Ìrohìn: The newspaper Estado de S. Paulo recently published an article under the title ‘Lula begins trip to Africa to be next to dictator’, referring to President Lula's trip this week to four African countries, starting with Burkina Faso. How would you evaluate this trip?

Carlos Moore: In the sense of what actually happened, what the newspaper published is entirely accurate. Twenty years ago, on 15 October 1987, there was a coup in Burkina Faso, where the president Thomas Sankara - a great man, an African nationalist and important pan-African - was assassinated in a cowardly act during a swift coup orchestrated by the country’s current president, Blaise Campoaré. Sankara was killed along with twelve other nationalist leaders.

I: What were the reasons for the bloody coup?

CM: Everything derives from the fact that Burkina Faso, the former French colony once known as ‘Upper Volta’, escaped French control in 1983 when Sankara took power and along with his companions initiated a genuine social revolution and policy which would quickly eliminate corruption, introduce women's rights and implement radical land reform. The new revolutionary government advocated the unification of the entire African continent into a single federal country, and promoted the non-payment of debts owed unfairly to the West, beginning, with this, a social revolution. Thus arisen, Sankara caught the eye of the French, with the reasons being these: the class currently heading Burkina Faso is totally in the hands of the West, those powers that have worked for the underdevelopment and backwardness of Africa in ceaseless and merciless exploitation. The year 2007 thus marks the twentieth anniversary of a vile act that will do nothing but delay the progress of the African continent.

I: Sankara was a pan-Africanist?

CM: Absolutely. He is loved throughout the continent, where his memory is venerated along with that of Patrice Lumumba. Sankara fought to realise a project of African continental unity, a proposal also supported by leaders such as President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, and Steve Biko of South Africa. In other words, this great pan-African fought for the unity of the African continent, and many were killed by following this ideal. Sankara is one of them and always will be at the heart of Africa as a worthy upholder of the continent’s best interests.

I: How did it come to pass that Brazil’s President Lula has begun his trip to Africa in Burkina Faso on the anniversary of the current president’s assassination of Sankara?

CM: It is a fact that the Brazilian conservative press used this diplomatic decision to de-legitimate the entire policy of reconciliation with the African continent. There is no doubt that we are facing a surprising fact. This was effectively a decision by the Brazilian diplomacy that I personally do not understand. It is not a mistake, because those who took this decision knew the facts. So there are two issues here: a decision which I consider unfortunate and the exploiting of the decision by opposing forces looking to advance African progress as much as Brazil’s as a multi-racial nation. That is why we feel doubly sad, because I believe in the sincerity of Lula pro-African stance. The arguments on the subject offered by several newspapers seem in accord with these conservative forces.

I: Do you think that President Lula had all the information at hand before accepting the invitation of the Burkina Faso dictator?

CM: President Lula is someone who I respect a lot. Lula is a leader with an extraordinary past, who has distinguished himself time and again as the opponent of any form of dictatorship. He has always fought against the forces opposed to democracy. Indeed, I was puzzling to me that President Lula would allow himself to be associated with this figure precisely on the anniversary of the Sankara assassination. It is very sad to see the man who actually killed Sankara using this moment to try to fool the world, as the figure of Lula is internationally respected. For me as a pan-African, it was a moment of personal sadness and political embarrassment.

I: How is it that the president's aides are not aware of the fact that it may not be the most favourable time to go to the country?

CM: I understand that states have their own logic, the so-called ‘reason of state.’ This is a logic different from that which directs the actions of political activism. But here it is clear that there was an operation orchestrated by the neocolonial Burkina Faso state, led by President Blaise Campoaré, to coincide with a visit from a great and respected leader of the Third World at the time of the anniversary of the taking of power through the murder of Sankara, an event which has been disapproved by all African nationalists.

I: What is your assessment of President Blaise Campoaré?

CM: I do not have the slightest bit of respect for this leader, who has remained in power through successive acts of electoral fraud, and thanks to his intimidation of political opponents and the campaign of terror against his population. I consider him one of the vilest men and indeed one of the least capable leaders on the African continent. I won’t elaborate any further on this, because I do not think it merits all this attention.

