The article, deals very clearly with some historical myths being perpetrated in the name of racial superiority. I have recently been checking out Angola on google earth and all over it is tagged by some military nostalgists talking about great victories of the SADF special forces and claims of non discrimination in those forces.

Aluta Continua!

Thank you for your thoughtful and illuminating piece, . Much needed analysis from outside of the narrow confines of a poverty paradigm, and well beyond the official 'criminal' supposition. In my own observations of the unfolding crisis in Johannesburg (some of which have been captured in a recent past issue of this fine website) it was clear that the attacks were not simply confined to 'foreigners', and this is now confirmed by the report yesterday that 21 of the deaths were of SA nationals.

Of course they could have been nationalised nationals if you follow me, but nevertheless, we are clearly looking at something more than a 'fear of foreigners' here, and your piece is helpful in making us survey a wider range of options. The references to Fanon are also helpful, and think this could be followed further and especially in relation to really understanding the meaning of alienation and powerlessness that you implicitly begin to unravel for us with reference to both Lindela and the response of the Durban shack dwellers.

I also thought you might like to know that in my union (SAMWU) there is evidence of both xenophobic comment and profound sympathy for and solidarity with the victims of it, and sometimes from the same person! Unpacking such contradictions could be fruitful in guiding the campaign work that must be done. Hope this is helpful.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/381/48819slumtalk.jpgIn even the most exploitative African sites of repression and capital accumulation, sometimes corporations take a hit, and victims sometimes unite on continental lines instead of being divided-and-conquered. Turns in the class struggle might have surprised Walter Rodney, the political economist whose 1972 classic “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” provided detailed critiques of corporate looting.
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In early June, the British-Dutch firm Shell Oil – one of Rodney’s targets - was instructed to depart from the Ogoniland region within the Niger Delta, where in 1995 Shell officials were responsible for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha. After decades of abuse, women protesters, local NGOs and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) gave Shell the shove. France’s Total appears next in line, in part because of additional pressure from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

Across the continent, exploitation by other European capitalists and politicians has become so extreme that something has to break. Although it was six months ago that the European Union’s ultramanipulative trade negotiator, Peter Mandelson, cajoled 18 weak African leaderships -- including crisis-ridden Cote d’Ivoire, neoliberal Ghana and numerous frightened agro-exporting countries -- into the trap of signing interim “Economic Partnership Agreements” (EPAs), a backlash is now growing.

An Addis Ababa conference from June 9-11 brought officials from the African Union and a few African states together with critical academics and scholar-activists allied to the Council for the Development of Social Science Research (CODESRIA). It’s extremely rare to find genuine coincidence of interests, and even possible strategic agreement, between these camps.

“We can’t continue to deal with incompetent, weak, corrupt, supine governments,” explained Dot Keet of the Alternative Information and Development Centre in Cape Town. “But these are not factors of the same order of magnitude. The domination of African countries by neocolonialism and the subordinate stance by African governments are not the same. We must be clear where the main driving force comes from: outside Africa. We have to tackle the source.”

The conference host, CODESRIA director Adebayo Olukoshi, provided a visionary strategy in the spirit of Nkrumah, calling for a united Africa. Pretoria-based Nigerian academic Omano Edigheji insisted on this happening “in the context of transformative social policies” in the leading countries, in contrast to the Washington Consensus. Added Zambian trade union leader Austin Muneku, “This should be integration from below, by the people and their organisations, not from above by elites.”

From above, many African elites have succumbed to what Olukoshi terms trade-balkanisation, following the lead set by colonial pigs in the 1884-85 Berlin conference that so irrationally carved up the continent. Since 2002, the EPAs have supplanted the agenda of the gridlocked World Trade Organisation, just as bilateral trade deals with the US, China and Brazil are also now commonplace.

A united Europe deals with individual African countries in an especially pernicious way, because aside from free trade in goods, Mandelson last October hinted at other invasive EPA conditions that will decimate national sovereignty: “Our objective remains to conclude comprehensive, full economic partnership agreements. These agreements have a WTO-compatible goods agreement at their core, but also cover other issues.”

Those other “Singapore” issues (named after the site of a 1996 WTO summit) include investment protection (so future policies don’t hamper corporate profits), competition policy (to break local large firms up) and government procurement (to end programmes like South Africa’s affirmative action). These were removed from the WTO by African negotiators during the Cancun summit in 2003, but have re-emerged through EPA bilaterals.

Says Zimbabwean anti-EPA campaigner Nancy Kachingwe, “These are not trade agreements, they’re structural adjustment programmes. It’s about policy and all sorts of other controls, and the impacts are the same.”

Europeans’ regular abuses of donor power include threats of trade preference withdrawal if EPAs are not signed. European capital has made its own needs clear: not only access to cheap commodities, as was enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, but also unrestricted African market access, protection from potential restrictive public policies, and a buffer from Chinese competition.

According to Gyekye Tanoh of Third World Network in Accra, “The key thing for Mandelson is to gain exclusive preferential market access. Europe is gaining 80% of our markets in exchange for what is effectively just 2% of theirs.”

Already, says Tanoh, “The effect of trade liberalisation on African agriculture is a disaster, with only one sector anticipated to grow: agro-processing. That’s the one that most easily invites European capital to scale up investments in joint ventures. Agricultural output would only increase by 1%, our studies show. But the big contradiction is in the export of cash crops, at a time of severe pressure on food products.”

African farmers’ ability to sell on the local market will be undercut by rapid trade liberalisation that opens the way to surges of cheap, often subsidised imports. Women are most adversely affected.

As Walter Rodney observed, “It is typical of underdeveloped economies that they do not -- or are not allowed to -- concentrate on those sectors of the economy which in turn will generate growth and raise production to a new level altogether, and there are very few ties between one sector and another so that, say, agriculture and industry could react beneficially on each other.”

Earlier allegedly “developmental trade” strategies, such as the EU’s “Everything But Arms” deal, haven’t worked, because of strict rules of origin and serious supply-side constraints. There is simply no capacity in African firms to penetrate Europe given this continent’s small production runs and high transport costs.

As Keet suggested, it therefore may be time to question trade itself -- not merely the mythical “export-led growth” shibboleth -- in part because climate change will soon invoke hefty taxes on ships (whose dirty bunker oil sends vast amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere). Yet EPAs will require an even greater African investment in port infrastructure and other management costs necessary to facilitate trade.

Added Senegalese scholar Cherif Salif Sy, “Most of Africa has an electricity crisis, and yet to get economies of scale for European agro-processing companies if they locate in Dakar, they require vast amounts of electricity. And they come with the power to demand a lower price, which puts much more stress on our grid and causes the price to go up for local buyers, and the supply to be redirected.”

African firms cannot compete in this sector, as they lack the brand names, skills and marketing structures that European companies enjoy. The same firms have also no access to EU support in the forms of straight subsidies, tax incentives, research and development funding or concessional credit.

As a result, African countries face unreliable provision of public utilities (electricity and water); poor public infrastructure (run down roads and railways); rapidly fluctuating exchange rates and high inflation; labour productivity problems arising from poor education, health and housing provision; vulnerable market institutions (such as immature financial systems); and poorly-functioning legal frameworks. The EU has no interest in reversing such fundamental structural economic challenges.

From early on, African civil society movements – especially the African Trade Network - called on elites to halt the negotiations.

But it has not been easy to develop a strong coalition, as Third World Network director Yao Graham concedes: “Unions have been too syndicalist, while our justice movements have been exhausted fighting structural adjustment. The local private sector has been absent. But in some regions, like West Africa, agricultural producers have been well organised and opposed to EPAs. Links to the Caribbean are weak. But we are working behind enemy lines with progressive allies in Europe, including within the Brussels parliament.”

Graham points to the surprising resistance to EPAs from the South African government, especially deputy trade minister Rob Davies – in the wake of the 2004 departure for another ministry by former trade minister Alec Erwin (so effective a free trader that he was once endorsed for WTO director in Foreign Policy journal).

Nigeria is another crucial state, one which is publicly pro-EPA but nevertheless slowed the process down and refused Mandelson’s pressure to sign an interim deal.

According to Graham, “It should be possible to shrink the EPA agenda to nonreciprocal market access to goods, and no more. This we can win in coming months.”

His colleague Tanoh says that inspiration comes to the campaigners from Korea: “The Seoul government is backing down – and cabinet has resigned - when protesters attacked US beef imports, and they reversed their trade deal.”

African social movements will have to strengthen considerably to have that degree of influence on elites. “Can a corrupt government represent you when it negotiates with outside actors?” asks Nairobi-based pan-Africanist intellectual Tajudeen Abdul Raheem. “In most cases their negotiating position is aimed at maximising their personal or familial interests.”

Hence, remarks Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua of the World Forum for Alternatives in Dakar, “In these agreements there is inherent corruption, in their very substance. We don’t want these.”

Rodney might agree, as he criticised “the minority in Africa which serves as the transmission line between the metropolitan capitalists and the dependencies in Africa ... The presence of a group of African sell-outs is part of the definition of underdevelopment. Any diagnosis of underdevelopment in Africa will reveal not just low per capita income and protein deficiencies, but also the gentlemen who dance in Abidjan, Accra and Kinshasa when music is played in Paris, London and New York.” (And now, with EPAs and the WTO, add Brussels and Geneva.)

But because Mandelson is squeezing so hard, he may be single-handedly breaking the links between elites. Led by Senegalese and Malian politicians, most of the African officials at the conference agreed with the left intelligentsia that dangers now arise of: - regional disintegration (due to EU bilateral negotiations and subregional blocs) and internecine race-to-the-bottom competition:

- Threats of not only deindustrialisation but further EU penetration of the African services sector;

- Increasing social polarisation (including along gender lines), and the rise of parasitical classes; and

- Much greater gains for some sectors of the capitalist class: owners of plantations, mines and oil fields; commercial circuits of capital; and financial institutions.

Even Botswana’s former (conservative) president, Festus Mogae, admitted in 2004, “We are somewhat apprehensive towards EPAs despite the EU assurances. We fear that our economies will not be able to withstand the pressures associated with liberalisation.”

Moving from fear to confidence in rejecting the EU won’t be easy. But a step was taken by Nigerian president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua during his Cape Town visit last week, unilaterally announcing the end of Shell’s hell in Ogoniland: “There is a total loss of confidence between Shell and the Ogoni people. So, another operator acceptable to the Ogonis will take over.”

In Paris, Total’s Christophe de Margerie reacted: “We have people who work over there ... who are unfortunately more and more often subjected to major aggressions (or being) kidnapped. We are asking ourselves the question (about whether to follow Shell).”

