deficient in all three respects.

The professional affiliations of NGO Board members reveal an equally disturbing gap between ideals and practice, although it must be acknowledged that the present analysis is limited in scope and a deeper survey would be desirable. I elected to identify Board members who have links to the tobacco, arms or finance industry.

More than half the organisations listed have Board members who are affiliated with companies that invest in, or provide legal, marketing, or other services to the arms and tobacco industries. In reality, it is likely that a larger number do so since only 3 tobacco companies and 10 companies that produce arms or provide military services were considered.

Many would question whether association with the arms and tobacco industries is compatible with the promotion of ideals of justice and social progress. Even if no position of principle is taken, however, NGOs certainly need to explain how association with these industries is consistent with their objectives.

With respect to the finance industry, the figures are similar. At first sight, the presence of finance experts on Boards may seem defensible. Boards have a duty of financial oversight, and many of the NGOs surveyed manage budgets of millions of dollars. They nevertheless have a duty to explain their choices, and most do not do so.

The reputation of the banking sector was highly compromised by the greedy and irresponsible conduct of numerous banks and investment houses in the period before and after the 2008 crash. It cannot credibly be said that the sector has shown evidence of working to protect the interests of less privileged groups in society, who are the primary constituents of most of the listed NGOs. Nor is this a ‘left wing’ perception. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has commented that an out-of-control financial sector is eating out the modern market economy from inside, just as the larva of the spider wasp eats out the host in which it has been laid’. NGOs should ask themselves whether the appointment of numerous senior executives and partners in large investment banks and hedge funds helps them to achieve their mission.

As individuals, of course, bankers too can be philanthropists. It is not a question of excluding such sources of economic expertise altogether. What is shocking is the number of them on NGO Boards, and the glaring absence of so many other kinds of expertise.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, men can individually contest the unequal status of women, individuals of European origin can imagine and oppose the exclusion and marginalisation that many people of different ethnic origins experience, and highly educated persons can choose to figure out how the world appears to those with little or no education. Nevertheless, governance systems that primarily rely on personal empathy and imagination are fundamentally unsatisfactory. The truth is that, where governing bodies have a quite different social composition from the populations they seek to serve, they will imperfectly understand those populations and will not represent them or their interests adequately, and their decision-making will suffer as a result.

Homogeneous Boards are also likely to be blind to certain social realities, as responses to this survey reveal. A number simply did not record the ethnicity of their Board members, refusing in effect to take account of the influence of power and privilege on exclusion and disadvantage—issues that in many instances are central to their mandates and values. Many also failed to perceive the implications of their links to the arms, tobacco and finance industries and arguably failed in their duty of due diligence.

In the end, how an organisation governs itself is a choice. However, organisations whose declared objective is to improve the lives of impoverished or disadvantaged groups cannot afford to ignore attitudes or behaviour, in their own conduct or in society at large, that shore up illegitimate, unjust social structures. NGOs that de facto exclude those they are meant to serve from the most powerful positions in their organisations, or appoint to their Boards individuals who serve industries that oppose or hinder their mandates, must expect to be challenged.

LOOKING AHEAD

So what should an NGO keep in mind if it wants to appoint a Board that is sound and appropriate? Four considerations perhaps spring to mind. Taken as a whole, its membership should:

• Include a sufficient number of individuals who are recognised and trusted by the (principal) communities it serves.
• Possess enough relevant professional and operational expertise (governance, finance, technical skills, etc. associated with the NGO’s mandate).
• Include a range of voices, sufficient to ensure that the Board maintains oversight and standards of due diligence, and brings a sufficiently broad ethical perspective to its deliberations.
• Be consistent with the organisation’s mandate and values (with respect to diversity, social objectives, etc.).

Clearly, achieving a balanced Board is challenging and the more activities and audiences an organisation has, the harder it is to represent them adequately on a Board of normal size. Nevertheless, the effort is necessary—on ethical grounds, for reasons of efficiency, and to manage risk—and it is certainly less difficult for most organisations to appoint a sound Board than to achieve their mandate.

One must tread carefully, however. Boards exclusively composed of Western-educated African or Asian women will be as limited in their worldview as those dominated by heterosexual, middle-aged men of European descent. The same can be said of gender-balanced Boards whose ethnically diverse members all belong to elites in their respective societies. Meaningful diversity is not about quotas but equitable representation. To take account of different ways of communicating and experiencing life, it is necessary to balance fundamental values and a variety of specific concerns.

According to Robert Jensen, if we want to meaningfully change the world, ‘[t]he first step is to tell the truth. Not just the truth we can bear, but all of the truth. Part of that truth is our own complicity’.

NGOs should accept that, to act more authentically, they need to be transparent about, and accountable for, the choices they make. If Boards themselves are usually responsible for their composition, most participants in NGOs have a role to play in this. Staff can choose which NGOs they work for and can ask their managers and Boards to address diversity and inclusion. Members can place these issues on the agenda of their organisations, and elect Board members accordingly. Donors can take diversity and inclusion into account when they select whom they fund.

With that in mind, here is a non-exhaustive list of additional questions that NGOs might ask when they appoint members to their Boards:

• How is she connected to the problems we are trying to solve?
• Does his experience hinder him from understanding the reality of those we seek to serve?
• Does she bring a different and relevant experience to the table?
• How do some of her life experiences compare to those of others on the Board?
• Are his professional affiliations in line with our objectives?
• Do his actions match his words?
• How does she relate to ‘difference’?
• What world does this person aspire to?

Clearly, there is no one or easy way to achieve social change. Unless NGOs think, speak and act coherently, however, and question their beliefs and standpoints more strongly, they are likely, as Arundhati Roy (http://www.democracynow.org/2004/8/23/public_power_in_the_age_of) cautions, to ‘unwittingly reinforce racist stereotypes and re-affirm the achievements, the comforts, and the compassion (the tough love) of Western civilization’, acting as ‘secular missionaries of the modern world’.

If we do not explore with open minds the richness and variety of human experience, we will be unable to imagine concretely the new world we say we want to create.

* Fairouz El Tom is creative director at Plain Sense in Geneva, and conducts independent projects on issues related to diversity and "otherness". She tweets at @onrelating.

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Saints of dictatorship versus prisoners of defunct legitimacy

Putting Zimbabwe’s forthcoming general elections in the context of 2008

Moses Tofa

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87403

cc G M The events of 2008 in Zimbabwe led to bloodshed and the present-day Government of National Unity. ZANU PF has exposed its cast-iron willpower to thwart the implementation of any meaningful reforms and the prognosis for the 2013 elections appears bleak

Probably the most important question for Zimbabwe today is that for how long shall this great country be covered by a dark cloud of tyranny? The ‘saints of dictatorship’ have defied the popular will to transform the country to democratic politics via the infrastructure of tyranny. Zimbabwe offers a classical example of a state which is in a state of ‘arrested democracy.’ By the year 2000, the support ZANU PF used to enjoy had patently plummeted. By 2002, Mugabe had surely become a ‘fully-fledged persona non grata’ within and beyond the borders of Zimbabwe. There is no doubt whatsoever that the people of Zimbabwe have become ‘prisoners of lost legitimacy.’ Legitimacy is whereby the government governs with the express consent of the governed. Legitimacy can be given or revoked through the conduct elections. This is because it is in and through elections that power can be given or revoked. When conducted responsibly, elections are an essential means of legitimizing governments and preventing the emergence of violent conflicts. Conversely, when they are patently hijacked, they can be a potential source of protracted conflicts and in some cases deadly ones. For example, in 2007/2008, a patently hijacked election by the Mwai Kibaki regime in Kenya invoked iniquitous violence in which hundreds of thousands of Kenyans lost their lives and livelihoods.

THE MEANING OF ELECTIONS

In Cote d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the results of the 28 November 2010 election in which he lost to Alassane Ouattara. On 4 December 2010, Gbagbo was inaugurated president and on the same day, the investiture of Ouattara as president also took place. This occasioned an unprecedented political impasse in Cote d’Ivoire in which the country plunged into a calamitous civil conflict. This situation was resolved when (on 11 April 2011) forces loyal to Ouattara, with assistance from French forces, launched a titanic knockdown offensive on Gbagbo’s banker and captured him, together with his wife Simone. The basic truth is that elections can either be meaningful or they can be devoid of any meaning depending on the spirit and manner in which they are conducted.

The contact of elections in Zimbabwe has come to be synonymous with violence and the retention of lost legitimacy. The forthcoming elections are going to be the country’s hotly contested and highly controversial elections, with ZANU PF and MDC-T not willing to accept defeat. ZANU PF will go out of its way to ensure a victory, especially with regards to the presidential election. The party may afford to lose the parliamentary majority to the MDC but it cannot afford to lose the presidential election. However, although the MDC has lost a significant constituent of supporters, it is difficult to see how ZANU PF can win a free and fair election. If not conducted properly, the forthcoming elections may see Zimbabwe going through the experiences of Kenya and at worst of Cote d’Ivoire.

REVERIES FROM THE MOUNTAINTOP: THE 2008 HARMONIZED ELECTIONS

It is important for any government anywhere to respect the sacrosanct right of the citizens to elect a government of their choice through the ballot. According to the ‘New York Time’ of 31 October 1990, the nineteenth-century US President Abraham Lincoln, while a member of the US Congress, made a passionate speech on 12 January, 1948, apropos of the US invasion of Mexico in which he stated that:

‘Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better. This is the most valued—the most sacred right which we believe, is to liberate the world.’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: 82).

It is regrettable that the people of Zimbabwe have been divested of this sacred right by the post-colonial state. During the liberation struggle, Zimbabweans fought a spirited struggle with the inextinguishable faith that the end of colonial oppression will mark the advent of a new epoch in which democracy; good governance and material prosperity are embedded. This is what Amilcar Cabral realized when he was leading the independence struggle for Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde Islands and he puts it incisively:
‘Always remember that people do not fight for things, for ideas that exist only in the heads of individuals. The people fight and accept sacrifices. But they do it in order to gain material advantages, to live in peace and improve their lives, to experience progress and to be able to guarantee a future for their children.’(Young, 1982:90).

Zimbabweans did not sacrifice their lives for ideas that exist in the heads of ZANU PF old guards. The conduct of bogus elections and the rise of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe have betrayed the letter and spirit of the liberation struggle. There is not an ounce of doubt that Zimbabweans voted for change during the 29 March 2008 elections. These elections marked a watershed in Zimbabwe’s electoral history. They were the first harmonized elections (they consisted of the parliamentary, the presidential, and the local council elections) that were held following the unanimous passing of the constitutional amendment Act 18 by parliament. The act stipulates that all these elections be held together, unlike the past when they were held separately. Unlike the 2000 parliamentary and the 2002 presidential elections, the pre-electoral period of the 2008 elections was fairly violence-free.

However, it was tainted by some electoral malpractices, such as the monopolization of the state media by ZANU-PF, irregularities in voter registration, impartiality of bodies responsible for the contact of elections, politicization of food and other forms of aid, gerrymandering of constituency boundaries, and isolated incidents of political violence. For the first time in history, ZANU-PF lost the majority of the parliamentary and council seats to the MDC and Mugabe lost the presidential race to Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC.

When Mugabe realized that he had lost the presidential elections to Tsvangirai, he ordered the chairman of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), George Chiweshe, to withhold the results. Chiweshe and other influential ZEC officials are confessed ZANU-PF supporters. Mugabe needed ample time to manipulate the results in his favor. However, having realized that Tsvangirai’s victory was transparent, Mugabe could not manipulate the results to the degree that he could declare himself the winner. In fact, Mugabe had been caught in an inextricable cobweb of illegitimacy. He saved himself in extremes by making capital of section 110 (3) of Chapter 2:3 of the Electoral Act, which stipulates that ‘where two or more candidates for President are nominated, and after a poll taken in terms of subsection (2) no candidate receives a majority of the total number of valid votes cast, a second election shall be held within 21 days after the previous election in accordance with this Act.’ To manipulate this act, Mugabe declared Tsvangirai the winner but with less than the required 50 percent needed to be declared the outright winner in Zimbabwe’s first-past-the-post-electoral system.

Mugabe took some time to engineer this strategy. The most interesting thing about these results was that the Herald publicized the facts that no presidential candidate had won an outright majority and that a runoff between Tsvangirai and Mugabe was to be held well before ZEC officially announced them. When they were finally announced, it was but a formality. The results were announced on 1 May 2008 (a month after the polling day), following a catcall from sections of the national and the international community. According to Matyszak (2010:13) the lengthy delay in announcing the results gives credibility to the idea that they were manipulated to cut Tsvangirai’s votes to below 51 percent necessary for him to be declared the duly elected President of Zimbabwe. ZEC announced that Tsvangirai had polled 47.9 percent, Mugabe polled 43.2 percent, and independent candidates Simba Makoni and Langton Towungana shared the remaining 8.9 percent of the valid votes cast. Under these circumstances, a presidential runoff between Tsvangirai and Mugabe was definitely inevitable.

THE DEVIL AND HIS ADVOCATES: THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ‘ELECTION’

After the full announcement of the results, ZEC declared that it would decide the date on which the runoff will be conducted. It finally settled on 27 June 2008, despite the fact that the law stipulates that the runoff should be held within 21 days after the previous election. ZEC justified its decision on logistical problems. Although it is undeniable that the preparation for such an election was cumbersome, and therefore ZEC needed more time, it is equally undeniable that ZANU-PF needed more time before the run-off in order to reinvent itself through the orchestration political violence. Mugabe was cognizant of the fact that if the runoff was going to be free and fair, he was going to lose to Tsvangirai with a very large margin. The pre-electoral period leading to the runoff elections witnessed political violence characteristic of a country at physical war. Hundreds of thousands of homesteads, business premises and other effects of known and suspected MDC supporters were torched by ZANU PF bastards. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, maimed, raped, tortured, harassed, and arbitrarily detained. In Murewa, a number of people were abducted and never seen again.

In Mutoko, some confessed supporters of the MDC were abducted and tied to a heavy log before being thrown into a deep river to die. In some of the nastiest incidents, victims would be shot dead before a chanting congregation. These cases were mostly committed by war veterans, members of the CIO, the ZANU-PF youth militia, and in some few cases by the soldiers. In both rural and urban areas, the ZANU-PF youth militia forced people to attend rallies on a daily basis. Most of those who were MDC polling agents during the harmonized elections were victimized, harassed, and in some cases killed. For example, Clemence Makombo, who was a polling agent in Bikita, was killed by ZANU-PF youth. Gift Mutsvungu, who was a polling agent in Harare, was killed and his decomposing body was found on 3 July 2008.

The police embarked on a titanic campaign of arresting, detaining, and torturing those who were MDC polling agents during the 29 March election. For example, Peter Chihombori and scores of other MDC polling officers in Masvingo were arrested and detained at Mutimurefu prison and later transferred to Bikita prison in Masvingo. When he was interviewed by this writer, Chihombori said, ‘I went through hell that I survived by sheer luck; I will never be a polling agent again in my life.’ In his letter to ZEC dated 25 June 2009, Tsvangirai claimed that more than 2,000 MDC polling agents were arrested nationwide. Violence against MDC agents was intended to make sure that many people will not be willing to be MDC polling agents on 27 June. As a result, there would be a number of polling stations without MDC agents and this was going to present ZANU-PF with the opportunity to freely manipulate votes right at the polling stations. In the period between the 29 March and the 27 June run-off elections, at least 80 MDC supporters had been killed, hundreds had been abducted, scores had lost their livelihood, thousands had been tortured and detained and hundreds of thousands had become homeless (Timberg, The Washington Post: 5 July 2008).

ZANU-PF elements also embarked on a massive, systematic, and widespread confiscation of identity particulars of MDC supporters with the view to divest them of the opportunity to vote on 27 June. They told their victims that they would return their particulars after the elections. Mugabe himself and his wife, Grace, vowed that they will not vacate the state house regardless of the outcome of the elections. Mugabe and other high ranking ZANU-PF elements vowed that a full-scale civil war would be fought should Tsvangirai win the elections. These threats were taken seriously by the majority of the electorate, especially considering that the soldiers had already been ordered to vacate their barracks and take positions on mountains and bushes. The slogan ‘27 June ini nemhuri yangu tinovhotera vaMugabe chete!’ (On 27 June myself and my family will vote for Mugabe only) became the catchphrase for the runoff elections.

