Two oil exploration companies recently said the discovery of an estimated three billion barrels of oil is set to propel the country into the league of the big African oil producers when production starts in 2010. Some 18.2 percent of Ghana’s 22 million people are deemed “extremely poor” by the UN as they live on less than a dollar a day, struggling to access basic social services like health, water and education.

President Robert Mugabe's government is challenging widespread reports of systematic beatings and assaults by the army, police and ZANU-PF militia as part of a campaign dubbed "Operation Mavhoterapapi" (Who did you vote for?). The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) claim that since the 29 March poll, in which the ruling ZANU-PF lost their majority in parliament for the first time since independence from Britain in 1980, at least 10 of their supporters have been killed and hundreds assaulted.

The International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) is pleased to announce the introduction of a Journal Fellows Programme aimed at increasing the publication and dissemination of pieces from south-based transitional justice practitioners and scholars. The Programme will provide the opportunity for five applicants to develop their writing, analytical and comparative content skills through a short training workshop followed by a one year e-mentorship by leading scholars and practitioners in the field globally as well as the IJTJ Editorial team.

About 95 people have been killed in tribal clashes in south Sudan, which have also targeted equipment and facilities used in an historic nationwide census, local press reports said on Friday. Clashes broke out on Tuesday in the southern Lakes State between two rival branches of the Dinka tribe after a dispute over cattle, the daily al-Sahafa reported, adding that dozens were left dead in the streets.

Climate change in Africa could leave 250-million more people short of water by 2020, spurring conflicts and threatening stability on the world's poorest continent, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner said on Tuesday. Rajendra K Pachauri, chairperson of the United Nations panel of climate experts who shared the prize with former United States vice-president Al Gore last year, said the responsibility lay with wealthy developed nations to curb their carbon emissions.

The second and final day of voting in Ethiopia's local and parliamentary polls was held Sunday amid tight security, days after deadly blasts in the capital, Addis Ababa. Three people were killed and 18 wounded when simultaneous bomb blasts went off at two petrol stations on April 14, a day after the first day of voting in the country's first elections since the disputed 2005 general polls.

Southern African gender activists have called on their leaders and the international community to "act decisively" in ending the Zimbabwean crisis which threatens all peace loving citizens, especially women and children. They have specifically urged Angolans to refuse entry to a shipment of arms headed for Zimbabwe from China after citizen action in South Africa led to the shipment being diverted from Durban harbour at the weekend.

Uganda has suspended the creation of a communications court pending the harmonisation of relevant laws. Minister for Information and Communication Technology Dr Ham Mulira said the establishment of the tribunal has been suspended because of differences over the transfer of the Broadcasting Department to the ICT ministry. He said the Prime Minister had requested his ministry to stay action on transfer of the department pending further consultations.

More than two years after Ugandans went to the first multiparty elections in 26 years, the country’s political parties have continued to defy electoral laws by failing to declare their sources of funding for the February 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. The Political Parties and Organisations Act 2005, enacted a year before the election to provide electoral guidelines, requires parties that take part in national elections to present audited accounts of the monies spent during the exercise 30 days after election day.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47403beat.jpgZimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) as an organisation has strength in its permanent deployment of two monitors in each electoral constituency of Zimbabwe ensuring a grassroots presence. ZPP monitors work in the communities of their ordinary residence, which gives ZPP the leverage to sense potential violations and record incidents swiftly and discretely with a high degree of accuracy. ZPP received a worrisome report last week of the existence of torture bases in Mutoko and Mudzi constituencies in Mashonaland East province and our Provincial Coordinator took time during the weekend to investigate the incidents and gave us the following report:

War Veterans have unleashed terror in Mashonaland East with the assistance of the ruling party Zanu PF. War Veterans, youths and war collaborators are beating and torturing suspected opposition party supporters and local observers of the harmonised elections like ZESN.

MUTOKO SOUTH CONSTITUENCY

About ten war veterans using a new B1800 truck and two Toyota trucks all armed are moving around Mutoko beating up people suspected to have voted for MDC Tsvangirai they are forcing villagers to attend meetings during the day and in the evening with the help of Zanu PF youths beat up people. Bases of torture have been established at Corner Store, Kushinga, Jari, Nyahondo and Rukanda.

Last week on Friday, 11 April 2008 around 1900hrs about twenty people were beaten at Corner Store Base and those assaulted included Desmond Dovi residing in Village 13. The war veterans are led by one Chimhini and youths are led by Brighton Mutendera and Jimmy Chivambu. Our Coordinator spoke to a policeman who confirmed the beatings and the bases. The Coordinator said all those who observed elections on the ZESN ticket have been allegedly listed for beatings.

MUTOKO NORTH CONSTITUENCY

Armed veterans are moving around villages forcing people to meetings where suspected MDC members are being beaten up. Bases have been established at Charehwa, Chitekwe, Nyamuzuwe, All souls mission where doctors have fled for their lives.

On Thursday, 10 April a police officer by the name Ngorima said war veterans visited Mutoko police station where they ordered the Member in Charge to call all police officers at the station for a meeting. They were allegedly threatened with death if they arrest any of the perpetrators and were also ordered that during the run off all police officers should cast their votes at the office before the member in charge. Bases were also established in Mutoko East at Lot and Kawere villages and Bondamakara and Chikuhwa schools.

MUDZI CONSTITUENCY

Bases have been established at Nyamapanda, Dendera, Kotwa, Suswe and Chifamba. The same war veterans stated above are holding meetings in villages and people are being beaten. On Thursday, 10 April 2008 three MDC activists were heavily assaulted at Kotwa and are detained at Kotwa hospital. These war veterans have instructed all hospitals not to attend to these victims. ZPP is still trying to establish the identity of the three MDC activists.

MUREHWA NORTH CONSTITUENCY

On Friday 11 April 2008, war veterans and Zanu PF youths held a meeting at Murehwa Centre around 1600hrs. All shops were closed and war veterans fired two shots in the air to instil fear in the people. At around 17.30 hrs more than 100 MDC supporters toyi toyied in the centre and the war veterans and Zanu PF youths were outnumbered and were forced to disperse.

In Matenda village two ZESN observers Blessing Chirambadoro and another were threatened with eviction and are now living in fear.

MARONDERA EAST

ZPP Provincial Coordinator also visited the constituency and reported that by Friday 11 April 2008 three houses had been burnt down and people were being assaulted by Zanu PF supporters. On Friday three MDC activists were heavily assaulted at Rapid farm and they are being guarded by Zanu PF youths so that they do not access treatment. The victims were assaulted by war veterans.

MASHONA LAND WEST

One polling agent Aaron and three MDC activists Broderick Marigawa, Taka Ganje and Caleb Marufu were for the past two weeks living in mountains in Kanzamba village, Makonde constituency. The four are said to have ran away from their homes after serious threats of violence from Zanu PF men namely, Black Jesus of Mhangura, Thomas Ganure a soldier from the village, Lovemore Mupoto, Marko Gungungu, a Mashintini and one Brown all from the same constituency are said to be the perpetrators haunting the polling agent and the activists. The polling agent’s plight has been allegedly heightened because his parents belong to Zanu PF and are aiding the perpetrators in threatening the activists. The four are in dire need of legal and counselling services.

As ZPP we are getting frustrated with the situation prevailing in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West and in other parts of Zimbabwe in direct contravention of the country’s laws and international laws that the Government is a signatory. These actions should come to a quick stop as no people should be terrorised continuously with perpetrators threatening police officers that they should not carry out their law enforcing duties by arresting perpetrators and intimidating Doctors and victims that they should not get medical assistance. These are serious forms of politically motivated violations and they should just come to a stop in the spirit of letting Peace Prevail.

Let Peace Prevail

*ZPP envision a Zimbabwe that would transform into a society that cherishes the pursuit and realisation of justice, freedom, peace, human dignity and development.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406camera.jpgAs the baton of violence heads over to Zimabwe, Bronwen Manby looks at the African Peer Review Mechanism in relation to Kenya, its shortcomings such as lack of follow-up and political teeth and the urgent lessons from its engagement with Kenya

"There is a need for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarized. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalization and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation can be achieved."

This is not a quote from a report on the recent election violence in Kenya, but from the country review report of the African Peer Review Mechanism, presented two years ago by the APRM panel of eminent persons to African heads of state and defended by President Mwai Kibaki himself on the margins of the July 2006 African Union summit.

The report went on to consider previous violence in Kenya, making observations that are just as valid today as when its writers made them. The APRM eminent persons noted ‘the role of prominent members of the ruling party and high ranking government officials in fuelling the so-called ethnic clashes’. They complained that many of the people involved ‘have neither been investigated nor prosecuted. Some have continued to serve as senior officers, ministers, or members of parliament. The inability to act [against them] tends to underline general public perception of impunity, while at the same time constricting the ability of people to come to terms with the past experiences of injustice and violence thus further aggravating and reinforcing polarities and suspicion.’

All in all, the APRM country review report made a remarkably frank assessment of Kenya’s problems. The report did not shy away from highlighting issues of corruption, especially in land allocation, nor from the ethnic tensions that have been so horribly demonstrated in recent weeks. It identified ‘overarching issues’ that Kenya would need to address, starting with ‘managing diversity in nation building’, and going on to filling the ‘implementation gap’ between policy and action on the ground; addressing poverty and wealth distribution; land reform; action against corruption; constitutional reform; and addressing gender inequality and youth unemployment.

