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Nigeria continued last year to reap a grim harvest of ethnic and religious violence, as it had in 2000, which began with clashes that claimed over 2,000 lives in the northern city of Kaduna, and ended with fighting in Lagos in which hundreds died.

U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)

NIGERIA: IRIN Focus on ethnic and religious conflicts in 2001

[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]

LAGOS, 30 December (IRIN) - Nigeria continued this year to reap a grim
harvest of ethnic and religious violence, as it had in 2000, which began
with clashes that claimed over 2,000 lives in the northern city of Kaduna,
and ended with fighting in Lagos in which hundreds died.

In January 2001, while the government was issuing estimates showing it had
spent more than US $5 million in the previous 10 months to provide relief
supplies for victims of religious riots and ethnic unrest, fresh alerts were
being issued of a likely outbreak of violence in Lagos.

After a meeting in January, Nigerian Catholic bishops called for a summit of
Christian and Muslim leaders to seek ways to deal with the religious causes
of the violence, particularly the introduction of strict Islamic law in
predominantly Muslim states in northern Nigeria.

But before their call could be heeded, Muslim vigilantes in the northern
city of Kano burned a truck laden with alcoholic drinks, in late February.
Over the next two months, there were frequent reports that the vigilantes
attacked hotels suspected of serving alcohol to guests.

By April signs that Nigeria’s central region would be a hot-bed of violence
began to emerge. The first clashes reported - between Tivs and their
Hausa-speaking Azeri neighbours - claimed about a dozen lives in Nasarawa
State. A similar number of people died in skirmishes in nearby Plateau
State, mainly involving indigenous Christians and Muslims settlers from the
far north. Further north in Bauchi State, the mainly Christian communities
of Tafawa Balewa local council were up in arms against moves by authorities
of the Muslim-majority state to impose the Sharia.

Many analysts blame the ferment now brewing in the central region on
deepening mutual suspicion between Muslims and non-Muslims, largely fuelled
by the introduction of Sharia in an increasing number of northern states.
"Many of the communities in the central region successfully resisted
Islamisation both in the pre-colonial and colonial eras, despite the
authority ceded to the Muslim emirates by the British," James Ibrahim, a
political analyst from the region, told IRIN. "Many of these communities now
perceive the introduction of Sharia as a resurgence of Islamisation and have
taken the stance of aggressive resistance."

Ethnic and religious violence reached a new peak in June/July in Nasarawa
State, after an Azeri traditional and spiritual leader was attacked and
killed by unknown gunmen. Suspecting the attackers to be Tiv, the Azeris
launched reprisal attacks. What began initially as a land dispute escalated
into widespread ethnic war. Hundreds of people were killed while more than
50,000 displaced Tivs fled Nasarawa for neighbouring Benue State, where they
are the majority.

Another eruption of violence between Christians and Muslims, sparked by a
minor incident outside a mosque, occurred in September in Jos, Plateau
State's predominantly Christian capital. Scores of houses were destroyed.
The Nigerian Red Cross reported at least 500 deaths in three days of
clashes.

Other violent developments were by now taking shape in Taraba State, in the
east of the central region. Long standing hostilities between the Jukun and
Fulani communities on the one hand, and the Tivs on the other, were
revived - no doubt spurred by the generalised violence in the region.

Early in October, the federal authorities deployed troops on the border
between Taraba and Benue states in an attempt to quell the growing unrest.
It was a mission that went wrong. Tiv militiamen, alleging attacks by men
dressed in military uniforms, ambushed a contingent of 22 soldiers near the
town of Vaase. A few days later, the mutilated bodies of 19 of the soldiers
were found in a primary school in the nearby town of Zaki-Biam.

By 22 October, soldiers ordered by President Obasanjo to track down the Tiv
militiamen had rampaged through several communities in apparent reprisal
attacks, killing about 300 people and completely destroying seven villages
and towns. When these were added to those killed in the fighting between the
original adversaries, more than 1,000 people were estimated to have died.
According to figures released by the Benue State government, more than half
a million people, mainly Tivs, were displaced. The disturbances, occurring
in a region reputed to be Nigeria’s main breadbasket, also posed a threat to
the country’s food security.

In the same month there was another outbreak of ethnic and religious
violence in Kano, where a protest by Muslim radicals against the US
bombardment of Afghanistan following the 11 September terrorist attacks,
degenerated into violence between Muslims and Christians, northerners and
southerners. Scores of people were killed and dozens of houses razed in
three days of fighting that was only brought under control with the
deployment of troops.

Apart from sending in the troops, another significant response by Obasanjo
to ethnic and religious crises threatening Nigeria’s unity was the setting
up of a special commission to investigate the causes of widespread unrest in
the country of 120 million people, Africa's most populous nation. The
commission’s brief includes recommending ways to make Nigeria's more than
250 ethnic groups live in peace.

"Peace and security are fundamental foundation stones on which democracy and
development can and need to be anchored," Obasanjo said.

[ENDS]

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