Another slogan was kumuda kana kusamuda ndiyeye, kumuvhotera kana kusamuvhotera ndiyeye, kurohwa kana kusarohwa ndiyeye (whether you like him [Mugabe] or not he is the one, whether you vote him or not he is the one, whether you are beaten up by his supporters or not he is the one). Every household and vehicle had to display a ZANU-PF campaign insignia in order to avoid being victimized by the vicious ZANU-PF youth. Individuals had to buy ZANU PF party cards and produce them whenever they are asked to do so in order to avoid being victimized. They also had to master ZANU PF slogans so that when asked to chant them, they could do so. And people had to refrain from buying and travelling with independent newspapers which are known for being critical of ZANU PF. They also had to refrain from putting on any red clothes and from stretching their hands, even when they are warming them on fire or a heater.

Throughout the period leading to 27 June, ZANU-PF sent a strong message to the entire nation that although ‘elections’ were to be held, the presidential post was not an elective one but was ‘eternally’ reserved for Mugabe, the ‘sacred cow.’ In cases where the rampageous youth wanted to cut off part of their victims’ arms, they would ask whether he/she wants a ‘short’ or a ‘long sleeve.’ Meaning should we cut your arm from the elbow (‘short sleeve’) or from the wrist (‘long sleeve’)? In most areas, the youth were based at local shopping centers from which they could engage in their infamous witch-hunting activities. Many villagers who are known or suspected MDC supporters lost their cattle, goats, chickens, and other belongings to the youth. The youth embarked on a door-to-door campaign in search of any MDC campaigning materials. Those who were found in possession of such material were dealt with ruthlessly. The youth established torture camps where their victims were taken to and tortured. Even though the police knew about these issues and the location of the torture camps, they did not do anything to protect the victims of this wave of violence.

Most of these youth were illiterate individuals whose derelict lives had been abandoned to drug abuse and destitution. For the better part of the pre-electoral period, most rural people lived in mountain caves or along river banks. Teachers were victimized such that virtually all schools were closed. Soldiers were ordered to go out of their barracks and take positions on mountains and bushes, where they gave the public the impression that a war would ignite should Tsvangirai win the elections. Most areas were declared ‘no-go areas’ for supporters of the MDC. The police and ZANU-PF leaders not only encouraged and participated in this wave of political violence, but they had the effrontery to attribute it to supporters of the MDC. A number of covert military operations which were intended to ‘punish’ the voters were contacted in the run up to the run-off elections. For example, a campaign of terror codenamed ‘Operation Makavhotera Papi’ (who did you vote for?) was embarked on. The operation targeted those people who were believed to have voted for the MDC. Those who were targeted were tortured, maimed, harassed, abducted, detained and in some cases they were killed. It was contacted by members of the army, police, CIO and CID, and the youth militia. The entire country was clouded by an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The climate could be scarcely distinguished from that of a country which is going through a deadly civil war. People had to avoid travelling because of the fear of potential victimization.

Tsvangirai had initially agreed to participate in the run-off elections. However, as this ferocious cyclone of political violence engulfed the country, it was clear that the conduct of democratic elections was certainly inconceivable. Tsvangirai then went on to set strict conditions for his participation. These included the cessation of all forms of violence against MDC supporters, unrestricted access by international observers, the reconstitution of the partisan ZEC, equal access to media, and the provision of peacekeeping forces by South African Development Community (SADC) in order to curtail political violence. ZANU-PF refused to concede to these demands. Barely two days before the polling day, Tsvangirai publicly withdrew his candidature for the runoff elections.

In his letter to ZEC dated 25 June 2008, Tsvangirai anchored his withdrawal on the following reasons: disenfranchisement of voters and the MDC’s lack of access to rural areas; the partiality of ZEC itself in the conduct of elections; political violence (in which the MDC recorded at least 86 deaths, 10,000 homes destroyed, 200,000 people displaced, and 10,000 people injured); threats of war made by Mugabe, the participation of the uniformed forces in ZANU-PF campaigns of terror; intimidation of MDC supporters and its lack of access to the media; and the banning and disruption of its meetings and rallies nationwide. ZEC ruled that the ‘elections’ would be held because the law required Tsvangirai to formally withdraw his candidature 21 days before the harmonized elections. This ruling demonstrated that ZEC had no elaborate regulations of dealing with the run-off elections. This explains why it initially thought of declaring Mugabe the unopposed winner.

Tsvangirai instructed his supporters to either refrain from voting or to spoil the ballot papers. The ‘elections’ were indeed held, and Mugabe was declared the winner. He was quickly inaugurated president. It is clear from this discussion that the June 27, 2008, ‘elections’ were a mere farce that they came to be popularly referred to as a “one-man race.” They were the most ignominious ‘elections’ to be held the world over even if one is to compare them with the “pseudo elections” that were held under the fascist regime in Italy and the Nazi regime in Germany. These ‘elections’ were reprobated by the national and the international community. The date June 27 is evocative of the evil political violence which was perpetrated against innocent people who had exercised their democratic right to elect a government which suits their interests.

LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE VIA THE PAST: DISSECTING THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ELECTIONS

After the 2008 electoral fiasco, Zimbabwe witnessed the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in which ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC-M (now MDC-N) came together and formed an all-inclusive government. The core purpose of the formation of the GNU was to implement broad democratic reforms with the view to ensure that the post-GNU elections will be free and fair in order to avoid a repeat of the 2008 situation. In Article VI of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), the parties to the pact agreed to mend ‘once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for our country.’ It is therefore essential for the coming elections to be analyzed in the context of the end-and-the-means nexus. The end refers to the actual conduct of the post-GNU elections while the means refers to the implementation of broad electoral reforms as a prerequisite to the contact of these elections.

As far as the means side of this nexus is concerned, the GNU can be characterized as a ‘betrayed business.’ This is because it has not only failed but it has actually betrayed the business of implementing broad democratic reforms in preparation for the coming elections. Instead, the GNU implemented ‘metaphorical reforms’ like the adoption of a cosmetic constitution which is devoid of anything except a façade of constitutionalism. To exacerbate this betrayal of business, the GNU did not adopt even ‘metaphorical reforms’ as far as key institutions such as the security sector, the media, the judiciary, and electoral management bodies are concerned. With these institutions as intact as they were in 2008, the contact of democratic post-GNU elections will remain a mirage. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay urged the parties to the GNU to implement key reforms because the next election could be ‘a repeat of 2008 election which resulted in rampant politically motivated human rights abuses, including killings, torture, rapes, beatings, arbitrary detention, displacements and other violations.’ It is important to note that the context of the 2008 elections discussed above is crucial for the coming elections in many respects.

It is difficult to see how one can discuss the coming elections without making reference to the events of 2008. These are the events which led to the formation of the present-day Government of National Unity. The formation of the GNU was primarily intended to address the events which led to its formation in the first place. The tortuous negotiations which led to the formation of the GNU gave ZANU PF negotiated legitimacy after the party was rejected by the electorate via the electoral verdict. The most important question that can be asked at this point is that to what extent (if any) has the GNU addressed the events which led to its formation? The degree to which the electoral field of the forthcoming elections will be dissociated from that of 2008 as a result of electoral reforms determines the credibility of these elections. Kenya, unlike Zimbabwe, managed to implement largely bona fide democratic reforms which have credibly managed to ensure a peaceful transfer of power from Mwai Kibaki to incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta. This has avoided a repeat of the 2007/2008 post-election violence and the country is now moving forward.

The major question is that who betrayed the GNU business of implementing reforms? The answer is simple; ZANU PF. Since the formation of the GNU, ZANU PF exposed its cast-iron willpower to thwart the implementation of any meaningful reforms. Mugabe has been calling for the conduct of elections since 2010. He has stated over and over again that elections will be contacted with or without reforms. The principal reason as to why ZANU PF betrayed electoral reforms is that the party knows for certain that democratic reforms will definitely facilitate its loss of power in the coming elections.

In order to ward off broad democratic reforms, ZANU PF carefully diverted attention from other essential issues and concentrated it on the enactment of a compromise constitution. The party knew that the adoption of a new constitution will pave way for the contact of elections. With this constitution in place, the major question now is when these elections will be contacted and not what other reforms need to be put in place. Even if other political parties continue to propose the implementation of other essential reforms, there is no longer time for such reforms at this point. This is because elections are expected between June and November 2013. The MDC and other political parties may push for the postponement of the conduct of these elections. However, the most important thing is not whether the elections are postponed or not but whether ZANU PF has the willingness to implement democratic reforms before the elections. It is clear that from the beginning of the GNU, ZANU PF has focused on the end (the conduct of elections) and not the means (democratic reforms).

The forthcoming elections are the MDC’s ‘decisive moment’ because they will witness the MDC taking its way either to the state house or to a dense political wilderness from which not even some remnants will return. If Tsvangirai lose the coming presidential elections to Mugabe (whether through drastic loss of popular support or through electoral irregularities) that will mark the swansong of his political career and the gradual but sure decline of the political fortunes of the MDC.

The enactment of a new constitution should not be seen as a major electoral reform. It is simply a metaphorical metamorphosis of Zimbabwe’s political dispensation which marks a bogus ricochet towards a democratic political order. It is difficult to see how this constitution will contribute to the conduct of democratic elections, especially considering that the elections are likely to be conducted before its institutionalization. It is therefore clear that there are cogent reasons to support the view that the electoral field is not germane to the contact of free and fair elections. Zimbabwe cannot afford another unity government. This is no longer the time to let ZANU PF once again use elections to confer on itself a façade of legitimacy. ZANU PF is a tottery regime which cannot recuperate from the loss of support which it has encountered during the last decade or so. Its only best bet is to manipulate elections through an array of irregularities including the perpetration of political violence.

In fact, violence is ZANU PF’s anchor of its power retention strategy. Because of its overreliance on violent and terror tactics, ZANU PF can be hardly distinguished from terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the thickets of Somalia. The outcome of the coming general elections is of titanic national importance. They will determine whether the country will restore its fortunes and take its way towards a democratic dispensation or maintain its “thorn in the flesh status” and drift towards a calamitous humanitarian crisis. If it takes the later route, it means the country is going to relive the economic and political crisis with excruciating consequences not only for the present but for succeeding generations as well.

Mugabe is widely known for maintaining that he cannot let the power which he acquired through an armed struggle depart from him via the ink of a pen (elections). This explains why he does not have the strength of will to adopt democratic reforms. The status of the electoral playing field in the run up to the coming general elections suggests that there are basically three potential outcomes to these elections. These are summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Potential outcomes (in order of their likelihood) and their potential consequences

Potential outcome 1: ZANU PF may win both the presidential and parliamentary elections with a small margin via electoral malpractices. In this case, it will proceed to form the next government. This outcome will engender precarious political and economic consequences for the country. The MDC will boycott government business and call for Zimbabwe’s isolation. The national and international community will strongly disapprove the outcome. The sanctions regime will broaden the scope and ferocity of existing sanctions. Zimbabwe will become a “persona non grata” in the international system and this will clamp its economy. A complex, intricate and protracted humanitarian catastrophe will probably ensue.

Potential outcome 2: The formation of GNU 2? Zimbabwe’s potential tragedy is that the conduct of the coming elections is likely to engender a situation which necessitates the formation of yet another GNU. This may occur when ZANU PF wins the presidential election but lose the parliamentary election to the MDC. Even if the current electoral field will give ZANU PF a head start over the MDC, chances are high that the MDC may win the majority of the seats in the house of assembly. In this case, it will be difficult for ZANU PF to govern the country without the support and cooperation of the MDC. However, given the poor performance and the disunity that characterized the GNU, there is no doubt that there will be little or no political will to form GNU 2 though conditions may require its formation.

Potential outcome 3: MDC-T win but will it govern? The MDC may win the presidential and parliamentary elections. In such as case, there are two possibilities, that is, the MDC will form the next government or the army will stage a military coup. If the former possibility happens, the country will restore is fortunes and move forward. However, if the later possibility happens; the country will plunge in a protected political stalemate which might be restored through international intervention. However, because of the skewed electoral playing field, an MDC victory is the “most unlikely likely outcome”.


WHAT IS ZIMBABWE’S PROBLEM?

At this point, it is important to ask the question: ‘what is Zimbabwe’s problem’? It is disturbing that after 33 years of national independence, Zimbabwe remains in the clutches of a scarce form of dictatorship. Since independence, many African countries have made significant developments as far as the democratization agenda is concerned. Some of them have tottered and faltered along the way but at least the most important thing is that they are on the way. Zimbabwe does not have a democratization agenda, even an amorphous one. Not only that it does not have such an agenda, but it has institutions (particularly the security sector) which are inimical to the realization of a democratic dispensation. The most important thing to ZANU PF is not the democratization of the state but the retention of power at all costs. Zimbabwe is a country which is beset by a myriad of problems whose collective effects have been and continues to mount a death blow to the county’s development and democratization prospects. The problems of Zimbabwe are summarized below.

CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP

The worst thing that can happen to any society anywhere is to be led by a crop of irresponsible leadership. The difference between a progressive society and a retrogressive one is embedded principally in the leadership of these societies. It is essential to always remember that leadership is not only about today, but that it is essentially about tomorrow. A life that is lived without preparing a future for succeeding generations is a derelict one. I believe in the patent truth that each generation is dutybound to duly honor its responsibility to prepare a future for succeeding generations for this is what makes a generation a generation. Those societies and states which honor this responsibility are always more progressive and forward-looking than those which shirk it.

Irresponsible leadership is Zimbabwe’s problem incarnate. Leaders with an ounce of responsibility cannot hijack an election and massacre hundreds of thousands of citizens simply because they want a change of leadership. It seems that ZANU PF quotes from Milton Obote’s Paradise Lost in which the devil, in consequence of having been deposed form heaven, maintained that it is better to rule in hell than to be a servant in heaven. It does not require one to conduct cutting-edge research in order to discover the source(s) of Zimbabwe’s problem. Zimbabwe’s problems are rooted in the leadership crisis, period.

Zimbabwe is led by a macabre and lunatic fringe regime that composes of diehard kindred spirit kleptomaniac ‘kingpins’ whose insatiable desire for power and material aggrandizement has cosigned the country to a scarce form of confiscatory dictatorship. Zimbabwean leaders need to know that Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans and not for ZANU PF, the MDC or any contemporary or future political formations. Zimbabwe’s major problem is that political leaders have an inclination to ‘institutionalize themselves.’ A country cannot be progressive without sculpting strong institutions which will in turn regulate human behavior. In the case of Zimbabwe, instead of building institutions which are intended to further the interests of the nation, the leaders have turned themselves into institutions. What Zimbabwe is experiencing is not bad governance, it is rather evil governance. Mugabe in particular and ZANU PF in general should know that the excruciating consequences of flagrant repression of citizens who are exercising their democratic rights are inevitable. It is time Africa should sculpt rarefied intellectual leaders of this age. Africa needs selfless leaders who have a vision not only for their countries and the continent but for the international community in its entirety.

WEAK INSTITUTIONS

Zimbabwe needs strong independent and democratic institutions which can regulate the behavior of individuals, groups and particularly that of the government. Such institutions are essential because they avoid the personalization of the state and they play a pivotal role in the transformation of the state. They also inculcate democratic values and practices in the citizens and the government. Institutions play a crucial role in determining what individuals, groups, communities and the government can do and should refrain from doing. Strong institutions do not merely guide the behavior of people and the government but they make such behavior largely predictable. Zimbabwe has weak and in some cases ‘captured’ institutions which alienate the people instead of incorporating them. Zimbabweans are therefore ‘worlds apart’ from institutions which should protect and promote their welfare and interests. Credible institutions are those which put citizens at the depths of their objectives and purpose as opposed to those which alienate the very people for which they were established to serve. It should be noted that good leadership is a sine qua none for the establishment of good institutions. The reason is simple. Leaders create institutions and in turn, those institutions determine what people and the government may do may refrain from doing. Mugabe rules Zimbabwe as a personal fief and instead of putting strong institutions in place; he has made himself the institutions. A society cannot expect to have John Locke’s ‘limited government’ in a state where the leaders have made themselves the institutions. In such a society, state institutions often offer their services to people on the basis of their political affiliation. This is something which is common in Zimbabwe. However, it should be noted that the responsibility to build strong institutions is not for the leaders alone but the citizens in general have a strong role to play.