Finally and notably, the report called for ‘transformational leadership’ – leadership that ‘recognizes the need for dramatic change in a society’ and that ‘entails not simply directing change but managing it in a way that ensures broad ownership, legitimacy and self-directed sustenance and replication of change in all associated systems.’

Thus, just two years ago, Kenya was being lauded as one of the first countries in Africa to complete the process of examination by the APRM, while the resulting report provided a hard-hitting analysis of the challenges the country faced and made some important recommendations on the way forward. The country’s decision to sign up for the APRM was supposed to be an indication of commitment to good governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights. Had the problems the APRM report then highlighted been tackled, it is possible that the violence and distress of the 2008 crisis could have been avoided. And yet nothing was done. What went wrong?

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47406map.jpgThe Kenyan APRM report does have some weaknesses. Most importantly, it does not identify the issues relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission of Kenya that were so critical on election day and in the following period. This in turn reflects a weakness in the APRM questionnaire that guides the reviews, which does not focus on electoral management and its independence, but rather the simple fact of holding elections.

A much greater weakness lies in the gap between the country review report and the programme of action which is supposed to set out concrete, costed actions that will address the problems identified in the report.

For example, the review report decries the lack of independence of the judiciary, and especially the vulnerability to executive influence of the process for nomination and appointment of judges. The eminent persons noted that during their visits to Kenya, they had received reports of incidents in which prominent government officials either disobeyed court orders or expressed an intention to disobey them. They state forthrightly that, ‘The Chief Justice being an appointee of the President is not trusted to be able to take an independent decision’ – the very reason why Raila Odinga and his ODM party rejected the insistence by the incumbent PNU that any challenges to the election results should take place in court.

Yet the programme of action talks only of ‘enforcement of judicial reforms and existing administrative measures to ensure members of the bench improve efficiency, accountability and monitoring of judicial functions’. There is no mention of steps to end executive interference and ensure respect for the rule of law.

In other areas too, the programme of action shies away from the difficult political issues, focusing rather on capacity building and resource mobilisation; matters to which even President Kibaki could happily agree – and in many cases had already done so as part of ongoing donor-financed reforms.

But the biggest concern is the issue of political will. Was the Kenyan government ready to try to fix what was broken? Were the APRM eminent persons and secretariat willing to hold them to account? And were other African heads of state who had signed up for the APRM process – to whom the APRM eminent persons and secretariat report – ready to urge remedies for poor performance, or would their own glass houses discourage the throwing of stones?

A journalist and member of Kenya’s national NEPAD secretariat was present at the APR Forum (the meeting of all the heads of state who have signed up for the APRM) when it met to review the Kenya report. His account gives us a clue as to what the ‘peer review’ element of the APRM really means:

"I counted the number of leaders who spoke after President Kibaki had responded to Dr Machel. They were from Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria. Not one posed a question to Mr Kibaki. They all praised the report and commended Kenya for being candid, thorough and open. They pledged to support Kenya in seeking solutions to its constitution review and diversity problems.

When it was all over, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia expressed relief and promised to go on with the process, after realising that it was not a life-and-death situation."

Thus, though Kibaki was said to be ‘committed to addressing all the issues, among them tribalism, poor corporate management and corruption, which were raised’ by the APRM report, he need not expect too critical a review from the other heads of state on his follow-up in practice.

Although each country that has undergone the APRM process is supposed to report back to the APR Forum on its progress, there is no serious monitoring exercise of how effectively this is done. Nor any sanctions for failure to act. Nor, apparently, is there any real system to ensure that the commitments the government makes address the most important problems highlighted in the APRM review. Certainly, no individual or institution at the African level, least of all the APR Forum, raised the implementation of the APRM commitments as critical issues during the recent Kenyan crisis – or, perhaps more importantly, during the lead up to the election, when such a focus could perhaps have averted the near-catastrophe into which Kenya was drawn.

At national level, meanwhile, the implementation of the APRM programme of action is also left entirely to the executive, with no formalised role for parliamentarians or civil society to hold the government’s feet to the fire should it fail to perform. As in other countries, the APRM process has not been well-integrated into other national development planning processes – a problem recognised by the APRM secretariat in South Africa – and it does not appear to have informed other important reform programmes under way at the same time.

Moreover, the systems in place to monitor the implementation of other national policies (however imperfect) are also not mobilised to engage with the implementation of the APRM programme of action. President Kibaki did not report back to parliament on the APR Forum meeting and on the actions he had committed to take, nor was the report tabled for debate. Though there was some coverage in the media of the APR Forum discussion of Kenya, it did not generate a real national debate on the report and programme of action and their implications. The conclusions and recommendations were not widely disseminated throughout the country by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat or other means. Although a meeting hosted by the NEPAD-Kenya secretariat in mid-February 2008 aimed – encouragingly – to involve civil society in the process of preparing the country’s progress report to the next APR Forum, the report of the meeting is surreal in its lack of any suggestion that this review might be relevant to, or affected by, the national political crisis.

Even the continental APRM secretariat failed to engage in any serious way with national institutions, such as the Electoral Commission of Kenya or the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, in order to brief them on the conclusions relevant to them and the follow-up role they might play.

Without this sort of integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making.

There is no demand from civil society in Kenya or elsewhere for the APRM to issue condemnations of countries’ performance on governance or to ‘take action’ on the behaviour of recalcitrant governments (as some international commentators have suggested—for example, in the case of Zimbabwe): the APRM is not a human rights monitoring body, but rather a tool for mutual learning, and there are other AU institutions that are more appropriate for the more obviously critical and political role. Nevertheless, civil society groups do feel strongly that while peer review by fellow heads of state is all very well, it should be backed up by a greater effort by the APRM Secretariat or other independent groups to monitor performance of governments against the programmes of action to which they have signed up. The Pan-African Parliament could also be brought in to play this role.

‘National ownership’ – which everyone agrees is critical for the success of the APRM project – should not be interpreted to mean that the only actions agreed are those that ruffle no feathers and disturb no vested interests. And whatever actions are undertaken should be subject to monitoring and enforcement by institutions that are independent of executive control – at both continental and country levels, by national parliaments, constitutional oversight bodies and civil society coalitions.

There are now 29 countries that have acceded to the APRM – Mauritania being the most recent, after signing the APRM memorandum of understanding at the January 2008 AU summit. To date, the process has exceeded the expectations of many observers. The eminent persons appointed when the APRM was established have, by and large, done a good job in establishing its credentials: many civil society activists were taken aback that the level of criticism directed at Kenya could have emerged from the APRM process.

But lessons should be learned as the mechanism takes on its next countries. The APRM process needs a stronger connection to three critical constituencies: to the citizen in whose name it is being undertaken (through outreach by government, media and civil society); to the political class (through policy planning processes, parliament and political parties) and to the wider African and international community (through African continental institutions as well as the structures through which development assistance is channelled).

The new members of the APRM panel due to be appointed in 2008 will have to take on board the lessons learned so far – and be strong enough to resist the pressure placed on them to conform to executive wishes. The heads of state themselves should have the courage to stick to their original commitment that the process be independent and effective, as they select the next members and agree the budget for the secretariat.

For Kenya, meanwhile, the 2006 conclusion of the APRM report remains relevant today:

"From all indications, it is obvious that the challenge in Kenya is beyond the mere adoption of a new constitution. The challenge remains that of resolving the following contentious issues: the nature and character of executive powers, devolution of power, constitutional provisions for religious courts, and the mode of transition to the new constitution. These issues, among others, cannot be resolved by simple technicalities or constitutional legalese, but will require a modicum of political sagacity to evolve necessary political solutions. Current prognosis suggests that a carefully managed mediatory and conciliatory intervention under the aegis of the African Union may prove crucial in facilitating the much needed political compromise and solution in resolving these issues and minimise loss of face by the different power centres and factions. The sustainability of the proposed outcome will be hinged on the ability to devise a win-win formula while simultaneously responding to the collective aspirations of a highly divided society."

The important and serious effort that went into producing these recommendations must not go to waste. If the official oversight institutions are neglecting to ensure that they are implemented, then civil society organisations must step into their place.

*Bronwen Manby is a Senior Programme Adviser - AfriMAP at the Open Society Institute. For more analysis of the APRM process in Kenya and elsewhere see

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The Young Communist League of South Africa [YCLSA] had sent its delegation to Zimbabwe as observers in the recently held elections. The purpose of the mission was to make our own observation independent of various observer missions.

The delegation was led by the Deputy National Secretary, Cde. Khayelihle Nkwanyana, and comprised of 12 members of the YCLSA drawn from district, provincial and National Committees. The delegation was based in the three main regions of Zimbabwe, which are Bulawayo, Harare and the Midlands.

INTIMIDATION OF THE DELEGATION

It should be noted that the delegation observed constatnt surveillance from the Central Intelligence Officers, which led to three members of the delegation returning to South Africa before they were due. In the same vein, one members of then delegation who was based in Bulawayo was interogated by the CIO. This shows the level of intimidation that is still prevalent in Zimbabwe.

