The latest report by Human Rights Watch about labour abuses in Chinese mining companies in Zambia is not only woefully inaccurate but also perpetuates Western racist stereotypes about China's 'neo-colonialist' expansion in Africa, according to Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong.
A November 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on labour abuses in four mining firms in Zambia parented by state-owned enterprise (SOE) China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Co. (CNMC) is predictably a media sensation.  Myriads of news outlets and blogs have reported its conclusions: that the Chinese firms are 'bad employers' compared to the five Western-based major foreign investors in Zambia’s copper mining industry; that they are the worst as to the safety of workers, their pay, hours and union rights. Despite HRW’s focus on one industry in one country, it sets out to provoke inferences that accord with the larger, highly-skewed Western discourse of 'China-in-Africa.'  Indeed, HRW asserts (p.1) that its report 'begin[s] to paint a picture of China’s broader role in Africa.'
HRW investigations are assumed to be empirically accurate, methodologically sophisticated and politically neutral. We challenge these assumptions in the HRW report on CNMC in Zambia, which draws empirically problematic conclusions and uses a dubious methodology
Readers of the HRW report may be overwhelmed by its basis in interviews with miners. We do not wholly dismiss concrete observations made by interviewees about rights deficiencies they experienced, such as having to work in unsafe conditions. CNMC firms employ some 6,000 workers and Zambia’s total mining work force is almost ten times as large.  Those interviewed by HRW included some 95 who had worked only at a CNMC firm and 48 who had also worked elsewhere. Those who worked only in a CNMC firm cannot, however, reliably infer from their own experiences that CNMC operations are less safe than elsewhere. Miners who formerly worked at other mines, may not necessarily make sound comparisons, as observations of safety practices experienced by a worker at KCM in 2008 and then at NFCA in 2011 do not tell us about safety practices at NFCA in 2008 or KCM in 2011.
More importantly, the HRW report does not tell readers whether those of its interviewees, who worked at a non-CNMC firm before moving to a CNMC one, were contract or permanent workers. This is significant, as we show below that contract workers generally have significantly worse experiences with safety. It is likely that many, if not all, of the 48 workers were permanent employees elsewhere before being laid off in 2008-2009. Thus, they had likely experienced the better safety conditions of permanent employees and could not represent non-CNMC workers as a whole. HRW relies on interviews as the method of investigation. Interviews could be very useful for investigating specific incidents of abuse, but could not be relied upon to draw a general conclusion about the extent of abuse with comparative implications. That research objective could only be achieved by producing and analysing random survey data from all mining companies. Thus, no general conclusions about the overall situation in CNMC firms or how conditions there compare with other mines can be drawn from such interviewees’ attestations.
Inferences of 'worst practices' drawn by interviewees about Chinese-owned firms are also highly suspect. A climate of intense anti-Chinese prejudice was whipped up from 2005-2011, especially in mining areas, by then-opposition leader and now Zambian president Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front, in order to advance their election campaigns.  Studies show that racialised discourse shapes attitudes and distorts evaluations on a wide range of issues. 
HRW’S SIMPLISTIC SAFETY COMPARISONS
Days after HRW issued its CNMC study, the president of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) Oswell Munyenyembe responded to it by saying that 'his union cannot entirely blame the Chinese companies because other mining houses are equally culprits.' He added: 'We cannot wholesomely condemn the Chinese-owned mining houses. Remember when we had the global crisis no worker was retrenched at any Chinese mine [unlike at other mines">. Yes, they have their own problems like mistreating workers and not following labour laws, but other mining houses are also culprits in this area. It is not only the Chinese mining companies.' 
The MUZ president thus disputed HRW’s central argument: that CNMC, among the foreign investors dominating Zambian mining, is almost uniquely culpable of abusing workers’ rights.
The way to know whether a mining company is deficient in safety compared to other firms is to determine (other things being equal) whether that firm accounts for a large disproportion of fatalities. Mining firms in Zambia cannot avoid reporting deaths. Injuries may go unreported, but serious ones correlate with fatalities, as most of both result from rock falls. 
Statistics provided by the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) on fatalities in all foreign-owned copper mines and for CNMC-owned operations indicate that CNMC is unexceptional.
