TEXT OF THE APRIL 19th. REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA.
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1394 (2002) of 27 February 2002, by which the Council
extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2002 and requested me to provide
a report on the situation before the end of the present mandate.
Reaffirming its previous resolutions on the question of Western Sahara
and its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and
mutually acceptable solution, the Security Council decided to consider
actively the options contained in my report of 19 February 2002
(S/2002/178). The present report covers developments since that date.
II. Activities of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General
2. During the reporting period, in anticipation of a decision by the
Security Council concerning one of the options submitted for its
consideration in my 19 February report (S/2002/178), my Personal Envoy,
James A. Baker III, has had no direct contact with the parties. I expect
that, subject to the proviso in paragraph 22 below, Mr. Baker will be
prepared to resume his activities once the Security Council has taken a
decision on how it wishes him to proceed with his efforts to assist in
finding a solution to the dispute over Western Sahara.
III. Developments on the ground
3. My Special Representative, William L. Swing, has continued to
maintain regular contacts with the parties. In Laayoune he has met
regularly with the Coordinator of the Kingdom of Morocco with MINURSO,
Governor Hamid Chabar. On 20 and 21 March 2002 my Special
Representative, accompanied by the MINURSO Force Commander, visited the
Tindouf area in Algeria, where they met with the Frente POLISARIO chief
official dealing with defence issues, Mohammed Bouhali, and the Frente
POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, Emhamed Khaddad. During his visits
to Algiers and Rabat on 31 March and 4 and 5 April, respectively, Mr.
Swing met with senior Algerian and Moroccan officials. On 8 April he
held talks in Nouakchott with the President of Mauritania, Maaouya Ould
Sid' Ahmed Taya, and other senior Mauritanian officials. On 7 March my
Special Representative visited Rabat, where he met individually with the
Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council and
the Ambassador of Spain.
A. Activities of the Identification Commission
4. During the reporting period, the Identification Commission continued
its work in its offices in both Laayoune and Tindouf on the electronic
archiving of the individual files of all persons who applied to be
included in the list of voters for the referendum in Western Sahara. As
at 15 April some 71,736 individual files out of a total of 244,643 had
been processed.
B. Military aspects
5. As at 15 April 2002 the military component of MINURSO stood at the
authorized strength of 230 military personnel (see annex). Under the
command of Brigadier General Claude Buze (Belgium), MINURSO continued to
monitor the ceasefire between the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente
POLISARIO military forces, which has been in effect since 6 September
1991. There has been no indication on the ground that either side
intends to resume hostilities in the near future.
6. During the first half of the reporting period, discussions continued
between MINURSO and the Frente POLISARIO at various levels, with a view
to lifting the restrictions imposed by the latter on the freedom of
movement of United Nations military observers east of the defensive
sandwall (berm) since January 2001. At a meeting on 21 March, the Frente
POLISARIO informed my Special Representative of its decision to lift
these restrictions. My Special Representative welcomed this positive
development. MINURSO has been advised that the restrictions will be
effectively lifted at the end of April, by which time members at all
levels of the Frente POLISARIO chain of command will have been duly
informed of the decision of their leadership. Accordingly, a
coordination meeting between General Buze and the Frente POLISARIO
military is scheduled to take place shortly, in order to ensure that the
final arrangements for the full restoration of the freedom of movement
of United Nations military observers east of the berm are in place.
7. On the western side of the berm, MINURSO military patrols continued
to visit and inspect Royal Moroccan Army ground units larger than
company size, in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements between
MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army.
C. Civilian police aspects
8. As at 15 April the strength of the civilian police component of
MINURSO stood at 25 officers (see annex) under the command of Inspector
General Om Prakash Rathor (India). The officers continued to work around
the clock to ensure the protection of sensitive files and materials at
the Identification Commission centres at Laayoune and Tindouf.
D. Preparatory work for the repatriation of the Saharan refugees
9. During the reporting period my Special Representative visited the
headquarters of several agencies working on humanitarian aspects of the
Western Sahara conflict. On 28 February and 6 March he met with senior
officials of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Commission
Humanitarian Aid Office in Rome and Brussels, respectively, to discuss
continuing food supply problems for the Western Saharan refugees in the
Tindouf camps. On 5 and 31 March he met with representatives of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
Geneva and Tindouf, respectively, to discuss the overall humanitarian
situation in the refugee camps and enquire about prospects for the
implementation of cross-border confidence-building measures. I regret to
inform the Council that, so far, there is no progress to report in
regard to these measures due to a lack of consensus on the issue.
