The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has urged the government of Zimbabwe to put and end to the ongoing crackdown on the media in the wake of increasing attacks on media professionals and the enactment of a draconian communication bill that could lead to monitoring of journalists' communications.

Why Democracy? is a documentary project using film to start a global conversation about democracy. In October 2007, ten one-hour films focused on contemporary democracy will be broadcast in the world's largest ever factual media event. More than 40 broadcasters on all continents are participating, with an estimated audience of 300 million viewers. Each of the broadcasters - an A-Z which includes everyone from Al Arabiya to ZDF - will be producing a locally-based seasons of film, radio, debate and discussion to tie in with the global broadcast of the Why Democracy? films.

Africa appears to plunge from one corporate nightmare to another. Just as we begin to come to terms with the colonially-sponsored corporate conquest of our oil resources, along comes a new wave of 'green' companies turning fertile African lands to Northern 'gold'. Senegalese president and agrofuel promoter Abdoulaye Wade has called this 'a new revolution in Africa'. Others have likened it to 'the new scramble for Africa'.

The first impression of the global agrofuel movement was that of a 'win-win' scenario. The rationale offered by the global North was the reasonable sounding desire to minimize dependence on traditional fuel sources such as oil and coal by investing in renewable energy source from plants. This, the argument continued, will ensure that carbon contained in fossil fuels remains safely stored in the earth, thereby reducing the impact to the earth's climate. Furthermore, fuel crops grown are supposed to provide a 'carbon sink' by capturing and storing carbon dioxide and assisting with balancing concentrations of the gas in the atmosphere. The global South was promised that agrofuel would lead to climate-related benefits and an increase in revenue derived from selling the crops to growing green markets. New evidence has, however, challenged each of these presumptions. In the face of reckless new targets, large-scale land conversion for energy crops, increasing food prices and damning scientific reports, government's actions are increasingly being labeled by environmentalists as fraudulent.

A recent study published by the Africa Biodiversity Network (ABN) provides compelling evidence from Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Benin that the misguided scramble for projects could lead to an environmental and humanitarian disaster on the continent. For instance, Timothy Byakola reports that a plan is underway to convert a third of Uganda's prime rainforest reserve, Mabira Forest, into agricultural land on which sugarcane will be planted for ethanol production. According to Byakola, President Yoweri Museveni has vociferously supported this controversial project, ignoring community opposition to it. The consequences of the deforestation of 7,100 hectares of one of the key water catchment sources for the Nile River and Lake Victoria, and the implications for the communities around Mabira which depend on the forest as a source of livelihood, are potentially enormous.

All the other countries in the study report similar situations in which large tracts of arable land are being sold off to the highest bidders with little regard for the repercussions on local populations livelihoods and food security. Furthermore, an environmentalist from Ethiopia reports that there are plans to introduce the new 'wonder' plant, Jatropha, which will be grown as an agrofuel in fertile lands. Apart from emerging criticism about use of the plant as an agrofuel, this is controversial because Jatropha was promoted precisely because it is a hardy plant that could grow in drier lands and minimize use of the arable land that is needed by local populations.

The ABN report also indicates that there is a lack of engagement within the countries studied on the potential impact on rural communities and on food security. In South Africa, however, the draft strategy on biofuels/agrofuels has been vigorously opposed by a variety of stakeholders who fear that rural communities will be compelled to bequeath their lands over to industrial producers of oilseed rape, maize and soy. The government is currently revising the strategy and it is due for comment again in June next year.

As with carbon trading, the agrofuels issue brings climate justice questions to the fore. In 2004 climate change activist George Monbiot warned that rising demand for biofuels will result in competition for food between cars and people. 'The people would necessarily lose: those who can afford to drive are, by definition, richer than those who are in danger of starvation.' He goes on to argue that the reason Northern governments are enthusiastic is because they don't want to upset car drivers. He argues that biofuels 'appear to reduce the amount of carbon from our cars, without requiring new taxes. It's an illusion sustained by the fact that only the emissions produced at home count towards our national total.' In the latest UK budget announced in June, the tax rebate on biofuels was extended. From March 2008 all suppliers in the UK will have to ensure that 2.5% of the fuel they sell is derived from plants. Failure to do so will result in the imposition of a penalty of 15p (USD.30) per litre sold. The quota is set to increase to 5% in 2010 and by 2050 the government hopes that 33% of fuel will come from crops. The US is setting similar targets. In response to such moves, both Monbiot and the organization Friends of the Earth have called on governments to halt support of agrofuels. In a recent press release Friends of the Earth argue that 'more attention should be focused on reducing energy demand and improving vehicle efficiency, as this will cost less than subsidizing inefficient new sources of supply like agrofuels.' But this will be difficult to achieve with the market growing as it is. According to US research consultancy Clean Edge, the global market for agrofuels is set to grow from $20.5 billion in 2006 to $80.9 billion by 2016. Recent media reports in the South African press suggest that investors in Africa have already pledged billions of dollars for production plants that will derive bioethanol and biodiesel from crops like sugar, maize and soy in Africa. Talk in the North is already focusing on imposing guidelines to mitigate the problems that arise from agrofuels. Ultimately, the challenge for Africa will be to map its own path for sustainable development and not to be swept away by the current wave of potentially ill-conceived 'green' schemes.

* This article first appeared in ISS Today on 13th September 2007.

* Trusha Reddy, Researcher: Corruption and Governance Programme, ISS Cape Town

* Please send comments to or comment online at

This regional conference organized by the EISA will be held from 25 - 27 September in Maseru, Lesotho. The primary goal of the conference is to promote regional dialogue on election related disputes and share experiences across countries in terms of best practice in managing them.