Mining fatalities in Zambia are not especially high by world standards; Zambia is not among the 60 most dangerous countries for miners listed by the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions. CNMC-firm fatalities in Zambia - 11.5 percent of the country’s total from 2001 to late 2011 - are not a disproportionate number, which contradicts the claim that CNMC mines’ safety conditions are markedly worse than its industry peers.
HRW asserts that the supposedly worst conditions at CNMC firms 'stem largely from the attitude of Chinese owned and run companies in Zambia, which have tended to treat safety and health measures as trivial' and which 'appear to be exporting abuses along with investment.' The death toll in non-ferrous mining in China is much higher (about 83 miners per 100,000 miners in 2009)  than that in Zambia (about 30 per 100,000 for 2008-2011). As CNMC-owned firms do not have an especially high fatality rate by Zambian standards, the assertion that CNMC exports safety abuses does not mesh with its record in Zambia.
Explaining CNMC’s safety outcomes only in terms of attitudes is in any case simplistic. The relative number of fatalities is not determined solely by the level of safety consciousness of mining firms, but also by operational configurations of mines. Underground mines typically have more casualties than open cast (open pit) mines. The deeper underground mining goes, the greater the likelihood of rock falls and casualties.  CNMC firms have two mines in Zambia: CNMC’s Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA) has Chambishi, which at over a thousand meters is a deep underground. CNMC Luanshya (CLM), at least 580 meters deep, is also underground. Open cast mining is not only safer, but also cheaper, so wages as well as safety are affected by mine configurations.
Other, larger Zambian copper mining firms do not have only underground mines; some have open cast mines and some are mixed underground/open cast operations. Konkola Copper Mine (KCM) is owned by Vedanta, the UK Indian major. KCM Nchanga open pit mine (55 percent of production), plus KCM Nchanga underground mine (45 percent) had 32 fatalities from 2001-2011, while KCM Konkola, an underground mine, had 31 fatalities. Mopani Copper Mine (MCM) is owned by the Switzerland-based mining and metals trading giant Glencore. MCM Nkana has underground and open cast mines and had 55 fatalities from 2001-2011, while MCM Mufilira, an underground mine, had 27 fatalities.  Many fatalities are also linked to the use of less-skilled, low-paid contract workers.
When copper prices increase, expansion occurs and fatality rises as new workers are brought in to expand production. For 22 months, from October 2006-August 2008, NFCA had zero-fatalities, a rarity in the industry. When asked about its fluctuating record, CEO Wang Chunlai explained that, “Before, we only had one ore body to work on; now we have two [and "> now we go down to more than 1,000 meters. The ceiling there gets unstable and that can create injury . . . As the scale of work enlarges, we’ve recruited more new workers, so our training may be lagging and we have to invest more in training.'  As to CLM, the director of Zambia’s Mine Safety Department (MSD) told us that it had the industry’s best dust abatement system  and from June 2009-December 2010, CLM had only one fatality. 
Unsafe conditions of service remain an industry-wide problem, as detailed in a study by John Lungu of Copperbelt University and Alastair Fraser of Oxford University.  There have also been firm-specific studies of Chibuluma mine under South Africa’s Metorex firm,  KCM,  and MCM  that have shown substantial safety problems. In a 2011 interview with us, the MSD Chief Inspector of Mines spoke negatively of NFCA, but only of its first five years in operation (2003-2008), when he said it 'was the worst mine in terms of safety. It didn’t want to do sufficient support work. And it didn’t have proper ventilation.' Now, however, 'NFCA is OK' in terms of safety, so 'NFCA no longer stands out.' 
No one, including CNMC, asserts there are no safety problems at its Zambia facilities and, at these and other mines, such problems require urgent attention. Taking into account fatality figures and differences in the configuration of mines however, there is no basis to claim that CNMC is the worst in terms of safety. To do so serves mainly to reinforce hoary racist stereotypes which have endured for more than a century in the West and have been spread to Africa, that Chinese are cruel and have a disregard for human life. 
WAGES AND HOURS: THE EXAGGERATED GAP?
CNMC still has to catch up on pay, but there is a narrowing trend. In a 2011 interview, John Lungu compared miners’ basic salaries at the two CNMC Zambia mines with the country’s largest foreign mining firms.
