The United Nations and African Union envoys heading international efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict have travelled to the town of Juba for talks with the former southern Sudanese rebels as they seek to bring new momentum to the stalled political process. The UN’s Jan Eliasson and the AU’s Salim Ahmed Salim met with Salva Kiir, Sudan’s First Vice President, and members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) Task Force on Darfur, UN spokesperson Marie Okabe told reporters.

Zimbabwe's opposition leader Tsvangirai has squashed reports that he is prepared to clash with Robert Mugabe in the presidential run off within a period of 21 days as stipulated by law. Tsvangirai who was invited to attend a SADC's emergency meeting in Zambia said his party had won the elections and would what so ever not participate in the run off.

Social grants are out of the reach of many of the poorest South Africans because they cannot afford to get the necessary identity documents from the Department of Home Affairs. Some of the biggest barriers are money for transport to the Home Affairs offices or to pay for documents they needed to get ID books, such as baptismal and doctors’ certificates, photographs and photocopies.

While welcoming increased international attention to the climate crisis, civil society groups from the global South and global North today are calling on the World Bank to withdraw its proposal to establish climate investment funds. The World Bank on April 3 detailed plans to establish at least two funds outside of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a Strategic Climate Fund featuring a “Pilot Program for Climate Resilience” and a Clean Technology Fund.

The latest round of negotiations between trade unions and the Moroccan government failed to yield a comprehensive solution. The talks will continue in the coming weeks, in hopes the two sides will agree on increases in wages and benefits for Moroccan workers.

When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Directors meet for their Spring and Annual Meetings tens of thousands of demonstrators regularly protest in front of the conference centers. The activists want to raise global awareness of the neoliberal trade and financial policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions. These policies were established in 1989 in the so-called “Washington Consensus” between the World Bank, IMF and the US Government.

On April 7th and 8th local reaction to the government’s violent crackdown on a peaceful strike on April 6th has grown and intensified as residents express their anger over the brutal actions taken by Egyptian authorities that culminated in the death of fifteen year old Ahmed Mohamed Hammad. Yesterday thousands of people have taken to the streets destroying public property including pictures of Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak which are displayed in Mahalla’s main square.

Botswana’s laws are still not specific on whether to condemn homosexuality or not but gays and lesbians in that country are forced to remain in the closet for fear of being stigmatised, disowned and marginalised. Speaking openly about sexuality remains a major challenge for many gays and lesbians in Botswana such as 19 year old Selina Sello*. Sello is a lesbian student at the university of Botswana who encountered problems regarding coming out to her family and friends.

Reporters Without Borders and Journalists in Danger (JED), its partner organisation in Democratic Republic of Congo, have written to Congolese interior minister Denis Kalume Numbi asking him to intervene in the case of newspaper editor Nsimba Embete Ponte and his assistant, Davin Ntondo Nzovuangu, who are being held incommunicado.

To ensure that anti-corruption action remains a top priority in the World Bank’s mission to reduce poverty, Transparency International (TI) will participate in the 2008 World Bank and International Monetary Fund Spring Meetings. TI will be represented by Christiaan Poortman, Director of Global Programmes, Nancy Boswell, President & CEO, TI-USA and Aneta Wierzynska, Senior Policy Director – Development, TI USA.

Security in the Mt Elgon region of western Kenya, where the army was deployed in March to stop a local insurgency, has improved, but civilians still fear being targeted in the ongoing operation. "There is an improved sense of security and people are able to access the markets more," Sokwony Laikong, a local resident, told IRIN on 10 April. Most farmers were now able to reach their gardens, although they were suffering from high prices of inputs, such as fertilizer.

Of the 50 million seedlings planted every year in the 11 northern Nigeria states worst effected by desertification, 37.5 million wither and die within two months, environmental officials say. “The 12.5 million seedlings that make it to maturity are not enough to create a deforestation-reforestation equilibrium, especially given the fact that a large number of the trees that grow are later chopped down,” Kabiru Yammama of the National Forest Conservation Council of Nigeria [NFCCN] told IRIN.

Halima [not her real name], a mother of five girls, shudders whenever she remembers how she suffered after undergoing female genital mutilation (FGM/Cutting), a practice still widespread in Somalia. "I will not put my daughters through it," Halima told IRIN in Bosasso, the commercial capital of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, where an estimated 98 percent of girls still undergo the cut.

More mothers and children in developing countries are receiving treatment than ever before, according to a new report by the United Nations. But stigma, limited information and fragile health systems still pose hurdles to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Coverage of mother-to-child transmission prevention (PMTCT) services continues to expand, especially in southern and eastern Africa, according to a report by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) entitled, “Children and AIDS: Second stock taking report.”

This is the quarterly update on campaigns towards popularization, ratification, domestication and implementation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. It reports on work done during January to March 2008 and includes information on the status of ratification and upcoming events that could offer opportunities for further action towards the objectives of the campaign.

SOAWR also takes this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our two new members; Fórum Mulher (Mozambique) and Girl Child Network (Zimbabwe).

This letter is written in the wake of your justification to Dr. Haider Eid of your intention to attend a Writers' Festival in Israel.

I write to you as an American-Israeli Jew who ignorantly immigrated from the US to Israel 50 years ago. I came then to raise my children as Jews in a Jewish country. Only many years later, after much experience living here in Israel and much research, did I finally realize how misguided I'd been about Israel—what it was meant to be and what it is.

Let me begin with a question: how would you, an individual so widely recognized and admired both as author and as courageous rebel against apartheid, how would you have felt about a celebrity who during the height of your efforts against apartheid would have agreed to come to South Africa to attend a public function of the kind that you propose now to attend?

Would you not have felt that it was a debasement of all the efforts that yourself and others—particularly of those who were calling for sanctions, boycott, and divestment—were engaged in? Would you not have realized that however respectable and honest the intentions of the celebrity in coming to South Africa, that the government would use his/her attendance at the function for its own purposes?

Do you not realize that even though the writers' festival that you intend to come to is not sponsored by the Israeli government, the event nevertheless will be associated with the 60 years of so-called Independence celebrations? Do you not realize that your criticisms of Israel's policies will be so much stronger if instead of expressing them while attending a forum in Israel you state them as explanation of why you refuse to attend?

I deeply hope that it is still possible to convince you to not come, at least not as a guest to a public function. For you to attend a formal affair organized by Israelis in Israel--be it literary, academic, or other--is to undercut the endeavors of those of us who call for change, and believe that boycott, sanctions, and divestment from Israel can help bring about that change.

Israel is a disaster for Israeli Jews as well as for the indigenous Palestinians. Not that there is symmetry—for, as I'm sure you realize, there can never be symmetry between occupier and occupied, oppressor and oppressed.

Nevertheless, Israel, instead of being a safe haven for Jews, is the contrary. Where else since WWII have Jews gone through 10 wars and battles in less than 60 years? Where else since WWII have over 23,000 Jewish soldiers been killed in violence? Where else in the world do so many Jewish youngsters suffer from post-traumatic distress symptoms following their army service (and during it) because of what they experienced and what they did to Palestinians? Where else in the world do over 80,000 Holocaust survivors live in dire poverty, ignored by their government, which has money for expansion but not for them or for health, education, or social benefits?

Peace could have come long ago had Israel's leaders wished it. There have been many opportunities for peace (e.g., the Saudi Arabian proposal). But because Israel's leaders deem expansion more important than life, they not only do not protect Israelis but demand instead of Jewish inhabitants to be forever prepared to live by the sword. As Professor Robert Aumann, an American-Israeli Nobel Prize Laureate, has argued, the country is more important than lives; Israel's continued existence, he says, rests on readiness to sacrifice its young: "We are too sensitive to our losses, and also to the losses of the other side . . . In the Yom Kippur War, 3,000 soldiers were killed. It sounds terrible, but that's small change."*

'Small change,' indeed! Yet the acts of Israel's leaders from Ben Gurion till today clearly imply that to them lives are 'small change.' Thus, for example, Israel's present government instead of furnishing the long-suffering residents of Sderot either peace or shelters to protect them from the missiles fired from Gaza, tells the people of Sderot to learn to endure. Israel's leaders hold the residents of Sderot hostage so as to use their sufferings from missile attacks as propaganda.

Some of the above data is elucidated in a petition that Israelis recently sent to the United Methodist Church in support of its proposals to divest from companies that contribute to the occupation: More data is available in two compilations that I prepared as handouts for my speaking tour in the United States in March and April this year. I would gladly send them to you (and to anyone else interested) by email or other means, if you wish.

Rather than celebrating 60 years of Israel's existence, there is every reason to reconsider the establishment of an ethnographic state—a Jewish state—whose criterion is not democracy but demography, whose leaders care not an iota for peace but for expansion. For centuries Jews, Muslims, and Christians lived in Palestine in amity prior to Zionism. They could again live together in peace. But this will not happen until there will be justice, freedom, and security for Palestinians (including the right of refugees to return).

Your agreement to come here to participate in any official or semi-official function undermines our endeavors to bring justice, freedom, and security to all who love this land—be they Jews, Muslims, Christians, or seculars.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/370/48047zim.jpg Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights issued this statement concerning escalating cases of organised violence and torture, and the intimidation of medical personnel.

Since the last report on the 25th of April, our members have reported a dramatic escalation in incidents of organised violence and torture with the number of victims documented in the post election period now standing at over 900. This figure grossly underestimates the number of victims presenting countrywide as the violence is now on such a scale that it is impossible to properly document all cases. There have been 22 confirmed deaths but at least double that number have been reported but are yet to be confirmed. It is alleged that some of those killed have been buried on the orders of state agents before documentation can take place.

There has been a dramatic increase in violence since the beginning of May. In the last 24 hours alone, 30 victims of violence have been treated for limb fractures in Harare hospitals and clinics and supplies of Plaster of Paris bandages are reported to be exhausted in most health centres.

One hospital in Harare has treated an average of 23 victims a day over the last week. On the 8th of May, there were a total 53 more seriously injured patients (13 females and 40 males) admitted to wards in 3 Harare hospitals. These included one 30 year old man on life support in the intensive care unit with severe, irreversible head injuries and a 30 year old man with severe soft tissue injuries to the buttocks and secondary renal failure, also on life support. Both of these patients died later that day. Also admitted was a 3yr old boy with trauma to his R eye from being struck with a rock and a 78 year old man with a fractured lower leg from blunt trauma. One young breast-feeding mother had bilateral fractures of her hands and was unable to hold her baby to feed her. Among the other patients, 20 had defensive, forearm or hand fractures, 5 had leg fractures and 1 fractured ribs. Fourteen patients had severe injuries to the buttocks from blunt trauma which required surgery for the removal of necrotic (dead) tissue. The perpetrators in all cases were alleged by the victims to be war veterans and Zanu PF supporters. Similar patterns of injuries are being reported from other hospitals.

As emphasised in the previous ZADHR reports, the cases documented by our members represent only a fraction of the total number countrywide. ZADHR is concerned that many victims of current violence are not receiving treatment. Numerous incidents of violence are being reported from remote rural areas where there is no access to transport and there are also widespread reports of the injured being denied treatment at health centres where staff have been intimidated and/or are acting under specific instructions from state agents not to treat victims of violence. It was reported from one district (Headlands) that medical care was being provided only if the victim had a letter from the police authorising this. Accounts have also been received of ambulances, sent to collect seriously injured victims, being turned away by war veterans. Under these circumstances, it is likely that many of those with less severe injuries are not seeking medical attention. This seems to be confirmed by increasing reports of victims presenting with complications such as wound infections or infected haematomas which are directly attributable to delayed treatment.

Doctors and nursing staff at rural hospitals are working under conditions of severe stress and many health workers have reported intimidation with some having been specifically instructed by state agents not to treat opposition supporters. These health workers, who, according to some reports are treating up to 60 victims of torture and violence a day, are emotionally traumatised and depressed. One nursing sister treating victims in a rural clinic was observed to be shaking so violently with fear that she was unable to write.

Government spokespersons have repeatedly claimed that they have not received reports of violence or of deaths from the police. However, there is evidence that the police themselves are being intimidated. ZADHR has eyewitness statements that on the 24th of April, at Mayo Police Station in Headlands District, a high-ranking police officer from Harare physically assaulted the Member in Charge, accusing him of being sympathetic to the opposition. The police post had been taking statements from victims and referring them for medical treatment. The Member in Charge was summarily transferred out of the district.

The current pattern of organized torture and violence being perpetrated by state agents in the rural areas of Zimbabwe is similar to that documented prior to the 2002 elections. However, the current violence is dramatically more intensive and unrestrained. The level of brutality and callousness exhibited by the perpetrators is unprecedented and the vicious and cowardly attacks by so called war veterans on women, children and the elderly shames the memory of all true heroes of the liberation struggle.