This World Development Movement podcast features George Monbiot, writer, broadcaster and academic, talking about the history of direct action – particularly relevant given the recent coverage of the climate change protestors near Heathrow this summer.

The New Path: African Forum for Intellectual Thought is published quarterly by the African Research and Resource Forum (ARRF) and provides a forum for innovative thinking about our common future and about how we need to tackle the most intractable problems facing Africa today – focusing on Eastern Africa. The editor invites your articles (opinion and analysis) for the October 2007 edition. Please send your articles of not more than five thousand (5,000) words to: [email][email protected] by 20th September 2007.

In a landmark decision, El Alwani v. Libya, Communication No. 1295/2004, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has found that Libya committed multiple serious human rights violations including torture, disappearance and arbitrary execution. The case was filed by Mr. Farag Mohammed El Alwani whose brother was disappeared by Libyan security forces in 1995. He is represented by the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and Human Rights Solidarity, two Geneva-based human rights organizations.

Police in Angola are responsible for persistent human rights violations, with few perpetrators ever brought to justice, Says Amnesty International. A climate of arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment, deaths in police custody and extrajudicial executions is exposed in a new report. Officers that commit such abuses have almost total impunity.

Following a recent nutrition survey, UNICEF and its partners estimate that 83,000 children in central and southern Somalia suffer from malnutrition - 13,500 of whom are severely malnourished and at risk of dying. “These children urgently require attention to ensure that they survive,” said UNICEF Representative to Somalia Christian Balslev-Olesen. “UNICEF is very concerned that their numbers might increase with continued civil strife, limited humanitarian access to these areas, food insecurity and a depressed economy,” he added.

One of the millions of victims of Robert Mugabe’s chaotic campaign to forcibly clear slum areas across the country has been found dead at her make shift home, in Harare’s high-density suburb of Mbare. Sources in Zimbabwe’s capital said Wednesday that a middle-aged woman had been found dead by her neighbours in a wood-and-plastic shack she has been calling home since the Mugabe regime destroyed her’s in 2005. The cause of the death is not known.

Kenyan lawmakers are set to debate proposed amendments to a bill that, if passed, would prevent the government from issuing compulsory licenses to produce urgently needed medicines without seeking approval from the patent holder. The amendments, which involve deleting parts of Kenya’s Industrial Property Act of 2001, were first expected to be debated Thursday. But Peter Munyi, an intellectual property lawyer in Nairobi close to the issue, told Intellectual Property Watch that parliamentarians were meeting late Wednesday to discuss the proposed changes.

This paper by Jonathan Holslag evaluates the extent to which China adapted its Africa policy to external criticism and expectations. It is found that policy modifications mainly occurred when long-term interests were at risk, with regard to issues of limited importance and non-binding initiatives. The article departs from the vast literature on adaptation and tests this concept on several aspects of China’s engagement in Africa

For Sierra Leone, considered by many as the ultimate symbol of a failed state, nation building cannot come too soon. The election is widely seen as a test of the country's ability to stand on its own after UN peacekeepers withdrew two years ago. But Sierra Leone's steady stabilization since the civil war ended in 2002 and the still-to-be-concluded electoral process bring reasons for cautious optimism.

Central and local government officials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have called directly on Congolese refugees in Zambia to return and help rebuild their homeland. David Byaza Sanda, secretary general in the DRC ministry of home affairs, made the appeal during a visit to the Meheba settlement in north-west Zambia's Solwezi district on Tuesday by a tripartite commission on the voluntary repatriation of Congolese refugees living in this country.

Indigenous peoples around the world are celebrating the UN General Assembly’s approval of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The declaration was approved by an overwhelming majority in an historic vote in New York on 13 September 2007. The vote is the climax of 22 years of intensive debate and negotiation. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States voted against the declaration, whilst 143 nations voted in favour and eleven abstained.

As postwar Burundi prepares for a reconciliation process based on South Africa's, women's rights advocates say the first step must be bringing the perpetrators of sexual violence to justice. Second in a series on African women and the rule of law.

Reporters Without Borders has voiced deep concern about the future of press freedom and independent journalists in Rwanda after studying the very disturbing comments made by four government ministers, another senior official and two members of the security forces during a programme broadcast by the state-owned media on 9 September.

A high attrition has been recorded in Ethiopia's health sector, as 80% of the country's medical graduates, including one of medical doctors left the country to chase greener pastures abroad annually, a study by a local non-governmental organisation, Unity for Development, disclosed. Ethiopia is described as the African country worst affected by brain drain. In fact, the study revealed that currently there are more working Ethiopian doctors in the United States than in Ethiopia. Many Ethiopian doctors also left for Botswana, South Africa and the Middle East in search of good pay.

Trying to measure the impact of the Zimbabwean exodus on HIV/AIDS rates in the region is so fraught with ifs, buts and maybes that the only reasonable assumption is that, like other migrants, economic migrants may run a higher risk of infection than they would have if they had not left their homes.

Increased global demand for biofuel has pushed up the already buoyant price of maize in South Africa, forcing aid agencies to procure food from elsewhere to feed an expected more than six million food-insecure people in southern Africa. After a second consecutive poor maize harvest in South Africa, which usually meets food shortfalls in the region, prices have been high, according to the latest USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS-NET).

Paediatric HIV care is high on the agenda of most HIV programmes today, but less talked about are the social aspects of life as a child born with the virus, and later on, as an adolescent facing the challenges of relationships and sexuality. "The focus has been on the medical aspects of sexuality, but it goes beyond the physical," said Dr Harriet Birungi, an associate with FRONTIERS, a reproductive health programme of the US-based Population Council.

