is a short story of two brothers trapped in a murderous cycle of environmental and cultural devastation in Somalia.

Charcoal Traffic is a global first:

• Charcoal Traffic is the world's first short fictional film based on Somali pastoral culture.

• Charcoal Traffic was shot entirely on location in northern Somalia under very challenging conditions due to almost 20 years of civil war.

• Charcoal Traffic has an all Somali local cast with no previous acting experience.

• Charcoal Traffic is in Somali with English subtitles.

Charcoal Traffic was directed by Nathan Collett, assisted by Godfrey Ojiambo, and co-produced by international award winning environmentalist, Fatima Jibrell with James Lindsay, co-founder of Sun Fire Cooking. Godfrey Ojiambo, resident of Kibera and trustee of Hot Sun Foundation, travelled with Nathan Collett to Somalia to film Charcoal Traffic.

The ‘Best Short Fiction Award’ will be presented to Charcoal Traffic during the VideoFest in San Francisco, California, October 17-18, 2008. Charcoal Traffic has been selected and screened at 19 international film festivals around the world.

* To interview Godfrey Ojiambo or Nathan Collett about their experiences in Somalia or for more information, contact SANTA MUKABANAH, Hot Sun Foundation Communications Officer, [email][email protected] or visit http://www.charcoaltraffic.com/ and http://kiberakid.blogspot.com

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Following the resignation of South African President Thabo Mbeki, William M. Gumede explores the future of the ANC and the likely consequences of a Jacob Zuma presidency. While suggesting that an elected Zuma would scarcely provoke an all-out political implosion in the short-term, Gumede concludes events to represent a genuine reconfiguration of South African politics.

The brutal ousting of South African President Thabo Mbeki by the 88-member national executive committee of the ruling African National Congress has unleashed political and economic turmoil, but it has also finally forced open the space to focus on how to bring fresh ideas, imagination and leadership to bear to renew a faltering democracy, mend a torn society, and foster more equitable development.

South Africa is stuck in a number of interlocking crises: broken families, communities and society; soaring poverty, unemployment and crime; a pervasive air of public corruption; rising racial animosity; battered democratic institutions; rapidly declining public confidence in government’s ability to deliver services; and looming economic problems ahead. The country must deal with these problems in an increasing complex, dangerous and economically volatile world. The ANC and South Africa need a less divisive and more unifying leader, with fresh ideas, to tackle imaginatively the country’s pressing problems. Mbeki and his group at the helm for over a decade now had clearly run out of ideas, direction and energy.

Yet, this is not why he was so vindictively forced out. It was also not because of ideological differences with the disparate coalition of his political enemies rallied around his rival ANC president Jacob Zuma: Mbeki’s centrist economic instincts against the leftist views of the trade unionists and communists or the virginity testing supporters on the traditionalist right. No, it was simply revenge. Those who fell under Mbeki’s sword saw an opening for an eye-for-an-eye retribution. They wanted to humble Mbeki, as they thought the president had humiliated them. But they also wanted to launch a pre-emptive strike, fearing that in his last days in office, Mbeki would use state resources to crush his enemies. They also feared he would set up a commission investigating corruption related to the controversial arms deal, in which Zuma is implicated, or recharge him. Zuma’s supporters are bragging about their triumph, and seeking to purge the government and the party of pro-Mbeki supporters. Anybody critical of Zuma is now increasingly labelled Mbeki loyalists. All the purges are going to destabilise the ANC and paralyse government further. South Africa now faces a leadership vacuum. Yet, Zuma is certainly not the answer.

The very obvious and most sensible solution to the African National Congress and now South Africa’s deepening crisis is to appoint Kgalema Motlanthe, the former trade unionist and deputy ANC leader, appointed as interim president until next year’s general election as the permanent presidential candidate of the ANC. Such is the political crisis that the only way to prevent an implosion of the ANC is to retire both Mbeki and Zuma, who are equally divisive. Zuma’s candidacy as South African president threatens to break up the ANC before it reaches 100 years in four years’ time. It is better to appoint a new leader with the necessary political gravitas, who is above both the Mbeki and Zuma political divisions, and who can rally significant groups in both camps. Right now the two ANC leaders that may be able to do this are most probably only Motlanthe and Mathews Phosa, the ANC Treasurer. The ANC could have prevented this destructive process if Mbeki had long ago stood aside for Motlanthe or any other of the younger talent, Phosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, Nelson Mandela’s preferred successor ahead of Mbeki, and Tokyo Sexwale, the former Gauteng Premier.

This is the obvious solution to unite the ANC and the country, which should have been done a long time before. In the end Mbeki’s selfish insistence to stand for a third term as party leader last year, rather then endorse either of these young Turks, because they criticised him in the past, meant that everybody opposed to Mbeki’s centralised, aloof and prickly reign, temporarily rallied around Zuma to dislodge the former president and his crew. Among the real reasons why many of the more reasonable on the ANC Left have embraced Zuma is the fear that any of the in-waiting, younger and more competent leaders may marginalise, as Mbeki did, not only the Left again, but also the pressing issues of the poor, of deepening democracy, of building stable families and communities and of inclusive nation building.

Furthermore, under Mbeki the democratic institutions have been undermined, ordinary citizens’ participation in policy and decision-making reduced and freedom of expression threatened. Judge Chris Nicholson in his judgement clearing Zuma of corruption charges was critical of the manipulation of public institutions for political ends under the Mbeki administration because the prosecutors did not follow the correct procedures; they did not interview Zuma before they charged him. Yet, in his campaign to quash the corruption charges against him, Zuma and his sometimes violent supporters have attacked the judiciary, democratic institutions, the media and critics to such an extent that the country’s not yet consolidated constitutional system, institutions and values are at the same risk as Mbeki’s previous manipulation of them. But the talent of all of South Africa’s people, whatever their ideology or colour, has also sadly been marginalised under the Mbeki presidency, who sideline even polite critics or different opinion, within the ANC as racists if white or handmaidens of whites if black. Yet, the Zuma camp is now purging everybody associated with Mbeki, and they now label everybody critical of Zuma as Mbeki loyalists. Zuma himself has sued a number of individuals, including this correspondent, in the biggest defamation to date in South Africa, following mild criticisms of his behaviour.