It has been clearly documented that much of the violence has been specifically directed against members of the opposition party, particularly those who acted as election agents or monitors in the recent elections. Villagers and school teachers from districts where the opposition predominated in the elections have also been targeted even though they have no political affiliations. Without exception, victims treated by our members have identified the perpetrators either as war veterans, armed security force members or Zanu PF youth militia or varying combinations of the three. The few acts of violence attributable to opposition members appear to have been retaliatory or defensive. It is clear from the widespread and coordinated nature of the violence and the consistent pattern of injuries inflicted, that state agents including elements of the security forces are organizing and directing this campaign of terror.

It is now obvious that the intent of the campaign is to secure victory for President Robert Mugabe in a run off election. As in the 2002 election, it may be anticipated that the violence will be halted just prior to the arrival of international election monitors, to create the illusion of a peaceful and fair election, although state agents will maintain an intimadatory presence throughout the rural areas.

ZADHR again appeals for the immediate cessation of acts of violence and for the restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. To this end it calls for:

1) the immediate, large- scale deployment of teams of SADC and other credible international observers to all districts where violence is being reported.

2) attested members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police to assume sole responsibility for the enforcement of law and order, and for the protection of the law be extended to all Zimbabweans irrespective of political affiliation.

3) the immediate withdrawal of all military personnel, both regular and irregular to barracks and the arrest of those war veterans and those posing as war veterans who are instigating violence.

4) the withdrawal of uniforms and arms from all irregular police and army militia not formally attested into the service and not entitled under law to bear arms.

5) the postponement of all run off election activities until the above conditions have been achieved.

Finally, ZADHR again appeals to the international community of health workers, including the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and the Zimbabwe Medical Association to bring whatever effective pressure is within their capability to bear on the Government of Zimbabwe to stop these grotesque, cruel and shameful acts of violence, and to be prepared to actively defend their colleagues facing intimidation and physical threat.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

I must express deep appreciation to Jeremy Cronin for his piece on the Zimbabwe election struggle (Why South Africa will never be like Zimbabwe: ). His use of the rural site of struggles (for Zanu PF) in contrast to the urban-township sites (for ANC combatants), to struggle from, is most helpful in understanding the possible power of the mass-base to monitor and discipline their post-freedom leaders.

That analysis does, however, have problems when compared with the experience of TANU/Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania (with its predominantly rural base); as compared to Kenya, where KANU under Kenyatta's determination to create a "Kenya aristocracy" (according to an interview he gave to Sunday Times Magazine in London 1967), met a different fate. In the former, Nyerere used various devices, including his stepping down from Prime Ministership for one year to tour among the rural majority so as to devise strategies for holding elected politicians accountable and committed to the implementation of "one-party democratic elections" as well as to "Ujamaa". In Kenya, Kenyatta ruthlessly demobilized the party and its branches; and eliminated all effective challengers among the political class, including Tom Mboya. Pio Gama Pinto and J.M. Kariuki.

In this regard, Cronin's quip about Fidel Castro not blaming the failure of Americans to subsidize Cuba's tobacco or sugar-based economy, is most apt in highlighting the role of bold and ideologically focused leadership. He, however, fails to bring in that invisible but creatively lethal force called the rump of the White Settler political class that had known power and political management, including electoral competition ( albeit within a limited racial electorate), since the 1920s. Their combination of control of economic power, deep political experience and bitter but resurgent ambition for power, must not be left out of the picture.

Mugabe had made the mistake of failing to constantly call attention to this critical mass of race-located economic and political energy whose critical location made them a vital entry-point for any external British, American and European Union "sabotage" initiatives against Mugabe. As an example, the political skills of this class was demonstrated during the summit of Commonwealth leaders when they met in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. The efforts of their agents to capture the debate on Zimbabwe at sessions held by civil society groups, was formidable; if crude in parts when white individuals found it hard hiding their commandist relationship with the black activists in their team.

A critical focus on this group, and its much larger and more complex sector in South Africa, must not be hidden by a form of analysis that appears like a form of 'tribalism by silence' by analysts who share or do not share their aspirations for a return to the front row in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe and post-Mbeki South Africa. Such silence inhibits a creative and continuous engagement of this group for the challenge to undertake internal regeneration towards contributing to building de-racialized political and economic cultures in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Seen in this light, their possible success in exploiting Mugabe's disadvanatges since 1980, should not be glorified without drawing attention to poisonous racism that drives it; and their failure to join hands in creating rehumanized freedom and equality-rooted new societies.

President Obasanjo went on television in Nigeria to take some of the blame for Mugabe's difficulties. He told Nigerians that in 1980 and 1990 African leaders pressurized Mugabe and Zanu PF to stay their hands off land-reform. In 1990, African leaders begged Mugabe to make it easy for the conservative white settlers in South Africa to go along with getting Nelson Mandela out of prison; and for the elections, that gave power to the ANC, to be held. This information should be put on the table as we judge Mugabe. That, as Cronin rightly insists, must not exonorate the policy failures and crimes against the people of Zimbabwe by Mugabe and the Zanu PF's class of 'primitive accumulationists'. But my stomach did get some bitter knots when I watched Jacob Zuma on a BBC interview dismissing the political delays of the election agency in Zimbabwe while failing to acknowledge shackles that Mugabe was pressured to wear by other African leaders in the interest of ANC.

I deeply appreciate Cronin's drawing attendion to the gap in the political education that the ANC went through in comparison to the highly compressed military-combat dominated schooling of Zanu-PF. A deeper exploration of such factors would give value to his analysis; and be a useful guide for comparative studies of experiences with succession traumas in other African countries.

Finally, it is not honourable to treat Mugabe as if he had tripple machine-gunned MDC challenegers. He is also decades away from Idi Amin's treatment of Asians in Uganda and Amin's use of massacres of opponents as a form of remuneration for his killer squads: from the first night of his grabbing power in 1971 to his last moments of panic and flight in 1979. Put the credit on the Catholic priests who gave Mugabe education, or Ian Smith's barbaric refusal to let Mugabe see his sick child when he was in detention; but do give Mugabe credit where he deserves it. That will help us build a healthy tradition of critical review of leadership and governance in Africa while plucking off warts from out plumes.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/370/48056women.jpgAs a result the terror campaign by the military and the youth militia, the most affected are women and children as 80% of Zimbabwean women live in the rural areas. This statement urges women in Africa and the world to take action against the Mugabe government.

On March 29,2009 Zimbabwe went to the polls to elect its next government until 2013.Results for the Presidential elections were announced a month later and people in Zimbabwe maintained peace. From 2 April 2008 the government organised a retribution campaign to target those who allegedly voted for the opposition and since then there has been terror in mostly rural Zimbabwe with youth militia under the command of the army and police have gone on to unleash terror in a campaign to teach the rural people how to correctly vote in the forthcoming presidential run off supposed to take place on 23 May according to the law but whose date remains unannounced

As a result the terror campaign by the military and the youth militia, the most affected are women and children as 80% of Zimbabwean women live in the rural areas. So far, over 800 homes have been burnt down, over 10 000 people have fled their homes, over 40 people have been shot dead in cold blood, over 7000 teachers have fled their schools as a number have been beaten in the eyes of parents and pupils, Doctors for human Rights report that over 2000 serious cases of physical torture and beatings have passed through their hands and a lot of those they treated have suffered serious fractures to an extent that most are permanently handicapped. The oldest victim of the post election violence is an old woman with 12 grandchildren all of them orphaned and whose son is alleged to have campaigned for the opposition. The youngest female victim is a 15 year old girl who was stripped naked together with her pregnant mother forced to lie down and beaten on the breasts and buttocks. Many women including the old have been forced to strip naked and beaten on the breasts and buttocks. 7000 teachers, a third of them women have fled their homes and several schools mostly in rural areas are closed. Several girls and women are feared raped. The youngest child seriously assaulted is only 3 years. Despite calls from all corners of the world for the violence to stop, it has become worse and we fear more and more people are getting killed and buried

Our situation is such that an estimated 5 million Zimbabweans mostly professionals and the young have left the country. An estimated 3 million are in South Africa with half being illegal immigrants facing inhuman deportations daily. Women cross border traders cross over the crocodile infested Limpopo River and many have been allegedly raped. HIV and AIDS prevalence is 60% among women and girls and their life expectancy is 34 years. Domestic violence is rife with a woman killed or left dead weekly. Unemployment is 80% and inflation is 165 000 % and the highest in the world. 95% of women of the 200 000 women made homeless and jobless by the government 2005 Operation Restore Order which demolished their homes and markets that earned them an income has left them in the open cold and in commercial sex work since then and now the same women are alleged to have voted opposition and have gone through torture.

At least 6800 girls get raped annually and with the current displacements the number is expected to treble. Most female teachers have been displaced and many have fled the country and a lot more have sought refuge in the cities. Access to the rural areas has always been a big challenge for humanitarian organisations but now that women in rural areas are held hostage by the militia and the army and the rural areas have been declared no go areas we have seen it almost impossible to assist. Women Directors of NGOs are on government hit list that seeks to arrest, detain and destroy the organisation.

Zimbabwean women in rural areas constitute women abandoned by husbands and dumped in the rural areas because of HIV status, they have gone through the war of liberation in the 1960s and 1970s and war songs by the youth militias at their doorsteps have left them semi slaved. The worst is that they have been beaten because their husbands, brothers, uncles, boyfriends ,grandsons and other male relatives allegedly campaigned for the opposition. Old grandmothers struggling to feed orphans and sickly, women who are bed ridden, orphaned HIV positive children, the poorest and weakest have been tortured, terrified, displaced from homes and the organisations that normally help them are denied access and with most of the leaders on the government hit list.

OUR URGENT APPEAL FOR ACTION TO AFRICAN WOMEN AND THE WOMEN WORLD ALL OVER THE WORLD

- First we come to you because we have exhausted all channels and have failed to get help and urgent attention .Please help us find how best we can deal with the situation and appeal to anyone you know who can help victims get immediate help like medication, safe shelter, counselling and support leaders of women’s groups with security as they are also under threat and have been victimised and most of them are on the government hit list for those to be tortured and eliminated

- Reach out to SADC and AU Countries to put in place measures to protect women and girls fleeing Zimbabwe to take refuge in neighbouring countries

- Help us to see how we can use the AU protocol for women’s rights for protection of women and girls. Zimbabwe ratified the AU protocol

- Help us get SADC and UN put in place a security and protection plan for women and girls and help demilitarise the youth militia and stop torture of ordinary citizens

- Get our case on crimes against humanity taken to the UN security council. We have all the documented evidence since the terror started in 2000 to have the perpetrators brought to book

- Mobilise female ministers and female vice Presidents to convene an urgent meeting in the region and make appeals to the Liberian President Her Excellency Ellen Johnson to help us broker peace talks in Zimbabwe with leaders of women’s groups in the continent

- Help us set up African women in solidarity with Zimbabwe women focal point persons in African countries who go to their Presidents to lobby them to come to the urgent rescue of Zimbabwean women

- Pass on this message to any networks you know and those who can assist should email [email][email protected] or [email][email protected] and we will refer you to all the women in Zimbabwe working in various areas.

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/372/48212zimbabwe-police.jpgArg... that Mugabe has been "talking left" while "walking right" Grace Kwinjeh analyses Zimbabwe through regional, African and global capitalism.

The post election crisis in Zimbabwe and the SADC region is a manifestation of much deeper, complex issues to do with global capitalism and its vampire-like tendencies.

At the root of the problems is the failure of our nationalist governments to deal with these dimensions of the global crisis: food shortages and price hikes; oil speculation; financial meltdowns and higher interest rates. These manifest themselves as rising inequality and unemployment and competition between very poor people in places like Alexandra, Tembisa, Diepkloof and the Johannesburg inner city for scarce resources.

It is only by addressing these issues that we can meet the aspirations of the masses for freedom and decent lives.

Forces both local and global may seem to be worlds apart in the definition and context of the Zimbabwean struggle but we African citizens are all in an awkward position.

GLOBAL CAPITALISM

While we are fighting the Robert Mugabe dictatorship, we Zimbabweans have not been spared from the negative impact of global capitalism on our livelihoods especially in poor communities - as we are currently witnessing, in the current xenophobic attacks against us in South Africa.

The xenophobia exposes not only working-class people's fears of lower wages, higher crime and new cultural influences, as is the explanation at first blush. In addition, we can see in the attacks on non-nationals the duplicitous role our national elites play in pushing us further to the mercy of capitalist forces while they label us in the opposition – puppets of the West.

The attacks are being condemned by progressive forces in SA, including COSATU Secretary General, Zwelinzima Vavi, who said: "I want to send out this message: It is not the Zimbabweans (exiles) that cause the problems (of the poor)".

He cited the capitalist system as the problem and argued that South Africa should focus on building an economic system that could: "seriously eradicate poverty".

The same position reiterated by the Anti-Privatisation Forum:"Let us not forget that it is South African corporate capital – through the framework of NEPAD – that has, over the last decade, moved into other African countries, most often causing many local, smaller businesses to close down and thus contributing to a situation in which many poor people have lost their jobs."