It is mandatory that Zambia's hotels, lodges and guest houses stock at least two Bibles in each of their rooms, but it is rare to come across condoms or even condom-vending machines, despite many of these establishments being used by commercial sex workers and their clients. About one in five sexually active people, or 1.6 million of Zambia's population of 10 million, are infected with HIV/AIDS.

A project to mine uranium in northern Malawi next year promises to spur economic development in the area, but fears of serious health hazards associated with the radioactive element have aroused the country's civil society. The Malawian government granted a mining licence in April 2007 to Paladin Africa Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Australian company, Paladin Resources Ltd, to develop the Kayelekera uranium deposit, 40km west of the town of Karonga on the shore of Lake Malawi.

An Egyptian court sentenced four outspoken newspaper editors to one year in prison with labour on Thursday for defaming President Hosni Mubarak and his politician son Gamal, court sources said. The court also ordered Ibrahim Issa, Adel Hammouda, Wael el-Ebrashi and Abdel-Halim Qandil to pay fines of 20 000 Egyptian pounds each.

Sierra Leone's opposition leader Ernest Bai Koroma, who looks set to win the West African country's presidential election, says he will wage an implacable war on corruption and work to revive the war-scarred economy. With just over three-quarters of the votes counted from last week's run-off poll, Koroma of the All People's Congress (APC) has a commanding lead with 60 percent. His rival, Vice-President Solomon Berewa of the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), trails by some 20 points.

African farmer organizations will meet in Selingué, Mali on November 27-28, 2007 to discuss ecological alternatives to the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations' proposal for a new Green Revolution in Africa. The Gates/Rockefeller Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) will use a combined $150 million over five years to promote higher yields through hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and western-style crop management.

Underneath signs of economic progress in Tanzania, religious tensions persist, which threaten social cohesion and the political stability of the nation.

It was a case of petty arson turned media spectacle. Amidst the violence of the 2005 Zanzibar elections, the Janjaweed militia— loyalists to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party—were charged with vandalizing and setting fire to a Kinuni residence by Civic United Front sympathizers. As cyberspace is a preferred platform for political protest throughout East Africa, one need look no further than the message boards of CUF activists to gauge the tone of this ideological duel. Speaking about the fire, one impassioned commentator writes, “Even the Holy Quran was not spared” beneath the image of a few charred pages.

Through a broader lens, coverage of the event serves the CUF in an effort to redress voting irregularities they claim have kept them from power since the introduction of multiparty democracy in the early 1990’s. Religious references add another layer of meaning. With Muslims accounting for 98% of Zanzibar’s population, this is not a typical case of Muslims vs. Non-Muslims. This is a case of secular Muslims against their radical brethren. Despite a shared creed, religion remains the symbolic fault line of Zanzibar’s political fallout expressed through CUF suspicions around of CCM pieties.

The religious dimension of politics in Zanzibar and throughout Tanzania cannot be overstated. A general survey of Tanzanian politics airs a religious subtext that, in the light of recent provocations, inches into the foreground, posing a significant challenge to the long-term stability of the nation. More specifically, the grievances not only of the CUF but of groups throughout the country are reaching a crescendo as many assert their rights as Muslims.

These tensions are not a recent apparition, but have grown steadily over decades. British colonial rule, in its support of Christian mission schools, impaired Muslim access to educational opportunities. Muslim apologists cite this as resulting not only in the under-representation of Muslims among Tanzanian’s educated elite, but also within the civil service and parastatal institutions. This process was cemented with the undoing political ties between Muslim organizations and the government under Nyerere. More recently, the participation of Tanzania in the US-led war on terror is interpreted as a means to suppress the political opposition by linking would-be competitors with terrorist activities.

While this substantiates perceived discrimination, there is much concrete evidence to support these suspicions. In 1992, the Tanzanian government acknowledged after many years the educational disparities between Christians and Muslims. Years later, only 20% of secondary school students in Dar es Salaam—a city where 80% of inhabitants claim Islam as their religion-- are Muslim.

The perceived marginalization of Muslims in Tanzanian can be juxtaposed with the enabling of other special interest groups. The multiplication in number and grandeur of churches in Dar Es Salaam occurs within the bounds of religious freedoms granted by the constitution. However, when read against the 2004 closure of the renowned al-Furquan Islamic Primary School and the suspension of the Islamic press, a confounding portrait of the “secular” state comes into focus. It is difficult to refute that a special brand of discrimination preoccupied with the habits of Muslims forms the crux of religious tension in Tanzania.

In the grand scheme, with macroeconomic indicators suggesting upward turn in the country’s fortunes, Tanzania appears to be doing well. While we can all look with pride on its successes, enthusiasm over recent advances in Tanzania must be read cautiously against religious tensions percolating beneath. The consolidation of economic gains in the long term will require serious efforts to redress persisting disparities.
Aaliyah Bilal

* Aaliyah Bilal is a masters student at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Mahmood Mamdani writes about the dangers of the UN’s new role in Darfur. The balance between the military and political dimensions is crucial, and the UN tends to privilege the military dimension.

Significant changes are currently taking place on the ground in Darfur. The peacekeeping forces of the African Union (AU) are being replaced by a hybrid AU-UN force under overall UN control. The assumption is that the change will be for the better, but this is questionable. The balance between the military and political dimensions of peacekeeping is crucial. Once it had overcome its teething problems – and before it ran into major funding difficulties – the AU got this relationship right: it privileged the politics, where the UN has tended to privilege the military dimension, which is why the UN-controlled hybrid force runs the risk of becoming an occupation force.

