The issue of presidential term limits has always bucked my mind as I try to comprehend various constitutional trajectories across the globe and Africa in particularly. A cursory review of the polity in Gabon, Chad, Burkina Faso and Uganda etc will reveal something in common; poor institutional governance and near economic collapse. Can this hypothesis be explained by the fact that the presidents of these countries have been in power for more than two decades? Why do we need presidential limits? Do we necessarily need them in societies where there are institutional restrain on executive excesses grounded in accountability, representation and accountability?

Since the dawn of the third wave of democratisation in Africa, constitutional limits on presidential terms have somehow found themselves within the constitutions of some African countries. Presidential term limits were grounded in the rational that some of Africa’s political and economic ills are due to extended terms. While constitutional limits might be germane in themselves have they really achieved their desired effect?

My argument here is that, rather than focusing too much on presidential limits, we should first and foremost focus on strengthening institutional governance and the capacity of Africa states. Presidential term limits to my mind are the least of efforts to check executive excesses. For example, we need to create an environment and institutions which are responsive to executive prerogative. This entails widening the electoral base of a country, educating the electorate and enhancing courts. Within this context, presidential term limits will not just be a matter of constitutional provision but rather a matter of delivery.

Where presidential term limits operate within weak institutional frameworks, they are always easy to trample on. There is no doubt democracy and governance in some Africa countries is cosmetic and illusionary. Consequently, presidential term limits operating in a polity grounded in patrimonialism and rent-seeking, against a backdrop of weak and poor institutions, is always going to fail in achieving the “desired” effects.

Even when a president thus decides to step down, in a context of poor and weak institutions, presidential term limits do not preclude him from negotiating a reliable lapdog in the name of a successor to preserve elite interest, nor does this restrain him of hatching a deal to escape prosecution while he enjoys his bounty.

If we put too much energy into talking about presidential term limits, we might lose sight of the bigger picture, which is the institutional framework within which these presidents operate.