To make inroads into South Africa’s pressing problems will firstly need a less divisive and more unifying leader, and a clean break from the two factions – Mbeki and Zuma - currently paralysing the ANC, government and South Africa. Furthermore, any new leader must show a commitment to the deal with corruption, deepen democracy within the ANC and the country, be inclusive and tackle race and class inequality. The reality is, Zuma may be popular, and have a hardcore, loud and militant support base who are prepared to ‘die’ to have him president, but at the same time, a large proportion of the ANC’s membership disapprove of him with equal gusto. They are unlikely to vote for the ANC when he is the presidential candidate. Furthermore, such is the strength of the opposition against Zuma within the ANC that his administration is likely to be paralysed by log-jams, which will make it difficult to implement pro-poor policies. The lingering questions over Zuma’s involvement in alleged corruption if he does not answer the allegations fully in court will continue to paralyse government, erode public confidence and undermine the democracy. A new South African president will need to tackle a pervasive air of public corruption, which will demand honesty. Judge Nicholson rightly heavily criticised Mbeki and his government for routinely abusing public institutions to launch vendettas against critics. Zuma claimed he could see by the way a woman dresses and sits that she was looking for sex and that he should oblige. With violence against women reaching record levels, such views are not only unconstitutional, but it provides a legitimate cloak for sexist views. Outside the court house, Zuma’s supporters daily shouted abuse the accuser and stoned a woman they thought was her. He said nothing about this.

Zuma’s rape trial exposed the deep divide between the call for women’s equality in South Africa’s model constitution – which has priority to cultural considerations, the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP’s statutes and rhetoric and the archaic public attitudes to women. He gave his backing to traditionalists who want to introduce virginity testing for young girls. Throughout his rape trial and again during his corruption trial, Zuma played the ethnic card, speaking in Zulu in court, inventing new Zulu cultural norms to excuse his appalling sexist attitudes. South Africa is struggling with the consequences of broken, one-parent and child-headed families, caused by the combination of the legacies of apartheid, through its undermining of black male identity, the breaking-up of families because of the migrant work system, the militarisation of society by the apartheid state and the liberation movements violent response to it, the macho male identity culture among both black and white communities, and the consequences of poverty and HIV/Aids. Mbeki had failed to provide progressive leadership on this. Mbeki’s ally Trevor Manuel, the finance minister, said providing income support to vulnerable families will mean these families will spend it on alcohol.

It is hard to see Zuma presenting a progressive response to how to provide stable families, how to make gender equality as set out in the constitution real, and how to set a progressive example of male identity that aligns with the values of the constitution. With South Africa having among the highest HIV/Aids case loads in the world, Zuma believes that having a shower after unprotected sex with a HIV/Aids positive partner will stop infection. He has urged the police to shoot first and ask questions later to combat high crime levels. He will consider the death penalty. He is under fire from his own camp for flip-flopping on economic policy depending on the audience. Zuma has surrounded himself with hard-line demagogues. This will make it difficult for him to bring in new talent from across the colour, ideological and political divide, which is so necessary to energise the country, but which Mbeki has not done.

Under Mbeki, only a relatively small black middle classes benefited from affirmative action, and a dozen oligarchs from black economic empowerment. The white middle class, with the social capital, education and property acquired during apartheid and white business did well too. Yet the majority black poor and working class, and those eking out a living in the informal sector were marginalised. Many rightfully fear Zuma will be held hostage by the special interests, big black business oligarchs, such as the casino magnate Vivien Reddy, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) moguls Don Makwanazi and the Shaik family, and arms companies like Thint, of which Zuma is alleged to have been bribed to shield them from prosecution.

Competent and decisive leadership is now required to lift the economy, not populism. Economic growth is slowing, inflation and costs are rising, and power shortages are undermining production, while high unemployment and poverty persist, service delivery remains poor, and ANC supporters are demanding urgent redistribution; all this amid the global financial disaster. Zuma has reassured the markets that the post-Mbeki government will steer the same economic path as Mbeki. President Motlanthe has been handed a new government report (Towards a 15-year Review) by his predecessor that concedes that in spite of growth levels averaging 5% the past years, not enough has been done to slash poverty and inequality, and to increase trust in government. Problems identified five years ago had proved more ‘deep-seated’ than previously recognised, Joel Netshitenzhe, head of policy coordination and advisory services, said: ‘Growth has exposed weaknesses ... the increase in the rate of growth does not necessarily result in a reduction in poverty.’ Nor had growth reduced inequality, but had rather created a bigger gap between the rich and poor, as Netshitenzhe outlined: ‘The state has had to learn new ways of doing things as it implemented, but not always have these been decisive and flexible enough.’

The Left’s backing for Zuma is not likely to give them much influence on economic policy. They may be consulted more regularly, of course, but will be told, as Mbeki told them before, that the government cannot risk unsettling the markets. Zuma will have to pay back other supporters – the BEE oligarchs, who were marginalised under Mbeki, but who are now sponsoring Zuma. Others who lost out on the gravy train will want their slice of the pie too. Cosatu and the SACP will have to compete with them for Zuma’s ear. The ANC’s allies, the SA Congress of Trade Unions and the SA Communist Party, are demanding to be upgraded as ‘full partners’ instead of junior partners as under Mbeki. Blade Nzimande of the SACP says it wants more of its members on the ANC's candidate list for the 2009 elections, and more appointed as national and provincial ministers, mayors and local councillors, with a 'deployment committee' to pick its people. It has just concluded a policy conference, ahead of an alliance summit with Cosatu and the SACP; Nzimande says the summit should veto government policy.