The AU’s involvement in Darfur began a year after the start of the insurgency, when in April 2004 it brokered the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebel movements. The result was the setting up of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which started with a group of 60 observers in June 2004, and expanded to 3605 by the end of the year: 450 observers, 2341 soldiers and 814 police officers. The troops came from six countries – Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Gambia and Kenya – and the police from Ghana. There were also military observers from Egypt and Libya, among others. A Joint Assessment Mission, led by the AU with participants from the UN, the EU and Canada, followed in March 2005. It called for an increase in the numbers of soldiers and police to a total of roughly eight thousand, and for civilians to be brought in as humanitarian officers.

One member of the assessment team was Major General Henry Anyidoho from Ghana, who was UN deputy force commander in Rwanda at the time of the genocide. I met him in Khartoum in May this year, and asked what he thought of AMIS. ‘I got to Darfur in January 2005,’ he said. ‘I found out they were doing an incredibly good job. First, the rebel movements were still intact, so it was easy to deal with the government and the two rebel movements. Second, the Janjawiid were pretty well under control. Third, the ceasefire agreement was being observed.’ This positive view was shared by Refugees International, which reported in November 2005 that earlier in the year, AMIS had been able to provide some security and deterrence. Displaced persons were congregating near AMIS bases, the UN World Food Programme started parking its vehicles at AMIS sites, AMIS escorted humanitarian convoys, and helped victims of attacks get to hospitals. The round-the-clock presence of civilian police in some IDP [Internally Displaced Person] camps has provided a greater sense of security to a population that is distrustful of the Sudanese police. AMIS forces have helped to restore order and provide security during the very difficult IDP re-registration process.[1]

By the time the Refugees International report appeared, however, it was clear that the rebel movements were beginning to split. AMIS had succeeded – and this was a major political achievement – in negotiating a Declaration of Principles and getting all the insurgent factions and the government of Sudan to sign it on 5 July 2005 in Abuja. That declaration remains the only political basis for peace in Darfur. But only three months later, when the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) held its conference in Darfur, Abdel Wahid, its leader, anticipated problems and did not attend. His suspicions proved justified when Minni Minawi, the commander of the movement’s field forces, was elected to replace him. The AU decided to invite both men to peace talks in Abuja, where Minawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. But the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the other original rebel movement, refused to sign, as did 19 representatives of the SLM, who defected to follow Abdel Wahid.[2] The so-called Group of 19 wielded a lot of influence among the fighters, who soon began to degenerate into tribal groupings. The difficulty for the AU now was how to get all these groups together, but it remained committed to a political solution, knowing that only a renegotiated ceasefire would provide protection for civilians in Darfur.

Another unfortunate development was that support for AMIS from Western donor countries began to weaken just as the going got rough. The N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement had involved a formal collaboration between the AU, the UN and leading Western powers. According to Anyidoho, ‘Canada was to provide aircraft and maintenance, the UK vehicles, the US camps, and the EU soldiers and police.’ Donors eager to be seen to pledge money early in 2005 were reluctant to release it once the mission ran into difficulties. The US had promised $50 million to support AMIS at the donors’ conference in May 2005, but didn’t deliver. By November the following year, Congress had removed the funds from the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill. Around the same time, the EU announced that salary payments would be made only on a quarterly basis and demanded proper financial accountability before releasing funds for the next quarter. When the paperwork didn’t arrive, the EU suspended the provision of funds.

‘Donors call the shots,’ Anyidoho told me. ‘When donor fatigue set in, the world began calling for UN forces. The AU force has not been paid since January 2007. It is short of aviation fuel from time to time. Donors have provided the AU with commercial, not military, helicopters, so the pilots must decide whether or not to go to an area.’ In July, when I made my second visit this year to Sudan, the AU force still hadn’t been paid. AMIS has faced a series of problems of this sort. As early as 2005, when Refugees International sent a mission to assist AMIS in North Darfur, it noted that ‘all of AMIS’s local interpreters were on strike because their salaries had been cut in half following a restructuring of salaries . . . for all AMIS personnel.’

The AU had assumed that the ceasefire would be observed by all parties, and expected that its mission would be needed for only a short time. As the rebels began to split, and the political agreement underlying the ceasefire to unravel, fighting resumed and the inadequacy of AMIS’s mandate became apparent. There were demands that it be expanded so that the armed peacekeepers could protect not only the unarmed observers, who were supposed to monitor the ceasefire, but also the civilian victims of the conflict.

The AU itself had quickly become a target both for the belligerents and for anybody agitated by the conflict – including the media, the international NGOs (INGOs) and the IDPs they had come to ‘save’. Throughout the second half of 2005, there were attempts by all sides to murder or kidnap AU soldiers. According to Refugees International, Janjawiid attacks on villages in North Darfur, which killed ten people and displaced nearly seven thousand more, also wounded three members of an AMIS patrol; a rebel splinter group kidnapped nearly forty AMIS troops in West Darfur; four Nigerian AMIS troops and two of its civilian contractors were killed when they intervened in an attack, reportedly by the SLA, on another contractor; the next day, a JEM splinter group kidnapped an entire AMIS patrol of 18, including its American monitor, in Nana, near Tine in West Darfur.

There were other problems too. In September 2005, two AMIS soldiers died of Aids-related illnesses, sparking public anxieties. In March 2006, Channel 4 reported that women and girls as young as 11 at the Gereida IDP camp in South Darfur were claiming that AU soldiers had offered them money in exchange for sex. The AU set up a committee to inquire into alleged ‘sexual misconduct including rape and child abuse’ carried out by its forces.