We are however pleased that the Zimbabwe government allowed our delegation to enter and leave the country without any major intereference of the mission.

We engaged various formations and structures that are active in Zimbabwe. Amongst those were our interactions with civil society organizations, the attendance of political rallies of the contesting parties. We engaged with the Youth structures such as the NYDT, student formation ZINASU and individual candidates contesting in constituencies for Parliament and Local government from all the political parties.

ABSENT CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Our observation as the YCL is that conditions towards elections were not conducive to be regarded as "free and fair elections" because of the following factors:

1. The State controlled media (the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the paper – Herald) were openly campaigning for the incumbent President, vilifying the contesting opponents and giving more TV airtime and paper spaces to the ZANU-PF.

2. No voter education done given that these elections were harmonized for the first time with Presidential, Senate, Parliament and Local government level.

3. Voters roll was not given to the opposition, this underpinned the court challenge against the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and dead people in the voters roll.

4. Delimitation of constituencies in favour of the ruling party.

5. Polling station where there was no people residing in the area.

6. The Army generals who threaten Zimbabweans that they will not support any Head of State except Mugabe.

7. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is ran by senior leaders of the Zanu PF.

The current electoral results which are displayed outside the various polling stations shows that the MDC has won this current electoral process in all the four categories. The remaining result for the Presidential contest is reported to be in favour of Morgan Tswangirai. There is fear of rigging the Presidential leg, thus the delay of the announcement of the results.

As the YCL we are calling for the ZANU PF and the current President of Zimbabwe to accept the will of the people. He must accept the outcomes without any attempt of rigging.

(The actual parliamentary votes as tabulated by the opposition has MDC-Tsvangirai at 14, Zanu at 2 and MDC-Mutambara at 1. See

INTERVENTION BY SADC, AFRICAN UNION AND UNITED NATIONS ON THE POST ELECTIONS' PROCESS

We are calling, once more, the SADC and AU to immediately deploy the peace keeping mission in Zimbabwe to avoid any instability that might be generated by the electoral outcomes. There is fear for the Kenyan situation if Mugabe force his way back. And there is fear about the Army and police staging a coup if the opposition takes the Presidency.

In this regard, we call for the immediate deployment of SADC and United Nations Peace Keeping forces so as to avert any attempt towards sinking Zimbabwe further into violence.

This should serve as a post elections process undertaken by all the parties involved in the elections and all the countries in the region.

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47412violence.jpgSam Kabele looks at the fault lines along which violence in Zimbabwe is traveling and calls for solidarity the Zimbabwean people

At the time of writing President Mugabe is refusing to engage with his reasonably supine fellow southern African leaders, concerned about the crisis and lack of declared results from the presidential elections. Instead he has chosen the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence with reports coming in especially in Manicaland of targeted intimidation and beatings of opposition activists, especially in areas that swung to MDC. The votes in the parliamentary elections went so overwhelming for the opposition that the government was unable to fix that election and we thus had a historic victory for the Movement for Democratic Change. It seems clear the ruling ZANU-PF party are desperately trying to avoid a similar meltdown in the presidential ones. So, unsurprisingly, Zimbabwe’s High Court refused to rule on the MDC’s urgent application for release of the presidential election results on April 14. 

As President Mugabe opts for the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence, it is worth asking how we even reached the stage where the opposition was allowed to win the parliamentary elections and where the usual violence and intimidation appear not to have paid off. Were the ruling party over-confident and the rest of us, expecting the usual stolen election, too dismissive of the effect of the crisis on ordinary Zimbabweans – urban and rural? Of course in any normal situation, hyperinflation signals an end to any ruling government, but Zimbabwean ‘normality’ has been different since 2000, and arguably before that. Given the normal retaliation that ZANU-PF unleashes when it is threatened as in 2000 after the referendum (farm invasions etc) and Operation Murambatsvina after 2005, there is a second and probably more important question. Who is willing and able to stop a descent into repression and violence? And, thirdly, who in Zimbabwe and the region has the strategic vision to change this? Is there still the possibility of a peaceful transition (even if not a transformation as such)? 

The ZANU-PF government has largely appeared impervious to international pressure to reverse repression and its economic policies. Zimbabwe has few close allies, after leaving the Commonwealth, having been near to expulsion from the International Monetary Fund (perhaps the only possibly advantageous element), its policies criticised by the UN and some African institutions like the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and with its elite subject to ‘smart’ sanctions from the EU, Switzerland, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has retained some African, Chinese and some Third World state and popular support by astute playing of the ‘anti-imperialist card’.   Is, however, the southern African region now sufficiently worried to push harder for real change after the (unadmitted) failure of their negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’?

CAN ZIMBABWEANS CONTINUE THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR MASSIVE REJECTION OF ZANU-PF?

Whilst the results dribbled out, the courts are largely supine and the counter-offensive starts. After the failure of the negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’ perhaps the real question is whether their self-interest in a reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe is likely to continue? With the exception of South Africa’s ANC president Jacob Zuma - who called for the election results to be declared after meeting Zimbabwe’s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai - the region has been largely silent. It has, however, after its weekend summit issued a lame statement calling for the election results to be ‘expeditiously’ declared and for the parties to contest any run-off. This is despite evidence of increased intimidation and violence and strong opposition from regional civil society.

The only path appears to be people power, but is the fearful population, committed peaceful forms, subject to eight years of intimidation, and having to engage in every possible strategy for mere survival able to sustain this? Recent general strikes such as the one called for from 15th April cannot really be anything other than staying at home since only 8% of Zimbabweans are actually employed. 

It has been argued that in any transition Zimbabwe should be characterised as a post-conflict state since it exhibits many characteristics of a society in violent conflict due to the scale of economic collapse and casualisation, political violence and social trauma, the breakdown of basic services (although the party structure of ZANU-PF remains intact), mass flight of people and capital. Zimbabwe currently has the highest rate of inflation in the world, with an annual rate of over 100,000%.

1. Wages have plummeted as the cost of necessities spirals out of control.  About 80% of the country’s population lives in poverty, while about 3 million people have left the country in search of work.

2. Failed agricultural policies have meant widespread food shortages of food with this year’s harvest predicted to be one of the lowest on record.

3. Agriculture was the motor of the pre-crisis economy, but is massively depleted in production and export. Zimbabwe once a food exporter (in good years) is now food insecure with up to half the population reliant on food aid.

4. The above is particularly worrying given the generalised HIV and AIDS pandemic and life expectancy being the lowest in the world at 34 years for men and 33 years for women.

5. The humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by government food distribution being manipulated to secure votes.

6. Demands for change emanating from civil society have been routinely suppressed by the state, including the use of assaults, arrests and torture.7 The number of health professionals fleeing the country has escalated while resources for the health sector have collapsed, with dire effects on the around 20% of the population with HIV or AIDS.  

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence in all its parallels with the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and at the same time becoming more vicious. The combination of centrally directed and presidential-inspired incitement to violence, including sexual violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, the use of informer networks and covert ‘Third Force’ hit squads to brutalise the opposition and destroy its structures before elections, and the manipulation of the media and hate speech attacks, all seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition and licensed informal violence. However, whether through over-confidence or under pressure from South Africa and the region, there was less violence in this election with both the opposition factions of the MDC and the ZANU-PF ‘renegade’ Simba Makoni being able to campaign in rural areas. 

Several post-Mugabe scenarios are possible, including a transition to Mugabeism without Mugabe, an MDC-led government, the rise of a reformist faction within ZANU-PF, a broad government of national unity, a military coup, or even a descent into chaos. But at present a Mugabe hardball response urged on by the ‘Jacobin’ faction inside the party around a presidential run-off seems likely. Violence and intimidation have worked in the past to keep the president in power, have tended to divert the party from its internal divisions, and sidelines the ‘moderate’ ZANU-PF faction which is tempted to reach out to MDC and the international community – not least to try to safeguard their businesses, and other resources including land. Use of the militia and to some extent the police also avoids using the military some of whose loyalty is suspect – at elite level where the would-be kingmaker is thought to have bankrolled the Makoni presidential bid, and at lower ranks level, where many soldiers presumably voted MDC. 

ELECTIONS

The background to the elections was of fear of state-sanctioned violence through use of police, military and militias with the aim of ensuring a ruling party victory at whatever cost8.  Conditions for free and fair elections in the called for in the recent pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops were not followed. Key aspects of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ratified by the Zimbabwean government were not respected.9  These included the pro-government bias of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)10, insufficient mechanisms for voter registration and roll inspection and ZEC failing to clearly publicise boundaries of new voting constituencies and locations of polling stations. There was also the disqualification of three million diaspora Zimbabweans, lack of voter education, state domination of the media and a lack of independent international and civil society observers.  