MCM and KCM are the best payers among the mine owners. But the Chinese have responded to criticisms. The lowest wage in Chambishi went up from 400,000 Kwacha to K1.5 million and there’ve been later increments . . . Chinese companies have not caught up completely with the Western companies in terms of incomes in the mines, but they’re not lagging behind too much. There’s been great improvement. 
KCM and MCM each have workforces around three times the CNMC mines’ total workforce and produced, in 2010, 5-13 times the amount of copper concentrate (138,000 tons for KCM and 98,000 tons for MCM versus 22,000 tons for NFCA and 10,000 tons for CLM).  But apart from the global tendency of large, more productive enterprises to pay better wages than smaller, less productive ones,  there are Zambia-specific reasons why there is still a wage gap between CNMC and larger Western-based mining firms. One is the costs of rehabilitating Chambishi, which was closed for 13 years and flooded before CNMC acquired it, and refurbishing the antiquated Luanshya mine, which had been neglected and then abandoned by previous owners.  There are also differences in the copper content of mining concessions that affect wage levels. A section engineer at Chambishi Mine told us in 2008 that, 'With 1.8 percent copper content, the former [owner"> didn’t think it was worth their while to mine it. 1.8 percent in Zambia is considered a tail [leftovers"> mine. They don’t think it was worth their effort if it’s lower than 3 percent. Other mines have 4 or 5 percent.' 
Deep underground operations and lower copper content make CNMC production more labour intensive, with lower productivity. NFCA and CLM together produced 4.7 percent of the Zambian foreign-owned copper industry’s concentrate in 2010, but had 10.5 percent of its workforce. NFCA and CLM’s productivity is thus much lower than industry averages in both Zambia and China.
We asked CEO Wang Chunlai about NFCA’s reputation for low-wages. He responded that, 'Wage levels have to do with the scale and age of the enterprise. In terms of scale, we’re ranked number five and in terms of cost of labour, number five or six [as"> salary increases are a cumulative annual percentage . . . NFCA is labour intensive. This can be compared in terms of tons per workers.'
There are stark differences in productivity measured that way: Canadian-owned Kansanshi produced 232,000 tons of copper concentrate in 2010 with about 3,500 workers, while NFCA produced 22,000 tons with the same number.  Wang noted that CLM provides higher pay than NFCA because it is an older enterprise and was taken over; thus it has workers who have accumulated many years and have higher salaries, but starting pay at CLM is about the same as for NFCA. [28">
Other reasons also emerged in our interviews. The National Union Mineworkers and Allied Workers (NUMAW) chairman at Chambishi Mine told us in 2008 that, 'The government is responsible for the slow pay rise. It issues a benchmark every year and dictates the percentage of increase, for example 15 percent. It announced that the inflation rate in 2007 was 9.8 percent. The government is actually afraid that much of an increase in wages will destabilise the single-digit inflation. The management relies on the government benchmark to negotiate pay raises with workers'. [29">
HRW claims (p. 24) that 'Chinese copper mining companies often pay base salaries around one-fourth of their competitors’ base salary for the same work.' CNMC Company officials have said NFCA’s overall average basic pay is about half that at KCM;[30"> while at CLM is about 80% of KCM’s level, the industry’s highest. [31"> CNMC’s statements, which cover mines where 80 percent of CNMC Zambia employees work may be accurate, however, because workforces at KCM, MCM and other mines include many low-paid contract workers, while NFCA and CLM aver that almost all their workers are permanent employees. [32"> For example, half the 16,560 employees at MCM in November 2011 were contract workers. [33"> Of the 19,000 workers at KCM in mid-2011, 12,000 were permanent and 7,000 were contract workers. [34">
Zambia’s Deputy Commissioner of Labour has stated that contract workers may get as little as one-fourth the pay of permanent employees [35"> and indeed '[L]abor offices have recorded a number of reports especially in areas such as Mopani Copper Mines and Konkola Copper Mines where several sub-contracted companies have been paying below the government's minimum wage requirements,' [36"> which is even less than a fourth of permanent employee salaries. For example, in late 2011 MCM miners reportedly were 'typically paid' three British pounds per day. That’s a surprisingly low figure, but only if one forgets that half of MCM’s workforce is contract workers. [37"> If contract workers’ low salaries at non-CNMC mines are taken into account, there may still be a gap, but not a huge one, between CNMC wages and those elsewhere. MUZ informed us moreover that CNMC intends to reach the “industry standard” in salaries in 2012.[38">
The HRW report author has written that 'Several Chinese-run copper mining companies require miners to work brutally long hours – 72-hour work weeks for some, 365 days without an off day for others . . . ' [39"> Western media have expectedly played up this 'cruel Chinese' theme. It is sweepingly inaccurate: the HRW report itself (p. 4) states only that 'Miners in certain departments at Sino Metals [one of the smaller CNMC firms"> work 72-hour weeks without sufficient overtime, while those in other departments work 365 days a year . . .' The report (p. 78) is unclear on how many workers have long hours, which affect workers in only some Sino Metals departments, not 'several' in firms and certainly not most CNMC workers, 80 percent of whom work eight-hour shifts in the Luanshya and Chambishi mines.