THREE MILLION EXILES

There are over three million of us eking out a living outside Zimbabwe's borders, a result of the failure of our national leaders to deliver both politically and economically for us at home. The situation gets more ridiculous when looked at within the context of the aspirations spelt out in the reformed African Union, in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and its dream of an African Renaissance.

These programmes are again full of empty rhetoric framed, more to attract international donor funds and less to deliver dignity to African citizens, negating our 'ubuntuness', which espouses values to do with compassion, value for human life, respect for each other and harmonious existence.

Even as Frantz Fanon prophesied back then on the dilemma of African Unity in post–colonial Africa: "Now the nationalist bourgeois, who in region after region hasten to make their own fortunes and to set up a national system of exploitation, do their utmost to put obstacles in the path of this 'Utopia'. The national bourgeoisies, who are quite clear as to what their objectives are, have decided to bar the way to that unity, to that coordinated effort on the part of two hundred and fifty million men to triumph over stupidity, hunger and inhumanity at one and the same time."

Fanon’s insight helps us understand the failures of Mugabe and his allies beyond their “leftist” rhetoric. They are forever trapped in the awkward “talk left – walk right” jive as they remain arguably the best custodians of capitalist/imperialist forces, in our countries.

Mugabe flirted with the US military for many years, and until 1998 was considered amongst the highest-performing of World Bank and International Monetary Fund puppets, earning a "highly satisfactory" rating from the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1995. Did he not use $205 million in hard currency in 2006 to repay the IMF for failed loans?

In Zimbabwe today those suffering under the yoke of Mugabe's oppression are us black citizens. We are the homeless, the jobless, the battered and the bruised.

MAJORITY NOT RESPECTED

We are in the majority of those whose vote is not respected, in a negation of that very national liberation struggle aspirations of 'one man one vote.'

At the moment, Zimbabweans are just as good as people who did not go out to vote. We remain at the mercy of the dictatorship, as Mugabe is determined at each turn to reverse our hard-earned victories.

The elections did not deliver change. Instead, the moment of triumph against Mugabe and his cohort soon turned into a nightmare. The opposition won against one of the most entrenched liberation movements on the African continent. We romped to victory with a narrow parliamentary majority, equal seats as Zanu PF in the Senate and a majority votes in the Presidential election count. It was a great achievement given the odds placed against any possible opposition electoral victory.

DEVASTATING RETRIBUTION

“One group grabbed a 79-year-old widow, yanked up her skirt, then lashed her bare buttocks with barbed-wire whips as two dozen terrified relatives looked on. The woman, Martha Mucheto, said she cried in pain and shame. ‘If none of you confesses, we will hit this granny until she's dead,’ Mucheto, a great-grandmother and former nurse's aide, recalled hearing. She spoke from a hospital bed in Harare.”

The story of Mugabe's retribution against innocent civilians gets more devastating each day – from abductions, torture to cold blooded gruesome murders.

Old grannies such as gogo Mucheto are not spared in this brutality. Young men are killed in cold blood. The latest case is of Better Chokururama who was shot once and stabbed four times around the chest area by Mugabe's thugs. Chokururama was buried on 17 May 2008, one of at least two dozen MDC members killed for their beliefs in recent weeks, and one of several hundred since 2000.

Most affected are the already-struggling and impoverished rural folks. Scores are being displaced our national leaders to deliver both politically and economically for us at home. The situation gets more ridiculous when looked at within the context of the aspirations spelt out in the reformed African Union, in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and its dream of an African Renaissance.

MAJORITY NOT RESPECTED

We are in the majority of those whose vote is not respected, in a negation of that very national liberation struggle aspirations of 'one man one vote.'

At the moment, Zimbabweans are just as good as people who did not go out to vote. We remain at the mercy of the dictatorship, as Mugabe is determined at each turn to reverse our hard-earned victories.

The elections did not deliver change. Instead, the moment of triumph against Mugabe and his cohort soon turned into a nightmare. The opposition won in their own areas while others find their way to towns, many being victims of torture.

Zanu PF, the liberation movement that defeated the colonialists in a protracted struggle, somehow concluded that they should hold state power in perpetuity. The era of democratization has not yet arrived. The elites in Zimbabwe, like their despotic friends elsewhere in the world, disdain the notion that elections are the process through which people elect leaders of their choice.

Elections remain a privilege that is denied to the masses. As Zimbabwe prepares for a run-off on the 27th of June, we expect once again to be fed nauseating fascist propaganda on good citizenry and patriotism. Mugabe has declared war against the people of the world.

We have an obligation to organize ourselves and fight back. As Fanon advised: "…we must understand that African Unity can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of the people, and that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie."

The marches on 17 May 2008, led by COSATU, helped to strengthen people-to-people solidarity. The way our SATAWU comrades exposed and fought against the 'ship of shame' and stopped it from offloading its cargo of arms in Durban, is a show of solidarity that the people of Zimbabwe will forever remember.

Zimbabwe does not need arms. We are not at war. We want decent jobs, homes, schools and food.

*Grace Kwinjeh is an NEC member of the MDC and the Chairperson of the Global Zimbabwe Forum.

**Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

is one of the best articles. This is reality and should be considered as it is very informative. Thanks to the author!

Mawuli has just hit the nail on the head in his article . I'm a TV talk show hostess billed to discuss women involvement in this year's elections on my talk shows, but I'm very heart broken. Heart broken because our men are just fighting to get the few women in parliament out. The parties are now on their primaries and eliminating those few women (about 22). How can we progress as a nation with this behaviour? God help our nation!

In this article Mukelani Dimba shows how freedom of information legislation can be used by citizens to pursue their socio-economic rights. He argues that it creates the conditions in which government decisions about resource allocation can be effectively challenged.

The third wave of democratisation in the developing world has created opportunities for development and reconstruction in many nations brought to their knees by past regimes that were oppressive, secretive and undemocratic. This has focused not only on infrastructure and the economy but also on a rethink of the relationship between those in power and those who voted them into power. In this reconfiguration we should recall the words of the American constitutionalist, Alexander Hamilton, who once said that ‘If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary… A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.’

These ‘auxiliary precautions’ referred to by Hamilton included not only the courts and other organs of state but also the constitutional legal framework established to support them. If men and women were angels, basic human freedoms, such as the right to vote and freedom of expression (which includes the right to seek, receive and impart information), would not need to be protected in national constitutions. Nor would there be any need for special constitutional provisions obliging governments to share the spoils of economic growth fairly among citizens by ensuring that even the most impoverished have access to the services needed to sustain life, protect dignity and enhance the prospects of future generations. Alas, men and women are not angels, and we therefore need these ‘auxiliary precautions’ to protect the democratic order for the material benefit of the poor. It is vital that national constitutions not only protect civil and political rights but also promote the realisation of social and economic rights.

By social and economic rights, I refer to what Professor Kader Asmal, the South African human rights scholar, activist and former government minister, once called ‘the red and green rights’, namely the rights to housing, health care, food, social security, social services, education, human dignity in conditions of detention, healthy environment, land and security of tenure.

The third wave of democracy has not, in most cases, led to the social and economic development of communities previously materially disadvantaged by discriminatory and undemocratic systems of government. I believe that this is largely because the focus has tended to be on the full constitutional protection of civil and political rights as the cornerstone of the democratic order, while neglecting or partially entrenching social and economic rights within the constitutional framework.

Some correctly argue that democracy is not a sufficient condition for development or for social and economic equality. Many scholars have argued ‘that democracy will remain a formality unless it also includes substantive social and economic equality’ (Jones and Stokke, 2005). Amartya Sen’s argument is that ‘democratic institutions are guarantors for public deliberation and effective responses to poverty and deprivation’ (Jones and Stoke, 2005). Sen (2000) goes on to argue that:

‘Freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its primary means. Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.’

Mumtaz Soysal, in his 1977 Nobel lecture, argued that:

‘When those deprived of their socio-economic rights cannot make their voices heard, they are even less likely to have their needs met. If a person is deprived of one right, his chance of securing the other rights is usually endangered. The right to education and the right to freedom of information and open debate on official policies are necessary to secure full public participation in the process of social and economic development. The freedom of the human mind and welfare of the human being are inextricably linked.’

In countries where citizens have been unjustly denied access to certain services and resources because of their race or other societal background, a constitution, as an ‘auxiliary precaution’, that protects socio-economic rights is vital to the process of redress, reconstruction and redistribution.

The protection of socio-economic rights by a country’s constitution and their progressive realisation partially justiciable by the courts is a departure from the norm, where the focus has tended to be on judicial protection of political and civil rights. Traditionally, freedom of information (FOI) has found its place among the body of these political and civil rights.

During the era when only a few Scandinavian countries and the USA had freedom of information legislation, these laws created an understanding of FOI as merely part of the right of freedom of expression, which in and of itself had come to be perceived as a right that affected only journalists and political activists. Earlier international legal instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also enveloped FOI within the broader right to freedom of expression. The newer Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights follows a similar route, the major difference being its extension of FOI to privately held information.

I firmly believe that it is when freedom of information is used as a form of leverage to protect or promote other socio-economic rights that it finds its real meaning in a developing-country context. The well-known and remarkable work of the MKSS in Rajasthan in India, emulated by other organisations in South Africa and elsewhere, shows how FOI can be used to the benefit of local communities and governments by helping social organisations expose corruption that compromises the proper implementation of development projects and social security schemes. This supports the idea that one of the purposes of the tools of democracy, such as FOI, is ‘to advance poor people’s access to socio-economic resources and services’ (Barbeton, Davis and Sarkin, 2000). This is consistent with the United Nations Development Programme in its assertion that:

‘Effective anti-poverty programmes require accurate information on problems hindering development to be in the public domain. Meaningful debates also need to take place on the policies designed to tackle the problems of poverty. Information can empower poor communities to battle the circumstances in which they find themselves and help balance the unequal power dynamic that exists between people marginalised through poverty and their governments.’

In India, for example, the government runs a massive food subsidy scheme as a social security measure to promote the right to food. Food rations are in most instances distributed through shopkeepers in the private sector, called ration-dealers. A person takes their ration card and collects food parcels from their local ration-dealer. The dealer then claims payment from the government for the food he has distributed to the community. However, some ration-dealers have been reportedly manipulating the process for their own ends by telling people that they have run out of food subsidy stock, offering to sell them food from their ‘ordinary trading stock’ instead. In the ration-dealers' records these transactions are recorded as distributions related to the food subsidy scheme and money is claimed from the government. The ration-dealers therefore get paid twice, by the customer and by the government.

This practice was exposed in a number of villages in Rajasthan when these communities, assisted by the MKSS, used the state’s freedom of information law to access the claims submitted by the ration-dealers to the government. Massive discrepancies were discovered between what the ration-dealers claimed and what they had actually distributed, which was captured on individual ration cards kept by each member of the community. By accessing government documents these citizens were able to reconcile what was claimed on paper with the reality on the ground. This illustrates vividly the multi-dimensionality of freedom of information in the developing world, where it can be used as tool for accountability, to protect socio-economic rights, fight corruption and improve government efficiency.

In Thailand, children’s right to education and fair and equal treatment was protected when one parent used the country’s freedom of information law to challenge a public school’s decision denying their child’s enrolment in one of the country’s best public schools. In seeking access to the results of enrolment tests, the parent exposed the discrimination that had hitherto been part of the selection process, and which favoured children from rich and prominent families. This action prompted a countrywide overhaul of the system of selection and enrolment in public schools.

However, in countries where freedom of information legislation has not yet been passed, citizens cannot claim the protection it might provide. In an area near the Tanzanian capital of Dodoma, schools were built with donor support on condition that the donor and the government would provide match funding for the money paid by parents towards their running costs; the funds would be controlled by local authorities and school principals. However, inefficiency and some reported cases of corruption have left some of these schools in a state of disrepair. There is simply no accountability for the use of these funds. Local people have no recourse open to them, short of social mobilisation, which in itself require access to information. But Tanzania does not yet have a freedom of information law.

In neighbouring Kenya, citizens have complained about the mismanagement of constituency development funds (CDF), which are funds controlled by members of parliament to fight poverty at regional levels. CDFs are also used to run educational and bursary schemes and constitute about 7.5 per cent of the government’s revenue. However, in Kenya the CDFs are popularly called ‘corruption devolvement funds’. Kenyans have very little recourse to ensure that they receive the services to which they are entitled because Kenya does not yet have a freedom of information law.

Slightly more fortunate are a group of women in KwaZulu-Natal, one of South Africa’s poorest provinces. Villagers in the hamlet of Emkhandlwini noticed that those in neighbouring villages were receiving water from municipal tankers while they were not. Their water source was a dirty stream that they shared with their livestock. Luckily, some villagers were aware of their basic civil rights because they had had some training, but they did not know how to seek solutions to the water problem without relying on an unresponsive local government political representative who had until then failed to deal with the issue.