AMIS has responded ineptly to such problems. It has almost no appreciation of the critical role of spin in shaping public opinion in modern Western democracies and has neither a public relations office nor a legal department. Instead of releasing its version of events in a convincing way, it always communicates in the form of a short press release. Refugees International reported incredulously that when they asked for ‘a brochure describing their mission, officers handed RI a printed copy in English and Arabic of the Declaration of Principles . . . with photos of the signatories’.

The powerful, usually well-intentioned INGO community in Darfur has added its voice to those who see the presence of the UN, and of the Western powers in particular, as the only viable solution to the crisis. Refugees International wants the UN to take charge of African peacekeepers, on the grounds that ‘“blue-hatting” a mission . . . has worked in the past in such places as Burundi and Liberia, where the AU or Economic Community of West African States, after providing initial stability, handed over a mission to the UN.’ They argue, above all, that the UN has the resources to support more troops on the ground, and to furnish them with superior weaponry. RI has even called on the UN Security Council to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur and on Nato and other forces to assist AMIS in enforcing it. There are concerns, naturally, that such measures would ratchet up the military element of the ‘humanitarian intervention’, but there has been hardly any discussion of their potential political consequences. It is this tension between the military and political aspects of intervention that explains the contradictions in Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July on the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Resolution 1769 begins by affirming that this ‘hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries’. It calls on the secretary-general to ‘immediately begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID’, and leaves no doubt about the meaning of ‘immediately’: ‘as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007’. At the same time, the resolution ‘emphasises there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur’ and stresses the importance of the Darfur Peace Agreement as the basis for a ‘lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur’. It deplores the fact that ‘the Agreement has not been fully implemented by the signatories and not signed by all parties to the conflict,’ and calls for an immediate ceasefire, including a stop to the government’s aerial bombings. Here, then, is the contradiction at the heart of Resolution 1769: it aims to enforce a ceasefire that does not exist. It sets a firm deadline for the transfer of authority to UNAMID, but suggests no deadline for either a ceasefire or a political agreement to be reached by the warring parties. An external force can monitor a ceasefire agreed by belligerents, but only if such an agreement exists. The collapse of a ceasefire is evidence that there is no agreement. It was, after all, the breakdown of the N’djamena ceasefire that reversed the fortunes of AMIS.

‘The AU has become part of the conflict,’ Mohamed Saley, the leader of the JEM splinter group that allegedly abducted the AMIS patrol in October 2005, told Reuters at the time. ‘We want the AU to leave and we have warned them not to travel to our areas.’ Trying to keep the peace in the absence of a peace agreement made the AU ‘part of the conflict’. There is no reason to believe that the fate of the UN will be any different. To strengthen the mandate in the absence of a political agreement is more likely to deepen than to solve the dilemma. To enforce the ceasefire will mean taking on the role of an invading – and not a peacekeeping – force. Darfur, which is a bit smaller than France – and larger than Iraq – will surely require a force of more than the 26,000 currently planned by the UN.

Abdu Katuntu was chair of the African Union Parliament’s Select Committee on Darfur between 2004 and 2006, during which time he made six lengthy visits to Darfur, including stays in IDP camps. I met him in Kampala a few weeks ago and asked him why the UN could not have given AMIS more resources and made its mandate more robust, instead of ‘blue-hatting’ it. ‘It would have rendered them irrelevant,’ he answered, ‘because the international community would have said the Africans have sorted out their own problem.’ I have also spoken to UN personnel who are puzzled by the organisation’s focus on only one set of belligerents. ‘There is something wrong with the UN Mission,’ an Afghan security officer in the UN’s Department of Safety and Security reflected. ‘Everyone knows that for the UN the problem is only the government and the Janjawiid. They are here to disarm them and not the rebel forces. How then can you get a political solution between them?’

The AU’s political vision is encapsulated in a provision in the Darfur Peace Agreement that calls for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). The AU distinguishes between the processes of dialogue and consultation: although the formal dialogue can begin only after a comprehensive peace agreement is in place, the AU is committed to an informal consultation intended to pave the way to such an agreement. The consultations began in July last year. The first meetings were held in cities in each of the three states of Darfur: Nyala in the south, Zalingei in the west and El Fasher in the north. They brought together grassroots activists and leaders representing many different groups: the Native Administration regime in the rural areas that was displaced (into the towns and cities) by the 2003 insurgency, local voluntary organisations, political parties (both government and opposition), intellectuals and academics (each of the three states has a university), and the more than two million displaced people living in camps in Darfur.

The first rounds of discussion in Nyala and Zalingei had produced a consensus on one issue: the DDDC should not be a top-down affair but should rather include all political and tribal affiliations (even those implicated in providing recruits for the Janjawiid). It would have to be independent of any political party or group (including the government). But the consultations produced a double shock for the African Union. A large majority at the El Fasher meeting in July this year called for an intervention by forces who would not only be ‘external’ but non-African. Most participants identified the AU as the root of their problems and the UN as the most likely source of an effective solution. ‘The AU is like the Arab League,’ the representative from El Fasher Call, a voluntary organisation, explained. ‘It responds to governments, not public pressure. All African governments are dictatorships, which is why people look at the AU with suspicion. The UN also represents governments, but most states in the UN are democratic.’ ‘We want the UN to come,’ the sultan of El Fasher added. ‘It has mercy.’