ENTRENCHED IMPERIAL INTERESTS

Imperial interests in Zimbabwe are as ancient as the state itself. Pristine imperial interests continue to sway the trajectory of Zimbabwe’s economic dispensation. Zimbabwe’s ‘daunting dilemma’ is that before the country recuperated from centuries and centuries of colonial exploitation, it immediately found itself environed by ferocious forces of the ‘neo-Berlin Conference’ whose consequences are more lethal than those of the Berlin Conference of 1884. The behavior of the world’s powerful states of ‘bereaving the children of their bread’ is one of the major sources of Zimbabwe’s economic problems. In his analysis of Africa’s development challenges, Walter Rodney has this to say:

‘…the question as to who, and what, is responsible for Africa’s underdevelopment can be answered at two levels. Firstly the answer is that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with those who manipulated the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system.’ (Rodney: 1982).

During the struggle for independence, the people of Africa religiously believed that the end of colonial oppression will mark the swansong of all forms of domination in the continent. This belief was especially embodied in Kwame Nkrumah’s aphorism in which he beseeched the people of Africa to ‘seek ye first the political kingdom and everything will be given unto you.’ However, the end of colonialism did not mark the end of fierce imperial interests in the continent as envisaged by the majority of Africans. Instead, it marked the dawn of a phase in which these interests became more intricate, sophisticated and merciless than before. The titanic hegemonic agenda of the world’s powerful states in Africa manifest itself in many forms, many of which are disguised in colorful packages such as foreign aid and Foreign Direct Investment.

When policies which are intended to redistribute resources in order to redress the entrenched injustices of the past are implemented in Africa, they are labeled a violation of human rights but when they are implemented in developed countries they are called affirmative action or positive discrimination. At independence, the colonial regime made an egoistic provision in the Lancaster House Constitution which states that the government should not redistribute land for a period of ten years after independence.

The patent purpose of the provision was to ensure that despite political independence, the land (which is the linchpin of Zimbabwe’s agrarian economy) remains in the control and ownership of the minority white population while the majority of black Zimbabweans live in brutish poverty and inertia. These are the same forces which are renowned for saying constitutions should be people-driven and should embody the values, needs and aspirations of the people. They are also keen to refer to Africa as a ‘dark continent.’ When the Zimbabwean government moved to redistribute land in 2000, the land reform programme was widely condemned. To the imperialists, it is not a question of the chaotic, corrupt and violent way in which the policy was implemented but it is a question of the policy itself which is contrary to their economic interests in the country. Although, the land reform programme was poorly implemented, its adoption was indeed necessary in the context of black disparities which obtained between the blacks and the whites from the colonial period.

Apart from Zimbabwe, let us briefly discuss the case of South Africa. South Africa is a “bogus democracy” but it is regarded by the international community as a ‘paragon of democracy.’South Africa’s economic dispensation is owned, cramped and controlled by a minority white population while the majority of black South Africans are chained on its periphery where they feed on ‘calories which fall from the master’s stable.’ It’s a country in which the black South Africans are harassed and bruised day in day out by the imperial edifice. To regard South Africa as a democracy is to divest the term democracy of its meaning. Democracy is not limited to the contact of free and fair elections. It is difficult to see how democracy can be realized in a country where there are two worlds, one world of a few people who are filthy rich and another of many people who are living in brutish poverty. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world with a gini coefficient of 0.6. The inequalities do not matter to imperialists, what matters is that the economy is in the clutches of their interests. The institutions which were put in place by the apartheid regime to segregate the South African black population are still largely intact. As long as these institutions are in place, imperialists will be happy and will continue to perceive South Africa as a ‘democratic and progressive’ state which is investment-worthy.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the steps which are being taken by ZANU PF to empower the local people through land reform and other empowerment policies are commendable as long as the imperative to redistribute resources is concerned. The problem with these policies is that they lack proper planning, coordination and implementation. It is difficult to regard for example, the land reform programme as a policy because the problems mentioned above. Africa needs to be always alert to the painful reality that there are a myriad of lethal imperial interests which are already entrenched in the continent and others which are emerging from the “imperial horizon”. This means that Africa is going to suffer not only from old but also new imperial interests. Africa needs leaders who can combat imperialism and ensure that the resources of the continent are owned and controlled by Africans themselves. Mugabe can be credited for his struggle against the imperial empire in Zimbabwe although his strategies are poorly thought out and implemented. There is not a vestige of doubt that Mugabe has a legacy to leave when he dies, but it is a tainted legacy. Some will remember him as a ‘hero of emancipation’ while others will remember him as a ‘saint of dictatorship.’ To mesh these diametrically opposed vantage points, the recalcitrant Mugabe will be remembered in the quicksand of history as a ‘defiled hero.’

A CAPTURED SECURITY SECTOR

The security sector is Zimbabwe’s problem number one. Of all the institutions in Zimbabwe, the security sector is the least trusted one. In fact, it is the most dreaded of all institutions because it is the main source of insecurity in the country. It is at the depths of the travail of Zimbabwe’s transition to democratic politics. Zimbabwe’s savage, oxymoron, and brutal security sector is inimical to the democratization and development needs of a modern state. The oddity and infinitude nature of suppression of dissent by the security sector has reduced Zimbabwe to the status of a ‘secret society.’ There is no universal agreement as to how widely the security sector should be defined. For the purpose of this article, the security sector shall be defined to include institutions such as the army, police, intelligence services, border management agencies, election management bodies, the parliament, the media, war veterans, women’s leagues, youth militia, and the judiciary. However, this article expends its focus on the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the notorious Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), war veterans and the youth militia. The primary reason is that these are the institutions which are notorious for their open support of ZANU PF.

For these institutions, security is synonymous with ZANU PF’s retention of power. Their activities have engendered an atmosphere of fear, secrecy and insecurity among the people of Zimbabwe. This has caused a situation in which people have to always take stock of their surroundings (especially when they are in the public) before they say anything against ZANU PF in general and Mugabe in particular. This has ‘crippled’ the freedom of expression in the country, a development which has always undermined the country’s development prospects. The Central Intelligence Organization is the most dreaded institution in the country. It is regarded by many Zimbabweans as an ‘occult organization’ whose mandate is to stalk and harass, intimidate, detain and in some cases massacre perceived and real opponents of ZANU PF. It is disturbing to note that billions of tax payer’s money are used to finance activities which are intended to intimidate, victimize, harass and even kill the very owners of that money.

The ZRP is renowned for its deliberate unwillingness to protect real and perceived opponents of ZANU PF from arbitrary attacks and victimization by ZANU PF elements. In some cases, members of the police force themselves have been involved in the perpetration of violence against ZANU PF opponents. The police is also renowned for denying other parties the freedom of assembly and for overzealously and arbitrarily disrupt their gatherings. The police is also well known for taking little and in some cases no action at all against ZANU PF supporters who are known for their violent activities such as the Chipangano group in Mbare. This action by the police has sent a strong message to ZANU PF supporters and the nation at large that ZANU PF supporters can defy the law and escape scot free. This has inculcated a belief among ZANU PF supporters that they are above the law. This is one of the developments which account for the total breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

The majority of Zimbabwe’s high-ranking security personnel, particularly the heads of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) have repeatedly vowed that they will not accept any electoral victory by any other presidential candidate other than Robert Mugabe (CRS Report for Congress, 2008:4). For example, in an exclusive interview with the Zimbabwe Independent on 26 May 2011, ZNA commander brigadier-general Douglas Nyikayaramba said that Mugabe should be Zimbabwe’s ‘life President.’ Nyikayaramba said:

‘Why do you want to force him to go? Where were you when he crossed into Mozambique to fight in the liberation struggle and why didn’t you go? If you can change your father in your family, then we can do the same. But has anyone changed his or her own father just because he is old? Until your father dies only then can you have a step father-that is that.’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 27 May 2011).

Nyikayaramba insisted that the ZNA wants elections to be contacted in 2011 despite overwhelming public opinion that any contact of elections in Zimbabwe should be preceded by broad democratic reforms in order to ensure the credibility of the outcome of such elections. He further claimed that the army would ‘do anything’ to ensure that Mugabe retains power even if the people vote him out of power. Other generals such as Trust Mugoba and Martin Chedondo also made statements to the effect that there will be a ‘bloodbath’ should the MDC win the coming elections.

The army is widely known for vowing that it will not accept anyone who does not have ‘liberation credentials’ to be elected Zimbabwean president. The army has reputedly maintained that it will stage a military coup should Tsvangirai be elected president. Mugabe has elevated himself to the position of a ‘deity’ by maintaining and propagating the position that elections cannot depose him from power. This comportment by the Mugabe regime has occasioned a myriad of brutish political and economic challenges that by 2005, Zimbabwe had degenerated into a tumbledown state. The restoration of durable peace and the construction of a stable economic edifice in Zimbabwe depend on the implementation of sincere democratic reforms (particularly in the security sector) which will form the basis for the conduct of democratic elections.

There is a chasm between the values and needs of the people of Zimbabwe and those of the security sector. What is imperative is the alignment of the principles, values, needs and aspirations of the security sector to those of the nation and not of ZANU PF. It is essential for people to repose their trust in the security sector and this trust can be built and consolidated if the people and the security sector share common values, needs and aspirations. People tend to cooperate with a security sector which they trust and such cooperation is essential in the construction of a peaceful and prosperous society. ZANU PF has maintained the position that no security sector reforms will take place in the country.

IRRESOLUTE CITIZENS?

It is undeniable that the people of Zimbabwe have tried valiantly to combat dictatorship through the ballot, especially since the 2000 parliamentary elections. They have braved, through and through, widespread incidents of intimidation, harassment, arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, rape, massacres, confiscation and destruction of their livelihoods by ZANU PF supporters, including state security agents. The people should be credited for such spirited fight against tyranny. Always remember that resolute citizens always have the power and cast-iron determination to shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better but irresolute ones are always prisoners of defunct legitimacy. When leaders deny citizens their fundamental freedoms, particularly the freedom to elect a government which suits them better, it is the responsibility of the people to take shake off the existing government.

In The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon maintained that each generation should unearth its mission and either fulfill or betray it. It appears that the present generation of the people of Zimbabwe has largely ‘betrayed’ its mission, something which it has to be answerable to succeeding generations. Since the emergence of the Zimbabwean crisis, the majority of Zimbabweans have demonstrated the determination and willpower to ‘vote with their itineraries’ and abandon the country and its diverse resources to ‘consuming locusts.’ Zimbabwe is today a “bifurcated state” which consists of a Zimbabwe of Zimbabweans who are in Zimbabwe and another Zimbabwe of Zimbabweans who are in the diaspora.

Some have ‘voted with their itineraries’ while others have ‘voted with their feet’ but Zimbabweans should always remember that going beyond borders does not solve the country’s problems. Those who did not vote with either their itineraries or their feet have tried to find resourceful ways of surviving in a derelict economic order. Most of these ‘resourceful ways’ have contributed significantly to the decline of the national economy. Either fleeing the country or concentrating on finding resourceful ways of surviving within the country is not good for the country. These ‘twin injustices’ which the people of Zimbabwe have committed have had a knockdown effect on the country’s development and democratization prospects. The problems of Zimbabwe can be resolved only when the people of Zimbabwe organize themselves with the unflinching determination to extricate their country from the clutches of flagrant dictatorship. This can be achieved when the people themselves, through distinguished leadership, demonstrate the iron-clad willpower to free their country from the ‘consuming locusts’ and introduce a new political dispensation. This is a shared responsibility, a responsibility which cannot afford to be betrayed any longer. This is not to suggest the people of Zimbabwe should take up arms against ZANU PF. They should organize themselves and depose ZANU PF from power through means which are short of a civil war but there are sacrifices to be made.

The other problem with Zimbabweans is that they repose an unnecessary amount of their hope in the international community. They expect too much from this community and in the process they tend to forget that they themselves should shoulder the primary responsibility to obliterate dictatorship root and branch, with or without the assistance of the international community. There are consequences which come from bearing this responsibility but the people should brace themselves and get prepared to suffer them with the knowledge that they suffer such consequences for a noble cause. The basic truth is that the international community’s responsibility in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s daunting problems is residual and not primary. This is not to say that the international community can and should not be expected to play a role, but always remember that what it can do is always limited. The efficacy of the influence of the international community largely depends on the degree of cooperation that ZANU PF exercises. ZANU PF is not prepared to cooperate fully with the international community because of the consequences of such degree of cooperation as far as its agenda to retain power is concerned.

The only likely decisive way through which the international community may disencumber Zimbabwe from ZANU PF is via the use of force under the rubric of saving strangers beyond boarders which is embodied in the principle and practice of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This option is very unlikely in the Zimbabwean context. This is because any talk of R2P in Zimbabwe has to satisfy two conditions. First, Zimbabwe has to go through a humanitarian catastrophe whose gravity and consequences should reach the minimum threshold of a “large scale loss of life”. Second, the international community should be able and willing to intervene, ideally following authorization by the United Nations Security Council via a unanimous resolution. It is difficult to see how these conditions can be met in the Zimbabwean situation.

Even if these conditions are met, the implementation of R2P in Zimbabwe is undesirable because it will mean that the country has to go through a physical state of war with potentially more disastrous consequences. It is therefore important for the people of Zimbabwe to have limited expectations of what the international community can do to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. It is only when the people of Zimbabwe awake to this reality that they will begin to talk of the possible transformation of that country. It is essential for the people of Zimbabwe to outbrave the ZANU PF regime which has made the country an ‘out-Herod of tyranny.’ It is clear that ZANU PF will always use force against such determination. The use of violence by ZANU PF has largely enabled the party to maintain power. However, the continued use of this strategy will come to a point where it becomes is a bind alley and at worst, a form of precarious jaywalking. Like Muammar Mohammed Gaddafi of Libya, the use of violence will possibly make Mugabe a victim of changed history. When people decide to make history they can make it. When history has changed, it does not matter how long a certain regime has been in power and how authoritarian it is. The people of Zimbabwe need to join hands and build an all-inclusive, tolerant and democratic Zimbabwe which will stand as an ultimate rebuke of ZANU PF dictatorship.

Zimbabwe has to close the regrettable dark chapter in its post-independence history and turn over a new page. At this point, the road on which the country has traveled does not matter. What matters is that it is here and that it has to find its way towards a destination which is called by the name democracy via an unstoppable wind of change.

A large constituency of Zimbabweans is wishing Mugabe to die so that the country can transform to democratic politics. They question why a number of vice presidents have died with Mugabe remaining alive. This shows the degree to which many Zimbabweans have drifted to desperation. It shows that they are largely convinced that no elections or anything else can make Mugabe cede power except via fate. What these people need to understand is that Mugabe is not the sole problem of the country. His death does not therefore guarantee a transition to democratic politics. The institutions which Mugabe has put in place, and especially the political culture, will continue to betray the democratization agenda in the country, even in his absence.

A CULTURE OF INTOLERANCE FOR DIVERSITY

The heavy-handed repression of dissent during the gukurahundi massacres is probably the cradle of intolerance for diversity in Zimbabwe. The celerity, ferocity and catholicity of acts of indiscriminate killings, raping, harassment, maiming, torture and all other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment was fathomless. The fiendish brutality with which the gukurahundi massacres were executed was evocative of the brutality which the people of Zimbabwe suffered during the colonial era. Since this period, ZANU PF has continuously embarked on carefully orchestrated egregious violations of fundamental freedoms. The formation of ZUM by Edgar Tekere in the aftermath of the seemingly defunct Unity Accord was regarded by ZANU PF as a negation of national unity. From that period, national unity came to be regarded as synonymous with monopoly politikos. This culture will remain embedded in Zimbabwe’s political system as long as ZANU PF retains power. There is imperative need for the people of Zimbabwe to change their political behavior and value, respect, and promote the truth that diversity is the kernel of societal progress. Mugabe has learnt the art of ‘immunizing’ himself against criticism via the promulgation of draconian legislations and other forms of suppressing dissent. He uses state institutions to guard his political interests and to entrench himself in power. These institutions are used to victimize diversity. There is need to extirpate this savage culture from the country’s political order.