In 2004, and with the assistance of the Open Democracy Advice Centre, the villagers used South Africa’s freedom of information law, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to ask for the minutes of the council meetings at which the municipality had decided on programmes of water provision. They also asked for the municipality’s integrated development plan and budget. It took a frustrating six months before the information was released, but it showed that while there were plans to provide water, no-one had thought of sharing these with the community. With these plans in hand the women started asking difficult questions of the authorities regarding the delivery of water. The media also covered the case, which may have created sufficient pressure to prompt the municipality to act. Almost a year after the initial FOI request, fixed water tanks, replenished a couple of times a week, were installed in the village and mobile water tankers began delivering water, while the municipality worked on a more permanent solution of laying down pipes.

This case demonstrates how socio-economic rights can be realised through the use of freedom of information and public pressure rather than through litigation. Public pressure to influence resource allocation can only be effectively applied if there is sufficient transparency in the process of resource allocation. Freedom of Information creates the conditions in which decisions about the allocation of resources can be challenged.

I strongly believe that in countries plagued by socio-economic imbalances inherited from undemocratic systems of government, it is crucial that the products of democratic transition, such as freedom of information legislation, must be used to address these imbalances. In the field of socio-economic rights, as the cases above show, FOI creates a basis for contestation and justification of government decisions on resource allocation. It creates a basis for a fair and reasonable manner of decision-making.

I wish to conclude this article by quoting South Africa’s leading legal academic on administrative law, the late Professor Etienne Mureinik, who once wrote:

‘If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected and justified, in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion.’

*Mr Dimba is the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Open Democracy Advice Center (ODAC), Cape Town. This essay was presented on behalf of the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) on the occasion of the international conference on Right to Public Information, organized by the Carter Centre, 26–29 February 2008, Atlanta, Georgia.

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Dewa Mavhinga makes a case for the resignation of the Zimbabwean police chief who has vowed to only salute Mugabe

Utterances and statements emerging from Zimbabwe's uniformed forces, starting with Rt Major General Paradzayi Zimondi, Head of Prisons, to the effect that they will not accept or salute either opposition Movement for Democratic Change Presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai or Independent and former ruling party minister Simba Makoni (should they win the Presidential election on 29 March) cannot go unchallenged. Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri and Army General Constantine Chiwenga are also on record saying they will not accept Robert Mugabe losing to what they derisively termed 'puppets'. There is no room for such misguided utterances in Zimbabwe; these men of uniform must resign with immediate effect.

Zimbabweans will not be held to ransom by a bunch of men who should know that it is highly unprofessional for the army, police and prisons to delve in political matters or to attempt to influence the vote by spreading fear, alarm and despondence. Political engagement and discourse is for civilians and civilians alone, it is a fundamental right of the people of Zimbabwe to determine through the ballot who they wish to lead them; the uniformed forces must be reminded that this is none of their business. The uniformed forces belong to the people of Zimbabwe and have an obligation to respect democratic political processes and must swear allegiance to whomsoever Zimbabweans chose as leader.

It must be stated clearly that it is treasonous and shameful for the leadership of uniformed forces to issue such irresponsible statements threatening to return to war if President Mugabe loses elections; it is shameful for government of Zimbabwe to remain silent and not condemn outright such utterances; worst of all, it is shameful and unacceptable that SADC and international community should remain silent in the face of these treasonous statements which are obviously meant to sway and compel voters to vote for a value system that is unmarketable and can only be forced down the throats of the masses. Effectively, Chihuri, Chiwenga and Zimondi have become Zanu PF campaign agents, poor ones at that, as they only know the language of threats. It is very strange that, in the face of all these unconstitutional, frivolous and inflammatory utterances, South African President Thabo Mbeki still has the audacity to express hope that Zimbabwe elections will be free and fair. One wonders what benchmarks Mbeki is applying to elections in Zimbabwe; they are certainly not the SADC guidelines, standards and norms for the conduct of free and fair elections.

How can elections in Zimbabwe be possibly be credible, free and fair when the electorate is threatened with war should they vote out Mugabe? Enough is enough, we cannot accept mortgaging Zimbabwe's future to a few cronies who selfishly cling to the past and are keen to destroy Zimbabwe for selfish personal interests. In a new Zimbabwe there will be no place for unqualified and unprofessional people in our uniformed forces, people will hold office on the basis of merit and merit alone, so let beneficiaries of political patronage beware. This old guard in army, police and prisons must know that it is now time for professional uniformed forces who are not in any way part of political formations and that should either Morgan Tsvangirai or Simba Makoni win in the coming elections, if they do not wish to salute they must simply resign and go home. Already they have outlived their usefulness in these institutions and must be replaced in order to take our uniformed forces back to values of impartiality, patriotism, professionalism and allegiance to Zimbabwe's constitutional values. Chihuri, Chiwenga and Zimondi cannot masquerade as kingmakers and godfathers of Zimbabwean politics, they must confine themselves to their terms of engagement which categorically exclude meddling in political affairs of the country.

The rank and file in the army, police and prisons must also reject these patently partisan and unprofessional utterances and be patriotic enough to resist illegal orders to vote for Mugabe. Soldiers, Police officers and prison officers have a right to vote, their vote must be a secret and a personal choice and not an order from anyone. I am hopeful and positive that the views expressed by these cronies are views of a tiny minority in Zimbabwe and do not reflect the views of masses inside and outside uniformed forces who love peace and democracy and are equally fed up with a diet of starvation and rantings of little men allergic to democracy and good governance. As a patriotic Zimbabwean, it is my sincere hope and trust, and my prayer that sense will prevail over madness.

*Dewa Mavhinga is a Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

ICG warns that the international community needs to have contingency plans ready in anticipation of rigged elections in Zimbabwe on 29 March that could precipitate a potentially violent crisis

Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines likely scenarios for Zimbabwe’s simultaneous presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections. Even though President Robert Mugabe has two serious challengers, including for the first time one from within his own ruling party, he probably has the means to manipulate the process before, during and after balloting, sufficiently to keep his office, though possibly only after a violent run-off. If that happens, no government will emerge capable of ending the country’s long crisis. “Zimbabweans desperately want change but have little faith these elections will produce it”, says François Grignon, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “Even after the 29 March vote, a negotiated compromise will likely be essential to reverse a deteriorating political and economic situation but only the first step.”

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) mediation by South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, which once offered the most realistic chance of resolving Zimbabwe’s eight-year crisis, has failed. Primary responsibility lies with Mugabe, who unilaterally called snap elections and ruled out passage before the polls of the new constitution. His ruling ZANU-PF party has subsequently been using all the extensive means at its disposal to maintain an unfair advantage in the campaign. The bitterly divided opposition must also share blame: it gained relevancy from the mediation but was unable to agree on an electoral strategy at a time of acute national crisis.

If the election leads to further confrontation, the African Union (AU) should be ready to promptly offer mediation for a power-sharing agreement to produce a transitional government with a reformist agenda. A settlement need not necessarily remove Mugabe. He might serve as a non-executive head of state during a transitional period in advance of fresh elections. The important point is for the region to be prepared to act quickly if the elections do not produce a legitimate government that can deal with a national crisis whose consequences are increasingly being felt beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. With South Africa and the SADC having lost some credibility, the AU needs to take the lead.

The wider international community must also be ready to provide concerted backing to AU-led mediation. The EU and U.S. have little appetite to re-engage with a ZANU-PF dominated government, but if that is the result of a genuinely negotiated agreement that aims at reconciliation and renewal, they should not hold back.

“If the region’s leaders were again to recognise an illegitimate government, Zimbabwe’s dramatic economic disintegration would continue, and the inevitable next round of the struggle over Mugabe’s succession could easily provoke bloodshed”, warns Andebrhan Giorgis, Crisis Group Senior Adviser.
Pretoria/Brussels, 20 March 2008

*Read the full Crisis Group report at: The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation covering some 60 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

** Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Mary Ndlovu argues that in spite of the obstacles placed by ZANU-PF, Zimbabwean people must at a minimum strive to vote Mugabe out of power and elect a leadership that will unite Zimbabwe, rebuild the economy and deliver justice and healing as opposed to revenge

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869mugabe.jpgAnyone trying to predict the outcome of the Zimbabwean election must be either bold or foolhardy or both. No sooner has a prophesy gone to press than a new factor slips into the equation and everything has to be re-calculated. Commentators are reduced to scenarios – and the number of scenarios required to cover all eventualities and twists of fate multiplies by the day.

And yet six short weeks ago it all looked sealed and delivered to Robert Mugabe. Morgan Tsvangirai’s formation of the MDC had refused, against their own party’s and President’s apparent interests, to form a coalition with the Mutambara faction. Without a united opposition, ZANU PF could not fail to win. Nothing would change, our downward rush to disaster would not be halted.

If a week is a long time in politics, six weeks is an eon. Enter Simba Makoni, and it all looked different. For the first time, the long talked-of split in ZANU PF would make a difference at the polling stations. For the first time, there would be a three-way contest for the top position. For the first time, Mugabe might not know who would do his bidding and who would subvert it. For the first time, there could be a run-off vote.

As campaigning has picked up to full steam, several further factors have come into play. The economy deteriorates at a faster pace than ever, with the value of the Zimbabwe dollar dropping by mid March to one tenth of its value in the middle of January. Food is either unavailable or unaffordable, and ZANU PF seems to be short of supplies to give out to their loyal supporters (if they can identify them). The civil service goes on strike and has to be enticed back by massive salary increases, which in fact, it seems will mostly not be paid before the election. Even the army have yet to be paid the amounts promised. The salary increases will further increase the pace of the downward plunge in standards of living as inflation spirals upward.

Even more important, as opposition candidates move into the rural areas, a miracle seems to be happening – the rural voters are awakening from the trance which made them believe that ZANU PF was their party and Robert Mugabe their man.

But the questions only multiply. Who will the rural voters support in place of Mugabe – Makoni or Tsvangirai? And who will they vote for in the parliamentary elections, where instead of the straight ZANU PF-MDC choice of the last three elections, there are sometimes two ZANU PF candidates and two or even three MDC candidates, plus several others, including independents supporting Makoni.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869billb.jpgWhat kind of chaos will result as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission attempts to stage a highly complex election composed of four ballots being cast and counted in 11,000 polling stations? What will Mugabe do if he realizes that he has lost any possibility of winning the vote and at the same time can’t rely on a dedicated rigging system? Will he rely on the military brass, who insist they will not allow anyone else to win? And will they be able to rely on their troops, reportedly supporting opposition candidates, and even said to be short of ammunition? All or at least some of these questions will be answered very soon, but to try to predict them requires a high level of audacity.

Are there any certainties regarding this election? Two very important ones.

The first is that there is no minutest possibility of a “free and fair” election. Those observers from SADC who boast that it can still be so are only destroying their own credibility. The government has totally ignored amendments to the Electoral Act, to POSA and AIPPA. There is no independent electronic media, there is blatant campaigning for the ruling party in the state media, there is bias in the behaviour of the police, the arrangements for the electoral process are shambolic, with ZEC even having to withdraw some of their own information pamphlets, no meaningful voter education has been allowed, not to mention the chaos of the voters’ roll, the partisan nature of the delimitation which went before and the uneven allocation of polling stations. And now the familiar process of last-minute amendments to the Electoral Act has begun – using the Presidential Powers Act to reverse changes made by agreement during the Mbeki-led mediation

The second certainty is that this election presents the electorate with two tasks: getting rid of the incumbent President in spite of the unevenness of the playing field, and replacing his government with one which can unite Zimbabweans to renew and rebuild the Zimbabwean nation in all its aspects.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869Makoni.jpgAre Zimbabweans capable of using the seriously flawed electoral process to remove Mugabe, or will he manage to hang on once again? That is the first issue, and there is no doubt that with the entry of Simba Makoni into the game, it becomes a distinct possibility. Why? Because Makoni has created the necessary split in ZANU PF, and he has offered a three-way contest. This makes it very difficult for any of the three to win over 50% of the vote. But who will the ZANU PF deserters vote for? Sizes of crowds and results of rudimentary opinion polls can not be relied on, and people in rural areas are still making acquaintance with the challengers. Makoni apparently believed that he needed to present himself as ZANU PF in order to gain the disaffected vote, but he could be wrong. Once the spell is broken, people may desert not only the leader but the party as well. Tsvangirai is reported to be drawing large crowds at rallies in smaller towns, but Makoni too is being greeted with excitement as he whistle-stops through rural areas.

Will the people speak for Makoni, or will they speak for Tsvangirai, and will Mugabe be able to stifle their voices through manipulation of the process? These are the questions that this election should answer.

