The adoption of a 'briefing note' by the ANC's NEC last year, which accused
elements in Cosatu of 'counter-revolutionary' and 'ultraleftist' plans to
launch a political party, remains a thorn in the side of some. Dinga Sikwebu
concludes the SACP's response fails to take into account the changes taking
place in the ANC.
SA Labour Bulletin Vol 26 Number 1 . February 2002
POLITICS and LABOUR
The adoption of a 'briefing note' by the ANC's NEC last year, which accused
elements in Cosatu of 'counter-revolutionary' and 'ultraleftist' plans to
launch a political party, remains a thorn in the side of some. Dinga Sikwebu
concludes the SACP's response fails to take into account the changes taking
place in the ANC.
The South African Communist Party (SACP) released it's response to the
briefing notes amid much concern as to what they actually represented.
Cosatu and other activists questioned what the notes said about the Alliance
and the African National Congress (ANC). In many respects, the SACP response
sidesteps this question while at the same time revealing serious political
inadequacies. The SACP welcomed the briefing notes as being the cataylst for
sparking a debate within the Alliance but at the same time, pointed to a
number of incorrect and dangerous issues in the briefing notes.
These include:
? The briefing notes attempted to avoid discussions on issues of difference
that have emerged within the Alliance such
as the growth, employment and redstribution strategy (Gear) and
privatisation.
? The focus on the strength and influence of 'non and anti-ANC tendencies
within Cosatu' could have the effect of enhancing the influence and prestige
of anti-ANC forces in the trade unions and mass movement.
? The briefing notes have the potential to discourage debate.
? The briefing notes could lead to witchhunts, a 'dogmatic closing of ranks'
and deepening of divisions within the Alliance.
Putting the ANC briefing notes to bed?
While few will deny the dangers in the briefing notes as identified by the
politburo, the SACP response still has
glaring weaknesses. It fails to point out the real agenda behind the
briefing notes.
The basis for the Alliance
The briefing notes should not be seen in isolation of an attempt by the ANC
leadership to re-organise the Alliance on a
new basis - a basis where Cosatu and the SACP are more subordinate. This is
not a new agenda. In fact, the briefing notes
have huge 'cut-and-paste' chunks from an ANC NEC discussion document issued
in October 2000. At the time, the national
executive committee NEC document raised alarm bells on potential
ultra-leftism within Cosatu.
A year down the line such a possibility has become real, according to the
briefing notes. There exists a group within Cosatu
that harbours political ambitions of the federation becoming the 'primary
political home' of an ultra-left tendency, the briefing
notes argue. If we are to believe the briefing notes, among the aims of this
tendency is the transformation of Cosatu into a political formation
independent of the ANC. The views of this tendency in Cosatu, the authors of
the briefing notes claim, are 'often expressed as official policy of the
federation'.
The evidence for claims of an ultra-left tendency, as identified by the
authors of the briefing notes, is reflected in:
? Cosatu's decision to embark on a strike against privatisation;
? the determination to continue with the anti-privatisation campaign;
? persistent calls for an Alliance political centre and a common Alliance
programme;
? a decision by Cosatu to call on its office bearers to step down from the
ANC NEC;
? calls for an end to Gear and adoption of a new growth path;
? the decision by Cosatu to convene a People's Summit made up of
'organisations of civil society';
? Cosatu's criticism of the government position on Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS;
? the 'tendency in the pronouncements of some of the senior leadership to
seek media publicity at the expense of the
ANC and government';
? the SACP's decision to relaunch itself 'as a mass party' being viewed as
an accomplice to the 'left rebellion';
? calls for an Alliance political centre being viewed as an attempt to
foster 'co-governance' against ANC leadership
of the Alliance.
Mass struggle and independent mass formations were viewed as threats that
must be nipped in the bud. That is the message of the briefing notes but the
SACP's response failed to reveal this. Welcoming the notes' reaffirmation of
the Alliance is a political disservice. The briefing notes call for a
different Alliance. One that is not a coordinator of struggle and
transformation; one where Cosatu and the SACP are subordinate partners.
Ultimately, the briefing notes propose a new basis for the Alliance - one
that is different from the one agreed to on 9 May 1990 when the
ANC-Cosatu-SACP Alliance was formally constituted.
ANC and the working class
The briefing notes reflect the deep forces at play within the Alliance. They
reveal attempts by the ANC to restructure its
relationship with the working class so that the latter is nothing else but
an electoral base. Secondly, they reflect what has been
happening to the ANC as an organisation. Since the ANC's move into
governmental office, there has been an intensification of a campaign to
restructure the relationship between the ANC and the working class. The
struggles by the working class are not refracting through the ANC as the
organisation has become 'struggle-shy'. The policies being pursued by the
ANC government have been the target of criticism by key working class
formations. The ANC is cutting itself adrift from the working class while at
the same time there has been a weakening of the ANC as an organisation. It
is common cause that branches through which the working class is supposed to
express itself, are weak if non-existent. The ANC is no longer dependent on
working class bodies and branches to drive policy formulation. What is even
more critical is the relationship that has been developing between the ANC
as an organisation and the state.
At the centre of the disagreements in the Alliance is the fact the policy
formulation does not reside in the ANC but in the state. Also important to
note has been the transformation of the ANC in a way that makes the
organisation mirror the state. Among many of the initiatives aimed at
mimicking the state was the 1997 decision to hold national conferences every
five years, similar to terms of government. Presently, the ANC is
restructuring its branches so as to coincide with boundaries of local
authorities.
