Brian Raftopoulos argues that the SADC mediated talks between ZANU-PF and MDC were undermined by the unwillingness of Zanu PF to allow for a significant opening up of political spaces in the country. He further argues that SADC's endorsement of an outcome that did not take broad democratic principles into account was in effect an endorsement of Mugabe

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46870map.jpgThe 2007 SADC mandate to South Africa to broker an agreement between Zanu PF and the MDC should be seen as an extension of the “quiet diplomacy” that has been the hallmark of the South African and SADC approach to the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000. It took on an added urgency after the brutal public beating, arrest and torture of opposition and civic leaders in March 2007 and the widespread attacks on the MDC structures that followed thereafter. A combination of international pressure and the obligation by SADC to be seen to be taking action on the Zimbabwe question, led to an Extra-Ordinary SADC Heads of State Summit in Tanzania at the end of March 2007 at which South Africa was given the facilitation mandate on Zimbabwe.

There was widespread cynicism in many quarters both within and outside of Zimbabwe about the possibility of success of such an intervention, given the history of SADC’s supine position on Mugabe’s authoritarian regime. However it also presented an opportunity for national, regional and international forces to navigate a common approach out of the Zimbabwean debacle by reaching a political agreement that would be broadly acceptable to all sides.

For the MDC, weakened by the split in the organization since 2005, there was little alternative to such talks, as other methods of confronting the Mugabe regime had hitherto been handled with characteristic intolerance and repression by Zimbabwe’s ruling party. Mugabe, under strong pressure from SADC to enter the dialogue, had little option but to at least be seen to be willing to talk to the opposition. The South Africans, always keen not to make any interventions on Zimbabwe without regional support, saw this as an opportunity to push their “quiet diplomacy” agenda, and perhaps end up with their longstanding hope for a reasonably free and far election that would result in a Government of National Unity led by a reformed Zanu PF. The EU and the US, long frustrated by Mugabe’s intransigence and the regional and continental solidarity he continued to receive, also had little alternative but to allow the “point man” Mbeki the time to play his hand.

Mbeki started out with the intention that the dialogue between Zanu PF should achieve three objectives. Firstly both parties should endorse the decision to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. Secondly they should agree on the steps that should be taken to ensure that all concerned accept the elections as being truly representative of the “will” of the Zimbabwean people. Thirdly, that there should be agreement by all political parties and “other social forces” on the measures that should be implemented and respected in order to facilitate a legitimate election. The “other social forces” referred to the civil society groups who were cast in a more or less supporting role in the whole play.

Towards the end of 2007 the facilitation had, in the words of the MDC, reached “significant but not full consensus” on a number of areas in a political agreement covering issues of violence, sanctions, land, abuse of traditional leaders and food aid. The talks themselves, begun in an atmosphere of enormous distrust, appeared to have made some progress, with Zanu PF swallowing the bitter pill of negotiating with an opposition party that it had since 1999 labeled a foreign construction.

The dialogue also provided the divided MDC with an opportunity to work together as joint negotiating partners, even as attempts to re-unite the two formations were continuing parallel to the SADC facilitation. Discussions on the various aspects of the SADC dialogue added to the urgency of the need for the two MDC’s to at last work towards an election pact that would allow them to fight the 2008 Presidential and general elections together. Moreover it was clear to the MDC negotiators that if the talks were to break down with Zanu PF it had to be seen to be the fault of Mugabe’s party, and not due to any obstructiveness on the part of the opposition.

As matters transpired it was precisely the intransigence of Zanu PF and the unwillingness of Zanu PF to allow for a significant opening up of political spaces in the country, that lead to an impasse in the negotiations at the end of 2007. Notwithstanding some small changes to the media and public order legislation, the ruling party proved unwilling to make substantive changes on the issues that would affect the transitional political arrangements that would precede the 2008 elections. At the centre of the political deadlock that emerged in December 2007 were three areas: the date of the election; the timeframe for the implementation of the agreed reforms; and the process and modality of the making and enactment of a new constitution. Mugabe’s unilateral proclamation of the election date for 2008, outside of an agreement of these substantive issues, effectively put an end to the SADC facilitation process.

The SADC announcement on the 4th February 2008 that Mbeki’s facilitation had resulted in the political parties reaching an “agreement on all substantive matters relating to the political situation in Zimbabwe” and that the matters outstanding were merely procedural, was the worst kind of political dishonesty. What might have been a principled stand by the outgoing President Mbeki turned into another disgraceful endorsement of the politics of a repressive regime.

