For the past seven years China had been planning for an Olympic games that would both showcase the country’s extraordinary modernization drive while reassuring a skeptical world that China’s rise and development are “peaceful”. For the most part Beijing was successful in projecting this image during the games. While there were a few minor hiccups, Beijing’s normative power and standing in the international community will increase in ways that are beneficial to China’s long-term strategy.

While successful, the games will not alter the foundation of Chinese foreign policy. At its core this policy is about creating the necessary conditions for China to become a developed country in the first half of the 21st century. While President Hu Jintao has targeted 2020 as the year for China to become a “prosperous society” others such as Zheng Bijian (an architect of the “Peaceful Rise” slogan) believe this goal may not be reached until 2050. The concept of a “Peaceful Rise” may be doubted in parts of the West and in particular in Japan and the United States, but for many in the developing world China is now seen as more of an opportunity than a threat. Peace and stability are paramount to China’s grand strategy particularly since China still does not have the ability to project power far from home; it doesn’t even possess one aircraft carrier. Additionally, any potential instability on China’s periphery could endanger China’s modernization.

In the short term China’s “Soft Power” will increase. For the past month viewers all over the world saw an image of China that is exactly what the ruling elite in Beijing wanted to project - an up and coming super power that is both confident and well-behaved. There will likely be a spike in the number of students coming to China to study Mandarin (it rises every year Olympics or not) as well as an increase in foreign tourists visiting China’s famous sites. Resources like the Confucius Institute, which is designed to foster the study of Mandarin and Chinese culture overseas, have been able to get a lot of mileage out of relatively small investments, this at a time when perceptions of America have plummeted.

It is true that China’s has moderated its international behavior in the past few years, especially when it comes to issues like Darfur and Zimbabwe. China’s support on July 31, 2007 of a 20,000 strong UN-AU Darfur force as well as Hu Jintao skipping a visit to Zimbabwe on a 2007 Africa tour can be interpreted as a slow change in China’s policy towards these countries. This evolving shift coincides with the Olympics. The games and the attention they bring to China may accelerate this change, however it would be wrong to claim the Olympics as the sole or even the main catalyst for this turn in policy. This shift is related as much to China’s integration into the international order as it is about trying to take attention away from political liabilities such as support for dictatorships. China does have an interest in a peaceful outcome to the Darfur crisis as well as an acceptable political settlement to the mess in Zimbabwe. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Zoelick’s “Responsible Stakeholder” speech is in line with long-term Chinese goals: Beijing wants to been seen as a respectable member of the international community even though its view of what this means may differ from Washington’s.

It is important to note that in addition to the Olympics demonstrating China’s newfound place in the world, they also provided the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a strong sense of legitimacy. The games were as much directed at the Chinese people as they were towards the outside world. One cannot turn on the television in China or pass a newsstand without hearing or reading about China’s new glory. The CCP must deliver to the people and success at the games in the form of a world leading 51 gold medals is proof to many Chinese that the CCP has helped heal the “sick man of Asia”. China’s “century of humiliation” which lasted from the 1840s until 1949 plays a critical role in China’s dealings with the outside world as well as with Chinese identity itself. The exploitation of China by foreign powers during this period has helped spawn a national inferiority complex amongst many Chinese.

China’s newfound sense of confidence may slowly influence China’s relations with foreign countries especially towards big powers like the U.S. and Japan. If a new self-assurance does emerge from the games, this will be the most important legacy of Beijing 2008. The China Youth Daily said of the nation’s Olympic achievements: “Her people have never been so optimistic and self-confident, so full of faith in their country's advancement.” The collective sense of exploitation and humiliation is just below the surface and before China can become a true great power it must overcome this psychological hurdle.

Toward a more practical foreign policy.

