Namuli, the lead character of this novel, makes her way from an isolated Ugandan village to international recognition. She encounters obstacles, prejudices and uncertainties about her own identity as a student, professional woman and mother. She experiences the enigmas of love, relationships and loss. The novel is based on a true story and aims to give readers an authentic picture of what it was like to live in Uganda from the 1950s through to the 1970s. Patricia Haward first came to Uganda is 1964. Since this time, she has worked extensively as a teacher and editor of African writers and literature.

Journalists, novelists and Internet writers from 17 countries have received Hellman/Hammett grants in recognition of their courage in the face of political persecution. The Hellman/Hammett grants are given annually to writers around the world who have been targets of political persecution. The four awards made to writers in Africa included:
- Kum Margaret (Cameroon), freelance journalist
- Tewodros Kassa (Ethiopia), newspaper editor
- Isioma Daniel (Nigeria), newspaper journalist
- Ismail Mbonigaba (Rwanda), journalist and newspaper editor.

The Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) is an international non-governmental organization working to facilitate linkages between people, knowledge, and resources, with a view to strengthening the self-reliance of vulnerable communities from East Africa and the Horn. SUDIA has been operational in Sudan since 2002, designing and implementing rehabilitation and development projects in collaboration with various international donor agencies. In response to the on-going crisis in Darfur, SUDIA has initiated an action-research project that will look beyond the immediate humanitarian and relief needs of the population and pave the way for post-conflict reconstruction initiatives that integrate humanitarian, development and governance concerns in a holistic manner.

Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is an international coalition of more than 280 non-governmental organisations (NGO), which is seeking to ensure that natural resource companies publish the payments they make to all national governments and authorities. The campaign was launched in mid-2002 by groups such as Global Witness, Save the Children, CAFOD and the Open Society Institute. PWYP aims to build greater accountability between governments, oil companies and civil society for the management and allocation of extractive industry revenues which can provide the basis for successful growth and poverty reduction in some of the least developed countries in the world.

AFRODAD is in search of a competent young man/woman to work as a Programme Officer for its Fair and Transparent Arbitration (FTA) Project. The position is a two year contract subject to renewal. The officer will be stationed at AFRODAD's Mulungushi, Lusaka office.

For over 28 years, Facing History and Ourselves has offered an interdisciplinary approach to citizenship education that connects the history of the Holocaust and other examples of genocide to the moral questions young people face in their own lives. The online course, Holocaust and Human Behavior, is a powerful learning experience that provides an excellent overview of Facing History's resources and methodology.

The African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), which was established in June 2000, is the first Africa-wide fundraising and grant-making fund, which aims to support the work of organisations working to promote women’s rights in Africa. The AWDF funds local, national, sub-regional and regional organisations in Africa working towards women’s empowerment. The objectives of the AWDF are fundraising within and outside Africa, grant making on an Africa-wide basis, communicating the work and achievements of African women’s organisations and providing technical assistance to grantees.

The International Human Rights Colloquium is an annual capacity building and peer-learning event designed for activists from the Global South. Since 2001, the Colloquium has gathered more than 510 activists and academics, mainly from Latin American, African, and Asian countries.

Siyabhala - We are writing Africa - is produced by Venekera Works on behalf of Writers of Zimbabwe. The aim is to promote a writing and reading culture in Zimbabwe. If you would like to subscribe please send an email to [email protected] with "join" as the subject.

A bicycle-powered, Linux-based VoIP system: not your usual high-tech architecture. But what if you were one of the more than 1 billion people living without electricity? No power, no phone. The mission of Inveneo, a nonprofit group of inveterate high-tech adventurers, is to bring developing communities that never reached a 20th century level of infrastructure into the 21st century. Its bicycle-powered system brings not just VoIP but also e-mail and Web browsing to remote areas.

September 23rd to 25th 2005, the weekend of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's annual meetings, holds great importance for millions around the world. This year, the Mobilization for Global Justice, a Washington DC-based activist group, will join our allies in the global South, Europe, and the U.S. as well as with those in the anti-war community to demand an end to the international system that uses economic and military might to extract resources and serve corporate interests.

Radio for Peacebuilding is a project that aims to help develop knowledge about the use of peacebuilding techniques among radio professionals across sub-Saharan Africa. The project's main audience is sub-Saharan African radio broadcasters. The project is run jointly from Brussels, Belgium and from Bujumbura, Burundi. The Radio for Peacebuilding website is intended to be an interactive tool for radio professionals (journalists, radio presenters and editors). It includes radio programmes, manuals and other documents and other useful information.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has welcomed the release of "Le Front" editor-in-chief Joseph Bessala Ahanda on 21 July 2005, two days after a delegation of journalists met the director of criminal affairs at the Justice Ministry. "The end of this arbitrary imprisonment is good news for Cameroon's journalists," the organisation said.

If the G–8 is to respond effectively to poverty in Africa, it must address Africa’s vulnerability to climate change, and discard the "business as usual" method of choosing and building energy projects, says the International Rivers Network. G–8 funding should prioritize access to renewable and clean, modern energy services while reducing African energy vulnerabilities to a changing climate. G–8 funding should prioritize projects that are identified through participative and informed processes and meet identified energy needs.

There is a new phenomena spreading around the world - the spread of extremely restrictive seed laws. A new series of articles, in the latest issue of GRAIN's Seedling magazine, has found that many countries are being pushed into embracing some of the world's most repressive laws: seed laws. It is clear that these seed laws have very little to do with protecting farmers at all and a lot to do with creating conditions for the private seed industry to gain and control markets worldwide. Seed laws are all about repression. They're about what farmers can't do.

Ministers attending the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ministerial Conference on Biotechnology have adopted a resolution asking member countries to prepare their national biosafety frameworks by 1 July 2006, so as to facilitate harmonization in the region by 2008. The conference, held from 21-28 June 2005 in Bamako, Mali, also produced a number of other resolutions, which addressed: adoption of measures by the ECOWAS Secretariat to facilitate implementation of a regional strategic plan on biosafety; increased budget allocations to agriculture; and prioritization of funding research for biotechnology tools for small farmers.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) has said that it and nine other international NGOs had requested international monitoring of 8,000 Rwandans who they say were taken from Burundi illegally and by force on 13 June. In a letter on 1 July to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the NGOs asked her to "insist that the Rwandan government provide guarantees that the safety and dignity of those returned from Burundi will be ensured, and that these guarantees be subject to effective international monitoring."

This article evaluates the potential impact of the IMF and WB adjustment policies on women's and children's vulnerability to HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. The study finds that adjustment policies may inadvertently produce conditions facilitating women's and children's exposure to HIV/AIDS. In particular, it finds that certain components of adjustment reforms, such as currency devaluation and trade liberalisation, may produce mixed effects on the vulnerability of women and children to HIV/AIDS. Other reforms, such as financial liberalisation, removal of food subsidies, and introduction of user fees for healthcare and education have a negative impact on the spread of the epidemic among poor women and children.

A thematic annotated workshop was organized by the UNCHR in Addis to discuss the comprehensive plan for Somali refugees' gap analysis in Ethiopia.
One of the gaps identified was the absence of reliable data on the composition and profile of the Somali refugees in Ethiopia. There were also no specific mechanisms in place for the identification of refugees with special protection needs, including victims of sexual and gender-based violence, partly due to the absence of a reporting system and multi-sectoral referral mechanism.

For thousands of years, girls in the area that is now the tiny African country of Djibouti, have been subjected to pharaonic circumcision. It is a practice that involves cutting away a girl’s inner labia and clitoris, and sewing the wound together, leaving a tiny hole for passing urine and menstrual blood. Despite medical evidence that genital mutilation puts women at risk of infection, pain and complications during childbirth, social pressure is such that most mothers opt to circumcise their daughters.

EPAs mark a historic turning point in the history of trade agreements. But, writes Charles Abugre, any new trade agreement must help ACP countries to improve and diversify what they produce and export. This will require a radical rewrite of EPAs as they currently stand.

EPAs are historic trade agreements. They will have an unprecedented impact on the development of some of the world’s poorest countries. They mark a radical shift in the relationship between these countries and their most important partner for aid and trade – the European Union. Previously characterised by preferential market access and aid for building trade capacity, this 'partnership' will oblige ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries to sign up to free trade agreements with the EU in order to maintain the market access on which producers and traders have come to depend and in order to benefit from the development assistance package that is tied to 'economic partnership agreements'. Christian Aid recognises the danger of this approach. If carried out in their current form, EPAs will undermine the development potential of many of the world’s poorest countries by exposing poor producers and traders to unequal competition and by tying the hands of governments to use trade policy selectively to support their agricultural and industrial development.

As the deadlines for the 6th ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation in Hong Kong become more pressing, the attention of civil society is potentially diverted and the negotiating capacity of ACP countries is increasingly stretched. It is therefore important that the criticality of EPAs is not forgotten, not least because the two sets of negotiations are inextricably linked.

The discussions underway in the Rules Negotiating Group on regional trade agreements (RTAs) will establish the framework for EPAs. The call of the African Union to shift the timetable of EPA negotiations to let these basic rules be in place before substantive negotiations start is a logical one (African Union 2005). Currently ACP countries are trying to hit a moving target, or worse are trying to shoe-horn EPAs to fit flawed rules that were not designed for RTAs between developed and developing countries. WTO talks will also establish the baseline for EPAs. It is impossible to know what is the value of offers on market access until these talks are completed. It is also impossible to know what the impact will be of a new WTO deal on preference erosion – a critical issue for ACP countries, and one that the EU has committed to address under the Cotonou Agreement and as part of the Doha agenda.

Under EPAs, some of the world's poorest countries are being asked to open up their markets to products from Europe. The likely results are not hard to imagine. With their diverse range of products and muscle in the marketplace, European producers can outstrip ACP rivals in their domestic markets. European producers have enjoyed decades of subsidies, support and protection from their governments and have built strong, competitive industries. ACP countries – whose problem is not only that they cannot sell enough, but that they cannot produce enough – have not. They stand not only to lose existing markets, but also the potential to develop new ones.

According to the rhetoric, EPAs are designed for poverty reduction and to ensure the ACP's integration into the world market. After decades of structural adjustment, the majority of ACP countries are already integrated into international trade – it is the nature of this integration that is the problem. Since colonial times, ACP countries have been locked into feeding the European market with raw commodities and are often locked out when they try to export processed or value-added products.

Any new trade agreement between ACP countries and Europe must help them to improve and diversify what they produce and export. EPAs that focus on locking in an inexorable reduction in tariffs, and their eventual elimination, will not achieve this. No country has developed without the flexibility to raise as well as lower tariffs selectively to protect and encourage development of new industries.

In a recent report, Christian Aid exposed the already disastrous impact of enforced trade liberalisation on poor producers and looked ahead to the likely effects of further lowering tariffs in three African countries (Christian Aid 2005).
In Ghana and Senegal, the enforced lowering of import tariffs on products such as tomato paste and chicken parts has been followed by a deluge of products sold at cut-throat prices from Europe. These often undercut local goods, causing factories that add value to local produce to close down. This leads to great hardship in poor, rural communities where people's livelihoods rely on selling surplus food.

In Mozambique, liberalisation resulting from EPAs would open up a thriving milling industry to more cheaply produced wheat-flour from Europe. This would not only mean job losses in the milling industry, but would have a knock-on effect among the small but growing number of Mozambican farmers who produce wheat.

The studies show that not only is liberalisation often a harmful policy for poor people, but it will 'cap' development and leave countries dependent on the same narrow range of primary commodities.

EPAs are also threatening existing but fragile regional groupings among ACP countries. African countries in particular have long considered regional integration an important development strategy. It is both a means to overcome the limitations of small markets and an opportunity to pool resources for infrastructure and major production projects. But regional integration will not be advanced enough to kick-start growth by the time the EU expects African countries to start opening up markets to EU imports. This will mean that advantages accrue to the EU as the common and dominant partner in these trade arrangements. Opportunities to develop industries in goods that can be traded regionally will be lost.

EPAs are poorly designed to promote regional integration, regardless of timing. Least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs have different incentives to sign up to EPAs, since LDCs benefit from the Everything But Arms initiative beyond 2007. The integrity of two long-standing African regional groupings – COMESA and SADC – is under threat because member governments of both groupings now have to choose under which they will negotiate a new trade deal with the EU.

Putting development first will require a radical rewriting of EPAs. EPAs provide potential advantages over preferential schemes as they enable the ACP to negotiate continued and improved access to EU markets that is legally secure. They are also attached to development assistance to enhance regional integration, to address supply-side constraints to production and to help cope with the costs of adjustment caused by trade reforms. Neither of these features of EPAs should be used to leverage commitments to liberalise. Instead, the EC must work with the ACP to ensure that development does indeed come first, and that ACP country governments are able to use trade policy flexibly to enable this to happen.

Progress towards this goal can be made in Hong Kong, if countries support measures to make effective special and differential treatment an integral part of WTO rules governing regional trade agreements.

* Charles Abugre is currently the head of policy and advocacy at Christian Aid. He has been a development activist in Ghana and many parts of Africa and Asia

* Please send comments to [email protected]

References

African Union (2005) 'Ministerial declaration on EPA negotiations', June

Christian Aid (2005) For Richer or Poorer: transforming economic partnership agreements between Europe and Africa. London: Christian Aid

Current EPA negotiations must be stopped, says Liz Dodd. These trade negotiations contain little for ACP countries and could actually increase poverty in some of the poorest countries in the world. Dodd explains that the EU is making grossly unfair demands over EPAs and is forcing controversial 'new' issues through the back door. EPAs are further undermining regional integration.

The Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states speak out

At a meeting in London organised by Traidcraft in June, Kenyan Trade Minister Dr Kituyi issued a strong challenge on economic partnership agreements (EPAs). He called on the European Union (EU) to revisit their negotiating mandate in order to ‘whittle out’ mercantilist interests such as the demand for reciprocal trade.

Dr Kituyi made his bold challenge in the presence of the UK’s trade minister, Ian Pearson MP, just days ahead of the UK taking up the presidency of the EU. Addressing an audience of parliamentarians, ambassadors and journalists, Dr Kituyi said if the EPA negotiations require greater concessions than those at the WTO, then ‘to make poverty history, we will also have to make EPAs history’.

On trade liberalisation more broadly, Dr Kituyi commented that, ‘lowering your tariff guard to your neighbours is like inoculation, but if you open up to the EU that’s a full dose of the virus.’ He described the devastating effects of liberalisation on African economies and referred to the ‘lost generation’ of the 1990s who have been denied an education. Dr Kituyi’s challenge came hard on the heels of a strong statement on the negotiations issued by the Africa Union trade ministers at their Cairo conference. In particular the statement reiterated the position that the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ should remain outside the EPA negotiations.

Just days later the ACP Council of Ministers expressed ‘grave concern’ that the negotiations had not proceeded in a satisfactory manner and had failed to start addressing most issues of interest and concern to the ACP. The statement also highlighted the disconnect between what EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson was saying in public and what his negotiators were actually doing in the negotiating sessions. The ministers reinforced Dr Kituyi’s request that the EU rethink their negotiating directives to take on board ACP concerns.

A catalogue of disappointments

This flurry of statements is clear evidence that ACP governments are getting increasingly tired of the EU saying one thing and then doing another on EPAs. The EU talk about EPAs as instruments for development, but then refuse to listen to what ACP governments want. The EU are unhappy that ACP countries’ own development plans and priorities do not include giving the EU preferential access for their markets in return for nothing. The frustration of ACP governments is understandable. At every turn in the talks, the ACP’s legitimate concerns and positions appear to be put on the back burner.

This process began way back at the start of discussions when ACP countries did not want to negotiate EPAs, but the EU insisted that they were necessary to comply with WTO rules. Effectively the ACP were being given no choice. For some ACP countries the only alternative to an EPA on offer would see their market access to Europe slashed.

So the ACP agreed – reluctantly - with the proviso that WTO rules might be changed to be more flexible and that alternatives would be provided for those countries that felt they were not in a position to sign up to a free-trade EPA.