10. During the reporting period, UNHCR continued to carry out its
mandated responsibilities for the Western Saharan refugees in the
Tindouf camps and to coordinate with MINURSO. As a follow-up to the two
workshops on international refugee law held in the Tindouf area in 2001,
UNHCR organized another workshop in Algiers on 27 February 2002, in the
presence of Algerian officials and refugee representatives, aimed at
strengthening its protection capacity and establishing a more effective
asylum framework in the host country. Two other workshops to achieve
better coordination among the host country, key donors and humanitarian
agencies took place in March 2002.
11. During the reporting period the food supply situation remained
precarious because of continued difficulties in ensuring an adequate
pipeline of balanced food for the refugees. The reduction of
humanitarian assistance, in the absence of a durable solution to the
question of Western Sahara, remained a major concern for the refugees
and their leadership. Together with WFP, UNHCR coordinated a donor visit
to the Tindouf camps on 10 and 11 April 2002. On 14 April WFP announced
a two-year refugee aid project, estimated to cost $30 million, which
could
provide approximately 68,000 metric tons of aid to the refugees, pending
approval by its Executive Board in May. A donor briefing on Western
Sahara is scheduled to take place at UNHCR headquarters in Geneva on 23
April.
E. Prisoners of war, persons unaccounted for and detainees
12. On 5 March my Special Representative met in Geneva with senior
officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to
discuss the Moroccan prisoners of war and the fate of all those
unaccounted for since the beginning of the conflict. At present, 1,362
prisoners of war continue to be detained by the Frente POLISARIO. Of
these, some 916 have been detained for more than 20 years and are
currently the longest-held prisoners of war in the world. At the meeting
with my Special Representative in Geneva on 5 March, ICRC once again
expressed its deep concern at the poor physical and mental health of the
prisoners.
F. Organization of African Unity
13. During the reporting period the observer delegation of the
Organization of African Unity to MINURSO, led by Ambassador Yilma
Tadesse (Ethiopia), continued to provide valuable support and
cooperation to the Mission. I wish to reiterate my sincere appreciation
for this contribution.
IV. Other developments
14. On 27 February President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria visited the
refugee camps in the Tindouf area, where he met with the Frente
POLISARIO leadership and attended festivities marking the twenty-sixth
anniversary of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic". This was the
first reported visit to the refugee camps by an Algerian Head of State
since the establishment of the camps in 1976. On 5 and 6 March King
Mohammed VI of Morocco visited the towns of Dakhla and Laayoune in the
Territory, accompanied by the Moroccan Cabinet. In Dakhla King Mohammed
VI presided over a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the first time
he had ever done so in the Territory. In a televised speech from
Laayoune, the King announced the creation of a new agency for the social
and economic development of the Territory. The Secretary-General of the
Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdelaziz, protested the King's visit in a
letter dated 4 March addressed to the President of the Security Council.
15. In my last report I informed the Council that in late December 2001
Saharan detainees carried out a three-week hunger strike in a Laayoune
prison, demanding better conditions. The hunger strike ended the
following month, after the Moroccan authorities took a series of
measures to address prison conditions.
V. Financial and logistical aspects
16. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/262 of 14 June 2001,
appropriated the amount of $48.8 million, equivalent to a monthly rate
of some $4.1 million, for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. I shall continue to reassess the Mission's
resource requirements in the light of the recent staff reductions and
will revert to the General Assembly with consequential adjustments, if
necessary.
17. As at 31 March 2002 unpaid assessed contributions to the special
account for MINURSO amounted to $56,558,258. The total outstanding
assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date
amounted to $1,423,008,273. 18. MINURSO's logistical infrastructure
remains generally adequate, but some of the equipment is old, either
approaching or beyond its expected life span. Evolving logistical
requirements have already led the Mission to install three communication
ground stations at military observer team sites, upgrade some
information technology equipment and accommodation at various locations
in the Mission area, and improve
security conditions at headquarters in Laayoune. However, additional
upgrades are required. Pending a decision by the Security Council
concerning the extension of MINURSO's mandate, a technical assistance
team from New York Headquarters is scheduled to visit the Mission in the
near future to assess its logistical needs.
