Since its independence, Senegal has been governed by a single party, that from the first was rife with contradictory influences: the concern of preserving the interests of the former occupying power versus intransigent nationalism. This led to a political crisis in 1962. After deposing the prime minister, Mamadou Dia, with the installation of the presidential regime, all the powers were given to the president of the republic, who was also the secretary general of the party. And, as one might have expected, in spite of the establishment of a multiparty system in the mid-1970s and greater freedom of the press at the end of the two following decades, the wearing out effect of power, as well as the total absence of democracy within the ruling government, caused the management of the country to go seriously adrift.

As a consequence the economy became increasingly less productive and close to collapse, public finance was in dire straits and there was an inevitable accumulation of difficulties for the population, which structural adjustment only intensified. Thus the political changes that took place at the national level in 2000 raised great hopes among most of the Senegalese. But were these hopes fulfilled? Were the difficulties that plagued the country until 2000 overcome? Were the structural weaknesses of the party currently in power comparable to those that had caused the defeat of the socialist party in 2000?

On the other hand, are the political forces that offered an alternative and proposed reforming the state really able to bring about genuine changes in the situation? Are they sufficiently united to do so? Have the leaders of this camp really converted to a new concept of power so that, if they ran the country, they would really serve the population and be deeply committed to work within the strict framework of the priorities of the country? Would they renounce the personalisation of power (that is, imposing on their entourage, as well as members of their party, the cult of their own person)?

These are important questions that should be posed by each citizen who has a clear conscience and a good understanding of the realities in our country.

HOW TO JUDGE THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESENT REGIME?

It is necessary, in such an exercise, to recall the conditions in which the Parti démocratique sénégalais (PDS), now in power, came into existence in 1974. It should be remembered that the political regime of that time had been very repressive, against any opponent. So much so that the founder of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade, in order to escape the vigilance of President Leopold Sedar Senghor, had first to present his party as a ‘contributory’ party (i.e. one that would support the majority party). In spite of everything, however, the activities of the PDS turned it into a real opposition party, canvassing for votes, expressing opinions that went against that of the regime at the time on several issues about how to conduct the country’s affairs.

It should also be noted that Wade had, all by himself, to find the means to finance his party and he was the sole inspirer of the political line of the organisation. Also he was the only interlocutor with the authorities and the foreign parties that supported the international liberal movement. All these roles made the PDS national secretary feel that he represented everything for the party. It was perhaps from then on that he developed the conviction that the party was his alone and that even those who supported him in the running of the organisation, were only collaborators and not really responsible in their own right. At the same time, the perception that Wade had of his relationship with the militants always led him to consider that they would rally first behind his ideas and vision, before – and perhaps only incidentally – being members of the party.Even if he abandoned this party to found another, most of these militants would follow him.

Added to all this is the fact that Wade, during his long struggle, has always been at the forefront, giving of himself more than all the others. He was a regular victim of arbitrary deprivations of his liberty as the regime of the Socialist Party considered him its main enemy and more than a simple political adversary. These are the reasons why Wade can be considered as the person who brought his party to power rather than the other way around.

It is therefore easier to understand why the person of the secretary general comes before the structures of the party and this becomes even more convincing if we look carefully at the insignificant role played by the congress of the PDS. It has not been convened for more than ten years.

The fact that the party belongs to the national secretary has made it impossible for any outstanding figure to emerge beside the chief. This is also its weakness and disables the structures that are the corollary. Arrangements have even been made to prevent one of the party cadres acquiring a certain reputation that could make him an eventual rival. The notion of a Number 2 is almost inconceivable and consequently it is difficult for the party to determine how it will ensure its continuation.

The chief of the PDS, perhaps under cover of the presidential regime, has actually adapted its relationship with his party in its rapport with the State. Here, too, it is not difficult to consider that the power of the state, if not simply the state, belongs to him. But it is precisely at this point that there are signs of a drift away from the set-up of republican governance towards monarchical practices.

How can one otherwise interpret the fact that four ministries, that have nothing in common in terms of their mandates or activities, have been conferred on one person, who is none other than Karim Wade, the son of the president. One can hardly cite the need for economy as an argument in a government that has 41 ministers, with a large number of departments whose mandates do not require full-time national supervision. It would probably be a good idea to make arrangements in the constitution to define the norms of the Senegalese government structure and prohibit the number of mandates that can be held at the same time, which is frowned upon in contemporary realms.

We must remember that being republican and a democrat does not only entail observing the laws and regulations, it also means respecting a professional code of ethics that does not give favours to one’s clan or one’s friends to the detriment of other citizens with the same merits and who, furthermore, belong to the same political sphere that is in power. One might wonder whether the discretionary power of the head of state to nominate the members of government and to define their remits should be limited by the principle of the equality of citizens to participate in running public affairs in their country, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

This same convention, which was ratified by Senegal (whose constitution specifically refers to it), envisages, in its second article that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter must not be limited by any kind of distinction through birth or membership (of race, ethnicity, religion, region, etc.). Here we should call upon specialists in administrative and constitutional law as surely the ratification of an international convention involves the integration of its measures into the national law of the country concerned.