MOSOP held a victory march in Port Harcourt, and its information officer, Bari-ara Kpalap, thanked Yar’Adua, yet also promised more agitation in the Niger Delta “until the government took more practical and sincere steps to genuinely address the problems of the area”. As all agreed, booting European exploiters was the necessary first step.

*Patrick Bond directs the University of KwaZulu Natal Centre for Civil Society in Durban, where Richard Kamidza is doing a doctoral degree.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/381/48821ghana.jpgUnequal and uneven development inherited from British colonialism by present day Ghana continues to divide the North from the South. For Samuel Zan Akologo and Rinus van Klinken "Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Togo are gory reminders" should serve as warning to the Ghanian leadership that it must change course.
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The floods have gone. In September last year Northern Ghana briefly hit the head-lines with washed away bridges and destitute communities. Concerned citizens, benevolent donors and an opportunistic government responded with welcome relief. But now the situation has gone back to ‘normal’ and attention can go back to issues of national importance. As if the North is not part of the national agenda.

There is a natural reluctance to raise ‘the North’ as an issue. After all, is northern Ghana really so much disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country? Are the northerners the only poor people in Ghana? And is it not so that people from Northern Ghana are always complaining? Even if there is acceptance of a disadvantaged situation, this is then often accompanied by the thought that this is all rather inevitable. Considering the ecological conditions, the human resource base and the land-locked position, what is the economic potential of northern Ghana really?

In this article we argue, that there is a ‘special position’ of the North within Ghana. This has many and deep-rooted reasons. We think that to address this issue requires a deliberate effort. Not so much from international donors or civil society, but first and foremost from the government. What we have seen so far is not sufficient. There is a strong imperative for the national leadership to take note of the northern challenge. It is preposterous to think that middle income status can be achieved for Ghana by 2015 with the current pace of development in the North – more than one third of Ghana’s land mass and 20 per cent of the population!

The North – South divide in Ghana has gradually developed over time, and has become more marked and significant, even after Independence. If the slave trade affected all parts of present-day Ghana, northern Ghana was attacked from two sides by slave traders from the coast (trans-Atlantic) as well as from the hinterland (trans-Sahara) for export of slaves to America and the Arab world respectively. The Gate of No Return may create a vivid and strong symbolic image in the castles on the Coast, but for the Northerners there were so many more (and equally tortuous) slave routes to be whisked away on. The abolition of the slave trade did alleviate the situation, but did not stop the flow of human resources from the North.

Within the colonial administrative arrangements, the southern parts of Ghana became the Gold Coast Colony while the northern parts were administered separately as the Northern Territory. Granted that the developmental agenda of the British Empire in its formal colonies was rather limited, but for the Northern Territory it was entirely non-existent. The colonial government focused purely on ‘maintaining law and order’ and did not initiate any meaningful education in the North, even actively discouraging missionary efforts as from the White Fathers in Navrongo. Some secondary schools in the south are celebrating a 100 years of existence, and the University of the Gold Coast started in 1948, yet by the mid 1950s the entire North had six students in secondary school and one attending university. It is just a bit over 50 years ago that the first secondary school was established in Northern Region!

This educational discrimination served to preserve the status of the north as labour reserve for the mines and the plantations in the south. The only effective opportunities for economic advancement during the first half of the 20th Century for people from the North was migration. With no schooling and strong trading barriers, employment on the cocoa farms was often the only choice available.

The historical neglect is reinforced by ecological differences. Southern Ghana is humid and hot as part of the West African rainforest. Northern Ghana, in contrast, is part of the guinea zone, with less favourable conditions for agriculture. Not only does rainfall decrease the further north one travels in Ghana, but the rain is also concentrated in shorter periods with characteristic torrential rains. This leads to higher run-off, and coupled with soils poor in organic matter, crop production can only take place in one, often erratic, season. Yet, despite these more difficult conditions, many more households in northern Ghana are dependent on agriculture than in southern Ghana (72 % compared to 44 %). The land-locked nature of northern Ghana, linked to the Coast by one single road passing through the Kumasi metropole, severely limits alternative economic opportunities.

Independence did bring a change in the picture, but the differences between north and south in Ghana were not systematically addressed. To correct the historical imbalance and the ecological differences requires more than nation-wide policies and demands specific policy choices. The strong social policies of the Nkrumah era did boost education in the North, while the economic policies of the Acheampong regime brought some industrialisation (meat factory in Zuarungu, tomato factory in Pwalugu, groundnut factory in Bawku) and boosted commercial agriculture (rice and cotton). It was at that time that rice farms were so big that planes had to be used for spraying. Though these state-led policies did little to address the structural north-south divide, it did give Northern Ghana a chance to make a step ahead.

With the introduction of structural adjustment, projects and activities depending on the government were scaled down. While the idea of privatisation could somehow work in the South, as there was an elite and foreign companies to take over these activities, such conditions did not apply in the North. The factories ground one by one to a halt. Commercial farms went into receivership. Employment and income collapsed. The market players, who were to exploit the opportunities afforded by the withdrawal of the government, simply were not ready for it. Whatever economic elite had started to develop either sank back into obscurity or joined their brethren in the south.

Economic power goes hand in hand with political power. While the cocoa industry and the gold mines have traditionally been the basis for economic development in Ghana, it is no co-incidence that both are located in the south and that both have received favourable treatment, no matter the party or president in power. Mining may possibly have less potential in the North than in the South, but even that cannot be fully ascertained, as geological explorations in northern Ghana do not achieve the level of detail as the southern equivalents.

Even clearer is the discrimination when comparing the cocoa industry in the South to the shea industry in the North. The government since colonial time has heavily invested in the cocoa sector through research, extension, support to co-operatives and other farmer groups and investment in supporting infrastructure. Even in the market-driven environment of today the government retains a heavy regulatory hand in the cocoa industry.

Yet the shea industry, with similar economic potential, has been systematically neglected. No research, no extension, no investment in infrastructure, no regulation. The industry is left to the poverty-stricken women to collect a meagre income during lean times. Market agents then buy it opportunistically from the women at the time that they are looking for small cash in the ‘hunger season’ and hoard it till prices have risen. It ends up in the hands of a few multi-national companies. The fact that Ghana garnered over USD 1 billion in export from cocoa in 2006, compared to USD 30 million in export from shea is not just due to different economic potentials. It also demonstrates the effect of systematic policy neglect.

While economic policies have not favoured the North, government social interventions have done little to alleviate the situation. With 38 out of the 101 opposition members of Parliament coming from the North and the overall majority of northern MPs being in the opposition (38 out of 49), the government is not inclined to give the North favourable treatment in the allocation of resources. The paradox here is that continued neglect of ‘the Northern problem’ comes in the guise of ‘national policies’, not discriminating between Regions.

Economic policies are characterised by liberalisation and giving free reign to private actors. The private sector is the engine of growth. But the private sector will invest where conditions are most favourable. In the South the harbour is near; in the North it is at least one days’ drive away. In the South skilled and unskilled labour is available; in the North educational achievements are low. Infrastructure and climatic conditions are much better in the South than in the North. Probably the only advantage much of the North has (apart from the upper Regions) is abundance of land, but given the land tenure situation in Ghana and climatic conditions, that is difficult to translate in an economic gain. So, given the choice to invest in the South or in the North, which investor would indeed choose the North?

A similar logic bedevils social policies. National policies, ostensibly designed so as not to favour specific parts of the country, end up disadvantaging the North. The Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) was originally conceived as a programme focusing on ‘Hunger Hotspots’, and was therefore targeted at the North. For obvious political reasons, the government decided instead to make it a national policy benefiting all districts equally. But with programme management using its discretionary powers, individual districts were able to lobby for additional schools. Inevitably, such districts were politically well connected and close to the physical and political centre. With as end result that Greater Accra, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions receive a whopping 70 % of the total funding for school feeding (leaving the other 7 Regions to fight over the remaining 30 % of the funds). The three northern Regions, home to 30 % of the total poor in Ghana, receive a paltry 7 % of the funding! Just two districts in Brong Ahafo Region (Nkoranza and Atebubu) have an equal number of schools in the programme than the entire North (consisting of 34 districts)! One of those districts was the site of a parliamentary bye-election in 2006. In the struggle between political expedience and pro-poor policies, the former reigns supreme. With no political muscle to speak of, the North systematically looses out.

The distribution of HIPC funding tells a similar story. The Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative was an attempt by the World Bank and IMF to reduce the debt burden of the world poorest countries. One of the first major policy initiatives of the new NPP government when it attained power in 2001 was to apply for HIPC status. A special account was opened, whereby the money which otherwise would have been used for debt re-payment would be channelled to special spending targeted at the poor. But once again the reality was different. While the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 planned that almost half of the HIPC funds would be used in northern Ghana, in reality this was only 17 %, just about one third of what was planned! The remaining 83 % of the projects went to southern Ghana, for which only 52 % had been planned.

It cannot be denied that northern Ghana has recorded considerable progress since independence. But the North on most of the social and economic indicators is still far behind the South. Only in a few instances is the gap narrowing. In terms of social indicators, school enrolment in the three northern Regions is still the lowest in the country, even though the gap is narrowing. Yet, while over half of the population in the South is literate (54 %), in the North this is still less than one third (32 %)!

More worrying is that particularly in the economic field, the gap between North and South is widening. In the whole of Ghana in 1992 some 52 % of the population were living below the poverty line. By 1999 it was down to 40 %,. However, for the same period in three regions the poverty actually increased, of which two were located in the North. In Upper East Region the increase was by 32 %, and by 1999 almost 90 % of the people there were considered living in poverty. Out of every 10 people, 9 are poor! Take away the people with access to some income, e.g. teachers, civil servants, some traders and households benefiting from remittances, and just about everybody else is poor.

Some projections have been done on what could happen to poverty in Ghana by 2015, if policies and international conditions do not change. The prediction is that in 2015 the poverty head count will be down to 23 % for Ghana, a further decrease of 40 % since 1999. But the same projections indicate poverty figures in the three northern Regions between 60 and 70 %, hence without ‘the burden of the North’ poverty in Ghana would be down to 10 % in 2015. While the Northern Region in 1992 was 11 % behind the national average, by 2015 this will be 33 %, so the gap is widening. Similarly for Upper East (from 15 % behind the national average in 1999 to 47 % in 2015) and Upper West Regions (from 36 % to 44 %).

Colonial policies for the North were characterised by brazen neglect and systematic discrimination. Policies and attitudes need to change, if the North is to catch up with the South and fully integrate into the glorious nation of Ghana. There is no alternative. The evidence is there for all to see what happens if discontent over regional differences erupts into serious national conflicts. Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Togo are gory reminders of that sordid reality. Fortunately, there are no indications that such is likely to happen now in Ghana. The northern elite is divided, and there is still an economic safety valve through migration, though intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts are far too prevalent. But it does also not need to happen.