In line with a policy of “peaceful rise” Beijing has displayed a maturing and more astute foreign policy. In dealings with Japan and Taiwan, the Hu-Wen (Premier Wen Jiabao) administration has departed from a policy that was seen by many in the region as bellicose and is now openly courting the Kuomintang, its former archenemy. For the first time thousands of Mainland tourists visited Taiwan this summer and Hu Jintao, while still claiming Taiwan as an inseparable part of the Mainland, has displayed a much more pragmatic approach toward the island. Hu was certainly helped by the departure of Chen Shui-bian, who as Taiwan’s president from 2000 until this year, actively pushed for Taiwanese independence. Chen’s successor Ma Ying-jeou does not have a policy that pursues independence and his election came as a great relief to Beijing.

In regards to Tokyo, Beijing has actively sought to repair relations that were badly damaged in the spring of 2005, as Chinese students and activists carried out massive anti-Japanese protests, some of them violent, in Chinese cities. Relations with Japan are complicated and extend far beyond issues of Japanese history textbooks that gloss over Japan’s imperial past and visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where Japan honors its war dead as well as honoring 14 convicted class-A war criminals. While historical issues may dominate the headlines, friction between Tokyo and Beijing is as much about establishing a new Asian geopolitical hierarchy in the 21st century. In the 1980s Japan saw itself as reclaiming its place as the leader of Asia, but this dream was shattered with the crash of the Japanese economy in the early 1990s. Now Tokyo sees a reemerging China as challenging this role and China is pulling away in a race Japan cannot possibly win. With this in mind it is even more remarkable that Hu Jintao reached out to a new right-wing Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe in the fall of 2006 by inviting him to Beijing. Yasuo Fukuda who replaced Abe in September 2007 is openly pro-China and visited China in December 2007.

Beijing’s relations with Tokyo and Taiwan are directly linked to Beijing’s dealings with Washington. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Americans are committed by law to selling arms to Taiwan. As for Japan there is a growing chorus in Washington and especially the Pentagon that Japan adopt a more assertive military strategy.

Beijing’s interactions with Taiwan and Japan are closely watched by China’s neighbors. If China is seen as flexing its growing military muscle vis -a-vie Taiwan or Japan it could be counter-productive for Chinese efforts elsewhere in the world. Many countries bordering China try to balance the Americans and the Chinese against each other. Few want an American military presence, but they also do not want to become over-dependant on Beijing. The greatest nightmare for many of these neighboring leaders is the thought of getting simultaneous phone calls from Beijing and Washington asking them to take sides in a military dispute. China would much prefer to have images of the Birds Nest (National stadium, where the Olympic flame was located) projected to a global audience than pictures of its new nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. As some in the international community (most notably the U.S.) have begun to grow uneasy with China’s newfound influence, the Olympics have provided the Chinese with an international platform to reassure the world that their rise does not have to be viewed in relative terms, in other words this is not a zero-sum game and that China can be viewed as an opportunity. It should also be noted that China has resolved most of its border disputes, many of which saw China concede substantial portions of is claims.

China’s new pragmatism would be emerging even if the Olympics had not been held in China. In some ways the Olympics actually became a liability. The disastrous torch relay that followed the unrest in Tibetan areas in March could have cast a dark shadow over the games had it not been for the tragic events that unfolded in Sichuan province after the massive earthquake struck in May. The rage that was directed at Beijing over its Tibet policy was quickly transformed into an outpouring of sympathy for the victims of the quake. If there is one thing that Beijing should learn from the events in Tibetan areas in the spring is that an effective public relations campaign is essential to an aspiring superpower. Instead of attempting to explain to the world some of the positive developmental work Beijing is carrying out in Tibet, Chinese leaders fell back on Cultural Revolution rhetoric and started a smear campaign against the Dalai Lama. An effective PR campaign for Beijing, while likely to be propagandistic would also allow China to more clearly state its position on controversial policies such as its position on Darfur and Myanmar. Many Chinese foreign ministry officials rely too much on a policy of “non-interference” in other countries internal affairs. This policy only provides ammunition to China bashers who rightly or wrongly criticize Chinese actions across the globe. By not saying much, Beijing allows China bashers to frame the issues.

A model to export?