The naivety of these assumptions was typical of the discussions at El Fasher. Just as they identified the UN with Western democracies, and talked as if democracies cannot be empires, every speaker who called for UN intervention seemed to assume that UN forces – unlike those of AMIS – would be white. They did not appear to have grasped that what will change in the transition from AMIS to UNAMID is the command much more than the troops on the ground.
The discussion on UN intervention ended in a cul-de-sac. On the one hand, the call for external intervention was backed up by a strong feeling that all internal avenues (national and African) were exhausted. On the other hand, those most vociferously calling for external intervention seemed to see the UN as a benign agency without any political agenda of its own – even though it is clear that a UN intervention would be guided by the big powers of the Security Council. Many supporters of external intervention saw it as an extension of a local practice, ‘ajawiid’, whereby a third party intervenes in a conflict that cannot be resolved. But the lesson of ‘ajawiid’ is that the intervention can only be credible and effective if the third party’s interests are compatible with those of the belligerents. In El Fasher no one questioned the politics of an intervention driven by the major powers.

Local voluntary organisations were critical of the growing dependency of IDPs on international NGOs. The representative from El Fasher Call made the point with some bitterness: ‘IDPs are trying to endear themselves to international NGOs but don’t want to deal with national NGOs.’ ‘IDPs don’t believe in anything Sudanese any more,’ a representative from a Fur charity added. One participant from a construction NGO observed that the war had made people adopt a ‘consumer mentality’. The disaffection with INGOs was shared by all local voluntary organisations, regardless of their ethnic affiliation or political inclination. ‘National NGOs lack the capacity to provide necessary services,’ a representative of Sudan Development Organisation explained, not least because they are excluded by INGOs: ‘They make no attempt to acknowledge that we know the ground better, and also the demands of the people. No wonder most national NGOs have been rejected by the IDPs. If international NGOs gave us a chance, people might appreciate us more.’ One participant, however, reminded his colleagues that, without the INGOs, ‘you would not have found any IDP alive in Darfur.’ As he saw it, the problem was twofold. First, the INGOs have a short-term perspective: they may leave after peace is established, and national NGOs should be ready to fill the gap. Second, each INGO has its own agenda that limits its perspective: ‘Every organisation has its own programme for each place. There should be a dialogue among organisations to co-ordinate a programme.’

Summing up the discussions at El Fasher, the AU mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, made the crucial point that for external intervention to work it would have to reinforce an internal process, not be a substitute for it. What matters, he argued, is ‘not how large a force it is but what they have come to defend’, since ‘without an agreement on peace, even a force of fifty thousand can’t change the situation here radically.’ He meant to caution Darfurians that to pin all hopes on the hybrid force would be tantamount to abdicating their own responsibility. But he was in a minority.

Salim reflected more widespread agreement when he remarked: ‘Even if those who have taken up arms have a cause, it is important to consult those who have not taken up arms, the civilian population.’ The point of the consultations should be ‘to show them an alternative to armed struggle: dialogue, persuasion, organisation’. Earlier negotiations, he argued, should have involved more civilians. But if civil society is to be more than a mere appendage to the second round of negotiations involving armed groups, the DDDC talks will need to be the beginning of a far more ambitious process.

No internal force appears capable of effective leadership. Even the SPLA, which is in political control of the South of Sudan and has been guaranteed, under the terms of the separate Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, 10 per cent representation in every parliament in the northern states, doesn’t have the human resources necessary for effective leadership. Like the UN, the INGOs seem to have no patience with an internal political process. For them, the people of Darfur are not citizens in a sovereign political process so much as wards in an international rescue operation with no end in sight. They are there to ‘save’ Darfur, not to ‘empower’ it. This is why many of the big INGOs and some of the American and British staff at the UN offices in Khartoum are sceptical about the DDDC. They worry that bringing together political figures and representatives of civil society for an open discussion risks conveying a feeling that normality is returning to Darfur, when it is actually the depth of the crisis that should be emphasised. The ‘humanitarian’ effort is itself based on the conviction that both the crisis and its solution are military, not political; accordingly, there is little appetite for an internal political process designed to strengthen democratic citizenship.

‘What is the solution?’ I asked General Anyidoho, who has recently been appointed joint deputy special representative for the hybrid force. ‘Threefold,’ he replied, military fashion. ‘First, a complete ceasefire.’ (This would require a political agreement among all the fighting forces.) ‘Second, talks involving a cross-section of Darfurians. They must agree. And third, the government has a big role to play. This is not a failed state; there is a sitting government.’ What about the Janjawiid? ‘They are nomadic forces on horseback; they have always been there. They are spread across Sahelian Africa: Niger, Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic. The problem is that the AK-47 has replaced the bow and arrow. The Janjawiid should be disarmed before the rebels turn in their arms.’

What about the camps? ‘The camps are becoming militarised. Women go out to collect firewood and they are raped. Rape has become a weapon of war. It is meant to destroy a people’s moral fabric: in an Islamic society, rape is a big blemish. The AU police used to provide firewood patrols and they were successful. But if there is security in future, men will join their women in going to collect firewood. The objective should be to close the IDP camps.’

What about the American threat to ‘take steps’ – a no-fly zone, sanctions? ‘It is not the way to go. Americans give deadlines all the time. The threat of sanctions is also not enough. They have lived under these for so long that they have become normal. They are used to living in seclusion. Now, they have oil and a friend in the Security Council . . . We can’t solve these problems through weapons. We have to sit and talk, which is why it is important to look at how Côte d’Ivoire was solved after four years of fighting. Outsiders can never solve the problem for us. It’s a distant misery for them. We have to do it for ourselves.’

Footnotes
1. No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan by Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein (Refugees International, November 2005).
2. Alex de Waal wrote about this in the LRB of 30 November 2006.

* This article first appeared in the London Review of Books vol. 29, no. 17, 6 September 2007 and reproduced here with the permission of the author.