The personal route out of poverty for northerners has almost invariably consisted of migration to the south and beyond. And the favoured role for the elite, be it modern or traditional, has been pleading for special government projects or the lobbying for special attention from donors. The political elite, consisting of all the District Chief Executives and Regional Ministers from the three northern Regions, has regularly met over the past few years in what has come to be known as the Mole series. But the Mole series are dominated by the discussion of government and donor projects, rather than in lobbying government for policies, addressing key concerns of the North. The northern elite needs to catch up with the reality that projects, distributed like peanuts to favoured sites, does not bring social and economic development.

Likewise, the role of donors has shifted in northern Ghana, as elsewhere in the world. The era of the 1980s and particularly the 1990s was for northern Ghana dominated by bilateral and multi-lateral agencies, implementing projects either through government or more recently through NGOs. This almost gave the impression as if the government was taking care of the southern part of Ghana, leaving the northern part to international partners. The myriad of signboards for local NGOs in northern Ghana, particularly in Tamale, is a visible remnant of that time. But times and tides have changed. Led by the World Bank, national ownership of development policies is now seen as the only way to bring home-grown development, and many donor agencies are situating their policies within the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy. For some this leads to the pooling of resources, either through Multi-Donor Budget Support or through Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp) for specific sectors. For others, it is more the situating of their projects within larger processes. As GPRS 1 and now 2 do not give specific and systematic attention to the North, donors cannot be expected to do so.

There is no alternative to the government taking leadership in breaking down the barriers blocking social and economic progress in northern Ghana. That is not only in the interest of northern Ghana, but also in the interest of southern Ghana.

*Samuel Zan Akologo is the Ghana country director of SEND Foundation while Rinus van Klinken is affiliated with SNV Ghana.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/381/48823beardragon.jpgIn Africa, the Russian state seems far more ‘upfront’ about pursuing its grand geopolitical projects than the more cautious and patient Chinese. Russia’s private sector too is prepared on occasion to operate with an unashamed directness where others might be more diplomatic." While all eyes are on China's growing influence in Africa, Stephen Marks argues that Russia's Russia's bear is quitely intensifying its hug.
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While all eyes have been focussed on China’s rise in Africa, the other former Cold War Communist giant has also been making a comeback. And at first glance there are obvious parallels between the dragon and the bear, as each seeks to rebuild its African links on a commercial basis while building where it can on the friends and contacts made in an earlier, more ideological era.

Today the Aswan dam stands as a monument to Soviet aid in the Cold War era, as the Tazara railway does to China’s role. And the thousands of Soviet graduates match the specialists trained in China.

But Russia’s recent rise in African trade though steep, is far from matching China’s. The fall from $2.7bn in 1994 to just over $900m in 1994 (only 1.5% of all Russia’s non-CIS trade) has been followed by a climb back to over £3bn in 2006, with a further leap to $6bn in 2007. (See also www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~chegeo)

But this is easily dwarfed by China’s trade volume, already at $40m in the first nine months of 2007 alone, and projected to soar to $100m by 2010.

Nonetheless the trappings of Russia’s African rise seem at first glance to mimic those of China, if on a smaller scale. In September 2006, just weeks before the FOCAC summit in Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin took 100 Russian businessmen - some of them top ‘oligarchs’ - on a five-day whirlwind trip to Morocco and South Africa, followed up in March 2007 by then-Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov taking more business chiefs and officials to Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

As with Chinese President Hu Jintao’s whirlwind African trips, there were reports of major deals, promising investments in mining, energy and even space exploration. And Russia has also stepped up to the mark with the right noises about development and debt relief.

This April, at the first joint meeting of the AU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Russia’s ambassador to Ethiopia announced a $500m development assistance package and a $20m contribution to the World Bank’s African anti-malaria programme.

And Russia has also written off $20bn of African debt, making its contribution to the Debt relief Initiative for HIPCs the biggest of all donors in share of GDP, and the third biggest in absolute value.

A more detailed look at the deals done by the business chiefs accompanying Russia’s leaders on these jaunts shows some apparent similarities, but also significant underlying differences when compared to the pattern of China’s intervention.

As with China, energy and raw materials deals are a prominent part of the Russian roadshow. As production-sharing agreement with its Nigerian owners, followed by taking a 56.66% stake in three prospecting projects in the Ivory Coast and Ghana from the U.S. company Vanco Energy.

Metals have also been an area of of South Africa’s leading steelmaker Highveld Steel and Vanadium. And United Manganese of Kalahari, a company part-owned by billionaire ‘oligarch’ Viktor Vekselberg,, recently confirmed that it had won a mining license for its planned $200m manganese mine. Vekselberg’s company Renova and its partners last year bought the Transalloys ferro-alloy plant in South Africa. Vekselberg has said Renova plans to invest around $1 billion in buying ore deposits and processing plants. Renova is also in a currently stormy partnership with BP in the Russian oil company TNK-BP.

Mr Vekselberg appears to be a key figure in Russian-South African trade relations. He was appointed by President Mbeki to his International Investment Council. He also heads the foreign relations committee of Russia’s Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and is said to be known as ‘Mr South Africa’ in Russia and ‘Mr Russia’ in South Africa. As we shall see he has been in the news for other reasons too.

Putin’s original 2006 visit took in only Morocco and South Africa, leading to the criticism that he was leaving out the expanse of black Africa in between. But since then the gap has been at least partly filled, not only by oil deals in West Africa, but also by Russia’s financial sector. In Luanda Angola’s first foreign-controlled bank has opened, owned 66% by Russia’s foreign trade bank Vneshtorgbank.

Russia’s Renaissance Capital group now owns 25% of Ecobank, the Nigerian bank which claims 450 branches in 22 countries. And the Renaissance group is also launching a $1bn African investment fund.

There has also been a Russian-South African tie-up between the world’s two largest diamond producers De Beers and Alrosa, the largely state-owned Russian producer. The two signed a joint exploration agreement a joint exploration agreement to facilitate De Beers exploration in Russia which is said to have reserves potentially greater than Botswana’s. This followed an EU anti-trust ruling barring De Beers from buying diamonds direct from Alrosa.

But diamonds apart, there is one significant difference between this Russian interest in energy and raw materials and its larger and more publicised Chinese comparator. While a major Chinese motive is the need for raw materials to fuel and feed China’s soaring output, Russia is a major raw materials exporter. Indeed it is rising world raw material prices, partly fed by China’s growing demand, which provides Russia with the cash resources to fund its purchases of African and global assets.

As Newsweek put it: ‘Russia is the world's largest energy exporter, and has plenty of its own metals and minerals. But rich Russian companies want to extend their global reach while they have the money, and with oil approaching $100 a barrel in recent weeks [sic], the time is now. There's another motive, too, analysts say: moving empires beyond the reach of the Kremlin serves as insurance against future political changes in Russia’.

As a result, the detailed articulation of the relationship between the state and its geopolitical strategy, and the commercial interests of private capital are arguably different in the Russian and Chinese cases, though it may not be immediately clear how the difference should be characterised.

In energy for example, Russia’s position as a net exporter enables the state to use its energy strategy as a geopolitical tool. While Russia is said to be running short of gas, this is partly due to the need to meet its considerable export commitments. Russia has been accused of attempting to use German and Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas as a means of political leverage. And at least one Russian analyst sees recent trends in Algerian policy as a reflection of Western fears of a Russian-Algerian energy tie-up being used in the same way.

Thus the Novosti News Agency reported in December 2007:

“Algeria has joined the global fight for diversification of energy supplies... According to Andrei Maslov, director of Rosafroexpertiza, a Russian expert group on Africa, his view stems from news on the expiry of a memorandum of understanding, which Algeria's Sonatrach state oil and gas corporation and Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom signed in August 2006.

“Algeria earlier leaked that it was not satisfied with the quality of Russian military equipment. Surprisingly, the criticism came not from direct clients in the Algerian armed forces, but the civilian team of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

“The Russian expert sees a connection between the two incidents, especially if you take into account the high price of the question of Russian-Algerian strategic partnership. He writes that the two countries could jointly control up to 40% of gas supplies to the European Union. But Europe has opted for Algeria and Libya in an attempt to neutralize the growing influence of Gazprom.

“Europe's vigorous efforts to diversify supply routes have made Gazprom's presence in the two countries unacceptable to end gas consumers. The United States is also concerned … Maslov writes that the end of hostilities in Algeria and growing oil and gas export revenues led to a lightning transfer of political influence from the army elite to the energy lobby. President Bouteflika, who had maintained a neutral stance for several years, took the side of the energy lobby - and received a pat on the back from his Western patrons, primarily the United States.

“The redivision of power affected Algeria's relationship with Russia, especially their military-technical cooperation. The Algerian army and law-enforcement and security bodies were pushed away from the economy, and also from domestic and foreign policy. Until recently, Russia's policy in Algeria was based on confidential relations with the most influential military and security groups, who have now been pushed aside. Therefore, the Kremlin cannot hope for any good news from the Algerian front soon, Maslov concludes.”

But if so, Russia is fighting back. According to ‘Africa Report’ Putin in his recent visit to Libya concluded a $4.5bn debt cancellation and arms sales package combined with ‘a raft of new oil and gas deals...the details of which have yet to be spelled out, and a partnership with the National Oil Corporation of Libya to produce, transport and sell oil and gas. This follows an agreement between Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s ENI to work together in “third countries”.This in its turn is said to be connected with plans for a gas pipeline between Libya and Sicily able to carry 8bn cubic metres of gas a year.

There is also talk of a grand $13bn trans-Sahara gas pipeline from the Niger Delta to the Algerian coast and thence to Europe [1]. While some experts consider this ‘politically and technically impractical’, the majority state-owned Gazprom’s Chief Executive is said to be in continuing discussions with officials from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

Whatever may become of these particular initiatives, the Russian state seems far more ‘upfront’ about pursuing its grand geopolitical projects than the more cautious and patient Chinese. Russia’s private sector too is prepared on occasion to operate with an unashamed directness where others might be more diplomatic.

Mark Buzuk, Africa Projects Manager for Vekselberg’s Renova Group, has the writers tell the reader that “this is the story of how the government, through the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), awarded prospecting rights to a consortium set to benefit both Vekselberg, one of Russia's infamous oligarchs, and Chancellor House, the company we reveal to be an ANC business front.

The story is important because it suggests that the government was swayed by a mix of diplomatic expediency -- it was keen to improve economic relations with Russia in tandem with growing ties of friendship -- and the ruling party's funding needs.”