The actual story of hours worked by Zambian miners does not at all correspond to the impression HRW creates of Chinese work-‘til-you-drop bosses in contrast to enlightened managers at Western-based firms. In 2007, KCM miners reported they worked more than eight hours, often up to 12 hours, without overtime pay. [40"> In 2008, a Zambian seeking work at Chambishi said that 'his countrymen prefer to be employed by the NFCA rather than other foreign companies. They say they would rather work the eight hours demanded of them by the NFCA than the 12 hours which is commonplace in other companies.' [41"> In 2009, KCM miners worked four 12-hour days, then two days off. [42"> A 2011 UK newspaper account noted MCM miners 'toil six-and-a-half days a week in the rock underneath Mufulira,' that is, more hours per week than do NFCA or CLM underground miners and, in effect, up to 365 days a year.[43"> Presumably, thousands of miners at MCM work that schedule, while the number of workers at CNMC Sino Metals who HRW said work every day is apt to be very much smaller.
THE UNION QUESTION
HRW has charged that the two smaller of the four CNMC firms it investigated, Sino-Metals and Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS), deny workers the right to join MUZ. Yet, at least one of the two unions (MUZ and NUMAW) is recognised at all four firms and 80 percent of CNMC workers can choose between them as their bargaining agent, although the two unions bargain together with management. NUMAW had 1,000-plus members and MUZ 400 at NFCA in August 2011; MUZ had 1,700 members and NUMAW 400 at CLM. [44"> The ruling PF is popular among miners and both unions have PF supporters and critics among their leaders.
The reason why MUZ is recognised by NFCA and CLM, but are not by the two CNMC processing firms needs more investigation, but the facts thus far do not support the claim that CNMC firms are hostile to MUZ because it supports PF. What has most devastated union activism in Zambian mining was the drastic decline in membership due to retrenchment during the financial crisis. MUZ’s membership dropped from 26,000 before the crisis to 12,000 in August 2011. [45"> When other firms retrenched or closed operations during the crisis, CNMC firms promised 'three nots' (san bu): not to reduce investment, not to cut down on production and not to lay off workers. Rather, CNMC bought Luanshya mine, which had been shattered by its Swiss owner at the peak of the crisis. It re-hired laid-off workers and hired hundreds more, which belies HRW’s claim that CNMC is a 'bad employer' compared to the five other major foreign investors in Zambian mining. The nickel mining firm Albidon Ltd., with the Chinese SOE Jinchuan owning 51 percent of its shares, indefinitely suspended operations in November, 2011, due to a sharp decline in nickel prices and technical problems, but continues to pay full salaries to its 2,000 employees.
Why does HRW focus on labour abuses at CNMC firms in Zambia? Labour abuse in Zambia’s copper industry, while deplorable, is not an outstanding issue in the context of the African continent, which like many other parts of the world, experiences massive human rights violations, including grave labour rights violations. CNMC’s practices, seen in the context of Zambia copper industry, are worse in some respects (pay), about the same in other respects (safety), and better in still other respects (job security). They are slowly improving. There should be improvements across the board for mine workers in Zambia, who still receive a subsistence wage and live in underserviced communities, a possibility made less, rather than more likely when Chinese firms are singled out and erroneously accused of being the worst.
