A View of Sudan from Africa:
Sudan Focal Point Monthly Briefing
October 2004

Southern peace talks in Nairobi reportedly made some progress but fell short of reaching a final comprehensive agreement before breaking for Ramadan. In a joint statement, the two parties said they had resolved “most of the outstanding issues” in a “cordial and frank atmosphere”. These issues included the Joint/Integrated Units (JIU) in Eastern Sudan, a “collaborative approach to handling other armed groups” (although there is apparently still disagreement over the time frame for integrating these into the two forces), and “other aspects of permanent ceasefire including the role of United Nation Peace Support Mission”. However much of the progress seems to be that various committees will commence their work, rather than substantive agreement. The issue of funding of southern forces during the Interim Period was not resolved. It remains likely that an agreement will be signed in the coming weeks or months.

Meanwhile there is no fundamental change in the situation in Darfur, despite the UN Security Council resolution and the huge international interest. Human rights violations continue, and there is little doubt that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is primarily responsible for what is now generally accepted to be genocide; the militia have been neither disarmed nor controlled; displaced persons are still afraid to return to their homes due to insecurity; the humanitarian disaster has not abated; GoS continues to restrict access and Field Marshal Omar Hassan al-Bashir now describes the international humanitarian organisations as “the real enemies”; aid agencies have suffered casualties; attempts to enlarge the mandate of the African Union (AU) forces have not yet borne fruit; there are fresh allegations of GoS bombing its civilians; GoS continues to promise cooperation but fails to deliver on its promises (which comes as little surprise, as this is a tried and tested GoS tactic); peace talks in Abuja totter on the brink of collapse yet again.

The AU is increasing the size of its force in Darfur and the EU has joined Canada in promising funding. Australia and the USA have promised transport aircraft, although GoS seems reluctant to accept US aircraft. The USA has reportedly awarded contracts to private military companies PAE Group and Dyncorp; the latter has been criticised for its record in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. Lack of logistics capacity has so far prevented the AU force from performing effectively, and there is little indication that its limited mandate will be changed to allow it to protect civilians and humanitarian operations. Two new liberation movements have reportedly sprung up in Darfur, although little is known about them and there is speculation that at least one of them might be connected with GoS.

President Putin has banned the sale of Russian weapons to non-governmental groups in Sudan. However Russian arms have repeatedly been used against civilians by GoS itself in support of its militia, not only in Darfur but also in other parts of Sudan. According to media reports in the Middle East, Russia deems Sudan a major arms client and a model in the use of Russian military platforms to quell an African insurgency. GoS has procured not only MiG-29 fighter jets and Mi-24 attack helicopters but also a range of other weapons and munitions. Churches and Amnesty International are amongst those calling for a complete embargo on arms sales to all armed factions in Sudan, including GoS itself.

It is very easy to become bogged down in the details and miss the bigger picture. To a large extent this is what is happening in Darfur, where international attention is focused on humanitarian intervention, human rights and civilian protection. While these immediate needs must obviously be addressed urgently, it should never be forgotten that there are root causes to the conflicts that create such human suffering. Ultimately the suffering will cease not because of humanitarian intervention and civilian protection measures, but because a negotiated political settlement has been reached. The former benefits the political and military leaders, the aid industry, contractors and manufacturers; the latter benefits the people on the ground.

The conflict in northern Sudan is spreading. Militia from Darfur have reportedly been seen in Southern Kordofan and the Funj Region (also known as Southern Blue Nile), although the Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission (JMM/JMC) announced at the end of September that “no evidence has yet been found of such presence” in the Nuba Mountains. There are now reports that Darfur militia are arriving in Upper Nile, ostensibly to protect oil installations. The Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) was reportedly asked to investigate. A new rebel group has sprung up, led by a Kordofani and using Western Kordofan as a springboard for its operations. The movement calls itself Al-Shahamah (nobility) and seeks fair development opportunities for the region, and a revision of the Naivasha agreement in regard to power- and wealth-sharing and the status of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. Insecurity is increasing on the eastern Front, where both the Beja Congress and the “Free Lions” are active. GoS has accused Eritrea of massing forces on the border. All of this reinforces the analysis that Sudan’s problem was never a “southern problem”, followed by a “Darfur problem”. It is in fact a problem of an over-centralised government marginalising the peripheral regions in every respect (power, wealth, resources, development) whilst at the same time attempting to impose on them a particular cultural identity (“Arabisation”) which includes a particular interpretation of Islam not shared by the majority of Sudanese Muslims. It should not be forgotten that many urban northerners are also frustrated with these same issues, but they may not have the same opportunities for armed resistance as the people on the peripheries. It was only a matter of time before resistance would begin to spread throughout the north.