So far, the ACP has received no support from the EU on either of these key issues. Similarly at the end of the first phase of the talks, the ACP side wanted a binding agreement on issues that were critically important to them – such as additional resources to compensate for the adjustment costs involved in EPAs. The EU refused to agree.

Most recently the UK government came out with a position paper on the EPA negotiations, raising some concerns and questions. They were promptly disciplined by the European Commission (EC), who in a letter sent to all the EC delegations in ACP countries called the UK position ‘a major and unwelcome shift … Some recommendations move well away from agreed EU positions.’ The letter went on to say that ‘Peter Mandelson is taking up our concerns and will press for a revised UK line.’

Given the weight of this evidence the ACP are justified in questioning the negotiating faith of the EU.

EPAs: pro development or a hidden menace?

The EU want to sell EPAs as good for development. And they seem determined to drag ACP countries through the process. But the ACP are not playing ball in quite the way the EU would like.

And there are good reasons for the ACP’s fears:

The EU is making grossly unfair demands

Despite the fact that the poorest countries (least developed countries, or LDCs) do not have to open their economies as part of the WTO talks, they are being asked to do so as part of EPAs. At the moment 39 of the 77 ACP countries are classified as least developed. Under EPAs, it will be very difficult for them to prevent cheap, subsidised EU goods flooding their markets and putting local farmers and small-scale manufacturers out of business.

The EU is forcing controversial ‘new issues’ through the back door

Following resistance from developing countries and campaigning by NGOs around the world, three of the highly controversial ‘new issues’ (investment, competition and transparency in public procurement) are now off the WTO agenda. But they are being pushed through the ‘back door’ of EPAs. In some areas the EU is pushing for EPAs to go much further on these issues than was ever demanded at the WTO.

EPAs are undermining regional integration

EPAs should contribute to the process of regional integration between ACP countries. But in negotiations so far the opposite is happening. EPAs put the poorest countries in an impossible dilemma: should they continue with their ‘non-reciprocal’ duty-free, quota-free access into the European market, but leave their regional grouping or should they open up to the EU and stick with their regional partners? The problem is that whilst the poorest have nothing to gain from EPAs, their slightly less poor neighbours (non-LDCs) have a great deal to lose.

Take East Africa. The East African Community includes Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The countries are committed to working together and are in the process of establishing a customs union and a joint currency. They have already set up an East African Parliament. But with EPAs comes a big problem. Uganda and Tanzania are LDCs, Kenya is not. As LDCs, Uganda and Tanzania already have duty-free and quota-free access into the EU market under the Everything But Arms agreement. Uganda and Tanzania have nothing to gain from an EPA. But if they refuse to negotiate, while Kenya goes ahead, how will they stop EU goods entering their markets via Kenya and the customs union? If EPAs are supposed to support and strengthen regional integration – why has it put East Africa in this impossible situation?

Impact fears

There are serious concerns about the impact that EPAs will have on poor and vulnerable groups in ACP countries:

- Company closures and job losses. As European goods begin to enter ACP countries without facing any tariffs, local businesses will be unable to cope with the competition and will be forced out of business. This is likely to be particularly damaging in the agricultural sector where ACP countries are most dependent and where the EU gives the most support to its own producers.

- Glass ceiling. ACP countries are not just concerned about losing out to European competition in the goods they already produce. Because European manufactured goods will be entering African countries without paying any trade taxes, they may be cheaper. For small businesses struggling to add more value to their products by moving into new industries such as manufacturing or food processing this will be a real blow, potentially consigning countries to remain simply exporters of raw materials and basic goods. This would be deeply damaging to national development plans in ACP countries.

- Loss of vital government revenue. Many ACP countries rely heavily on the money they get from levying customs taxes for their normal expenditure. Opening up to the EU will reduce that revenue base and will mean less money for social expenditure. For example, there are estimates that between 25% and 30% of all Namibian government revenue was derived from this type of trade tax between 1990 and 1996.
What would this mean for a country like Kenya?

- The loss of tax revenue will make it harder for the government to implement new plans to help micro enterprises.

- Unfair competition from European goods still heavily supported by the EU under the Common Agricultural Policy could devastate Kenya’s dairy and cereals sectors – both are made up of thousands of small farmers.

- Kenya’s ability to diversify and develop an advantage in value-added areas could also be undermined. The sector most at risk here is the textiles and garments industry.

- The Kenyan government has plans to keep a portion of government contracts for micro-enterprises. EPAs could mean they are no longer allowed to do this.

A call to action

EPA negotiations so far contain little for ACP countries, and could actually increase poverty in some of the poorest countries in the world. European groups are stepping up the pressure on EPAs in direct response to a call from our ACP civil society partners.

Traidcraft along with partners from across the UK and Europe are calling for the European Union member states to wake up to the threat of EPAs and immediately:
- Stop the current negotiations
- Remove the demand for the opening up of reciprocal trade and for new issues from their negotiating mandate
- Work with the ACP to reform WTO rules
- Work urgently to investigate alternatives that leave ACP countries better – not worse – off, as was promised in the Cotonou Agreement

For more information visit: or www.stopepa.org

* Liz Dodd works for Traidcraft in the UK.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Far from being a development tool, Demba Moussa Dembele argues that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) seek to take control of the continent’s resources and undermine its drive toward autonomous economic and social development. The result would be the transformation of Africa into a playground of multinational corporations. Trade and Africa’s ‘integration’ into the global economy must not be allowed to take place on terms dictated by Europe, Dembele concludes.

In February 2000, the new framework agreement, signed between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU), marked a major departure from previous agreements in that it opened the door to a profound transformation of the relationships between the two groups. Arguing that the new international trade environment requires that both parties comply with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU has compelled its ACP partners to engage in separate free trade zones, dubbed 'economic partnership agreements' (EPAs), whose fundamental aim is to remove the trade preferences granted to ACP countries and establish reciprocity in trade relations:

Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements shall aim notably at establishing the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules. (EU 2000, Article 37-7).

However, the EU insists that the partnership agreements will be negotiated only with countries which feel that their economies are able to sustain competition from European products. All the other non-least developed countries (LDCs) that do not fall within this category would be granted some undefined 'alternative possibilities'. The necessity to bring the ACP/EU relationships into compliance with the WTO framework stems from the belief that it would be almost impossible to get a waiver for an indefinite period for maintaining the trade preferences granted to ACP countries. In fact, the EU claims that under WTO rules, these preferences are both discriminatory – applying only to ACP countries rather than all LDCs – and non-reciprocal – European exports are not granted similar preferences in ACP markets.

Apart from the need to comply with the WTO provisions, the economic partnership agreements are intended to achieve two other objectives. One of them is the necessity to maintain the 'special relationship' established between Europe and the ACP countries. From the EU perspective, the necessity to comply with the rules of the new international trade framework does not mean giving up all the benefits associated with decades of special trade and financial relationships with ACP countries. According to the dominant view, Europe has invested too much in these countries to let others undermine the close relationships that have been nurtured over decades.

The other objective assigned to the EPAs is to make the economic partnership more 'efficient'. The concern with efficiency stems from what Europe perceives as a 'poor' performance of the Lomé Convention. The EU's own studies, corroborated by several other studies, indicate that ACP countries’ share in the EU market has consistently shrunk over the years to the benefit of other developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The reasons for this 'poor' performance are both internal and external to ACP countries. The internal constraints are weak supply conditions, a limited awareness of Lomé preferences, the lack of well-functioning trade channels, and so forth. Among the external constraints are the stringent rules of origin imposed by the EU, which require an added value of between 50% and 60% of ACP exports to Europe, and complicated and cumbersome trade procedures. To these constraints, one may add numerous non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and transportation costs that are a real handicap for small or medium-sized exporters, particularly those in landlocked countries.

In addition, the Lomé mechanism has not helped export diversification in African countries, but contributed to reinforcing their trade dependence on the European Union, which is estimated at more than 45%. In the light of this, the European Union tends to draw the conclusion that trade preferences granted to ACP countries have been a waste and have had little impact on the development of ACP countries.

But despite their emphasis on trade liberalisation and reciprocity, the EU insists that the EPAs will promote 'integration' and stimulate 'economic development' on the continent. For this to be the case there would need to be a fundamental reorientation of the EPAs, to transform them into a development-enhancing scheme, as spelt out below.

Non-reciprocity in trade liberalisation

Article 53-1 of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that: 'Economic and trade co-operation shall be based on a true, strengthened and strategic partnership.'

If that is really the case and if the EU is sincere in adhering to these principles, then, it should accept that the huge asymmetry that exists between the two economies should prevent the establishment of a free trade zone between African and European countries. In other words, the EU should give up its intention to impose reciprocity in trade relations. It is said that the EPAs seek to go beyond what is allowed under the WTO rules, such as special and differential treatment as well as non-reciprocity which have been integrated into the WTO since the Punta del Este Declaration. Even the Commission for Africa, established by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has challenged the free trade stance of the EPAs, to such an extent that it seems to have alarmed Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner.

Indeed, given the asymmetry between African and European economies and the huge subsidies the latter enjoy, any reciprocity in trade liberalisation, as implied by the economic partnership agreements, would deal a major blow to Africa’s development prospects. It would mean not only more unemployment and poverty on a larger scale, but worst of all, the total collapse of the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn would aggravate the food crisis on the continent. It is widely acknowledged that trade liberalisation has already entailed huge losses to African countries. It has been estimated that the combination of deteriorating terms of trade and the trade restrictions introduced by developed countries has led to an average annual loss of $60 billion for Africa, about four times the amount of development 'assistance' to the continent. Admittedly, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered disproportionately from trade losses over the last 25 years. In particular, the costly protectionist European agricultural policies are undermining the objective of 'poverty reduction' in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the other objectives that the EU claims to pursue in Africa.

Findings reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2004) confirm that trade liberalisation has aggravated the economic and social conditions of the least developed countries, most of which (34) are in Africa. These findings are consistent with the analysis made in 1997 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which made the following observation, based on a number of case studies around the world:

In the real world, distinct from the imaginary world of free-trade proponents, the survival in agricultural product markets depends less on the policy of comparative advantage than on the comparative access to subsidies. To liberalize local food markets in the face of such an unequal competition is not a policy aimed at improving efficiency, but a recipe for the destruction of livelihood on a large scale. (UNDP 1997: 86)

This observation and those by other UN agencies must convince the EU that reciprocity in trade liberalisation with Africa would be a recipe for disaster. Indeed, agricultural policies left to the free play of market forces, combined with the continued subsidising of developed countries’ high-cost production, have led to the collapse of commodity prices in world markets and contributed to a low level of investments in productive capacity in Africa. Therefore, unless European agricultural policies are dismantled or substantially reformed, to take into account the interests of African countries, the latter must insist that agriculture be kept outside of any negotiations with the EU, while they reserve the right to protect key sectors of their domestic economies. Thus, it can be argued that reciprocity in granting trade preferences should not be based on a theoretical timetable proposed or decided on by the EU. Rather, it should be linked to tangible achievements by African economies in being able to sustain competition from European products.

No to TRIPS

If the EU is really committed to promoting 'a true … partnership' and establishing 'a strategic partnership' with Africa, it should help African countries take full advantage of all the WTO provisions that allow them to protect their economies under certain conditions. The EU should not be forcing them to forgo those provisions, or to go beyond what is allowed under the WTO framework. The compliance with some of the WTO key provisions would represent a major threat to African economies. For instance, the continent’s industrial policy would be particularly hurt if African countries were forced to comply with some of the most basic WTO provisions such as the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The following paragraph in the Cotonou Agreement clearly indicates the EU's determination to force ACP countries to abide by these provisions:

Without prejudice to the positions of the Parties in multilateral negotiations, the Parties recognise the need to ensure an adequate and effective level of protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, and other rights covered by TRIPS.
(EU 2000: 40, Article 46-1).

If there are not profound modifications to these provisions, complying with TRIPS would compel African countries to enact laws designed to protect the intellectual property rights of European multinationals for 20 years, even for essential drugs. In effect, these provisions protect intellectual property through patent arrangements that exclude third party use, offering for sale, selling or importing of such products for a minimum of 20 years. This would make it impossible to produce generic copies for at least 20 years. This policy would strengthen developed countries’ technological monopoly and deprive African countries of the opportunity to catch up through adapting technology and producing generic copies of drugs, which was possible before the WTO provisions entered into force in 1995.

Even worse, African countries would be required to enact laws to protect patented products, including those owned by companies in the EU that patent plants and products found in developing countries. In other words, Western multinational corporations operating from the EU can freely patent products found in African countries and get protection from these countries’ governments! This is unacceptable. Thus, development-oriented EPAs should support the call for a comprehensive review of some WTO provisions that are detrimental to developing countries and for an extension of the transition period for these countries. In particular, the EU should support African countries in calling for a profound transformation of TRIPS to limit the threat to Africa’s industrialisation, technological progress and food sovereignty.

Indeed, these provisions have been called into question by developing countries and even by some institutions within the United Nations system. For instance, UNCTAD has made some recommendations to that effect. One recommendation is for a comprehensive reassessment of the links between property rights and development. Another is to extend the transition period to allow more time for developing countries’ industries to adapt. The third recommendation is to allow developing countries to use compulsory licensing to ensure technology transfer and meet public health concerns. These recommendations apply more specifically to African countries, given their extreme economic vulnerability. Therefore, the EU should take into consideration those recommendations and change its view of the EPAs, not as a trade-enhancing tool, but as a development-oriented instrument.

Taking into account the real costs of the EPAs

The EU tends to minimise the costs of the EPAs to African economies even if it says that it has put in place mechanisms aimed at compensating for the transition costs incurred by African countries. However, the real costs of that transition cannot be estimated. First of all, a free trade zone means full reciprocity when it comes to granting trade preferences, which means a complete removal of all quantitative and tariff barriers between African and European countries. In other words, African industries would be exposed to competition from European products. One important implication is that infant African industries would be deprived of the minimum protection they need, which would result in the collapse of many national industries that would not be able to sustain competition with European companies. This would have dire consequences in terms of lost income, higher unemployment and an increase in the level of poverty.

On the other hand, the removal of tariff barriers would entail heavy financial losses for the state as a result of lower revenues from import duties. Since in many African countries’ more than 20% of their budget revenues depend on import duties and more than 50% on primary export revenues, those countries would lose up to 50% of their revenues, because a free trade agreement with the EU would abolish or drastically bring down tariffs on European imports. All this would lead to a further sacrifice of the social sector, because financial compensation from the EU is not likely to match the magnitude of the losses incurred by these states.

In addition, a free trade agreement implies not only a free flow of goods and services, but also a free flow of capital, which means that European multinationals would have a legal basis for freely investing and selling in many African countries. The economic partnership agreement would give fiscal privileges to European investors and protect their investments. The free movement of capital would result in a free and unlimited repatriation of profits. The free flow of capital could aggravate capital flight from Africa and foster short-term capital movements that would be harmful to Africa’s development, as the East Asian case demonstrated a few years ago. All this would exacerbate the financial problems experienced by African countries.

To limit these losses and help African countries overcome some of the most intractable obstacles to development, any development-oriented economic partnership agreement must be linked to unconditional debt cancellation for all African countries, to a rise in official development assistance (ODA) and to the repatriation of stolen wealth. In addition, the EU could provide incentives to stimulate foreign direct investments (FDIs) that are compatible with African countries’ development needs and priorities.

Keep the Singapore issues out of the EPAs

In connection with the above, the Singapore issues must be kept out of the EPAs. These issues include competition policy, government procurement, investment policy and trade facilitation. They had been one of the principal subjects of contention in Cancun, when African and other developing countries rejected discussion of these issues within the WTO framework, leading to the collapse of the meeting. The EU is trying to use the EPAs to force these issues on African countries. This would deal an even greater blow to the continent’s development prospects. Joseph Stiglitz (2004) has stated that acceptance of these issues by developing countries would certainly 'stop the process of development'. Even the British government has asked for the issues to be removed from the negotiations unless the ACP countries feel ready to discuss them.