ENDNOTES:

Rodney, W. 1982. ‘How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.’ Washinton DC: Howard University Press.
Matyszak, D. 2010. ‘Law, Politics and Zimbabwe’s “Unity” Government.’ Harare: The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Research and Advocacy Unit.
Tofa, M. ‘The Trajectory of Iniquitous Dictatorship in Zimbabwe: Implications for Democratization in Southern Africa and Beyond’ in ‘Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa: Five Decades of Misrule’ edited by M. A. Amutabi, & S. W. Nasong’o. London: Routledge (Taylor and Francais Group).
Tofa, M. & Tofa, E. 2007-2008. ‘Zimbabwe and Mugabe’s Politicization of State and Civic Institutions’ in ‘Democracy in Practice: Elections, Campaigns and Voters.’ The Georgetown Public Policy Review Volume 13/1/ 2007: 36-46.
Ntalaja, N. 1997. ‘The State and Democracy in Africa’ in ‘The State and Democracy in Africa’, edited by N. Ntalaja, & M Lee. Eritrea: World Press Inc. 1-18.
‘The Responsibility to Protect.’ Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001.
CRS Report for Congress, 2008. ‘Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications for US Policy.’ Congressional Research Service.

*Moses Tofa is the author of ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Metaphorical Metamorphosis: Memories from the Experiences of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire.’ He is a political analyst and a Peace, Security and Development Scholar with the African Leadership Centre.

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Capital's insatiable drive for profits at the heart of South Africa's wage and employment crisis

Dale T. McKinley

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87397

cc N R If capital is to be believed, it is the worker who is the main source of South Africa’s contemporary social and economic problems

Every time the annual season of wage negotiations is about to begin, as it is now, representatives of capital unleash a tsunami of propaganda about workers’ ‘high and unaffordable’ wage demands. Dire warnings of destructive social unrest/conflict, high inflation rates, poor competitiveness and generalised economic devastation roll off their silver-lined tongues. The underlying message is neither subtle nor sanguine; the wage demands of workers are to blame for just about everything bad that is happening in our society.

Of course, propaganda is one thing, reality another; something even the most serious disciples of capitalism have always understood. Adam Smith, the author of what many consider to be the ‘Bible’ of free-market capitalism (‘The Wealth of Nations’ published in 1776) noted that while “English businessmen frequently complain about the high level of wages” and argue that “this is the reason why they cannot sell their goods at prices that are as competitive as in other countries … they remain quite silent about their high profits.”

Such silence, Smith noted, was a conscious way of obscuring the fact that “in many cases, the high profits made by capital are much more to blame for price rises than are exorbitant wages.” On this front, little has changed in the last 237 years. Indeed, if there is one essential constant in the capitalist production process it is, as Smith himself confirmed, that “labour is the true measure of value”.

In the words of Belgian political scientist and historian Eric Toussaint, capitalists “have also forgotten (or never even bothered to understand) that workers are not free not to sell their labour power.” After all, the labour power of workers is the only thing they have to sell in a capitalist economy in order to make a living. Workers have no other means of access to the means of production, the very thing that defines class position and privilege under capitalism.

Today’s capitalists and no more so than in South Africa, are trying to airbrush their own capitalist history. They want us to naively believe that society can only progress by affirming their ‘freedom’ to intensify and expand the exploitation of workers’ labour power; that their endless, ‘by whatever means necessary’ pursuit of profits is an enabler as opposed to a destroyer of socially and economically productive labour. This is one of the key reasons why Karl Marx’s study of capitalism remains absolutely relevant today. As Toussaint points out, this is the case precisely because the contemporary reality of the capitalist system “remains one of a struggle over attempts by capital to increase, and attempts by the working class to resist increases in, the rate of profit.”

When applied to South Africa’s post-1994 developmental trajectory it should come as no surprise then that there is an inverse relationship between capitalist profits and workers’ wages. According to economist Asghar Adelzadeh, the rate of profit in the economy from 1994-2012 has increased by almost 250%, while our own official Stats SA agency shows that from 1994-2010 the real wage share of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has decreased by around 7%.

Such a huge gap, which symbolises nothing less than a massive transfer of wealth from the already poor majority to an ever increasing uber-rich minority, has been made possible because of a consistently pro-capitalist, anti-worker macro-economic policy. The policy framework, which includes the current National Development Plan, and which capital has always selectively embraced, has catalysed reductions in real wages by prioritising an export-led growth centrally based on wage suppression for workers. In turn, this has facilitated the consistent moves by capitalist employers to largely remove meaningful cost-of-living adjustment clauses in labour agreements and casualise labour such that the historic ‘social wage’ accompanying permanent employment/ job security has been thrown in the developmental rubbish bin.

This reality is made all the more tangible for that majority when the relevant rate of increase in prices (inflation) is factored into the equation, remembering that the generalised rate of inflation is an average (the latest average being 5.4%) and that our own Stats SA calculates inflation for five different expenditure groups. In this respect, as the Labour Research Service (LRS) shows, since mid-2012 the inflation rates for the ‘very low’ and ‘low’ expenditure groups (i.e. the unemployed and workers) have been almost 2% higher than those for the ’very high’ group (i.e. the capitalists). When applied to specific items in the expenditure basket which the poor and workers spend a greater portion of their income on, the average price increase for public transportation comes in at 16.1%, while food, housing and water/electricity prices are all far above the generalised inflation rate.

Specific wage data (for 2012) compiled by LRS only serves to further confirm the overall picture of Dickensian wage inequality. While the median minimum wage for workers was R2 300 per month across nine sectoral determinations and R3000 per month across all bargaining councils, the median wage for executives at 80 JSE-listed corporates was R483 000 per month and for CEOs, R758 000 per month (these exclude bonuses and Long-Term Incentives – LTIs - such as share equity schemes). Over the last two years, the average wage of workers stands at R114 per day while the average wage package (inclusive of bonuses/LTIs added) of corporate CEO’s comes in at R32 204 per day.

Taking a closer look at the recent wage-profit nexus of one particular corporate – Anglo American Platinum (Amplats) – reveals a consistent pattern of manipulation that proves the general ‘rule’. Research by political economist Dick Forslund shows that at the end of 2009, Amplats laid off 12 000 workers and announced an expected 99% decline in headline earnings per share (the general marker of corporate profitability). Yet, six months later a 532% rise in headline earnings was being proudly proclaimed.

The following year (2011), profits of R1.3 billion were reported but then after a ‘tough’ 2012, Amplats announced that they had taken a 562 cents per share loss from the 1365 cents profit per share in 2010/2011. And then just last week, they revealed plans to cut another 6000 jobs in order to “restore profits”, a move which one Goldman Sachs analyst claimed did not go far enough to “implement the corrective measures for the benefit of the shareholders”.

If there is any remaining sympathy for ‘poor’, struggling capital, it must surely be blown away by the fact that the overall share of revenue accruing to workers in the platinum industry declined from 60% in 1998 to just 27% by 2010, a time period during which record profits for shareholders were being made and bonuses/LTIs for executives handed out.

It’s not hard to figure out that what is really at stake for Amplats (and for all other corporate capitalists) is ‘restoring’ and when possible, surpassing previous levels of profits as opposed to just making a profit. Massive lay-offs of workers boost prices by (temporarily) cutting production which, in turn, ensures higher profits for shareholders. The wages and indeed lives of workers are peripheral; intensified exploitation of their labour, essential.

Workers are not the perpetrators of South Africa’s wage and employment crisis, they are its fodder. All the while, it is capital that is feeding at the trough.

Dr. McKinley is an independent writer, researcher and lecturer as well as political activist. This article was first published by SACSIS.

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Monkey business in Ivory Coast

Gary K Busch

2013-05-15

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87394

cc D S Two years after French-led forces brought Allassane Ouattara to power, he is not yet in control of the country. Rebels run a parallel taxation system and looting of the country’s resources is in top gear

There is a saying in West Africa which describes the current power of Alassane Ouattara over the people of the Ivory Coast – ‘Quand un singe monte très haut dans un arbre on finit par voir son cul.’ (When a monkey climbs high up a tree he ends up showing the world his ass.)

Ouattara has notionally been in charge of the country ever since the French Army and the UN’s rented Ukrainian helicopter pilots attacked the Presidential Palace and removed the legitimately-elected President Gbagbo. This ‘victory’ was supposed to lead to a democratic transition in which the people of Ivory Coast would forget that Ouattara had lost the election and would be forced to believe that the rebel bands of thugs, foreign mercenaries, Dozos and killers who had murdered thousands of Ivory Coast civilians had mysteriously become law-abiding democrats. What actually happened is that the decade-long misrule of the northern half of Ivory Coast by rebel forces operating as the Forces Nouvelles was expanded to cover the conquered South.

Ouattara is not in charge of the country despite his title. He lives in fear of assassination by those who put him in power. He travels incessantly, usually out of the country, because he is afraid of being killed. Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, the notional head of the Forces Nouvelles, who was appointed as Prime Minister by President Gbagbo, under duress after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, is now President of the National Assembly since March 2012. He is equally afraid of being killed and hides behind a cordon of bodyguards wherever he goes. He recalls the assassination attempt on him in 2007 when they shot his plane taxiing on the runway in Bouake, killing four people and wounding ten. He blamed the attempt on rival forces in the Forces Nouvelles. The fact that he was a Christian did not endear him to the largely Muslim rebellion leadership.

What was clear during the rebellion in 2002 was that the rebel forces were largely Muslim northerners fighting along with fellow Muslims from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. President Blaise Campaore was the ringleader of the rebellion and worked closely with Mamadou Tandja of Niger and Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali. These three were the contact points between the French sponsors of the rebellion and Ouattara who was known as the Godfather of the Rebellion. The foreign mercenaries from Sierra Leone and Liberia fought for pay and loot but had little political influence on the rebellion. The division of the country between North and South, a border patrolled by French troops and later UN peacekeepers, allowed the north to be divided into ‘com zones’ led by local warlords who were self-appointed and largely untouchable.

With the division of the country all the civil servants, educators, doctors and the other members of the professional class fled from the North. The poor farmers who were left there paid no taxes, no rents, no customs fees, and for no services to the central government. They paid these to the warlords in their areas. The rich crops of cocoa, cotton, hardwoods which were normally exported from the North to the world’s market were smuggled to Burkina Faso, Togo and Mali to French intermediaries. No taxes were paid to the central government based in the South; no revenues were paid to the legitimate owners of the crops. The diamond mines, the gold mines and minor metals were taken over by important warlords who exported their smuggled goods through Burkina Faso where Campaore shared in the profits. There were no customs controls and no accounting of the lost revenues. In return the minor warlords were allowed to bring in motor scooters for sale on which they paid no duty.

This became well-established as a system of ‘parallel taxation’. Côte d'Ivoire may have one president but it has two ‘treasuries’. The first is the official Treasury; the other is funded from the continued collection of road tolls, rents, fees and other taxes by former rebels. During the rebellion local government was abolished and only the rebels collected ‘taxes’. This has not changed even with Ouattara in power. In August 2011 the International Crisis Group issued a study[i] which stated ‘The FN former rebels, who helped Ouattara take power by force in Abidjan, play a disproportionate role in the FRCI. Soldiers from Prime Minister Sore’s movement dominate Abidjan and the west, in addition to the north of the country they controlled for the last eight years. They are badly trained, disorderly and commanded by warlords not in a good position to establish rule of law. If the government cannot prevail over FN area commanders quickly and re-establish order before the legislative elections, the president’s standing will be irreparably damaged.’

The ICG recognised that there was no justice to be had under such a system and impunity was the watchword. It recommended that, ‘The entire civil justice system needs to get back on its feet if impunity is to be ended. The north of the country has had no courts for eight years. In areas that remained under governmental control, judges were often appointed on the basis of ethnic and political criteria. It was easy to bribe the courts to make appropriate judgements’. [ii]

The situation in Ivory Coast worsened in 2012 and early 2013. The United Nations sent down a Group of Experts to examine the situation in the country. Their damning findings were published in a report to the Secretary-General in April 2013. [iii] The report speaks of the degenerating situation. Warlord military commanders in Ivory Coast are making hundreds of millions of dollars by plundering the country's exports of cocoa and other resources, according to a report by these UN experts.

Forces Nouvelles militia leaders who took the side of President Alassane Ouattara in his showdown with Laurent Gbagbo in 2011 are part of a ‘military-economic network’ taking advantage of ‘rampant’ smuggling and parallel tax networks, according to the Experts. The former rebel leaders have been integrated into the national army ‘without the commanders having abandoned their warlord-style predatory economic activities, which they have now extended to the entire Ivorian territory’. Highlights of the report show that

(a) Although Ivory Coast is the world's leading cocoa producer, it lost about 153,000 tons out of the 1.47 million tons produced in the 2011-2012 season to smugglers, according to government figures quoted by the Experts. The lost cocoa was valued at about $400 million and much of it went through Ghana, the experts said.

(b) A third of the country's 450,000 tons of cashew nuts, worth about $130 million, was lost to the smugglers. Ivory Coast is the world's second biggest producer of the nuts.

(c) Côte d’Ivoire is the fourth largest cotton grain producer in West Africa after Burkina Faso, Benin and Mali. In the 2011/12 season, cotton exports stood at 130,000 tons. Estimates indicate that, in the same period, 2,000 tons were smuggled out of the country, representing a loss of $1 million to the economy and $100,000 in fiscal revenue.

(d) In Côte d’Ivoire, the timber industry is traditionally one of the most affected by the permanent predatory and smuggling activities that generate revenue and may also be illicitly used for the purchase of arms. The Group received evidence and reliable testimonies about the constant illegal exploitation and trafficking of teak that is currently exacerbated by former Forces Nouvelles combatants working for illegal timber-exploiting companies in Bouaké as a result of their knowledge of the forests. For example, from February to December 2012, there were seven seizures of timber, amounting to more than 478.6 m.

(e) Smuggling and illegal networks are relevant to both exports and imports. The country’s economy has also been affected by the influx of foreign commodities and the government has therefore been unable to obtain import taxes on a series of products, including sugar (which registered an unsold stock of 60,000 tons during the 2011/12 season), thousands of tons of fertilizers and pesticides and a large variety of manufactured food products.

(f) Côte d’Ivoire is particularly underdeveloped in terms of gold mining, taking into consideration its greenstone belt gold-bearing geology. What can also be concluded from this is that artisanal and small-scale gold mining is likely to rise in tandem with industrial mining. According to figures obtained from the Ministry, exports of gold produced at the country’s large-scale industrial gold mines in 2012 were in excess of $600 million at current world prices. Interestingly, these official figures also list an amount of 213 kg, worth approximately $12 million, as exported by ‘others’. In this case, ‘others’ refers to the holders of the 30 gold buying and exporting licences issued by the ministry, which represents an increase of more than 3,000 per cent on gold exports in 2011 by non-large-scale industrial gold mining licence holders, who officially exported 6.6 kg of gold. As these licensees do not buy from established mining companies, the Group concludes that this gold is purchased from the now hundreds of artisanal gold mines scattered throughout the country. Estimates of the true value of artisanal mining output could easily see this figure multiplied fivefold. Interestingly, while artisanal and small-scale gold mining is not illegal in Côte d’Ivoire, that is, there is provision under current law to obtain artisanal mining licences, the Ministry has not been issuing such licences. From this, the Group concludes that the buying/exporting licence holders have been purchasing illegally mined gold and permitted to export legally.

The Expert Group skipped over the massive quantities of diamonds smuggled out every year by the warlords. In Burkina Faso, under the aegis of Blaise Campaore, Ivory Coast top warlords were introduced to the buyers from Hezbollah and Al Qaida. Ivory Coast has diamond mines. Illicit diamond mining in the northern part of Ivory Coast still continues and provides a healthy stream of diamonds to Al Qaida, especially Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

There are four big mines - Bobi, Diarabala, Seguela and Tortiya. The US sent a CIA team in to discover what was happening in 2012. They attempted to trace the origin of around 300,000 carats produced in the Ivory Coast in 2011 and which generated earnings of roughly USD 25 million. The business is mainly controlled by two warlords, Issiaka Ouattara AKA ‘Wattao’ and Herve Toure AKA “Vetcho.” The diamonds are smuggled out mainly through Mali and Guinea before ending up on the international market in Tel Aviv.

The Expert Group did highlight the ‘parallel treasury’ issue. It wrote that there was a military-economic network entrenched in the Ivorian Administration. This network has adopted taxation methods similar to those used by the former central treasury of the Forces Nouvelles, ‘La Centrale’, but has shifted and is currently operational in a more discreet form. A parallel taxation system has thus been put in place for various types of business activities, including agriculture (cocoa, cotton and cashew nuts), trade, artisanal mining, transport and commerce. The network has appointed former students from the central city of Bouaké in all major cities of the country to manage the revenue that it obtains.

The report named Martin Kouakou Fofie, who has been on a UN sanctions list since 2006, Ouattara Issiaka, Herve Toure, Kone Zakaria and Cherif Ousmane as all being in ‘strategic command posts’ with significant amounts of weapons.