In October the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) met in Nairobi to coordinate the three different peace processes: Machakos/Naivasha/Nairobi; Abuja; Cairo. They expressed a preference for “a single negotiating forum” but accepted the current reality of three tracks. They stated that the overall aim should be “a comprehensive peaceful resolution that provides for the democratic transformation of the country and building of a New Sudan,” to “bring about a genuine lasting peace, and not be used for buying time or creating contradictions and collisions.” This seems to be aimed at GoS, which has a tendency to use parallel peace fora to create delays. Finally they note that “the speedy conclusion of the Naivasha process, the core of which is already in place, will propel the other tracks…”.

What do the different parties want, and what are the realistic prospects for peace? Taking the southern process first, many would argue that what the two parties want is to remain in power. The current protocols give them both a good chance of doing so. GoS has no accountability to its people at all; it is the same Islamist military dictatorship which seized power from a democratically elected government in 1989. Elections held since then have been a sham, and decentralisation into 26 federal states has also been a fiction, with power still firmly in the hands of central government. SPLM/A is also unaccountable. While many senior commanders remain close to their people and so SPLM/A cannot totally ignore the wishes of the population, nevertheless the top leadership does not have a good record on transparency and inclusivity. Tensions typical of an authoritarian military liberation movement in transition towards being a government expected to answer to democratic principles have already surfaced between the SPLM/A and southern civil society. If remaining in power really is their priority, then both parties appear to benefit from a partnership during the Interim Period. However SPLM/A may have miscalculated the extent to which GoS will actually deliver on genuine power sharing.

But what about peace? Will this partnership, based on the Machakos and Naivasha protocols, bring peace? Many would argue that there will never be peace as long as the current regime is in power in Khartoum. It will be remembered that it seized power precisely to pre-empt meaningful peace negotiations in 1989. Although the agreements signed so far by both parties represent a fairly good compromise (with the exception of the protocol on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, which was a defeat for SPLM/A), what are the chances that they will actually be implemented? GoS has already made it clear that it opposes the break-up of the country. If the Interim Period is ever implemented, if a referendum ever takes place, if GoS has not succeeded in manipulating the electorate and rigging the ballot to guarantee victory, if the southerners vote for secession… will they get it? The answer is probably not. It would prove a major challenge for the AU. North African states, who are also members of the Arab League, will certainly support GoS in calling for the “territorial integrity” of Sudan to be maintained at any cost. Most sub-Saharan states, fearful for their own borders and conscious of Arab funding, will find ways to avoid the issue. Europe and the USA are increasingly losing credibility in the developing world and this may not be an issue on which they wish to make a stand; some have already privately acknowledged that they would urge a return to the negotiating table or an extension of the Interim Period rather than supporting secession. Southerners are very unlikely ever to see an independent southern state.

What of the territorial integrity of the south, even during a period of unity with the north? GoS has already carried out ethnic cleansing in western Upper Nile and to a lesser extent in the Collo (Shilluk) Kingdom and parts of eastern and northern Upper Nile. There are reports of northerners settling in these regions, and the recent arrival of Darfur militia is no coincidence. GoS has also maintained its southern militia in the region. Malakal and Bentiu have been developed to an extent not seen in other GoS garrison towns in the south, and Malakal in particular has seen an increase in Arabisation and Islamisation. It seems very unlikely that GoS has invested this much in the region in order to give it all up two and a half years after signing a comprehensive peace agreement, when it is due to withdraw all its forces except those in the JIU. A likely scenario is that GoS will annex these oil regions; even if the rest of the south attains independence, the old Greater Upper Nile will not. It should be noted that this area also includes the agricultural projects around Renk. Of course GoS is too diplomatic to simply refuse outright. There will be a long process of assuring the world that GoS intends to withdraw and honour the peace agreement, but that it needs more time, that there are still details to be hammered out, that borders and administrative arrangements need fine tuning, that it will happen soon… bukra insh’allah. What options would the south have in such a situation? Very few. A return to war would be difficult, for both practical and political reasons. SPLM/A will not be on a war footing by then. GoS will have used the time to strengthen its position on the ground, and used its oil revenue to strengthen its forces; in contrast, SPLM/A will find it difficult to justify spending huge sums of money on the military when there is such an obvious need for reconstruction and development in the south. And the international community will be unlikely to support a return to war.