Instead of stopping the legal problems of Zuma, forcing out Mbeki has actually only increased Zuma’s legal woes. When announcing that Mbeki was ‘recalled’ as president, Gwede Mantashe, the ANC general secretary had said: ‘The National Prosecuting Authority’s decision to appeal the judgment has become a worry and a point of division for the ANC.’ The reality is that Zuma still has very real 16 charges of corruption against him. Judge Chris Nicholson, who cleared Zuma on a technicality – the prosecutors had followed the wrong procedure - emphasised he did not give a verdict on the charges, but proposed the prosecutors recharge Zuma, provided they do so by the book. To rescue their own credibility, the prosecutors have no other choice but to appeal and recharge Zuma.

Moreover, the prosecutors have been under such an attack from Zuma militants now that their very credibility may rest on successfully recharging Zuma. In any event, they know that if Zuma comes to power, the prosecuting unit may be broken up, with members of the team that have been prosecuting Zuma likely be ‘redeployed’ elsewhere, or simply put under pressure to resign. Furthermore, even if the prosecutors did bow under the pressure and did not prosecute, a number of private prosecutions against Zuma have been lined up – so it is difficult to see how Zuma is going to extricate himself out of this, which have already seen his former financial advisor sent to jail for 15 years. The National Prosecuting Authority has now confirmed that it had applied to appeal against the ruling that sprang Zuma free on a technicality. Mbeki has also formally approached the Constitutional Court to ask that Judge Nicholson's findings be declared unconstitutional and set aside; he says the judgement was ‘vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial’, cost him his job and damaged his good name and reputation. Zuma is opposing Mbeki’s bid to clear his name. If Mbeki won, his sacking by the ANC’s executive would be shown to be based on false assumptions, and therefore void.

Following Mbeki’s forced exit, the Zuma coalition, consisting of five distinctly different groups, who were all opposed to Mbeki, have lost the glue that hold them together – opposition to Mbeki. Furthermore, with Mbeki gone, all of them are now focusing on securing their own interests in the leadership vacuum. Within the Zuma coalition, not all are set on securing the presidency of South Africa for Zuma. Those who are, though include: the ANC youth league, the pro-Zuma black economic empowerment business oligarchs – both hoping to secure patronage; the Communist Party and the trade unionists, who nave no alternative presidential candidate of their own, think they can manipulate Zuma in power; and those ANC leaders who are being investigated by the National Prosecuting Authority for corruption, because, they argue that if Zuma’s case is quashed – especially when he comes to power, theirs will also. So, now the Zuma coalition are divided between those who want Zuma at all costs to become president, such as those seeking a pardon for corruption or patronage, versus those who are prepared to look for a unifying ANC leader that will be pro-poor, the latter include the more serious elements of Cosatu and the SACP. Yet, Zuma is not entirely in control of his own coalition. Ahead of Mbeki’s ouster, he opposed efforts to oust Mbeki, because he feared he will inherit a divided party, unprepared to run a general election. However, he was rudely overruled by his own militants.

Furthermore, in the week when Mbeki detractors within the Zuma coalition moved to oust him, all the old presidential rivals of Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mathews and Tokyo Sexwale, again took centre stage within the ANC, dwarfing Zuma, almost like a decade ago. Zuma initially wanted Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, and the ANC’s chairwoman, a more pliable supporter, as caretaker president. However, he lost out on that. Until yesterday, the Zuma camp, in control of the ANC had planned to appoint Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, as interim president, to smooth the way for Zuma and to create an environment for Zuma’s legal charges to be withdrawn. Motlanthe was the choice of those in the Zuma coalition, who are more interested in keeping the ANC united, and securing a pro-poor government focus, rather then putting Zuma into the presidency. They have long seen him as an alternative candidate for the presidency if Zuma stumbles over his legal hurdles. Motlanthe does things by the book. In this crisis, their may be openings for other Young Turks of Motlanthe’s generation. To contain the Young Turks – Motlanthe, Phosa, Sexwale and Ramaphosa, Zuma has promised to stay as president for one term only, and then allow a competitive election for the leadership between them. But Mothlante obviously now has the inside track, because he is already an MP, the others, including Zuma are not. He will be presiding president for six months, which is enough to show his credentials not only as a unifying figure, but a source of new ideas, energy and principle, and to contrast this to the divisive potential of a populist Zuma.

Under the Mbeki administration, corruption was often only selectively punished, depending on one’s closeness to Mbeki’s inner circle. A number of ANC leaders under investigation for corruption support Zuma’s attempts not to stand trial, on the basis that their cases will also be cleared. This week parliament has started winding down the National Prosecuting Authority's elite crime fighting unit, the Directorate of Special Operations, known as the Scorpions, which brought the corruption charges against Zuma. The Zuma dominated ANC leadership voted to have the Scorpions, South Africa’s most effective crime-busting disbanded, claiming it was used for political ends, when it investigated Zuma and other ANC leaders for corruption. With the country awash with crime, the best solution is not to close down the most effective crime fighting unit. A better solution would have been to expanded democratic oversight over the Scorpions, and intelligence, defence and security services. While, all eyes were focused on the transition from Mbeki to Motlanthe, the Zuma-dominated ANC parliamentary caucus slipped in a decision to cancel outstanding monies owned by individual ANC MPs who were defrauded parliament’s travel voucher scheme, dubbed ‘travelgate’, to stop outside civil actions against them to recover the money. Parliament had tasked liquidators to recover outstanding monies from MPs implicated in the travel voucher fraud, which amounted to R6 million. More than 100 MPs, including some ministers, who implicated in defrauding parliament’s travel scheme for MPs.