VI. Observations and recommendations
19. The humanitarian aspects of the overall situation affecting the
question of Western Sahara remain a source of great concern. The
detention of 1,362 prisoners of war continues to be one of the most
pressing humanitarian issues. As the Council is aware, I have already
asked my Special Representative to assist ICRC in the discharge of its
critical tasks. It is my earnest hope that members of the Council will
join me once again in urging the Frente POLISARIO to release all
remaining prisoners of war without further delay. I also hope that both
parties will continue to cooperate with the efforts of ICRC to solve the
problem of the fate of all those unaccounted for since the beginning of
the conflict.
20. Given the current low levels of food supply in the refugee camps in
the Tindouf area, I am also urging the international community to extend
its financial support to enable UNHCR and WFP to meet the humanitarian
needs of the refugees. As indicated in paragraph 9 above, my Special
Representative has been in close contact with UNHCR and WFP to support
efforts to address this problem. As the same time, I expect Morocco and
the Frente POLISARIO to cooperate without further delay with UNHCR in
the implementation of the long overdue confidence-building measures, as
repeatedly called for by the Security Council since 1999. The plight of
the separated refugee families demands no less. 21. It is my hope that
the Security Council will decide by the end of the current mandate
period how it wishes to proceed with regard to the future of the peace
process in Western Sahara and that it will take action, as appropriate
on the mandate of MINURSO. I believe that by choosing the option that it
considers most likely to help resolve the conflict, the Council will
indicate to the parties its determination to continue to look actively
for a realistic solution to the conflict that will also contribute to
long-term peace, stability and prosperity in the Maghreb region.
22. My Personal Envoy stands ready to undertake the activities that will
be required under the option the Security Council chooses, in order to
steer the parties towards a resolution of their dispute over Western
Sahara, provided that the Council does not support any changes to
options one, two or three that would require the concurrence of the
parties. Such changes, as my Personal Envoy told the Council on 27
February 2002, would simply encourage a continuation of the conflict and
the current stalemate. As always, I intend to lend all my support to my
Personal Envoy in his difficult task.
[2]
the Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara]
------------------------------------------------------
iv) ANNAN AND THE MOROCCAN POWs
Washington DC, 24 April 2002.
Morocco and the world – for that matter - never cease to amaze me. I was
already quite shocked when Morocco, quickly parroted by Mr. Annan,
demanded Polisario’s “release [of] all remaining prisoners of war
without further delay.” For one, Morocco intends that the Polisario
lose its prestige and credibility as legitimate representative of the
Saharawi people and therefore as leader of the Saharawis. How can the
Polisario release prisoners of war who overran and occupied its country
– while thousands of its own people were forcibly exiled? Please can
somebody break the news … there are more than 150,000 Saharawis who fled
their country, due to Morocco’s invasion, living under dire conditions
in refugee camps. These refugees could have had a bright
future, had this terrible rape of their land not been allowed to happen.
Could the UN ever straighten its priorities? How could Mr. Annan ask for
the release of some 1,200 prisoners of war – SOLDIERS who massacred,
bombed and raped defenseless civilians – while a whole people has been
for more than a quarter century deprived from the right to live freely
in their own country? Since these soldiers stormed Western Sahara,
Saharawis have experienced daily humiliations and deprivations, living
under inhuman and brutal rule, courtesy
of the state of Morocco.
Annan’s own institution called - in its time, in 1975- upon Morocco to
immediately withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara. How could
Mohamed VI now cry injustice when Morocco - for more than twenty years-
has been utterly and absolutely denying the existence of such prisoners?
It’s Morocco’s own making and entire responsibility that these prisoners
ended up as such. Does the UN want Saharawis to lose faith in the world
itself as they see a vicious and flagrant violator of international law
get away with it in the name of realpolitik and pure hypocrisy?
It still amazes me.