The article goes on to show that Renova’s BEE [Black Economic Empowerment] partner in the Kalahari deal was Chancellor House, an investment company used as a funding front by the ruling ANC.

It charges that ‘The African National Congress's (ANC) Chancellor House group has targeted investments in sectors of the economy where government institutions dish out opportunities such as business rights or contracts. When companies in which Chancellor holds a share compete for such opportunities, the ruling party becomes both player and referee’.

The journalists also documented outstanding racketeering charges against Vekselberg in the US courts relating to the process by which he acquired control of his companies in the first place.

Those involved in the negotiations leading to the Kalahari deal have denied any wrongdoing, as has the management of Chancellor House. But since the change of leadership at the ANC’s Polokwane Conference last December, the newly elected leadership has ordered a forensic audit of all empowerment deals and tenders that were received by Chancellor House.

This follows a

Cynics may claim that these decisions are more a reflection of factional score-settling within the ANC than a sign of any new leaves being turned. Presumably Mr Vekselberg will be among those awaiting the outcome.

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/379/48635tank.jpgWhat does gender have to do with issues of sanitation and water? Roselyenn Musa gives us a multi-faceted gender perspectives that consider the role of African governments, gender awareness and water privatization amongst others.
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INTRODUCTION

The upcoming mid-year African Union (AU) summit of heads of state and government has as its primary agenda as ‘Water and Sanitation.’ Development goals in the water and sanitation sector in Africa typically address issues of access to and the availability of adequate and safe supply and services, health and well being of all members of the society. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, Heads of State pledged to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water by the year 2015 yet at the end of 2002 some 1.1 billion people or 18% of the world’s population lacked access to safe drinking water, while 2.6 billion or 40 % of the world’s population lacked access to improved sanitation services.

Gender issues are applicable when conditions are bone dry and also when they are dangerously wet. Women and children are the first to suffer from the disruption of water supply and the provision of sanitation services. They are disproportionately affected by natural and ‘man made’ disasters as a result of gender inequalities. They play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water and sanitation, but the pivotal role they play as providers and users of water and has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and management of these resources.

This essay considers the concept of gender in the context of water supply, sanitation and hygiene development. It recalls the commitments of African governments to gender in the broader framework of international instruments. It then analyses why gender is central to water and sanitation and the implications of water privatization. It concludes with some suggestions to meet the challenge of enabling change, recommending gender awareness as one o the keys to sustainable development in water and sanitation.

DEFINING GENDER AND CONTEXT

For the purpose of this paper the term ‘gender’ describes the social relations between and characteristics of women and men. It concerns men’s and women’s participation in the determination of their lives including access to rights, power and control over resources. In most African countries men’s and women’s gender roles determine their access to, power and control over adequate water supply and sanitation services. Locating Water and Sanitation In International Gender Equality Instruments The United Nations Decade for Women and Development’s (1976-1985) themes of equality, development and peace signaled the way for international debate that encompassed the broad spectrum of development issues.

The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (UN CEDAW, 1981) proved to be a major step forward in fostering debate and setting international standards of gender equality. Article 14 (2) calls on states to take account of particular problems faced by women and the significant role that they play in the economic survival of families. It calls for measures to eliminate discrimination against women and ensuring women’s right to enjoy adequate living conditions with respect to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply. The United Nations 4th World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) also calls on governments to ensure that women’s priorities are included in public investment programmes for economic infrastructure such as water and sanitation, electrification etc.

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of women in Africa in Articles 2 and 15 enjoins governments to provide women with access to clean drinking water, enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory measures, including those prohibiting and curbing all forms of discrimination particularly regarding those harmful practices which endanger the health and general well-being of women. It is depressing to note that most African countries’ commitments to these instruments remain only on paper.

GENDER ISSUES IN WATER SUPPLY

In developing countries some 3 billion people do not have basic access to a tap. Women and very often young girls are primarily burdened with the responsibility of fetching water for household use, transport, store and use it for cooking, cleaning, washing, and watering household animals. Men are rarely expected to perform such tasks. Yet all too often decisions about the design and location of water facilities are made without the involvement of the female users, who have most at stake in this regard.

Women and girls spending up to 6-8 hours a day collecting water can consume up to a third of daily caloric intake often bringing back a mere 15 to 20 litres which has to cover the needs of a whole family leading to rationing water in the household. Many infectious diseases are associated with poor water quality.

Carrying this heavy load consumes much of their energy (requiring 600 to 800 calories of food per day). This chore often deprives girls of time to attend school or mothers a job. It presents a health hazard, especially during development and pregnancy periods. They face the risk of drowning if the water source is a river and injuries from attacks during conflicts. With closer water comes less danger, greater self-esteem, less harassment of women and better school attendance by girls.

Water and sanitation go hand in hand, e.g. sewage thrown into the river which is a source of water supply often leads to its pollution. When there is no proper sanitation the risk of disease is higher. It is the women who have to look after sick children, and the young daughters who lose out on education.

GENDER ISSUES IN SANITATION

The UN has declared 2008 the International Year of Sanitation, and a lot still need to be done to make a difference. Human waste disposal is often a taboo subject due to cultural and gender boundaries even though it presents one of the most pressing needs

There is a need to understand the implications of gender in the broader definition of sanitation. Most of the time bad sanitation denotes a lack of toilets or latrines at home, in schools or public places. Sharing of latrines can also be a deterrent to their use by women because they do not want to be seen entering or leaving the toilet and they often have to wait until dark to defecate or urinate.

This has a number of detrimental effects including security in terms of rape and harassment and health in terms of infections that may affect future fertility. Equally invasive are issues of privacy and personal hygiene related to menstruation, washing and bathing. At school there are often no facilities for menstruating girls and where latrines exist they are often expected to share facilities with boys.

While women are mostly responsible for cleaning sanitation units they often do so without any training on the use of protective gloves and anticeptics. This could result in poor hygiene and exposure to bacteria and several parasitic infections resulting in outbreak of epidemics.

PRIVATIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO WATER

Privatization of water services versus the right to water has been controversial. Water for basic needs has been identified primarily as a public good and a human right and not as a commodity to be traded in the open market for profit.

This does not imply that the government should supply water free to the population, but implies that shifting responsibility to large private corporations may supersede attention to human needs and rights and private companies may remain largely unaccountable to the people they are supposed to benefit. This could force poor women to use contaminated water that is free rather than clean water, which they cannot afford. This of course impacts the health of the community, and may result in much higher costs in health care.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Water and sanitation goals may seem ambitious, but they are very modest as these goals do not envisage providing a tap in every kitchen or a flush toilet in every house. Access to clean water and sanitation does not only improve the health of a family, but it also provides an opportunity for girls to go to school, and for women to use their time more productively than in fetching water thereby contributing more to the economy..

Gender mainstreaming would ensure the participation of women in capacity building, design and management of water and sanitation services, but care should be taken not lead to more work and responsibilities for women and exempt or bypass men, but equitably distribute benefits and burdens between the sexes.

Budgets are a critical tool for mainstreaming. If gender considerations are built into policies and project design, they should reflect in resource allocation otherwise they will not deliver substantive equality for women. Also key is increased gender awareness, through training at all levels to achieving sustainable development.

*Roselynn Musa is the Advocacy Officer at the African Women’s Development and Communications Network, (FEMNET) in Nairobi, Kenya.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

*For further notes, please follow this link:

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/379/48637pots.jpgThis year's African Union Summit, 24th June to 1st July 2008, will be on ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals on Water and Sanitation’. What should African leaders take into account when thinking about how to meet these goals and those of The African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa? Catherine Irura tackes this question.
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The African Union Summit is here with us again and on 24th June to 1st July 2008, African leaders will be discussing ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals on Water and Sanitation’. As our leaders deliberate on this very important topic we must ask ourselves whether our leaders will take into consideration women’s concerns over water and sanitation and remind them that women amount to almost more than half of the population in Africa and that their voices must not be ignored. In this article we voice some of the concerns that women would like their leaders to take into consideration as they debate on this issue.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) goal number 7 calls on governments to ensure environmental sustainability. The goal is to reduce the proportion of the people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and states as an indicator the proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources and using improved sanitation facilities. [1]. Whereas the MDG’s voices the promise to alleviate poverty from the world it is not legally binding on Governments but instead forms the minimum standards for which all countries in the world should aim to achieve. As a result many countries have continuously used the MDG’s as a standard for their policy and planning processes. The MDG’s as goal 3 also call on governments to promote gender equality and empower women at all levels including in decision making and policy formation.

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa substantially addresses issues and challenges that women face everyday including those relating to water and sanitation. State parties are required to ensure that women have access to clean drinking water [2] and it further advocates for women’s access and control over productive resources and most importantly participation of women in conceptualization, decision-making, implementation and evaluation of development policies and programmes [3]. This is a home grown instrument that was adopted by the African Union to benefit women in Africa. The Millennium Development goals and the protocol therefore merge in buttressing the place of women in sustainable development, and their incorporation in planning procedures [4].

Water and sanitation is critical to environmental sustainability while sanitation refers to interventions to reduce people’s exposure to disease by providing a clean environment in which to live by taking measures involving both provision of facilities and behaviors which work together to form a hygienic environment [5]. There are various uses of water such as for food, sanitation, personal hygiene, care of the sick, crop irrigation and for the care of domestic livestock and poultry. Women in Africa in an effort to ensure that their families and livestock are well taken care of will walk 10–15 kilometers to get water and carry up to up to 15 litres of water per trip [6] yet their significant role in water and sanitation is constantly overlooked. Women are direct users, providers and managers of water in households and they are guardians of household hygiene [7]. This should be the basis upon which women should be fully involved in public decision making with regard to water resources. Improvement of the quality, quantity and access to clean water liberates women and young girls freeing up their time to engage in income generating activities, education and public life.

States’ failure to uphold the right to water for all infringes on the rights of women as household caretakers because they have to go the extra mile to gain access to water, which is a basic right [8]. In lower income rural areas, women have to use lower quality water which makes the household susceptible to waterborne diseases [9] which in turn drains the limited household resources due to the medical expenses incurred. The unavailability of clean water then becomes burdensome for women reducing the quality of life as they have to forgo other rights to gain basic necessities.

Women usually have no rights and/or access to land for varying legal and cultural reasons yet they are the majority of the world’s agricultural producers, playing important roles in farming, fisheries, forestry and farming. They are the least title holders among the property holders in the world [10]. For example in Kenya, customary law generally limits ownership of land and only entitles access to communal land so long as a woman is married. Legislative provisions may be gender neutral but the application of land law is gendered [11]. Most land is registered in the name of the eldest male of a household. This not only excludes women from the registration process but further predicates the rights to use land to the rights of the male title holder.