* Mahmood Mamdani is the Herbert Lehman Professor of Government in the Departments of Anthropology and Political Science at Columbia University in the United States. He is also the Director of Columbia's Institute of African Studies.[ He is also the current President of the Council for Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Dakar, Senegal.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Ningefurahi kama baadhi ya mawazo ya wasomaji katika baadhi ya hizi makala zinazohusu Afrika mashariki zingetafsiriwa kwa lugha ya kiswahili kama jina la jarida lilivyo. Hii inasaidia "Kuwezesha Sauti yako Kusikika" kwa usahihi na kwa watu wengi zaidi.

I like the story about governments and restaurants. The question is, Are the fcustomers including the frogs any better than the managers of the restaurants?

From what the article says, it seems that the customers, even though complaining are still content with the culture of managers. It is suprising that it is the managers who are expected change, and actually some have changed and are working hard. What about the people themselves, those who are hungry and angry? Why dont they just stop paying the bribes so that there is no incentive for the bad managers? Why dont they just boycot eating as it has been the cases where people felt the need to do so in past? A few deaths? Yes, malnutrition? that is also obvious and innevitable but a worth price to pay for the future generations. Why dont these people remember the few brave customers who refused the promises and even boycotted to eat bad and smelling food in South Africa, Angola, Liberia, Zaire and other palces?

I think the customers, especially those making the loudest noises in the media, workshop and seminars, and the frogs at the edge of the restaurant have found an alternative to get better food. That is why they have the energy to make the noises about the poor quality of food. I feel some go to neighbouring restaurants for better services for their children. I do not blame them, as one of them once retorted "..... You are right my friend, but I cannot dare see my child just about to be eaten by a greedy crocodile and do nothing, just because I am a believer in the rights of animals!

In my opinion, I may not want to continue blaming the managers and waiters at the restaurant, but the customers.......... amka kumekucha is the right slogan then. and then tuache kupiga kelele kwa kiingereza kwa vile siyo wengi wataamka, na wale watakaosikia wamekwisha amka lakini wanaenda kwenye migahawa mbadala.

Japhet Makongo Is an Independent Consultant, Ubunifu Associates, Dar es Salaam

In this week's AU Monitor, we bring you news and documentation for forthcoming AU meetings on children, industry and of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. In addition, the AU Monitor features interviews from the African Development Bank (AfDB) with resource mobilization lead expert, Boubacar Traoré, who sheds light on the Multilateral Development Banks’ meeting on debt-related issues held at the World Bank and with Ms Motselisi Lebesa, Principal Public Utilities Economist at NEPAD’s Regional Integration and Trade Department, who talks of Africa's infrastructure deficit and the approaches developed by NEPAD and AfDB in two recent studies. Also at the African Union, the President of the African Union, Ghana’s Head of State, John Kufuor, has appointed Cameroonian Vice President of Transparency International, Barrister Akere Tabeng Muna, as a member of the African Union Audit Commission, in conformity with the Accra Declaration in which Heads of States and Government agreed that, in order to attain the Union Government, "an Audit of the Executive Council in terms of Article 10 of the Constitutive Act, the Commission as well as the other organs of the African Union" be conducted prior to the January summit of the African Union in Addis Ababa.

In Asian-African news, the AU Monitor brings you an important article by Mills Soko on African and Indian economic ties, enunciating the potential for lessons and skills sharing, Dr. Soko states: "Africa has become the emerging market for Indian products and enterprises and an alternative source of energy for India, while African exports, including natural resources, agricultural goods and household consumer items, have grown exponentially." Further, in Sino-African relations, the African Union announced this week the donation of $300,000 by the Chinese government for peacekeepers in Somalia. Also in peace and security news, the AU Mission in the Sudan has condemned an attack by the Justice and Equality Movement and the Unity faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Unity) on a Sudanese army base in Kordofan while the United Nations Secretary General also condemned the government bombings on Southern Darfur on Tuesday.

In regional news, President of the ECOWAS Commission, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, urged the European Union to show understanding and flexibility in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, while, in a communiqué of the SADC Civil Society forum on “Ensuring Effective Civic Participation in Development and Democratic Governance”, Southern African civil society call upon heads of states and government to institutionalize and operationalize the participation of civil society in decision making at the national and regional levels; take concrete and urgent action related to the violations of human rights in Zimbabwe and Lesotho; and to enter trade negotiations, particularly with the EU, as a united bloc for the benefit of the region.

Unequal trade and investment relationships are nothing new for Africa, although beginning in 2005 the world’s attention was drawn to Africa’s plight as never before. However, in contrast to the neo-orthodox strategy implied by Gordon Brown, Bono, Bob Geldoff and other mainstream campaigners, Africa’s deepening integration into the world economy has typically generated not wealth but the outflow of wealth, says Patrick Bond.

Reporting to the director of the Crimes Against Humanity (CAH) program, the Senior Associate-Africa will play a key role in formulating and achieving program goals and objectives; conducting research; writing reports, web site content, and press materials; conducting advocacy; fostering relationships with staff members of nongovernmental organizations, governments, and international organizations; and developing specific projects. Deadline for applications is September 14, 2007.

The Oxford Internet Institute (University of Oxford) invites applications from the global South to fill two places in its Civil Society Practitioners Programme. This visitor programme is intended for Civil Society Practitioners of distinction or outstanding promise who wish to visit the Institute for a period of six weeks between February and December 2008, to undertake research concerning the social impact of the Internet and related ICTs.The deadline for applications is September 26 2007.

The scale of corruption carried out in Kenya by family and associates of its former president, Daniel Arap Moi, has been revealed in a secret report which alleges that more than £1 billion of government money was stolen during his 24-year rule. Mr Moi’s regime, which came to an end in 2002, has long been regarded as one of Africa’s most corrupt, but the extent of the graft has never been exposed in so much detail.