I: How do you see relations between Brazil and Africa?

CM: We cannot forget that this is essentially a continent weakened and dominated by outside interests and lying prostrate in front of the wider world after several centuries of hard blows, imperial assaults, intense trafficking in slaves and the conquest of the whole continent by Western Europe. To this we must add that the process of independence, from 1957 onwards, was already undermined by neocolonial relations; the overwhelming majority of leaders who came to power were already corrupt and in service to the world's hegemonic interests. This was about elites colluding with the imperialist and hegemonic interests of Western Europe, the United States and Japan and, lately, these elites are also colluding with hegemonic ambitions of neo-imperial emerging powers like China. It is in this context that the overall Brazil-Africa relationship fits and begins before us.

I: As regards the future of Brazil-Africa relations, is your assessment optimistic or pessimistic?

CM: Neither of the two. This relationship will be the result of directions taken and the specific conditions governing the two and what the Brazilian and African civil societies allow it to be. Inter-country relations reflect either the interaction of harmonious, balanced structures - those that are therefore symmetrical - or opposing, unbalanced and asymmetric forces. Political, economic and military interests obey games of interest, not sentimental collisions. Actual interests, and not emotional reactions, govern political and economic strategies.

I: Which specific conditions are you referring to?

CM: There are many, quite varied examples, but in order to summarise I would say the main ones are:

a) A weak African civil society, disjointed, repressed and with little power to pressure leaders, who are in their majority despotic, corrupt, and likely to collude with external interests, culturally alienated and attentive only to their own material interests

b) An international context defined by the supremacy of the interests of a handful of imperialist nations - medium, large and superpower - whose greed exploits the fabled mineral wealth and strategic materials of a downtrodden Africa

c) A thriving industry in Brazil in search of areas ripe for investment and profit, giving rise to a growing economy worthy of highly technologically developed countries and fully industrialised, despite the fact that Brazil belongs to the so-called Third World.

Added to this is another factor of ideological nature: the existence in Brazil, the result of a well-known past, of a deep contempt towards the African continent, its descendants and its history. That is, in general, that the dominant elites in Brazil, profoundly Eurocentric and Europeanised, admirers of American and Euro-Western methods and standards, do not consider Africa as an equal partner, but rather as the ‘black continent’ and a provider of slaves, worthy only of being exploited and humiliated. These elites have virtually all the media in their hands, and thus can forge - and do forge - all manner of distorted images of the African continent. In turn, this media monopoly causes the public and civil society to get caught up in the exploitation of the African continent. This is where the danger lies: that, little by little, the Brazilian view is directed in a way hostile to the essential solidarity with African mainland felt by most of the country's population.

I: Adding a further political dimension and economic aspects, what would you say about the Brazilian government’s investing in African countries like Burkina Faso, Angola, the DR Congo and South Africa?

CM: We know that a head of state must defend the interests of all its citizens. A state’s economic interests are key points to be protected by its head. To the extent that these interests are represented by sectors that mark the country's presence in the international arena - particularly industry and commerce - it is logical that the Brazilian president makes deals to open new avenues for business investment, companies and multinationals from his country, as any other head of state would. This is something that is foreseen in the logic of the power of a head of state. Surely, there is no mystery at all. Moreover, the African continent is the object of international greed because of the extraordinary mineral wealth found in its subsoil. Of the 48 minerals considered as strategic by the industrialised, technologically developed world, in Africa no less than 38 are monopolised. It is no coincidence that Africa has been called a ‘geological scandal.’ It is for this reason that Africa appears as a focus for world powers and will be even more so over the course of this century. At this point, China possesses its own ongoing major operations within 53 African countries. China is interested in the exploration and acquisition of these strategic materials. And not only China, but Japan, South Korea, India, Turkey, and Iran; that is, all the emerging powers. Once restricted to the major European powers, the range of the countries interested in Africa is now expanding. It is no longer just the former colonial powers such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and England, but also Germany, Russia and even Poland. All these countries are interested in Africa. It is within this set of interests that Brazil lies as a country also seeking to be a power in the twenty-first century. Logically, this presents risks to the African continent, but the situation could also present positives.