All reports from partners and credible observers note that the organisation of the elections was partisan, the opposition parties had little access to state media and to rural areas of the country, and the state media overwhelmingly privileged the messages of the ruling ZANU-PF party11. Nor was there sufficient time between the unilateral announcement on 25th January of the election date for political parties to organise their campaigns. Indeed the electoral commission itself was disorganised as well as partisan. The weighting of the new constituencies is also towards the rural areas – normally seen as government strongholds where opposition parties rarely get access. (But it seems that rural voters were less intimated, including in areas that were formerly ZANU-PF-leaning, although there have to be concerns about any second round where there are no observers). There were widespread reports of government attempting to buy voters’ allegiances through provision of agricultural equipment and (deferred) pay rises to the armed forces and teachers. President Mugabe also amended the electoral law on 18th March to allow the police into polling stations - widely seen as an intimidating tactic, although it is not certain that it was that effective. 

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS

The conditions of the post-election period do not promise well for Zimbabwe escaping from its current interlinked crises and hence helping to stem the increasing poverty of its citizens. Civil society is currently working out its strategy, but it is uncertain what the MDC’s is bar the general strike weapon and Tsvangirai’s regional tour of uninterested leaders. There are worries in civil society that violence and intimidation will characterise any possible second round and that manipulation of results is aimed at gaining either an outright victory or to provide a weakened MDC that will be railroaded into a spurious government of ‘national unity’ to provide greater regional and international legitimacy for continued ZANU-PF misrule. 

It seems that any effective response to the Zimbabwean crisis must be African-led, however unlikely that currently seems.  There should be support and encouragement for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and SADC to provide stronger political mediation in the post-election period aimed at securing government commitment to political and economic reform and to the restoration of basic rights of citizens. Secondly, there is a need to respond to the long-term humanitarian crisis and its effects on the people of Zimbabwe. 

Even if Mugabe were to win the run-off vote he faces a country in total meltdown. A transition point - if not a transformation point - now appears inevitable. The immediate tasks will be to reform the security and legal sectors; create legitimate institutions of government; political reconciliation; rebuild the state; economic recovery, normalisation of relations with the international community for aid; debt relief  and investment. All will take place under circumstances in which Zimbabweans will be extremely vulnerable to externally imposed agendas.

Sequencing of reform will be vital. A return to due process of law and transparency needs to take place with depoliticisation, demilitarisation and demilitia-isation of formal and informal state institutions top of the agenda. Perhaps Zimbabwe can then start to move away from a culture of violence, impunity, corruption and cronyism.

Addressing the question of land will be a volatile process. There will need to be a detailed investigation into who has what land under what conditions. It would be politically unacceptable to return to the highly unequal colonial-pattern of land ownership. But for those former commercial farmers prepared to share their expertise innovative land sharing/ renting schemes could be piloted.

The tasks will be immense and there is already talk of creating a Trust Fund to help Zimbabwe’s absorptive capacity which will be fairly modest. Measures to help the skilled and the diaspora return will need to be balanced with employment creating schemes for those who stayed,without overwhelming what few social services remain. Health care professionals could be invited back, initially on a short term basis without losing residence rights elsewhere, and with a range of inventive packages.  

A national convention process could be vital in producing a new people-driven constitution. A stakeholder conference to take this forward could address issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform, land reform, truth recovery and economic and social recovery.

Promoting justice and reconciliation will be a long term process, but Zimbabwe is one of the best-documented sustained human rights abuse processes. Finally from a rather longer run historical view are we seeing the end of the sustainability of the nationalist/ liberation project as it is unable to recuperate and reproduce itself except through violence? State authoritarianism had the dual inheritance of the interventionist settler state and the command politics of the liberation movements.

The seeming illogicality of the politics of disorder has been functional for rewarding clients and supporters, once the original nationalist coalition of workers, peasants, trade unionists, urban dwellers, students and intellectuals had been destroyed through structural adjustment, elite accumulation strategies and corruption. ZANU-PF has been unable to address what Chris Alden saw as the interlinked crises of illegitimacy, expectations and governance; it has only been able to respond through violence/ clientilism, destruction of the disparate social forces opposed to it such as farmers, farmworkers and urban dwellers through militarisation/ militia-isation. This has been accompanied by a location of the crisis as external – Western imperialism and ‘sanctions’. Whilst these have their niche the crisis is overwhelmingly local although not without an initial external dimension that Patrick Bond has pointed to - acceptance of settler debts, ESAP etc, with an ideological debate around ‘who is a real Zimbabwean’? This has acted to exclude urban, white, farmworker, professional etc Zimbabweans through denial of their legitimacy as citizens. The battleground is not just economic and political but also ideological through identity, exclusion and exclusion questions and demonisation of non-ZANU supporters, ruralisation/ totems etc.  

For now Zimbabweans need the greatest international solidarity and pressure on regional governments. The UN Security Council should also be a forum for laying open the human rights abuses which are likely to get worse in the days and weeks ahead. 

*Sam Kabele is a human rights activist. 

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kenyan civil society for their solidarity [Kenyans call and solidarity with Zimbabwe, Indeed Zimbabwe is too big to be left to Zimbabweans alone and all people world over have the duty to at least denounce the evil and ensure the good triumphs.Your words of solidarity and encouragement is a source of hope and strength to most activists in Zimbabwe.

In the same way that US cotton farm subsidies hurt African cotton farmers by depressing the world market, Bill Quigley argues that by subsidizing its rice farmers, the US has gravely hurt Haitian rice farmers.

Riots in Haiti over explosive rises in food costs have claimed the lives of six people.  There have also been food riots world-wide in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivorie, Egypt, Guinea, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

The Economist, which calls the current crisis the silent tsunami, reports that last year wheat prices rose 77% and rice 16%, but since January rice prices have risen 141%. The reasons include rising fuel costs, weather problems, increased demand in China and India, as well as the push to create biofuels from cereal crops.

Hermite Joseph, a mother working in the markets of Port au Prince, told journalist Nick Whalen that her two kids are "like toothpicks - they're not getting enough nourishment.  Before, if you had a dollar twenty-five cents, you could buy vegetables, some rice, 10 cents of charcoal and a little cooking oil. Right now, a little can of rice alone costs 65 cents, and is not good rice at all.  Oil is 25 cents.  Charcoal is 25 cents. With a dollar twenty-five, you can't even make a plate of rice for one child."

The St. Claire's Church Food program, in the Tiplas Kazo neighborhood of Port au Prince, serves 1000 free meals a day, almost all to hungry children - five times a week in partnership with the What If Foundation.  Children from Cite Soleil have been known to walk the five miles to the church for a meal. The cost of rice, beans, vegetables, a little meat, spices, cooking oil, propane for the stoves, have gone up dramatically. Because of the rise in the cost of food, the portions are now smaller.  But hunger is on the rise and more and more children come for the free meal.  Hungry adults used to be allowed to eat the leftovers once all the children were fed, but now there are few leftovers.

The New York Times lectured Haiti on April 18 that "Haiti, its agriculture industry in shambles, needs to better feed itself." Unfortunately, the article did not talk at all about one of the main causes of the shortages - the fact that the U.S. and other international financial bodies destroyed Haitian rice farmers to create a major market for the heavily subsidized rice from U.S. farmers.  This is not the only cause of hunger in Haiti and other poor countries, but it is a major force.

Thirty years ago, Haiti raised nearly all the rice it needed. What happened?

In 1986, after the expulsion of Haitian dictator Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loaned Haiti $24.6 million in desperately needed funds (Baby Doc had raided the treasury on the way out). But, in order to get the IMF loan, Haiti was required to reduce tariff protections for their Haitian rice and other agricultural products and some industries to open up the country's markets to competition from outside countries.  The U.S. has by far the largest voice in decisions of the IMF.

Doctor Paul Farmer was in Haiti then and saw what happened. "Within less than two years, it became impossible for Haitian farmers to compete with what they called 'Miami rice.'  The whole local rice market in Haiti fell apart as cheap, U.S. subsidized rice, some of it in the form of 'food aid,' flooded the market. There was violence, 'rice wars,' and lives were lost."

"American rice invaded the country," recalled Charles Suffrard, a leading rice grower in Haiti in an interview with the Washington Post in 2000.  By 1987 and 1988, there was so much rice coming into the country that many stopped working the land.

Fr. Gerard Jean-Juste, a Haitian priest who has been the pastor at St. Claire and an outspoken human rights advocate, agrees.  "In the 1980s, imported rice poured into Haiti, below the cost of what our farmers could produce it.  Farmers lost their businesses.  People from the countryside started losing their jobs and moving to the cities.  After a few years of cheap imported rice, local production went way down."

Still the international business community was not satisfied. In 1994, as a condition for U.S. assistance in returning to Haiti to resume his elected Presidency, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced by the U.S., the IMF, and the World Bank to open up the markets in Haiti even more.

But, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, what reason could the U.S. have in destroying the rice market of this tiny country?

Haiti is definitely poor.  The U.S. Agency for International Development reports the annual per capita income is less than $400.   The United Nations reports life expectancy in Haiti is 59, while in the US it is 78.  Over 78% of Haitians live on less than $2 a day, more than half live on less than $1 a day.

Yet Haiti has become one of the very top importers of rice from the U.S.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008 numbers show Haiti is the third largest importer of US rice - at over 240,000 metric tons of rice. (One metric ton is 2200 pounds).

Rice is a heavily subsidized business in the U.S.  Rice subsidies in the U.S. totaled $11 billion from 1995 to 2006.  One producer alone, Riceland Foods Inc of Stuttgart Arkansas, received over $500 million dollars in rice subsidies between 1995 and 2006.