Of what, then, is Ouattara president? He is powerless in the face of his allies who brought him to power. The French are happy to co-operate with the warlords as they have been doing so for over a decade. French companies assist in the transport and marketing of these smuggled goods as they pass through Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo. Ouattara has no power; he has no control of the economics or the politics of the country and is totally isolated from contact with the warlord-operated FRCI, the Gendarmerie, and what passes for civil administration at the local level.

This is a government founded upon racketeering, smuggling and the arbitrary use of power by unelected thugs who operate with impunity. It is more than ironic to think that the UN would send down a Group of Experts to delineate the failings of the UN in its ill-advised and illegal war against Gbagbo and the people of the Ivory Coast. While the actions and the complicity of the French in promoting and sustaining such a system should surprise no one, one might have hoped for better from the UN.

END NOTES

[i] ICG, “ A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Cote D’Ivoire”, Africa Report N°176 – 1 August 2011

[ii] ibid

[iii] Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 2045 (2012) 17 April 2013.

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African Liberation Day, Toronto

Pan-Africanism and today’s challenges: Obstacles and ways forward

GRILA-Toronto

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/Announce/87396

Toronto, ON -The Toronto chapter of the Group for Research and Initiative for the Liberation of Africa (GRILA), will commemorate the African Liberation Day 2013 on Saturday, May 25th 2013 at 5:00 p.m. This will mark the 50th anniversary of the creation of the OAU (Organization of African Unity). This public education event will take place at A Different Booklist which is located at 746 Bathurst (next to the Bathurst Subway station).

In the New Scramble for Africa, the continent is facing the dual threat of militarization and capitalist-driven land grabs. In militarist terms, the US and its European allies are increasingly consolidating their imperialist stranglehold in the region. Under the auspices of the so-called United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US is seeking the recolonization of the continent in bid to secure unfettered access to vital resources in the wake of China’s ascendancy in Africa. The bloody military intervention in Libya was swiftly followed by deployment of Special Forces in Uganda, paving the way for militarization in the Central African region and the new escalation by President Obama of America’s two decades old war in Somalia.

In the Sahel region, Mali has suddenly become the centre of a new global “war on terror.” Paradoxically, US-backed, French forces in Mali are fighting the same terrorist bands trained by US and NATO Special Forces, now justifying a full-fledged, neo-colonial invasion of Mali by France. Under the pretext of fighting terror, the French-led militarization strategy in Mali is rooted in AFRICOM’s hegemonic military objectives of securing vital resources, countering China’s strategy and confronting the revolutionary wave sweeping across the continent.

The choice of Mali as a new staging ground for a joint AFRICOM/NATO military offensive on the African continent is not a mere coincidence. With proven oil reserves as well as gold and uranium deposits, resource-rich Mali is strategically located in the heart of the oil-rich Sahel region. Its proximity to oil-rich Libya to the north and the vastly oil-rich, Gulf of Guinea region to the south comprising of oil-producing states of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and newly oil-rich Ghana, makes it a convenient springboard to direct a new phase of imperialist-driven, military intervention in the continent. Mali is touted as a potential site for AFRICOM’s proposed base in Africa.

In addition to threats posed by AFRICOM/NATO militarization, there is also a growing threat to African food security and prosperity from massive land grabs by external capitalist forces. Africa is being used to bail out the world’s food crisis by secretive, powerful land grabbers seeking control over land and water resources. The new scramble for prime African land erstwhile dubbed the “Great Land Grab,” is driven by biofuel demands in the European Union and other industrialized nations and renewed global attempts to augment food security in other regions of the world, principally in the Persian Gulf and East Asia. The threat posed by AFRICOM’s militarization and ongoing land grabs calls for sustained Pan-African response from the grassroots level to national and continental level. On Saturday, May 25th, 2013, join concerned Pan-Africanists at an African Liberation Day Panel discussion on the unfolding situation in the continent.

Date:Saturday, May 25, 2013
Time: 5pm - 7pm
Location: A Different Booklist -746 Bathurst (South of Bloor), Toronto

Brought to you by the Group for Research and Initiative for the Liberation of Africa (GRILA – Toronto Chapter) http://www.grila .org Email: admin@grila.org, grilator@gmail.com Phone: (416) 721 – 4531

NOTE: A major international campaign around these issues (Militarization and Land Grab) will be announced the same day.

Somalia: IHS Jane’s spin on Jubbaland trap

Mohamud M Uluso

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/87408

A few days ago, IHS Jane, a well-established company for global security analysis, released an analysis under the title Somalia's Jubbaland Conundrum. The following key points are presented at the beginning of the analysis for quick and effective impact.

• The Somali federal Government‘s new policy of doing away with the federalism that brought it to power poses a threat to the country’s progress towards stability.
• The government’s reluctance to allow the creation of the autonomous state of Jubbaland illustrates the lack of a central policy that takes into account the country’s clan based politics.
• To bring stability to Somalia and finally defeat the Islamists militant group the Shabab, all clans need to be equally represented in federal institutions, including military forces and the security apparatus.

These unfounded blames, institutionalization of clan politics and deliberate or accidental omissions of some truths in the analysis, prompted me to write this commentary. The analyst, as a service provider to clients, did not make any disclosure of representation or conflict of interest for consideration. However, the analysis uses and embellishes refuted arguments made repeatedly by known critics of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), probably at the behest of anti-state building cartels (foreigners with local collaborators) opposed to the re-birth of the Somali state that respects the rule of law and equality among citizens, and promotes peace, national common interests and prosperity. The cartel is now neutralized by the ‘New Deal Strategy’ adopted by the International Donor Community (IDC).

Indeed, the conclusions of the analysis, which could have the potential to influence western policy makers and analysts, are off the mark and inconsistent with significant acknowledgements made in the body of the analysis. It seems that the analyst either deliberately ignored or accidentally failed to undertake due diligent investigation of certain truths rather than creating new or recycling old baseless assertions for backup. Somalia cannot enjoy the offered international support if it remains in the status quo of a fragmented society hobbled by perpetual clan mistrusts and divisions. Somalis must own their future.

It is my opinion that a careful and objective reader of the analysis will come away with the realization that the principal drivers of the Somali crisis are identifiable foreign powers exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Somali people rooted in clan rivalry, poverty, religion and selfish ambitious personalities. Due to Wikileaks releases, there is sufficient information with regard to the detrimental manipulations of neighboring states against Somalia’s nationhood.

The acknowledgments made in the body of the analysis include:

• Clan-based Federalism in Somalia is the strategic pre-requisite of Ethiopia and Kenya, despite a ‘centralized state’ may well minimize the social fragmentation.
• Important actors-indigenous and foreign- want to control the region (Jubbaland).
• Kenya is the principal driver of the project of creating an autonomous Jubbaland region with foreign resources.
• Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya are all embroiled in the Somali conflicts for their individual geostrategic pre-requisites.
• Military agreement between Somalia and Turkey has alarmed Kenya and Ethiopia as it realigns the interests of Djibouti, Turkey, Egypt and Somalia, potentially against Kenya and Ethiopia who both support the concept of clan based federalism in Somalia. Uganda and Burundi may at the end walk away from supporting the FGS and support Kenya and Ethiopia.

Moreover, to bolster the soundness of the analysis, the analyst emphasizes clan-based federalism for stability, concession to the formation of autonomous Jubbaland State to appease one sub-sub-clan, and compliance with the wishes of neighboring countries for status quo. In response, the FGS committed itself to implement federalism (decentralization), lead the process of Jubbaland State formation and fully cooperate with IDC, particularly with troop contributing countries.

In addition, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presented to the people of Somalia as well as to the IDC his political platform based on six pillar policy priorities. 1) National stabilization based on security, order and justice; 2) Economic recovery; 3) Peacebuilding, Reconciliation and Outreach; 4) Public services delivery; 5) Unity and solidarity of the people and territory of Somalia; 6) Establishment of international relations based on cooperation and mutual respect. This interconnected political platform reflects the policy priorities prescribed for the quick recovery of failed state like Somalia.

CLAN-BASED FEDERALISM AND PROVISIONAL FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (PFC)

The analysis asserts that the FGS is pursuing a policy of doing away with federalism because it is opposed to the formation of Jubbaland state. This baseless assertion is to pressure the FGS to violate the provisions of the PFC, retreat from its stabilization plan that covers equally all regions of South Central Somalia and endorse clan-based federalism. It is untrue that FGS endorsed the establishment of an autonomous regional authority in Hiiraan.

The analyst failed to examine the historical process that ended the nine-year transition period. That process, facilitated by UN, USA, and EU, delivered the PFC, the new federal Parliament, and the election of new Speaker and President. I concur with Dr. Michael Weinstein’s observation that ‘Among all the business that was left undone when the Western ‘donor’-powers/U.N. rammed through the ‘transition’ to the Somali [Transitional] Federal Government (S.F.G.) in the late summer of 2012 was that of the form that a permanent Somali state would take.’ However, this happened with the help of the current faultfinders. For example, Puntland State boasts itself that it played an instrumental role in the national constitutional process for ending the transition in Somalia. Then, it finds hard to embrace the political transformation and integration prescribed by the PFC and the end of transition. The vision of the PFC is the unity and solidarity of equal citizens belonging to the Federal Republic of Somalia. Therefore, the FGS must be allowed to assume the overall responsibility of the country before it can be blamed for constitutional violations, unequal treatment and resource-sharing. The FGS has no interest, power, and opportunity to engage fresh clan confrontations because of its exclusive responsibility of rebuilding new Somalia. The FGS has engaged leaders of each region for establishing local administration that will adhere to the standards of transparency, efficiency, and accountability.

While clan balance and sensitivity considerations have influential role in the Somali politics, clan vanity should not hijack or abort the state building and peace building of Somalia espoused by the IDC after years of reluctance for the best interests of all clans. The PFC promotes justice and democracy as a basis for governance. The current FGS must ensure that, after four years, people’s representatives should be elected directly by voters. Therefore, it is unconstitutional to form a Federal Member States along the clan lines symbolized by the present prototypes.

The Guidebook to the PFC notes that due to long years of over centralized government structure and control, populations in many parts of Somalia demand regional self-rule. In the same breath, it states the following:

‘The creation of federal member states proved to be a very controversial issue during the constitutional conferences leading to this draft provisional constitution. It is noted that it is important to have fair and open procedures for the creation of the federated member states. Reflecting this, the draft provisional constitution itself does not create federal member states, but entrusts the house of the people of the federal parliament which represents all people of Somalia to decide on the number and demarcations of federal members states.’

Three deductions from the above statement are in order. First, it is important to distinguish the experience of the centralized government structure and control of the failed state in 1991 and the current fragmented Somali society which needs immediate solidarity. Second, national representatives and regional leaders of the local people must join forces to develop a national integration process that will facilitate the implementation of the federal or decentralization system based on the constitutionally recognized 18 regions of Somalia. Third, the FGS must be allowed time to prepare for facing the frightening challenge of federalism/decentralization left unresolved by the 6 signatories of the roadmap, the 825 members of the National Constituent Assembly, and the 135 traditional leaders supported by IDC.

JUBBALAND TRAP

The Jubbaland state is not to protect the interests of Somalis. It is trap to finally tear Somalia apart. The author’s analysis mystifyingly argues that Jubbaland holds potentially the balance of power in Somalia; that the Somali society has been historically decentralized and autonomous and led by traditional leaders. This means that the Somali politics remains based on clan and clan family interests. Based on this observation, the analyst argues that the FGS must adopt a central clan based policy and drop the opposition against the creation of Jubbaland state. This glorification of the clan politics is Achilles heel of the Somali society. In counter-argument, the Somalis are determined to tame the negative role of clan politics.

Establishing Jubbaland is not a test of federalism for FGS. Rather, Jubbaland exposes the kernel of the view of the anti-statebuilding cartel and it represents cartel’s last bastion. It is also inaccurate that former Transitional Federal Government of President Sheikh Sharif endorsed the creation of Jubbaland project. To the contrary, President Sheikh Sharif fired his defense minister Professor Mohamed Abdi Gandhi who played the mole role of the Jubbaland project and the president strongly opposed to the involvement of the Kenyan Defense Forces into
Somalia conflict.
It is worth mentioning in this context that the US government rightly rejected from the beginning the Jubbaland project and its recent diplomatic actions support that position. In fact, the position of the FGS is not new or reversal of an earlier endorsement.

NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF SOMALIA

The analysis reveals that the FGS has failed to persuade IGAD to accept its “diktats” on Jubbaland region. The analysis warns that Mogadishu’s independent policy is not palatable to the neighboring countries and that could imperil the realization of the long-delayed statebuilding in Somalia and threaten the stability of the Horn of Africa. In substance, this confirms that Kenya and Ethiopia are determined to control and manage the internal affairs of Somalia in spite of the formation of national permanent government.

CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

It is important to note here that the use of the words ‘centralization and decentralization’ by the analyst is totally misleading because there is nothing yet to centralize or decentralize. Puntland, Somaliland, Khatumo, Galmudug and Jubbaland are fiefdoms or separate enclaves despite representatives of the people in the areas are members and officials of the FGS. These fiefdoms or entities claim separate constitution, citizenship, flag, control of local resources and parity with FGS. The President, Speaker and the Prime Minister of the FGS cannot travel to those areas without the express permission of the local leaders. The President is a visitor not a Commander- in-Chief in those areas. The FGS seeks not centralization but national integration, citizenship spirit and respect of constitutional hierarchy enshrined in article 48 of PFC. The integration issue has to be resolved quickly for the best interest of Somalia.

It is a reality today that the majority of the people under the rule of these entities are complaining widespread abuse of human rights, endemic corruption, nepotism, political frauds and poor leadership. The cry wolf of corrupt leaders should not defraud Somalia of the opportunity for statebuilding and peacebuilding.

Although Somalis have many ways to settle their property disputes, the FGS cannot address the issues of land and property restitution and others social problems hanged on as excuses to undermine President Hassan’s leadership unless there is full embrace of national government, national citizenship and respect of the fundamental principles of the PFC. Presently the rights of the Somali citizens from one region are not fully protected in other regions under the rule of law. To appoint people from different regions of Somalia to high positions of the federal institutions located in one area, the FGS must be able to exercise power and influence over all regions. Otherwise, the loyalty of a non-indigenous of the FGS seat becomes questionable. Selective reference to the implementation of certain provisions of the PFC without full adherence to the constitutional vision and spirit is red herrings.

Similarly, the issue of equal representation in the federal institution is subject to the equal participation of national burdens, commitments and subordination to the authority and directives of the national government. National dual representations or representation without taxation are unconstitutional. Most regions have their separate financial resources and well-armed forces-police, security and intelligence, anti-piracy- and other forces operating in the area. The FGS must develop national plan that takes into account complex national strategic, political, financial, administrative, and command and control factors to form a national security forces able to live and work in different parts of the country.

CONCLUSION

Without doubt, there are many legitimate concerns to criticize the FGS. But clan-based federalism, Jubbaland trap to disintegrate Somalia and foreign dependence against national sovereignty are not among those legitimate concerns. The accusation that the central assumption of FGS’s ‘hardline’ position is for international recognition, the support of powerful international backers and army on the international payroll, is preposterous. If the leaders of yesterday did not fulfill their responsibilities with vision, competence and patriotism, they should not blame their failure on their successors. Today’s leaders have the responsibility to find right solutions to the inherited problems and plan for a better future.

Kingsley Kuku and his co-apostles of anarchy

Uche Igwe

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/87401

A few years ago, a former US ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. John Campbell, wrote a tiny, brilliant book titled ‘Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink’. I wrote a piece acknowledging the searching intelligence and inspired insight in that book and got so many knocks on the head for doing so. It got the Nigerian officials so angry that they publicly condemned the author on what they dismissed as doomsday prophesies. Many officials of the Nigerian embassy in Washington, D.C., at that time were indescribably livid. I recall a particular officer who wrote one harsh email to me and even requested a meeting. We later met, argued and became good friends before she left D.C. for a higher posting. I wonder if those officials who were calling for the head of the author can stand up to a debate now about what has come of Nigeria today and the postulations in that book.

