The impact of the fourth FOCAC meeting held in Egypt ten days ago is still being felt in the world’s press, if no longer in front-page headlines. The new Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan with its new eight measures is now available for officials from both sides to sit down to explore the best ways to implement it[1]; while domestically, various relevant Chinese ministries and organizations are even busier mobilising all necessary resources to make up a few shortfalls in achieving “the eight policy measures to enhance practical cooperation with African countries”; for example a group of 19 volunteers, needed to reach the targeted number of 300, are expecting to leave for Malawi shortly[2]. Also, as the deadline approaches, diversified human resource training programs are moving into top gear to reach the total figure the Chinese government announced at the Beijing Summit.

During and immediately after the sensational event, one question has been asked repeatedly – for example to Premier Wen at his press conference; what are the differences and similarities between these new measures, and those announced in 2006[3]? Premier Wen has given the answer that both old and “new measures aimed at the same goal of improving the capacity of African countries for self-development”, while new ones focus more on the “improvement of people's well-being, health care, education and other social development programs, the construction of agricultural and basic infrastructures, and the protection of eco-environment.[4]” Yet, to understand the answer better we need to read between the lines of the documents published at the conference, in particular the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan.

If we read the document item by item and compare it with the corresponding items of the Beijing Action Plan, the first difference we find is that cooperation in international affairs has changed places with economic cooperation from fourth to third place, immediately next to political cooperation[5]. This shift could be interpreted as a simple technical improvement in an official document; yet, it could also be perceived as a response to the increasing importance of closely coordinating different policy positions in the international arena, especially in view of the continuing financial crisis.

Other prominent topics, besides those usual in mutual support statements, are the G20 (relating to improving Africa’s position in the international economic system) and climate change; for the latter, as a consensus, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is emphasized in the new action plan, which shows in which ways the Chinese government needs African support on the international stage, while being determined to put a major effort into jointly tackling the problem with Africa[6].

There are also changes in the traditional political arena. For example, just as political cooperation has been enriched into “political affairs, and regional peace and security”, the government of China has also taken on the role of helping to develop the necessary institutional capacity, in order to reinforce its partnership with African regional organizations. The Chinese government has often been challenged to make clear whether it prefers a bilateral or multilateral approach to African countries and whether these approaches have promoted regional integration and common development. It is therefore significant that in the new action plan, cooperation on regional issues and a strong intention to increase bilateral relationships at this level are emphasized, whether with AU, NEPAD, or sub-regional organizations.

Similarly, it is interesting that peace and security which used to be roughly included in ‘international affairs’, is picked out as the new sub-area of ‘political cooperation’, and deserves a closer look. The concept of “Solving African Problems by Africans” is highlighted at first, together with the great efforts the Chinese government has so far contributed to UN peacekeeping missions. The creation of the position of Special Representative for African Affairs is appreciated as a special successful initiative of the Chinese government, and encouraged to contribute more to promote dialogue and conflict solving. As for the Chinese government’s counter-piracy efforts which have led to much imaginative speculation about the potential for further Chinese military interventions, these are qualified with the key phrase “in line with the spirit of relevant UN Security Council resolutions” in order to put an end to rumors and ease the unnecessary fears of Africans.

The most dramatic change in the new Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan from the previous Beijing Action Plan is the absence in the new plan of any equivalent to the eye-catching pledge in the 2006 document to double China’s aid assistance to African countries. At the same time, both the concessional loans and credit lines with exact numbers announced in 2006 as the very first items of assistance development, have disappeared in the new action plan. On the other hand $10 billion in preferential loans has been written into the area of Economic Cooperation, specifically for infrastructure, which was singled out as the top-rank priority for cooperation, immediately after agriculture and investment, and even ahead of trade[7].

After the 2006 Summit, a common theme in the extensive literature on China’s aid assistance to Africa, was criticism of what was seen as inadequate transparency in the application of funds, and questioning of the apparent ambiguity between seeking economic profit and providing development assistance and aid. This may well have led to reflection and readjustment of the definition of China’s official development assistance. It seems likely that a deliberate decision has been taken to avoid conspicuous words such as “double aid” that were used in the previous plan and which stimulated too much close attention; though at the same time the severe financial crisis has provided a good reason for the Chinese government to scale up its assistance to Africa. Significantly, there is a sentence following the prominent high number of preferential loans waiting to be provided in the next three years, explaining these loans “will be used mainly to support infrastructure and social development projects”[8]. Clearly, this is also intended to emphasise that China’s assistance to Africa is not simply tied to the demand for energy from the continent. It is all the more significant in view of the difficulties and the criticism that China has met (such as in DRC and in Guinea recently).