One worrying now also is that the division between the ruling party and the state is now increasingly blurred. In fact, South Africa is in danger now of becoming a party-state or ‘partocracy’ where there is no clear firewall between the executive, legislatures, and public institutions on the one hand, and the ruling ANC, on the other. Yet, the country constitutional democratic system demands a clear division between the party on the one hand, and the state and public institutions on the other. The problem is also that ANC leadership under Mbeki and now again under Zuma, assumes that they are the South African nation, or euphemistically, the ‘people’ itself, rather then its representatives. This means every decision taken by the ANC leadership is viewed as a good for the country, without consulting the wider nation. It also means that decisions that are often purely factional ones are seen as in the interest of the nation as a whole.

Of course there are many problems inherent in a party-state. The one is that if the party is paralysed by factional fights, tainted by corruption or run undemocratically, the country are also likely to be. Turning into party-states are one of the reasons why many African countries run by former independence or liberation movements have failed to institute broad-based democracy when they came to power. When the ruling independence or liberation movements became corrupt, undemocratic or divided into factions, or the leadership become personalised, their governments became so also, stunting a democratic, development and service delivery efforts. Can the worse effects of party-state or ‘parto-cracy’ be reversed?

The first thing is that the ANC must become more internally democratic. The truth, although the ANC’s Polokwane conference has made a call for greater internal democracy in the party, little has change. A case in point is the face that Zuma is currently explaining to ANC provinces, branches and ordinary members why Mbeki was so brutally pushed when he only had six months to go. The decision should have been canvassed among the membership, branches and provinces before. An integral part of becoming more internal democratic is to make the ANC’s internal elections more democratic. South Africa’s electoral system that allows the party bosses, rather than the ordinary people, to decide who should be candidates for parliament, provincial legislatures and local government should be scrapped. This means that the elected representatives are more accountable to the welfare of the party bosses rather than to the people and to defend the constitution – to which they pledged allegiance when elected.

It is even more urgent now that South Africa adopt a new electoral system, as already proposed in 2004 by the electoral task team headed by Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, to give more say to ordinary people, rather than the party, and which make elected candidates are accountable to their constituencies and allow them to be recalled by their constituencies, if they fail to deliver. Secondly, democratic institutions, the judiciary, parliament and audit institutions must become more vigilant and assert to defend the democracy, constitution and its values. Thirdly, civil movements, non-governmental organisations and the media must do so also. Fourthly, ordinary citizens must also assert their rights more, and hold government and public institutions accountable.

Finally, South Africa’s opposition parties must get more serious, adopt more relevant policies, actually do the hard work of establishing proper and working branches and elect more competent leaders. Faced with the real prospect of Zuma likely to become president of South Africa, some ANC members have said they will form their own party, to challenge a Zuma-led ANC in next year’s general election. Mbeki’s 92-year old mother, Epainette, a struggle icon in her own right, has said she will support such a new breakaway party ‘100%’. This shows the extent of the dissatisfaction among the ANC rank-and-file. The absence of an effective and relevant opposition party in South Africa remains one of the biggest shortcomings of the country’s infant democracy.

The main reason why the ANC under Mbeki has been so complacent, and why Mbeki was ultimately forced out, is because the party had no opposition to fear it if messed up, that could dislodge it. Only when a ruling party faces the real prospect of losing an election, will South Africa’s politics be infused with the electoral dynamism the country so desperately needs to renew its faltering democracy and provide a better life for it’s people. Before the ANC’s Left components, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, in one last gamble in 2005, decided to rally behind Jacob Zuma, in an attempt to change the direction of the ANC, each of them had already resolved to combine forces and form a party of the Left. Both the memberships of Cosatu and the SACP resolved in 2005 to form a new party, if they could not sway the ANC to become more pro-poor. However, when Mbeki fired Zuma for corruption in 2005, the latter joined forces with the leaders of the unionists and communist party, and signed a pact that instead of them forming their own party, they should back him (Zuma) for the ANC presidency, and he would in turn make the ANC more pro-poor.

Whether a breakaway party will be formed depends on whether Zuma becomes the president of South Africa. If Motlanthe is given the job permanently, and unite the ANC, pursue a pro-poor agenda and deepen the democracy within the country and the ANC, the disaffected ANC members are more likely to stay. Or if they go, a new party may have less legitimacy. If Zuma becomes president of South Africa, the chances of a breakaway party being set up will increase. Ultimately, if it happens, the success of a breakaway party will also depend on the policies and leadership at the helm. It will only work if its leaders and reason of existence is genuinely pro-poor, for deepening democracy and for equitable redistribution. The current crop of opposition parties in South Africa are irrelevant because they don’t differ from the ANC on policies if they do the policies are on the right, rather than pro-poor or to deepen democracy, or on the unrealistic far-left or Africanist. The parties are often one-man or woman and a fax machine, no deep-rooted branches, credible policies. Yet, in the long-term it will be better for the democracy if the ruling ANC/SACP/Cosatu tripartite alliance is reconfigured – the forcing out of Mbeki will now bring that closer.

Ultimately, the best solution for South Africa is the breakaway of the ruling ANC tripartite alliance into centre-left faction, and its left faction, and the assortment of current opposition parties on the centre-right. Of course, if Zuma becomes president of South Africa, the country won’t implode, yet, but it will just plod along business as usual, democracy, protection and development for the well-off and politically well-connected, and pockets of wealth, service delivery and excellence, for the few, and continuing poverty and tyranny for the majority. Mbeki’s enforced early exit and the ANC leadership’s attempt to push Zuma into the South African presidency at all costs, and the inevitable backlash thereof, are providing the political earthquake South Africa needed to reconfigure its politics.

