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From Cancun to Cotonou - the struggle continues
Jane Nalunga

With the collapse of the 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September, the Cotonou negotiations have taken on a new and more dangerous dimension. Both the EU and the US will continue to use their power to pursue their trade agenda through a series of bilateral negotiations with developing countries. As the US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick succinctly put it:
“The United States has an agenda on multiple fronts. We are going to keep opening markets one way or another ……We will always be there to engage in it [the multilateral system], but we are not waiting forever. We are going to move else where” (The Guardian – 16th September 2003)

It is clear that the EU will use the ACP –EU negotiations to get what they have failed to get in Cancun; especially increased market access for EU goods and services; and commitments on the New / Singapore Issues” (See articles by Margaret Lee and Traidcraft in this Bulletin). What is not clear is whether the post Cancun period will be characterised by increased determination and aggression from the EU or increased respect for developing country negotiators who showed remarkable unity and confidence in the face of considerable pressure in Cancun. Yet given the history of arm-twisting characterising the various trade negotiations, ACP countries in general and Africa in particular must be ready for some tough negotiations. As Nancy Kachingwe points out in this Bulletin, “In a negotiation where the parties are of equal strength, it can be presumed that the give and take from each party will be fairly equitable. This is not the case in this negotiation. The ACP are in an extremely weak bargaining position”.

The Cotonou negotiations, launched in September 2002 and ending on December 31st 2007 with the formation of reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) represent a significant shift from the system of non-reciprocal preferences of the previous Lome Conventions. The EU explains this shift as a measure to make the EPAs WTO-complaint and also because of the inability of ACP countries to translate market access into development gains. However, the actual reason is the EU`s desire to further its own aggressive market access strategy. In fact the ACP countries were in no hurry to get rid of the preferences as Sutiawan Gunesse, the Mauritius ambassador to the EU pointed out that the ACP Group took a political decision (to negotiate the EPAs) “ not without reticence for various reasons . It was based more on pragmatism rather than the belief or conviction that the ACP states would benefit from the EPAs.” (SEATINI Bulletin Vol 5. No. 18). Thus the ACP countries neither wanted the negotiations nor were they ready for them. One year after the launch of the negotiations most ACP regions and countries are still as confused as they were at the beginning of the negotiations.

In the above cited Bulletin, which came out at the launch of the negotiations – 30th September 2002, it was clearly pointed out that the negotiations were a farce. The negotiations are between two very unequal parties i.e the ACP countries are among the poorest of the world's nations and they were also former colonies of the EU. They still depend heavily on the trade and aid with the EU. In fact even for the negotiations the ACP countries are looking to EU for funds for impact assessment studies!. The negotiating capacity of the ACP countries is low and over stretched given the many related negotiations at different fronts i.e WTO, and at the regional level. However, most important of all, most ACP countries do not know what, why and how to negotiate. Take an example of Uganda which has been vacillating between negotiating as part of COMESA and East African Community (EAC). These configurations also have their own complications as there are overlapping membership and as some members, in the case of EAC, are classified as LDCs (Uganda and Tanzania) and developing (Kenya). The actual outcomes and implications of these negotiations are not clear.

The First Phase of the negotiations (September 2002 – September 2003) which was supposed to come up with a binding agreement on a number of substantive issues, according to the ACP negotiating mandate, have so far come up without anything substantial.

Although regions like ECOWAS are ready to negotiate the EPAs , a decision which has greatly undermined the unity of the ACP group and the outcome of the first phase , it is clear that the Eastern and Southern African region is not ready for these negotiations.

Way Forward
The ACP cannot stop the negotiations because the EU will not let them, unless it is the EU that does not wish to negotiate. There is no doubt that the EU wants to negotiate, so the ACP countries have to negotiate whether they want it or not. In these difficult circumstances, the ACP countries must demand from the EU more time to prepare adequately. For example independent impact assessment studies must be done, although there is ample evidence on the ground as to the outcome of the EPAs, i.e the beef industry in southern Africa is in trouble as a result of the EU-South Africa FTA and the economies of developing countries are suffering as a result of liberalisation.

The negotiations are also supposed to take into consideration the regional integration process of the ACP countries. In the Eastern and Southern Africa, the process is still in its nascent stage; for example the EAC does not have a Customs Union as yet. The regional integration efforts must be strengthened, as this is the only way to deal with Africa's marginalisation in the global economy. The currently promoted Free Trade Agreements (FTAs ) between countries at different levels of development will only serve the interests of the developed nations but will thwart the development efforts of the developing countries as it locks them up in low productive activities. Thus, the long-term plan must be sub regional and regional (Africa) integration.

The negotiations in Geneva and Brussels must be closely linked in order to avoid the ACP-EU negotiations being WTO+ ; and also to ensure that what has been rejected in the WTO i.e the New Issues , do not resurface in the EPA negotiations. The linkage will also help in utilising the limited resources available. The Phase 1 negotiations must be extended in order to come up with a binding agreement on the substantive issues; or else the EU will arm twist the regions individually.

Civil Society Organisations must fully engage in these negotiations. Cancun was just the lull before the storm; the storm is now here in the form of the EPA negotiations, it is the new battleground and we must be fully involved. Governments must also ensure that all stakeholders are involved in these negotiations; the WTO negotiations are an indicator that government and other stakeholders can work together for a common purpose.