To look at the last question first. There is no doubt that there is a loosening of the hold of state security over the people, even in Mugabe strongholds. The fear factor and the patronage factor are still there, but their influence will not be as great this time in securing ZANU PF votes. The rigging factor is impossible to calculate. It will surely play some role, but if people vote in large numbers, as it seems they may do, it will be more difficult, it may have to take place at the very top, and the loyalty of the riggers is in any case in doubt.

But all Zimbabweans need to look around and see that the new political landscape requires new responses. They have, like many voters around the world, voted with their emotions and their hearts, demonstrating their loyalties to the parties with which they have long identified, and to individuals whom they trusted to govern them. That is no longer a viable approach to voting. Zimbabweans must learn to think strategically. What vote is most likely to dislodge Robert Mugabe, to end the corrupt and despotic rule of ZANU PF?

A vote for Tsvangirai assumes that his party can win enough votes from ZANU PF to carry the day. Mutambara’s MDC has already declared for Makoni, and there are signs that much of Matabeleland will heed that call. Can Tsvangirai, with so many of his supporters outside the country, retain the rest of his traditional following, and gain a very large number of former ZANU PF voters? Or is Makoni more likely to draw support as a new, fresh face appealing to both disaffected former MDC and former ZANU PF voters, and representing the idea of co-operation rather than polarisation? A vote for Makoni will assume that Tsvangirai’s time has passed and he would not be able to attract enough of ZANU PF to gain large numbers. Zimbabweans have to consider these possibilities carefully, and vote for the one they think is most likely to oust Mugabe.

If this election is primarily about showing Robert Mugabe the door, the key question for voters is which of the two challengers is likely to succeed in drawing more votes.

But the second task is to choose which of the two is more likely to take us into re-building mode selflessly, with the interests of social justice for the people the main motivation. Again, both have baggage – Tsvangirai is dragged down by the self-interested squabbling within his party which begins to look more and more like ZANU-PF itself; their tendency to insult and denigrate other opposition forces instead of seeing them as allies in a common cause is not promising. Makoni will bring with him some ZANU PF loyalists who could not stand up to criticize their party’s evil doings, and others who have been direct beneficiaries of that evil.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869airball.jpgWhat will be needed will be strong leadership which can give the country a new vision of a united people, while curbing any excesses of their adherents. Zimbabwe needs someone who can reach across party lines and treat the sicknesses of hatred and greed, while ensuring that evil-doers do not escape with impunity. Each voter will have to ask himself, not which candidate gains his sympathy, but which candidate can do both jobs.
Political goals cannot be reached in a single leap. This election will not bring social justice in Zimbabwe. But there are critical achievements that can be made through this election:

- Remove Robert Mugabe from power and end his catastrophic rule.

- Put into power a government that can unite the people to embark on the tasks of restoring rule of law, rebuilding the economy, bringing justice not revenge, healing and dignity to Zimbabweans.

We would dream for the achievement of both, but even if only the first is attained we will have taken at least one step forward.

There is of course the possibility that even the first task will fail. But it is clear that there is a seismic shift in the Zimbabwean political scene which has to produce significant change. If it is prevented from coming through the ballot box, then we surely will face some very dark days in Zimbabwe. Many dangers lurk in the coming weeks, whoever is declared the winner. But progressive Zimbabweans must not give way to despair and assume that the election is already pre-determined against us. If we want change through the vote we must hope and believe and work to reach our goals. In spite of all the odds, if Zimbabweans are prepared to overcome fear, to cast aside emotional loyalties, to think and vote strategically, and to keep their eyes on the goals of peace and social justice, much is possible.

*Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

***Also read more of Mary Ndlovu's Zimbabwe analysis.
Blowing Away the Rhetorical Smokescreeens in Zimbabwe

In response to Truth commissions and prosecutions: Two sides of the same coin? [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/46719]. I just finished reading "A Human Being Died That Night: Forgiving Apartheid's Chief Killer" by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela. I had a meeting with Elazar Barkan about my work in Liberia on collecting stories from Victim and Perpetrators in Liberia making them talk on the radio about what had happen to them during the war and what (perpetrators) did during the war in Liberia. How both Victims and Perpetrators felt when it was happening to them as a Victim and the how Perpetrators how felt when they were hurting people.

I worked with the Liberia TRC trying to talk to the Perpetrators to be part of the TRC processs in Liberia. Since they have beening coming on my radio program to talk about what they did during the war, they also needed to go to the TRC. The TRC has been charged with the responsibility of investigating the root causes of the conflict in Liberia, amplifying historical truths. If this is the work of the Liberia TRC then the Perpetrators have to be part of the Liberia TRC.

You ask: Are TRC's designed to generate more truth, more justice, reparations, and genuine institutional reform? Or are they designed to undermine the State’s and society’s legal, ethical and political obligations to their people? I have asked myself this question alot.

Again you say "Truth commissions have been multiplying rapidly around the world and gaining increasing attention in recent years. They are proposed for different reasons and driven by diverse motives. They can be used firstly, for the purpose of national reconciliation and in the interests of the society; secondly, sometimes they can be used to avoid accountability or prosecution and merely to shield an offender from justice." If we are going to have TRC in Africa after conflicts - are we going to have the same type of South Africa TRC?

In Sierra Leone there was a TRC. How did was it at the end? Did the people of Sierra Leone get Justice? After theTRC finished its work and gave its recommendations, did the Sierra Leone Government adopt them? How can the Liberia TRC learn from these two TRCs? What will Happen to the Kenya TRC?

We have to see what will work for us in Africa after our conflicts. There are so many tensions between Truth Commissions and Prosecution in Liberia. Prince Yormie (or Yeomi) Johnson is a Liberian political and former military figure. He was elected to serve as a senator in the Liberian congress in the historic 2005 election. Johnson was born in Nimba County, in the east-central interior of the country.

In 1990, Johnson was allied with Charles Taylor as part of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which crossed the border from Côte d'Ivoire and began operations in Liberia on Christmas Eve, 1989. However, an internal power struggle resulted in Prince Johnson leading a faction of fighters which he named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

In spite of ECOMOG opposition, INPFL forces captured most of the capital, Monrovia, late in the summer of 1990, and Johnson's supporters abducted President Samuel Doe at ECOMOG headquarters, the Free Port of Liberia. Although Johnson has recently denied killing Doe, there is no question that Doe was brutally executed in Johnson's custody on September 9, 1990, as the spectacle was videotaped and seen on news reports around the world. The video shows Johnson sipping a Budweiser as Doe's ear is dismembered. Ahmadou Kourouma also accused Prince Johnson of war crimes (abduction and torture of several Firestone's executives) in his book "Allah is not obliged". Shortly after Doe's death, Johnson allied with UN-supported ECOMOG peacekeepers in capturing the Liberian capital.

Subsequently, Johnson briefly claimed the presidency of Liberia in the fall of 1990. His claims ended following the consolidation of rebel power by his rival Charles Taylor of the NPFL. In an attempt by the weak national government to reconstruct Liberian politics, the INPFL was recognized at a conference held in Guinea, where Amos Sawyer was elected president. However, Johnson was forced to flee to Nigeria in fear of rebel forces supporting Taylor. He returned to Liberia in March 2004, stating his intention to return to politics by running for a senate seat in Nimba County; however, he left Liberia again on 7 April, apparently due to death threats he had received from the country's dominant rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). In the October 11, 2005 elections, Johnson contested and won a Senate seat representing Nimba County, in spite of having a reputation for wartime brutality and having committed gross human rights abuses. He is the chair of the Senate's defense committee. Can we have him prosecuted in Liberia? How long will it take and how much money will the government spend on him? After all, he is a Senator in the same Liberia where he commited Human Rights abuses.

I've finished reading Prof. Campbell's comments [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/46809], and I can see that he is enthusiastic, encouraged, and hopeful regarding the candidacy of Barack Obama. But I had to wade through way too many words to find his actual points, and many of those words were confusing. I long to read clearly expressed incisive thought, and this just doesn't qualify. Perhaps there is an in-crowd who shares a common understanding of some of the terms that are opaque to me, and I'm not part of that group.

I'm left wondering, what are "new self-organizing tools for self-emancipation" (is this a reference to robotics?), and "self-similar processes being developed in spaces of peace, spaces of hope and non-racialized spaces"? Not only what, but where, are such spaces found?

And this statement: "Decent Christians are now seeking the gospel of peace and love instead of hate and religious fundamentalism." Is that "decent Christians" as opposed to "indecent" Christians? I've met some Christians, as well as non-Christians, who've been seeking the gospel of peace and love for a long time now. If this is a change, is Prof. Campbell suggesting that it's been brought about by Barack Obama?

What is "this methodical organizing like the repetition of self-similarity"? What is the "scaling pattern of Obama"?

"This leap has been reinforced by the nested loops of new social networks wired through the spaces of the information revolution". Perhaps I'm to understand this as poetry.

"Safe and clean neighborhoods, children who are reared to respect all human beings and a society that support (sic) repair of the planet earth awaits these new self-organizing forces." Exactly which forces are those? In my view, these requirements wait for no politician or political force, but are the direct responsibility of individual citizens. No parent can put off teaching respect for all humanity until the right politician appears on the scene. If our neighborhoods are unclean and/or unsafe, it's our fault, not the fault of "politics". In my view, each individual is responsible for the space s/he occupies.

My message: reading this piece was largely a frustrating experience.

Blessing-Miles Tendi argues that If Mugabe is to stand trial for crimes against humanity, he must do so as close as possible to the site of his crimes - Zimbabwe.

On February 27, 2008, the BBC’s John Simpson asked Simba Makoni if he ‘would not stand against the principle of sending President Mugabe to The Hague’.

Makoni replied: ‘No. We will be a full member of the international community and we will act in accordance with the normal standards of international justice’.

International newswires immediately went into an excited frenzy about the prospect of Mugabe standing trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), which functions to try individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This ‘international’ excitement needs to be shot dead in its tracks.

Since the treaty for the ICC was assented to by countries around the globe in 1998, 105 countries have ratified the treaty to date. Zimbabwe is not one of these 105 countries hence the ICC has no jurisdiction over Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, the ICC treaty came into effect in 2002. The ICC can only prosecute crimes committed after 2002. The crime that could provide the strongest basis for Mugabe standing trial at a court such as the ICC is the Gukurahundi atrocities. However, the Gukurahundi was perpetrated before 2002.

Mugabe cannot stand trial for the Gukurahundi at the ICC.

Mugabe committed many crimes after 2002 but the burden is on those who advocate for Mugabe standing trial at The Hague to prove how these crimes qualify as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.

And while it is within the power of the UN Security Council to refer a human rights situation to the ICC for investigation, this has failed to materialise for years now and it is debatable whether consensus for such a measure can ever be reached given some of Zimbabwe’s long standing allies on the Security Council.

States that have not ratified the ICC treaty can opt to accept the court’s jurisdiction but for Zimbabwe, this option is undesirable and unnecessary.

Zimbabwe’s justice system has been corrupted by Zanu PF over the years but it remains competent and it has retained a considerable level of independence despite manifold state pressures. More importantly, there is a pertinent tension between the universal jurisdiction embodied in the ICC and the local.

Justice that is local or national is better felt than justice delivered in distant international courts such as the ICC.

Justice at The Hague is not felt by widows deep in Tsholotsho who lost their husbands to the Gukurahundi. It is not felt by the homeless and displaced victims of Murambatsvina who are living like cockroaches on Caledonia farm. If Mugabe is to stand trial, he must do so as close as possible to the site of his crimes - Zimbabwe.

The appropriate place for Mugabe to face the judgment of history is in Matabeleland where he had thousands slaughtered and in the areas where Murambatsvina was conducted.

There are many unanswered questions in Zimbabwean history, and there is a need for national healing and reconciliation. Mugabe has a part to play in addressing these issues, and he can only do so adequately if his fate and confessions are a national affair.

The likes of John Simpson, the ‘international’ media, the executive director of the International Bar Association Mark Ellis, and some members of the British House of Commons, who make a lot of noise about Mugabe standing trial at The Hague must be reminded that Zimbabweans have a strong historical perspective, and that Zimbabweans are not blind to their double standards.

For instance, were it possible for Mugabe to stand trial for the Gukurahundi at The Hague, serious questions about British sins of omission and commission in Zimbabwe would arise. Britain was aware of the killings in Matabeleland but in 1983, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in India, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not raise the matter of the Gukurahundi.

In the same year, Malcolm Rifkind, Foreign Office Minister, visited Zimbabwe and held diplomatic consultations with Mugabe. Rifkind did not mention the Gukurahundi in his report to the British House of Commons on his return to London.

Perence ‘Black Jesus’ Shiri, the dreaded commander of the Fifth Brigade during the Gukurahundi, was the first Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) officer to attend London’s Royal College of Defence Studies as an honoured guest in 1986. The Royal College of Defence Studies describes itself as ‘the senior Defence academic institution in the United Kingdom… the most prestigious institution of its kind in the world’.