Additionally, there is little incentive for women to make environmentally sound decisions and their lack of access to credit (of which land may be required as security) hampers them from buying technologies and inputs that would be less damaging to natural resources. As providers, their willingness to eke out a bare existence despite access to agricultural resources and education on viable methods of farming may make them adapt to less labour-intensive crops and practices that may harm the environment [12] and drain the water resources. These factors may lead to declining productivity and increased environmental degradation. Recognition of women as land holders and contributors to development would motivate them to protect the environment and desire to realize the full value of land in agricultural production.

Women are also increasingly becoming heads of households partly due to the numerous conflicts in Africa, HIV/AIDS and other existing social problems. This means that they are solely responsible for providing for their families and take part in farming activities yet they do not have the legal rights to access water and land (which are the main source of livelihood). Since many women do not own land, women and girls constantly face the threat of becoming economically unstable and dependant on their male relatives or husbands. In the eventuality of economic despair they may turn to means such as prostitution or transactional sex, or bowing to certain cultural practices such as wife inheritance that expose them to sexually transmitted diseases and other health risks.

The absence of clean water acutely increases the impact of HIV/AIDS. The causes and consequences of HIV are related to wider issues revolving around poverty, food security and water and sanitation. Bad hygienic conditions affect people living with HIV and they need more water for better health and general hygiene. This somewhat suspends household responsibilities as death takes away family members leaving destitute children and elderly people [13]. In impoverished rural areas, where women themselves are sick and dying it means that they cannot walk long distances to get water.

It is a fact that the proximity of sanitary facilities to the household increases security and privacy for women. It also reduces health and digestive system problems that arise when women have to wait until nighttime to relieve themselves. Separate sanitation facilities for girls and boys in schools also boost the school attendance of girls and ensure a safe and healthier learning environment. For mothers and pregnant women, improved water supply sanitation and hygiene leads to better health and reduced labour burdens and reduced mortality rates for children.

Poor families cannot afford to buy sanitary towels or tampons for their women and girls to use and women use old rags, leaves, toilet paper or sometimes nothing at all. Poor sanitation heightens the awkward conditions women face during menstruation because it is difficult to concentrate knowing there is no water, proper sanitary facilities or sanitary towels to use. Students and female teachers may feign sickness during their menses to avoid going to school altogether. Given that on average a woman has her cycle 13 times and menstruates 4 days per period, that amounts to 52 days which is almost 2 months in a year. That is a considerable amount of time to miss out on learning and it negatively affects the general performance of girls in school. In Rwanda secondary school girls have even proposed for increase in tuition fees so that schools can provide sanitary towels [14].

It cannot be disputed that sanitary towels are basic necessities for women and promotes their sexual and reproductive health. Article 14 (1) of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa requires state parties to respect and promote and the right to sexual and reproductive health of women. Despite the separate provisions for sanitation and reproductive health, we need to recognize the relation between sanitation and sexual and reproductive health and their effect on the living conditions of women. Lack of adequate sanitation and clean water makes women susceptible to infections that affect their sexual and reproductive health. The use of materials such as old rags and other unhygienic materials cause a number of health problems for women which in turn can affect their reproductive health. Often women have no resources and even time to seek proper medical treatment and for many women in the rural areas health facilities are often located far away and are inaccessible. States must ensure that when discussing about water and sanitation they take into consideration how the lack of these two impact women and the society at large.

Careers and training areas around water supply and sanitation are dominated by men. There is a need to break the social barriers restricting the participation of women in community based forums or public consultations that influence water policies from the grassroots level. If water management is to be democratic and transparent, it should represent the needs of all, that is to say that men and women ought to have an equal say. This process needs to delineate the specific roles and needs of men and women in water management and how both can be incorporated for equal and sustainable use of resources. Some of the basic rights are intertwined, for example the rights to water and land, and a practical approach needs to be established.

During times of war and conflict, sanitation facilities in camps are generally poor and women rely on foreign aid to cater for their needs. Women are the worst hit by shortages of water and poor sanitation because they have to travel longer distances to search for water under very insecure conditions. Gender inequalities regarding political, economic status, human rights, education and health increase the risks during health hazards [15]. There is a need for women to be integrated in the process of peace building and natural resource management.

In conclusion, despite the preponderance of various international instruments underlining the status of women in access to water supply and sanitation, more needs to be done at the enforcement level. There should be some active reflection of the substance of these laws and adjustment of procedures that hinder access of women to resources. The African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women and the United Nations Millennium Development goals have given Africa leaders standards that they can adopt to ensure that the right to water and proper sanitation is assured to all citizens and most importantly to women who are the caretakers of homes and the users of water and sanitation for the benefit of their families and society as a whole. African leaders can no longer afford to ignore the voice of women.

*Catherine Irura is a Law Student at the University of Nairobi and currently an intern with Equality Now, Africa Regional Office.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

*For further notes, please follow this link :

Kola Ibrahim's about the achievements of the Cuban revolution and the negative effects of neo-liberalism are accurate enough; but unfortunately much of the article is sheer drivel, reflecting either a paucity of historical knowledge and analysis on the part of the writer, or an attempt to conceal the truth. A few examples: "...the Soviet Union only supported Cuba as long as her expansionist interest were satisfied." The Soviet Union gave diplomatic and material support to revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements and states, but this was limited by its policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with the West and its position of relative weakness (eg in material wealth, level of technology and military power) vis a vis the USA & its allies. It is certainly an arguable view that the Soviet Communist Party's main international policy line was wrong, but to describe the USSR as expansionist flies in the face of the facts.

"Cuba.. would not... internationalise the revolution..." A truly bizarre assertion, particularly as it comes from an African writer. Cuban soldiers fought in the Congo in the 1960s, and thousands more later on in Southern Africa. The defeat of the SADF at Cuito Canavale would have been impossible without the Cuban fighters.

"[Cuba] would accept Soviet goods at any cost... a terrible effect on Cuba as many inferior goods were brought in without any alternative." In fact, Cuba got its petroleum, industrial equipment and consumer goods from the USSR and other CMEA members at very low cost. They were paid for by Cuba supplying sugar at significantly above the prevailing world market price, and through 'soft' loans on terms which were very advantageous for the Cubans. Through these arrangements, which are usually described as a 'Soviet subsidy' by Western commentators, living standards in Cuba rose very substantially, despite the US blockade. It was when they came to an end that the Cuban economy crashed, leading to the 'Special Period' of great material hardship.

Kola Ibrahim notes that "It is not for the capitalist apologists to teach Cuba democracy..."- but presumably it is OK for him or her as a non-capitalist apologist' to try to teach democracy to Cuba: "There is need for a socialist multi-party democracy from local to national level in Cuba and the ability of the people to determine and discuss every government policy." Well, Cuban democracy is far from perfect as even its Communist Party leaders would agree. But by making this remark without noting the relatively very high level of participation by the Cubans in choosing their representatives and deciding policy, Kola Ibrahim conceals the reality in terms of democracy in Cuba. It is unworthy that a supposed 'tribute' to Fidel should contain such falsehoods and distortions.

George Ngwane

George Ngwane comments on the failures of “State-centric” PanAfricanism which has so far been characterized by “dialectically opposing ideologies and procedural battles on the methodology and ownership of its dividends…”According to Ngwane,

“With the attainment of political Independence by most African countries in the 60s the pendulum oscillitated between an atavist pseudo-nationalist group that held tenaciously to national sovereignty and an economic-integrative bloc that favoured the clustering of sub regions resulting in the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Economic Treaty (1991). Muammar Gaddafi’s convening of forty Heads of State to Sirte Libya on September 9th 1999 was an acknowledgement of the flawed Pan African promises since 1900 and a resolve to rekindle the Casablanca dream through the transformation of a moribund O.A.U to a fast track African Union. Unfortunately the launching of the African Union on 9th July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, stalled the Sirte revolution and in its place erected a Durban evolution…

Until the ownership of PanAfricanism is citizen-oriented through the concrete establishment of common economic values, shared social identities, a consensual political front and a more authoritative African Union Commission, pan Africanism shall continue to stay at the level of futile state-centric theses and reactionary anti-theses and the result shall be the ubiquitous power jockey among a rent seeking political elite, the scramble for depleted resources among the emasculated masses and the stereotype image of a continent that has erroneously earned the stigma of “a scar on the conscience of humanity”.

Clement Nyirenda’s blog world
http://blogs.thetimes.co.za/hartley/2008/06/12/tutu-is-right-to-call-for-a-sports-boycott-of-zimbabwe/

Ray Hartely commends Archbishop Desmond Tutu's for callling on cricketers to boycott Zimbabwe and condemns South Africa's continued tepid response to the situation in Zimbabwe:

“South Africa’s response to Zimbabwe has continue to be cautious and muted even as pre-election violence escalates ahead of the June 27 run-off election between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai...

This soft approach fails to acknowledge the role played by the sports boycott in dampening the global image of the apartheid state.

Such boycotts send a powerful signal that a government is a pariah and can hasten change by providing the oppressed with evidence that the outside world is in solidarity with them.
South Africa’s struggle leaders should know this better than most because many were at the forefront of the apartheid government’s international isolation.

By carrying on a normal sporting, diplomatic and commercial relationship, we are saying that we accept the Zimbabwean government’s legitimacy, even as it blatantly attacks democracy.”

Virtual Africa
http://virtualafrica.co.za/travel/robben-island-virtual-tour/

The Virtual Africa blog presents an life-like virtual tour of Robben island, particularly Nelson Mandela’s prison pell and the famous cave at the limestone quarry where Mandela and others held meetings. Virtual Africa reveals that the virtual tour project began about a year ago at the behest of South African Tourism:

“This virtual tour was included in the official SA Tourism Google Earth layer and we thought we’d share it with you here.

Robben Island has a unique and colourful history: Leper Colony, World War II fortress, Prison and now …. a museum, a place of remembrance.

You can read the history books and look at the pictures as much as you like, but it simply won’t prepare you for the experience of actually being there.

When you step off that ferry for the first time, you know you’ve arrived at a place of significance.

Walking the halls of the prison, peering into the cells, visiting the quarries where the prisoners had to work and listening to the stories of ex political prisoners is hugely educational, deeply depressing and wonderfully uplifting - all at the same time.”