The relationship of the head of the executive with the state means that all the other institutions give way to the head of state. Their weakening is due to both the behaviour of the PDS in parliament, which ingests all the wishes of the head of the executive mechanically, and also to the organised, if not planned instability of the governmental institutions. This last factor is the key to the whole situation because it has been absolutely necessary to prevent a prime minister from remaining long in his post in case he becomes popular enough that it becomes difficult to remove him in case he is transformed into a possible successor. As for the ministers, their status has never been so precarious – all that is probably intended to make them understand that their real chief is not the prime minister.

When those in power have difficulties in their contact with public opinion and the voters, the nature of the PDS – and also the vision of its secretary – is such that the head of state is the only one considered responsible, because he is the source of all decisions, all nominations, and all mandates in his party and in the state structures.

Such a concentration of power and the absence of any signs of internal change-over, which is typical of this political set-up, make it probable that the PDS has no chance of survival when Wade leaves his post. Incidentally, the Senegalese opposition (as well as broad sectors of public opinion) suspect that, as far as Wade is concerned, his own descendants should ensure the continuation of his power. But if this dream were to materialise, it would come up against enormous obstacles.

In fact, if Senegalese voters were consulted transparently and on a regular basis, they would contest the management of public funds in different projects and upon which light has not yet been shed, as well as examine the accusations of corruption. These were indeed the reasons for the failure of the electoral test in March 2009.

It should also be added that the balance sheet presented by the regime concerning its action, even if it has some positive aspects, is greatly weakened, whatever anyone says, by inappropriate allocation of resources. Poverty is still widespread among most of the population, there are recurrent deficiencies in the power supply, ineffective funding for education and confusion among a large number of young people. As for agriculture, the groundnut sector alone (the government seems to have forgotten that industrial crops are produced to sell) reveals the imprecision and chaotic nature of the policies that have been adopted.

If, on the other hand, it is a question of taking another path, violating the constitution and republican values, this project would be very dangerous for national cohesion and might incur civil war. And any politician, of whatever political stripe, whose acts and gestures above all serve his personal ambition, would commit an enormous blunder and cause his country to slide into violence and chaos. This is the why we dare to hope that those who believe Wade has this intention are mistaken. Such an enterprise would not only be very risky but also his compatriots would put into question his whole life and his political career, which has been for the most part dedicated to changeover among parties, to commitment without concessions, to a continuous struggle for the defence of public liberties and democracy.

In the history of all countries, the great men who leave a mark on their epoch are often distinguished by a certain quality of thought, by a vision, by setting aside their own person, by a disinterestedness that earns respect and finally by devotion, in the face of adversity, to the high road of excellence which they desire for their people. But this eminent position also forces them, if life gives them the time, to know when to conclude their work (or to leave to others to continue it) at the time and in the way that makes it possible to keep intact the value of the symbols and reference points that they had helped to build.

All that we have said about the model being followed by the present regime, both through the party and the institutions, suggest that serious obstacles would prevent such a system from being able to reproduce itself. For the regime is turning in on itself, neglecting its relationship with the people and only concerned with adjustments in the apparatus so as to be continually on the alert against internal competition. Moreover, because of this pressing need to weaken anyone who puts forward a claim for a dominant position, there is nobody else to take over power – not to mention the strong resistance in public opinion which shows unequivocal signs of wanting radical change.

For this reason it is important to consider the capacity of the political forces that are proposing new options and to ask whether they can really implement another conception of the state, putting an end to all the difficulties that the populations currently faces.

CAN THE OPPOSITION CARRY OUT THE CHANGE THAT IS NEEDED?

The opposition, considered to be structured, is the group Benno Siggil Sénégal (Together to save Senegal). This organisation came out of national consultations where part of civil society joined the opposition in thinking about the new orientation required to solve the various problems that Senegalese development faces, from the political, economic and social viewpoints.

The Benno Siggil Sénégal group has now at its disposal what could be called a programme, even if it has some imperfections. The section concerned with the changes necessary in the state structure specifically calls for the establishment of a parliamentary regime, instead of a presidential one. One can only support this proposal, seeing the damages caused by the extreme personalisation of power that, since the independence of Senegal, has emptied representative democracy of its meaning and content. We have seen the confiscating of national sovereignty by a personal power that has been controlled very little and rarely condemned.

It is not surprising then that the majority of the population lives in extreme poverty. This is not an exaggeration: Senegal seems like a country cut in two with, on one side, most of the inhabitants living in utter destitution and, on the other, a minority to whom nothing is refused and whose lifestyle seems to belong to a developed country.