[3]
Front Communique- New York, 22 April 2002]
----------------------------------------------------
vi) ANNAN CALLS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION
ABIDJAN, 24 April (IRIN) - UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has urged the
Security Council to decide on the future of UN involvement in the peace
process in Western Sahara, pending the expiry this month of the mandate
of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO).
Annan, in a new report to the council, also appealed for international
support through UNHCR
and WFP for relief for Sahrawi refugees. He said food supplies in
refugee camps were low, the
UN reported on Tuesday.
"I expect Morocco and Polisario (the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia el-Hamra and
Rio de Oro) to cooperate without further delay with UNHCR in the
implementation of long overdue confidence-building measures, as
repeatedly called for by the Security Council since 1999," Annan said.
"The plight of the separated refugee families demands no less."
He expressed concern over the continued detention of 1,300 prisoners of
war. "It is my earnest hope that the Council will join me once again in
urging Polisario to release all remaining prisoners of war without
further delay," Annan said. "I also hope that both parties will continue
to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross to solve
the problem of all those unaccounted for since the beginning of the
conflict."
Annan has suggested four options on Western Sahara: One is for the UN
to try to implement a 1988 settlement plan, even without the concurrence
the Polisario and Morocco; another is for his personal envoy, James
Baker III, to try to revise a draft framework agreement that he prepared
a few months ago; for Baker to discuss the division of the territory
with interested parties; or the termination of MINURSO's mandate.
Polisario wants independence for the 260,000-sq km territory that
Morocco annexed in 1975 when the former colonial power, Spain, pulled
out. The OAU recognised Western Sahara's independence, prompting Morocco
to pull out of the continental body. In 1991, the two sides signed a
cease-fire, paving the way for the deployment of MINURSO but efforts to
organise a referendum on the territory's future have since failed.
[4]
13 activists and businessmen, including Abraham Serfaty, a renowned
Moroccan Jewish leader, who had been jailed and exiled by the late King
Hassan II of Morocco for opposition to Morocco's annexation of the
Western Sahara.
The Western Sahara is a small mineral-rich portion of desert bordering
Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The conflict over the territory began
in 1975 when Morocco moved in, occupied and annexed it following the
withdrawal of Spain, the former colonial power.
The Polisario (Spanish acronym for Frente Popular para la Liberation del
Sagiat Al-Hamra y Rio de Oro) -- the political movement formed by the
Sahrawis originally to seek independence from Spain -- went to war
against Morocco and Mauritania when the country was invaded by Moroccan
and Mauritanian soldiers.
The Polisario defeated Mauritania in 1979, but the war against Morocco
continued for many years until a cease fire, brokered by the U.N., took
place in 1991. The U.N. established a mission, MINURSO, to oversee the
cease-fire and a referendum allowing the Sahrawis to vote on
independence or incorporation into Morocco.
With the chance of holding the referendum growing slimmer because of
insurmountable differences between Morocco and the Polisario over
voters' lists, the U.N. Security Council voted in June 2001 for what it
called a political solution to the Western Sahara question.
The arrangement would confer on the population of Western Sahara the
right to elect their own executive and legislative bodies and to run its
own local government administration, territorial budget, and basic
infrastructure.
But the alternative was rejected by the Polisario, which clings to the
referendum as the sole way out.
To break the new deadlock, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
proposed last February four options. These include the resumption of
efforts to try to hold a referendum, revision an autonomy plan brokered
by James Baker -- former U.S. secretary of state and Annan's personal
envoy for the Sahara -- taking into account the concerns expressed by
the parties and exploration of a possible partition of the Western
Sahara or alternatively a termination of the U.N. mission.
The alliance on Monday released a charter defining its prime objective
to open dialogue with all the parties concerned, including the Polisario
front. "The Alliance will start a faithful and open dialogue with all
the parties, especially Morocco, the Polisario and Algeria," says Ali
Benameur, who leads the group.
"There will be no red lines nor taboos in our quest for a lasting
settlement to the issue," adds Benameur, who is also Head of the
state-run Higher Institute of Business Management (ISGE).
The group envisions the solution of the conflict part of a regional
integration in North Africa.
"The settlement of the dispute should be a step towards Maghreban
economic integration," says Abraham Serfaty.