The Cato Institute recently reported that rice is one of the most heavily supported commodities in the U.S. - with three different subsidies together averaging over $1 billion a year since 1998 and projected to average over $700 million a year through 2015. The result?  "Tens of millions of rice farmers in poor countries find it hard to lift their families out of poverty because of the lower, more volatile prices caused by the interventionist policies of other countries."

In addition to three different subsidies for rice farmers in the U.S., there are also direct tariff barriers of 3 to 24 percent, reports Daniel Griswold of the Cato Institute - the exact same type of protections, though much higher, that the U.S. and the IMF required Haiti to eliminate in the 1980s and 1990s.

U.S. protection for rice farmers goes even further. A 2006 story in the Washington Post found that the federal government has paid at least $1.3 billion in subsidies for rice and other crops since 2000 to individuals who do no farming at all; including $490,000 to a Houston surgeon who owned land near Houston that once grew rice.

And it is not only the Haitian rice farmers who have been hurt.

Paul Farmer saw it happen to the sugar growers as well.  "Haiti, once the world's largest exporter of sugar and other tropical produce to Europe, began importing even sugar-- from U.S. controlled sugar production in the Dominican Republic and Florida.  It was terrible to see Haitian farmers put out of work.  All this sped up the downward spiral that led to this month's food riots."

After the riots and protests, President Rene Preval of Haiti agreed to reduce the price of rice, which was selling for $51 for a 110 pound bag, to $43 dollars for the next month.   No one thinks a one month fix will do anything but delay the severe hunger pains a few weeks.

Haiti is far from alone in this crisis.  The Economist reports a billion people worldwide live on $1 a day.  The US-backed Voice of America reports about 850 million people were suffering from hunger worldwide before the latest round of price increases.

Thirty three countries are at risk of social upheaval because of rising food prices, World Bank President Robert Zoellick told the Wall Street Journal.  When countries have many people who spend half to three-quarters of their daily income on food, "there is no margin of survival."

In the U.S., people are feeling the world-wide problems at the gas pump and in the grocery.  Middle class people may cut back on extra trips or on high price cuts of meat.  The number of people on food stamps in the US is at an all-time high. But in poor countries, where malnutrition and hunger were widespread before the rise in prices, there is nothing to cut back on except eating.  That leads to hunger riots.

In the short term, the world community is sending bags of rice to Haiti.  Venezuela sent 350 tons of food.  The US just pledged $200 million extra for worldwide hunger relief.  The UN is committed to distributing more food.

What can be done in the medium term?  The US provides much of the world's food aid, but does it in such a way that only half of the dollars spent actually reach hungry people.   US law requires that food aid be purchased from US farmers, processed and bagged in the US and shipped on US vessels - which cost 50% of the money allocated.  A simple change in US law to allow some local purchase of commodities would feed many more people and support local farm markets.

In the long run, what is to be done? The President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who visited Haiti last week, said "Rich countries need to reduce farms subsidies and trade barriers to allow poor countries to generate income with food exports.  Either the world solves the unfair trade system, or every time there's unrest like in Haiti, we adopt emergency measures and send a little bit of food to temporarily ease hunger."

Citizens of the USA know very little about the role of their government in helping create the hunger problems in Haiti or other countries.  But there is much that individuals can do.  People can donate to help feed individual hungry people and participate with advocacy organizations like Bread for the World or Oxfam to help change the U.S. and global rules which favor the rich countries.  This advocacy can help countries have a better chance to feed themselves.

Meanwhile, Merisma Jean-Claudel, a young high school graduate in Port-au-Prince told journalist Wadner Pierre "...people can't buy food. Gasoline prices are going up. It is very hard for us over here. The cost of living is the biggest worry for us, no peace in stomach means no peace in the mind.I wonder if others will be able to survive the days ahead because things are very, very hard."

"On the ground, people are very hungry," reported Fr. Jean-Juste.  "Our country must immediately open emergency canteens to feed the hungry until we can get them jobs.  For the long run, we need to invest in irrigation, transportation, and other assistance for our farmers and workers."

In Port au Prince, some rice arrived in the last few days.  A school in Fr. Jean-Juste's parish received several bags of rice.  They had raw rice for 1000 children, but the principal still had to come to Father Jean-Juste asking for help.  There was no money for charcoal, or oil.

Jervais Rodman, an unemployed carpenter with three children, stood in a long line Saturday in Port au Prince to get UN donated rice and beans.  When Rodman got the small bags, he told Ben Fox of the Associated Press, "The beans might last four days.  The rice will be gone as soon as I get home."

*Bill Quigley is a human rights lawyer and law professor at Loyola University New Orleans. People who want to help change U.S. policy on agriculture to help combat world-wide hunger should go to: or http://www.bread.org/

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

One month after elections in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has yet to release the results of the presidential elections. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) noted in its interim statement that “the post-election phase which forms part of the entire electoral process, including the announcement of results, remains a concern and needs to be closely monitored" but concluded that “the environment for holding an election was conducive” and “generally the voting was conducted in a transparent and efficient manner”. The African Union (AU) goes further to express “its satisfaction once more over the success of these elections, which were conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner” though also expressing “concern over the delay observed in the announcement of the results, which creates an atmosphere of tension that is not in the least conducive to the consolidation of the democratic process that was so felicitously launched through the organization of the elections.” Following comments by South African President, and mediator for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Thabo Mbeki that “there is no crisis in Zimbabwe”, the East African Law Society (EALS) called an emergency pan-African citizen’s consultation on the situation. Over 200 African civil society organizations convened in Tanzania and called on the AU “to revoke SADC’s mandate on Zimbabwe and appoint an independent high level Pan African panel of mediators” as well as “not to recognize the illegitimate incumbent government in Zimbabwe until a democratic solution to the crisis is found”. One of the conveners of the consultation, Don Deya, Director of the EALS, noted that “when election fraud occurred in Kenya, the AU acted swiftly and effectively to mediate a settlement. We have the same situation in Zimbabwe. Why is the AU silent?” Concurrently, Professor Anyang Nyong'o, a Kenyan minister and member of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement, called into question the electoral process throughout Africa for not responding to the wills and wishes of the people.

While the role of SADC remains uncertain in resolving the situation in Zimbabwe, the SADC International Consultative Conference on Poverty and Development was held in Mauritius to engage in policy dialogue, forge consensus, and review progress of the SADC economic integration agenda, with emphasis on poverty eradication. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will hold an extraordinary meeting of ministers of trade and industry in early May to discuss the impact of rising food prices in the region. The meeting will further review the status of the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations with the European Union. As one of the organizers of Africa’s International Media Summit, ECOWAS has also agreed to implement three media pilot schemes, in and with the collaboration of governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Tunisia, to deploy African youths towards improving the image of the continent as part of the process of re-branding Africa. Meanwhile, the ECOWAS Commission has signed an agreement with Cuba to implement a regional programme on renewable energy. Further, ECOWAS will collaborate with Oxfam America to create a common mining code for the region “to facilitate the contribution of civil society in the process of forming a common mining policy that is favorable to the poor, respectful of the protection principles of the environment and of human rights, and that renders the government and the mining companies responsible through good governance practices.”

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed support for strengthened coordination and synergy between the United Nations (UN) and the AU during the UN Security Council high-level meeting on peace and security in Africa. He stated that: "while maintaining its authority, the Security Council should give priority to supporting the African Union’s key role in resolving regional conflicts, and give full consideration to the views of the African Union."

Ahead of the forthcoming session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in Ezulwini, Swaziland, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is hosting a panel discussion on human rights and conflict management at Ezulwini Sun Hotel on the 5th of May. The discussion will highlight the linkages between human rights and conflict prevention and resolution as well as examine the role that institutions such as the ACHPR, national human rights institutions and non-governmental organisations play in preventing conflict and building sustainable peace. The meeting will further provide an opportunity to introduce CCR’s forthcoming book on Africa’s Human Rights Architecture. The Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights will also be holding a panel discussion at the Royal Swazi Sun on 11th of May which will consider the relationship between the African Court and the African Commission and the opportunities for civil society in using the African human rights system to protect human rights, among other themes.

The Conferences and Events Secretariat supports participation by eligible delegates at conferences that address topics of particular interest to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Conferences must directly support one or more of CIDA’s program priorities (governance, health, basic education, private-sector development, and environmental sustainability, with gender equality as a cross-cutting theme), and seek to influence sustainable development in developing countries and/or countries in transition.

Angola's government has authorised a Chinese ship carrying arms destined for Zimbabwe to dock, although it says it will not be allowed to unload weapons. In a statement, the government said the vessel would only be allowed to deliver goods intended for Angola.

Since the January post election violence and subsequent mediation and resultant national accord by the political elites there continues massive appeals on reconciliation by the grand coalition government behind the scenes the government has and continues to engage in massive infringement of fundamental rights of historical proportions never witnessed before on the civilian population in Mount Elgon district and surrounding areas.

"The destruction of democracy begins when good people just people or merely those who are well intentioned do nothing", Gabriel Shumba, a torture victim, human rights lawyer, exile and spokesperson for the Truth and Justice Coalition announced. The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM) has initiated, with full support from civil society, labour and legal organizations, the Truth and Justice Coalition on Zimbabwe.