The SADC has once again demonstrated its inability to distinguish between Africa’s concern for imperialist interventions, and its commitment to the democratic and human rights of the region’s citizens. It has subordinated the latter to a grubby solidarity with a repressive political regime that has transformed a lofty Pan Africanist discourse into a spurious attempt to legitimize a authoritarian political project. The regional organization had an opportunity to send an unambiguous message to Mugabe that unless he fulfilled the objective of establishing the conditions for a broadly acceptable free and fair election, he could not expect the customary solidarity of SADC. Such a position could have changed the dynamic of Zimbabwean politics decisively and helped to ensure that further intransigence on Mugabe’s part would be met with stronger censure in the region.

That SADC once again took the line of least resistance has demonstrated its lack of commitment to questions of democratic principle, and its priority of protecting libration leaders who have long failed their citizens. However perhaps a Makoni victory in the forthcoming elections will satisfy the need by some SADC members for a reformed Zanu PF solution, for a long time the real objective of “quiet diplomacy.”

*Brian Raftopoulos, Director of Research, Solidarity Peace Trust. This article first appeared in the Mail and Guardian.

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Introduction

One of the central features of the Zimbabwean crisis, as it has unfolded since 2000, has been the emergence of a revived nationalism delivered in a particularly virulent form, with race as a key trope within the discourse, and a selective rendition of the liberation history deployed as a an ideological policing agent in the public debate. A great deal of commentary has been deployed to describe this process, much of it concentrating on the undoubted coercive aspects of the politics of state consolidation in Zimbabwe […]

However the manner in which the ideological battle has been fought by ZANU PF as a party and a state is of particular importance in trying to understand the ways in which a beleaguered state is attempting not only to extend its dominant economic and political objectives, but also its "intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental group over a series of subordinate groups." (Gramsci 1971: 182.)

For the manner in which Mugabe has articulated the Zimbabwean crisis has impacted not only on the social forces in the country but also on the African continent and in the Diaspora. Such an ambitious political outreach demands that we view the Zimbabwean state as more than a 'simple, dominative or instrumental model of state power,' but as a state with a more complex and multi-dimensional political strategy. (Hall 1996:429; and Hall 1980.)

In this multi-dimensional strategy, the state has monopolised the national media to develop an intellectual and cultural strategy that has resulted in a persistent bombardment of the populace with a regular and repeated series of messages. Moreover this strategy has been located within a particular historical discourse around national liberation and redemption, which has also sought to capture a broader Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist audience […]

Moreover in articulating this ideological strategy the ruling party has drawn on deep historical reservoirs of antipathy to colonial and racial subjugation in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and Africa more generally, and on its complex inflections in the Diaspora. Thus the Mugabe message is no mere case of peddling a particular form of false consciousness, but it carries a broader and often visceral resonance, even as it draws criticisms for the coercive forms of its mobilisation. […]

Nation and Race.

In Zimbabwe the state has a monopoly control over the electronic media through such laws as the Broadcasting Services Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Through such instruments the ruling party has been able to saturate the public sphere with its particularist message and importantly to monopolise the flow of information to the majority rural population […]

Thus, as a report on the ways in which Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) delivered views on the nation in 2002, concluded: “ZBC's conceptualisation on "nation" was simplistic. It was based on race:

The White and Black race. Based on those terms, the world was reduced to two nations - the white nation and the black nation and these stood as mortal rivals. The black nation was called Africa. Whites were presented as Europeans who could only belong to Europe just as Africa was for Africans and Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans. (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 4.) […]

For the Mugabe regime the emergence of the opposition MDC in 1999, was a manifestation of foreign British and White influence in Zimbabwean politics. This construction of the opposition thus placed them outside of a legitimate national narrative, and thrust it into the territory of an alien, Un-African and treasonous force that 'justified' the coercive use of the state in order to contain and destroy such a force […]

Having discursively located the opposition as an alien political force, the full coercive force of the state was brought to bear on those regarded as 'unpatriotic' and 'puppets of the West'. Deploying elements of the police, intelligence service, army, the war veterans, party supporters and the youth militia, the ruling party has inflicted enormous damage on the personnel and structures of the opposition […]

Nation, History and Culture.