Sociolingo’s Africa
http://sociolingo.wordpress.com/2008/06/08/coca-cola-speaks-out-about-democracy-in-africa/

Sociolingo’s Africa reprints excerpts of a recent interview by Neville Isdell, the world-wide head of The Coca-Cola Company who argues that economic growth is posssible in non-democratic systems:

“Oppressive societies – that is always a problem. You don't get good growth out of those. Where you have a deficit of democracy as defined today by Western elites, you can still have very good growth because they're putting in place sound policies. Not just economic policies – educating their people, having good rule of law, building infrastructure.

I think the real qualifier for democracy to be not just a vote once, but really to take root is a functioning middle class. That is the democratic stabilizer. There's a little bit of a chicken-and-egg situation here. You do not get a functioning middle class unless you have got a growing economy, unless you've got the right economic policies, and those can be put in by governments which don't meet the current Western democratic norm.”

Addis Journal
http://arefe.wordpress.com/2008/06/10/desperation-as-hunger-grow-bbc/

Addis Journal produces excepts of what it describes as an “appalling” BBC report about hunger in Ethiopia:

“It is a strange and unsettling ride west from the Ethiopian town of Shashamene. The fields are vibrant green. There is water in the creeks. The soil is a deep rich burgundy.However, the people here speak of a ‘green drought’.

It is the time when the land is full of new shoots but there is no food. It happens because the last rains failed and few crops were planted.”

* Dibussi Tande, a writer and activist from Cameroon, produces the blog Scribbles from the Den

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org/

CODESRIA is pleased to announce that it is organising a high level research meeting on African Economic and Political Integration and Alternatives to the EU-ACP economic and partnership Agreements (EPAs). The initiative is being undertaken as a contribution from the African social research community to the raging debate on Africa’s integration and development in general, and the EPAs in particular. The meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9-11 June 2008.

Among the numerous challenges facing social research in Africa is the lack of visibility for research output. Traditionally, research findings are presented in conferences through conference papers which are subsequently published as articles in scholarly journals, and eventually as books. In the light of this situation and its challenges, CODESRIA has deemed it useful to encourage African social scientists actively involved in research, publishers who disseminate the results of such research, and the information professionals who collect, indicate and promote the research, to debate and discuss the different issues raised around electronic journals, in order to better promote their knowledge and development.

Zimbabwe's suspension of aid work before a presidential run-off will especially hurt HIV patients in the country, which has been hard hit by AIDS, a national association of NGOs said Sunday. "One cruel direct impact of the ban will be that people living with HIV/AIDS will increasingly die since many NGOs provide assistance in form of home-based care and anti-retroviral medication to them," said the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO).

Informative and timely . I have met Cubans in Cuba who fought in Angola who have a clearer understanding of the significance of these battles than most africa leaders. The African Revolution is still unfinished.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/380/48712fearpolitics.jpgXenoph... must be understood as a political discourse, the result of political ideologies and consciounesses, writes Michael Neocosmos, which have arisen, and have been allowed to arise in post-apartheid South Africa, as a result of a politics of fear prevalent in both state and society. To counter these politics, an active politics of peace is necessary, but for this to develop we need first to understand the politics of fear and the fear of politics which prevails in South Africa today.
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Reflecting on the causes of the recent xenophobic pogroms in the country, it is striking how most commentators have stressed poverty and deprivation as the underlying causes of the events. Yet it requires little effort to see that economic factors, however real, cannot possibly account for why it was those deemed to be non-South Africans who bore the brunt of the vicious attacks. Poverty can be and has historically been the foundation for the whole range of political ideologies, from communism to fascism and anything in between. In actual fact, poverty can only account for the powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators, but not for their target. After all why were not Whites or the rich or for that matter White foreigners in South Africa targeted instead? Of course it is a common occurrence that the powerless regularly take out their frustrations on the weakest: women, children, the elderly... and outsiders. Yet this will not suffice as an explanation. The systematic and concerted attacks on those deemed to be foreign according to popular stereotypes requires more of an explanation than powerlessness can provide, however important a factor that may have been.

In order to provide a more inclusive explanation one should first recall the observations of Frantz Fanon in the immediate post-independence period in Africa: “the working class of the towns, the masses of the unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen ... line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans...From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked...” The collapse of nationalism into chauvinism, Fanon observed, was fundamentally occasioned by the new post-independence elites to grab the jobs and capital of the departing Europeans, while the popular classes only followed in their footsteps in attacking foreign Africans. This suggests that a politics of nationalism founded on stressing indigeneity lay at the root of post-colonial xenophobia. To what extent is Fanon’s account applicable to post-apartheid South Africa?

There is little doubt that the politics of grabbing and enrichment among the post-apartheid elite have been both brazen and extensive. So-called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has enabled the development of a new class of so-called ‘black diamonds’ whose newly found wealth is not particularly geared towards national accumulation and development but primarily towards short term quick profits in a country where estimates put the poor at half the total population. Reports of corruption among state personnel from the national to the local levels abound and are obvious for all to see. Few get prosecuted let alone convicted in a hegemonic culture which extols the virtues of free-market capitalism, which equates private enrichment with the public good and quick profit with development. Corruption in the civil service we are told by one senior civil servant, cannot be eliminated; it can only be managed. Yet how do we logically move from this to scapegoating the ‘foreign other’? In order to provide an answer, we must shift our focus from economic to political hegemonic ideologies.

I have argued at length that xenophobia must be understood as a political discourse, the result of political ideologies and consciounesses - in brief political subjectivities - which have arisen, and have been allowed to arise in post-apartheid South Africa, as a result of a politics of fear prevalent in both state and society. This politics of fear has at least three major components: a state discourse of xenophobia, a discourse of South African exceptionalism and a conception of citizenship founded exclusively on indigeneity. This politics of fear which finds its origins fundamentally within the apparatuses of power, has been complemented since the 1990s by a fear of politics, ie. the unwillingness or the inability of popular politics, with a few exceptions, to break away systematically from a state politics of fear.

There is a name for the kind of political activity which we have witnessed over the past few weeks: the politics of (ethnic) cleansing, made infamous in the ex-Yugoslavia of the 1990s and then repeated in several parts of the continent, Rwanda and more recently Kenya being the most infamous. The notion of ‘cleansing’ with all its dehumanising connotations of dirt and purification is a common leitmotif of all these politics irrespective of their historical specificities. The notion of ‘cleansing’ was also used in the recent South African pogroms by perpetrators. It should be clear that the term ‘cleansing’ is the name of a politics of fear, of violence, a politics of war against those who are seen to be different for whatever reason. To counter these politics, an active politics of peace is necessary, but for this to develop we need first to understand the politics of fear and the fear of politics which prevails in South Africa today.

A STATE DISCOURSE OF XENOPHOBIA

Government departments, parliamentarians, the police, the Lindela detention centre, the law itself have all been reinforcing a one way message since the 1990s: We are being invaded by illegal immigrants who are a threat to national stability, the RDP, development, our social services, the very fabric of our society. Moreover African migrants are fair game for making a fast buck by those with power, (police, state bureaucrats, employees at Lindela). Examples abound, but what is interesting from interviewing migrants from West Africa in 2003 is that while xenophobia from state agencies was consistent, that from the South African people was very contradictory. We can see that today in that many South Africans helped distressed foreigners in many ways. As a reminder for people, ex-home affairs minister Mangosotho Buthelezi who today cries tears for the victims of xenophobic violence, stated in 1998 that “if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme”. In fact Buthelezi developed quite a notoriety for his infamous xenophobic statements which included inter alia the suggestion that all Nigerian immigrants are criminals and drug traffickers. Not only Buthelezi but politicians of all shades of opinion asserted their politics of fear; by 1998 Human Rights Watch had concluded that: “in general, South Africa’s public culture has become increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often make unsubstantiated and inflammatory statements that the ‘deluge’ of migrants is responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment and even the spread of diseases.”

This political discourse has been supplemented by regular police crackdowns on ‘illegal immigrants’ and the setting up of regular extortion rackets by the police in places like Esselen Street in Pretoria. At one point in 2000, when the Human Rights Commission meekly ‘raised its concerns’ regarding “the ill-treatment of ‘illegal immigrants’ in recent police blitzes in Gauteng”, a government spokesperson was quoted as saying that the HRC “was creating the impression of being sympathetic towards illegal immigrants” continuing to state that the government wanted to hold regular meetings with the HRC to ensure that they do not work at “cross purposes”.

The police are particularly notorious, using their powers to avoid intervening to help foreign migrants when attacked by tsotsis, by raiding and beating up migrants in their sanctuaries, by tearing up official documents. All this is documented at length. Moreover, and this is less documented, there is evidence that on several occasions police and employees of various government departments have in the past encouraged members of communities to ‘uproot’ or round up ‘illegal immigrants’, leading to systematic xenophobic violence. It would be important to find out the extent to which there may have been evidence of this also this time. In other words, state institutions have, in the past, provided legitimacy for the kind of behaviour we have been seeing today. Although state institutions have never condoned violence against migrants and have regularly condemned it, they have provided an environment wherein such xenophobic violence has appeared as legitimised by the state. Incidentally it was reported to me that last week , ie one week after the worst of the violence, police i Johannesburg were arresting suspected ‘illegals’ and harassing seemingly ‘foreign’ people to produce documents.

I refrain from detailing migrants’ experiences at Lindela detention centre in detail, suffice it to note that this is not a prison and that the people held there have not been found guilty of any crime. Here are some of the statements from research on Lindela. The Human Rights Commission found in 1999 that “employees of the private Dyambu Trust (which runs Lindela) extort money from detainees under a wide variety of circumstances. These circumstances include requiring money for fingerprinting, for the use of public telephones, and in order to allow access of family and friends to the Facility...” Moreover, staff at Lindela also extorted amounts apparently for the final processing of those who are due to be deported: “at Lindela we were asked to pay an amount of R50.00 before being deported to Zimbabwe...yesterday we were supposed to go home but they asked for money to take us home. I didn’t have any money so I didn’t go.”

In other words people are kept in what amounts to detention - in conditions worse than prison according to the same reports - and not repatriated on time unless they pay bribes to officials. In fact at this centre, people’s rights are systematically denied and they seem to be regularly coerced, including through the use of physical violence for the simple reasons of maintaining control. People are denied a free phone call as required by law, they are not informed of their rights and they are detained regularly for longer than the stipulated maximum of 30 days. Another victim stated: “the security staff here at Lindela randomly abuse us. They assault us. They leave us alone in the Wall and we are not allowed to go to the loo unless given permission. But since they do not enquire as regularly as they should, people often go to the loo without asking. If such a person is caught he is usually assaulted by security officials”.