On the 7th anniversary of the pledge by African Union member states to allocate 15% of national budgets to health, Nobel Prize Winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Africa Public Health Alliance 15% Now Campaign of which he is Honorary Chair have urged African Heads of State and Government not to in any way revise, drop or further delay implementing the Abuja April 2001 commitment.

Humanitarian Agenda 2015: The State of the Humanitarian Enterprise describes the challenges faced by humanitarian actors striving to maintain fidelity to their ideals in a globalized world. The report highlights persisting tensions in the relationship between “outsiders” and local communities, encroachments of political agendas – particularly as a result of the war on terror – and the deteriorating security climate for humanitarian workers on the ground.

One month after Nigerian passengers were kicked off a British Airways flight for protesting against the inhumane treatment of a deportee, the outrage has not subsided, particularly on the blogosphere where there are numerous petitions and articles calling for the boycott of BA.

Intellectualismo

Intellectualismo is among those calling for a boycott, arguing that it is in the interest of BA and the British to treat Nigerians with respect:

“The British government needs Nigerians. In the post 9/11 season of transatlantic flights decline, the Lagos-London route almost literally kept BA afloat. Presently there are daily flights from Abuja and Lagos to London respectively…

The British High Commission of Nigeria makes millions of Naira from visa applications (on a monthly basis, I dare say). Less then 20% of all applications are successful. For the unsuccessful, their application fees are not refunded. The High Commission generates an absurdly high amount of revenue from application fees alone, all their offices in Nigeria are self-sustained. Consequently they’ve been weaned off financial reliance on the Home Office.

The British High Commission has no qualms about issuing visas to looters and thieves, but when the common man applies they almost have to pry open his mouth and count his teeth to make sure they’re really his and he is not in fact stealing them. Despite this, many will continue to try their luck to migrate to the UK where they can be productive and enjoy the fruits of their productivity. Thousands of students will also apply to study in the UK because of the warped perspective of Nigerian employers who value UK degrees over locally obtained ones.

Needless to say, it’s high time Nigerians demand better treatment in this symbiotic if not equal relationship. We no longer live in colonial times where we have to fear offending the master.”

David Ajao
http://crybelovedzimbabwe.blogspot.com/2008/04/results-are-non-negotiable.html

With the results of Zimbabwe’s twin elections still mired in controversy, Cry Beloved Zimbabwe rejects any talk of a possible government of national unity as a way out of the crisis:

“A lot of theories as to what Mugabe will do next have been doing rounds with the state's own propaganda machinery fueling the rumours ever since Mugabe and Zanu PF lost to Tsvangirai and MDC in the March 2008 harmonised elections. Lets make one thing clear here Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC won the elections they are the choice of people irrespective of the fact that the results from the presidential election are still to be officially announced, and that an illegal recount is taking place in 23 constituencies engineered to reverse the will of the people of Zimbabwe, nor the fact that the Mugabe's dogs of war have murdered 10 people and displaced 3000 arrested 500 MDC members and officials on trumped up charges. So this new talk written in Mugabe's propaganda mouthpiece, of a government of national unity headed by Mugabe should be discarded here and forthwith. Mugabe and his military junta have been behaving as if nothing happened, like as if no election took place, they cannot just brush events like the recent harmonised election like a non-event to suit their selfish needs.
[…]
Because MDC has refused to partake in the run-off that will only inflame a volatile situation Zanu PF is now changing its strategy. Now we hear that they want a government of national unity, based on what? They called the elections and lost what needs to be negotiated is the smooth transition of power to MDC the choice of the people. Even Zuma the South African Presidential hopeful's ideas of a negotiation between MDC and Zanu PF should be mooted, there is nothing to negotiate, we won the election, we are ready to govern. This whole idea of that Mugabe will steal this election and declare himself a victor rule for 18 months and then hand over power to Emmerson Mnangagwa who in turn will then instigate negotiations with MDC to resume the flow of international aid and perpetuate Zanu PF's stranglehold on Zimbabwe will be rejected by people of Zimbabwe and if needs be we will defend our vote violently.

Sports Kenya
http://sportskenya.blogspot.com/2008/04/changing-face-of-kenyan-football.html

On a much lighter note, Sports Kenya writes about the changing attitudes of Kenyan football fans towards local Kenyan clubs:

“I couldn't believe it the other day when I was walking in the streets and my fellow countrymen were talking about Mathare United and Tusker FC. Now what was more interesting was to find them actually naming players in both teams… I was amazed to read our radio personalities as well as our TV journalists are going to watch Kenyan football games live. Now that's progress !

It is good to see Kenyans are developing an interest in the local game. The challenge now goes to the teams to raise the quality of the game as well as develop some consistency. I also think the Stadia Management Board need get more stadia around the country back into playing fields. That way the game will actually reach its intended audience.
For those guys ( I might be a victim too) who usually follow foreign leagues with such intent, it's time we learnt to love our own.”

Free Thinking
http://mpayukaji.blogspot.com/2008/04/is-it-right-time-to-probe-mkapa-and-is_30.html

Free Thinking republishes a commentary from This Day which is calling for the prosecution of former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, currently facing a series of abuse of office and corruption allegations:

“We used to laugh at Zambians when they were prosecuting their corrupt rulers-cum-looters. Now look! The same shame-cum-imbroglio is amidst us testing our tenacity and accountability…

Let’s face it point blank. Mkapa abused and misused the office of president… What precedent are we setting for current and future heads of state if we let Mkapa off-the hook…?

Silence is golden. But this is relative. There are issues that do not need silence. Mkapa has arrogantly and shamelessly maintained silence! Phew! Why shouldn’t he be presumed guilty because of his silence? … The right thing for [President] Kikwete to do is to distance himself and let Mkapa face the music…

On the same footing even the parliament should strike off the much touted immunity that Mkapa has so as to let the judicial process take its course…

Let us face the moment of truth as far as Mkapa's legacy and deeds are concerned.”

Scribbles from the Den
[email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org/

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/367/47799scale.jpgChido Makunike looks at the various competing interests in Zimbabwe, the MDC, ZANU PF, Mugabe and the West in relation to what the Zimbabwean are hoping to get out of democracy.

A month after Zimbabwe’s March 29 elections, the winner of the presidential poll remains unknown. The delay adds considerable additional complexity to the many undercurrents of the country’s problems.

By virtue of the suspicious, poorly explained delay in announcing who won the presidential poll, the authorities in Harare have ensured that the only outcome that will be widely believed by a sceptical world would be one in which main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai emerged the winner. Any other result would be widely dismissed as “fixed” by the authorities to produce a favourable outcome for President Robert Mugabe in the time since the election.

Even a close result requiring a run-off election between Mugabe and Tsvangirai would be seen by many as engineered to give the ruling party a second chance to mobilise the state machinery to do whatever it took to ensure the “right” result for him. The results delay and whatever other gambits the authorities are likely to serve up arguably can no longer serve to impart even the veneer of electoral legitimacy on Mugabe.

It would be one of many recent defeats in which Mugabe resorts to out rightly thwarting the electoral will of the people. But he does nevertheless need a façade of democracy. He has often responded to his Western criticism by saying they have no authority to chide him on the basis of his democratic credentials. “We brought democracy at independence in spite of Western support for the racist, anti-democratic government we replaced” has been his argument. He points out that by the measure of regularly held elections, Zimbabwe is far more democratic than many other countries that are in much better books with the Western world than it is.

Mugabe makes this point to bolster his argument that Western opposition to him is not because of any concern for the welfare of Zimbabweans, but is due to his stinging criticism of the double standards of the West, as well as his refusal to be compliant with Western expectations of how an African leader should conduct himself. It is precisely Mugabe’s fearlessly expressed, hard-to-fault arguments about the West’s relations with the rest of the world that makes him such a hero to many in Africa and beyond, even as Zimbabweans have suffered steep economic decline and increasing repression at home.

If the veneer of democratic legitimacy such as that imparted by regularly scheduled elections, no matter how flawed, has always been so important to Mugabe, why would he seem to risk throwing it all away now? Whatever the presidential results will show when released, the opposition MDC’s unprecedented win of a majority in the concurrently held parliamentary election is a convincing indication of the level of disaffection with the rule of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. His actions since March 29 do not at all suggest a man who respects the right of the voters to choose their leaders.

For the three election cycles up to the mid 1990s, Mugabe’s desire for the perception of a strict adherence to at least the forms of electoral democracy, if not the substance, was relatively easy to achieve. Independence-era euphoria and “gratitude” may have been lifting with every election, but until about then, Mugabe could count on genuine popularity to make his party’s re-elections a foregone conclusion. Mugabe has now shown that his dedication to those electoral forms is not quite so strong after all, now that the evidence suggests a likely majority of the electorate want him gone.

Merely conducting an election cannot bestow democratic legitimacy when it is clear that the only results that will be respected are those in which the incumbent wins. By so awkwardly making this obvious, Mugabe’s government has trapped itself into the equally unhealthy situation in which much of the Zimbabwean electorate and the world would now only believe a result which showed Mugabe losing. This has made “the Zimbabwe crisis” take on a dimension far beyond what can be resolved by the much anticipated release of the results of the presidential poll.