The world’s attention on China has also highlighted China’s incredible development over the past 30 years. This in itself is a role model for many developing countries. Many of these nations would like to emulate Beijing’s accomplishments. A recent World Bank report pointed out that China currently has 207 million people classified as living in poverty - those subsisting on less than 1.25 USD per day. While still high, this number must be compared with the 1981 figure of 835 million people. China’s growth has also contributed to a rising middle class that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2004 estimated to number 247 million people. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics in contrast calculated the middle class in 2005 to include 75 million people. (The criteria used was family assets ranging from 18,000 to 36,000 USD) The point is that China has in many ways deviated from the Washington consensus and has created a “Beijing Consensus” - top down development directed by an authoritarian state that puts economic development above all else. For governments that have so far failed to see material benefits from the West’s programs, Beijing’s formula may offer hope. Some governments even see the prospect of limited to non-existent democracy as an added bonus of the Beijing Consensus. For China - still a developing country - to spend over 40 billion dollars on the Olympic games and have it account for less than 0.5 percent of fix asset spending over a six-year period is remarkable. Many in the developing world envy China’s progress over the reform era. In this way the Olympics add to China’s luster and provide it with a new form of normative power that other countries aspire to.

Those who wish to replicate China’s success must be careful, as the Beijing Consensus is not without its faults. China’s Gini index (where 0 represents complete equality and 1 indicates complete inequality) hovers around .50. Researchers from People’s University in Beijing have calculated it at .56, or the same as Brazil’s. Yes, the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping have lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and are turning China into a global power, however China is experiencing the same kind inequality that has in living memory led to revolutions. The “Iron Rice Bowl” of the Mao era that guaranteed cradle to grave care for urban workers is a thing of the past and for many Chinese medical emergencies can result in bankruptcy and subsequent destitution. A 2006 report issued jointly by UNICEF and the Chinese Office of the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council, reported that 75 percent of rural residents who declined hospitalization did so because they could not afford it. The number was 56 percent for urban residents. If developing countries wish to emulate China’s success they must be wary of the inequalities that accompany China’s rise.

China’s economic success has coincided with enormous corruption. The lack of an effective opposition to the Communist Party is partly to blame for this. The absence of an independent judiciary as well as a free press has also exacerbated the problem, which the party views as a cancer. When Chinese talk of democracy many do not advocate one-person one-vote, but instead they pursue a more open society where officials are held accountable and transparency in areas like budget allocations and the legal system are a permanent fixtures. Countries wishing to follow in China’s footsteps would be wise not to duplicate these glaringly negative aspects of China’s modernization.

There has been constant talk of whether the Olympics constitute the emergence of a new super power. The Olympics were not as many said “China’s coming out party”; that party was the story of the 1990s. Perhaps a better way of perceiving the games is to see them as China’s coming of age party. Titanic shifts in the global order do not transpire over the course of 16 days, instead they take many years, decades and generations to evolve. China’s rise will be no different. Its 1.35 billion people have good reason to be proud of their recent achievements and the world, especially the developing world, can learn much from Beijing’s achievements. Talk of a “new Cold War” emerging between Beijing and Washington is overblown. The Soviet Union spent 45 years trying to destroy the global capitalist system, the Chinese have spent the past 30 years integrating into this system, in fact over this period the Chinese have arguably been globalization’s greatest beneficiary. While the Americans and Chinese will have their competitions on and off the pitch, they are ultimately rivals on the same team. Both have a vested economic and strategic interest in maintaining the status quo, which in turn leads to an interdependence that neither can afford to jeopardize.

The differences in Chinese foreign policy may not be discernable for many years if at all, however the games have helped China to turn a psychological corner as a nation. The streets of Beijing have recently been full of a more positive form of nationalism; this one differs greatly from the angry nationalism that has reared its face in recent years. This positive nationalism will strengthen the ruling elites’ legitimacy in the near future and will give Chinese a new sense of pride in the international community. One thing this new generation of Chinese must not do is to allow their nationalism to become chauvinistic. As Chinese power becomes more pronounced and more medals are won in future Olympics this may prove to be a difficult task. This is exactly what the world’s China bashers want and expect. It is up to the Chinese to prove them wrong.

* Chris Colley lectures on Chinese foreign policy at Renmin (People’s) University’s School of International Studies in Beijing. He has lived in China since 2002.

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