The five North African nations: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco,
set up in 1989 a regional bloc, the Arab Maghreb Union. But the grouping
has been unable to take off as a full fledged regional union, mainly
because of the Sahara issue. Morocco blames Algeria for politically and
militarily backing the Polisario.
For the Alliance, granting a large autonomy to the Western Sahara would
be the best solution, as a referendum would imply a winner and a loser.
"There should be no loser and no winner in this sensitive issue that
risks to plunge the whole North Africa in chaos," says the group.
"A self-rule, attached to the Moroccan crown with joint defence and
external relations, will be best scenario to end this conflict," says
Serfaty.
Observers in the Moroccan capital city see the Alliance's initiative as
a premiere that "evidences a change" in Morocco's way to deal with the
Sahara issue.
"Such initiative was unthinkable during the reign of King Hassan II,"
analyst Abdelkebir Gharroub told IPS.
Since the outbreak of the Sahara conflict in 1975, the Moroccan Palace
has been the sole authority entitled to handle the issue on the part of
Morocco. The country's political parties merely followed the political
manoeuvres from afar, while the press only transmitted official press
releases on the issue without any comment.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Western Sahara Foundation on Monday called on
President George W. Bush to press King Mohammed VI of Morocco to accept
the holding of the self-determination referendum in the Western Sahara.
The ruler of Morocco is currently on a work visit to the USA.
"As a leader of the free world, Mr. President, we urge you to tell the
King 'referendum now or withdraw from the Western Sahara,'" the
Foundation said in a release.
"By blocking the referendum process, Morocco is not only doing a
terrible injustice to the Sahrawi people, but it is also harming the
development of a Muslim democracy in North Africa," the foundation
added.
http://www.equiponizkor.org [5]
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Reaffirming its previous resolutions on the question of Western Sahara and its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution, the Security Council decided to consider actively the options contained in my report of 19 February 2002 (S/2002/178). The present report covers developments since that date.
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[1] https://www.pambazuka.org/author/contributor
[2] https://www.pambazuka.org/United%20Nations%20-%20Security%20Council%20-%20S/2002/467%20-%2019%20April%202002%5D%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B------------------------------------------------------%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3Bii%29%20TEXT%20OF%20DRAFT%20RESOLUTION%20WHICH%20WOULD%20COUNT%20WITH%20THE%20SUPPORT%20OF%20THE%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BUSA%2C%20UNITED%20KINGDOM%20AND%20FRANCE....%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%5BFRA/FRE%5D%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BNew%20York%2C%20le%2023%20avril%202002%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BLe%20conseil%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%2C%20Rappelant%20ses%20pr%C3%A9c%C3%A9dents%20r%C3%A9solutions%20sur%20le%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BSahara%20occidental%20et%20particuli%C3%A8rement%20la%201359%20%282001%29%20du%2029%20juin%202001%20et%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bla%201394%20%282002%29%20du%2027%20f%C3%A9vrier%202002.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BAyant%20consid%C3%A9r%C3%A9%20le%20rapport%20du%20Secr%C3%A9taire%20g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral%20du%2019%20f%C3%A9vrier%202002%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%28S/2002/178%29%20et%20ayant%20discut%C3%A9%20avec%20les%20parties%20les%20quatre%20options%20qui%20y%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bsont%20trait%C3%A9es.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BAyant%20%C3%A0%20l%27esprit%20qu%27apr%C3%A8s%20plus%20de%20onze%20ann%C3%A9es%20d%27efforts%20des%20Nations%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BUnies%20il%20est%20clair%20que%20le%20plan%20de%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Br%C3%A8glement%20ne%20peut%20%C3%AAtre%20appliqu%C3%A9%20dans%20sa%20forme%20actuelle%20en%20vue%20d%27aboutir%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%C3%A0%20une%20solution%20rapide%2C%20durable%20et%20accept%C3%A9e%20du%20conflit%20sur%20le%20Sahara%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Boccidental.