* William M. Gumede is author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. ISBN: 9781842778487

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Tidiane Kasse

Tidiane Kasse looks back at Guinea’s historic “No” vote of 1958 that led to independence from France, and the continued resonance of Ahmed Sékou Touré’s famous declaration; ‘We prefer poverty in liberty than slavery in riches’ for a continent that strives to maintain its dignity and sovereignty in the face of poverty and suffering.

Abel Gbêtoénonmon

Abel Gbêtoénonmon reviews the 6th ACP summit held in Ghana on the 2nd of October 2008. Key issues emerging at the meeting were the exploration of bilateral ties with the European Union, and the creation of a Free-trade zone for the ACP countries. Other topics discussed at the summit were the current global food, energy and economic crises, development assistance and climate change.

While underlining Canadian people’s best intentions for the African continent, Gerald Caplan argues that his country and the rest of the Western world should understand that many existing practices around trade, aid, lending, investment, and recruiting in relation to Africa cause far more harm than good. Without an approach that goes beyond mere compassionate humanitarianism, the author stresses that the efforts of millions of courageous African social activists will be in vain.

Highlighting women’s conspicuous absence in the media coverage, negotiations, and resolutions during the Zimbabwe crisis, Pumla Dineo Gqola outlines the extent to which we have grown accustomed to the near total elision of women’s lives, contributions and agency from significant political events. Drawing upon her recent experiences with a group of South African women on a feminist solidarity trip to Zimbabwe, the author concludes the Mugabe-Tsvangirai power-sharing agreement and its ‘gender neutral’ language to be blind to women’s struggles.

Celebrating Pambazuka’s 400th issue is celebrating pan-Africanism itself. Through its half a million readership and one thousand plus contributors from all over Africa, Pambazuka has truly set ablaze an intellectual pan-African trail; ‘insurrection of ideas precedes insurrection of arms’, some militant is quoted to have said. Pambazuka is certainly not a call to (physical) arms, but one to intellectual and ideological arms. We need it if the pan-African vision – not a dream – is to survive and continue to guide our thoughts and actions as Africans. As Souleymane Bachir Diagne says, we should make pan-Africanism a category of intellectual thought.

I have asserted many times in the pages of Pambazuka and elsewhere that ‘new pan-Africanism’, rooted in social (popular) democracy, is African nationalism of the era of the so-called globalised phase of imperialism. African nationalism was born of pan-Africanism, not the other way round. Its genesis was rooted in democracy – self-determination and anti-imperialism. Self-determination and anti-imperialism are two sides of the same coin, none of which could be successfully achieved on the level of colonially carved territories. The first generation of African nationalists were deeply conscious of the dangers of territorial nationalisms based on geographical spaces designed as countries by colonialists. Nyerere derogatively characterised African countries as vinchi or statelets! African nationalism outside pan-Africanism is tribalism on the international level, he boldly asserted in the early 1960s. Both Nyerere and Nkrumah believed that without a continental unity, individual African countries would become pawns on the imperialist chessboard or degenerate into narrow cultural, racial, or ethnic nationalisms, or both. In this, unfortunately, they were prophetic as half a century of African independence has amply demonstrated.

On the morrow of receiving the insignia of sovereign states, a few of the ‘founding fathers’ genuinely set out to build nations within the colonially defined borders, which all of them, as heads of states, unanimously agreed were sacred, although unviable. Others set to build their power-bases on the colonially invented or re-invented ethnic ‘identities’. Still others did not survive long enough to do either, or something else, because they were overthrown (Nkrumah) or assassinated (Lumumba) by imperialist machinations. Whatever the case, they all failed to build viable, legitimate states and nations.

Kenyatta’s Kenya and Nyerere’s Tanganyika are illustrative examples. Anchored in ethnic power-bases, which also determined resource allocations, the darling of Western imperialism in this part of the world exploded following the 2008 general elections. The so-called government of the so-called ‘national unity’ was cobbled together by American pressure while pretending to be a miracle performed by the chairman of African Union, Jakaya Kikwete, the Tanzanian president. Tanganyika has not so far exploded, thanks to the legacy of Nyerere’s far-sighted policies, preaching and personal integrity helped by relatively undeveloped class divisions. That is proving to be fragile, thanks to extreme social and economic polarisation wrought by Mkapa’s neo-liberal polices, taken over by Kikwete, over the last 15 or so years. The 2000, and even more so the 2005, elections were marked by racial and religious animosity and ethnic based alliances and campaigning. Under the veneer of peace, unity, and stability, Tanzanian political and even intellectual elites are covertly and overtly involved in religious- and ethnic-based politicking. This came out openly in the last session of the parliament where honourable members were unashamedly polarised along religious lines on the issues of the possible membership of OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) and the proposal to introduce Kadhi’s courts for the Muslim community.

Even more problematic is the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar which this year celebrated its 44th anniversary. While the Cold War was the context and pressure from the West to meet what it considered a communist threat undoubtedly played a role, Nyerere’s was driven, at least partly, by his pan-African convictions. He would have preferred Zanzibar to be part of a greater East African federation but his colleagues in Kenya and Uganda were too enamoured with new power and state positions to relinquish it in the interest of a larger association. The failure to form the East African federation bore out Nyerere’s fears. He had argued repeatedly that once African countries went into independence alone, it would be too difficult to dislodge vested interests thus created.

Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats at the United Nations, and individuals entitled to 21 gun salutes, not to speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers, and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised.