Those predicting a free and fair election next year were left re-evaluating their optimism after an opposition candidate was stabbed to death last Friday. Jabulani Chiwoka, an MDC candidate in next year’s rural district council elections, died from stab wounds after suspected Zanu PF thugs attacked him at a beerhall in the Svosve communal area of Marondera. Another party activist, Tafiranyika Ndoro, is in a Marondera hospital recovering from stab wounds.

For the past 6 weeks I have been travelling in the West, East and Southern parts of Africa. The mission (as these trips are grandiosely described in UN vocabulary) has been to assess situations on the ground with regards to the implementation and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in the various countries.

This being the mid year in the 15-year terminal date set for the achievement of the goals. The other and more immediate reason for the travels is to see what preparations are being made by various partners of the UN Millennium Campaign for this year’s Guinness Challenge to beat the record set last year for Standing Up against poverty.

The UN Millennium Campaign’s Global Director, Salil Shetty, led the missions. It involved meeting with various UN country teams, Government officials, National Coalitions for the Global Call Against Poverty (GCAP) / MDG campaigners, Local and International NGOs, Other CSOs, Media, other opinion moulders, etc. We have been in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya,Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi.

There have been a number of activities; reports and media focus during July (the exact midpoint of the MDGs being, July 7 2007, i.e. 777) in many countries indicating slow progress on a number of the goals. But there is a general pessimistic consensus that on current pace most of our countries may not achieve the goals by 2015.

A disproportionate focus on what has not been achieved may actually make one lose sight of the progress being made and what more could be done. For instance all the countries we visited have made tremendous progress in the area of increasing access to education for both Boys and girls. Millions of children who could not have passed by the gates of a school are now in School. In some countries they are moving access beyond Primary school to secondary school.

While it is true that there are issues about retention and quality the minimum threshold is being pushed. It is now up to citizens to press harder for better education through a general improvement in teaching and learning conditions. In a country like Kenya the provision of Mosquito nets has dramatically brought down the number of people especially children dying from Malaria. Malawi today is only second to Peru globally in the most dramatic reduction of infant mortality. In the past four years infant mortality has come down by more than 1/3.

In Ghana and Malawi the interlink age between poverty and lack of access to education even when it is officially free and universal has led to complimentary programmes including giving children from poorer homes a decent meal in school and also providing transport. These successful initiatives proof the integrated nature of the MDGs. They are not cocktails that states and communities can cherry pick as they go along. Progress in one goal must demand progress in others if the success is to be sustainable. In all the countries there are sad paradoxes that both governments and campaigners have to focus upon. As infant mortality is coming down maternal mortality remain scandalously high. In Zambia, Nigeria, Malawi and Tanzania, they are so high that it is really amazing that there is no public outrage about them. If our children are living longer why are our mothers dying often so young? Who is going to look after these children? How can we achieve the lofty goals on Gender and women empowerment if so many women continue to die in childbirth?

While we welcome the patchy and slow progress that has been made so far it is important to use this mid point year to realign our national priorities to ensure that the MDGs are met and even surpassed. As a foot ball supporter and a life long Liverpool one, at that, the analogy I can draw is that of the European finals of 2005. At half time Liverpool was trailing AC Milan 3:0. As the whistle was blown both managers went into the dug out. Liverpool Manager was furious and he read out the riot act to his players. On resumption we saw a changed team who had levelled the scores by full time and refused to concede any even at the extra time. Finally in the Shoot out Liverpool won.

We should use the same tactics for our governments. The fact that they are making uneven progress at mid point should not mean that the outcome is necessarily doomed. More can be done. One of our Key partners, The Micah Challenge (a global group of ecumenical churches campaigning on MDGs) has dubbed their campaign: blowing the Whistle. We need to blow the whistle on our political leaders at local, national, Pan African and globally that they fulfil the commitments made under the MDGs.

There is no point in being cynical. 7 years may be short but it is long enough for all states to meet these goals if citizens insist and continue to put pressure on the policy makers whether government or parliamentarians or politicians at all levels. Indifference is the enemy of delivery and a great ally of insensitive politicians.

On October 16/17 every one of us will have the opportunity to show we care about the poor and support the MDGs by helping to beat the Guinness record that we set last year. Over 23.5 millions of people around the world stood up against poverty in support of the MDGs. You can do so anywhere you are. Look at or www.millenniumcampaign.org for details.

* Tajudeen Abdul Raheem is the Deputy Director for the UN Millennium Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes this article in a personal capacity as a concerned pan-Africanist.

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

A dissident Congolese general called for African mediation to broker a ceasefire in eastern Congo as fighting between his forces and government troops neared the provincial capital on Thursday. New clashes broke out before dawn around Karuba, a village about 30 km (19 miles) west of Goma, the capital of troubled North Kivu province, after President Joseph Kabila's government rejected talk of negotiations.

Between August 29, 2007 and September 2, 2007, a Tribunal of 16 esteemed jurists from nine countries, including Algeria, Brazil, France, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mexico, South Africa, Venezuela, and the United States, convened in New Orleans to hear testimony by experts and survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. After hearing nearly 30 hours of testimony by hurricane survivors and experts – covering government neglect and negligence in 15 areas, ranging from police brutality to environmental racism, from misappropriation of relief to gentrification, the jurists announced their preliminary findings.

Sudan and Darfur rebels will hold talks on October 27 in Libya to push for peace ahead of the expected deployment of a 26,000-strong peace force in Darfur, a U.N.-Sudanese government statement said on Thursday. The statement said the United Nations "expresses the hope that parties will cooperate fully" with U.N. and African Union (AU) mediators.