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English edition, translated by Rob Bland; London: Penguin Books, 2004

In We Did Nothing, veteran journalist Linda Polman draws on her experience in war zones of Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia to expose the shortcomings of international intervention in these contexts. Her thesis is that United Nations (UN) member states, particularly those on the Security Council (SC), privilege national interests over UN goals. This seriously weakens the UN, which is given ambitious mandates at the same time as it is chronically under-funded and under-resourced. While constrained by member states' interests, the UN is often criticised for its failures, as if it were an independently functioning organisation.

According to Polman, this criticism would be better aimed at UN member states, particularly powerful Western countries that push for peacekeeping operations, but then are noticeably under-represented in terms of personnel on the ground. The book also exposes examples of 'Blue Rinsing', in which powerful SC members intervene unilaterally in conflicts, and then call for UN involvement once more difficult and lengthy stages of reconstruction and democracy-building begin. Polman makes a powerful case against such practice in analysing US involvement in Somalia and Haiti, and French intervention in Rwanda.

In an era of UN-bashing, We Did Nothing is a refreshing re-take on the UN's "failings", showing that they are not organisational, but rather a product of structural power plays in international relations. However, by focusing on self interests as the root of the problems of the international community's reaction to conflict, Polman tends to paint all individuals she encounters in conflict zones with the same brush of egocentricity. International staff members are reduced to national stereotypes, while local populations are portrayed as either passive, helpless victims or unscrupulous profiteers and militia.

This dehumanisation overlooks the extraordinary capacity for resilience, coping and collective action that many people display in conflict. Absent from Polman's often cynical accounts of chaos and confusion are examples of how ordinary people - both local and international - go to extraordinary lengths to help each other eke out a daily, 'normal' existence in the face of adversity. While these examples are less sensational than the US military bullies, the quavering UN officials and the local racketeers portrayed in Polman's book, it is only just, not to mention good journalism, to give equal weight to both sides of the story.

* Reviewed by Christina Clark, Fahamu