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BAcceptant%20que%20la%20Mission%20des%20Nations%20Unies%20pour%20un%20Referendum%20au%20Sahara%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Boccidental%20%28MINURSO%29%20accompli%20une%20contribution%20significative%20au%20maintien%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bdu%20cessez-le-feu.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BPrenant%20note%20de%20l%27option%20pour%20une%20possible%20partition%20du%20territoire%20mais%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Baussi%20signalant%20qu%27il%20n%27y%20a%20pas%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bsuffisamment%20d%27informations%20sur%20cette%20option.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BExprimant%20son%20soutien%20total%20au%20r%C3%B4le%20et%20travail%20de%20l%27Envoy%C3%A9%20Personnel%2C%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BR%C3%A9affirmant%20son%20engagement%20%C3%A0%20aider%20les%20parties%20pour%20trouver%20une%20solution%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bjuste%2C%20d%C3%A9finitive%20et%20mutuellement%20accept%C3%A9e%2C%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B1-%20d%C3%A9cide%20de%20proroger%20le%20mandat%20de%20la%20Mission%20des%20Nations%20Unies%20pour%20un%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BReferendum%20au%20Sahara%20occidental%20%28MINURSO%29%20jusqu%27au%2031%20juillet%202002%20%3B%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B2-%20Demande%20au%20Secr%C3%A9taire%20g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral%20de%20donner%20instruction%20%C3%A0%20son%20Envoy%C3%A9%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BPersonnel%20de%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%281%29%20de%20pr%C3%A9parer%20un%20accord-cadre%20prenant%20en%20consid%C3%A9ration%20les%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bpr%C3%A9occupations%20exprim%C3%A9es%20par%20les%20parties%20et%20par%20d%27autres%20entit%C3%A9s%20ayant%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bl%27exp%C3%A9rience%20de%20ce%20type%20de%20documents%20mais%20sans%20chercher%20l%27assentiment%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bdes%20parties%20comme%20cela%20a%20%C3%A9t%C3%A9%20fait%20par%20le%20pass%C3%A9%20%3B%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%282%29%20de%20soumettre%20l%27accord-cadre%20au%20Conseil%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20qui%20le%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bpr%C3%A9senterait%20ensuite%20aux%20parties%20comme%20%C3%A9tant%20non%20n%C3%A9gociable.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B3-%20Appelle%20les%20parties%20%C3%A0%20coop%C3%A9rer%20pleinement%20avec%20le%20Secr%C3%A9taire%20g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bet%20son%20Envoy%C3%A9%20Personnel.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B4-%20Appelle%20les%20parties%20%C3%A0%20collaborer%20avec%20HCR%20pour%20la%20mise%20en%20application%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bdes%20mesures%20de%20confiance%20et%20demande%20%C3%A0%20la%20Communaut%C3%A9%20internationale%20de%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bfournir%20une%20aide%20g%C3%A9n%C3%A9reuse%20au%20HCR%20et%20au%20PAM%20dans%20le%20but%20de%20les%20aider%20%C3%A0%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bfaire%20face%20%C3%A0%20la%20d%C3%A9t%C3%A9rioration%20de%20la%20situation%20alimentaire%20des%20r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B5-%20Appelle%20le%20Maroc%20et%20le%20Front%20Polisario%20de%20continuer%20%C3%A0%20coop%C3%A9rer%20avec%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bles%20efforts%2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[3] https://www.pambazuka.org/By%20Khatry%20Beirouk%2C%20Western%20Sahara%20Online%20%28www.wsahara.net%29%20-%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B24Apr02%20-%20By%20way%20of%20the%20Norwegian%20Support%20Committee%20for%20Western%20Sahara%5D%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B------------------------------------------------------%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3Bv%29%20UN%20SECRETARY-GENERAL%20HELD%20INTERVIEW%20WITH%20THE%20COORDINATOR%20OF%20FRONT%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BPOLISARIO%20WITH%20%20MINURSO.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BNew%20York%2C%2022%20April%202002%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BThe%20Secretary-%20General%20of%20the%20United%20Nations%2C%20Mr.%20Kofi%20Annan%2C%20today%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BApril%2022%202002%20received%20Mr.%20Mhamed%20Khadad%2C%20coordinator%20of%20Front%20Polisario%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bwith%20%20MINURSO.%20%20During%20this%20audience%2C%20Mr.