The argument that there will never be peace while the current regime is in power may well be true. But “regime change” is also problematic. External regime change as in Iraq and Afghanistan would be totally unacceptable to most of the world (although many southern Sudanese have repeatedly called for it and would welcome it) and would probably result in chaos and bloodshed as in those two unfortunate countries. The Khartoum regime has cooperated enough with the USA in its “war on terror” that it is unlikely to be a priority for regime change, and it is doubtful whether the US currently has the appetite or the military capacity to topple too many more regimes. The Sudanese people have a proud history of overthrowing military regimes by intifada (popular uprising), but during its first few years the current regime embarked on a campaign of terror, disappearances, torture, purging of the military, police, civil service, etc, and the setting up of a security state. Northern civil society has still not fully recovered from this and is unlikely to overthrow the government. Splits from within are always a possibility.

But would a new government in Khartoum benefit the south? This regime did not begin the marginalisation of the south, and it was not in power when the current war broke out. Every northern government since independence in 1956, whether military or democratic, has been bad news for the south. Ironically the current military dictatorship has made more concessions to the south than any previous regime, and in that sense its survival may be the south’s best hope. But every government has been guilty of breaking agreements made with the south, and there is no reason to believe that this one will be any different. If a new government were to come to power, even through a democratic process, there is no guarantee that it would accept the peace protocols. A major weakness of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process was its exclusivity; it was only between two parties, and all the other factions, movements and parties in both north and south were excluded, as well as civil society (unlike the much more inclusive peace process which this regime destroyed when it seized power in 1989). Many of these parties have already indicated that they are not happy with the agreement, particularly the possibility of secession for the south. The main problem for most northerners has never been the war in the south; rather it is living under a dictatorship which imposes its own interpretation of Islam on them. The first act of a new government might be to demand that the talks start again from the beginning. And the possibility of a “fake coup d’etat”, in which the current government is “overthrown” and a “new” one comes to power precisely in order to restart the negotiations, cannot be completely excluded. But this fear that any change of government would set back the southern peace process should not be used as an excuse by the international community to continue to support a brutal military dictatorship which is still oppressing its people in a manner that ought to be totally unacceptable to democrats throughout the world. While eschewing forcible regime change, nevertheless the democratic opposition must be supported, albeit not unconditionally; it must be encouraged to buy into the existing peace process.

Southerners are in a “Catch 22” situation. If they put their faith in a peace agreement negotiated with the current regime, they are unlikely to get what they have been promised. If they work for regime change, they are likely to find themselves back at the beginning of a new negotiation process, and at the end of it there will still be no guarantee that they will get whatever they have been promised by the new regime. The southern elite will benefit in either case, as they will still have positions and a degree of power and wealth, but it is not clear that the south as a whole will gain much. While the current cessation of hostilities is certainly welcomed by the people, many ordinary southerners feel that war is better than a bad peace; if the conditions which caused the war in the first place are not removed, then a new and more terrible war will break out eventually. Southerners in general have probably been over-optimistic about the level of political support they will get from the international community. Humanitarian aid is one thing, and there has been a degree of pressure to conclude the IGAD process and do something about Darfur; but there is neither the international will nor consensus to fully safeguard southern interests. The international community has also singularly failed to grasp that promises and signed agreements mean little in the context of Sudan. Progress can only be said to have been made when substantial and irreversible changes have actually occurred.