As has been observed on many occasions, the legislation which deals with issues of migration in South Afruica is founded on notions of exclusion and control and is founded on the assumption that people wish to abuse the system and come to South Africa to take and not provide anything. The idea behind the legislation, according to one author is to defend ‘Fortress South Africa” against “hordes of immigrants”. To do this, police officers and officials from the Department of Home Affairs are given such excessive powers over extremely vulnerable people that bribery, extortion and corruption become not only possible but regular practices.

The press has by and large also contributed to creating a climate of fear of migrants. A number of surveys of the press have been undertaken one remarking that “the general tenor running through English-language newspaper reportage on foreign migration issues is more negative, more unanalytical than critical”. Insofar as the content of the press coverage is concerned regular refrains concern the comment that “migrants ‘steal jobs’”, that migrants are mostly “illegal”, that they are “flooding into the country to find work” while a typical statement was that “foreigners are unacceptably encroaching on the informal sector and therefore on the livelihoods of our huge number of unemployed people”. Other xenophobic repetitions concern the supposed drain which migrants represent on the South African fiscus, the links between illegality and migration (occurring in 38 percent of the sample analysed) and the purported links between crime and immigrants such as in the statement in the Financial Mail of the 9th September 1994 that: “ the high rate of crime and violence - mainly gun-running, drug trafficking and armed robbery - is directly related to the rising number of illegals in SA”. One researcher put the facts straight, when she noted that “out of all the arrests made in 1998, South African citizens comprise an average of 98%”.

Under such conditions, it is not at all surprising that a public discourse of fear and xenophobia has become hegemonic in the public sphere. The politics associated with this discourse are invariably founded on the notion that migrants from Africa are here to take and not to give. After all they are so much more backward than we are! It should be noted that such xenophobic conceptions are also prevalent among professionals. One respondent who had a high position in the Gauteng Department of Health told me that every time a new appointment was made, his South African colleagues sent him a copy of the immigration legislation as if to say that they only wanted Black South Africans appointed.

THE DISCOURSE OF EXCEPTIONALISM

There is a hegemonic notion of exceptionalism in South African public culture (maintained by all and not only by Whites). The prevalent idea here is that our country is not really located in Africa and that our intellectual and cultural frame of reference is in the United States and Europe. Africa is the place of the other. Given that South Africa is industrialised, democratic, advanced in relation to other countries of the continent and also a paragon of reconciliation and political liberalism. It was thought until recently that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 or more recently Kenya could not possibly happen here. According to this perception, South Africa is somehow more akin to a Southern European or Latin American country given its relatively high levels of industrialization, and now increasingly of liberal democracy. To this must be added the view that South Africa must be celebrated as it is the envy of the world as it has managed a reconciliation process successfully. A corollary of this view is one that sees Africa as some kind of strange backward continent characterized by primitivism, corruption, authoritarianism, poverty and >failed states= so that its inhabitants wish only to partake of South African resources and wealth at the expense of its citizens. Africa is thus a continent to be guided, advised, developed and visited by tourists in search of authentic primitivism and wild animals. It is not a continent where we belong, only a place to be acted upon. This view is regularly upheld by the press which simply takes its cue from its European largely neo-colonial sources which are reproduced totally uncritically.

While such views are not universal, they are indeed dominant. This dominance has not been unconnected to a schizophrenia characteristic of the new Black ruling elite which, on the one hand, wishes to assert its Africanness vis-a-vis the old ruling elite of Whites, but which concurrently asserts stridently its adherence to a Western culture of neo-liberal economics and politics. Presumably its ability to become super-rich is predicated precisely on its acceptance in the global world of the new capitalist world order. Africa seems to be an embarrassment to the new elite as it seems to remind them of who they wish to forget, their poorer relatives; although simultaneously it is seen as a place where fortunes can be made, in extractive industries for example. The dominant South African discourse on Africa is thus undoubtedly neo-colonial in its essence.

THE DISCOURSE OF INDIGENEITY

The idea that we are not Africans is complimented by the dominant perception that indigeneity is the only way to acquire resources, jobs, and all the other goodies which should be reserved for ‘us’ only. This necessarily leads to a debate on who is more indigenous, and hence to nativism, the view that there is an essence of South Africanness which is to be found in ‘natives’. Hence the stress on the native (eg in Native Club) which itself leads to privileging the twin ideas of birth and phenotype (‘race’) as the essence of the indigenous. This is extremely dangerous. A recent letter to the Mail & Guardian newspaper argued that BEE deals should be restricted to the indigenous, by which the author meant that “Indians” and “Coloureds” being somehow less indigenous should be excluded. This is a common way of arguing in the public sphere. In fact historically, the only true indigenous in Southern Africa would be the San, all other groups having migrated from somewhere else at one time or other in history. Indigeneity then is never a historical fact nor indeed a natural one, it is always politically defined by those with power. The previous apartheid regime spent much intellectual time and effort trying to prove that there were no people living in South Africa before the White colonisers arrived, precisely to stress their indigeneity and hence to exclude. Most elites on the continent and elsewhere have done the same as they have organised citizenship rights around political indigeneity. Currently I am told, (DR) Congolese living in Angola are being brutally expelled by the Angolan state simply for being foreign; this is not being reported simply because of the current close ties between the two governments. Therefore the issue is not one that affects South Africa alone, but is arguably endemic in the whole continent where the post-colonial state has defined citizenship rights in terms of indigeneity.

In South Africa the post-apartheid state has continued to classify people according to apartheid groupings. This is a fundamental problem, as it stresses the thinking of politics through the lenses of racial and national stereotypes which are ‘naturalised’. Blackness is only stressed vis-a-vis Whites, not in relation to other Africans. In fact there has been a complete failure by the post-apartheid state to construct a nationalism which is firmly rooted in Africa. Nepad is simply the neo-liberal Western entry into the continent. Neither the ideas of the African Renaissance nor those of Ubuntu have been taken beyond the stage of being simply state slogans with little in terms of roots in the population at large.

BEYOND THE FEAR OF POLITICS

It can be seen then that xenophobia is a political discourse, a set of ideological parameters within which solutions to our pressing problems are being conceived. The terrible thing is that other than in a few instances, such a discourse has been unsuccessfully contested and has been allowed to become hegemonic. There is no doubt that many in the ANC in particular have spoken up against xenophobic utterances in the past, but these have been largely isolated voices and in any case they have not constituted an alternative political discourse founded on equality. They have themselves been largely equivocal. We do not like xenophobia but on the other hand how are our social services to cope under massive pressure from immigrants? It should be clear therefore that the recent wave of xenophobic pogroms, was entirely predictable given the political discourse briefly outlined above. The fact that quasi-fascist (a strong word perhaps but I can think of no other) politics has acquired a certain grip over large sections of the poor should come as no surprise. To use Malcolm X’s famous expression, “the chickens have come home to roost”.

The final point then must be one of confronting the fear and passivity, of putting across alternative discourses. Passive citizenship, the expectation of delivery from the state, the fear of criticism, self-censorship, the culture of uncritical celebration have all been noted at one time or another as obstacles to political thought. A fear of contesting authority, kowtowing to those in power, the politics of cramming ‘our people’ into positions, all this has lead not only to a demarcation between ethnic and other identities capable of ‘delivering’, but also to a politics of the exclusion of others as a standard/ normal practice. The exclusion of alternatives (economic, political or intellectual) constitutes the dominant practice. The fear of responding to the politics of fear in a critical and organised manner, to say no to treating people differently, to say yes to maintaining a firm point that all must be treated equally by power; the absence of all this constitutes the fear of politics, the fear of political agency by all of us. This is why those South Africans who risked their lives to help those foreigners being attacked in a myriad of ways should be saluted. Politics is too important a business to be left to politicians alone. A consistent political practice of peace must be systematically developed and sustained in the face of attack. If this becomes an outcome of the current events, it would be a very positive development. The demonstrations in Johannesburg and elsewhere a few week-ends ago were important beginnings, we need to pursue this and not lose the momentum. The alternative is to allow the current collapse into evil to degenerate even further into inter ethnic violence, which it easily could.

We cannot wait for elections to engage in politics for what is right. We need to maintain what the French philosopher Badiou calls an axiom of equality, namely the idea that every single person who lives in this country must count the same and must be treated the same. To remind you of the Freedom Charter: South Africa belongs to all who live in it. The only way to challenge xenophobia is to courageously fight the fear of politics and stand up for those ideas which challenge the politics of fear and discrimination. Some have already began doing this. It is noteworthy for example that in Durban in those shack settlements in which the popular movement Abahlali baseMjondolo has a strong presence, there were no incidences of xenophobic attacks. Abahlali released what I think was the most important [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org

Take action today to stop child labor on the Firestone rubber plantation in Liberia by calling Bridgestone Americas CEO Mark Emkes at 615-937-1000 and tell him to switch from a quota pay system to a living daily wage for workers on his rubber plantation in Liberia. For 82 years, Firestone has operated a rubber plantation in Liberia where there is widespread child labor, abuse of workers’ rights and environmental destruction.

For Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, "Obama’s nomination and his eventual victory should make us reexamine our legal, political, cultural and social attitudes about citizenship and stop using it as a means of exclusion and marginalisation."
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There is a carnivalesque celebration across Africa greeting Senator Barrack Obama historic presidential campaign. The excitement is such that one would be forgiven to think that Obama was about to be sworn in. No where is this excitement more infectious than in Kenya, the homeland of Obama’s father.

Even Kenyans who in the closely fought Presidential elections of last year swore that Raila would never be president, not because of anything other than his being Luo, without any sense of irony, are part of the Obamamania. A 100% Luo is not good enough for them as President of Kenya but they are supporting a 5O% Luo to be president of the USA!

Kenyans are not alone in these contradictory responses. I am not sure how many of the millions of Africans celebrating Obama’s possible victory would as enthusiastic were Obama running for office in their countries. Can you imagine an Obama as a presidential candidate in Ivory Coast? Would he not be reminded that he is not African enough? How could he pass the ‘ivorite’ test when even a former Prime Minister of the country born in the country was disqualified? If Obama had run in the Nigerian election would he have generated the same mass adulation?

This a continent in which a former President (Kenneth Kaunda), who was founding father of the country, a man who served as President for 25 years had his citizenship stripped off him by his successor because his parents allegedly came from a neighbouring country, The former President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, had the citizenship of a number of Tanzanians annulled just because they disagreed or he suspected that they did not agree with him politically. One of them was a serving High Commissioner and the other a former member of Parliament and leading member of the ruling party. As part of his campaign of prolonging his gerontocracy President Mugabe stripped some Zimbabweans of their citizenship. The journalist, Trevor Ncube, was declared a Malawian but his siblings who were not considered sympathisers of the opposition remained Zimbabweans. Ethiopia and Eritrea shamelessly engaged in tit for tat denationalisation of innocent citizens because of the senseless war between the two leaders. There are so many extremely bad examples of routine denial of citizenship across Africa.