%20Khadad%20handed%20over%20a%20message%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bof%20Mohamed%20Abdelaziz%2C%20%20President%20of%20the%20RASD%20and%20Secretary-general%20of%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BFront%20Polisario%20relating%20to%20the%20%20last%20developments%20of%20the%20question%20of%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BWestern%20Sahara%20on%20the%20eve%20of%20a%20debate%20in%20%20the%20Security%20Council%20on%20the%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Boptions%20presented%20last%20February%20by%20Mr.%20James%20Baker.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BDuring%20this%20audience%2C%20Mr.%20Khadad%20recalled%20the%20constant%20co-operation%20the%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BPolisario%20Front%20has%20had%20with%20the%20United%20Nations%20in%20order%20to%20carry%20out%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bthe%20decolonization%20process%20of%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20through%20the%20exercise%20by%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bthe%20Saharawi%20people%20of%20its%20right%20to%20self-determination%20and%20independence.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BLikewise%2C%20he%20underlined%20the%20outright%20rejection%20on%20the%20part%20of%20the%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BSaharawis%2C%20of%20the%20framework%20agreement%20aiming%20at%20imposing%20the%20annexation%2C%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Barbitrariness%20and%20injustice%20on%20the%20Saharawi%20people%20and%20consequently%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Btension%20and%20instability%20in%20the%20Maghreb%20region.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Ba%20href%3D
[4] https://www.pambazuka.org/United%20Nations%2C%20Office%20for%20the%20Coordination%20of%20Humanitarian%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BAffairs%20%28OCHA%29%2C%20Integrated%20Regional%20Information%20Network%20%28IRIN%29%2C%2024Apr02%5D%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3B-------------------------------------------------------------------------%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3Bvii%29%20POLITICS-MOROCCO%3A%20ACTIVISTS%20WANT%20SAY%20IN%20WESTERN%20SAHARA%20STRATEGY.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BMoroccan%20civil%20society%20activists%20have%20formed%20an%20alliance%20to%20press%20for%20a%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bsolution%20to%20the%20protracted%20conflict%20of%20Western%20Sahara.%20The%20move%20is%20a%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bpremiere%20in%20this%20North%20African%20monarchy%2C%20where%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3Bhas%20always%20been%20an%20affair%20strictly%20reserved%20for%20the%20Royal%20Palace.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BThe%20Alliance%2C%20which%20calls%20itself%2C
[5] https://www.pambazuka.org/RABAT%2C%20Apr%2023%2C%202002%2C%20Inter%20Press%20Service%20via%20COMTEX%5D%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B--%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BFIN%20DEL%20MENSAJE%20END%20OF%20MESAGGE%20EINDE%20BERICHT%20FIM%20DA%20MENSAGEM%20FINE%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BDEL%20MESSAGGIO%20ENDE%20NACHRICHT%20FIN%20DEL%20MENSAJE%20END%20OF%20MESAGGE%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BEINDE%20BERICHT%20FIM%20DA%20MENSAGEM%20FINE%20DEL%20MESSAGGIO%20ENDE%20NACHRICHT%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%2A%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BThis%20Information%20is%20edited%20and%20disseminated%20by%20Nizkor%20International%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BHuman%20Rights%20Team.%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BNizkor%20is%20a%20member%20of%20the%20Peace%20and%20Justice%20Service-Europe%20%28Serpaj%29%2C%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BDerechos%20Human%20Rights%20%28USA%29%20and%20GILC%20%28Global%20Internet%20Liberty%20Campaign%29.%26lt%3B/p%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Bp%26gt%3BPO%20Box%20156.037%20-%20%2028080%20-%20Madrid%20-%20Spain.%20Telephone%3A%20%2B34.91.526.7502%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3BFax%3A%20%2B34.91.526.7515%20Mailto%3Anizkoreng%40derechos.org%26lt%3Bbr%20/%26gt%3B%26%2310%3B%26lt%3Ba%20href%3D
[6] mailto:[email protected]
[7] mailto:[email protected]
[8] mailto:[email protected]
[9] https://www.pambazuka.org/taxonomy/term/3278
[10] https://www.pambazuka.org/article-issue/62
[11] https://www.pambazuka.org/taxonomy/term/3271
[12] http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category.php/conflict/7217