The sad truth is that most of the predictions in that book have come to pass except that, probably, the country has not yet physically ripped apart into a Christian south and a Muslim north. With only that pending at the moment, and 2015 fast approaching, there are genuine reasons to worry. That is why in the last few weeks many Nigerians have become increasingly concerned about the commentaries as it relates to the 2015 elections. Many politicians from Northern Nigeria are insisting that the incumbent President must keep respect the gentlemanly agreement reached with the region and state governors and not re-contest his position even though he is said to be constitutionally empowered to do so.

Supporters of the president have warned repeatedly that they cannot guarantee peace in the Niger Delta if their kinsman, Goodluck Jonathan, is not elected. Major highlights in the verbal missiles were the ones thrown by the Special Adviser to President Jonathan on Amnesty Mr. Kingsley Kuku during a forum in Washington, D.C., recently. In many ways the speech of Mr. Kuku, to an extent, did not surprise me. The prayer of an average public office holder is the maintenance of the status quo as this could guarantee continued stay in office, at least in principle. If the office he currently occupies is ‘lucrative’, as many have opined, it will only be natural for him to ask for more, like the proverbial Oliver Twist. I can also imagine that he means well for his boss and wants to be seen as loyal. However wittingly or unwittingly that speech has raised the antennae of many of Nigerians at home and abroad, who have begun to give his comments closer scrutiny and a more nuanced interpretation. That speech may end up hurting the person who he travelled all the way to D.C. to try to assist.

Let me touch on four areas of immediate concern to many. First is to quickly declare without equivocation that I am a Niger Deltan, broadly speaking. I may not have an oil well in my backyard but at least my state is oil-producing, as covered in the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act. I think it is wrong to portray the president as a regional player. That is exactly what Mr. Kuku’s speech has inadvertently done. I support President Jonathan in delivering dividends of democracy to all parts of Nigeria and expecting to be elected by all of us. If he underperforms, it weakens our morale—period. We know that no one region can elect him alone, at least going by the stipulations of the constitution, no matter how much we love him. So we need each other now more than ever before. Related to this is the fact that the message was delivered to the sensitive and sometimes nosy Washington, D.C., audience. As if that was not enough, after a few days, another self-proclaimed supporter of Jonathan echoed the same message as if they were playing out a well-rehearsed drama. For all intents and purposes, such statements corroborate the predictions made by the former ambassador in his book.

Another aspect of the concern relates to the position of Mr. Kuku himself. The Niger Delta amnesty program is a very sensitive one. Whenever anyone from that office speaks, the person should expect to be taken seriously. From the declaration of amnesty by President Yar-Ardua, the ex-combatants dropped all their weapons and embraced amnesty. The federal office that Mr. Kuku coordinates was commissioned to carry out a comprehensive demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration programme. That means that theoretically speaking, neither miltants nor stockpiles of weapons of any kind should exist anywhere in the Niger Delta. Most of the fighters should have been trained or are currently undergoing training and so will be expected to reintegrate into the society as normal, law-abiding citizens. If this is the case then who are the people that Mr. Kuku is referring to? Many people are now struggling between what they consider the original goals of the amnesty program and the speculations that it will be converted into a private army of some sort. We do not need any war or drums of war—what we need is fiscal federalism that will allow us to control our resources and develop our region.

The third and probably the most important point is the timing of these comments vis-à-vis the ongoing considerations of extending amnesty to Boko Haram insurgents. Such a comment is capable of upsetting the momentum gathered in discussions about peace in the northern region. So what is the meaning of amnesty? Is Mr Kuku trying to fly a kite or are there things the Nigerian public need to know? On what basis can we convince the insurgents in the north to drop their weapons and embrace peace? What if others begin to see the statement as an inspiration to start making preparations for an imaginary war? Those who have examined the Niger Delta militancy and the insurgency of Boko Haram insist that the two are fundamentally different. Do we now want to start equating them? The mere flash of Niger Delta militants on one side and Boko Haram on the other is too frightening to contemplate, and any statement that seeks to insinuate this is not in our best interest as a nation.

Almost two years to 2015, there is no need to get into a panic mood. What is the desperation about? Good governance and public service. Really? Even at that are we to prepare for elections or to prepare for war? I insist that President Goodluck Jonathan’s action or inaction about very sensitive issues that border on Nigeria will be what we credit him for. Comments like those credited to Hon. Kuku and the flip-flopping, allegedly-repentant militant Asari Dokubo will heat up the system unnecessarily, portray Mr President in bad light and complicate what is clearly a challenging situation. Worse still, it could precipitate anarchy and pave the way for the military to confiscate the democratic space and plunder our polity.

Finally, and closely linked to the second thought but of far greater worry, is the rising suspicion amongst Nigerians today of the President’s amnesty programme. The Kuku and Asari comments, and the repeated threats to unleash the nation’s allegedly disarmed and ‘amnetised’ militants, who are now being trained and retrained and sustained under a national amnesty Programme funded with federal revenue, on Nigerians and the Federal Republic of Nigeria should one individual not be re-elected as president of the nation come 2015 now renders the entire amnesty programme as implemented by Mr President suspect. Many discerning minds are now beginning to question the true motive of this government’s amnesty programme, and justifiably so. They allege that the amnesty programme being implemented by the presidency and that conceived by late President Yar’Adua are not one and the same. Many now allege that the real amnesty programme has been tweaked with and reformatted for political intimidation as against a correctional scheme. People now ask if amnesty is truly a national demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration programme, or a mere perfect guise under which Mr President and his kinsmen are applying federal funds to maintain and sustain ethnic militia that shall be unleashed as a tool of political coercion on the generality of unsuspecting Nigerians in the build up to, during and perhaps after the 2015 general elections.

This feeling gets stronger especially against the background of the information recently released that the amnesty programme and payments being made thereunder may officially terminate in 2015. Would that be when the true mission has been accomplished in 2015, thereby rendering the ex-militants functus officio? The manure for these rising concerns is provided by the threatening comments of the president’s kinsmen like Kuku, Asari and, sometime in the past, the president’s self-proclaimed political godfather, Chief Edwin Clark. It is also fuelled by the presidency’s now unholy and very uncomfortable silence over these comments nearly one week after what many now interpret to be more than just tacit endorsement of the threats.

Nigerians are already asking very pertinent questions. Questions such as: are these repentant militants truly repentant and changed in their ways? Is their allegiance truly for the Nigerian nation now or to some ethnicity or individuals somewhere out there? If the amnesty programme, as it is being executed, is as successful as we are made to believe, then these repentant militants should by now be as civilly innocent as the rest of us having been fully disarmed, demilitarised and re-orientated. And so who are Mr. Kuku and his co-travellers referring to? The federal government must get the chief implementer of the amnesty programme to not only explain their utterances but also provide the answers to all of these questions! Indeed, it is time for a comprehensive review of the amnesty programme to ensure that we are not made to perceive that there is a hidden agenda against the generality of Nigerians or threat to the sovereignty of this nation!

Before Nigeria loses the north...

Dayo Olaide

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/87400

Northern Nigeria needs help. Decades of bad governance have continued to traumatize the region. In this period, successive administrative and political leaders have failed to educate the region’s poor, pursuing instead conscious policies to lock the vast majority in poverty and illiteracy in order to keep them subservient and passive. In doing so, the north’s political elite hope to disempower the people, minimizing potential resistance to their power and political influence over flows of petrodollars from the central government. The result is dangerously high levels of inequality that has produced a fragile society with sharp divisions between a small, despised, rich, elite class and an impoverished, illiterate majority. The people, once considered subservient and passive, have become fuel for the incendiary conflicts that frequently ravage the north. The responsibility to solve the problem rests, first, with the people and government of the region. Different ethnic and religious groupings that once lived and co-existed in the region for decades and centuries must learn to tolerate one another and live together again peacefully in order to reverse imminent danger of complete breakdown of law and order throughout the region. The evidence is clear. Militants with fundamentalist ideologies are gradually taking hold of parts of the region. This is a dangerous development and must be quickly confronted to avoid a possible scenario similar to those in Somalia, Afghanistan and Mali. However, leaving the region to deal with the problem alone is bound to be counterproductive. The consequences are bound to reverberate through to the rest of Nigeria.

Four things need to be done to save the region. First, governments and political leaders, at state and local levels, with assistance from the federal government, must address the massive youth illiteracy and unemployment in the region. A lot of the drivers of grievances that frequently turn violent are economic in nature. They stem from limited economic opportunities and exclusion from state programmes. Second, leaders and peoples of the region must fix the ‘identity’ question that eats at its peace and security. A lot of exclusion and discrimination in the allocation of economic opportunities takes place on the basis of ‘identity’. Your identity as ‘indigene’ or ‘settler’ is crucial to your being in Nigeria, but the destructive potential of this constitutional lacuna is most evident throughout the north. It has caused more havoc than cohesion and development. And it is time to expunge the provisions from our body of laws before its full destructive potential is unleashed on the land. Third, the region must uphold accountability and justice. Reports of public inquiries into violence and deaths have been abandoned to gather dust. Without implementing the recommendations and bringing perpetrators of violence and killings to justice, there cannot be forgiveness and healing. Fourth, the North is in urgent need of political and economic revival.

Nigeria’s north has the highest number of children out of school in the world, according to a 2010 World Bank report. Girls are most affected with enrolment rate of 20 per cent and 25 per cent respectively in the north-east and north-west, compared with 85 per cent each in the south-east and south-west and 75 per cent in the south-south. World Bank, in another report in 2012, estimated that 50 million youths are unemployed in Nigeria. A 2010 poverty profile released by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reveals the devil in the details. Unemployment is highest in Zamfara, Bauchi, Niger, Gombe, Bauchi and Nassarawa, with rates between 36.5 and 42.6%. It is not surprising that income inequality is also highest in the north, in Taraba and Yobe States, based on the Gini coefficient released by the NBS. Gini coefficient measures income distribution on scale of zero to one. According to experts, numbers between 0.3 and 0.4 indicates a relative income gap and numbers between 0.4 and 0.5 indicates large income gaps, while above 0.5 means that inequality is severe, requiring urgent actions in the society. Income inequality is 0.5241 and 0.523 in Taraba and Yobe states respectively; more than 0.447, the national average. Urgent actions are needed to check inequality in the region and reduce grievances that turn violent as a result of the apathy expressed by the ‘have nots’ towards the ‘haves’.

There is realization among northern elites of the danger youth unemployment poses to development and peace in the north. The growth in number of governors’ initiatives and budget spending on youth unemployment, poverty alleviation and empowerment programmes is indicative of this. If sustained, these programmes could go a long way to reduce the risk of grievances from limited economic opportunities turning violent. But the current approach of poverty alleviation and empowerment may be counterproductive and could exacerbate cynicism and distrust for the government and its programmes. This is because a lot of employment and empowerment programmes are fraught with secrecy, favouritism and corruption. In the absence of clear guidelines for managing and measuring performance and impact, the implication is that the programmes are politicized, often to gain political mileage, and therefore leave no dent on the problem. Some programmes are simply exuberant. For instance, a state governor recently announced international scholarship to train 100 pilots in an expensive international graduate training programme. The announcement has sparked public reactions among residents in the state. One resident asked, ‘Of what use to the state is a graduate training programme for pilots when the state neither runs nor owns an airline business capable of absorbing the new pilots?’ It is not clear how beneficiaries of the pilot graduate programme have been selected or the children of whom they are.
A lot of the responses to the problem of limited economic opportunities merely scratch the surface. The missing link has been poor planning, politicization of programmes, the lack of openness and citizens’ participation. Promoting transparency, openness and predictability in government youth employment and empowerment programmes can improve the benefits and beneficiaries, and reduce grievances and risks of violence that often result from apathy and feelings of exclusion. Transparency will benefit the citizens and government. By making information on employment and empowerment programmes available to citizens, the people are able to participate in the design and functioning of these programmes, draw benefits, and hold responsible government agencies accountable for the management of the programmes and budget allocations. This is likely to result in positive change in citizen-government relations. A transparent and accountable government will benefit from reduction in the distrust, cynicism and confrontations that often characterize government-citizen engagement. Governments must be able to envision the long term benefits in being more open in order to invest in it.

Over time, Nigeria citizenship has been defined into ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ where the former is synonymous with ‘nativity’; that is, being born in a particular location into a specific ethnic group considered to have a ‘homeland’ within the locality. Settlers, on the other hand, have their ethnic genealogy elsewhere, even if they were born in a particular state or lived all their lives there. This classification has evolved as the basis for citizenship rights, entitlements and access to opportunities. It is the basis for discrimination—in employment, admission to schools, running for political office, scholarships, etc. It has gravely fractured the north far beyond the rest of the country with frequent violent conflicts. Experts have explained that ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ status are creations of the misinterpretation of the 1999 constitution. Yet the absence of a clear mechanism for a perceived ‘settler’ to become an indigene in order to draw citizenship benefits makes the dichotomy a major challenge in the north especially. For example, a third generation resident of Jos who has lived in Jos for more than a century is disqualified from aspiring for a political office; they would be excluded even if they had lived in Jos for five centuries. This crude interpretation of the constitution should have no place in modern Nigeria and must be urgently addressed. While the constitutional reform process in the 2009-2011 phase failed to put the ‘identity’ question to rest, some states in the south have found creative administrative procedures to achieve inclusion and involve minority groups in state running. The ongoing constitutional reform presents a second chance for the northern region to put this vexing issue to rest once and for all. Northern Governors’ Forum and residents must seize the moment before Nigeria switches fully into the elections mode. Leaving the issue to drag for too long could make it ‘petrol’ for violence during the next elections in 2015.

Nigeria has had a history of unresolved violent conflicts. The failure of the federal and state governments to address the root causes and drivers of these conflicts leaves room for reprisal attacks and increases the risk of conflicts throughout the northern region. According to the International Crisis Group, at least 80 episodic violent conflicts were recorded in Jos between 1994 and 2004. The conflicts, mostly between indigenous Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups and non-indigenous Hausa and Fulani people, has consumed about 4000 souls over this ten year period, according to the Human Rights Watch. National figures estimated that conflicts displaced more than 6 million people throughout the country. Governments’ responses are often to set up commissions of inquiry. The inquiries have generated reports and recommendations that are never implemented. This action of government does not show any commitment to justice or interest in finding lasting solutions to the frequent bloodbaths in the region. Some reports contained recommendations to prosecute individuals that have been identified on account of their roles, and payment of compensation to some groups and individuals for the losses they have suffered. Implementing the recommendations of the commissions of inquiry will deliver justice, help the healing process and facilitate the process of peaceful coexistence necessary to rid the north of intolerance and violent conflicts. Commitment to justice and fairness is the essential ingredient for lasting peace in the region. Implementing the various reports of commissions of inquiry is an important first step to this. Federal and state governments must therefore work together to ensure accountability and justice.

Politics of winner-takes-all in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and highly-classed society like Nigeria is dangerous and unsustainable. The failure of the political elite to respond to national development needs in the last five decades have deepened ethnic suspicion and religious rivalry. Every ethnic and religious group is suspicious of potential domination by the other, and has no confidence that the other group, if given power, would protect its own interest. This suspicion runs deep in the politics and governance across the country. It is responsible for the wide inequality, exclusion and rivalry that have devastated the north. The region remains chronically poor and worse off than the rest of the country in many development indicators. This is in spite of its record of producing the largest number of Nigeria’s presidents. The northern political hegemons have failed to develop the region.

Inordinate greed for Western lifestyles and an absence of active citizenry fed the lack of vision and waste that plundered the state resources. The result is a large illiterate, unemployable labour force that is frequently instrumentalised by its political elite. The story is not very different in other parts of the country, which may be considered lucky not to have recorded as many conflicts so far. Northern leaders at all levels have an urgent responsibility to rally round and find lasting solutions to the widespread poverty and inequality in the north, expand opportunities, and ensure equity and fairness in the distribution and allocation of benefits to all residents. They must recognize and embrace conflict-sensitive approaches in government programming by encouraging inclusion, transparency and accountability, equity and justice, and fair representation. A stich in time could save the whole of the north from imminent combustion.

Dr Dipo Fashina: Farewell to the last standing man

Adewale Stephen

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/87399

Between 7 and 9 May 2013, Obafemi Awolowo University Campus came alive as the students, activists and scholars from every walk of life stormed OAU to honor Dr. Oladipo Fashina, an erudite scholar of Philosophy and former National President of Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) as he retired from the University. In his fruitful years of meritorious service which span for forty good years, he had not only been a remarkably warm and gregarious person marked by a probing and raging intellect and rich activism, but also one who especially delighted in the significant exchanges and the specific public trust of academic life.