Some have argued that the southern peace agreement is a model for peace in Darfur. According to Dr John Garang, “It is a political framework for the whole country…. I believe the completion of Naivasha and its implementation puts in place in Khartoum a new government and creates a new political dynamic in Khartoum. The solution to Darfur is actually through Naivasha.” This may be one reason why GoS is in no hurry to sign the final agreement. If it had to offer Darfur the same sort of terms as the south, it would firstly be admitting that there is a “periphery-centre” problem rather than isolated and unconnected “southern” and “Darfur” problems, and secondly setting a precedent for other parts of the north. In Naivasha GoS refused to offer Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains the same terms as the south for precisely this reason. GoS may be delaying a conclusion to the southern peace process while it hopes for favourable developments in Darfur. In some respects the international interest in Darfur has wrong-footed GoS at a time when it was gaining international acceptance due to its engagement in the IGAD peace process and its cooperation in the “war on terror”. GoS has so far avoided any really meaningful UN resolutions, and has been supported by the AU, the Arab League and other developing and Islamic countries in resisting external intervention. The UN Security Council will meet in Nairobi in November to focus attention on the IGAD peace process as well as Darfur. This is a further embarrassment for GoS, and a reminder that the final settlements agreed for each of the conflicts in Sudan must be taken to the UN Security Council for endorsement and guarantees. But it is difficult to see what meaningful guarantees the UN could offer and what effective sanctions the divided international community could apply. An embargo on Sudanese oil would hurt GoS, but it would be difficult to enforce without Chinese and Russian cooperation, and during a period when oil prices have hit a record high and the supply of oil from Iraq is so uncertain, the industrialised countries are unlikely to remove Sudan’s oil from the international markets. Pakistan and Algeria are other Security Council members who are unlikely to support robust measures against Khartoum. Nevertheless Darfur represents a set-back in GoS’ charm offensive.

Darfur is being seen by many as a test of AU commitment to “African solutions for African problems”. This is probably unfair. While AU involvement is to be welcomed, its political and security mechanisms are still in the very early stages of development. Sudan is a problem which has so far resisted the best efforts of all major international players. It would be unfair to judge the AU if it fails to resolve the problems in Darfur, although it must at least demonstrate that it is seriously attempting to do so. The AU must move beyond solidarity amongst governments and work towards solidarity amongst peoples, especially suffering peoples. Its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, did this in the case of apartheid, where it clearly supported the people against the then ruling regime in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, Sudan and elsewhere, the AU has failed as yet to find the political will to do the same. Its supporters might argue, though, that its less confrontational approach could be more effective in the long run than the sanctions, military threats (bluffs?) and public confrontation advocated by the global north, which often seem to have more to do with domestic politics than with actually solving the problems.

China has been a staunch supporter of GoS in international fora, not least because of its oil interests in Sudan. Justice and peace activists in other African countries are beginning to notice the extent of Chinese involvement all over Africa. China, as a developing nation itself and a supporter of African liberation movements, often escapes the critical analysis directed at other industrialised countries. However China’s interests may not be Africa’s interests.

So what is the solution to the problems of Sudan? It may well be that there is no solution. As long ago as the 1970s E F Schumacher wrote about “divergent problems”, which have no solution: "...a number of highly able people set out to study a problem and come up with answers that contradict one another. They do not converge. On the contrary, the more they are clarified and logically developed, the more they diverge, until some of them appear to be the exact opposites of the others". Sudan does not have one simple single problem. Instead there are a number of complex and inter-connected issues, with links to external factors as well. Trying to solve one or two conflicts, even partially, produces a knock-on effect which affects other conflicts. It may well produce a situation where attempts to solve one problem exacerbate another, and where different parties come up with contradictory solutions. GoS excels at manipulating this complexity to its own advantage. Eventually all parties may be forced to accept a compromise which falls far short of what they thought they could live with, and far short of the protocols which have already been signed but which are unlikely to be fully implemented. As in South Africa, it will be seen that there are tensions between different aims such as justice, peace and reconciliation. While it is clear to most people inside and outside Sudan that GoS is the “more guilty party” in terms of justice, nevertheless polarisation, confrontation and polemics may not be the best way to bring peace and reconciliation. Politics is reputedly the art of the possible; what is possible in Sudan? Good will and common sense are needed on all sides, but unfortunately these are lacking in Sudan. Perhaps one of the greatest problems is the lack of trust; this will not be overcome easily, if at all.

* John Ashworth