Retired General Edward Jones, Director of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe from 1983 to 1985, explained the motive for Britain’s offer of tenure at the Royal College to Shiri as follows: “Undoubtedly, he was the man who was going to be important in Zimbabwe and I think it was important that we should influence him positively in so far as we could.” In 2000, Tony Blair’s Labour government authorised the sale of spare parts for British made Hawk 200 jets to the Zimbabwe Air Force, now commanded by the same Perence Shiri. Farm invasions during the Third Chimurenga were coordinated by ZNA officials with Shiri playing a key coordinating role.

The military man whose excesses Britain had turned a blind eye to in the past, honoured at London’s Royal College and supplied with military parts became a key impediment to attempts at ending the violent farm invasions. In light of this, the ‘international’ moral grandstanding about Mugabe going to The Hague must be abandoned.

There is no powerful ‘international’ lobby for Tony Blair and his associates - or George Bush and his cronies for that matter - to stand trial at the ICC for their naked crimes in Iraq. The few criminal cases the ICC is dealing with today involve countries such as the Central African Republic, Sudan, the DRC and Uganda. Thorny questions about African sovereignty are brought into play by this focus on crimes in Africa. There is clearly one standard of international justice for the powerful and another one for the weak.

The ‘international’ clamour for Mugabe to stand trial at The Hague must be seen against this background.

*Blessing-Miles Tendi is a researcher at Oxford University.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Yav Katshung Joseph argues that as truth commissions multiply around the world it is important to look at their relationship to prosecutions and justice in an immediate and historical sense. Are TRC's designed to generate more truth, more justice, reparations, and genuine institutional reform? Or are they designed to undermine the State’s and society’s legal, ethical and political obligations to their people?

INTRODUCTION

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/354/46719truth.jpgTruth commissions have been multiplying rapidly around the world and gaining increasing attention in recent years. They are proposed for different reasons and driven by diverse motives. They can be used firstly, for the purpose of national reconciliation and in the interests of the society; secondly, sometimes they can be used to avoid accountability or prosecution and merely to shield an offender from justice. Following recent outbreaks of violence in the aftermath of Kenya's presidential election last December, stakeholders continue to make strides toward peace. Parties have agreed among other things to a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which will be established through an Act of Parliament. The Commission will inquire into human rights violations, including those committed by the state, groups, or individuals. This includes but is not limited to politically motivated violence, assassinations, community displacements, settlements, and evictions. It will also inquiry into major economic crimes, in particular grand corruption, historical land injustices, and the illegal or irregular acquisition of land, especially as these relate to conflict or violence. Other historical injustices shall also be investigated. The commission will primarily focus on events dating back to independence, December 12, 1963 up to February 28, 2008. However, it will as necessary look at antecedents to this date in order to understand the nature, root causes, or context that led to such violations, violence, or crimes. This gives us opportunity to share views on adequate truth commissions and their relationship with prosecutions.

TENSIONS BETWEEN TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

Very often, when a country wishes to move from dictatorship to democracy or from war to peace, various ways may be tried and these include trials in an international or national court of law and non-punitive approaches such as truth commissions. Thus, “…a country’s decisions about how to deal with its past should depend on many things: the type of dictatorship or war endured, the type of crimes committed, the level of societal complicity, the nation’s political culture and history, the conditions necessary for dictatorship to reoccur, the abruptness of the transition, and the new democratic government’s power and resources [1].” One may adds the “interests” of the country.

Different countries have chosen widely different strategies to deal with the past including prosecutions in one hand and, truth commissions and other non-punitive approaches, in the other. Although justice is crucial after violations of human rights, it may not be possible or practical. International tribunals are useful, but they are not the full solution. They are hugely expensive and can try only a small group of perpetrators, the most “responsible”. Ironically, many times, those who are tried are not the most responsible but the most “available” in the country. Therefore, justice becomes extremely selective and seems to be the way of granting de facto amnesty to those who fled the country and those responsible. Then come the necessity of other non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions not as a panacea for all the challenges of transition, or an alternative, but as a complement way to be used by broken societies, in order to bring the benefits of justice to the victims and to the political culture.

However, this is challenging and there are always tensions between the requirements of the criminal justice system and those of non-punitive approaches to gross and systematic human rights violations. Rightly, Charles Villa-Vicencio pointed out that, “the tension between justice and reconciliation and revenge, prosecution and amnesty is grounded as much in principled debate as in a tug-of-war between deep emotions, unresolved memories and uncertain futures. It is a tension that is best not collapsed into an attempted neat synthesis of a complex set of contradictions. The contradictions need to be sustained. The demands of the one side need to impact on the other. It is through honest encounter that opposing groups stand the best chance of knowing that they need one another. It is then that new possibilities begin to be imagined-and sometimes realised [2].

DOMESTIC TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROSECUTIONS: REACHING FORWARD

Truth Commissions are established to officially investigate and provide an accurate record of the broader pattern of abuses committed during repression, civil war and unjust periods. There have been more than thirty truth commissions worldwide, including in Sierra Leone, DRC, Morocco, and more importantly South Africa. “Truth commissions today”, according to Jose Alvarez, Professor of International Law at Columbia University, “are inescapable tools in establishing the truth of past crimes and a means for victim recompense and instruments to promote peace and reconciliation.”

Most recently, the United Nations Secretary-General’s report on “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” praised them as “a potentially valuable complementary tool in the quest for justice and reconciliation” and in “restoring public trust in national institutions of governance [3]”. The increased interest in truth commissions is, in part, a reflection of the limited success in judicial approaches to accountability, and the obvious need for other measures to recognise past wrongs and confront, punish or reform those persons and institutions that were responsible for violations. Successful prosecutions of perpetrators of massive atrocities have been few, as under-resourced and often politically compromised judicial systems struggle to confront politically contentious crimes. With an eye on building a human rights culture for the future, many new governments have turned to mechanisms outside the judicial system to confront, as well as learn from the horrific crimes of the past [4].

However, a truth commission should at the same time never be allowed to circumvent international human rights law or, more specifically, to ignore the punitive demands of the criminal justice.

Related to the South African case, where there was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a possibility to grant a conditional amnesty [5] in exchange of a full disclosure and shown remorse, could we say according to the Rome Statute that, the TRC decisions or proceedings were taken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility?

One should take into account and acknowledge that the South African TRC was democratic and genuine. The purpose was not to shift or to hide someone or a group from prosecution. It was in the interest of peace, reconciliation, etc. In my view and for many others, the South African TRC was not there to shield perpetrators but to seek the truth for national reconciliation. South Africa acted in good faith; the TRC was established by the best efforts of negotiators to end violations of human rights. This is justice, to my view and I may say in the interests of the entire country/society, not in the interest of prosecuting some few and not others, and still walk free as if they were granted de facto amnesty.

Emphasising this argument, Juan Mendez, stated that:

“In most parts of the world, the South African example stands out as an attempt to achieve reconciliation and forgiveness without impunity. Others decry the fact that most perpetrators of the worst crimes of apartheid did evade justice. In my view, however, the South African exercise with truth, justice and reconciliation is notable for its insistence on hearing the victims, consulting with all members of society, allowing participation by all stakeholders, and conducting the exercise in complete transparency. It is in this sense that the South African example continues to inspire all those who decide to turn a page in a country’s history without forgetting the plight of those who suffered [6].”

Therefore, we may pause with Naomi Roht-Arriaza that, if perpetrators appear before an independent and democratic truth commission that hears applications for conditional and accountable amnesty, they should not face prosecution by the ICC. In this case, amnesty (conditional) is granted for the purpose of domestic reconciliation and not to shield him/her/(the perpetrator) from criminal prosecution [7]. However, can all truth commissions have the same purpose of not shielding perpetrators? It is important to draw the line in order to avoid some contradictions between truth commissions and prosecutions. The next point will deal with that.

THE QUESTION OF ADEQUATE TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

We should ask ourselves if all truth commissions should be considered as genuine and serve the interests of the country. As we may know, in some countries the purpose of a truth commission may be not genuine and reasonable. This is challenging and it will be useful to deal at the case-by-case level. Rightly, Professor James Crawford of the University of Cambridge has said in relation to Article 17 of the Rome Statute:

“I think there is a question about truth commissions, because you can’t say a priori which ones are a reasonable response to the situation, and which ones are a cover-up. It’s going to require extreme care by the prosecutor. There may be some problem there with the capacity to subvert those processes if they are reasonable, and we’ll just have to hope that the institutions within the court take a sensible view about it. But complementarity extends to covering internal processes which don’t necessarily involve prosecutions of individuals, so there’s no reason why the principle of complementarity ought not to cover an appropriately constituted truth commission [8]."

Moreover, Charles Villa-Vicencio, talking about truth commissions states that: “… They demand fewer resources than courts and, if designed properly, can provide some accountability [9].” Using the words such as “if designed properly”, meant that we may find some not properly designed and therefore, the need for benchmarks in order to comply with international law. Can we say that the South African TRC was able to provide accountability and was consistent with international law?

Despite some few critiques, the South African TRC is internationally recognised, and has been favourably endorsed by numerous international human rights organisations and commentators. The TRC was passed pursuant to a valid Act of Parliament and imposes a form of public procedure and accountability for the actions of perpetrators. It was the country's decision in favour of peace. This is not impunity because there was political consensus in South Africa that getting as much of the truth out as possible and having fewer, but more effective prosecutions, was a just result. Given that, this was what the majority of the public wanted, that is not impunity.

In this line, speaking on the relationship between the prosecutorial mandate of the ICC and the amnesty administered by the South African TRC, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has observed:

“The purpose of the clause in the Statute (which allows the Court to intervene where the state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to exercise jurisdiction) is to ensure that mass-murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a State run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general breakdown of law and order. No one should imagine that it would apply to a case like South Africa’s, where the regime and the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an end, and the victims have inherited power.

It is inconceivable that, in such a case, the Court would seek to substitute its judgement for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way to put a traumatic past behind it and build a better future [10]”.

As noted, the South African TRC has been recognized and even endorsed as a valid means of dealing with crimes arising out of apartheid [11]. Moreover, state practice [12], international jurisprudence [13] and authors [14] confirm that the Rome Statute does not preclude a state from utilizing amnesty as an effective means of prosecution. However, what about the Congolese TRC?

In assessing if the Congolese TRC met some minimal requirements to approach legitimacy under international law, one can point out that the Congolese TRC was not created and operated transparently in order to sustain democratic legitimacy. There was a clear lack of citizen involvement in the creation and functioning of the TRC, and openness to ensure domestic legitimacy. There was no endorsement of the TRC and its work as a mechanism of transitional justice. Moreover, there are many critiques because commissioners came from different factions, and were not chosen by means of a process, which tried to ensure a democratic spirit and practice, and transparency. Therefore, it seems that the purpose of such a commission, was to be a “Truth Omission” instead of a “Truth Commission” and cannot encounter support by the international community [15].

In order for truth commissions to merit international legitimacy, Professor Crawford suggested that one possible test would be whether the procedure in question had been freely ratified by the successor regime, “so it’s not just a way that the generals can sign their amnesty on the way out of the door [16].” And for that, Charles Villa-Vicencio [17] helps us by saying that truth commissions needs at a minimum to incorporate the following:

- There needs to be convincing evidence that the majority of citizens endorse the provision as a mechanism of transitional justice;
- The disclosure of as much truth as possible concerning the gross violations of human rights;
- Accountability of those responsible for gross violations of human rights, recognising that this need not to be in the form of retributive sentencing by the state;
- A mechanism needs to be put in place to provide a form of relief or reparation to victims whose rights are suspended by a qualified amnesty provision;
- The suspension of prosecutions in a transitionary situation should not be a pretext for the abrogation of other requirements of international law;
- A forum in which victims and survivors may tell their stories and questions;
- Prosecutions should remain an option both during and after the TRC against those perpetrators who did not adequately participate in the process.

Although we agreed with Charles on these criteria, the last one seems not to be consistent. Truth commissions are not alternative to prosecutions, all are two sides of the same coin and should be used complementarily but sequencing for their success. Saying that “prosecutions should remain an option both during and after the TRC against those perpetrators who did not adequately participate in the process” seems to be too simplistic and could undermine the entire effort to heal the wounds of the nation and to fight against impunity.

In addition to satisfying the above minimum criteria for international legitimacy, a Truth commission should also be created and operated transparently in order to sustain democratic legitimacy. Citizen involvement in the creation of a truth commission, and openness to media coverage of its operations, are necessary to ensure domestic legitimacy [18]. And Juan Mendez put it clearly by saying:

“There are two conditions of legitimacy that we should insist upon for any program of transitional justice. First, transitional justice policy should be developed as part of an open, democratic debate, which includes consultation with and participation of the relevant stakeholders and full transparency of decisions. If decisions about how to reckon with the past are adopted exclusively by the parties to a conflict, without appropriate consultations with the victims of abuse or with society at large, the result will almost always generate dissatisfaction and rejection. Second, transitional justice policy should be contemplated in as comprehensive and holistic an approach as possible. This is not only because there will always be an ‘impunity gap’, meaning that many cases of abuse will not be resolved by trials, thus generating the need for a broader treatment of the universe of violations. It is also because the emerging principles in international law … establish that the obligations of the State are four-fold: to prosecute perpetrators, to unearth the truth, to offer reparations to victims, and to reform abusive public institutions [19].