Accordingly, EPAs that envisage making a contribution to Africa’s development must remove the Singapore issues from the negotiations until general consensus is reached among African and other developing countries. Indeed, the inclusion of the Singapore issues would compel African countries to comply with trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), which would deal another big blow to a regional industrial policy, since it would mean granting 'national treatment' status to European investors and allowing them to invest in any area of their choice. Worst of all, it would mean adapting African economic and social policies to the needs of these investors, since they would be allowed to sue host countries for any losses they might suffer as a result of domestic economic and social polices. These provisions are similar to those embodied in the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was strongly opposed by African and other developing countries. For individual African countries, as well as for the continent as a whole, this would spell the end of any chance of industrialisation for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the provisions for support and protection of investments, contained in the current post-Lomé IV Agreement, are far more extensive and stringent than those found in previous Lomé Conventions. An illustration is given by Article 78-3 of the agreement, which indicates:

The Parties also agree to introduce, within the economic partnership agreements, and while respecting the respective competencies of the Community and its Member States, general principles on protection and promotion of investments, which will endorse the best results agreed in the competent international fora or bilaterally. (EU 2000: 61)

According to critics, these 'general principles' do not contain any mechanisms to ensure investors’ responsibility for their labour force or the host country’s national development. Nor do they include mechanisms that ensure a clear relationship between investments, poverty reduction and sustainable development. Worst of all, these provisions have no mechanisms for allowing ACP countries to control the flow of portfolio capital, which is the most speculative part of foreign capital for developing countries. It is precisely the absence of such mechanisms that led to the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, with its devastating economic and social consequences.

Without such mechanisms, the free flow of capital that would accompany a free trade agreement with the EU would devastate African economies as a result of speculative short-term investments. A development-oriented partnership agreement must therefore aim at promoting long-term and stable investments in productive sectors, in infrastructure, in telecommunications and human resources development. It must also recognise African countries’ right to restore capital controls and set performance criteria for foreign investors in terms of technology transfer, job creation, etc, to meet the objectives of their economic and social development.

Provide genuine support for economic integration

A development-oriented partnership agreement should encourage real economic integration, at both regional and continental levels. This means that it should avoid imposing different trade arrangements within regional economic communities (RECs). But such a risk is associated with the current EPAs, which are dividing African countries into LDCs and non-LDCs. By offering some undefined 'preferences' to LDCs, the EU knows that selfish and narrow 'national' interests may override regional solidarity and compliance with the Abuja Treaty and Africa’s interests as a whole. Therefore, some countries may be tempted to sign separate agreements with the EU for short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of their regions or the continent.

Another risk of split lies in the possibility that European countries may attempt to establish closer relationships with some more 'developed' countries, such as South Africa, Nigeria and others, the so-called 'emerging markets', at the expense of the other countries, while nominally encouraging the process of integration. Indeed, by giving a free ride to market forces, the EU may seek to develop closer economic ties with countries presenting better opportunities for its industries and investors. This would lead to a two-level economic partnership and expose African countries to great risks of implosion, if they were to opt for different trading arrangements as proposed by the EU.

But the adoption of two or more trade regimes in the same regional bloc would violate the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, since the African Economic Community (AEC) is a supranational community. This would be even more incomprehensible for countries which already have a common external tariff for third countries. In addition, if there were several trade regimes, it would be almost impossible to control the flows of goods and services between countries of the region, a fact which was underlined by the EU's own study. Thus, African countries must insist that any economic partnership agreement with Europe must be compatible with the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, since it requires the regional economic communities to:

…make [their policies] compatible with those of continental integration and align their statutory instruments such as their Treaties and Protocols to the provisions of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. (AEC, 1997).

From this perspective, any economic partnership agreement must contribute to strengthening the region’s economic integration and accelerating the process toward building the African Economic Community. Therefore, if the EU is committed to promoting and strengthening regional integration, it should clearly demonstrate its willingness to invest in African countries’ productive sectors, in infrastructures, in human resource development, in promoting cross-border investments in order to improve supply conditions and strengthen the continent’s production base. To demonstrate this commitment, the EU should allow African countries to complete their integration process before engaging them in any discussions about any kind of economic partnership agreement. It was indicated that the SADC, which is the most advanced example of integration in sub-Saharan Africa, would complete its integration only by 2010 or 2012. Therefore, a genuine commitment to African integration should allow this process to run its full course.

Conclusion

Most observers argue that if the proposed economic partnership agreements between the EU and African countries remained in their original form and if they were implemented they would represent a fatal blow not only to Africa’s economic integration but also to its development prospects for the foreseeable future. These agreements risk dealing a fatal blow to the production model of integration adopted by the Abuja Treaty (1991), which was a major departure from the previous models followed by African countries. Several critics have argued that integration in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be conceived of as a trade-enhancing instrument, but as a development tool, that is, as a comprehensive approach to the continent’s complex economic and social problems. From that perspective, its first and foremost priority should be to develop a strong production base in order to meet the continent’s basic needs in food production, in industrial products, in technology, in employment, in human resource development, etc. This conception is embodied in the Abuja Treaty, which laid the foundations for the AEC. Since the signing of this treaty, all African economic communities have adopted the production model.

It is clear from this analysis that a free trade agreement with an African regional grouping – which would not be compatible with the treaty – would only serve the EU's interests at the expense of the continent’s drive toward building the AEC. Development-oriented EPAs must be compatible with the priorities defined by the integration process in Africa. For instance, any free trade agreement with the EU must be compatible with African countries’ own trade liberalisation scheme, while keeping sensitive areas vital to their economies out of the negotiations.

But Europe has little interest in strengthening Africa’s productive capacity. On the contrary, its fundamental aim is to perpetuate the current trading relations with African countries, whereby Africa remains a market for its products and a source of cheap commodities and labour. One could argue that the proposed EPAs are a response to the US-sponsored Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The EPAs and AGOA would in all likelihood transform Africa into an arena of confrontation between Western multinationals, which have been taking over assets in strategic sectors in Africa as a result of the liberalisation and privatisation imposed on African countries by the IMF and the World Bank. In reality, neither the EPAs nor AGOA would bring 'development' to Africa. Quite the contrary, both seek to take control of the continent’s resources and undermine its drive toward autonomous economic and social development. AGOA violates Africa’s sovereignty and overlooks Africa’s priorities. In short, AGOA aims to 'integrate' Africa into the world economy on 'America’s terms' (South Centre, 1999). So will the proposed economic partnership agreements. But Africa’s 'integration' into the world economy must be on its own terms, and not on America’s or Europe’s.

* Demba Moussa Dembele is Director of the African Forum on Alternatives
Dakar (Senegal)

* Please send comments to

REFERENCES

African Economic Community (AEC) (1997) 'The main conclusions and decisions of the first summit of the African Economic Community', AEC Newsletter 1 (4)

European Union (EU) (2000), The Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States. Brussels: European Union

South Centre (1999) Lopsided Rules of North-South Engagement: The African Growth and Opportunity Act. Geneva: South Centre

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2004) An Agenda for the Development Round of Trade Negotiations in the Aftermath of Cancun. London: Commonwealth Secretariat

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2004) The Least Developed Countries Report 2004. New York and Geneva: United Nations

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1997) The Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press

Richard Kamidza is not optimistic about the outcome of EPAs, arguing that they will ultimately undermine Africa’s economies. Kamidza explains that negotiations are taking place in the context of a skewed relationship between Africa and Europe that already hinders development prospects. This means that the EU is unlikely to face strong opposition to its desire to fast track EPA negotiations.

Introduction

The first round of the Cotonou Agreement ended without the legally binding document that is necessary for future references. Indeed, the European Union (EU) emerged the victor, a development that is haunting the ongoing economic partnership agreement (EPA) negotiations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the EU. As the EPA negotiations fast approach the EU-imposed deadline, the predictions are that the score will be EU 1, ACP 0, because the process firmly allows the EU to protect its interests against those of a begging trading partner.

Europe as a ‘partner’

As a partner, Europe is fortifying its vertical links with Africa, which also benefits its bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. Unfortunately, vertical integration with Europe is unlikely to facilitate the industrial development of African economies, because the EPA process does not take into account the differences in development between Europe and Africa, and within Africa itself. For instance, 34 of the 48 countries currently negotiating an EPA with EU are least developing countries (LDCs). They should have continued to benefit from the Lomé Convention’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative but under the EPA process they will have to do without such special treatment.

The current thrust of the EPA negotiations suggests that their main concern is solving Europe’s overproduction and profitability crisis by opening up more markets for its products and services in Africa. EPAs are essentially 'free trade areas' between partners that are both economically and politically unequal. They come supported by 'one size fits all' neoliberal policies, a development that provides a further example of the combined effort of global forces (the EU, International Monetary Fund, World Bank) to thwart the development of poor countries. Trade relations that were non-reciprocal are now being made reciprocal thereby removing the developmental component that characterised the previous Lomé Conventions. Indeed, EPAs seek to replace past special preferences, a development that also suits Europe’s political interests well, particularly now that the 25-member body is increasingly sensitive to the demands of the new member-states, which are reluctant to be guided by past colonial relationships.

The EU as a major trading ‘partner’

The EU is well positioned to ensure that its negotiating options and financial, institutional and technical resources all serve its interests in both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, the European Commission (EC) has a layer of technical experts whose sole duty it is to prepare these negotiations. It is likely to exploit its superior bilateral bargaining power to push for EPA outcomes that maximise the EU’s political and economic interests at the WTO negotiations. The EU’s push for EPAs is inextricably linked to the WTO’s political processes, where decisions are based on a one-country, one-vote consensus. So, EPAs provide the ideal political framework for the EU to neutralise the potential for opposition to its agenda in the WTO from a large constituency of the G90 grouping – the multilateral body of which the ACP countries constitute the larger proportion.

In addition, the EPA process will assist the EU politically by fostering a community of interest between it and the ACP in future WTO negotiations. The EU is also fast-tracking the negotiations in order to meet the end of the current waiver date of the WTO, which is December 2008. The above clearly shows the promotion of Europe’s interests at the expense of Africa’s long-term sustainable development as well as the failure of the dominant partner to muster the political will to defend future pro-Africa positions at the WTO.

While Africa is concerned about developmental issues and resources, Europe is busy prioritising issues within the six clusters (development, agriculture, services, trade-related issues, fisheries and market access) that countries are to negotiate with the EC. Europe is also working out how to bring back the rejected Singapore issues of competition policy, investment policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation, issues that are much easier to manage at the WTO level. This is also the reason why the EU is fast-tracking the process, so that the EPA negotiations are concluded before the finalisation of the Doha Development Agenda. As a result, the EU is ready to use all its leverage to put pressure on the four African configurations to come up with EPA outcomes that favour Europe, even though this may not necessarily promote the Africa’s long-term sustainable development through trade.

The EU as a ‘donor’

Europe provides developmental assistance to individual countries and debt relief to the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) of the continent. Having realised the vulnerability of African economies, Europe then dangled the 'developmental aid purse', which resulted in the split of Africa into four configurations that totally disregard existing regional economic communities. The division of Africa into small, weak and fragmented negotiating structures suits the EU politically, especially since to date no country has received the promised developmental assistance despite the development challenges they face.

The EU also supports many projects across Africa and provides assistance to fiscal financing. In some African countries, this budget support is estimated to be over 60% of the total fiscal budget. At a regional level EU support has gone to implementing developmental projects and bankrolling regional integration efforts on the continent. These regional groupings were able to establish trade protocols that seek to facilitate trade and development within and outside the regions. However, largely through the EPA process, the EU is sacrificing the very regional integration it has long been bankrolling. In the process, it is deligitimising the existing regional integration agenda simply because of its desire to experiment with the new wave of regional negotiating structures that are set to negotiate a new medium- to long-term trade regime with Europe.

Of interest is the EU’s desire to bankroll an EPA with the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) region - the 'high breed configuration' which does not have the legal standing and structures that ought to be required by any donor. But because the donor is an interested party, which expects to gain from the conclusion of the negotiating rounds, it simply overlooks the ESA’s legal and structural deficiencies. Under normal circumstance, no donor could bankroll the activities of a recipient through another 'entity’s structure' the way the EU is supporting ESA-EPA activities through COMESA. This raises a number of questions: Why bend the rules of donor funding? Whose interests are at stake if proper legal structures are established, albeit at a slow pace? What will happen if ESA member-states refuse to honour funds coming from the EU through COMESA? All this points strongly to the EU having considerable interests at stake over EPA negotiations. It therefore appears that forming these new regional configurations is likely to produce desirable results for the EU comparable to those of the 1884 Berlin Conference, which carved Africa into small but controllable states solely for the benefit of Europe.

The EU’s divide and rule policy

EPA negotiations have bundled countries in Africa into new regional political structures a development that separates them from the existing regional integration frameworks and hampers regionalisation efforts. Since countries belong to multiple economic integration blocs, the EPA structures have further split and bundled them into a weak and loose trade negotiating machinery. For instance, this process has split the EAC, ECCAS and SADC regional groupings, a development that raises the question of what will happen to Tanzania, the four original members of SADC (Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the three ECCAS member-states (Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the event of a good or bad ESA–EPA deal. This is part of divide-and-rule tactics associated with the EU and other bigger powers at the multilateral level. The result is total control over the other partner (Africa) and compliance with the EU’s interests. Africa is aware of well-documented threats the EU has made in the past, including withdrawing development aid, existing trade, aid and investments, contracts and budgetary support; interfering with national and regional security policies; re-imposing trade barriers; and removing ambassadorial representations from WTO and ACP-EU headquarters where key events take place.

Africa as a ‘partner’

EPAs will tie Africa to Europe in an unbalanced framework, and in so doing will undermine the continent’s economies, particularly the producers of goods and services and the regional integration effort. Africa is experiencing serious developmental challenges including supply-side constraints, growing unemployment and declining economic activity. The supply-side constraints include: the unreliable provision of public utilities (electricity and water); a poor public infrastructure (run-down roads and railways); weak institutional and policy frameworks (leading to fluctuating exchange rates and high interest and inflation rates); and low labour productivity (arising from poor education, health and housing provision).

In addition, all the African countries negotiating an EPA are locked into an unhealthy post-colonial dependence on Europe for development aid, fiscal support and markets, which hinders Africa’s competitiveness in the national, regional and international markets. This dependence and these economic weaknesses ensure that the EU is unlikely to face strong opposition to its desire to fast track EPA negotiations. Europe is aware that African configurations not only lack independent preparation, but are also small, weak, poor and too fragmented to mount a strong position in the timeframe that is being determined by Europe. Europe is also aware that African countries do not have the resources to mount any serious resistance to its long-term agenda and that her negotiators at every level lack the experience of their EC counterparts.

This clearly illustrates that Africa is being denied an opportunity by its partner and the referee of this process to revitalise its industrial development so that its products and service can become more competitive. Surely, the EU is set to win this bilateral round of negotiations. It is also certain to score victories at the WTO given its strategy for neutralising the larger organic group in the south.

* Richard Kamidza has just joined the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) as a senior researcher. You can reach him on [email protected] or +27315023908.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, our regular columnist, reflects on Norway’s decision to suspend some of its aid to Uganda as a result of faltering democratic reforms. It’s interesting that the West is only now starting to express concern over Uganda after treating President Yoweri Museveni as its ‘darling’ for many years, points our Abdul-Raheem. Museveni’s response of rejecting foreign interference and claiming that the Ugandan electorate should decide on his third term is also questionable. Why didn’t he reject foreign interference when it worked in his favour and why didn’t he consult the electorate when the World Bank and International Monetary Fund came knocking on his door?

Norway has cut some Aid to Uganda reportedly in protest against the 'slow pace and direction of democratic reforms' in the country. The Norwegian Ambassador to the country, Tore Gjos, put a sum to this displeasure at "mishandling of the democratic process'' at a whopping amount of $4 million which is ten percent of total Norwegian Aid to Uganda. The British government earlier in April took a similar line when it withheld $9.5 million in budgetary support to the Uganda government.

It will not be surprising if one or two more so called Donor countries took similar action. But they will be merely symbolic. It is important to note that both the British and the Norwegians talk about 'withholding' not canceling their Aid altogether. So the opposition need not congratulate itself that its campaign against Museveni is succeeding.