Scholars have observed that the writing of history has often been used to 'legitimate' the nation- state, both in an attempt to 'naturalise' it as the central principle of political organisation, and to make it the 'subject and object of historical development.(Berger, Donovan and Passmore 1999:xv) In Zimbabwe there has been clear evidence of this process since 2000 in particular […]

As part of the attempts to revive ZANU PF's political fortunes in the 2000 general election and the 2002 Presidential election, the ruling party placed a strong emphasis on reviving the narrative of the liberation struggle in general and the heroic roles of ZANU PF and Mugabe in particular […]

In this narrative of liberation, a common African history and Pan Africanist solidarity, the land has played a determining role as the key marker of a common struggle. It has formed the centrepiece of the ruling party's construction of belonging, exclusion and history. The official discourse on the liberation struggle has been marked by the translation of a multi-faceted anti-colonial struggle into a singular discourse designed to legitimate the authoritarian nationalism that has emerged around the land question since 2000. (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003.) […]

During the 2002 Presidential election this liberation rhetoric was accompanied by a cultural programme that saturated the public with liberation war films, documentaries and dramas, promoting ZANU PF generally and Robert Mugabe in particular, while also carrying strong messages against whites. […]

Amongst the most damaging aspects of the telling of this national narrative through a series of dualisms (black/white, British/Zimbabwean), and compressions of the various aspects of the anti-colonial struggle into a single field of force, has been the enormous loss of complexity of the colonial encounter. The complexity of the settler-colonial period (not least of which included the changing relations between the black elite and different settler regimes) has been flattened into a Mugabe/Blair colonial encounter. (White 2003:97.) While the demonisation of Whites has served the needs of authoritarian nationalist politics in Zimbabwe, it has prevented a more creative, tolerant and difficult dialogue on the European influences in the making of Zimbabwean identities […]

The On-Going National Question.

The Mugabe government has worked hard to generalise its model of resolving the national question, based largely on the model of land reform through violent land occupations, articulated through a Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist discourse. Moreover in this model the human rights question and the democratic demands of civic groups are dismissed as an extension of Western intervention, with little relevance to the 'real issues' of economic empowerment […]

In South Africa the Zimbabwean debate has taken on a particular resonance, not least because of the apparent popularity of Mugabe amongst many South Africans. On a broader level there are many aspects of the history and politics of Zimbabwe that resonate in the current South African context. (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004: forthcoming; Southall 2003; Melber 2003.) Zimbabwean commentators close to the ruling party have not hesitated to 'shame' the South African government into taking more Africanist political positions […]

Moreover the 'spell' of anti-imperialism and the resonance of the race debate in Zimbabwe, has found a broader canvas for its articulation in the diaspora. In addition to cementing the support of other liberation movements in Southern Africa, ZANU PF has actively cultivated linkages with a few black civic groups in the US, UK and Australia in an attempt to build Pan Africanist solidarity around the Mugabe project. […]

Conclusion

A decade ago I wrote an article on 'Race and Nationalism' in Zimbabwe. In re-reading the piece in recent weeks what strikes me most about the analysis, apart from an underestimation of the potential for a revived nationalist project by the ruling party, was its strictly national focus, which even then was a limitation of the article. In 2004 it is impossible to confront this subject meaningfully without addressing the broader reach of its effects at both regional and international levels. Mugabe has not only defined the national project around a selective reading of nationalist history and an exclusivist construction of the nation, he has also sought to ensure that this message resonates in other black struggles both regionally and internationally […]

ZANU PF has set itself the task of establishing a hegemonic project in which the party's narrow definition of the nation is deployed against all other forms of identification and affiliation. In this project the media and selected intellectuals have been used to provide a continuous and repetitive ideological message, in order to set the parameters of a stable national identity conducive to the consolidation of the ruling party. As Zimbabweans listen to the radio, watch television and read the daily newspapers, all controlled by the ruling party, they are being 'informed' about what it means to be a 'good Zimbabwean,' and a 'genuine African'. They are also being told who is the 'enemy' within and without and advised to confront such 'enemies' with ruthless exclusion if necessary. For the present this political assault has seriously closed down the spaces for alternative debates around citizenship and national belonging.

* These are excerpts from a paper by Brian Raftopoulos, Associate Professor, Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe entitled Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics, presented at the University of Edinburgh's Centre of African Studies International Conference on 'States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa' in May 2004. A complete version of the paper will be published in a forthcoming volume. Please see for further information. For a list of references please click on the link below.

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