Jingo, as he was fondly called in OAU, is a man of action and vision. His philosophical insights, writings, activism, ideologies, and approach to teaching were his weapons. Of all that will be written about Dr. Oladipo Fashina the husband, father, teacher, colleague, unionist, scholar, philosopher, fighter, and gentle man, I believe a lasting tribute to him should be his exploits as the President of ASUU.

It would be recalled that before Jingo became the National President of ASUU in 2001, the university lecturers were as poor as church rats. In fact, so poor that Professor Grace Alele William famously announced, in her days as the Vice Chancellor of the University of Benin, that she would never allow any of her daughters to marry a Professor. The reason was very obvious at that time; even the Universities Professors were so poorly paid that they found it difficult to maintain a decent family successfully.

But radical changes were witnessed as soon as Dr. Fashina mounted the saddle as he took the then Nigerian government to the cleaners. He not only imagined campus communities that were free of poor scholars, brain drain, morally and financially discouraged intellectuals, but devoted his life and his lifes’ work to achieving that goal.

I knew of Jingo through his activities before I met him as an undergraduate student in OAU; was deeply respected and loved by the students who came his way. I had been nursing the hope within the inner recess of my mind to have Dr. Fashina stand in a class and teach me Philosophy, and fortunately for me, it materialized following my undergraduate admission into OAU in 2008; he was the listed lecturer that taught me ‘Phil 101 and 104’. There I saw firsthand his analytical power and skill at directing and lecturing a class in paticular when he talked about the theory of development and why privatization will never bring Nigeria out of the doldrums.

According to him, the theory of development, an act of immaculate private conception, was founded, among other things, on considerable ignorance of the history of economic development in the United States itself. In the first 70 years of its own history, American government had played a relatively active role in building the turnpikes, canals, harbors, railroads and schools which made subsequent economic expansion possible. When what economists unhappily termed ‘social overhead capital’ or ‘infrastructure’ was the great need, public investment became a necessity, since private capital would not invest in areas of low returns. As for the Americans insistence on fiscal purity, this was perhaps a trifle unseemly on the part of a nation, which had financed so much of its own development by inflation, wildcat paper money and state bonds sold to foreign investors and subsequently repudiated.

If the criteria of the International Monetary Fund had governed the United States in the nineteenth century, its own economic development would have taken a good deal longer. In preaching fiscal orthodoxy to developing nations, America is somewhat in the position of the prostitute who, having retired on her earnings, believes that public virtues requires the closing down of the red-light district. This policy of the 21st century only reinforced the conviction that the essence of the United States purpose is economic imperialism. Its result for Africa and to a nation such as ours is to place our position and development in extreme external jeopardy.

He took students who spent their lives studying the realm of the probable and dared them to imagine and strive for the realm of the improbable. He had the soul of a philosopher and the vision of a revolutionary.

Since he picked up the teaching job at OAU as a brilliant young scholar in 1973, Dr. Fashina has made it a practice to make courageous choices. He encountered and overcame harassment, political enticement and financial inducement to achieve the prestigious positions he assumed over the years. Those positions alone could have constituted an important legacy in its own right, but an even more important example of his willingness to stay to his principles was his willingness to step away from those high-profile positions in the name of social justice. His choices were never easy for him or for his family as they often brought superfluous and undeserved embarrassment, incarceration, as well as persecution from the state and its agents. Still, it was his unwillingness to relinquish his ideological affiliations or abandon his deeply held personal commitments that helped me understand the value and consequence of adhering to principle.

Marcus Garvey, a 20th century philosopher, argues that ‘Yet the thing that lives in history, the thing that goes to the credit of man, is not how much wealth he has piled up for himself; is not how comfortable he has lived, but how good he has done for the rest of humanity. The present world generally worships power, influence and wealth. It is very easy to find sycophants who will fawn before such, and who will pay unreasonable compliments; but those who encourage and help the poor are few, and when they do engage themselves in such labor there is nothing else transient for them but condemnation’.

Perhaps, this is why Dr Oladipo Fashina was very careful to ensure that he autographed his deeds with excellence. For in the end, the mark of leadership is how many lives have been touched and how many enduring institutions built by such leader continue to serve, edify and uplift humanity. As my indefatigable teacher bows out of the system, I say a big farewell to a man I have come to know intimately over the years. Surely, Dr. Fashinas’ exit marks the end of an era, therefore, the question on everyones lip is: from whence comes another Jingo?

* Adewale Stephen is a lecturer at the Department of History, Osun State College of Education, Ilesa, Osun State, Nigeria

Principles PAC members must remember

Motsoko Pheko

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/87398

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) is not an abstract lifeless thing. PAC is its members, cadres and leaders working and winning together. By their behaviour, conduct and attitude towards life, they determine the success, progress and destiny of the PAC and the prosperous and happy future of the African nation in Azania and of the African Continent as a whole.

There are certain principles of life that PAC members must remember and embrace. We must not miss our potential to change our country and the world for the better. People in the world can be divided into two classes. Those ‘who are great’ and those ‘who might have been great’. This is a fine line between those people who have fulfilled their potential and those who have failed.

Many people hold to a defeatist mentality; a passive and powerless philosophy. It is a defeated thinking which makes one believes that he or she has no control over his or her destiny. A person is rewarded in life according to what he or she believes about himself or herself. Man has ‘inner’ self that the wise call the soul or spirit; the engine of a human being. It controls his or her destiny. That, which is defeated produces defeat while that which is self-confident produces victory and success in whatever type of struggle it is playing an active role.

In life we must live for a purpose and for the African cause to triumph and restore our people to their full dignity and essential humanity. They have been dehumanized and land dispossessed for over 350 years. We must live to succeed. We must live to achieve great things for our people and for ourselves. We must work to live a rich legacy for the coming generations.

One of the worst enemies against achievement is negativity. It holds you well below your potential and demoralizes you. Victims of negativity have excuses such as ‘We can’t do it’, ‘it is hard’, ‘we will never make it’, and ‘it is impossible’. Negativity reflects inner defeat.

Victims of negativity are characterized by criticism of their own organization or its leaders. They act recklessly and unconstitutionally in the media in violation of organizations’ disciplinary code. They delight in discussing personalities than discussing ideas. They fulfill what philosophers long observed when they wrote ‘Small minds discuss personalities, but great minds discuss ideas.’

Negative forces always paint themselves as “knowing-it all” and blame their own failures on others. They have sharp tongues that sink ships. Their tongues spit poison and death. Their mouths are a well of untruths and a swamp of defeat. They love great things, but they are not prepared to serve, suffer and sacrifice for them.

They ‘cut corners’ and betray national issues for their parochial ambitions and self interests. To defeat the forces of negativity we need to have a vision and a clear mission of the cause we want to serve and advance. We need a dream that can breathe life into our existence, build our destiny and change the course of future generations for prosperity and happiness.

But of course, we must watch out. We need the will to stand firm because there are many volunteers that are determined to kill our dream or that of our organization. They specialize in cynicism, malicious gossip and dubious activities. However, when challenge knocks at their doors, they shrink and manifest timidity worse than that of a rabbit.

To mislead the less vigilant, they use the correct political jargon, but their social practice contradicts them and exposes them as charlatans. We must focus on our vision as laid down by Pan Africanist giants such as Sobukwe, Mothopeng, Nkrumah, Lumumba and Sekou Toure. PAC members must have the will to succeed and the will to serve people with distinction amidst confusion and conspiracies which border on political treachery and lunacy.

Those who want to bring radical changes that benefit the poor and the powerless must remember this. The ‘reasonable’ man adapts himself to the interests of others. The ‘unreasonable’ man and woman persist in adapting others to the fundamental interests of his own people. Therefore, as the philosopher George Bernard Shaw put it, ‘All progress depends on the unreasonable man and woman’.

This is true. Without ‘unreasonable’ men and women, there would never have been Sharpeville Uprising, Robben Island, Armed struggle against apartheid, Soweto Uprising, Persistence On The Pan African Road, demand for free education, equitable redistribution of land and demand for the release of former freedom fighters in South Africa such as the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA), and the call for the abolition of ‘Floor-crossing’ in Parliament.

The struggles of life demand over-comers, not those who capitulate to what the Bible describes as ‘a dog returns to its vomit, and a pig that is washed goes back to its wallowing in the mud’. Pan Africanists must be over-comers; they meet the challenges of life. Life is filled with good starters. But how many of them finish the race well? Or finish at all? We must not only start well. We must have the commitment and the iron determination to accomplish our mission and realize our vision. We must keep focus on our dream.

That dream is the vision of a rejuvenated Africa and a country where no one will sleep in a cemetery as has been happening in some parts of ‘New South Africa’ for many years now. We must focus on a vision where no one lives in shacks, which often catch fire resulting in burning our people to death. We must create a nation where our people have skills and employment is not scarce for them. We must build a nation where all children of the poor shall received free education and can create jobs for themselves. Yes, where the minority shall not oppress the majority economically and dominate them technologically. Yes, where the people of this country shall not buy their water from the rich to whom it has been sold through the privatization of strategic state assets.

To accomplish the PAC mission and realize our Pan African vision, we need resources in the form of more members and supporters, finance, time, skills and commitment. Vision stands on three legs, African Nationalism, Socialism and Democracy. We need to have hundreds of trained and ideologically clear cadres to be the core and cornerstone of the Azanian Revolution.

Our victory for great things will not come cheap. It will be accomplished through our own sweat, sometimes tears and betrayal from within. The results of hard work and perseverance in struggle however, are sweet fruits of success, victory, prosperity and happiness for our people. We must intensify our work ethic. The secret of success in life is hard work. We must return the culture of hard work to our people, starting with us as individuals. Hard work is one of our African traditional values. There are many things that we can do without money.

We must learn and practice the principle of self-reliance seriously. Money from other sources comes with strings attached and destroys the genuine liberation of the African people, as is so obvious in Azania since 1994. If we are waiting for money to come not from us, but from ‘good Samaritans’ then we shall wait until horses grow horns.

Victory for great things does not come easily. It requires a lot of patience to turn things to our peoples’ advantage. Patience is not passive or weak thing; It is tenacious, courageous, focused, holds on against the tide, against intimidating circumstances and against false accusations. Indeed, against all fearful odds.

Over-comers are doers. They know that the noble struggle for economic and social emancipation of the African people is not a dinner party or for ‘summer soldiers’ but for true sons and daughters of Africa that historical necessity has called upon to contend under the scorching sun of stern realities of life with its vicissitudes.

Sowing and reaping are the law of life. We can’t reap if we do not sow. We must have a clear message and take it to the people day and night. Over-comers refuse to raise the flag of surrender. They refuse to quit, negotiate with failure or compromise the fundamental interests of the majority poor. Their purpose in life is bigger than themselves. They know that after every sunset there is a sunrise. Ours is the sunrise clause not the ‘sunset clause’ of appeasing the powerful at the expense of the powerless and dispossessed.

Our African ancestors have taught us that there is only one way to eat an elephant. It must be bite by bite. Progress is a process. Many people want progress without a process. They want glory without work, victory without fighting. They want to walk to their destiny without the journey. Of course, we can’t progress if we allow digression or regression in our noble cause.

Let us take an oath to build on what we have. We shall acquire what we do not have as we move forward with our struggle for economic liberation and social emancipation of the poor and powerless, vast land dispossessed African majority in our country.

We have lost very important political battles because of reckless actions of certain leaders. We have let down millions of our people and those who respect, love and have hope and confidence in our political mission. A divided army cannot win battles. But of course, true revolutions can succeed only on principled revolutionary unity in struggle. The Azanian Revolution from Sobukwe, Leballo, Mothopeng ,Masemola to Sabelo Phama and Zeblon ‘Ojuku’ Mokoena; was never about ‘leadership’. It was about service sacrifice and suffering for the criminally economically oppressed Africans of this country and the overthrow of colonialism.

We have lost important battles. But we have not lost the war. Land dispossession of the African people must be resolved. African land was stolen through guns. Those who claim they came to ‘civilize’ Africans in Africa must be told that ‘Civilized people do not steal other people’s land, let alone at gunpoint’.

The ‘Rainbow Nation’ and its ‘miracle’ are a fake and a myth respectively . Our country, has been sold to imperialism for 30 pieces of silver by new managers of ‘New South Africa.’ The dispossessed and the workers must pick up the pieces and prepare themselves for the bitter coming liberation struggle and victory for repossession of the land of their ancestors and African control of its riches.

African Workers must look forward to the day when they will dig the platinum in Marikana and gold and diamonds in other mines for themselves and their people. Africans have dug these minerals for Europeans for centuries and they still wallow in the quagmire of poverty. This must change. Azania must be free. As an African proverb puts it, ‘An ant-hill that is destined to be a giant-hill will ultimately come one, no matter how many times it is destroyed by elephants.’

Shango Lashu! Tiko ra Hina! Fatshe la rona! Umhlaba Wethu! The land is ours!

* Dr. Pheko is a writer of several books such as TOWARDS AFRICAS’
AUTHENTIC LIBERATION. He is a former Member of Parliament in South Africa

OccupyParliament: Speaking truth to Kenya’s ‘MPigs’

Edwin Rwigi

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/87409

What an uncanny assault on the senses! An unfamiliar stench saturates the air around and if I weren’t looking I don’t think I could have quite told what it was. What smells like a fertilizer experiment gone bad – manure-ish-blood! All thick and dark, it is poured in a very determined fashion on the street. Then there is a call to bring out the swine. Nobody saw this coming.

Our attention is immediately drawn towards a truck pulling back and edging closer to the crowd of mainly seated protesters. This must be a first in Kenyan protest history. Right here next to the corridors of power are several piglets and a humongous boar feasting and wallowing in a pool of blood!

Journalists, local and foreign, click away at the speed of light, their monstrous cameras trained on the faces of swine and people alike. I suppose the scene makes for a good and sensational fodder for the media.

About an hour and half earlier, a crowd had gradually swelled at what at the hallowed shrine of Kenyan rights struggles – The Freedom Corner, right at the edge of Nairobi’s Uhuru Park. Throngs of people clad in white t-shirts and black pants. Angry placards screaming all manner of messages at the so-called Honourable Members of Parliament, whose first order of business upon being sworn in after the March 4 elections was to demand bigger salaries. ‘Bunge si Biashara, Bunge ni Utumishi! – Parliament is not an enterprise, Parliament is for Service.

This was the #OccupyParliament protest, which quickly became a trend on social media.

The MPs (now chsristened MPigs, for their greed) have brand new Kshs 200,000 ($2,500) seats. Their demand is a-kick-in-the-gonads of the taxpayer. The different factions in the House have been on each other’s necks on the operations but not on their pay. The harmony with which they sing for a pay rise is nothing short of a celestial choir – it is in one spirit.

At the Freedom Corner, a couple of police officers are standing next to a pulled over police vehicle. The critical mass has been achieved and in a short while the protest march kicks off. The noisy crowd steadily makes its way out of the park in chants, shouts, dances and other displays - placards galore, banners that lend weight to the cause, sit-downs in the middle of the cleared highway and even a mobile puppet show depicting the greed of the MPs as animalistic. There is a slow but spirited march down Kenyatta Avenue and then along Moi Avenue and up again on Harambee Avenue to the destination – Parliament Buildings.

In the middle of a seated crowd, Gacheke Gachihi, a young civil rights activist rises up. In his hands is a copy of the Constitution. Like a nurtured Baptist preacher man, he reads from the Bill of Rights : “Article 37 says that every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions to public authorities.” The crowd responds with cheers of affirmation. Gacheke turns to the officers on the curb and re-reads the same article to them.

‘We are not here illegally, we are not breaking the law...’ he continues. ‘It is our right, it is written here. You can even consult with [renowned Kenyan constitutional expert Yash Pal] Ghai; he is seated right next to me. He wrote the constitution...’

But later, police forgot what Gaheke preached and engaged the peaceful protesters in violent chases and beat-downs coupled with tear gas shots and water canon attacks. The crowd’s resilience appeared to be broken when the leaders were arrested, people like Boniface Mwangi and Gacheke. The battles continued for a while as the crowd seemed to diminish with every police attack.

But the protesters had made their point. The ‘MPigs’ do not deserve a cent more in country crippled by mass poverty, unemployment, hunger, disease and natural disasters.