No doubt the withholding of Aid has something to do with the stated displeasure at the zigzags in the transitional politics of the country from a virtual one party state to a formal multi party system. The irony is that return to multi-partyism canvassed by both the opposition parties and donor friends of the President for many years - especially after the first ten years of division of Labor between them and the President - is exactly what Museveni has come round to. Is it now a case of not heading the advice: 'Be careful what you pray for, you may just get it'!

From 1986 to 1996 as a reward for bringing Uganda up from the backwaters into a 'positive' role model through macroeconomic reforms Museveni was given a huge discount on the usual democratic conditionalities beloved of Western countries when it pleases them. For being the apostle of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment policies he was more or less allowed to shape the politics of the country in his own image. He left the economy to them and they left the politics to him. He became the darling of the west and Kampala a must destination for Western delegations desperate for some good news from Africa or wanting to feel good about themselves.

However the romance has gone bad for many reasons. One, Uganda is no longer the single success story it used to be. Just look at the stories about Mozambique today and you wonder if you were not talking about Uganda of the 1990s. Two, almost all African countries have accepted the reactionary neo-liberal orthodoxy that proclaims that there is no alternative to the market. With so many of them prostrating before imperialism there is no need to be specially disposed towards one particular state or leader.

Three, imperialism has only permanent interests, not permanent friends. This is something that African and other Third world leaders always miss. They think they are so close, so popular and well liked in Washington, Paris, London or Brussels and delude themselves that they are indispensable. They are as dispensable as disposable towels in a toilet. When their Western patrons are tired of them they turn off the tap. The same people who praise them to the heavens as 'the best leader possible' 'the savior of the country', 'the best they can offer' or 'without him there will be chaos' will turn round to condemn them in the direct opposite of those praises.

Four, one of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc is a more positive environment for democratic politics to take root in many countries. While the West is not necessarily interested in democracy but continuing domination / exploitation, in recent years they are becoming more sophisticated in trying to give democratic legitimacy to their domination through some legitimate domestic processes. Partly this is because civil society in the West itself demands that their governments support what they preach although where their interests are more threatened like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, they do not shout so much. Also domestic pressures in many countries challenge the West's hypocrisy and double standards but also make democratic claims on their rulers. However for the many Banana/Ugali republics in Africa their shouts are much louder and impact more direct.

President Museveni and his supporters have generally reacted in two predictable ways. One, they consider the threats of cutting Aid or withholding such and critical comments on the political transition as unacceptable foreign intervention. Their second counter is a seemingly democratic one. All the political issues, they argue, are to be decided by 'the people' therefore it is undemocratic for foreign countries to think they know better than the Ugandan electorate.

In principle both counters are legitimate but the politics is not. Uganda and President Museveni enjoyed so much foreign patronage and basked in it for so long that it is too late in the day to start decrying foreign intervention. They are not opposed to foreign intervention in principle as long as it is on their side. They obviously think that the saying 'those who pay the piper dictate the tune' does not apply to them.

The second argument about letting the people decide is the most unconvincing of the various populist responses from the NRM. They did not ask the people of Uganda when they went to the IMF/World Bank and prostituted themselves to all kinds of donors and foreign interests in the name of inviting investors to Uganda and building a middle class, so why now ask the people to decide only when you have contradictions with your friends? It is not every time that people vote that there is democracy or even a democratic outcome. Even Hitler came in through the ballot box.

The bitter truth though is that after this process is all over the same donors will crawl back to the state house in Kampala bearing their Greek gifts and the president will make his usual jokes, pet talks and foreign rounds and things will return to business as usual. It happened in 1996 and 2001 and who says it will not repeat itself even in the changing circumstances of 2006?

The NRM has succeeded in creating an opposition whose internal bickering and inconsistencies make many to fear them more even when they are alienated from the government. The opposition must learn from the experience of other pro-democracy groups in Africa like Senegal where it took more than forty years and an alliance of 17 opposition parties to get rid of Abdu Diouf or Ghana where Jerry Rawlings' party was fought to a standstill and eventual surrender through consistent battles within democratic spaces opened up through a constitution that he had orchestrated to perpetuate himself or his party if self -succession failed.

Or just look across to neighboring Kenya where after several years of squabbles and internecine warfare, once Moi was not in the picture the opposition was able to get rid of KANU. In both Ghana and Kenya it was important that the long-term ruler was not standing in the election. This is where the removal of limitation on presidential terms in Uganda posits different challenges for a coalition of opposition parties. As long as the President is standing it may be extremely difficult but as the Abdu Diouf experience in Senegal shows, it is not impossible.

What unites all three examples is the continuing engagement by the political parties within the skewed and unbalanced political field but at the same time niggling away at the authority of the ruling party. They did not achieve their victory through boycotts and I do not see how Uganda's anti-NRM groups will use boycott to get rid of Museveni and the NRM. How can they boycott a referendum simply because the government is on the same side. Why bother about the reasons of the NRM instead of concentrating on their own intentions for supporting a return to multi-party democracy? Why boycott the referendum and then contest the election to follow?

* Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa. ([email protected] or [email][email protected])

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Thank you for your direct and uncompromising take on the G8.

I commend the editor of Pambazuka and in particular Mary Ndlovu for a brilliant article "Zimbabwe's Tsunami" and consider myself fortunate to have had the opportunity of reading it. Well done.

Her simple but powerful articulation of issues pertaining to the unfortunate Operation Murambatsvina will offer those not familiar with the historical perspective of Zimbabwean politics and economics a thorough lesson on Zimbabwe 101. It is such articles that must be preserved for future reference as we struggle with where to next?

I am an admirer of Mary Ndlovu and her approach to sensitive issues. She looks at all angles and avoids the mistake of being biased or persuaded by one school of thought. She lets history unfold and be told in a way that provokes action and enables Zimbabweans from all persuasions to unite and fight the common enemy in our midst.

The sequence of events, motives and repeated repression of a people by those entrusted with their welfare is hard to understand but Mary offers the kind of narrative that works through a jigsaw puzzle. We need to only find the critical missing pieces to make the picture complete and she provided hints on where we may look.

She also remembers to carefully analyze contemporary Zimbabwe where life is a constant nightmare. With citizens like Mary, we can only hope for a better tomorrow for our children. Her article must encourage other Zimbabweans to contribute and share their thoughts with the rest of the world.

Zimbabweans have been accused of not writing enough but what I have seen in the past year tends to refute that impression. We love Zimbabwe and what has happened since 1997 has only had one result, destruction; the very reason why we need to record our history and write we must.

The negative and painful history we so well remember should not be an excuse for us to give up but to find creative ways of fighting back and one day soon stand tall as a nation again ready to take our place on the global scene. I have hope that day will come because I know of many ordinary Zimbabweans all over the world and within Zimbabwe who realize how much their democratic space has shrunk but find new, innovative ways of making an impact. It is these small initiatives that when added together will be like another tsunami, only this time it will be a different tsunami with positive outcomes. Thank you.

Really appreciated Makeda Tsgaye's article about the need for accountable African leadership and governance. Throwing more money at the "problem" of Africa will make little difference to the lives of most Africans. Africa has most of what we need already to manage and develop ourselves, the missing ingredient is accountable governments.

"Community radio is participatory radio with a social development purpose"
The World Association of Community Broadcasters (AMARC)-Africa

A colleague of mine told me an interesting story recently. She works with a project that has to do with the establishment of three rural community radio stations--one in Mang'elete, Kenya, one in Terrat, Tanzania and one in Kagadi, Uganda. The aim of the project was to enable the communities involved to analyse and debate development issues from their own perspectives, thus providing a linkage between local-level experiences of development on the one hand and the national-, regional- and international-level policies that shape those experiences. Beyond production of content, all three communities also own and manage their stations.

The Kenyan station, Mang'elete Community Radio, was the last to go on-air due to the protracted wrangling to get a licence and a frequency for the station. Under the former government, little movement was initially possible. The former ruling party was clear about not wanting independent electronic media to go beyond the capital city.

The regulator, in a more open and reasoned fashion, had concerns about the definitions of a 'community,' definitions of a 'community radio station' and so on. The preconceptions were many. That, in Kenya, a 'community' could only be understood to be an 'ethnic' community. That no 'community' at the local level, however well-organised and prepared to run a station, would be able to withstand the political (disguised as ethnic) pressures that would inevitably be brought to bear on it to slant its coverage to the advantage of one political faction or party over another. And so on.

Finally, after much negotiation and some political intervention, the station got its licence and frequency. The story my colleague told me has to do with what happened since. Once the station went on-air, its value to those politically-inclined sharply rose. It started raising money through community service announcements. The women's group which had initiated it found themselves quickly shunted aside as men sought to gain control of management and programming. The men quickly factionalised. The coordinator was accused of nepotism and corruption. In short, it was a mess.

My colleague, whose role was merely to facilitate fundraising, training and technical support for the three community radio stations was forced to step in, together with colleagues from the other two stations in Tanzania and Uganda. Attempts at reconciliation failed. She finally, with the help of the local provincial administration, ordered the station off-air to enable sanity to prevail again. Finally, two months later, all has been resolved. Women are back in charge of the management committee, with a clearer sense of how to manage personal and political interests. A temporary caretaker has been found to run the station pending conclusion of inquiries into the financial allegations. And valuable lessons have, hopefully, been learnt about the difficulties of 'participation.'

I thought about her story earlier this year, reading reports on the elaboration and implementation of projects under Kenya's new Constituency Development Funds (granted to all constituencies for spending on development under the constituency's representative to parliament). When she had first called me, at the height of the crisis, I was tempted to throw the baby out with the bath water. That is, to take the story as yet another example of why 'participation' does not work. Sad, but true--it is so easy to become cynical and jaded. But another colleague cautioned both of us, reminding us that people's experiences of genuine control--at any level--are still too fragile, too new to dismiss what first, inevitably, happens when their control is genuinely facilitated.

So perhaps it is unsurprising then that since the reports on the CDF projects were done, much critique has arisen. The Law Society of Kenya pointed to their unconstitutional nature given that they are monitored by parliament, whose members serve as the chairs of the CDF committees. The reports themselves pointed to problems in the make-up of some CDF committees--as usual, accusations of nepotism abounded. The reports also showed the disparity of approaches to project prioritisation. The more rational committees opted for projects that already existed but had been stalled or for projects determined by constituency-wide consultations on project priorities. The less rational committees opted for projects in the personal and political interests of the committees' chairs.

None of these are insignificant problems and they do have to be addressed. Particularly if we understand the CDF projects to be a short-term, interim step towards decentralisation and devolution. Constitutional or not (and they should be brought in line with constitutional principles), the CDF projects are an experiment. As is Mang'elete Community Radio. Experiments from which we all should take pointers as to how to most effectively involve our 'communities' not only in a determination of our own development interests, but in the management of those interests. That implies that our parliamentarians should stop seeing them as their own personal property but rather as their opportunity to enable informed and genuinely bottom-up 'participation.'

Is that too tall an order?

* L. Muthoni Wanyeki is the Executive Director of the African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)

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There is a general opinion that publishing in Africa is developing. This view is based on evidence that more books are being published today than two decades ago and on the proliferation of indigenous publishing houses. This is indeed the case, but the development has been more quantitative than qualitative and this is not good enough to measure development of a publishing industry. Publishing in Africa remains an enclave industry serving foreign multinationals and their 'joint ventures', which are actually comprador companies, established to legitimise the former's presence and exploitation. More of the same textbooks covering the same core school subjects are published annually. There is little or no publishing of books of interest and relevance to the majority of the people. Not even the do-it-your-self books, covering all aspects of agriculture and animal husbandry, all aspects of health promotion and disease prevention; building construction, carpentry, brick laying, and so on that people need to improve their surroundings and their incomes. The few that are published are invariably in foreign languages.

Behind the backwardness of the publishing industry is a history of inappropriate educational and cultural policies, absence of national book policies including ineffective copyright laws, high duties and taxes on paper and other printing inputs, no or under funding of libraries. Book production and distribution cannot prosper in societies where reading is limited to functionality - passing school and professional examinations. In order to put the question of publishing and development of a 'reading public' in its proper context it is necessary to look at the economic and social conditions in which it is taking place. In the final analysis, publishing is as much about access to and management of resources - financial and human - as it is about political and social decisions that favour or obstruct all round development of society.

Legacies of colonialism and capitalism have never stopped exerting deleterious influence on African countries' economic and social development. The modest gains in the social sector - education and health - that were made in the first two and a half decades of independence were wiped out by the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank. 'While the record since Jomtien (Education for All) has been uneven across sub-Saharan Africa, the region in fact had made faster progress over the 1960s and 1970s in increasing primary enrolment than Asia and Latin America, tripling the number of children in primary school.' [1] The World Bank that was responsible for wrecking Africa's education, has turned around, is now 'funding' education and deciding through its army of consultants what education is to be given to Africans. 'At a meeting with African vice-chancellors in Harare in 1986, the Bank argued that higher education in African countries in Africa was a luxury: that most African countries were better off closing universities at home and training graduates overseas.' That position was later modified but the Bank was still 'calling for universities in Africa to be trimmed and restructured to produce only those skills which the "market" demands.'[2] This explains why the Bank is interested in African education; it is in order to control it. Who would deliver good education to African youth if the best of the product of World Bank's enlightenment would be primary school leavers or imported expatriates? Would such education policies not produce drawers of water and hewers of wood, the old debate between Booker Washington and W.E.B. Dubois?

Readers of Pambazuka will be familiar with the literature on the impact of neo-liberalism on African economies and the appalling poverty that it has created in its wake. The impoverishment of working people through massive lay offs, wages that can only pay for a week's, peasants whose labours are made nought by subsidies that European and American farmers receive; are these the conditions for development of a publishing industry? If a substantial percentage of revenues to be gained by the eighteen countries that were considered deserving of debt cancellation at the recent G8 summit is invested in improving education there will be more textbooks in schools. But as already pointed out there will be more of the same books and printing rather than publishing will be the beneficiary.

History of African Publishing

European missionaries introduced publishing in Sub Sahara Africa for the purpose of providing reading material intended to make Christians out of the African people. One hundred years since then is a very short time when compared with the history of publishing in Western Europe and America. If for example African publishing had already been developed by 1900, this period would still be shorter than the time it took publishers in the United States in the 19th century to respect copyright and to stop pirating books published mostly in the United Kingdom. Publishing in Africa (still by foreign companies), started in earnest after independence as governments of newly independent African countries poured money into education in order to fulfil one of the key objectives of the independence struggles. Indigenous African publishing is an even more recent phenomenon, and with few exceptions it is still fledgling, with companies that are struggling to survive and many going under a few years after they are established.

The state of current African publishing

One problem of writing about African publishing is the absence of data on the subject. UNESCO carries scant and unreliable data on publishing in Africa because African member governments rarely ever submit such information, which is not surprising given the little interest most of them have in publishing or in UNESCO for that matter. But even limited data that is available on publishing in South Africa (considered most developed on the continent) and Nigeria (1995) when compared with the same data for Norway, a small Nordic country, exposes the weakness of publishing in Africa. Norway with a population of 4.55 million inhabitants published 7,265 titles while South Africa with more than 42 million published only 5,418 titles. Nigeria with a population of over 120 million inhabitants published 1,314 titles. That Africa with fifteen per cent of the world's population produces around two per cent of the total number of world book must be accepted at face value.
Of the books published in Africa, up to 95 percent are school textbooks. The disjunction between book production, book sales and creation of a reading public starts here. Leaving out illiterate populations, an average of 40 percent across the continent, the remaining out-of-school reading public cannot support a meaningful publishing industry. When this group is further disaggregated into subject interest sub groups, the resulting numbers of book buyers becomes too small to support more than a few titles, in short print runs and on a limited number of subjects. Implications of this fact are clear; high unit costs, high prices, absence of variety and stimulation of the market, stagnation and, or exit of publishing companies from non-textbook publishing. Authors earn little or nothing from writing, so that authorship suffers.