I: What forms the basis of Brazilian interest in the African continent? Political sensitivity or purely economic interests?

CM: For me, there is no doubt that economic interests prevail, though it is also possible to take as sincere the sympathy expressed by the Brazilian head of state towards the African continent. I do not doubt Lula’s sincerity, but I also don’t doubt that there are actual interests conditioning Brazil’s international policy, interests both economic and commercial. However, these interests are expressed in a well-defined international context: the global supremacy of the United States and, in response to its unilateral hegemony, the emergence of new poles of power around the world. Brazil, the ninth or tenth economy in the world, is one of those possible centres aspiring to the status of great power.

I: Despite the new entente between Brazil and the countries of Africa, does this inevitably remain an ‘unequal’ relationship?

CM: No one can claim that there is balance between Brazil, a unified country with the planet’s ninth strongest economy, and a politically weak, huge continent comprised of 53 fragmented, poor countries. Brazil’s international clout surpasses that of all the countries of central Africa, for example. That is the reality. Even the Brazilian media has recently emphasised the imbalance between Brazil and African countries and stressed, not without perverse irony that the budget of Burkina Faso, a country of about 15 million, represents only 10% of the budget of a single Brazilian multinational in Petrobras! Brazil is a strong country-continent unified under a federalist system, active in the international arena and able to defend its borders. Africa is the exact opposite; there aren’t even well-articulated government projects at the federal level. Brazil is a strong country, vibrant, and technologically developed, whose economy and industry are driven by multinationals who move around the world in search of profit, raw materials and trade expansion. The 53 African countries, conversely, are primarily exporters of raw products from extraction, such as oil, gold, diamond, tungsten, copper and uranium. African armies serve only to exercise the repression of their people, or to mount coups, and certainly not for their countries’ defence against any external threat.

I: What must then be overcome in order to establish a just and fair relationship between these parties?

CM: There are several obstacles on both sides which will need to be overcome in order to establish equal relations between Brazil and Africa. Most African leaders themselves constitute major obstacles and generally a sizeable portion of a government will not seek to establish an equitable relationship with rest of the world. Remember that most governments came to power not because their leadership represented the best interests of their countries, but because they were placed there by Western imperialist powers to defend Western interests. That is where we must begin. Beginning with the independence of Ghana in 1957 and Guinea the following year, the process of decolonisation expanded to almost all African countries from 1960. As a result, true nationalist leaders came to power; powerful thinkers, great men of state who believed in continental cooperation and promoted African integration. These leaders longed for an Africa that would be no longer fragmented, a federal Africa, with just a central government, armed forces, a parliament and a single nationality. Among these visionary leaders who conceived of this Africa were the Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré, of Guinea, Modibo Keïta of Mali, Alphonse Massamba-Debate of Congo-Brazzaville, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Congo and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. These key leaders were followed by others of no less distinction in the form of Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Steve Biko and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. They were rooted in a radically different concept to the neocolonial approach of today’s Africa's leaders.

I: What happened to these nationalist leaders?

CM: These were visionary leaders who came to power in the process of decolonisation and fought for the independence of Africa, who were shot in bloody coups d’état or murdered, like Lumumba, Cabral, Murtala Mohammed of Nigeria, and even Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique. In less than thirty years, no less that 38 important African leaders were murdered under circumstances that in most cases have been dubious. In other words, these leaders have disappeared either through coups or murder. The African nationalist and pan-African has been decapitated! This forms part of the explanation around why Africa remains in its current situation of terrible underdevelopment. Its great leaders and thinkers have been decimated. And who took power in their place? Look over the longue durée of current governments and you'll see that those in power arrived there through bloody coups supported by countries in the West, in many cases killing those opposed to Africa’s exploitation and who had grand and innovative ideas about how to create a federation and emancipate the continent. So I would say that one of the major obstacles the African continent faces when trying to establish a relationship on an equal footing with the rest of the world is these African leaders themselves. In their overwhelming majority current African elites are a central factor in Africa’s underdevelopment.

I: Why exactly?