Conditions for millions of miners on the continent are so egregious that the African Union Commission on Human Rights and People’s Rights stated in 2010 that, 'Mine workers in most parts of Africa work in deplorable conditions often prone to accidents.' [46"> At the same time, there has been no shortage of critical studies of labour practices in the CNMC mines in Zambia,[47"> which employ one-tenth of one percent of the country’s workforce. HRW is thus barking up the wrong tree. Its exclusive focus on CNMC firms in Zambia as the worst labour abuser serves no useful purpose. Rather, it plays into the racial hierarchy in Zambia and beyond by calling its report 'a magnifying lens' for Chinese labour practices in Africa (p. 13). It also reinforces erroneous notions promoted by Western media and politicians, such as Hilary Clinton and David Cameron,[48"> that China is a 'neo-colonialist' power in Africa, while Western states and NGOs are the guarantors of human rights. Is it a coincidence that HRW studies of abuses in the mining industry in Africa have been confined to one about a Chinese SOE and two others that implicate the Zimbabwean government, a target of Western sanctions? The HRW report in fact tells us more about the political agenda of HRW than about Chinese activities in Africa.
BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS.
** Barry Sautman is associate professor, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Yan Hairong is an anthropologist in the Department of Applied Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
 HRW, 'You’ll be Fired if you Refuse’: Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines, Nov. 3, 2011.
 On bias in UK media coverage of Chinese activities in Africa, see Emma Mawdsley,”'Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers,” Political Geography 27:5 (2008): 509-529. We have made similar findings in a forthcoming paper that surveys two hundred articles published from 2005-2011in five leading US newspapers.
 Ministerial Statement of Maxwell M.B. Mwale . . . on the Development of the Mining Sector in Zambia, March, 2011 .
 We detail the anti-Chinese campaigns of Sata and the racial hierarchy constructed by his deputy, the now Zambian Vice-President Guy Scott (Indians are worse than white and Chinese are worse than Indians) in our monograph in progress, Red Dragon, Red Metal: Chinese Investment in Zambia’s Copper Industry.
 For example, in the US as to how people evaluate welfare measures Paul Kellestedt, The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 “Chinese Firms not that Bad, says Miners’ Union,” DM, Nov. 4, 2011. See also “Minister, Union Defend Chinese Labor Conditions,” Zambia Watchdog, Nov. 5, 2011 (“Government [Deputy Minister of Labor Rayford Mbulu"> says not only Chinese Mining companies have been flouting labor laws but all employers should try and ensure their workers are properly looked after”), zambianwatchdog.
 H.B. Miller, et al., “Identifying Antecedent Conditions Responsible for the High Rate of Mining Injuries in Zambia,” International Journal of Occupational Environmental Health 12:4 (2006): 329-339.
 MUZ, “Statistics of Mine Accidents by the Mine/Division for the Past 11 Years”; Mine Safety Dep’t, “Mining Industry Safety Record from the Year 2000 to August 19, 2011; “November 9 Power Failure Left One Miner Dead,” Zambia Watchdog, Nov. 20, 2011. There were also 46 dead in the 2005 BGRIMM dynamite plant explosion. NFCA owned a 40% interest in the plant, but did not manage it. MUZ does not count the BGRIMM fatalities as attributable to NFCA. We thus omit them from the totals for both all mining companies and NFCA..
 For fatalities in China’s non-ferrous mining, the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) website, www.chinasafety.gov.cn; and a telephone interview with SAWS, Beijing, Nov. 16, 2011. Fatalities figures for China involve only those reported, but in China many mining fatalities are unreported, so that the gap between Chinese and Zambian fatality rates are significantly larger than reported figures reveal.
 See S.K. Puri, “Safety Management in Indian Coal Mines,” in Pradeep Chaturvedi (ed.), Challenges of Occupational Safety and Health (New Delhi, Concept Publishing Co., 2006): 161-168 (166).
 MUZ, Statistics and Mine Safety Dep’t, Mining Industry.
 Interview, Wang Chunlai, Chambishi, Aug. 15, 2011.
 Interview, Mooya Lumamba, Kitwe, Aug. 19, 2011.
 Interview. Gao Xiang, Vice CEO, CLM, Luanshya, Aug. 17, 2011.
 “For Whom the Windfalls: Winners and Losers in the Privatization of Zambia’s Copper Mines”, Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, 2008.
 Austin Muneku, “South African Multi-Nationals in Zambia: the Case of Chibuluma Mines, Plc,” in Devan Pillay (ed.), South African MNCs’ Labor and Social Performance (African Labor Research Network, 2005): 258-285.