CONCLUSION

In many transition periods two methods are used to establish record of grave human rights crimes following a conflict/war: prosecutions at national or international level and truth commissions with various names, which investigate situations and submits reports. Both of these two methods are not sufficient and therefore, the need to complement each other.

There is a growing demand for transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions, around the world. The problem however, it is to test if all those mechanisms imply good faith. Is the effort designed to generate more truth, more justice, reparations, and genuine institutional reform? If so, they are welcome. If the objective is to evade the State’s and society’s legal, ethical and political obligations to their people, they should be rejected. The answer should be found in the design of the process itself, but also in the degree of participation, consultation, and transparency that surrounds them (e.g. of South Africa).

Moreover, we should start by avoiding seeing truth commissions as an alternative to prosecutions. Even if many of them have been accompanied by grants of amnesty to the major perpetrators of human rights crimes, viewing truth commissions, as substitute for prosecutions is not a right way and can lead to contradictions. Therefore, we should try to consider truth commissions as complementary to national and international prosecutions, not to substitute them. They are two sides of the same coin: transitional justice. However, the processes must be sequenced in a way that one does not affect the effectiveness of the other. Accordingly, Scharf has said, “a country should not rush ahead with prosecutions at the cost of political instability and social upheaval or that every single perpetrator must be brought to justice, an impossible task in most countries that have experienced widespread human rights abuses. By documenting abuses and preserving evidence, a truth commission can enable a country to delay prosecutions until the international community has acted, or the new government is secure enough to take such action against members of the former regime [20].”

Furthermore, it may be useful to examine the utility of conducting prosecutions after Truth commissions as a means of uncovering more “truth” that was not revealed through the process. Because, like in the South African case, if those people who did not apply for amnesty or those whom the amnesty was refused, do not face trials, someone could say that there is de facto amnesty and therefore, the purpose of a TRC was just to shield some perpetrators. In this hypothesis, the process will violate the international law and will not be in the interest of justice (society as a whole). So, we should look on the possibilities to trials for those persons in order to avoid impunity, contradictions and allow the roots of a just society to take hold.

*Yav Katshung Joseph is a Human Rights lawyer and. Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Footnotes are available at the URL shown below

Thank you for an insightful brief [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/46555]. As far as our criticism of the report's apparent "lack of a gender analysis, and narratives (not just descriptions) of how mining operations are devastating lives in local communities" is concerned, I think we should consider the report's disclaimer below and consult its accompanying report: "There are several further concerns about the impact of the mines on local people - notable in the area of human rights, displacement to make way for the mines and environmental pollution.

These issues lie beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on tax and economic impacts, and are instead considered in an accompanying report, Not All That Glitters is Gold: How Tanzania's Mining Boom Has Impoverished Communities, Violated Rights and Degraded the Environment"(page 43). Where can we get hold of this accompanying report?

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/358/46928powershare.jpgAs Zimbabwe threatens to pull a 'Kenya', this is a good time to consider the implications of the Annan mediated power-sharing deal. Antony Otieno Ong'ayo dissects and weighs the Kenya power sharing deal.

While the tensions and apprehension as a result of the post election violence in Kenya subsides, focus is now placed on the newfound relationship between the antagonists during the 2007 elections. More important are the hopes of thousands who have been since the onset of electoral violence, displaced and still live in degrading conditions in various camps in the country. Business in various parts of the country seem to return to “normal” although large sections of the population are not sure of what will come next? Commentators have pointed to the optimism about the peace agreement between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki; however, less attention is being given to the implications of the deal for governance and state restructuring.

In the recent past, two positions have defined the discussion about power in Kenyan politics. This begun with the commencement of the Bomas constitutional review process, where one position has been against devolution of powers, arguing that two centres of power is not workable. The other view is that devolution of powers is possible within a framework that provides for accountability in the highest office in the land. However interest-ridden views and adversarial approach hijacked the debate hence, a stalemate in finding a best alternative. Proponents of centralised power, failed to justify that position, except for suggestions that doing so is likely to lead into chaos and disunity. They did not state what benefits the country has enjoyed under such a system since independence. Their arguments seem to ignore the historical injustices caused by a presidential system with concentrated powers, a system that took the country through decades of authoritarianism and dictatorship. The previous presidents abused these enormous powers; hence politicised ethnicity that now threatens to tear the country apart. Through their abuse of power, the country continued to experience high levels of poverty, illiteracy and high unemployment rates, leave alone poor roads, lack of health and educational facilities. They used this power to detain opponents and allocate resources in a skewed manner to their own regions. They used the power to employ their own kinsmen in the armed forces, state corporations, and government departments without regard for the multiethnic composition of the country. Moreover if the centralised system was meant for the unity of the country, ethnic tensions that have plagued the country for decades is but a sign that the much touted unity was a coerced unification or a unity/peace that was forced, first by the colonial state and later by the three post-colonial regimes. These regimes did not take into account the institutional and constitutional arrangements that would pull every group towards the centre, but instead, adopted a system which broadly kept them under one (“roof”) territory, at the same time keeping them apart as much as possible. The economic and political marginalisation of certain regions in Kenya is a manifestation that the system was and is still not conducive for a country with a complex mix of diversity.

The common contradictions in the two positions are however inherent in the views of when change is necessary, which is also informed by which “group”, is in power. The attitude in Kenya is that if our man is in power, then nothing is wrong with the system, hence no need to re-negotiate or restructure the state. The malgovernance problem in Kenya, which lies in the elaborate power structure built up around the presidency, is also synonymous with the state structure. This has been done through minor constitutional change that entrenched the status quo in which “elite minority” monopolise state power and resources and in most cases in the name of an ethnic group. During the process there are extremists who have shown through their power strategy mix that they do not think about long-term interests of the entire country, instead, they are focused on short-term benefits and to have a place in the ‘grand coalition’. This rush to create positions without reflecting on how the very institutions could serve the country well undermines their potentials to diffuse the tension around access to and use of state power. All over sudden, both the opponents and proponents of centralised power are “silent”, and are not questioning the implications of this new arrangement for “national unity”. Therefore would the 2008 Bill be that different from its predecessor bills?

The concept of power sharing has been used in many contexts as a response to conflicts ranging from ethnicity, political differences of resources allocation and use, a means of setting up governing coalition in context where political parties have failed to win majority seats in parliament or in post-conflict situations where multiple actors who represent diverse backgrounds seek to control the state power. Power sharing it is also seen as “a multiple vehicle to create broad-based governing coalitions of a society's significant groups in a political system that provides influence to legitimate representatives of minority groups." It is also described as “a strategy for resolving disputes over who should have the most powerful position in the social hierarchy”. But it also implies a joint exercise of power where such an agreement is reached. While Kenya cannot be described as a deeply divided polity or experienced conflicts of a highly intense nature, enormous powers in the presidency have been used to “command monopolistic access to available resources, to employ violence and exclusion to safeguard interests”.

RELEVANCE IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT

While application of power sharing agreements might entail “the creation of broad-based coalition of significant groups, in a political system”, in the case of Kenya, it is however not a power sharing or negotiation between “ethnic minority groups”, but between an “elite minority”. The majority of “minority groups” that would have qualified for consideration under this conception are not part of the deal being signed in Nairobi nor are they represented in any way. For instance, those minority groups that are politically and economically marginalised, such as the Ogieks, Jemps, Rendile, are not represented in the process. Instead, we see some form of representation based on “political parties” even though some of them have no “official structures” other than in paper. This is because the political competition in Kenya has been between the dominant forces against the citizenry, and with the advent of multiparty, it has been between political parties that are individualistic, and disconnected with the citizenry they claim to represent, while at the same time using or whipping ethnic feelings for political expediency. So what difference would it make with the new power-sharing arrangement? This scenario raises problems with representation, but also aspects of collaboration and block building, which could reflect consociational arrangements that takes care of the interests of minority groups at the political table.

In the foregoing, Kenya of today demands some level of patriotism and commitment to the principles of effective representation and leadership for change. In order to bring back the confidence of Kenyans on leadership and use of power there is need to turn these negative and dangerous trends around, through power sharing. But this could also be problematic if there will be no equity and fair play through properly constituted institutions of the state. Turning the current volatile politics into a more amicable order is crucial, because a less conflictual politics would lead to and prompt elite disposition towards political accommodation and adoption of non-majoritarian political arrangements. Therefore what does the current power sharing deal mean for the ordinary Kenyan whose life has been disrupted or cut short by the police bullet, gang machete, or tribal fire? What are the long-term implications of this re-negotiation for governance in Kenya? What precedence would it set in the context of contested election results in the future? From a political and constitutional law perspectives, many important questions have not been asked while there is a rush to return to “normal” life. High hopes have been placed on the deal between Raila and Kibaki, but not much is asked whether it is the medicine Kenya needs for the many constitutional and institutional defects and deficiencies, that have plagued the country for decades. It is therefore crucial to question whether the deal is a step towards deal a long-term goal to devolution of powers or decongestion of the system from Presidentialism, which has been at the core of governance deficiency in Kenya? Is the current power sharing deal any different from previous manipulation of the system to serve partisan interests? What is the role of the citizenry in the process of state restructuring of this magnitude, and during a contested legitimacy?

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD

It is hoped that the peace accord, would be entrenched in the constitution, peace would return and that some level of democratic governance, equity and accountability, would be realised, however the accord as legally framed does not take into the account the stability, cushioning and democratic governance role of the very institutions it is creating. The bill provides for the “insertion” of a new section into the constitution but at the same time (in section 15 A (3) (a) provides for its termination at the whims of the parliament. Here too the drafters either intentional ignored the interest-ridden nature of parliamentary politics in Kenya, or potentials for “stomach philosophy” to carry the day and not constitutional considerations that matter to the millions of impoverished Kenyans. With such discrepancies, implementation of the accord might not entail the prospects for fostering a durable peace or devolution of powers that many Kenyans desire. This is because the “deal” and the “bills” are not about the internally displaced; land squatters, voters whose right was violated during the 2007 elections, nor it is for posterity, it seems to solve the differences between “elite minorities”.

Another concern is the way in which various groups are making claim to diverse stakes. Power sharing often includes reviewing such key institutions as “federalism and the devolution of power to ethnic groups in territories that they control; or providing for minority vetoes on issues of particular importance; grand coalition cabinets in a parliamentary framework, and proportionality in all spheres of public life such as budgeting and civil service appointments”. Taking this path in Kenya has implications for “ethnic” re-orientation” in the face of state re-negotiation and could present further obstacles to reconciliation, national cohesion and efforts towards a national identity. Un realistic power sharing will not augur well for development of issue oriented political parties since “ethnicity” and other particularistic considerations would come first in the national psyche. All signs point to some kind of elite mobilisation, bankrolling and interference with state apparatus to bolster their power at the centre, which is currently being negotiated. Therefore if power sharing is done with these factors as the underlying forces, then it will “reinforce the ethnic divisions in society rather than promote cross-cultural understanding”

The power-sharing deal also falls short of addressing the very factors that underpinned the post-election violence namely the decades of political and economic marginalisation, and the deprivation of millions of Kenyans, spanning generations to realise their full potentials as citizens of Kenya. It fails to address the problems of non-democratic governance, politicised ethnicity, draconian and defective constitutional order whose beneficiaries are local elites in collaboration with international interests. The deal fails to address the system of exploitation and expropriation the national resources in the name of millions of Kenyans who toil under harsh labour conditions and dehumanising wages. It also fails to address the relationship between various institutions within the broader governance structure that could directly link and relate to local needs, participatory democratic processes and decision-making.

POINTS FOR REFLECTION

The contents of the accord could still be fine-tuned to give it substance, through an integrative approach, to “eschew ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society”. Power sharing in this direction can entail re-designing of the institutional and constitutional frameworks to provide for "centripetalism," whereby political dynamics are engineered in a “centre-oriented spin”. Examples include “multiethnic political parties, electoral systems that encourage pre-election pacts across ethnic lines, non-ethnic federalism that diffuses points of power, and public policies that promote political allegiances that transcend groups”. Recent political realignments have shown that there are potentials for ethnic accommodation due to crosscutting interests.