This is the reason for the obvious underdevelopment of the publishing industry even for a country such as Nigeria, despite its production of tens of millions of books for its huge student population and expenditure of billions of naira annually. It is also partly the reason for there being no incentives to publishing books other than textbooks. The profitability of educational publishing, which, it has been argued would lead to supporting general publishing including fiction, tends on the contrary to be the noose that is strangling it. The multinationals are only interested in profits and repatriating them. For even the famous Heinemann African writers' series, which enjoyed great prestige, was abandoned by Heinemann's new owners because it was not profitable enough. No great loss, as two prominent African writers, Nobel Prize winner for literature Wole Soyinka and Ayi Kwei Armah called the series, 'a neo-colonialist writer's coffle formed by Europeans but slyly miscalled African.' [3]

The impression should not be created here that because textbook publishing is the core of African publishing, there are adequate textbooks to meet demand for school books. Far from it. It has been suggested that a 1:3 book pupil ratio is acceptable given available resources, but even where, as in Tanzania, substantial funds were donated to invest in textbook provision through open tender system, after eight years (1995 and 2003) the project evaluation team found in one school visited (only 120 miles from Dar es Salaam) the appalling ratios of 1:40 in one subject and 0:40 for two other subjects. The Ministry of Education reports book student ratios of between 1:4 and 1:7 but reality on the ground is a different picture. Admittedly, for the sons and daughters of well to do families, the situation was different as many books that were meant to be distributed free to schools for use by all pupils were diverted to bookshops where they could be bought for private use on a 1:1 ratio.

Multinationals in textbook publishing in Africa

The situation varies from country to country, but multinational publishing companies take the biggest share of the educational book budgets in all sub-Sahara African countries. Here again statistics are not easy to come by but in South Africa, for example, Maskew Miller an indigenous white owned South African company (est. 1893), which merged with Longman (also South African) in 1983 and is now part of Pearson Group (the largest publishers in the world based in the USA), reports that they publish approximately one out of every three textbooks in South Africa [4] With several other companies, the group exercises enormous influence in South Africa's education and society generally (because they also own the influential Financial Times, Financial Mail, Business Day and TV). Other multinational publishing companies present in South Africa are Heinemann, Macmillan (which landed the hugely popular Nelson Mandela's biography) Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and Stoughton Educational. OUP in South Africa as in the UK and elsewhere enjoys a not-for- profit status and does not pay taxes though it is one of the most profitable publishing giants in the UK and worldwide. Sixty percent of educational publishing in South Africa (which is 80 percent of the entire publishing industry) is controlled by multinationals with the remaining 40 percent being shared between white owned (30 percent) and black owned (10 percent) companies respectively. [5] Total net turnover for the three categories of publishing (educational, trade and academic) for 2003 is given as R1,609,500,231 which is equivalent to US$227,834,072. Sixty percent of that which is the share of the multinational translates into US$ 136,700,443. [6] Not an insignificant sum and from only one country!

All of the above multinational companies with the exception of the last one are also present in most other African countries. Their share of the markets in those countries is not very different from what it is in South Africa even in countries such as Kenya where there is a stronger local publishers' presence than in other countries. Their share of secondary and tertiary level books is even bigger. In some other countries, such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Macmillan does nearly all the publishing and supply of books as there is no local publishing there to the best of our knowledge.

Other issues in African publishing: New technologies, ICT, POD, Internet, e-books and e-commerce

African publishing has benefited greatly from new technologies especially in the origination of PDF files through Desk Top Publishing. Information and communication technology makes possible easy communication between all stakeholders in the book chain. Print On Demand has made it possible to publish books that would never have seen the light of day for lack of financial resources to offset print large editions whose markets were not assured. African Books Collective, (the marketing and distribution organisation owned by a group of African publishers and based in Oxford), with the agreement of their member publishers prints only the number of copies that they either have orders for or they know they can sell. This service helps the African publisher save money on freight charges and the hustle of handling of shipments. For ABC it ensures uniform quality of books according to western market demand, improves visibility, saves costs on warehousing and insures availability.

The internet has revolutionised access to information and to research for African academics. Although some African publishers have their own websites it is not certain that much business is generated via that channel especially internally, and for textbook publishers who have trade representatives on the move visiting bookshops. Outside the main cities and towns there are no ISPs and access to the internet is practically impossible. The same can be said of e-commerce. Although no doubt there is potential for it, problems of payment where credit cards systems are not yet in place or are just beginning and the cost of security software and management of such a system is high it will take time before this is a realistic and viable method of trading.

Publishing in African languages

Publishing in African languages is closely tied to the question of language of instruction in schools. All over Africa education is given in the languages of the former colonial masters. Naturally this works in favour of the foreign languages to the detriment of African languages. Proponents of African languages as languages of instruction are not against English or any foreign language that is currently in use in Africa. The issue is at the very heart of the question of emancipation of African people from the racist and colonial notions that African languages are too primitive to be used in any intellectual pursuits. For the British, the English language in addition to everything else is a multi billion dollar business annually. African languages could also be big business.

The same excuses that are being made today about the inadequacy of African languages for education vis-a-vis the colonial languages were made in the 16th century when Latin occupied the position that is today occupied by English. When England had adopted English and was making fast progress in spreading education, France lagged behind because education there was still in Latin. Likewise, far from being agents of development foreign languages act as hindrances to creation of literate and reading publics and keep the majority of African citizens from participating in one of the most important field of enlightenment. Missionaries had obviously a better understanding of the importance of African languages than African educationists and their foreign mentors. Fewer than 10 percent of African people can comfortably read books in these foreign languages, and that is probably generous. Without a strong reading culture, without access to books through bookshops and libraries and given the high prices of books, only a fraction of this group would actually be buying books. So, even in those languages, publishing in any meaningful scale is not possible. This is further justification for publishing in African languages where at least there is guarantee of a large population of potential readers who are also masters of their languages.

After noting how other countries developed via the 'scientification' of their languages, Professor Ali Mazrui has posed the question, 'Can any country approximate first rank economic development if it relies overwhelmingly on foreign languages for its discourse on development and transformation? Will Africa ever effectively "take off" when it is so tightly held hostage to the languages of the former imperial powers?'[7] There is urgent need to recognise this educational and cultural imperative and to invest in developing African languages to meet those challenges. The alternative is that publishing will continue to serve only the English speaking elite, and for that reason it will not grow to the same extent as that of the publishing industry of a small country's like Norway whose output is three or four times that of Nigeria, almost twenty times its size.

Marketing and distribution

Although editorial and production functions including printing are responsible for the book's existence, marketing and distribution are responsible for getting them to the readers. This regrettably is the weakest aspect of African publishing. Most publishers have limited knowledge and experience, which is compounded by the absence in most countries of an established book trade, bookshops and other commercial outlets. Transport infrastructure is weak especially during the rainy season when most roads are impassable. Postal services are unreliable and costly. Export of African books to European and American markets was practically non-existent until the African Books Collective was founded in Oxford and started trading in 1989. Overseas dealers in African books would make yearly visits, buying books at local prices with local discounts and then transporting them and selling them at high prices in their countries and pocketing the profits. Furthermore, contrary to expectations (naive for sure) western scholars and librarians are not all that interested in scholarship emanating from Africa. Western scholars come to Africa to do research and publish their books through publishers in their own countries. Libraries of African studies centres are the first to have their budgets cut and in post 9/11 US, African studies are losing popularity. The shift now is to Arab studies, language and religion.

The book selling business faces the same problem of financing as publishing. Access to bank loans is impossible without collateral in the form of buildings or guarantees. High interest rates are forbidding; at the worst period of SAP they were twice the trade discounts that publishers offered. In some countries for many years state monopoly of book distribution destroyed nascent bookshops in up-country stations (owned by missionaries) which were supplied from the major bookshop in the chain located in the capital acting as distributor. There are signs now that bookselling may be picking up but it will take time before book readers can access books through at least one bookshop in the district.

Copyright, policy and the publishing environment

The publishing environment in Africa is constrained by low literacy, by a weak reading culture, by lack of finance and by a weak system of distribution. Many of these can be traced to the absence of effective national book policies in Africa. Copyright is one of the areas where much needs to be done. Protection of works by local authors is only one aspect of copyright; but understanding and exploiting openings within the international copyright system and practices could allow countries to access foreign books for their educational needs more cheaply than through conventional rights purchases. Removal or reduction of high duties and taxes on paper and other printing materials could reduce printing costs considerably and result in lowering prices to more affordable levels. Training facilities for staff for the publishing and printing industries are a responsibility of governments through polytechnics but professional organisations can and must work hand in hand with government. So far APNET has been offering training opportunities to publishing staff from member National Publishers Associations. Some universities also offer degrees in publishing.

Banks could be encouraged to lend to publishers and other enterprises in the book chain. Indeed governments could even borrow at concessionary rates from international financial institutions and through guarantees enable them to borrow at lower interests than the market rate. Even simple steps such as lowering postal rates for printed matter would facilitate movement of books internally and help the book trade especially in the rural areas where there are no bookshops but postal services exist. Promoting reading through establishing libraries and organising national prizes for writers, illustrators and other distinguished persons in the book chain, as well as encouraging competitions in schools in book related activities are necessary if any society wishes to revolutionise learning and advance culture. However, all these can successfully be accomplished by governments that recognise the strategic importance of the publishing industry; that realise education, in addition to classrooms, teachers and textbooks is also libraries, bookshops, journals, magazines, newspapers, the Internet and other forms in which knowledge is packaged.

Notes.
[1] Novicki, Margaret A., Boosting Basic Education in Africa,Africa Recovery, Vol.II#4, (March 1998) p.8
[2] Brock-Utne, Birgit., Whose Education for All: The Recolonisation of the African Mind, London, Falmer Press, 2000, p.218
[3] Quoted from, Gedin, Per., Publishing in Africa: The View from Outside, in Development Dialogue 1984:1-2 p.103
[4] Business Day, Publishing in South Africa
[5] Communication with South African publisher, Brian Wafawarowa, New Africa Books
[6] Galloway, Francis., Trends in South African Book Publishing Industry Since the 1990s, Department of Information Science, University of Pretoria.
[7] Altibach, Philip G., and Hassan, Salah.,The Muse of Modernity: Essays on Culture as Development in Africa, Africa World Press, Trenton NJ 1996.

* Walter Bagoya is director of Mkuki wa Nyota publishers, Dar es Salaam

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Review of Pradip N. Thomas and Zaharom Nain (eds), Who owns the media? Global Trends and Local Resistances, Southbound (Penang), Zed Books (London), World Association of Christian Communications.

A couple of years ago I was threatened with arrest as I tried to go through the turnstiles at a major sporting event in South Africa. My offence was that I carrying a bottle of soft drink that was not produced by the company sponsoring the event, the US corporation Pepsico.

So what does this have to do with the media? In our globalised world, absolutely everything.

The event was the cricket World Cup, a tournament most enthusiastically supported in the Indian sub-continent. At the time, Pepsi did not even market its products in South Africa (although they were available at an exorbitant price inside the stadium). The issue was advertising. Pepsi’s sponsorship was an opportunity for it to promote its product to a billion thirsty, cricket-loving Indians. I, with my non-approved soft drink – actually it was just orange juice diluted with Cape Town tap water – might attempt ‘ambush marketing’, displaying the forbidden concoction to the cameras (and presumably shaking the Pepsi empire to its foundations).

The episode was absurd, of course. But it tells us something about how the media work – and that Africa is not immune to these global trends. Progressive media analysts are sometimes fond of talking about the “commoditisation” of news and other media content. But it is really we, the audience, who are the commodity. In this example, one US company, News Corporation, was engaged in a contract with another US corporation, Pepsico, in relation to an event taking place in Africa. News Corp, the broadcaster, was selling Pepsi its predominantly Indian audience.

The timeliness of this book lies in the fact that the rapid consolidation of media ownership into the hands of a small number of corporations – mainly US-based – has been one of the most striking aspects of globalisation. The extent of the reach of these corporations can hardly be exaggerated. Even as I write these dissenting words, I am using software developed by one of these global media corporations. My message will be transmitted using cable or airwaves owned by these same corporations.

The rapidity of these developments is important to note, especially for those readers who may feel that corporate control of the media is an issue of marginal significance for Africa. As Robert McChesney points out in his chapter, none of the nine corporations that dominate the global media market existed in their present form 15 years ago.

When it comes to the question of media ownership, African journalists and media freedom activists typically only look at one dimension: state ownership of the broadcast media. (This is a mea culpa; I was for some years head of the Africa programme at a freedom of expression organisation, where we did precisely that.) Fifteen years ago, as those global media corporations were beginning to form, this was indeed the dominant question in Africa. How could we wrest control of public media from the government of the day? How could we create space for the private media?

The second task has been achieved more successfully than the first. There is still a need to develop a genuine public service model of broadcasting in Africa. But at the same time, the question of who owns the private media (sometimes erroneously described as the “independent media”) becomes increasingly urgent.

This is addressed from slightly different perspectives in three good chapters on Africa in this book. William Hueva, Keyan Tomaselli and Ruth Teer-Tomaselli review the political economy of the media in Southern Africa since 1990. This focuses, inevitably, on the role of South African corporate media in the sub-region.

Mohamed Musa and Jubril Mohammed have written a largely historical review of the development of the media in Nigeria. This provides textured detail on the impact that ownership has on the political character and content of the media.

Francis Nyamnjoh attempts to situate media ownership issues in Africa in the context of globalisation. He concludes that ownership still mainly rests with governments or global corporations, with local capital squeezed between the two. He does not further explore those situations – such as Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa – where local capitalist ownership of the media is far more developed, not necessarily to beneficial effect. His conclusion, however, is encouraging. He stresses the skill of Africans in developing alternative means of political communication, outside the technological and ownership constraints of the modern media sector.

However, those interested in future trajectories of the African media would be well advised to read some of the other chapters in this book. Slavko Splichal’s review of the media in East and Central Europe, for example, presents a picture that may be close to the Africa of a decade from now. Government-controlled state media remain major players. Alongside them are corporate media owned by members of the oligarchy. These owners are either political players using the media to bolster their position or capitalists with political ambitions. Does this media landscape mean that ordinary East Europeans receive good, accurate information through the media? My own recent research in two former Soviet republics suggests a decisive No.

Splichal calls this phenomenon Italianisation – referring, of course, to the ascent of Silvio Berlusconi, media capitalist and now Prime Minister. Might Italianisation be what the future holds in some African countries? It is certainly possible and underlines the need for some hard thinking about the alternatives.

? Richard Carver is director of Oxford Media Research.
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AllAfrica.com

http://www.allafrica.com/

AMARC (World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters)

http://www.amarc.org

ARTICLE 19

http://www.article19.org

CREDO

http://www.credonet.org/

Highway Africa

http://www.highwayafrica.ru.ac.za

International Federation of Journalists

http://www.ifj.org/

International Press Institute

http://www.freemedia.at/

International Freedom of Expression Exchange

http://www.ifex.org/

MediaChannel

http://www.mediachannel.org

Media Institute of Southern Africa

http://www.misa.org

Network for the Defence of Independent Media in Africa

www.ndima.org

Panos Institute

http://www.panos.org.uk/

West African Journalists Association

http://www.ujaowaja.org/

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is at a loss for words over the current Live 8 and G8 attention for Africa. “It is like being offered a handkerchief by the same person who is beating the hell out of you,” he writes, preferring to focus his attention on the just-concluded African Union summit of heads of state that took place in Shirte, Libya. It was at this summit, he argues, that decisions about he real future of Africa were being made.

How I wish I could write this article from beginning to end without mentioning the G8, Tony Blair, Geldof or any of the other busy bodies running around like headless chickens claiming they want to help Africa. I will try and try very hard.

One of the difficulties with becoming flavour of the moment is that you forget what you want for yourself as others divest you of the power to help yourself. Everybody loves Africa now and is going to desperate lengths to show why they are our new best friends!

It is like South Africa after the release of Nelson Mandela from prison. Suddenly we could not find any supporters for the loathed apartheid system anymore both inside and outside of South Africa. Even the Boer Nationalist Party that institutionalised apartheid became anti apartheid. Everywhere Mandela went powerful politicians in powerful countries in Europe and America who had shielded the apartheid regime from international sanctions and prevented censure of the racist regime in multi lateral forums including the UN Security Council, Commonwealth, EU, etc were all queuing up to have their pictures taken with the Great Madiba. They all reinvented their political CVs to show how all along they had been fighting for his release and an end to apartheid. One of the worst of this latter day friend of South African Liberation was Margaret Thatcher, who as British Prime Minister resisted any criticisms of apartheid South Africa, invited Botha on a state visit to London and described the ANC as a 'typical terrorist organisation like the IRA.'