The desire to hold on to power and privilege, and fear of prosecution for past crimes are the usually discussed reasons for Mugabe and ZANU-PF conducting themselves with so little dignity in the face of evidence of an electorate earthquake of rejection against them. But genuine revulsion at what Tsvangirai and the MDC are perceived to represent is no doubt also part of the intransigence of Mugabe & Company in conceding defeat.

There is a self-serving element to Mugabe’s painting of the MDC as stooges of the West who are bent on reversing the efforts to have Zimbabwe’s political independence also have economic teeth for its citizens. Yet Tsvangirai and the MDC have ineptly only fuelled these suspicions in their words and deeds over the years. Mugabe and ZANU-PF in turn have largely failed to convince a majority of Zimbabweans that the claimed slavishness of the MDC to their Western backers is the reason their country is in such poor shape. Mugabe & Co. may genuinely worry that Tsvangirai and the MDC wish to “sell out” the country to the West and “reverse the gains of the revolution” by restoring the economic dominance of whites in commercial agriculture and other sectors of the economy.

But if so, electoral democracy required that Mugabe sell that message to the electorate more convincingly than the MDC’s pitch much needed change and renewal. The MDC has arguably won that battle for the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans, helped considerably by the country’s desperate economic state under Mugabe.

Instead of accepting his failure to sell his message of “Things are bad because we are besieged by powerful external foes, stick with me while I work out a plan to thwart them and improve things,” Mugabe has instead arrogantly chosen to accuse the electorate of not fully understanding what is at stake. His stance is essentially that the electorate are mistaken to buy the Tsvangirai’s message and reject his. And if he can get away with it, he seems inclined to “correct” the misguided electorate by hanging on in power regardless of the popular will!

Yet the price one must pay for accepting a system of electoral democracy is to respect the will of the people even if one believes that will to be wrong. You then revert to opposition, sharpening your message for the next election. The current impasse is partly because of the refusal of Mugabe & Co. to respect this rule of the game because for the first time its result has been unfavourable to them.

The MDC had begun to make inroads into reversing the suspicion with which it was regarded in many African capitals by a belated diplomatic outreach to them. Those efforts have in recent weeks become compromised again by the over-the- top eagerness of the Western political establishment and media to take sides in the Zimbabwean election. In the days leading up to the election, and since then, the Western political and media establishment abandoned all pretence of merely being onlookers who were just interested in seeing that Zimbabweans were able to freely exercise their vote. Zimbabwe’s economic, political and humanitarian problems are severe enough, but the Western media, particularly that of ex-colonial master Britain, went into an absolute frenzy to depict the country as a virtual war zone.

Whether or not it was a coordinated campaign to give the Mugabe a decisive final push out of power, in their shrillness the Western political and media establishment only served to give credence to Mugabe’s long-held claim of a Western conspiracy to depose him for not being pliable in the mould of most African leaders. Britain had kept a relative distance in the months leading up to the election, correctly fearing that any unusual interest would be used by Mugabe as proof of its dishonourable neo-colonialist intentions. But at the time of the election and immediately after, Britain seemed to smell Mugabe’s blood and lost all self-restraint in the excitement of the prospect of seeing its old nemesis gone. It was almost as if Britain were so certain of Mugabe being deposed that it no long felt the need to maintain the façade of being a neutral observer.

Western shrillness has only grown since the election, with the Zimbabwean authorities also feeding it by the astonishing games over the election results, as well as the jailing of some Western journalists for slipping into the country to report on the election without getting accreditation - under the country’s tight media laws. But the effect of all this has been to justify the paranoia of the Zimbabwean authorities about a claimed coordinated Western “regime change” agenda.

Such an agenda could not justify the flouting of the popular electoral will, but it is not much of a stretch to guess that the unseemly eagerness of the West to interfere in and influence the election against him would only have made Mugabe and his whole political machinery feel inclined to dig in even in defiance of the voters. It is therefore quite plausible to speculate that the Western eagerness to “help” the MDC ensure Mugabe’s exit may in the short term have done the exact opposite.

In the immediate term the desire of the West to see the back of a troublesome-to-them-Mugabe probably overlaps with the wishes of many Zimbabweans who put the blame for the political repression and economic hardships in their country squarely at Mugabe’s door. But it is not at all certain that those similar desires perfectly coincide. Neither Britain nor the US have an honourable history in regards to Zimbabwe, so their posing as great champions of democracy and defenders of its peoples’ best interests have a hollow ring.

Mugabe has indeed degenerated into a despot who has refused to accept any responsibility for his country’s mess. But he is no worse a ruler than many others who dare not point out the West’s double standards and who are quite happy to have their countries be client states in return for being absolved of scrutiny over their governance records. Therefore the West and the Zimbabwean citizenry want a change from Mugabe for likely very different reasons.

If Mugabe somehow survives the electoral and diplomatic onslaughts against him and hangs on for several more years, the ill-advised Western intervention on behalf of the MDC would provide him considerable ammunition against the opposition party. This may make little difference to the voters’ feelings towards him if economic decline and hardship continue, as is likely to be the case in a situation where the Western world would be even more resolute in closing doors to Mugabe’s government. Yet if Mugabe were able to stem the slide, say by paying serious attention to improved agricultural productivity, he might well be able to say “you saw how the Westerners behaved during the 2008 election; their conspiracy against me was not a figment of my imagination.”

With the economy continuing on its present slide, few outside his immediate circle and the die-hards in his party would listen to this argument. But with even modest stabilization, his idea of radical land redistribution remains popular enough amongst even his opponents that the argument could gain political currency to his benefit and at the expense of the MDC.

Even if Tsvangirai and the MDC assume office, their doing so with such open support for it as the West has shown will be a double edged sword. If the expected massive Western financial support flows in a way that quickly results in a stabilization of the economy that is widely felt at the grassroots, the whiff of the suspicion of the MDC having agreed to be “stooges” in return for Western support would be neutralised, at least in the short term. The need for a return to economic stability is probably the one issue that unites people across the country’s criss-crossing political divides.

But in the absence of either quick or widely-felt economic recovery, the tag of “Western stooge” around the necks of Tsvangirai and the MDC could remain a potent political weapon in the hands of a ZANU-PF that no longer dominates parliament, but nevertheless has only a handful fewer seats than the MDC. This assumes that ZANU-PF adjusts to being a minority party without disintegrating, which in turn also depends on how successfully they can choose a leader to fill Mugabe’s very large shoes. Without dramatic economic recovery, ZANU-PF in opposition could remain a formidable thorn in an MDC government’s flesh, with its Western backing becoming more of an albatross to it than a blessing.

Having won a majority, the MDC has not spent much time contesting the legitimacy of the parliamentary results. If they are considered to be a true reflection of the electoral will, it is astonishing that the ruling ZANU-PF did as well as it did, winning almost half of the popular vote and the number of parliamentary seats. With the rate of inflation said to be close to 200,000% and virtually every other economic index being strongly negative, one would have expected the ruling party to have been electorally wiped out.

Herein lie some of the nuances of the Zimbabwean crisis that much of the media we are exposed to is either oblivious of or simply not interested in relating. Mugabe has increasingly become repressive, he has been a brilliant ideologue but a very poor manager and he has simply stayed in power longer than was advisable for his own legacy. But his broad message of an unapologetic, assertively expressed desire for African empowerment retains its appeal and has led to a sea change in how black Zimbabweans think about what their independence should mean.

To say many and probably most Zimbabweans want Mugabe to step aside is not the same as saying his ideas have been largely rejected by them. For example, most would want his flawed land reform effort to be fixed to work, not for it to be reversed. The MDC was slow to understand this and other nuances of Mugabe’s complex legacy, losing it precious time and early support in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

Now the opposition party is careful to say it would not return land to its previous white occupiers, but would make sure it was productively used by the new black landholders. It remains to be seen if the MDC’s Western backers understand these nuances and would let it negotiate the minefield of balancing the need for reviving the economy with the political imperative of a strong desire for African empowerment that will remain one of Mugabe’s strongest legacies despite his failure to translate that desire into concrete, practical reality.

There has been talk of a Kenya-like ‘government of national unity.’ Both sides naturally posture against it. It may still be emerge as the immediate way out of the present crisis. But as in Kenya, such a compromise solution robs whoever the winner is of the spoils of electoral victory. When the game is played, all the participants are fully aware that they could lose by a mere handful of votes.

Whether in Kenya or Zimbabwe, another potential flaw of a GNU is to rob the electorate of two or more competing visions of how their country should be ruled. It may avoid conflict in the short term, but it also effectively allows political parties to put aside their competition for power because the GNU allows all of them a chance at the feeding trough. There is also the potential of them collectively ganging up against the citizens they usually claim are their whole reason for being.

Resolving the current impasse is undoubtedly the most urgent order of business in Zimbabwe. But the country’s tortured and violent history, the cynical external interests seeking to exert their influence for their own ends, the huge ideological gulf between the two main political parties and the closeness of the results announced so far suggest that whichever way the immediate crisis is resolved, there are long term difficulties ahead in getting Zimbabwe back on the track of political stability, psychic healing and economic growth.