But the question should be posed whether the leaders of the parties that compose Benno Siggil Sénégal are really sincere in supporting the reform of the political system. The parliamentary regime offers the prime minister, who is head of the majority in the chamber, the executive power. This is to the detriment of the president of the republic, who only has ceremonial functions. How, therefore, should one understand the disputes between the different heads of opposition parties about the designation of a candidate who, if he is elected would only ensure a brief transition period towards the parliamentary regime, after the adoption of a new constitution.

Thus there is a big mystery concerning the intentions of them all and this is a serious obstacle in implementing the new options of the opposition.

As for Senegal’s economic and social development, the situation requires, not only the definition of new directions but that political forces which promise to straighten out the country should present genuine political programmes in each sector, spelling out the different actions with measurable consequences that would increase the income of the greatest number of people. It is time, in fact, that political actors develop a new determination, committing themselves to a path that leads to a radical change in the structure of the economy. This is, as everyone knows, composed of a tertiary sector that supplies 52 per cent of the national wealth, while the primary sector, in which 65 per cent of the population is engaged, is only responsible for 13 to 14 per cent of these revenues.

Besides, it is really misleading to say that, because its GDP per capita is CFA400 000 (US$840) per year, in other words more than US$2 dollars a day, Senegal should therefore not be included in the category of poor countries. It is necessary to specify that the 8 million people who live on agriculture, fisheries, and animal production have less than US$1 dollar a day, benefiting from a very small proportion of the GDP. In fact, who benefits from the surplus profits from operating telecommunications, if not its shareholders? Who profits from the banks and the insurance companies? Who benefits from the profits of wholesale trade? And so on.

We are waiting to hear what actions are proposed so that, in three or four years’ time, the rice importation will be stopped, and local production will be suffucuent. We demand that the government and opposition present us with new proposals that enable farmers to sell their harvests at reasonable prices. We want to be convinced that those who, yesterday, privatised the groundnut sector, will be so intransigent towards the industry to force it to reconsider its supply and sale policies, in order to prioritise the transformation of Senegal’s national production.

And what about national education, which is an imitation of a foreign system that prevents the implementation of reforms that could provide the human resources required for Senegal’s development? What about the other basic services, to which public funds are dispersed in dribs and drabs, while other expenses (of which the utility is more than doubtful) are given priority? And what about energy, a sector in which absolute impenetrability reigns about oil supply processes and where serious audits are more than urgent?

All these questions, and still others, make it necessary for those proposing an alternative to give evidence of their determination to apply genuine solutions and convince the Senegalese that their hopes will not be dashed once again.

But the best guarantee would certainly be if the political game would be balanced by the appearance of a third force, a new pole which is strong enough to make it difficult for the traditional parties to obtain a majority and do what they want. What recently happened in the U.K. is a good example. In the U.K., the liberal party, thanks to its unprecedented electoral progress, obliged the conservatives to make a governmental agreement on a programme in which a good part of its options are taken into account.

To arrive at this result, as we have proposed, it is civil society that must involve itself, for it has shown that it has competences, that it is not divided by populations, that it has real patriots within its ranks. All it needs to do is to mobilise, organise and federate itself, in order to pool its resources to become stronger.

However, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the different movements that have sprung up recently and ensure that their real motivations are not simply to defend personal causes, but rather that they are seriously concerned with the interests of the population.

The emergence of the new ways of expression through petitions, which are undoubtedly a form of direct democracy, must be encouraged and, as soon as possible, institutionalised by a constitutional measure. This would also make the petition not only a way of rejecting a situation or to cancel a decision judged contrary to the general interest, but also an instrument for creating new regulations that the parliamentarians, left to themselves, would not have voted. It is a question of fighting against the blockages that the parties tend to impose in order to be the only channels through which the popular will is expressed. Very often partisan interests, as conceived by the members of the governmental parliamentary apparatus, win out.

The present situation in Senegal is at a decisive turning point in its history. We have, on the one hand, a power that is very uncertain about its survival and that seeks solutions of all kinds for its continuity but which, of its own accord, has deprived itself of the bases that can guarantee it. On the other hand, there is an opposition that is trying hard to elaborate concepts and strategies in order radically to change the nature of the state and of power but which must overcome the difficulties and obstacles that lie in the path of a sustainable unity.

And then, between these traditional forces, a civil society has emerged that brings real hope to those that now doubt the capacity of the parties to get the country going again, because they themselves have contributed to create the present difficult situation.

This is why the Senegalese are confronted by a challenge of enormous importance, which is fundamentally political. They must take in hand their own destiny and define the priorities of their country, involving themselves in action so that they are at the heart of the state’s policies. For this to happen new forms of political organisation – other channels expressing all opinions – are clearly necessary. And this must be implemented so that a change takes place as soon as possible, to avoid yet another lost decade, exacerbating even further the distress of our Senegal’s people.

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* Translated from the French by Victoria Bawtree
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