CM: Most of today’s African elites work to maintain old unequal relations of exchange, relations which began even before the 15th and 16th centuries, because this situation is very much to their benefit. Centuries ago, this entailed the sending of African slaves to the major centres of the imperial era: first the Middle East and then Europe. There is a history of unequal exchange with African countries introduced from the time when the Arab empire, from the 8th century, became dominant in the world. When that empire, which lasted more than eight hundred years, went into decline and the world began to see the emergence of a Western European empire, the same relationship remained unbalanced. Even today, this relationship upholds and promotes the interests of African elites. It is shocking to say, and let alone accept, but that's the reality. These elites are an important part of maintaining the fabric of the colonial links of yesterday and the possibilities for the neocolonial and neoimperial links of tomorrow.

I: Continuing with these obstacles, how about the Brazilian context?

CM: In Brazil, things happen in a different way. Here the dominant elites are powerful and able to defend their national interests well. Among these elites, there are sectors that exploit African raw materials. Interests are overseen by large multinational Brazilian companies that have the power to intervene outside the borders of this country. Currently, Brazilian companies are investing heavily in several Latin American countries and making a great effort to establish relations with the rest of the world. This is part of a plot of the capitalist world today. The Brazilian effort to be involved in Africa is therefore nothing out of the ordinary; it is part of the dominant dynamic around the world, fuelled by the liberal economy.

I: But you’ve just referred to the existence of conservative forces operating in Brazil. How do you classify them?

CM: We must recognise the fact that Brazil has a very complex system due to a national structure comprised of very small political pieces. Both economic interests and those of politicians are fragmented. North-east, south-east, and mid-west correspond to various historical and socioeconomic realities, often divergent. Here in this country, there are conservative forces that are simply homogeneous, but there are also several components to this conservatism. By the same token, there are different progressive forces in this country operating within quite a complex framework. Here, there are conservative forces acting in different directions. For example, there are groups who are opposed to ties with Africa, even though they benefit Brazil and Brazilian firms. Policy towards Africa, which Lula's government will try to establish with the support of a number of Brazilian companies, represents the interests of groups with a much better vision of national interests than the most reactionary sectors, which show a complete lack of interest for relations with African countries.

I: These links would benefit the people, basically?

CM: Indeed. At this point, I do not know to what extent those links currently benefit the African people. What is certain is that, at present, these ties will benefit African elites, on one hand and, above all, Brazil’s economy and firms. Nevertheless, there are conservative forces that do not want the establishment of ties with Africa. These conservative forces - not only in Brazil but throughout the American continent - are traditionally Afrophobic, having inherited a history of blind hatred and contempt for Africa to the point where they oppose the development of economic relations between their national companies and African countries, even though those relations - I repeat - can boost their own economies.

I: So you think these relations will be inevitably neocolonial?

CM: Under the conditions I have just described, it would be a miracle if this were not to happen, and I do not believe in miracles. It is clear to me that the conditions underpinning Brazil-Africa relations are no different from those that the rest of the world's powerful nations have established and maintained with the African continent. These conditions have certainly developed in a neocolonial direction, with Brazil taking on, little by little, the increasingly strong role of a hegemonic power, albeit with a ‘nice’ façade. This is why the current scenario of a representative and sympathetic approach to Africa’s interests will be restricted to President Lula’s mandate. Everything will hinge on the role played and interest shown by Brazilian civil society.

I: So these relations are bound to evolve negatively, would you say?

Carlos Moore – Neocolonial relations always spring from deep structural imbalances between nations. The focus on those relationships is, soon after, on guiding ideologies which guarantee the hegemony of the stronger partner over the other, who is increasingly subordinated within unequal relations. As I was saying, with regard to Brazil, the ideological factor has been supplied by a traditionally Afrophobic and anti-African national superstructure, itself the legacy of slavery. In Brazil, arguably, even in the face of repeated denials, strong structural and systemic racism continues, something deeply rooted in social imagery. These are major factors that cannot be forgotten nor taken lightly when speaking of Africa. To observe this we need only witness how the Brazilian media treats daily problems affecting the African continent, a treatment underpinned by an extreme degree of contempt, disrespect and insensitivity, and which promotes lies, half-truths and omitted facts that could so easily, under a different approach, explain the broader horrors of the continent’s corrupt elites and neocolonial system. There is no sympathy or empathy in reports on African peoples, but only the desire to present the ‘black continent’ as something bestial, and as a dark and dirty hole; primitive, barbaric, threatening! In other words, Africa is presented in the media in the same way as the slums of large Brazilian cities.