Africa is in a similar situation now. It is difficult to know how to react to this sudden show of concern for a people that have been so marginalized and humiliated for such a long time. It is like being offered a handkerchief by the same person who is beating the hell out of you.

After last Saturday's multi-city parties the whole world is now programmed to look up to eight white men in dark suits meeting in far away Gleneagles, Scotland, to save Africa. None of them is an African.

Yet a much bigger assembly of another powerful group of people, all of them heads of state from across Africa, were meeting in the Libyan city of Shirte deciding on the future of Africa without a similar focus in the global media.

It is these people through their action and inaction who have the power to change things for the better or worse on this continent. Anybody who really cares about helping Africa needs to know what these group of unfortunately, all men, have been saying to themselves.

The fifth ordinary Summit of the Assembly of the African Union has just ended in Shirte. The leaders amongst other pressing issues had to address themselves to the dances for poverty and pledges for action from outsiders about Africa. They welcomed the initial debt relief package for developing countries out of which 15 African countries will benefit. However they called for universal debt cancellation that benefits all African countries, not just a select few.

This is a logical consensus given previous experience of African countries scandalously competing among themselves about who is more connected in Washington, London or Paris. Individually they sold out but collectively we may regain some dignity and credibility. They have to avoid being played against each other. The separate deal for debt relief for Nigeria is potentially one of those divide and rule tactics. It may limit Nigeria's capacity to talk on behalf of Africa and also neutralise it in bloc negotiations, whether in the WTO or in the IMF/World Bank. My own suspicion is that they have agreed to throw this carrot at Nigeria as an advance compensation for her not to get the much-coveted UN Security Council permanent seat, which will more likely go to South Africa.

Significantly, the AU summit did not dwell so much on aid but rather called for the abolition of unfair trading rules that rig international trade against Africa and asked for a clear timetable for the abolition of these subsidies. One can see that the African leaders are not taken in by various pledges on aid and rather want us to trade our way to prosperity instead of being aided to remain dependent. This contrasts with Prophet Blair's breakthrough in getting a calendar on aid targets. The AU is saying we need some fair-trade not some aid.

These are the messages that the African leaders invited to the G8 as side salads will be taking to Gleneagles. I really wish that these leaders would stop ridiculing themselves by appearing like an NGO lobby group at the Summit of Rich White Men. From next year they should have a face-to-face summit to review any progress on mutually agreed targets. After all that is what the mutual accountability principle in the African Peer Review Mechanism is all about. It is about us judging ourselves and also mutually judging each other with our so-called international partners.

Apart from the response to the G8, the AU summit made numerous decisions on a variety of issues that have direct impact on Africa and Africans in more of a way than anything a group of ageing rockers and an exclusive club of white men will do for Africa.

One of those defining issues is the call by the Brother Leader, Muammar Gadaffi, which President Museveni immediately supported, for an all-African Union government and a dismantling of all barriers to freedom of movement for Africans across Africa. While many dismiss this as hasty and too ambitious I would like to remind them to rewind to the reaction to Gadaffi's call for an acceleration of the integration process through a review of the OAU charter at an Extra ordinary summit in the same city of Shirte in September 1999. Then as now the idea was initially dismissed as far-fetched but within three years we had the African Union. Its institutions are now taking shape and at this summit the Libyan leader was upping the stakes for the AU to rise up to the next phase of the struggle for unity without which we will remain beggars and vulnerable to extra African powers. There is no point in asking the rich countries to open up their markets to us when we close ours against each other. We cannot sustainably globalise without Africanising.

* Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa. ([email protected] or [email][email protected])

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The Centre for Civil Society is based at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. We aim to advance socio-economic and environmental justice by developing critical knowledge about, for and in dialogue with civil society, through teaching, research and publishing. As part of our mandate, the Centre grants research funds of up to R50000 to a number of researchers annually to encourage new and innovative research on civil society, through teaching, research and publishing.

"We, associations of inhabitants, international networks, voluntary groups, NGOs, public agencies, citizens of the world, are profoundly hurt by and denounce the ‘Murambatsvina operation’ (sweep away the garbage operation) launched by the government of Zimbabwe."

"That divide between fact and fiction in the lives of ordinary people is what Agualusa has tackled with O Vendedor do Passados. Yet he has done so in a format that could easily be described as magical realism, one based in southern Africa. As part of this merging of history as story, numerous characters play a part in the narrative, from Frederick Douglass, the abolitionist, to South African high court judge Albie Sachs and Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa." - From a review by Richard Bartlett on the website of African Review of Books. Visit to read the full review.

New writing from southern Africa 2005 is the first book in a three–year series of the US $10 000 HSBC/SA PEN Literary Award. The award is targeted at young writers who are citizens of any country in the SADC (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe).

Unexpected and overwhelming support for sacked former deputy president Jacob Zuma has given President Thabo Mbeki and the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) some pause for thought. Mbeki's attempt to have the ANC's national general council endorse his "handling" of Zuma - which means approve Zuma's dismissal - backfired, leading to the president having to give concessions he would rather have done without.

Angola is likely to produce diamonds worth nearly US $900 million this year, but little of that money will be spent on development in the diamond producing areas, according to a new report. The report by Partnership Africa Canada noted that "three years of peace is enough time for an oil-rich, diamond-rich government to have made wider social investments in the diamond areas and to have produced development policies that are more supportive of Angola's artisanal miners".

One-third of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan plan to return to the south within six months, posing considerable humanitarian challenges to aid organisations, an interagency survey found. Sudan has experienced the worst population displacement in the world, mainly due to prolonged conflict since 1983. Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of IDPs, the figure is commonly rounded to four million, the survey report noted.

Togo’s slide into political chaos following the disputed presidential elections in April 2005 has forced several thousand people to flee their homes, killed scores and wounded many more. While some 34,000 people have fled to neighbouring Benin and Ghana, UN agencies working with international and local NGO partners estimate that 12,000 people have been displaced within Togo's borders, especially in the Plateaux and Central regions.

As part for the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) Fahamu, the producers of Pambazuka News, set up an SMS number so that people around Africa and the world could send messages calling for debt cancellation and an end to poverty. So far we have received over 1000 messages – all calling for an end to debt and poverty. Below is a selection of some of these messages. You can send your message to +27 82 904 3425.

1. No to debt, yes to africa development. Mozambique

2. No to debt. Deeply unjust and maintains serious under development and inequality. Emma Harvey. South Africa

3. No to debt. The G8 countries must extend the cancellation of debt to all countries in the South to give them a chance to revamp their economies and improve the standard of living of their communities. The next important task will be to open up trade opportunities in terms of fair trade so that these countries can develop their capabilities and capacity. Aluta continua! South Africa

4. Every 3 seconds an African child dies due to poverty - cancel the debts. Ghana

5. SAY NO 2 POVERTY,10 YRS GHANA.

6. Poverty is bad. Ghana

7. No to Debt it binds a nation to poverty. Mugerwa Olga Nakato
Uganda

8. No to debt, Another world is possible. Adelson Rafael,
Mozambique

9. No to debt - I wish to remind the G8 leaders that delay is not denial and the focus is on them to act now. Ronald Ondari,
Kenya

10. Please help the children of Africa. Farida Choisy of the Seychelles. Thank you.

11. It has to stop. No to poverty. No to war!
Seychelles

12. TO ALL LEADERS MAKE THIS WORLD A BETTER ONE SO WE CAN ALL LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY.
Seychelles

13. I JANE NABUNNYA IN SEETA MUKONO DISTRICT UGANDA SAY NO TO POVERTY

14. Peace&unity will stop poverty (maga)
South Africa

15. The G8 must cancel our debt. But we Africans are our own enemy. We must say NO to corrupt, self serving leaders and vote them out of power. God has provided for Africa in abundance but some of our 'leaders' connive with the West in robbing Africa. Enough is enough! We shall overcome. Namibia

16. No to debt! We r not responsible for being down, but we r responsible for getting up! South Africa

17. I really hope leaders get it to their heads that they are the way forward for AFRICANS. Ayodele olufawo from Nigeria.

18. Africa is in debt BECAUSE since slavery, colonization, apartheid & now globalization we've been ENRICHING the G8 countries. AFRICA OWES NOTHING. Magauta, Joburg, South Africa.

19. LET THE (G8) CHANGE THE HISTORY OF THE POOR NATIONS BY WRITING OFF THEIR DEB TS;THANK YOU.
Kenya.

* CAN'T PAY WON'T PAY

Join the call for debt cancellation! Text your comments with your name and surname to

+27 82 904 3425

Your message will be used to demonstrate overwhelming support for debt cancellation.

Operation Murambatsvina - sweep out the trash – has torn through Zimbabwe like a Tsunami, describes Mary Ndlovu. Hundreds of thousands of people have been internally displaced, but the true cost of the government operation on the livelihoods of people is almost impossible to predict. As the G8 meets in Scotland and African leaders conclude an African Union Summit in Libya, Zimbabweans feel that the rest of Africa has turned its back on them.

Towards the end of May a tsunami struck Harare, flattering everything in its path - informal businesses, solidly built homes, shacks, orphanages, churches, even a mosque; it took with it people’s lives, livelihoods, family life, their spirit to survive. Like the Asian tsunami in December, the number of its victims and the total cost of the destruction are hard to quantify; unlike the Asian tsunami, it is man-made and continues in wave after wave of senseless brutality, reaching every corner of this increasingly miserable country.

The government calls it Murambatsvina – sweep out the trash – or Operation Restore Order. But Zimbabweans have rejected the government’s term, for they are not trash, and order has not been restored. Only the term “tsunami” adequately portrays the suddenness, the scale and the nature of the catastrophic destruction which has been visited on us - not by erratic nature, but by our own government.

Suddenly, with virtually no warning, police in central Harare descended on informal traders, breaking and burning their stalls, confiscating or destroying their wares, and arresting thousands. By the following week, the attacks had spread throughout Harare and to other urban centres in the country, and the assault on informal housing had begun. Six weeks later, the operation continues. Police of various descriptions move from township to township, ordering residents to destroy their illegal dwellings or have them smashed. Sometimes sufficient warning has been given for people to remove their furniture and salvage some of their building materials, other times the bulldozers are hot on the heels of the police, disrupting funerals, chasing people from their cooking and their bathing. At least six people have been killed directly by the police actions. Many others, especially babies, the aged and those suffering from AIDS have succumbed to exposure, shock and hunger as they huddle through the cold nights in the rubble of their homes.

Now, in the depth of the winter season, tens of thousands remain camped in the open, dazed and unbelieving. Others, perhaps hundreds of thousands, have moved into the houses of friends or neighbours or relatives, who were already overcrowded, or sleep on verandahs. Thousands are crammed into churches where they have been offered shelter and are being fed; some have managed to sell their furniture to raise the bus fare to go to their rural homes, where they face an uncertain future with no food or housing.

How do we expect them to react when our President tells UN experts that the action is for the good of the people, and they appreciate what has been done for them? Can it ever be for someone’s good to destroy their home when you have nothing to replace it with? When you tell them they are rubbish, maggots, who are not wanted? When you cause them the utmost trauma of preventing them from feeding their families? When you destroy the huts of orphans and smash the centres that were caring for them; when you bulldoze a clinic that was providing anti-retrovirals to AIDS patients and tell them to go to rural areas where there are no medicines.

Surely a government which turns so viciously on its own people must be acting in response to a serious threat to its power, an armed rebellion or organised sabotage at least. No. Not at all. That has not happened and government has not mentioned it. The government says it is seeking to reduce crime and restore order to the cities of Zimbabwe. There has been too much illegal activity and this must be stopped; informal trading venues and illegal dwellings were havens for criminals, foreign exchange dealers, fraudsters; purveyors of stolen property, making once beautiful cities filthy and unsafe. This is a clean-up operation which will catch the criminals, drive the forex back into the banks, and black market goods into legitimate channels.

It is unspeakably depressing to watch government and party leaders trying to defend the indefensible. Raze whole suburbs to catch a few criminals? Deprive people of earning a living to stop thieves? How many more thieves will be created? With a national housing backlog of two million units, bulldoze more than 80,000? Where is the once very professional police force whose training teaches them how to identify and apprehend criminals? Where are the health officials who enforce hygiene standards and the town planners who design orderly housing developments? Why the sudden need to restore beauty to the cities?

Of course it is true that the cities of Zimbabwe have deteriorated during the past ten years. Visitors from other parts of Africa once gawked at Harare, wondering how such a beautiful, orderly municipality could really be African. It was well-planned, most people were in employment, there was little sign of the shanty towns and street traders common in other African metropolises.

But things have changed, for several reasons. First is the deterioration in standards of government, especially the growth of corruption, which sees by-laws flagrantly ignored for the price of a small bribe, and awarding of contracts to cronies incapable of delivering the services. Second was the effect of the economic decline resulting from the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), introduced in the early 1990’s. Many urban workers lost their jobs, and government encouraged them to turn to the informal sector to create their own incomes, in manufacturing, services and retail trading; councils which resisted were ordered by central government to relax by-laws to accommodate them. Third was the effect of the farm invasions of 2000 and thereafter. On the one hand these produced a flood of displaced farm workers, many of whom crowded into the slums of Harare, and on the other it opened former farmland to be allocated without any planning to loyal supporters of ZANU PF for informal settlement. Fourthly, when the opposition MDC won control of most urban councils between 2000 and 2002, government deliberately undermined their operations, using its powers under the Urban Councils Act to prevent rate increases in line with hyperinflation. Borrowing powers to develop housing and upgrade crumbling infrastructure, especially in water and sewage reticulation, were systematically denied. The decline of Zimbabwe’s cities is in large part, therefore, the direct result of government’s economic and political mismanagement.

Then suddenly, without consultation, public deliberation, or even the simplest level of information, government declared itself obsessed with illegality, and determined to eliminate it from Zimbabwe. This seemed strange in view of the fact that it is the government that has been content to ignore legality whenever it threatened to restrict its own operations, flouting court orders in regard to holding of elections, seizures of land, release of detainees from prison, and prosecution of known criminals. But Zimbabweans have come to know that government uses the law when it finds it convenient and abuses it to pursue its political goals.

In this case, the line between legality and illegality has become blurred. Many of the informal traders had licences issued by the local authorities, but many did not. Many of those who did broke the law in other ways, by receiving stolen goods or dealing in foreign currency or black market goods, but most did not. The settlements around Harare which have now been destroyed had the blessing of the highest government authorities, who had allocated stands, arranged in some cases for financing, and publicly encouraged the recipients to build homes. Does this make them legal if the necessary planning laws have been ignored? The people are now being punished for taking government instructions as legality.

The cry by government that traders and home-owners were illegal is thus partly correct, and partly not. However, the methods used in carrying out their operation of destruction are clearly not legal. The actions of the police have all been taken without due process, and violate statute law, our constitution, and international law.

The Urban Councils Act specifies that an illegal structure can only be destroyed when notice of 28 days has been given to the owner and occupier and opportunity has been given for a court application; no one was given such notice. The common law does not permit the deprivation of property in the possession of anyone without legal sanction; those who had their buildings and their trading goods destroyed or seized had their property illegally despoiled. The constitution guarantees the right to be protected from arbitrary deprivation of property, and from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Surely destroying one’s home and leaving them in the open is cruel and degrading by anyone’s estimate. The United Nations Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights provides that everyone has the right to shelter, while the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights has been interpreted, in a case brought against Nigeria, to mean that a government may not evict anyone from his home without providing alternative accommodation. How can our government claim that it is restoring legality, when all the means it is using are quite clearly infringements of the law at every level?