 Action for Southern Africa, et al., “Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, Oct. 2007.
 Counter Balance, “The Mopani Copper Mine, Zambia: How European Development Money has Fed a Mining Scandal”, Dec. 2010: 16-17.
 Interview, Mr. Kalezi, Kitwe, Aug. 16, 2011.
 We extensively discuss past and present notions of Chinese cruelty and disregard for human life, including in Africa, in a paper in progress “Bashing the Chinese: Contextualizing Zambia’s Collum Coal Mine Shooting.”
 Interview with John Lungu, Kitwe, Aug. 15, 2011. In 2011 one US dollar has equaled 4,800-5,000 kwacha.
 “2010 Mineral Production (1st Half of Year)” and “2010 Mineral Production (2d Half of Year), photocopies provided by the authors by office of the Chief Mining Engineer, Lusaka, Aug. 19, 2011.
 See David Creedy, et al., “Transforming China’s Coal Mines: a Case History of the Shuangliu Mine,” Natural Resources Forum 30:1 (2006): 15-26.
 Interview, Mundia Sikufele, President of NUMAW, Kitwe, Aug. 27, 2008; Interview, Luo Tao, CEO of CNMC, Beijing, Oct. 18, 2011.
 Interview, Section Engineer Xu, Chambishi, Aug. 23, 2008.
 Shang Fushan, et al., “Sustainable Development of the Chinese Copper Market,” (Winnipeg: IISD, 2010): 16.; China Data Online (2011), “Copper Ores Mining & Dressing/Basic Condition”; “China Yearly Industrial Data,” All China Data Center, sourced from National Statistics Bureau, 2010 Mineral Production table; Wang Chunlai interview; Interview, Gao Xiang, Exec.Vice Gen. Manager, CNMC International Trade, Beijing, Oct. 21, 2011.
 2010 Mineral Production.
[28"> Wang Chunlai interview. Wang’s comparison of NFCA and KCM in terms of per worker copper production derives from “Zhongse Zanbiya bagong shijian”(CNMC Zambia’s strike incidents), Xin shiji, Nov. 5, 2011.
[29"> Interview, Mubanga Gillan, Chambishi, Aug. 27, 2008.
[30"> NFCA CEO Wang Chunlai and unions interviewed in “Zhongse Zanbiya bagong shijian” (The Incident of Strike at NFCA in Zambia), Xin shi ji Nov. 7, 2011, magazine
[31"> Interview, Gao Xiang, Beijing, Oct. 20, 2011.
[32"> Wang Chunlai and Gao Xiang August 2011 interviews.
[33"> Rob Davies, “The Other Face of Glencore Mining that Investors Never See,” Daily Mail (UK), Nov. 21, 2011.
[34"> Interview, Charles Mukuka, Acting MUZ President, Kitwe, Aug. 15, 2011.
[35"> Siti interview. Zambia’s minimum wage in 2011 was K419,000 (about US$85).
[36"> “Labor Ministry ‘War-Front’ Opens over Minimum Wages,” Times of Zambia, Oct. 1, 2011.
[37"> Davies, The Other Face.
[38"> Mukuka interview.
[39"> Matt Wells, “China in Zambia: Trouble Down in the Mines” Huff Post World, Nov. 21, 2011.
[40"> Undermining Development?: 14-15.
[41"> “China in Zambia: from Comrades to Capitalists?” World News Review, October, 2008.
[42"> Jean-Christophe Servant, “Mined Out in Zambia,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 9, 2009.
[43"> Davies, The Other Face.
[44"> Mukuka interview.
[45"> Mukuka interview.
[46"> “African Union to Tackle Human Rights Abuses of Mineworkers”, Coal Mountain, Oct. 25, 2010.
[47"> See, e.g., Ching Kwan Lee, “Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves,” China Quarterly) 199 (2009): 647-699; Dan Haglund, “In it for the Long Term? Governance and Learning among Chinese Investors in Zambia’s Copper Sector,” CQ 199 (2009): 627-646.
[48"> “Clinton Warns Africa of China’s Economic Embrace,” Reuters, June 11, 2011; “David Cameron Warns Africans about ‘Chinese Invasion’ as they Pour Billions into Continent,” Daily Mail (UK), July 20, 2011.