I: So you think that Brazilian imperialism may one day also arise?

Carlos Moore – History shows us that any powerful nation, despite its initial democratic profile, can become a hegemonic nation, domineering and abusive in relation to weaker countries. This is particularly the case when national interests are linked to economic and financial interests of large national and multinational companies. In this sense, Brazil can, yes, eventually become a sub-imperial or imperial country in the twenty-first century. There is no natural immunity against national pride, chauvinism or racism. There is no natural prevention against any powerful nation becoming an imperialist nation. The examples provided by the United States and Israel show us this reality. We must be very careful and very clear. A clear policy, and meticulous attention to the development of Brazil’s relations with African countries, requires civil society’s constant vigilance. I see no other way to ensure that these relationships are kept within acceptable ethical boundaries.

I: In terms of the building of more equitable relationships, what role is to be played by civil society, particularly by current social movements?

CM: Civil society has an ongoing responsibility for the direction in which a country’s foreign policy is guided. Assuming such a responsibility is crucial. I believe that in this particular case, it is precisely civil society that should provide the counterweight to the action and the interests of big business. Obviously the goal of business is profit and it tends, inevitably, to participate in the exploitation of the African continent. This is in line with the logic of global capitalism. There is a sector of the Brazilian economy, technologically advanced, that it intensely interested in other countries. Industry is clearly concerned with having access to raw materials and the African market. Today, Africa represents a growing market, where products manufactured in Brazil will find excellent opportunities for retail. As with Chinese, Japanese, Iranian and Indian companies, Brazilian enterprise is also interested in exploring and expanding that space. Prioritising the prevention of unfair working conditions for Africans will certainly be far from the agenda of these companies, and I think that such a concern will scarcely feature in their performance, in much the same vein as other states working in African today. The Chinese are not in the least bit anxious to know whether their employees are protected in an African union or not. They are simply interested in having a cheap labour force and appropriating the continent’s resources while paying as little as possible for them.

I: What is the role of Brazilian civil society in all this?

CM: The answer lies in immediately strengthening the capacity for democratic intervention in both Brazilian and African civil society. Democratic forces within Brazil, be they black or white, should be form coalitions as a means of political counterweight. Without this, there is a risk that history will repeat itself, and that the image of a country of ‘friendly, cheerful, and football-playing sambistas’ will become a mere neocolonial power. Brazilian multinationals must be made to understand that it is in their long-term interest to contribute to the welfare of the peoples of Africa as they accumulate profits in the continent. And, likewise, they must be made to understand that profit is not sustainable in Africa while we ignore endemic poverty of our own domestic Africa at home in Brazil. The interconnections between these two realities are not so visible now, but will arise in the near future and Brazilian multinational companies will soon understand them. In other words, we must help advance the cause of African federalisation, on one hand, and help reduce socio-racial inequalities in Brazil on the other. Brazilian multinationals can contribute positively in both regards, ensuring an equitable relationship with Africa while creating an environment of democratic brotherhood within Brazil.

I: And what are the actual possibilities of civil society to deal with that?

CM: Civil society needs to find out how to effectively intervene in order to have clout in international politics within Brazil, at least with regard to Africa. We have seen how the black population of the United States organised themselves under a strong lobby that forced the US government to pull back on its support for South Africa. The United States was entirely supportive of the apartheid regime and supported all governments of segregation to have settled there militarily, economically and politically. It was only as a result of the mobilisation and action of civil society that change was initiated. Leon Sullivan was the first pastor to propose an end to investments in South Africa, a policy that became known as ‘the Sullivan Principle.’ From there, there were to be several lobbies of black Americans, led by a trans-Africa body, which pressured the government and threatened boycotts if American multinationals continued to invest in South Africa This is a strong example of effective intervention and positive civil society diaspora action as a means of safeguarding the interests of African civil society. Even today, African civil society remains very weak. It is therefore necessary to help it grow and get stronger. African social movements have been so suppressed by dictatorships in their countries that it is only in the last fifteen years that we have seen the beginnings of civil society’s effective reorganisation and the creation of independent political life. We must help and encourage this process of revival of African civil society.