While the political union of East Africa is still marking time forty years later, even economic integration has been in the doldrums. The East African Community collapsed in the late 1970s and was only revived 10 years ago. Ironically, therefore, the union with Zanzibar, whose future is being seriously threatened, and the fragility of regional economic integration, are proving Nyerere’s position in his debate with Nkrumah questionable. It should be recalled that Nkrumah stood for immediate political union of African states while Nyerere argued in favour of a gradualist approach against Nkrumah’s immediate political unification. Nkrumah dubbed Nyerere’s efforts at EA federation ‘balkanisation on a larger scale’ while ‘regional economic groupings,’ he said, ‘retard rather than promote the unification process.’

While logic was on Nyerere’s side, history has vindicated Nkrumah. All experiments at regional political unions did not survive. Senegambia, formed in 1982, was dissolved on 1989 because the Gambia refused closer union with Senegal. Formed much earlier, the Mali federation collapsed within two years. The only union to survive long was the unity of former British Somaliland and the Italian Somalia, which was formed in 1960 voluntarily by the people of British Somaliland voting in a referendum to join the former Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic. With the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the whole country breaking up into warlords’ fiefdoms, Somaliland withdrew to form the Republic of Somaliland, which to this date remains unrecognised. Though it remains shaky, this makes the Tanganyika-Zanzibar the longest surviving union between two African countries. The moral is that regional unities, of whatever kind, particularly political, have failed to make it.

Nkrumah’s vision of continental political unity thus remains a beacon of hope. More recently, Muammar Gaddafi has tried to take on Nkrumah’s mantle. But Gaddafi is no Nkrumah. The call for political unification from Gaddafi has found little support. The classical debate between Nyerere and Nkrumah has been resurrected but it is a pale shadow of its former self. There is no Nyerere to argue for gradualism with any legitimacy while Gaddafi is a wrong man to argue a right cause. His maverick tactics and twisting of arms has only resulted in rekindling the Arab-African cultural divide. That brings me to the cultural argument often deployed even by otherwise progressive intellectuals against continental unity.

Pan-Africanism was rooted in anti-imperialist politics. It was a political and not an economic, cultural, or racial project. At a public rally called by PAFMECA (Pan-African Movement of Eastern and Central Africa) in Zanzibar in April 1959, Nyerere said that he did not believe that an African was defined by the colour of his skin. An African, he asserted, is any one who has made Africa his home and is struggling for the rights of his country. This is a political definition of an African, not racial or cultural. Both Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral saw culture as a form and expression of national struggle rather than an ossified custom or tradition. As Archie Mafeje argued, it is one thing to invoke culture – even invent it – as a counterpoint to the assertion and domination by European imperialist culture, it is quite another to make culture a reference point of (political) division.

In conclusion, I return to the point that pan-Africanism was a political project for the first generation of African nationalists and remains so. Africa is at crossroads. We either rise to the progressive, anti-imperialist pan-Africanism as a continental political project of national liberation and social emancipation, or descend into narrow chauvinist nationalisms, be they racial, cultural, or ethnic. I believe we are at the dawn of a new era of pan-Africanism. We have to re-appropriate the pan-Africanist vision, and make it a category of intellectual thought and a guiding post of political struggles.

* Issa G. Shivji is one of Africa’s most radical and original thinkers and has written frequently for Pambazuka News. He is the author of several books, including Silences in NGO Discourse (2007), published in Fahamu Books.

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Reviewing the historic role of African and African-American publications in the struggle for representation and access to information, Walter Turner situates Pambazuka News in an established line of liberatory writing. While illustrating the ability of publications like Pambazuka to catalyse social change, Turner stresses respect for the history of activist media and the importance of continual support to sustain their future vitality.

In a comprehensive review of the latest global capitalist crisis and its consequences for African populations, Patricia Daley explores how greed has continued to hinder African educational opportunities and the realisation of a Walter Rodney-esque development rooted in personal freedom, well-being and security. With the hegemonic narratives of the West failing to improve the lot of the majority, Africans must return to creating their own narratives of development, central to which will prove the more effective use of technological change and the access to information offered by media outlets such as Pambazuka News.

For the seventh consecutive year, Dignity is proud to invite applications to the Annual Global Linking and Learning Programme. The Programme will take selected participants on a ten day intensive – enjoyable - learning journey that will equip them with knowledge of the key elements of human rights based development, and enhance skills for its practical application. Participants will see the unity between human rights and development and become more committed to the work ahead to achieve the unified human rights and development vision of human dignity for all.

The Hargeisa Institute of Health Sciences (HIOHS) and Somaliland Nursing and Midwifery Association (SLNMA) have two vacancies for nurse educationalists with significant overseas experience to contribute to a programme of work being implemented to enhance nursing education within Somaliland. These rewarding positions offer a unique opportunity to be involved in the development of human and institutional capacity, crucial for the rebuilding of the health system in Somaliland.

Jack Govender, aka Sipho Khumalo, has made the ultimate sacrifice for freedom. An internationalist in every sense, he laid down his life not for 'his people' in any narrow sense, but for his people in the broader sense that he took oppression and suffering anywhere as his own.

A24 Media is Africa’s first online delivery site for material from journalists, African broadcasters and NGO’s from around the Continent. A24 Media’s business model ensures that all contributors receive a wide and previously unknown exposure to their content, thereby generating sustainable and generous revenues from the sale of their stories on a 60:40 basis in favour of the contributor. Most importantly, the contributor will continue to OWN the copyright of the original footage.

Millions of people around the world live in informal urban communities where a lack of resources leads to degradation of the environment. Deteriorating environmental conditions, in turn, create more poverty. When participants from IDRC's eight "Focus Cities" met to compare notes, they mapped out ways in which small practical gains could start to reverse that cycle — providing incomes for individuals and families while helping to create cleaner, healthier neighbourhoods.

Lovers of literature and human rights will gather across the world this Sunday, October 5th, for commemorative readings of the poems of Mahmoud Darwish. In Africa, readings will take place in Kenya, Sudan, Senegal, South Africa, Egypt and Zimbabwe.