With such fundamental changes taking place, it is surprising that the
politburo discussion document makes no references
to what has been happening to the ANC as an organisation. Detaching the ANC
from the working class requires a restructured Alliance. It requires an
acquiescent SACP. It requires a Cosatu, which according to one leader in the
federation, is nothing more than an 'ANC Workers League'. Cosatu and the
SACP are only useful insofar as they help manage discontent within the
working class. A fighting Cosatu and an independent SACP are stumbling
blocks in the big project of transforming the ANC into a party of capital
with the working class as an electoral base.
A glaring weakness in the SACP politburo discussion document is how the
threat of muzzling debate posed by the briefing notes is linked to trampling
of popular democracy at a societal level. Neoliberalism is the opposite of
popular democracy. To succeed neoliberalism cannot afford a situation where
policy options are opened to popular democratic decision making.
Developments in other countries have demonstrated how under neoliberalism,
power becomes concentrated in the executive and it is the economic
ministries that wield power within the executive. These features are evident
in our country.
In the last seven years we have witnessed a mushrooming of 'supposedly
independent' regulatory authorities. Whether one deals with the Independent
Communication Authority (ICASA) or the electricity regulator (NER), what is
common with these structures is their cushioning from mass pressure and to
varying degrees their accountability to the executive. Despite provisions
for public hearings and nominations, there exists no direct accountability
of these structures to the general populace. Compare these levels of
unaccountability to their powers to determine policies that affect lives of
ordinary people!
There is no doubt that power in South Africa lies in the presidency and the
departments of finance and trade and industry. Has parliament given a
mandate to offers that government has made to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO)? How many times have union negotiators found that government
departments they are engaging with were negotiating under the dictates of
the finance ministry? The delays in passing legislation, as required by the
constitution, that will enable parliament to initiate and amend money bills
is a sign of unwillingness by the executive to cede power to the
legislature. The politburo document should have reflected on these
developments, as the briefing notes do not only pose a threat to debate but
are a reflection of a move to take policy options out of popular and
democratically elected structures.
Conclusion
What does the politburo document say about what the working class and its
militants are supposed to do? Except a call not to 'deepen divisions' within
the Alliance as well as an appeal to prove the 'ultra-left argument' wrong,
one does not find a clearer definition of tasks for the working class and
its activists. A call on militants to do nothing to exacerbate the tensions
in the Alliance without a proper assessment of what the briefing notes
represent and how they reflect class realignment, has the potential to do
the very thing that the politburo document warns against - 'a dogmatic
closing of ranks'. Even more bizarre is the assertion that the immediate
task is to prove the incorrectness of the 'non and anti-ANC tendencies'
within the mass movement. Having conceded that 'the principle strategic
threat to the NDR' does not remotely come from these tendencies, it is
baffling to read that the task in the coming months is to prove the
ultra-left wrong.
The politburo argument is simple: the ANC's briefing notes have the
potential to stifle debate but more serious is that they
pose a 'very real danger to play straight into the hands of the ultra-left'
who will say, 'we always told you so', so let us prove
the ultra-left wrong. Ironically, therefore, the politburo concludes that
the task is to deal with the 'ultra left', which the briefing
notes say must be defeated. The only difference is that the ANC NEC thinks
that such a tendency is influential as its views
'are often expressed as official policy of the federation'. But the
politburo moves from the basis that such a tendency is a 'significant
minority within Cosatu'. Maybe there will be differences in dealing with the
tendency! Maybe class militants and their organisations should not focus on
the transformation of the ANC. They should not focus on class realignment
that is taking place and reflected in the briefing notes. They should also
not be concerned with the curtailing of popular democracy. They must
disregard moves to divide their labour movement into private and public
sectors. They must be unmindful of attempts to divide the Cosatu leadership
from affiliates. They should also ignore what are clear attempts to cow both
Cosatu and SACP. The focus should instead be on the 'insignificant
ultra-left'. This appears to be the advice-throughomission contained in the
politburo discussion document. The document reflects on how in the past the
ultra-left was dealt with. According to the politburo discussion document
'in the second half of the 1970s, the most significant non-ANC left emerged
within the trade unions'. We are told that the SACP in 1985, noting 'the
growing strength of the workerists', launched a campaign not 'to allow
socialism to be monopolised by an anti-ANC tendency'.
This is a counter-distinction to the briefing notes which characterise the
present 'left rebellion' as counterrevolutionary.
The politburo discussion document points to how the campaign to defeat the
ultra-left in the 1980s was fought on a principled basis. According to the
document 'the ultra-left and workerists were always treated as part of the
broad people's camp. They were never treated as if they were the enemy or an
imperialist conspiracy'. The battle was 'intense and comradely'. Those who
were part of the fight that led to splits in Mawu, MWASA and Ccawusa may be
in a better position to say how 'intense and comradely' the battles were.
Delegates at the 1987 Cosatu national congress who were scolded and
threatened by Peter Mokaba to adopt the Freedom Charter if they wanted to
escape being labeled 'political hobos', may be able to tell us about the
'comradely' struggle that made the SACP hegemonic within Cosatu. One has to
also consult editions of the African Communist and Sactu's Workers Unity to
see how comradely the battles were. They are there for all us to learn. For
it to provide valuable lessons it should not be sanitised.
Dinga Sikwebu is a Numsa official. This article was written prior to the
Alliance meeting in January 2002.
