*Chido Makunike is a Zimbabwean social and political commentator.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/367/47801farm.jpgIn this open letter to the Secretary General of the Food and Agriculture organization (FAO), Henry Saragih argues that the food price crisis exposes the instability of liberalized agricultural markets and calls for concrete measures that will strengthen peasant and farmer-based food production.

OPEN LETTER To : Mr Jacques Diouf Secretary General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, President of the G8, Mr. John W. Ashe, Permanent UN representative, Antigua and Barbuda's Permanent and Chairman of the Group of 77

Dear Mr. Diouf, Mr. Fukuda, and Mr. Ashe,

Our movement, La Via Campesina, consists of millions of small farmers and landless workers in more than 60 countries around the world. Although we are the ones producing food for our families and communities, many of us are hungry or living in poverty. Over the last months, the situation has worsened due to the sudden rise in food prices. We are also severely hit by the crisis because many of us do not have enough land to feed our families, and because most producers do not benefit from those high prices. Large traders, speculators, supermarkets and industrial farms are cashing in on and benefitting from this crisis. This current food crisis is the result of many years of deregulation of agricultural markets, the privatization of state regulatory bodies and the dumping of agricultural products on the markets of developing countries. According to the FAO, liberalized markets have attracted huge cash flows that seek to speculate on agricultural products on the “futures” markets and other financial instruments.

The corporate expansion of agrofuels and the initially enthusiastic support for agrofuels in countries such as the US, EU and Brazil have added to the expectation that land for food will become more and more scarce. On top of this in many southern countries hundreds of thousands of hectares are converted from agricultural uses in an uncontrolled way for so-called economic development zones, urbanization and infrastructure. The ongoing land grabbing by Transnational Companies (TNCs) and other speculators will expel millions more peasants who will end up in the mega cities where they will be added to the ranks of the hungry and poor in the slums. Besides this, we may expect especially in Africa and South Asia more severe droughts and floods caused by global climate change. These are severe threats for the rural as well as for the urban areas.

These are highly worrying developments that need active and urgent action! We need a fundamental change in the approach to food production and agricultural markets!

Time to rebuild national food economies!

Rebuilding national food economies will require immediate and long-term political commitments from governments. An absolute priority has to be given to domestic food production in order to decrease dependency on the international market. Peasants and small farmers should be encouraged through better prices for their farm products and stable markets to produce food for themselves and their communities. Landless families from rural and urban areas have to get access to land, seeds and water to produce their own food. This means increased investment in peasant and farmer-based food production for domestic markets.

Governments have to provide financial support for the poorest consumers to allow them to eat. Speculation and extremely high prices forced upon consumers by traders and retailers have to be controlled. Peasants and small farmers need better access to their domestic markets so that they can sell food at fair prices for themselves and for consumers.

Countries need to set up intervention mechanisms aimed at stabilizing market prices. In order to achieve this, import controls with taxes and quotas are needed to avoid low-priced imports which undermine domestic production. National buffer stocks managed by the state have to be built up to stabilize domestic markets: in times of surplus, cereals can be taken from the market to build up the reserve stocks and in case of shortages, cereals can be released.

Regulating international markets and supporting countries to strengthen their food production

At the international level, stabilization measures also have to be undertaken. International buffer stocks have to be built up and an intervention mechanism put in place to stabilize prices on international markets at a reasonable level. Exporting countries have to accept international rules to control the quantities they can bring to the market, in order to stop dumping. The right to implement import controls, set up programs to support the poorest consumers, implement agrarian reform and invest in domestic, farmer peasant-based food production has to be fully respected and supported at the international level.

We ask the FAO, based on its mandate, to take the initiative and create the political environment for a fundamental change in food policies. In the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) a broad majority of governments recognized and agreed on the importance of rural development and agrarian reform to combat poverty and hunger in the rural areas. The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), an assessment of the agricultural sector that involved Civil Society organizations, the private sector, and governments as well as the FAO and the World Bank came to the conclusion that corporate-led agriculture and the increasing dependence of peasants and small farmers is at the heart of the problem. They also concluded that peasant, and farmer-based sustainable agriculture has to be supported and strengthened. The International Fund on Agricultural Development (IFAD) also recognizes the key role of peasants and small farmers in the production of food.

We request that G8 governments allow these initiatives to be taken. They should stop the promotion of agrofuels as these are no solution for the climate crisis and add to the destruction of forests. Especially in the southern countries, agrofuels occupy millions of hectares that should remain available for food production.

We also demand that the G8 analyze critically their own agricultural policies, take initiatives to stop the ongoing volatility of the international markets and shift their financial support away from industrial agriculture towards sustainable family farmer-based food production.

We also demand that the G8 stop and cancel any free trade agreements that will only contribute to the destruction of food production in developing countries and block any possibility of autonomous industrial development.

The influence of transnational corporations and financial speculative interests has to be controlled as much as possible and kept away from the the international food market. Food is too important to be left to business alone.

A possible WTO agreement in the Doha Round will mean another blow for peasant-based food production. We demand that the governments of the G77 assess again the WTO negotiations on agriculture in the Doha round and reject any agreement that has negative implications for domestic food production and does not allow the taking of all necessary measures to strengthen food production and increase national self sufficiency.

Peasants and small farmers are the main food producers

La Via Campesina is convinced that peasants and small farmers can feed the world. They have to be the key part of the solution. With sufficient political will and the implementation of adequate policies, more peasants and small farmers, men and women, will easily produce sufficient food to feed the growing population. The current situation shows that changes are needed!

The time for Food Sovereignty has come!

*Henry Saragih is the International Coordinator for La Via Campesina.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

GROOTS International/Groots Africa and the Huairou Commission are seeking an Africa Regional Organizer / Coordinator, based in Nairobi, Kenya, to support members of GROOTS and the Huairou Commission in the region to facilitate grassroots women’s effective participation in our networks and programs. The African Regional Organizer will work to fulfill GROOTS’ goals, and will work with a team based in Africa and New York to coordinate the Huairou Commission’s Women’s Land Link Africa (WLLA) joint regional partnership project.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is looking for a Deputy Director, to be based at its Headquarters in New Delhi, India. CHRI is an advocacy organization whose core concerns are Access to Information and Access to Justice. Send CV, with contact details of three referees and a covering letter outlining why you are applying for the position and how you would contribute to the organisation to: [email][email protected] Applications will be accepted until the position is filled.

I had been out of journalism school for barely two weeks when Julia Opoti, a friend and an editor at Kenya Imagine, a popular online discussion forum for Kenyans, sent a text message to my cell phone. My name, she wrote, had been the subject of another online forum. "Hey, did you know that there is a whole thread about you on Mashada?" the message read.

Corruption is a cosmopolitan problem. However, its adverse effects on less-developed countries are perhaps more profound due to the fact that it has greatly affected the potential for governments in such countries to meet the basic needs and expectations of the common people. There is, therefore, a pressing need for a sustained effort to nip the seemingly elusive problem of corruption in the bud, so to speak. This study endeavours to conceptualise the nature, causes, and effects of the scourge.

To ensure the right to a basic education, the Dakar Framework called upon governments to develop responsive, participatory and accountable systems of educational governance and management. Since then, the search for improved institutions better able to deliver education has accelerated and it is now common for education programmes to have a ‘good governance’ component.

Kenya needs to find another $300m to pay for the expanded coalition cabinet formed after a power-sharing deal. Finance Minister Amos Kimunya says he may be forced to shift funding from vital programmes like resettling the displaced to pay for new ministries.

Police in Mozambique have been accused of killing and torturing people with near total impunity. The human rights group Amnesty International has published a report saying the Mozambique police appear to think they have a licence to kill. The group says officials have responded to rising crime rates with often lethal force, but that they almost never face criminal proceedings.

Up to 170 census monitors in southern Sudan have been told to return to the capital, Khartoum, after being accused of interfering with the count. Southern officials said the monitors were not approved and were mostly from the north of the country. The controversial first population count in 15 years will help determine how wealth and power are shared out.

The Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia deteriorating at an accelerated pace due to sky rocketing food prices, a deepening drought due to an abnormally harsh dry season and a delayed and poor start to the seasonal rains (mid-April to June). As result the number of people in need of assistance has increased to 2.6 million people in Somalia (35% of the total population), which is an increase of more than 40% since January '08.

The Security Council has extended until 30 April 2009 the mandate of the United Nations mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO), tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario and organizing a referendum on self-determination. In a unanimously adopted resolution, the Council called on the parties to enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations” to resolve their long-running dispute.

As the recount process for the parliamentary elections confirm the victory of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the party's rival factions announced on Monday that they had reunited. This gives the opposition a comfortable majority in the parliament.

Climate change is the newest threat to the increasing HIV and Aids epidemic worldwide, panelists said Wednesday at an HIV forum at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, the AAP/Age reports. The forum, titled "A Future Free of HIV," was moderated by Justice of the High Court Michael Kirby and included several HIV and Aids researchers, according to a UNSW release.

Oral treatment to improve vaginal health could have the potential to reduce the risk of infection with HIV for women, according to a study published in the May 15th edition of Clinical Infectious Diseases. Most new HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa are among women, for whom new HIV-prevention strategies are needed.