But what followed was crass and misguided coverage of #OccupyParliament by the media. From radio talk show hosts who termed the protest as a show of hooliganism and abuse of animal rights, to prime time news on various networks sensationalising the pigs in the saga, to inaccurate newspaper articles that totally missed the point. The media portrayed the protesters as exclusively belonging to ‘Civil Society’ – essentially saying that the protest was the autonomous agenda of the cryptic ‘special’ class of activists.

This is far from the truth, ordinary Kenyans carried the placards, got sprayed with acid water, had tear gas shot at them and some even got a beating by the police. This was a Kenyan agenda, carried out by Kenyans. The #OccupyParliament protest echoed the sentiments of most if not all Kenyans across the country.

If an opinion poll released a day after is anything to go by, Kenyans are opposed to the greed exhibited by the ‘MPigs’. According to the survey ‘a massive 88 per cent of Kenyans oppose the bid to a salary rise for MPs, with more than half citing contrasting poverty levels in the wider population.’

Some MPs have attempted to justify the pay raise on grounds that they are pestered for hand outs by their constituents. But the new survey indicates that only about 9 per cent of those polled are in any way beneficiaries of the supposed hand outs. 22 per cent of those against a pay rise said the government could not afford it, 10 per cent argued that MPs were aware of the ‘pay cut’ before they contested for office while 4 per cent said a more modest salary would discourage greedy individuals from contesting in future.

The avalanche of tweets in support of the #OccupyParliament protest was simply phenomenal. By no means can these agenda be reduced to the interests of idle picketers and ‘foreign funded’ civil society as has been alleged by detractors from the comforts of their offices.

MPs were paid a gross sum of Ksh 851,000 ($10,600) a month in the previous parliament, which has been cut to the still attractive sum of Ksh 532,500 ($6,656). Following this the MPs have turned into a lynch mob crying for the blood of the independent Salaries and Remuneration Commission. Their audacity knows no bounds with their demands for car purchase allowances.

Some of the pigs at the protest bore the names of some of the most vocal MPs agitating for a pay rise, a powerful symbolism of the greed the ‘MPigs’. Kenya has an already inflated public sector wage bill, with over 50 per cent of the population living on a dollar a day or less. The MPs were voted in with the assumption that they work for the public interest. The protest was a demand for public morality and ethical leadership.

FIND MORE ON #OccupyParliament

http://www.facebook.com/FahamuAfrica/photos_stream

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Boniface-Mwangi/136063603119640?ref=stream&hc_location=stream

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJF1y4NosME&feature=em-upload_owner#action=share

http://youtu.be/SHrcrFNQEJ8

CPJ urges President Zuma to block secrecy bill

Committee to Protect Journalists

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/87404

May 12, 2013

His Excellency President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma
The Presidency
Union Buildings
Private Bag X1000
Pretoria, 0001

Via email: president@po.gov.za

Dear President Zuma:

We are writing to express our concern about South Africa's Protection of State Information Bill and join with civil society organizations in your country in urging you to send the bill back to the National Assembly for further revision when it comes to you for confirmation.

The bill, which was introduced in 2008 to counter espionage and protect national security, has caused great concern among South African citizens and their supporters who have backed the struggle for democracy and a free and vibrant media. While we are pleased that the bill has undergone extensive revisions in the past two years, we are concerned that the draft that was passed by parliament on April 25 still falls short of the standards set by your country's constitution. South Africa serves as an example of democracy and good governance not only to the rest of Africa, but to the world.

The bill has also come under criticism from several civil society and press freedom organizations, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), which is a close ally of your own party; the African National Congress; and the Right2Know campaign, which represents more than 400 local organizations. These organizations believe that the language of the proposed legislation is wide open to interpretation and abuse by officials.

Cosatu has called for a "broader public interest defense for whistle-blowing." The bill affords limited protection to whistleblowers in connection with disclosures revealing "criminal activity." This could discourage whistleblowers from contacting the media with information. Cosatu has also requested that you refer the bill to South Africa's Constitutional Court for review before you consider signing it into law this week.

The Right2Know campaign has identified several problematic aspects of the bill. The bill allows for any journalist who discloses classified information "with the purpose of revealing corruption or other criminal activity" to be charged with espionage and other offenses. Journalists could receive up to 25-year jail terms for these offenses. The campaign warns that these "draconian sentences" will have a chilling effect on anyone in possession of information in the public interest.

Mr. President, an independent and unfettered media is a valuable ally in any government's efforts to root out corruption and improve service to citizens. In September 2011, at the Open Government Partnership, you highlighted your administration's promotion of citizen engagement and participation with these words: "We pride ourselves on having freedom of expression and media freedom that are enshrined in the constitution. This makes ours a vibrant democracy with a healthy exchange of ideas in society."

We believe that the passage of the Protection of State Information Bill would undermine your goal. We ask that you send this bill back for further revision, thus ensuring that apartheid-era secrecy is replaced by a law that is in keeping with South Africa's hard-won constitutional values. Your leadership on this matter would send a strong signal that South Africa can balance its needs for state security while respecting human rights and media freedom.

Yours sincerely,

Joel Simon

Executive Director





CC

Lakela Kaunda, Private Office of the President

Mac Maharaj, Spokesman for the President

Zanele Mngadi, Communications Officer of the President

Kgalema Motlanthe, Deputy President

Malebo Sibiya, Office of the Deputy President

Pansy Tlakula, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

Gaston Barban, Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa

René Dinesen, Danish Ambassador to South Africa

Kari Maren Bjørnsgaard, Norwegian Ambassador to South Africa

Anders Hagelberg, Swedish Ambassador to South Africa

Birgitta Ohlsson, Swedish EU Affairs Minister

Carl Bildt, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs

Virginia E. Palmer, U.S. Embassy in South Africa

Nicola Brewer, British High Commissioner to South Africa

All that glitters is not gold

An employee of Tsogo Sun (Garden Court-Marine Parade)

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/87405

Our sweat and all our hope that Labour Brokers will one day be banned from this democracy has vanished. We have all supported COSATU and millions of South Africans who have made this call to put an end to the Labour Brokers so as to save our exploited brother and sisters. People working under Labour Brokers are suffering incredible exploitation. We have no sense of security in the world. We are disrespected and humiliated every day.

We are employed by Progress CC in the Tsogo Sun formerly known as the Garden Court Holiday-Inn in Marine Parade on Durban’s beach front. Many of us have worked for more than seven, eight, nine and ten years without being registered with the Department of Labour or any Bargaining Council. There are more than 50 employees but only less than five are employed permanently. Here there is constant employment as constant firing is the order of the day. We earn R6 per room and are not paid per hour. There is no starting time and therefore no finishing time. We have to work overtime all the time but we are never paid for this time. There is no tea break or lunch hour. It is therefore taken as a crime to eat any time when you are hungry. We are not allowed to eat company food as this constitutes a dismissible crime.

We had joined several unions including the Hospitality, Industries & Allied Workers Union in 2007. In 2010 we had joined HEHAWU but we received no assistance or any improvements in these working conditions and so we left that union too. In 2011 we joined SATAWU and eventually we had to return back to the Hospitality, Industries & Allied Workers Union. We have paid and continue to pay a premium of up to R55 every month to these unions but we are paying for nothing. All of these unions take our money but they are not our unions – we do not decide what they will do and how they will do it. They are more like service providers that are failing to provide services. They are run on a top down basis.

The current union has tried to intervene but it has not succeeded. We are very concerned about the premium we are paying while not being able to give direction to the union from the bottom up or receiving any service. If we ask for a leave or time off for family responsibility then we are denied. We are not treated the same and equal. Some are better respected than the others. Those employed direct by the Tsogo Sun enjoy exclusive rights but we are the same and do the same jobs but we are treated so badly compared to them. They earn at least R19 per hour and not R6 per room as we do. Where is the truth in this company? Does this not constitute unlawful labour practice? We are forced to pay between R200 to R300 for the work uniform by our employer. Sometimes when we complain our manager tells us that we will be like workers of Marikana whose union failed to protect them and ended up shot. Sometimes she tells us that we have no children but work just for men or boyfriends.

We know that each guest pays up to R1300 per night every day while we get only R6 per room. This is not fair on us. The UIF money is always deducted but I do not think it reaches the Department of Labour as we are not registered with them either. Our pay slips are our disgrace as people see it as a joke as you will be confronted with many questions if we try to use it. We used to participate with great energy in our numbers in marches to end labour brokers organized by COSATU under the leadership of Vavi but today that hope has come to an end. We call upon the ANC lead government and the people of South Africa to protect workers in this famous hotel. But we also call upon Tsogo Sun guests to help us by supporting our demand for just and fair working conditions and salaries.

In the meantime we have decided to organize ourselves for ourselves in solidarity with our comrades in Abahlali baseMjondolo.

Ken Harrow’s ‘Trash: Garbage In Garbage Out’

'If you consider your friend to be an animal he considers you to be shit' (Tshi proverb, Ghana).

Biko Agozino

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/87407

Ken Harrow is a very thoughtful writer whose contributions to online debates always signal to me that a thread is important enough not to be junked automatically. I was pleased to see that his new book has two chapters on Nollywood whereas his past books on African cinema ignored this iconic genre because, according to him: ‘The images scattered to the wind in Nollywood films are continually relegated to the rubbish bin by celluloid film standards’ (p. 279). Gloria Emeagwali alerted me to the controversial nature of the new book when she questioned online why the author obsesses with trash and why there is no distinction between the people and trash in the book.

Having read the book, I admit that the author has an original thesis that he argued with varying degrees of conviction mixed with serious doubts. To argue that there are tropes of trash in African cinema is far from the mantra that African cinema is trash or that Africans are ‘worthless people’. The author over-generalized his observation of trash in some scenes by concluding that such trash is what defines the films, the culture, the politics, the law and the people. ‘What is worthless? Who is trash?’ He asks provocatively (p. 57). No one is worthless, and everything is not trash should be the answers.

The author reports in the introduction that he was warned about this choice of words in his earlier book on Postcolonial Cinema in Africa. According to him, Jude Akudinobi warned him against taking the analogy too far especially given that the dismissal of African cinema in a scene analyzed in that earlier book was contested by a character who condemned the speaker as trash: ‘If African cinema is trash, then you are trash because you are an African’, he retaliated. For reasons best known to him, Ken decided to double down on this pejorative description of Africans that is all too familiar from the point of view of white supremacy, a perspective that is contradictory to his otherwise pro-African views in his scholarship.

One of the reasons given by Ken Harrow for using the trope of trash to represent valuable African cultural productions is because he finds support in the theory of Bataille about the locations of trash in surrealism (Chapter 1). Here he said that he threw a challenge in his earlier book, Postcolonial Cinema, calling for a new Aristotle to emerge to theorize the new cinema of Africa. Without telling us why he presumed that another Aristotle, a guy who believed that slavery was natural, would be a suitable theoretical framework for understanding African culture, a culture that was wounded by centuries of slavery, Bro Ken decided to take up his own challenge.

Trash therefore appears to be a pitiable wrestling match between him and himself. His difficulty could have been enormously lessened if he had ignored Aristotle and examined the drama of classical African civilization in ancient Egypt that predated Greek drama by 3000 years, according to Cheikh Anta Diop (Civilization or Barbarism). The presumption of race-class-gender superiorism by Harrow is revealed when he cites Battaille as asserting that the upper classes make ‘almost exclusive use of ideas’ even when some of those ideas may have lowly origins (p.15). The Ken Harrow who writes everything in lower case letters in his constant online contributions to debates would have been expected to challenge Bataille here but he accepts the dubious notion uncritically just as he accepted Mbembe’s astonishing slur that Africans focus exclusively on the mouth, the belly and the phallus as if they have no mind of their own.

His only attempt to critique this myopic view about Africans came out lame because of his coupling of ‘glamorousness/repulsiveness’ (p.24) as if they are conjoined twins in African cinema. On the same page he demeans Ghana by suggesting that a ‘shit-caked handrail’ in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born (where the handrail in question was not covered in shit cakes but in a ‘generous grub of mucous’, a wise hygienic advice to avoid germ-infested public handrails that is heard even in ‘clean’ countries) was representative of Ghana under Nkrumah. But CLR James would differ in Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution by identifying the glorious National School Movement as a major medium of resistance to colonialism and a major achievement in nation-building, not shit cakes or trash.

Harrow cites Sembene Ousmane as identifying African cinema as the night school of the masses in line with Achebe’s subservience of literature to pedagogy but he devalues such emphases in African arts and cinema by following Ranciere to term them ‘mimesis’ or mere ‘representation’ as opposed to 'experimentation' (32-33).

In arguing his spurious hypothesis that revolutionary accounts tend to neglect trash, Harrow makes a grievous theoretical error by asserting that ‘views from the trash landscape…don’t figure in the Fanonian liberationist schemata’ (p.40). Quite the contrary, for according to Fanon, the dominant image of the colonized in the mind of the colonizer was that of: ‘Dirty Nigger, or simply, look a Negro’, dirty Arab, dirty Jew, or dirty Indian despite the fact that the colonized was remarkably clean compared to some filthy-rich members of the colonizing group.

Harrow also erred historically by asserting that ‘western decadence’ is the source of postmodernism whereas Jacques Derrida insisted that his deconstruction derived from his African cultural background, a view that is indirectly supported by Ron Eglash in African Fractals and by Adbul Karim Banguara in Fractal Complexity in the Works of Major Black Thinkers. Recognizing African originality even in a western art form such as cinema would demand less obsession with trash and a greater focus on creativity and worthiness.

To his credit, Harrow throws in genuine concerns about inequality, revolution and protest about consumer capitalism and the export of toxic waste from the West to underdeveloped countries. The former President of Harvard University and former Obama economics adviser, Larry Summers, is quoted (pp21-22) as saying that there is a rational basis for rich countries to export toxic waste to poor countries because the lives of the poor are not as valuable as the lives of the rich. This is an indirect suggestion that the trash represented in African cinema may be part of the 'evidence' for the 'mock trial' of imperialism as dramatized in one of the films that he discussed. With a chapter on the dumping of toxic waste in Africa, Harrow may be indirectly calling for more films on the theme of environmental justice in Africa.

However, Harrow neglected to point out to readers that the trope of trash is not an African trope but a Western one. The importation of trash is actually less pronounced in Africa than in the developed countries where interstate trade and transportation of trash was ruled by the US Supreme Court in 1973 as legitimate commerce after Philadelphia sued New Jersey for attempting to block the transportation of out-of-state trash across state lines.

Pennsylvania and Virginia are the top importers of trash, not just from other states in the US but also from Canada and Mexico in line with NAFTA, and the dumps for such refuse are usually located near poor communities where racial minorities predominate. In 1988, the Supreme Court ruled that police officers do not need a search warrant to seek incriminating evidence by going through the garbage left on the kerb for collection by garbage collectors. Also, Sweden had so little trash due to recycling that trash was imported from Norway to help power their trash-fueled power generators.

By contrast, African societies, like most precapitalist societies, managed to go on for centuries without generating mountains of trash until the unhygienic Europeans, as Olaudah Equiano observed, came to dump the excrements of their excessive consumption on the relatively deprived. Yet, not even Cecil Rhodes saw Africa simply as a junkyard of trash, he saw the mineral wealth and set out to rob Africans of their land and stole their labor to exploit the riches. Harrow sees trash everywhere in Africa and thereby missed the morality, the wealth and the natural beauty that are even more preponderant in African cinema despite the occasional scenes of trash that are common in Hollywood films too.

Instead of admitting that Africa is relatively unpolluted compared to the industrialized countries, Ken Harrow presents a fictional contrast between the suparmarche or supermarket in Paris and the trash ridden streets of Africa as represented in Sissoko’s La Vie sur Terre (1999) as if this is a contrast based on empirical reality that is verifiable in every part of Africa and every part of Paris – even the slums of Paris will have those gaudy supermarkets too while upper class reserved areas in Africa would be buried in rubbish. Harrow forgot that advice that his mother must have given him; do not believe everything you see in the movies. His dirty mind saw even things that were not trash, such as shoes on the streets, as trash.

I recommend Ken Harrow’s Trash to readers who are looking for spoilers given that his detailed plot summaries of the movies in the book are so well written that readers may no longer need to see the films after reading his book. The consumer warning to the reader is to beware of the trash talk lest you fail to see the people, landscape, gold and diamonds due to the obsession of Harrow with filth and rubbish - the 'below' of his sub-title.

* Biko Agozino is Professor of Sociology and Director of Africana Studies Program, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA

Igbo Genocide Day of Remembrance

Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe

2013-05-16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/87406

Fahamu