The South African government has withdrawn from parliament a bill that would have empowered it to expropriate land and other property and to unilaterally determine the compensation to be paid to owners.

The Council for Zimbabwean Christian Leaders in the UK (CZCLUK) has welcomed the signing of the power sharing agreement as an act that brings hope to the suffering people in Zimbabwe and the millions now scattered around the world. We urge both Zanu Pf and MDC in its two factions to put the interest of the Zimbabwean first and ensure that this agreement brings a period of justice,peace and reconstruction.

President Robert Mugabe and opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai met Tuesday but failed to agree on a share-out of ministries in a power-sharing government, the opposition said. MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa told AFP that the deadlock had been referred back to former South African president Thabo Mbeki who mediated the agreement signed earlier this month.

The African continent is one of the least connected – and when it is connected the costs tend to be higher than in most other parts of the world. In May 2008, the Association for Progressive Communications released the results of the study – The Case for “Open Access” Communications – Infrastructure in Africa: The SAT-3/WASC Cable. The briefing report, written by Abiodun Jagun, summarises the results of the study, conducted in four African countries, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal, which examined the impact of the SAT-3/WASC cable on communications markets.

More than two million counterfeit drugs destined for Africa have been seized in Belgium, customs officials say. They said the shipment from India, including copies of an anti-malaria drug, was the biggest seizure of fake medication ever made in Europe. Customs officers at Brussels airport became suspicious when they noticed spelling mistakes on the labels.

Medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres has sharply criticised the forced closure of South African migrant camps over the last two days. "There is no solution for these people, they have nowhere to go," an MSF spokesman told the BBC. The camps, holding 1,200 foreigners driven from their homes by May's xenophobic violence, are being shut around the city of Johannesburg.

Media Rights Agenda (MRA) has announced its rejection of the recommendations of the Senate’s Information Committee on the Freedom of Information Bill, saying if passed as proposed it would be the worst access to information law in the world and would bring Nigeria to ridicule.

The South African State IT Agency (Sita), which provides IT services to government, will itself migrate to open source software over the coming year. This is according to the organisation’s 2007/2008 annual report (PDF) which has been tabled in Parliament.

Millions of African women’s progress is challenged by their everyday realities of hunger, violence, exclusion, sickness, and discrimination. According to the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), most African women are worse off today than they were a decade ago.

Donor contributions for contraceptives and condoms for HIV prevention amounted to $223 million in 2007—a mere 5 per cent increase over the 2006 total of $212 million, according to a new analysis by UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund. This is despite a growing unmet need for such supplies, as more couples use modern methods of contraception and world population continues to increase.

Armed groups are still recruiting child soldiers to fight in the ongoing conflict in the province of North Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Those child soldiers who attempt to escape have been killed or tortured, sometimes in front of other children, to discourage further escapes. Children who are taken captive by the DRC army on suspicion of being armed group fighters, have faced ill-treatment and torture in military detention

The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe is deteriorating and will continue to worsen into next year, according to the top United Nations humanitarian official, who has called for urgent aid to avert increased human suffering in the Southern African nation. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes said that an estimated 3.8 million people would be classed as food insecure between now and the end of the year.

About 1,200 Congolese have sought shelter in southern Sudan in recent days to escape brutal attacks by members of the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that have included the abduction of children and the torching of homes, the United Nations refugee agency has reported.

The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) has given Zimbabwe a second chance to hold the regional bloc’s 13th summit, in what would appear to be a hasty show of confidence in the country as a result of the power sharing deal. The summit had been initially set to take place in May but was called off after state-sponsored violence swept through the country, following Robert Mugabe’s election loss to opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round of voting in March.

The 2008 Professor Thorolf Rafto Memorial Prize is awarded to Pastor Bulambo Lembelembe Josué, right, for his dedication to end the plight of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The board of the Rafto Foundation has decided to award the Rafto Prize to Pastor Bulambo Lembelembe Josué. The church leader brings hope to Eastern Congo, and his work brings hope for peace, reconciliation and human dignity to a people that have suffered from the deadliest conflict since World War II.

In its most recent rankings, Transparency International classifies Algeria as one of the more corrupt countries of the world, despite a modest move upward of seven places to 92nd out of 180. Financial and economic experts in Algeria say the low classification is a product of growing parallel trade, weak independent oversight and a failure to apply and enforce the law.

Attempts to coerce developing countries to take on commitments on climate change will not work and they will instead dangerously create a reaction that will make the climate change negotiations more complex. This was stated by the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy at the first plenary session of the WTO's Public Forum 2008..

As Africa grapples with the question of food insecurity, biotechnology buffs seem to have an answer: genetically modified crops that could feed a continent vulnerable to famine and food deficits. But environmentalists warn of new dangers. An appeal board recently overturned opposition from the South African GMO Executive Council to allow testing of a nutritionally enhanced, genetically modified sorghum, known as 'Super Sorghum' in greenhouses in Pretoria.

In attempts to clampdown on homosexuality, some angry Nigerian citizens devoted to torment and victimise the gays and lesbians in that country. The media is believed to be at the helm of infiltrating the recent spate of attacks in Nigeria on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people. This followed a series of articles published by some newspapers such as The Nation, PM News, The Vanguard and The Sunday Sun indicating that House of Rainbow Metropolitan Church – an all-inclusive congregation in Nigeria according to a lead member – is exclusively gay.

Reporters Without Borders notes with satisfaction that the National Press and Publications Council decided on 29 September to allow the English-language daily The Citizen to resume publication after being suspended for 27 days. The council said the newspaper is now complying with all administrative requirements.

A potential polio epidemic in Kenya has been monitored and contained using a mobile phone application called EpiSurveyor. The application, which is free to use and run on an open-source platform, was used by health officials to collate information on the disease, such as patient symptoms, treatment, levels of medical supplies and areas that needed vaccines.

Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos unveiled his cabinet following last month's landmark legislative poll on Wednesday, state media reported. Angola's ruling MPLA party secured a landslide election victory last month, setting stage for changes that critics fear could make presidency even more powerful and weaken other institutions.

Health officials say air pollution in Benin’s economic capital, Cotonou, is an often-overlooked, undiagnosed killer that is as much of a health threat as the country’s leading cause of death, malaria. “People banalise pollution because no one ever made the link…between pollution, illness and death,” said UN Development Programme coordinator Mathieu Houinato.

Disabled people in northern Uganda - many of whom were injured in the long conflict between the government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) - are calling on the government to provide a more targeted HIV response. Although there have been no rebel attacks in the region for over two years, the LRA planted landmines across the region and local people continue to find unexploded ordnance.

A chronic lack of healthcare workers in Malawi has crippled the health system, but a different way of doing things has alleviated the shortages, bringing new players to the field. Many Malawian doctors and nurses head to wealthier countries in search of greener pastures, so the government has been forced to come up with a plan driven by an idea known as "task shifting".

Archived, online coverage of the XVII International AIDS Conference (AIDS
2008) is now available from kaisernetwork.org, the official webcaster of AIDS
2008.

Gender equality and advancement of women is addressed by the Commission on the Status of Women of ECOSOC, and dozens of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, disparities continue worldwide, from the glass-ceiling in the nations claiming equality principles, to more stringent issues as unequal access to education, health care and decisionmaking positions in many cultures and world regions. This study is designed to collect judgments about the answers to a list of questions.

A continental workshop on the Economic Partnership Agreements between European and African countries will be held in Addis Ababa to analyse whether inconsistency between regional objectives and initial bilateral trade agreements involving some African countries and their European Union trading partners will jeopardise Africa’ s integration agenda. Meanwhile, African leaders attending the United Nations (UN) summit highlighted the challenges they face in funding basic services such as health and sanitation because of the soaring costs of fuel and basic foods and called for measures to be taken to address these at the international level, including debt cancellation, more research on seed variation and assistance with irrigation technology among others.

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) has given the coup leaders in Mauritania until October 6 to restore constitutional order in the country through the unconditional restoration of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and has declared as null all constitutional, institutional and legislative measures taken by the junta after the coup. Nevertheless, the new Mauritanian leaders, who enjoy the support of the majority of parliamentarians, have rejected the AU ultimatum describing it as non constructive and not in the interest of Mauritania. While, members of parliament have themselves adopted their own road map for the resumption of constitutional order. Also in peace and security news, the AU has strongly condemned Somali rebel assaults on its peacekeepers describing the attacks as ‘calculated provocation and intended to show its mission as partisan in the ongoing conflict so its troops could easily become a target’. As a result of these continual attacks on its troops, the AU has restated its call on the UN Security Council to immediately authorise the deployment of peacekeepers in the country and appealed to the international community to censure the acts of aggression and terrorism in Somalia.

Meanwhile, the panel of African eminent personalities is set to continue monitoring the political developments in Kenya to ensure that the coalition government delivers on its promises, especially in relation to constitutional reform, land reform, youth unemployment, and national cohesion. Meanwhile, the AU chairman, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, has dismissed fear that the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa could put the Zimbabwe power-sharing deal at risk, reaffirming the AU’s commitment to assist.

Participants at a regional conference in Kampala appealed to African countries to ensure that cluster bombs are banned, while the UN has called on all countries to sign a treaty in Oslo on 3 December that will outlaw the production of cluster munitions.

Finally, the Chinese government and the AU have signed a contract agreement for the construction of the African Union Conference Centre as another step in the partnership between China and Africa.

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) is pleased to announce that we are recruiting for the post of Senior Researcher in Forestry and Land Use.We are looking for an inspiring forestry leader to develop and manage a programme of research and partnership building to improve the sustainability and local livelihood benefits of forestry. If you believe that forestry involves multiple goods, services and stakeholders and that locally-owned decision-making and international support are vital to improve forest investment and stakeholders empowerment, by joining the team you will be able to directly influence the setting up of a global forest partnership initiative.

The Kenyan Equity Bank, One of the world’s first cellphone-to-cellphone cash-transfer systems, intends to expand its activities to southern Sudan by the end of the year. The system, called M-PESA, allows customers to transfer cash via their mobile phone, through an agent or store which supplies the cash. To send cash, a customer has to buy E-money which is then loaded on to his account and then he can send to a recipient who receives a text message with a code telling him to go and collect money from an agent within his proximity.

Angolan authorities files legal action to close down the Angolan non-profit AJPD – Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy. AJPD is one of the non-profits which are most committed to the development of culture of human right in the country. The State relies the lawsuit on unconstitutional arguments and invalid proceedings. AJPD CANNOT BE ELIMINATED!

As Muslims globally come to the end of the holy month of Ramadan, Salma Maoulidi explores the continuing spiritual and secular inequalities experienced by Muslim Tanzanian women. Focussing on the gulf between spiritual goals and worldly reality, the absence of an effective redistributive alms system, and the differing realities faced by female and male followers, the author questions the extent to which a symbolic ritual of deprivation and sacrifice has been turned into a calculated wealth generating opportunity.

In a potent critique of the post-apartheid state and its role in the wave of xenophobic discrimination to have gripped the South African nation, Dale T. McKinley explores the roots of the country’s ‘macro-nationalist paradigm’ and its consequences in the shape of the contemporary pogroms of African foreigners. Highlighting the ‘changing of the nationalist guard’ aspect to the ANC’s 1994 election victory, the author argues that the state’s dominant discourse of ‘nation-building’ has its natural corollary in the idea and practice of xenophobia directed at non-South African nationals.