The effects and costs of the operation are certainly too huge to measure. Six weeks since its beginning, the tsunami continues to destroy people’s lives. The original estimates of 200,000 to 250,000 persons displaced have by now doubled. The 300,000 school children displaced from schools was given by the Ministry of Education for Harare only, after only two weeks of demolitions. In Mutare, Bulawayo, Victoria Falls, Beitbridge, Harare itself, and many other towns and cities, countless thousands more have since been affected. A million traders and their families losing their livelihoods will have an immeasurable effect. Of course many will begin again because they simply have to feed their families, legal or not legal. But in total, how much business is being lost for every sector of the economy? And how many of these were sending money and food home to the rural areas. We simply can’t know.

Perhaps falling back in horror at what they have done in the past weeks, the government has suddenly announced a programme of reconstruction. Thousands of stands will be serviced and houses built over the next three years. Although only four houses have been built in a week, 9,000 are to be ready in two months. This raises more questions than it answers: where will the money come from in a cash-strapped economy? Who will pay for the houses? And most important of all - if government can mobilise the money to build houses, why didn’t they do it before smashing down the ones that already existed? The cost of re-housing Indonesian communities affected by the natural tsunami last December is estimated at $US5 billion for 500,000 still homeless. We have at least that number of homeless people now. Where in our wildest dreams do we imagine we will get funding to rebuild what we have ourselves destroyed? Our economy was already in a state of complete collapse - what some have referred to as meltdown. Rebuilding on this scale is pure delusion.

But as government’s efforts at damage control pick up pace, more themes have emerged. Applicants for new trading licences and allocation of stands will be “vetted” - a term that has not been defined. It is only assumed that they will be checked for criminal records (few will be found) and asked to produce ZANU PF membership cards. Already we are told that the stands at Whitecliff Farm are being reserved for civil servants - police, army and CIO primarily; they are certainly not the people who were displaced. Women arrested for protesting were finger-printed and told they would never get vending licenses again. “Presumptive taxes” will be levied on informal traders, who will pay income tax on “presumed income”. While party lackeys wheel and deal and survive on kick-backs and bribes, the struggling poor will provide for the instruments of their own oppression.

Perhaps more sinister, all these processes of “reconstruction” have been removed from the local authorities who legally have responsibility for them. Licences have always been issued by the councils, not by the police. Housing stands have been allocated by the council housing departments. Now we have unknown authorities responsible for allocating these resources. We have new “task forces” controlled by the army assigned to supervise the reconstruction. Clearly, there is an all-out attempt to usurp the designated powers of elected councils completely and emasculate any democratic participation of the people. We are truly heading for a military state, where central government takes everything, leaving no democratic space for anyone else. We are even to have chiefs for cities, since they will better implement government policies! Government is no longer by elected officials, answerable to the people. It is by appointees of those clinging to power by the barrel of the gun.

As we struggle to give a rational explanation for these seemingly deranged acts of destruction several points emerge clearly:

1. This is very obviously a pre-emptive assault on urban populations, the stronghold of the opposition, and the potential source of any meaningful threat to ZANU PF’s power; its main aim seems to be to forcibly relocate poor people to rural areas by making it impossible for them to live in towns;

2. It is not only an attack on towns, but on informal activities in rural areas as well – wood carvers and sculptors, gold diggers, even fishermen; nor is it an attack only on opposition supporters, as many of ZANU PF’s members have also been affected;

3. It seeks to impose government and ZANU PF control on sections of the economy where their grip has slipped in recent years - in the control of foreign exchange rates, the collection of taxes and the determination of who benefits from resource allocation. As such it is a desperate attempt to ensure that the little wealth that remains is channelled through the hands of government, to be spent as they see fit;

4. It is not going to improve the national economy - in fact it will cripple it further, and it will have horrendous consequences on the lives of millions of Zimbabweans, reducing hundreds of thousands more to penury;

5. It has been undertaken in a typically ZANU PF way - suddenly, violently, illegally and recklessly, without regard to the disastrous consequences;

6. One more very large nail has been hammered into the coffin of Zimbabwean democracy, which is rapidly being replaced by an illegitimate oligarchy amassing wealth for themselves while the people starve, and maintaining their position by military rule.

And Africa turns its back. They do no want to know. We helped South Africans when they were fighting a force too powerful, why do they deny us the same? We do not want to be rescued by the developed world. We want to be rescued by our fellow Africans, understanding our plight and standing by the principles to which they committed themselves in the African Union, the Harare Declaration, numerous international human rights instruments, the SADC and NEPAD. Why do they not care? Why do our pleas fall on deaf ears?

* Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist

* Please send comments to [email protected]

* Read the “The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Challenges for the Left” a Public Lecture delivered at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal by Brian Raftopoulos.
http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?2,40,5,735

Bob Geldof is only the latest in a long line of Europeans who have appointed themselves as spokespersons for Africans, writes Patricia Daley. With a distinct brand of humanitarianism they have acted to serve the demands of global capitalism, suppressing African voices and aiding the exploitation of the continent.

Bob Geldof’s rally against poverty in Africa seems to have incurred admiration from well-meaning whites and indifference or resentment from Africans. The questions the critics pose are: who gave this pop star the authority to speak for us; why does he represent Africa in such a one dimensional way? Can’t he and his supporters see the realities on the ground? Can’t he see that Africans want to speak for themselves? Geldof seems to believe that his mission is noble. To him and his supporters, the moral argument is clear: the West is rich, Africa is poor; the West has the means to help Africa out of poverty. The argument is so simple that only the easily cynical would seek to dispute it. Through his celebrity status Geldof hopes to mobilise western public opinion to put pressure on the leaders of the capitalist world to be more benevolent to Africa.

To understand the Geldof phenomenon, we need to look historically at the role that Africa has played in the European imagination and in global capitalism. Geldof’s crusade and attitude is not new. He is only the latest in a long line of European men whose personal mission has been to transform Africa and Africans. David Livingstone, the celebrity of his day, embarked on a similar crusade in the late 19th century, painting Africa as a land of ‘evil’, of hopelessness and of child-like humans. His mission was to raise money to pursue his personal ambitions.

‘Darkest Africa’ occupies a special place in the white man’s psyche; it remains a place where he [and she] can achieve heroic status. Therefore, does it not make sense that African voices are silenced? Michel Foucault’s treatise on the relationship between power and knowledge may be old hat in academia, but still relevant in the real world. Sir Bob would lose his authenticity and thus his power if he was to give space to the multiplicity of African voices; many of which would certainly challenge his stance.

It may seem amazing that in the twenty-first century, with increased mobility, greater communication and an African heading the United Nations that many westerners are more comfortable with European interlopers translating Africa for them. Perhaps, only then could some be persuaded, as one famous Irish comedian was, ‘to give money to those bloody niggers’. Africa remains the object of western desires not the subject of its own destiny.

Livingstone’s and Geldof’s humanitarianism fits well with the demands of global capitalism, serving to obscure distinct phases in the exploitation of Africa. Livingstone’s redemption of the African savage was very much tied to colonial conquest and exploitation of the continent’s resources; a mission that Livingstone supported in the marriage of commerce and Christian morality. The consequence for most of Africa was dispossession, forced labour, de-humanization, oppression and genocide, as in the Congo Free State.

Geldof’s Live Aid also occurred at a time when neo-liberal policies were being forced on recalcitrant African countries. The results are fully documented: collapse of health and education services, increased unemployment and privatization, leading to greater impoverishment of the masses. All this occurring while westerners bathe in the glory of their collective benevolence to the ‘lost continent’. Geldof was even rewarded for his chivalry with a knighthood.

How convenient for Live 8 - an upsurge of western popular goodwill - to occur at the same time as a new scramble for African resources? With the threat from China, Africa’s oil and other strategic minerals are even more critical to the continuance of western economic dominance. One just has to consider the significance of Africa’s resources in the west’s push for peace settlements in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is beneficial to western capital for Africans to be seen as the architects of their own misery. Mugabe, thug as he is, is no worse, and certainly less so, than many other leaders in Africa’s post-colonial history, yet his vilification fits into the discourse of corruption and self-inflicted harm and justifies the prevailing view that Africans cannot be trusted with their own destiny. Racism is not often used in explanations of the west’s attitude towards Africa, yet it remains a fundamental component of the west’s interaction with Africans – nowhere is it more visible than in the diaspora. How can one claim to want to save a people, when one is complicit in the marginalization of their relatives? The irony has not been lost on Africans.

Geldof, like Livingstone before him, represents the cultural arm of global capitalism. The inequalities he rallies against are reproduced by the very capitalist system he supports. How many artists, fading or otherwise, would turn down the promotional opportunity of playing to an audience of the magnitude predicted for Live 8? In the cultural as well as in the development industry, African poverty serves as a vehicle for wealth creation.

Those people, whether on the right or the left, who are conversant with the realities of Africa, know that aid will not ‘save’ the continent and deliver the promised land; that the problem in Africa is not poverty but impoverishment and that Africa needs freedom not redemption. Africa’s creativity has to be released through true democracy and not the compromise of ‘good governance’ and western tutelage.

Livingstone’s and Geldof’s suppression of African voices, whether deliberately or inadvertently, aids the continued exploitation of the continent. Geldof has the capacity to transcend Livingstone’s shortcomings, if only he would listen to Africans and engage with issues of reparations and the politics of truth. He would certainly get more diaspora Africans among his London audience, despite their lack of appreciation for rock music.

After Live 8, when African resources are delivering wealth to western trans-nationals and African people suffer further degradation, be it wars, hunger or political oppression, they are likely to find little external support. After all, a whole generation of western civil society will say, “did they not receive debt relief?” “Are they so incompetent or corrupt that they could not make good use of our bountifulness?” In Africa, people will continue to live and die and a lutta continua…

* Dr Patricia Daley holds the posts of University lecturer in Human Geography, and Fellow and Tutor in Geography at Jesus College, Oxford. She is an African from Jamaica.

* Please send comments to

In the context of this week’s G8 meeting, George Dor critiques the recent debt cancellation “deal” for Africa, the Blair Commission for Africa and the rise of Paul Wolfowitz to the top job at the World Bank. He concludes that they represent “nothing other than a new means of continuing the exploitation initiated under the times of conquest, slavery and colonialism”.

The upcoming G8 meeting or, more accurately as regards economic matters, the G7, to be held in Edinburgh, UK, will put the spotlight on Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa and the issue of debt.

Much has been made of the commission on the release of its report in March and the announcement on debt consequent on the meeting of Finance Ministers in preparation for the G7. But, at most, these developments amount to little more than a reflection of the need to react to the persistence of the activities of Jubilee and other social movements over the years. A closer look at these initiatives suggests very little to celebrate.

Debt “Cancellation” and Control of Africa’s Economies

Starting with the debt issue, the ministers announced an amount of debt to be cancelled of a mere US$40 billion for African and other countries. This is a fraction of the total debt of African countries of US$300 billion and of countries in the South of US$2 400 billion. It is less than the amount of more than US$50 billion that the United States spends EACH YEAR on its illegitimate occupation of Iraq.

It also compares poorly with the G7 offering in Cologne, Germany, in 1999 of US$100 billion. Moreover, the intermittent promises of the G7 include amounts promised before but not fulfilled. In other words, they are little more than recycled promises.

In the case of the Cologne announcement, the real intention was not to provide debt relief but to rescue the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank from their crisis of legitimacy and enforce their continued control over the economic policies of the countries in the South. The institutions were strengthened in the form of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Of course, these new initiatives were also quickly exposed for what they really are, structural adjustment in new guise.

Most importantly, the current offering, like that of 1999, is contingent on countries implementing economic reforms, in other words it is premised on a fundamental difference with the Jubilee South slogan, “total and unconditional debt cancellation”. This is cancellation for countries that have gone through the IMF and WB hoops, those that accept these institutions’ structural adjustment conditions. In other words, it is another deal to strengthen the IMF and WB.

Previously, the G8, IMF and WB have used debt as an instrument to dictate our economies in the form of making loans for debt servicing conditional on IMF and WB policies. Now debt relief/cancellation and grants are being put forward as the new instruments to dictate our economies. If a country wants relief, it first has to meet the prescribed conditions, it has to toe the line.

A related critical point is that debt relief/cancellation does not necessarily translate into more money to spend on meeting people’s needs. The relief may indeed result in less debt servicing, but this is only forthcoming if countries have agreed to the conditions that include cuts in government spending and promotion of the private sector. Indeed, this is the case in Zambia: in order to jump through the hoops to be included in the G7 list of 18 countries, it had to further cut state expenditure over and above the decades of cuts that the debt regime had already forced on the country. That is to say, it will get cancellation with less money to spend on people’s needs.

On the word “cancellation”, this does seem to be an advance on the previous rhetoric of debt “relief”, but the offer only covers 18 countries and it is not yet clear whether it amounts to 100 percent cancellation even for this short list of countries. In the case of the Latin American countries, for example, much of their debt is related to a multilateral institution, the Interamerican Development Bank.

The Blair Commission, Neoliberalism and the International Financial Institutions

As regards the Blair Commission, in its opening lines it states, “For its part, Africa must accelerate reform.” There are two important issues here. First, the report suffers from the recurrent syndrome of blaming the victim for corruption, conflict and war. There are indeed too many instances of African leaders who are guilty of one or more of these charges. But, the role of the Northern countries in slavery, colonialism and the imposition of neoliberal policies and the impact of these Northern interventions on poverty and death across the continent are simply ignored.

Secondly, while the report more explicitly refers to reform of political governance in order to address corruption and conflict, it also makes repeated references to various forms of “economic reforms”. In other words, in failing to address the neoliberal cause of so much of Africa’s current destitution, it simply reiterates that Africa must continue to follow this neoliberal path at a faster pace.

This is perhaps most evident in relation to the report’s treatment of the multilateral institutions. It fails dismally to address the negative impact of the World Bank and IMF on the destruction of African economies and the poverty and death that this has led to. It has been estimated that World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes are responsible for the deaths of 19 000 children in the world every day. Yet, the report simply asserts that “The African Development Bank needs to be strengthened… The IMF and World Bank need to give higher priority to Africa’s development.”

Paul Wolfowitz, Military Invasion and Economic War

It is no small surprise that the new President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, echoed this call and visited the continent immediately on assuming office. Wolfowitz was the architect of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which led to the expansion of United States military influence in the Middle East and the awarding of multi-million and billion dollar contracts in Iraq to corporations with close ties to the Republican Party leadership.

He has a history of being against détente and arms control during the years of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. He supported Asian dictators like the Indonesian General Suharto on behalf of the Reagan administration. He has been a persistently strong proponent of more spending on defense.

Wolfowitz was eagerly pushing for regime change in Iraq well before 9/11. He defined leadership as, “not lecturing and posturing and demanding, but demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished, and that those who refuse to support you will regret having done so." He helped convince George Bush 1 to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and urged Bill Clinton to turn his attention “to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power.”

He lied about the purported weapons of mass destruction and claimed, "Intelligence about terrorism is inherently murky, and the US must be prepared to act on less-then perfect information.” He later admitted that oil was a significant reason for the invasion and occupation, stating that North Korea will only be treated to sanctions because it is not sitting on “an ocean of oil”.

The sinister combination of George Bush’s appointment of his man in Iraq to lead the World Bank with the call for the World Bank to play a more significant role in Africa is now being pushed as a boost for Africa’s development. Wolfowitz’ role in the destruction of Iraq and the World Bank’s role in poverty and death on the African continent are being brushed under the carpet. Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s Minister of Finance, described Wolfowitz as a ‘wonderful individual, perfectly capable’. Even some critics are suggesting that Wolfowitz be given a chance in his new role and that the World Bank be given yet another chance on the continent.

Wolfowitz visited Nigeria, Burkino Faso, Rwanda and South Africa from 12 to 18 June. Jubilee South Africa and the Anti-War Coalition organised two demonstrations on 17 June, one outside the offices of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and the other at the Gauteng Provincial Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. The message was clear: “Paul Wolfowitz is not welcome in South Africa, he must go home! The World Bank, its partner, the IMF and related international financial institutions should be shut down!”

For Jubilee South Africa, the opposition to these institutions is based on both their role in the use of debt to impose structural adjustment in the countries of the South as well as their impact on South Africa. The World Bank and IMF supported the Apartheid regime and its institutions in the form of substantial loans until they were instructed to stop doing so. They have returned in the post-Apartheid era to shape the country’s neoliberal macroeconomic and social policies, manifesting in rising unemployment and lack of access to social services.

