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In the past decade the situation in Nigeria’s oil belt - the Niger Delta, has been characterised by restiveness among the local communities. The over seven million people in the region -source of most of the oil that is the lifeblood of Nigeria's economy - feel cheated of the wealth pumped from their soil.

U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)

NIGERIA: IRIN Focus on the simmering conflict in the Niger Delta

[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]

LAGOS, 30 December (IRIN) - In the past decade the situation in Nigeria’s
oil belt - the Niger Delta, has been characterised by restiveness among the
local communities. The over seven million people in the region - source of
most of the oil that is the lifeblood of Nigeria's economy - feel cheated of
the wealth pumped from their soil.

They also feel aggrieved that they often have to bear the negative
environmental consequences of more than four decades of oil operations in
the region.

When communities in the volatile region were not in conflict with oil
multinationals over land rights or compensation for environmental damage,
they were in dispute with government over more access to oil wealth, or
locked in conflict with one another over claims to ownership of areas where
oil facilities and accompanying benefits are sited.

The record of such incidents in 2001 varied only in terms of scale.
Relatively fewer violent incidents were reported during the year, mostly
revolving around current efforts by both the federal and regional
governments to deal with the problems in the area.

In sharp contrast to the bare-knuckled repression unleashed during years of
military rule, the civilian government elected in 1999 has made significant
efforts to calm frayed nerves, even if these efforts may be largely symbolic
as alleged by critics of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration.

In January, the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC),
set up to revisit past violations and seek national reconciliation, held
sittings in the oil industry capital of Port Harcourt. This provided a forum
for the Shell oil company to reconcile with the Ogoni ethnic minority of the
Niger Delta.

The Ogoni people had been aggrieved since a campaign against alleged
pollution and environmental degradation that they began in the early 1990s
led to the execution in 1995 of nine of their leaders, on the orders of late
military ruler, General Sani Abacha. The nine had been convicted of murder
by a military tribunal. Obasanjo's government apologised to the Ogonis
through the HRVIC for "the sordid and sad events that took place".

But these peaceful developments did not prevent militants of the Ijaw ethnic
group from attacking drilling facilities of the US oil company Chevron
Corporation in the western part of the Delta to press demands for jobs and
amenities. The attack by youths from 10 Ijaw communities also affected oil
service firms Giogio Ltd and Westminster Dredging and Marine.

By May, tension in the Niger Delta was heightened by several oil spills
which, in combination with communal and industrial disputes, disrupted crude
oil production by three transnationals. The Nigerian subsidiary of the US
transnational ExxonMobil Corporation shut its Qua Iboe oil export terminal,
after it was besieged by protesters from the local Eket community who
accused the company of neglecting the environment.

About the same time, Chevron reported that a faulty valve on one of its
pipelines had caused the leakage of an estimated 140 barrels of crude near
its Escravos operational base in the western part of the Delta. The company
denied allegations by several coastal communities that it was responsible
for an oil slick that caused massive fish deaths in areas adjoining
Escravos.

Before that - on 29 April - the year's biggest oil spill occurred at
Royal/Dutch Shell's Yorla oilfield in Ogoniland, where crude oil released by
a burst well-head shot several metres into the air before raining down on
surrounding farms and vegetation. The spill was only brought under
control many days later when a team of experts was flown in from the United
States to cap the well-head. Similar accidents, which Shell attributed to
improperly shut facilities during its forced withdrawal from Ogoniland in
1993, led to a number of spectacular fires. Although no lives were lost,
massive damage was done to the environment.

Apart from differences with the oil companies, there were also violent
incidents between communities in the region. Soldiers were deployed at Warri
in the western delta in June to curb renewed violence between the Urhobo and
Itsekiri communities over counter-claims to ownership of the oil town.
Several people died in fighting between two Ijaw communities, Odimodi and
Ogulagha, over ownership of land on which Shell was building a gas-gathering
facility. Violence reported in the Kalabari and Ikwerre communities in
Rivers State was attributed to a similar cause.

Among the key developments in the region in 2001 was the adoption by
governors of states in the Niger Delta of a longstanding demand by activists
for control of the oil resources, which were under the exclusive control of
the federal government. The governors also contested the central
government’s decision to remove income from offshore oil production from the
13-percent share of revenue the constitution guarantees the oil region. With
both sides hardening their positions on the matter, the federal government
filed a suit in the Supreme Court, seeking an interpretation of the
constitutional provisions on the matter in its favour. The case was still
pending as the year drew to a close.

But with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), set up to redress
the decades of neglect suffered by the oil region, finally gearing up to
make its impact felt, the government has also been implementing a policy of
strengthening its military presence in the region.

Key oil facilities in the Niger Delta are now under the protection of
troops - a move aimed at ending the disruption of oil exports by angry
communities and militant youths. To further strengthen this policy,
government set up in October a Presidential Special Committee on Oil
Producing Areas, headed by Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Alexander
Ogomudia.

In December, the NDDC organised an international conference supported by
UNDP with the aim of creating a consensus on the strategies necessary for
rapid development in the region. "The main departure point is that we want a
master plan to provide a framework for the things we want to do," NDDC
chairman Onyema Ugochukwu told IRIN. "It is not only necessary to harmonise
activities for other agencies involved. Part of the process itself involves
consultation with the people. Often people do development on people, but
it's not something you do to people; you do it with people."

Critics of the government’s Niger Delta policy allege that while the change
of fortunes which it has promised the region's inhabitants has been slow in
coming, the government has been quick to tighten its grip on the area's oil
resources.

"Signs of discontent are once more beginning to emerge in the region where
expectations that Obasanjo will make a difference to the decades of neglect
have largely been disappointed," Obudu Waritimi, an environmental activist,
told IRIN. "Many communities in the Niger Delta think it's time to go back
to renew the battles with the government." But they may well find a
government as ready to fight as it is to talk.

[ENDS]

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