I: What are the concrete steps that you suggest?

CM: Firstly, I would suggest that civil society constitute a body specifically tasked with the monitoring and tracking of Brazil-Africa relations. This is increasingly becoming an imperative. Secondly, civil society, through this body, must define a code of ethics and policy to be applied in the act of monitoring and pressuring Brazilian companies working on the African continent. This code, which should be discussed with the companies themselves and with the state’s foreign policy organs, should meet the aspirations of African civil society. So far nobody has called for this, that the state and Brazilian multinational companies subscribe to a code of conduct for African countries in order to clarify what will and will not govern their search for profit. In my view, these are some of the necessary preconditions to avoid Brazil's economic and political engagement in Africa descending into a neoimperialist spiral, as is already happening with China's relations with the countries of the continent.

I: Contrary to China experiences, what factors could influence a positive development in Brazil’s?

CM: Unlike China, India, Europe or Japan, most of the Brazilian population has its origins in Africa. That is why I think it is the duty of the social movement and civil society to ensure that the Brazil’s economic intervention in the continent shows consideration for the interests of African civil societies and people they represent, interests not protected even by the bulk of African governments. This is one of the major duties of the Brazilian civil society and all democratic forces of this country: to defend the interests of African civil society. All Brazil’s democratic forces must recognise that Africa has been historically targeted and crushed, and therefore you cannot allow Brazil to contribute, as it did in the past during the slave trade, to the continent’s regression. It is the responsibility of democratic civil society to ensure that Brazil's economic intervention in Africa is only beneficial to the peoples of Africa, and is not negative or catastrophic. We must prevent the emergence of neocolonialist relations between Brazil and the African continent.

I: In a nutshell, how would you define a relationship rooted in cooperation between Brazil and Africa?

CM: Briefly, I would say that a solid, healthy and mutually advantageous base will allow the signing of a cooperation between Brazil and the African continent to form the political and economic foundations for a strategic partnership in the twenty-first century. It is a matter of political will on the part of both parties. Specifically, Brazil can help the African continent overcome its chronic problems through putting in place a process leading to federal, continental African unity, something that Brazil has done itself. From this standpoint, Brazil could even prove to be the largest external influence in pushing Africa towards immediate federalisation. This process would be beneficial to Brazil as it emerges as a bigger power and in need of strong allies with which to defend itself. In turn, Africa as a whole may help Brazil to resolve its biggest internal dilemma: its socio-racial problem. Africa can help this country to oversee a smooth transition to a truly multi-racial democracy through the political, economic and social empowerment of the majority Afro-Brazilian population. This is, in all respects, historically inevitable. Africa too needs Brazil as a strong ally to defend it from the legendary greed of the major powers for its natural resources. There is therefore room for a sound strategic partnership between Brazil and the African continent around the definition of a common, long-term agenda, aimed at the elimination of major domestic and international imbalances that Brazil faces as much as Africa, in dangerous situations of collapse and violent conflict. Together, Brazil and a federalised Africa could define the terms of a great alliance for the future. In so doing, Brazil and Africa could represent the centre of a new strategic south-Atlantic bloc. Everything would hinge on the development of a large project in the name of a simultaneous, inter-linked process of democratisation within the international scene and domestic universe of nations comprising the international community. That would be the greatest contribution to the stabilisation and democratisation of the international order in the twenty-first century, something leading to a multi-polar process of decentralisation to benefit the planet, put an end to war and promote people’s happiness.

* Carlos Moore is a Cuban political scientist, who was previously an assistant to Cheikh Anta Diop. This article has been translated from an article in Portuguese entitled 'A Africa e o Brasil sob a ótica de interesses divergentes.' The original article by Irohìn can be found at www.irohin.org.br/onl/new.php?sec=news&id=2216.
* Translated from the Portuguese by Alex Free.
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