The Blair Commission, Trade and Resources

The Blair Commission’s handling of trade issues also reflects its insistence that Africa insert itself into the neoliberal global world. It calls on Africa to produce cheaper goods for the world market and suggests that rich countries allow African goods somewhat more access to their markets. In other words, African countries are being told to continue on the path of orientating their productive activities towards exports at the expense of producing the goods and services needed by the people of Africa.

The report’s recommendations on trade must be seen within the broader context of a world in which the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has assumed enormous power and in which unbalanced regional trade agreements are being foisted on African countries. African economies are being opened up to the goods of Northern countries, undermining local production and resulting in increasing unemployment. The report’s approach will, at best, offer limited opportunities to larger-scale private sector enterprises with the capacity to engage in export activities, while continuing to undermine small-scale production, rural economic activity, food security and the like.

The commission does highlight some of the most glaring manifestations of Northern exploitation of the continent. For example, it talks of “conflict resources” and implicitly acknowledges that Northern banks are holding stolen assets, Northern corporations are guilty of making bribes, and the oil, minerals and other extractive industries are less than open about their payments. However, its recommendations in this regard are by and large vague. It notes that “assets stolen from the people of Africa by corrupt leaders must be repatriated” and “Firms who bribe should be refused export credits.” From previous experience, there just isn’t the political will or clout to give effect to these recommendations.

As for resources, the commission is very much in keeping with the meagre offerings of the Finance Ministers in relation to debt. It suggests a mere US$25 billion per year to be committed by donor countries, to be implemented by 2010. This could be doubled by 2015, subject to the condition that “good governance in Africa must continue to advance.”

It argues that half of this amount should go to education and health. It makes positive recommendations on removing primary school and patient fees, but instructions of a similar kind by the United States Congress to the Treasury, World Bank and IMF have gone unheeded before. Most significantly, the pennies proposed in the report won’t come near to restoring the levels of finance to health and education on the continent so consistently undermined by the World Bank and the IMF in the decades of imposed structural adjustment.

Finally, the report argues that a third of the 25 billion a year should go to “growth and poverty reduction”, a euphemism for an increased role for the private sector and a “doubling of expenditure on infrastructure”. This includes large, regional transport and power projects. To date, projects of this sort have realised large profits for Northern and South African corporations at the expense of increasing indebtedness and environmental destruction on the continent.

There are substantial similarities and convergences between the Blair Commission and Thabo Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). This is particularly so in their neoliberal orientation towards the World Bank, IMF, trade and large infrastructure projects. The report has no qualms about exposing Mbeki’s capitulation to the neoliberal approach in stating that, “The developed world must support the African Union’s Nepad programme to build public/private partnerships in order to create a stronger climate for growth, investment and jobs.”

The Blair Commission and the G7 Finance Ministers’ announcement on debt thus represent no more than two additional moments in the decades of neoliberal exploitation of the continent. This is, in turn, nothing other than a new means of continuing the exploitation initiated under the times of conquest, slavery and colonialism.

* George Dor is Jubilee South Africa General Secretary.

* Please send comments to

Expect sugar-coated statements and hot air from G8 leaders, says Thomas Deve, who discusses various mobilizations to injustices including the World Social Forum and Global Call to Action Against Poverty. The greatest asset for mobilization in Africa, he says, is the testimony poor communities, unemployed youths, women, children and the marginalized can make on how market based dogmas and principles have unleashed untold suffering in Africa.

Once upon a time, most of us used to fancy witty statements from "Red" literature like the Communist Manifesto and highlighted the primacy of social action that was necessary to confront Bourgeois institutions. We all accepted that the executive of a modern state was nothing but a committee for managing the day-to-day affairs of the bourgeoisie, hence the need to study contradictions in society triggered by industrialisation and control over key means of production and people's welfare. The state was correctly portrayed as an arena of struggle, hence the desire to work towards a dictatorship of the proletariat and trigger the withering of the state as a precondition for an egalitarian society. The consensus was on the need for ideological clarity, good arguments and the passion to ignite citizens of the world to belong to movements and organisations seeking to build alternatives to capitalist societies.

With all roads leading to Gleneagles this coming week, a great opportunity is presented which demands that we audit our analytical arsenals and state of mobilisation, and review levels of solidarity which we have shown in struggling against bodies of thought and action giving legitimacy to the G8. Many questions do arise. For example, are there any future scenarios we can project on how the G8 has positioned itself, taking into account that vocal constituencies are telling it that: "Efforts to tackle poverty and sustainable development, as pledged in the UN Millennium Declaration, are grossly inadequate. Governments too often fail to address the needs of their citizens. Aid from rich countries is inadequate in both quality and quantity, and promises of debt cancellation have not materialized. Rich countries have yet to act on their repeated pledges to tackle unfair trade practices."

On our part, will those who have spent their time organising against the G8 take to the streets, issue petitions, position papers and other related actions we have witnessed in the past? If we borrow insights from the struggles of the past and positive passions that used to be triggered by the "Red" experience and questions in my opening remarks, it is clear that the G8 experts and strategists are not sleeping. They recognise that millions of people the world over are not accessing basic necessities in a sustainable manner that will allow the rich to sleep quietly. There is consensus that the G8 is a cabal of the world's richest countries that has overseen the world economy during the debt crisis; introduced aid conditions that forced recipient countries to liberalise, and developed unfair trade rules.

In order for the harmful effects to be redressed, these countries have to be part of the solution, and the time to act is now. Gaps of inequality are increasing and restlessness has increased in both camps of the poor and the rich. Those organising against the G8 have grown in numbers and have visible movements on the ground whose demands are now much more focussed and coordinated globally to such an extent that the rich and powerful have to be seen responding to their demands.

It is this realisation and growing awareness on the dynamics of modern poverty which has led the G8 to move a bit on calls for debt cancellation, more and better aid, and enhance dialogue on global partnerships targeting unfair trade rules. Damning statistics are being churned out everyday on how bad the situation is and all these cannot be ignored when we confront Gleneagles. It has been argued repeatedly that one third of deaths - some 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day - are due to poverty-related causes. This amounts to at least 270 million people since 1990, the majority being women and children, and roughly equal to the population of the United States. No less than 535 million still subsist on levels way below the poverty line - earning less than US$1 a day. Almost 185 million people are unemployed and half of these are young people between 15-24 years of age. For every US$1 in grant aid to developing countries, more than US$13 are taken out in debt repayments. For every three seconds that pass in 2005 without action, one more child will die from poverty. That is at least 30 000 children and at most, 50 000 people who will lose their lives from preventable causes. And finally, 245 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 continue to be forced to work (one in six of the world's children).

Poverty is not a given. 50 000 people dying a day from poverty is not acceptable and these telling statistics have inspired many people to continue fighting until figures of this nature are a relic of history rather than the reality of today. It is the situation of real people behind these statistics that has led many of us to use the white-arm band for example, and express our readiness to rededicate energy towards heightened awareness on the need to challenge systems and values of domination that cause this state of affairs. We still put on red T-shirts and feel that value has been added to critical consciousness building as was the case in the mid 70s when we went to a 200 litre fuel containers and tore out the black rubber lining on the lids meant to keep it air tight, proceeded to use them as wrist bangles for proudly proclaiming "Black power" as enounced in the then dominant Black consciousness philosophies of the time.

Back to the G8, our account would be incomplete if we do not acknowledge the role of the World Social Forum (WSF) in bringing together movements that have clearly put forward anti-capitalist struggles at the heart of how they challenge the G8. WSF processes have given some ideological coherence and clarity to many movements as they are proclaiming that "Our world is not for sale" and "Another world is possible." The above calls and pronouncements motivated one of the strongest voices challenging the hegemony of the G8. It is not a far fry from the truth, that since January 2005, most of these voices have coalesced around the "The Global Call to Action against Poverty"(GCAP), which has been described as a fast-growing coalition of millions of people and organisations united in the belief that 2005 offers an unprecedented opportunity for change.

It has simple demands:

- Increased aid from the G7 countries to 0.7% of GNI.
- More and better aid.
- The removal of trade barriers and unfair trade practices that inhibit the development of the poorer economies.
- There should be more trade justice.
- Debt cancellation for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America
- Maximisation of efforts to eliminate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals and more in a way which is sustainable, and implemented in a way that is democratic, transparent and accountable to citizens.

GCAP, whose organisations and movements are active in over 70 countries and boasts at least 150 million supporters, is organised around charities, trade unions and women's groups, to non-governmental and religious movements that span every culture across the world. Not all its constituencies are for radical reform and revolution, but feel good to lend their weight behind a campaign ready to push more vigorously for unconditional debt cancellation for developing countries for example. Not all in GCAP will say "Smash the WTO", but they are there to make sure that the slogan "One struggle with many fronts!" becomes a reality and meaningful, hence one of the action moments targeted is the Hong Kong WTO December ministerial.

Its diversity is testament to the strength of the movement and billed as one of the world's largest anti-poverty coalitions. It is a strong voice that cannot be ignored as has been shown by the latest coverage it is getting from corporate media that has largely concentrated on GCAP symbols and placing less emphasis on the nature of its demands.

For us in Africa, our greatest asset is the testimony poor communities, unemployed youths, women, children and the marginalized can make on how market based dogmas and principles have unleashed untold suffering in our part of the globe. We have incontrovertible evidence that liberalisation has led to loss of meaningful access to basic social services. Privatisation instigated by market-based public sector reform processes has rendered many services unaffordable for the majority of our citizens. Conditionalities attached to some reform processes spearheaded by institutions that function as extensions of the G8 have emasculated the State in developing countries, leaving it with very little flexibility when it comes to policy options that are pro-poor and defending its people against offensive interests spreading fast via corporate driven globalisation.

In this respect, nothing short of a paradigm shift will radically alter the plight of the poor. We have acknowledged that new languages will be adopted to reify what is happening and pacify the struggling masses through participatory processes like Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and HIPC initiatives, but the essence of solutions underpinning dialogue in the G8 still reinforce market driven fundamentalism despite overwhelming evidence that it is a fundamentally flawed world outlook when it comes to redressing poverty related inequities be-devilling the world. The G8 on its part will produce pronouncements sugar-coated with hot air and radical rhetoric but not good enough to stop the other wave - rooted in brimstone and fire and occasioned by real lived poverty experiences that can only be ended by meaningful social and economic justice.

* Thomas Deve ([email protected]) coordinates the Economic Policy Project at MWENGO (www.mwengo.org), an organisation whose mission is to nurture a community of values by strengthening and mobilising African human resources in support of organisations fighting for social justice.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Even those who remember the word "Ujamaa", and know it was the philosophy behind Julius Nyrere's attempt to collectivise agriculture in the 1960s, probably wonder whether it has anything more than academic relevance to today's debates about development. In this interview with BBC Newsnight’s Paul Mason (reproduced here with permission of Paul Mason) Marie Shaba, chairperson of the Tanzanian Association of NGOs, discusses how the G8 can assist Africa’s development.

PAUL MASON: What's the one principle that drives you as an activist?

MARIE SHABA: Justice - I've seen a lot of injustices in my life. I was born in the 1940s - as a young person I've seen the struggle for independence not only for Tanzania but for the whole continent and that's what's been driving me.

PM: What are the biggest problems facing you that the G8 could actually do something about?

MS: One of the most important things they have to do is keep their promises - we are dealing here with a human race, and when you make a promise and you want the support of somebody, then you have to fulfil your promise. Africa has gone through so much and not been able to get its fair deal in trade in governance, everything. The G8 has to recognise and accept that.

PM: Give me a concrete example of the kind of poverty you have to deal with?

MS: These days we have a very strange kind of impoverishment: most of our industries - the parastatals - have been privatised. And you find women who used to be the backbone in agriculture, especially for food security, have all gone into towns now - because with the Structural Adjustment Programmes a lot of subsidies were taken away from the farmers so most of the men left the women in the village - and without subsidies women could not farm even for subsistence. So most of them are moving into towns. And this is a great phenomenon in my country, because then you have to depend on food from others - and you have no respect if you depend on food from others.

So what is happening you find women now: they are employed in the flower industry in Arusha. They employ a lot of women because they are cheaper, they are careful in the way they handle flowers, but they are not protected health-wise, and they deal with a lot of pesticides, they suffer a lot of diseases: they are like human beings saturated with pesticide in their bodies. And when you are sick they just chuck you out, employ another one. And if this woman falls sick and dies, she leaves behind orphans. So in our country we are saying "for every rose that somebody in Europe wears there is the life of an African woman". So this kind of impoverishment is quite severe and it's frightening, and its all because of liberalisation.

PM: What are people doing for themselves? When people in this country (the United Kingdom) faced problems like that, in the 19th century, they got organised to do something about it...

MS: We come from a different background: immediately after independence we had our own brand of socialism - and the main part was to have a human rights culture: that's what Ujamaa meant. And self-reliance. We had a one-party system so our mindset was totally different - there was a lot of trust, faith that the government would take care of people. That they would enter contracts for the interests of the people. But after 1987 when Structural Adjustment came in, we began to see different behaviour - and a lot of people didn't realise what was happening.

PM: So what are people doing now?

MS: We are organising - the NGOs have been in the forefront: education, to make people realise they have the power to change things through elections, through organising in groups, support each other. If people are not organising, we wouldn't be here. It means people are organising to find solutions - especially women in the informal sector. They cushion the impact of some of the economic policies, because in the informal sector they sell goods from small producers, and at the end of the day they survive: if it were not for these small producers - the so-called illiterate women, we'd be telling a different story.

PM: A lot of people here ask: why can't Africans help themselves - why can't they do what South Korea has done and go from farming to industry in one big leap?

MS: That's blaming the victim - we are here not because we are lazy, unintelligent. If I was the leader of Tanzania, and the economy was down, and here is somebody who says: "I can give you money, BUT" .... the choice is: do you refuse and let your people die, or to agree and hope things get better? That's what happened to most of our leaders; they've been hoping things will change - so its blaming the victim.

PM: If the G8 could only do one thing what would it be?

MS: Fair trade!

PM: But that's not even on the agenda of the G8...

MS: We are wondering why. Because with charity - we are all so fatigued as recipients of charity, begging, when we know we can do it ourselves. The capitalist system is so strong and been there so many years - and they keep on changing their strategies. But it’s just what Emma (Thompson) was saying: capitalism is there to maximise profits. And this means we need to rearrange our mindset.

PM: What is the mood in some of the shanty towns and villages you work in? Do people know about the G8 and the international debate that's going on about African poverty?

MS: No. A lot of people blame the government. That's the immediate thing they can see - they don't understand the intricate issues behind it all. For example our president is on the Africa Commission, and Blair is the chair of G8, so they might be aware that our issues are being discussed - but not much.

PM: So there's no big feeling on the streets - that the G8 must do something, and this is the big chance?

MS: What people are saying is they blame it all on the (African) leaders - so its up to people like us to say we shouldn't blame our leaders because we will just fight each other and let the G8 countries off. Civic education is a process: you (Britain) have been there for a long time; we've been independent only since 1961 and there are a lot of things happening that are happening too fast: but slowly the picture is beginning to unfold.

PM: If it all goes well at Gleneagles, and you get everything you want, what kind of a difference could it make? What would we see in 10 years time?

MS: It will bring back self-confidence. Right now, as Africans, I think we have lost self-esteem - we feel like we are the poorest of the poorest, like we can't even think for ourselves; like everything has to be thought out somewhere in Europe - even how to govern ourselves. So there is lack of self-esteem. But should we get the solidarity and confidence of other people, we have all the resources we need. We are blessed with all the resources: human, material, land - everything. So the support we need should go to strengthening the structures for continuity and transparency, so that more people will know what's happening - and what opportunities are there. That's more important than giving us money to settle things.

And another thing, with trade, would be to help us compete: we need a lot of preparation - and we need to start it locally, or maybe regionally before we can even compete abroad - so we need that space. That's what the G8 can do: give us space to develop at our own pace.

* This article first appeared on the blog NewsNi8gt and is reproduced here with permission of Paul Mason. Visit http://paulmason.typepad.com/newsnig8t/ for more information.

* Please send comments to [email protected]