Another consideration is for the power sharing to move towards a group block building approach, a form of “consociationalism” in which there is an accommodation of the various “ethnic-groups” at the political centre and guarantees for minority rights. Such an approach might not necessarily lead to demands for autonomy because the interdependency of the various regions and groups within Kenya would not allow such a framework to function. This interdependency is caused by unequal availability of resources, un-equal infrastructure development, and disparities in climatic conditions with serious implication for food production or subsistence economy, which is still common in most part of Kenya. However a consociational arrangement could also lead to an outcome that “reflects the divisions in society but fails to provide incentives for building bridges across community lines”, hence the need for a framework, that encourages the various groups to identify with the state. This is also possible if the institutional framework and constitutional dispensation provides for receiving “something” back from the state regardless of “ethnicity”.

A "consociational" framework could also encourage collaborative decision-making, policy formulation and budgetary allocations that reflect the diversity of the Kenyan citizenry. The reality is that only through a broad based dialogue that the country can chart its way forward in these times of intensified globalisation. Arendt Lijphart maintains, “consociational democracy is the most viable structural model of politics for multiethnic societies”. But this is only possible if there is a political will, combined with the “will of the capital”, foreign forces and interests. Crucial at this juncture is a system that provides for institutional independence, holds people in power accountable and that decision-making is “consociational” as much as possible. It is only through centripetalism that all Kenyans would feel that they “belong” not just in words, but also through the policies of equity. The on-going power sharing therefore needs to look beyond Raila and Kibaki, focus on improving governance, accountability, equity and national cohesion and foster a common identity. It should also lead to institutional re-engineering to cater for governance conflicts. Although there exists a contrary notion that “fundamental conflicts in segmented politics cannot be solved by constitution writing and constitutional engineering”, it is also recognised that “rules can restructure a political system and cause changes in the game where there is some determination to obey the rules”.

Finally, re-thinking of an integrative approach would be a viable option. These would include “making persuasive appeals to people on the other side (usually focused on common values, goals, or needs), offering apologies and/or forgiveness for past deeds, seeking areas of commonality, reversing the de-humanisation process and building trust with opponents”. Integrative options are noted to be “less expensive to implement than force based options, and they are often more successful, as they do not generate the level of resistance and backlash that force often does”. Non-the less, how and whether the process will be taken seriously is a matter that heavily depends on the contents of the peace accord, its implementation, and acceptability by the citizenry. The success of the on-going power sharing however depends on whether the “grand coalition” would survive the conflict of interest and destructive confrontation, which are the hallmarks of Kenyan politics.

*Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.

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International development agencies, Progressio, Trócaire, Tearfund and FEPA today call for immediate action to stop what appears to impartial observers as government-led election rigging of Zimbabwe’s March 29th polls.

All four agencies are concerned about the slow release of election results, which as Noel Kututwa, Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network says “is fuelling speculation that there could be something going on”. Marwick Khumalo, head of the Pan-African Parliamentary Observer Mission, has also expressed concern over the delay.

Our mutual partner, Pastor Promise of the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance said: “SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections stipulate that counting of votes shall be done at the polling stations. This was done and completed yet ZEC is withholding the results which are already public knowledge as they were posted outside each polling station. With Kenya’s violence so fresh in our minds, it is not acceptable to delay the timely announcement of results as if to provoke the already highly charged electorate. It’s extremely urgent that ZEC announces all the results immediately.”

Specifically, the agencies are concerned that:

- In some cases, officially announced votes do not appear to be tallying with those registered and displayed at polling stations;

- It has taken over 30 hours to collate and begin to announce election results, which were posted up outside polling stations two days ago;

- The pace of announcement has been painfully slow. By 3pm on Monday 31st March the Electoral Commission had announced parliamentary poll results for only 30 out of 210 constituencies. Results for senatorial and presidential polls are also still pending;

- The delay in announcing results and the failure of the Electoral Commission to satisfactorily explain the delays to the general public is contributing to tensions and could lead to a situation of instability in the country;

- The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has already issued its statement on the elections. According to article 6.1.12 of the SADC guidelines, observers monitoring elections are obliged to issue a statement on 'conduct AND outcome'. The SADC observer mission only issued a statement on conduct of elections yesterday afternoon and has now declared its work finished.

In light of these serious concerns, we urge governments to take the following critical actions:

- African and especially southern African leaders should ensure that the SADC observer mission fulfils its obligations to the people of Zimbabwe by following through on assessing the counting process and declared outcome of the polls;

- There should be an SADC investigation and response to the allegations of fraud made by independent outside and domestic analysts and observers, in particular with respect to why the announcement of results was delayed when polling stations results were already reported;

- African Union and national leaders should be prepared to lead a process of mediation in the event of a disputed outcome;

- The UK, Ireland, EU and member states should encourage African leaders to insist that the SADC principles are rigorously followed, in particular on ensuring that the results announced reflect the will of the people;

- Security forces in Zimbabwe are also urged to respect the verdict of the people.

*Progressio is an international development agency working for sustainable development and the eradication of poverty.

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Against the backdrop of a blatantly unfair pre-election environment, Zimbabweans voted on 29 March to indicate the direction they want to country to go. According to electoral laws, all votes are counted, verified and displayed outside each polling station. This is especially useful since much of the rigging has taken place in the counting of the vote. Voting ended at 7pm and, in an unprecedented move, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission delayed announcing results for at least 36 hours and only started a slow process of announcing results at 6am on Monday, 31 March. The MDC, through its elections directorate, simply collected and collated all votes displayed outside polling stations and announced a resounding victory for Tsvangirai’s MDC.

Because of the highly suspicious behaviour of ZEC of taking too long to announce official results, there are genuine fears that Mugabe and ZAN U PF want to subvert the will of the people and silence the people who have spoken through the ballot by fixing figures and announcing that Mugabe and ZANU Pf as winners. There are rumours now swilling in Harare that security chiefs are in marathon meetings preparing to rig elections and prepare to crush any challenge to their electoral fraud.

I must say the conduct of ZEC is reckless and inconsiderate as it puts the nation at risk of a Kenya style revolt as the absence of official results for no apparent reason creates tension and anxiety in the people. It is criminal and treasonous for security chiefs to interfere with the counting of the vote and the announcements; security chiefs must be warned that days of lawlessness and mayhem in Zimbabwe are over, in a new Zimbabwe we will hold them to account for their actions. If Zimbabwe’s army and police think that they can hold the nation hostage they are dreaming; no-one can stop the wind of change that is sweeping across Zimbabwe, not Mugabe, not Chihuri, and not Chiwenga. Mugabe has said his conscience will not let him sleep if he steals an election (l wonder how he has managed to sleep since 2000), so he must heed his conscience and do the honourable thing of respecting the will of the nation. Zimbabwe needs a new political leadership with fresh ideas. Zimbabwe cannot move on with Mugabe at helm; Mugabe must go, and he must go now before he plunges our beloved country into chaos and bloodshed.

ZANU PF may want to take comfort in the knowledge that they have rigged before and there was no uprising and South Africa and others looked away and pretended all was well. That was then, this time the people of Zimbabwe will defend their vote; the prospect of another disastrous five years with Mugabe and ZANU PF is motivation enough to take the struggle to the next level, on the streets. What Zimbabwe needs is a new leader with fresh ideas, not the look-east nonsense and diet of starvation that we have known with Mugabe. This time the rigging is easier to expose because results are displayed at polling stations; so we must defend the vote and pray that all patriotic and peace loving security forces must join the people of Zimbabwe and say no to Mugabe. Let us all stand up and act to stop Mugabe squandering our future.

The people of South Africa must stand in solidarity with us in Zimbabwe during this, our hour of great need, and prevail on Thabo Mbeki to demand that Mugabe respects the will of the people. The African Union has rejected all forms of unconstitutional changes of government and the massive electoral fraud unfolding in Zimbabwe is clearly unconstitutional and must be severely condemned as such by AU. In the case of Kenya, the African Union led the international community in activating the international duty to protect the fundamental rights of Kenyans, sadly, it was after considerable loss of life. My appeal to Mbeki and SADC is that they help stop this madness in Zimbabwe now before Mugabe plunges us into total darkness. It is with a heavy heart and tears in my eyes that l write this appeal. Now that the people have spoken, Mugabe and ZANU PF have a moral and legal obligation to give expression to the voice of the people and the respect the outcome of the elections. In Shona we say, Chisingaperi Chinoshura - which extorts all to know that everything has an end; for Mugabe and ZANU PF’s leadership of Zimbabwe the end has come and l urge them to accept it.

*Dewa Mavhinga, Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer.

Joram Nyathi candidly makes the case that what ails African democracies is change in the absence of real alternatives.

A lot has been said about the Kenyan election debacle. Lessons have been drawn locally on both sides of the political divide. Unfortunately most of these lessons are no more than self-serving wishes. In my view, the real lesson is the danger of obsession with change for its own sake, and in that quest, embracing every claimant to power as the Messiah. Zimbabweans are guilty of this propensity.

South Africans look worse. Reading the South African media about President Thabo Mbeki's alleged autocratic rule in the few weeks before Polokwane made me feel like we in Zimbabwe were ruled by angels. So intense was the hatred for Mbeki that his rival Jacob Zuma was assured of the ANC presidency despite his soiled name. It was as if the name Zuma represented a cure for Aids, crime and racial inequality in SA.

It is perplexing. Here is a man who answers to every act of misdemeanor from rape to influence-peddling to outright corruption and tax evasion being elevated to the pedestal of a saint who is being victimised by a cruel sitting president whom he has challenged for office! In any civilised society, the accusation of corruption, let alone rape, should make any decent person recuse himself from the presidential race. Zuma would have magnified his own stature. He doesn't need to be convicted.

Things were never going to be easy for Mbeki from the start: matching Nelson Mandela's affability, dealing with a recalcitrant ruler such as President Robert Mugabe who is universally reviled by those he has hurt, and given growing anti-intellectual sentiment in politics in Zimbabwe and SA. But in Zuma we have a man who can stand up when later accused of rape, violence (leth' umshini wami), corruption, racketeering, fraud and philandering and say with a straight face: "When I campaigned I didn't hide who I am."

In the face of all this grunge you have influential organisations such as Cosatu threatening the judiciary with a "bloodbath" if Zuma is brought to court.

The biggest lesson from the Kenyan post-election violence is the danger of electing into power democratic charlatans without institutional fireguards to ensure such people can be removed later without bloodletting; and our fascination with the politics of tribe and other irrational considerations which blind us to people's motives for getting into politics. It is the danger of choosing leaders for where they come from ahead of enduring values necessary in nation-building.

Anyone who opposes a hated sitting president automatically becomes a democrat. Mwai Kibaki was feted as a democrat for defeating Daniel arap Moi without anyone examining his democratic credentials. The election was judged free and fair. In five years the guy has shown his true colours and those who elected him are shocked by his "transformation" from what he never was to a corrupt dictator and tribalist. To me there was no betrayal of the people but an exposure of bad choice.

The irony is that Western democracies which are quick to point to us torch bearers of democracy subject their would-be leaders to a very rigorous vetting before they are elected. I am fascinated by the ongoing campaign by the Democrats in the United States. This is not a country in any serious political crisis like we are, yet its leader must pass through the crucible of public scrutiny and explain fully what his policies are, what he wants to do and how. It is not enough to chronicle the current leader's failures. Any imbecile can do that. Talking democracy and human rights is cheap -- the test is on delivery.

Unfortunately in desperation for change, any change, we are shy if not afraid to confront our future leaders with hard questions about who they are and their shortcomings. Yet it is the political leader ultimately who gives the nation its international character.

The other lesson from Kenya is the threat of violence if elections are rigged. Forcing people to vote in a certain way on the threat of violence amounts to democracy by fear. It does not represent the free will of the people. It is the need to select for leadership people of integrity. We need leaders who are able to accept loss and victory in an election with dignity and know when to quit.

Kenya's Raila Odinga might have a cause to complain, but to me there is no point in voting for a leader of hooligans, who, after a disputed electoral result, rampage in the streets, burning, raping and murdering people in church. There was nothing among the poor Kikuyu in the slums of Kibera and Mathare to show that they had unfairly benefited from Mwai Kibaki's rule ahead of other tribes. Nor is there evidence that those being targeted for attack voted for him. Yet we read that boys and girls as young as six years are being raped for voting for Kibaki or for simply being Kikuyu.

In any case, if the Kikuyu are being targeted as an ethnic group because Kibaki is Kikuyu, then by inverse rule Odinga forfeits the claim of a "people's president" if only his Luo clanspeople and a few others voted for him.

The trouble with wanton violence is that it never affects the criminal leader himself. Does anybody for once nurse the illusion that Charles Taylor or Joseph Kony will ever fully pay for atrocities they have committed against their people in Liberia and Uganda? Or that Odinga is justified in causing the deaths of over 600 Kenyans because he wants to go to State House?

Broadly, the Kenyans are paying for what has become the bane of African politics -- short-term and opportunistic considerations in the selection of national leaders. Lack of long-term vision in the beginning comes to haunt us in the end.

*Nyathi is the deputy editor of the Zimbabwe Independent. This article first appeared in the The Zimbabwe Independent.

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