The ease with which political opponents are foreignised across Africa would never have given any hope for an Obama to even dream of becoming a local councilor let alone aspire to the Presidency.

Even within the same country claims of who is an indigene, a settler, a resident, etc are used to disempower fellow citizens. And if you are a woman who married across ethnic or national boundaries you are doubly disempowered. You may not be fully accepted by the Man’s group or country and your group/country will disown you for marrying out.

Obama’s nomination and his eventual victory should make us reexamine our legal, political, cultural and social attitudes about citizenship and stop using it as a means of exclusion and marginalisation. Obama did not have to hide his African and non-African origins and heritage and both are not considered to be disadvantages to his political ascendancy. Instead he is celebrating and using them as a political selling point saying that the diversity of his heritage and upbringing equip him to lead a multi cultural America in an even more diverse world. Without stating it directly he challenges the WASP (White Anglo –Saxon Protestant) hegemony with a global cosmopolitanism that makes the provincialism of the likes of Bush antithetical to the wider interests of the US in the world. When he says he understands the world and could make the world understand America, it is more believable coming from him than from any of his opponents.

Obama’s victory should open the doors of opportunity for the enjoyment of full citizenship rights to all Africans wherever they may be from Cape Town to Cairo and lift the veil from the injustices that continue to surround citizenship across the continent. If we can be happily anticipate an Obama victory in the US elections we should be equally prepared to accept that a Munyarwanda raised in Uganda can be president of Uganda; A Nigerian of Ghanaian or Togolese extraction can be President of Nigeria; an immigrant from Zimbabwe or Mozambique who are targets of negrophobic attacks in South Africa today or their descendants can aspire to be president of South Africa in our life-time.

If we cannot accept this we should stop the hypocrisy. If an Obama is good for America he or she should be good for Africa too. Show that you really care about Obama’s promised brave new world of tolerance and inclusion by recognising the many Obamas near you.

*Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem writes this column as a Pan Africanist.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

During the World Economic Forum on Africa that took place in South Africa, the host president expressed his confidence that Africa can overcome its challenges. His sentiments were echoed by Mr Borge Brende, WEF managing director, who noted the tremendous progress and many opportunities that Africa can capitalise on to triumph over the seemingly complex challenges it faces. Prior to the WEF, other African presidents attended the 8th Leon H.Sullivan Summit in Arusha, Tanzania. In his remarks, the Tanzanian president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, underlined the need for Africa to invest adequately in infrastructure development. However, the Worldwide Fund for Nature, in its reports, warned that many African countries are running out of natural resources in the marathon of industrialisation and with the rapid growth of its population. The report says that the global average footprint of 2.2 hectares per person will need two planets by 2050.

President Kagame of Rwanda, this week, blamed corruption and unnecessary cross-border checks as frustrating development efforts. President Kagame further emphasised the need for African countries to put in place effective and speedy integration measures so as to increase trade volume within Africa and with the international community. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has endorsed a proposal on joint border posts expected to facilitate border crossing and enable conditions for a borderless region, an important step towards regional integration.

Further, the African Union (AU) president, President Kikwete reiterated the need for Africa and its partner to address challenges of climate change, water, sanitation and the oil and food crisis. Meanwhile, The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group and the World Bank jointly organised, in Dakar, a fourth regional consultation on their respective strategies on climate change. The main objective of the consultation was to brainstorm and seek solutions to strengthen collaboration between African institutions and development partners to address climate change. The World Bank Director of Operations in Senegal, Madani Tall, said that the AfDB-World Bank consultation proved that climate change had a real impact on the continent.

Still in development related news, the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) launched a 50 million U.S. dollar private sector fund to assist the continent’s rural poor, enabling the private sector to invest in new business projects in the agricultural and financial sectors that provide development opportunities for the communities in which they operate. Despite huge pledges for short-term solutions to the food crisis made during the World Food summit, world leaders did little to enhance the capacity of growers in Africa. According to a study by the US Congress research agency, today’s food crisis might have been avoided had rich countries done more to promote agricultural development in Africa and other impoverished regions. The African Development Bank (AfDB) claims that “a smallholder agricultural revolution” in Africa is required to address the food crisis and turn farming into a business, rather than a means of subsistence, for African farmers.

In peace and security news, the AU has welcomed the agreement reached by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. It calls on other parties to join the negotiation table and commit themselves to the peaceful and negotiated settlement of the conflict in Somalia.

Civil society representatives expressed their disappointment at the lack of funding commitments and political will to tackle HIV/AIDS during the launch of a United Nations report. Since 2000, 14 million Africans have died of AIDS and an additional 17 million have been infected with HIV, says the report, which civil society says “did not pay enough attention to gender equality and violence against women as key aspects of the pandemic”.

Women’sNet, a feminist organisation, is looking for a youthful and energetic woman to join our hard working team. The incumbent will manage the Girls’Net project, and will therefore need to have a combination of project management skills, content development skills and interpersonal skills suitable to working with girls. The position is based at Women’sNet’s office in Newtown, Johannesburg.

On June 3, 2008, national police in Kampala arrested the three activists during a peaceful protest organized by local LGBT organizations. Demonstrators carried signs demanding attention to HIV/AIDS vulnerability among members of the LGBT community. The demonstration came in response to a statement by the Chairman of the Uganda AIDS Commission, Kihumuro Apuuli. On June 2, during the HIV/AIDS Implementers Meeting in Kampala, he declared that “gays are one of the drivers of HIV in Uganda, but because of meager resources we cannot direct our programmes at them at this time.”

The United Nations Security Council should effectively address sexual violence in conflict as a weapon of war and its destabilizing impact on communities, Human Rights Watch and the International Women’s Tribune Center has said. On June 11, 2008, high-ranking military officials from countries involved in peacekeeping missions and women from war-torn countries will make recommendations to the UN Security Council on how to stop sexual violence in war.

Government is considering declaring a national day of healing to enable the nation to pay its respects to all those who lost their lives during the recent attacks on people from other countries. The day will not be a public holiday, but a normal working day.

Citizen participation in local government matters encourages transparency and accountability by local government, and their participation in the local decision-making process is a precondition for good governance. REPOA’s Special Paper 08.26 by Amon Chaligha analyses local autonomy and citizen participation in six councils in Tanzania. This study covers: good governance; accountability and transparency of the local leaders to the community; local government autonomy and citizen participation; bottom-up planning, participation in local elections, and recommendations to improve citizens’ participation.

World leaders attending a high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS should pay more attention to women and youth, especially those living with HIV and AIDS, and seek their expert advice in responding to the epidemic. In addition, interventions addressing AIDS and sexual and reproductive health should be integrated in order to become mutually reinforcing, according to UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund.

United Nations relief agencies and the Ethiopian Government have drastically increased their appeal for funding to help people caught up in the country’s drought and the resulting widespread crop failures as the number of Ethiopians affected by the crisis continues to soar.

The number of grave human rights violations against children in Somalia, from acts of murder and rape to the recruitment of child soldiers to the denial of humanitarian access to those in need, have all increased in the past year, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a new report to the Security Council.

Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai and his campaign team have been detained in Kwekwe and are currently at Kwekwe police station. MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa said that Tsvangirai and his team were on a victory tour early Thursday.

South African President Thabo Mbeki, former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and losing presidential candidate Simba Makoni have all ganged up to help Robert Mugabe avoid the June 27 presidential election run-off. With Mugabe entering the election as a first time underdog, the trio are being accused of trying to help him by supporting the cancellation of the run-off and establishing Mugabe as head of a government of national unity. The suggestion is that Tsvangirai takes the post of Prime Minister, much the same way as happened in Kenya.

South African health officials have failed to advocate for more free water while efforts to improve sanitation have been undermined by lack of funds, resulting in high levels of disease and mortality mainly among the poor. This is according to Professor David Sanders, head of the School of Public Health at the University of the Western Cape and one of the world’s public health leading experts.

The Agencia Nacional de Communicacoes of Cape Verde has signalled intention to legalise VoIP. It will licence international VoIP service providers offering cheap calling and offer two classes of numbering. It has also licensed another Triple Play operator which will take advantage of the change in regulation to offer IP-TV, Internet and voice services. It joins the last real legaliser Botswana’s BTA which also opened the door to international VoIP service providers at the end of last year.

Most countries in the East and Horn of Africa have constitutions guaranteeing the freedom of the media. In real life, however, the same countries ignore or sidestep their own legislation. In addition, they have a frighteningly impressive repertoir of direct and discret, brutal or subtle means of repression.

Relative stability in the border province of South Kivu is encouraging Congolese refugees to return home, but some face problems once they get back – especially over land. Land is at the heart of many disputes and confrontation between returnees and those who never fled, as well as between returnees, be they refugees or internally displaced people.

The Twelfth African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN) ended five days of deliberations today with governments and civil society agreed -- separately -- on the importance of developing a common position for Africa at next year's climate change talks in Copenhagen.

Bringing basic skills training programmes to workers in the informal sector can help to bring down poverty and unemployment levels, while improving economic growth. This emerged at the World Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) held in Cape Town, South Africa. The theme is ‘‘People, Politics, and Globalisation’’.

Pambazuka contributor, Shailja Patel, has just been named the 2009 Guest Writer at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden.

The programme has previously hosted two guest writers, Ama Ata Aidoo from Ghana, and Gabeba Baderoon from South Africa.

The raison d'être behind the guest writer grant is the conviction that knowledge of Africa is not gained only from social science analysis and facts, and that literature can significantly add another language and meaning, and illustrate the diversity. The purpose of the grant is three-fold:

Firstly, to provide an opportunity to sit and write, away from daily chores, teaching or other (the Nordic Africa Institute is also not a teaching institution);

Secondly, to make possible readings to audiences in Sweden, and one or two other Nordic countries by visits to those countries

Thirdly, to add by their presence to the intellectual and cultural atmosphere of the Nordic Africa Institute with its researchers and other staff, guests, guest researchers and scholarship students.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, welcomed Thursday's decision by the United States Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush that the U.S. Constitution extends to foreign detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and that they have the right to challenge their detention by habeas corpus in the civilian courts.

Organisations have called upon the African Union (AU) to revise and swiftly adopt its draft Convention for the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

At least 21 of the 62 people who died in the recent xenophobic violence were South African citizens, government communications head Themba Maseko said on Thursday.
The inter-ministerial task team had reported to Cabinet at its meeting on Wednesday, and indicated that 62 people lost their lives during the senseless violence, he told a media briefing at Parliament.