In an interesting sideline indicator of progress towards becoming more transparent and proactive, Premier Wen at his press conference immediately after the opening ceremony gave a specific figure for China’s assistance to Africa. This issue had previously been the subject of much imaginative speculation and efforts by worldwide observers to pin China down to a precise figure. Though they were greatly surprised, Chinese officials feel relieved and can now come out with the number freely on any occasion.

The need to address the imbalance of bilateral trade is still a concern. The previous plan simply gave a zero tariff list of a numbers of products without enough information on the specific expectations from each African country. Now 95% of exports from the least developed countries (LDCs) are to be given the zero tariff treatment (even with a clear timeline with a mid-term goal met in 2010), which is more definite and therefore more beneficial for African products with a sort of “Package effect”. This shows up the readiness of the Chinese government to surrender part of the profits from bilateral business cooperation.

Beside the obvious readjustments in the economic cooperation area, there are also some new initiatives, such as the proposal to establish an African commodities trade center in China and to set up a trust fund of US$30 million under the platform of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) to support South-South cooperation for Food Security. The latter might be inspired by the experience of the Chinese government in delivering urgent food assistance to Zimbabwe in 2006 through FAO. Similarly, a brand-new measure beneficial to African SMEs is the special loan of US$1 billion for their development; it might be more helpful to African enterprises, though clearly, it will be implemented on a business basis, and not as a free grant.

To target widespread African complaints about low quality Chinese products, the new action plan shows an intention to combat the problem with a joint cooperative mechanism, though there is a lack of detailed proposals of some feasible ways or timetable.

Information and Communications was also taken out as one of the priorities for cooperation, and there is still a lack of clear-cut specialized ways to enhance it. But there is an understanding of the importance of cooperating with African ICT authorities . This is understandable in view of the fact that some of the preferential loans have been used in several countries since 2006 to implement optical fibres networks in Africa. Likewise, both service and transportation are recognised in principle as important elements to promote economic cooperation, although practical incentives are still needed to improve them.

In the field of social development, education and technology transfer were identified as two of the most important sub-areas of cooperation. As one of key words in the whole document, “technology” is also emphasized as the proper term for the existing agriculture demonstration program and therefore technology transfer is clarified again as the intention of the program. Correspondingly, terms such as “capacity” and “capacity building”, which previously were regarded as ‘unsuitable’and therefore never used in bilateral official documents, now appear as key words a numbers of times in the broad context of social and cultural cooperation in the action plan. This again is completely new compared with the previous document.

On the whole, based on the valuable lessons and experiences from the experiment of the previous three years since 2006, the new action plan has made a lot of progress, which could really provide a showcase for the increasing “smart power” of the Chinese government. In essence, many measures in the social development field are based on the previous action plan, such as hospitals, anti-malaria centres and agricultural demonstration centres. The continuities and readjustments show the strong will of the Chinese government to manage the assistance projects in a sustainable way in the new age, learning the lessons of the past 30 years when many projects were abandoned without any continuing benefit for local society.

Other new initiatives in the action plan, include the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan, 100 joint research and demonstration projects, and the China-Africa joint research and exchange plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks . And as the most prominent newly explored area of climate change has shown, more feasible incentives are waiting to be explored to encourage jointly tackling the issue. These new explorations and readjustments serve to emphasise the determination of the Chinese side to deliver sustainable assistance to African countries in this age of globalization, when the fates of people in different lands are more interlocked and entangled, in ways which extend far beyond the meaning of economic cooperation.

To those who know how much effort the relevant Chinese officials from various ministries have put into making this new guideline for the next three years, and especially how arduously they have been participating with both domestic and foreign scholars in a range of events, and actively involved in all kinds of discussion and debates, the achievements of the new action plan come as no surprise.

However, good intentions are just a starting point for the next three years phase of China-African cooperation. Efficiency in meeting the announced deadline is also just a matter of timekeeping. It will be the ability to implement these measures in a people-oriented way that will ensure final success, and this will require double effort and capacity building from both sides.

NOTES.
1. FOCAC Website, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)”, 2009/11/12, Available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm
2. FOCAC Website, “Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation”, 2009/11/10, Available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/FA32009/t627504.htm
3. Pambazuka news, “FOCAC: Transcript of press conference by Premier Wen Jiabao”, 2009/11/12, Available at: http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/60182
4. Ibid.
5. “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)”.
6. Following the recent intensive diplomatic contacts between China and other developing countries, such as the call Premier Wen made on Zuma, the South African president, the crucial importance of coordinating standpoints on the climate change issue will be understood.
7. “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)”.
8. “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)”.

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* Dr Liu Haifang is a researcher at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Beijing
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.