‘We used to think that women could not do the same things as men, due to religion. But now we no longer believe that. We are glad that women will stand for Parliament and [dramatic pause] we will vote for them’. - A member of the House of Aqils (local community leaders who administer justice) at a meeting with Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in December 2004.

The independent but internationally unrecognised state of Somaliland (North West Somalia) is due to hold parliamentary elections in March/ April 2005. This should be the most important phase of its democratisation process, marking the change from a clan-based and government-dominated polity with little effective parliamentary opposition. Such a polity has shown little intervention in social areas, and seemingly little commitment to overcoming gender and other non-clan inequalities. The regularisation of political representation in parliament could provide additional support in resolving conflict peacefully. Somalilanders see this as vital in avoiding a return to the instability that has plagued Somaliland and Somalia in the past. It could also mean that burgeoning Somaliland civil society will be able to campaign on and monitor government policies and spending. However recent decisions of MPs have made the progress of democratisation uncertain and the elections liable to delay. Uncertainty also continues in (South) Somalia despite the latest (and fifteenth) version of peace and a new government.

Somaliland, having decided unilaterally in 1991 to end its commitment to its union with Somalia, determined in the late 1990s to embark on a process of democratisation. For some Africanists this is seen as an interesting experiment which deserves greater study (and support) in its incorporation of democratic values within a well understood and traditionally-based social structure. A referendum in 1999, local elections in 2002 and a presidential election in 2003 all contributed to this process. There have been some setbacks, notably in the government’s incomplete and seeming reversible compliance with human rights standards, shown by the arrest of journalists and its perceived leaning on the judiciary. Authoritarian responses by the Hargeisa government to some of its critics such as the gaoling of journalists like Hassan Saeed, show lack of respect for human rights and the constitution. Illegal public safety committees are believed to exist. The recent gaoling for ‘treason’ of a 16 year old girl, Zamzam Ahmed Dualeh, on minimal evidence shows both the fragility of the democratisation process and the paranoia about security.

Somalilanders are though, rightly concerned about statements from the new Somalia President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed suggesting that Somaliland be forcibly reincorporated into Somalia. When military leader of Puntland, the semi-autonomous territory to the east of Somaliland, tensions ran high between the two territories, especially Puntland’s occupation of Somaliland territory in Sool in October 2004.

Although not linked, the killings of three foreigners in October 2003 meant that personnel of international organisations have had to travel with armed guards from the Special Protection Unit (SPU). Despite the security precautions, on a visit in December 2004, the country seemed peaceful and people can travel round.

This democratisation process has therefore both internal and international dimensions with the strategy of increased democratisation bringing hoped-for de jure international recognition (it can be argued that there is some minimal de facto recognition). There is within this an often explicit comparison between the chaotic, internationally-funded (and located) and expensive process to the south in Somalia and the home-grown, traditionally-rooted process in Somaliland.

Three political parties – Kulmiye (‘Bringing Together’), UCID (‘Justice and Welfare’) and the governing UDUB (‘Democratic United Peoples Movement’) party will contest the elections. The first describes itself as ‘social democratic’, the second as ‘like the British Labour Party’ and the third as ‘conservative’, although all are parties in formation rather than cohesive political and ideological units. Indeed UCID told us that it characterised the other two as one party split in two. Kulmiye (whose office was packed out, unlike the other two) appears to have strong support from women and youth, and from the old liberation fighters in the Somali National Movement (SNM). It also has a strong base in the diaspora – with UDUB fending off questions on the governing party using the advantages of incumbency by stressing the greater amount of remittances going to its major rival. Neither of the opposition parties saw the National Electoral Commission (NEC), as biased, rather stressing the commissioners’ lack of experience and the problems they face. The parties expected a free election – i.e. in terms of the overall context, but were less convinced over the fairness (i.e. the conditions around the actual election). Both stressed the need for change, their commitment to human rights as well as security, ensuring sovereignty, the environment and overcoming economic decline especially unemployment.

Somalilanders say that as the international community is pushing for democratic norms and practice in Africa, it should support them not least in observing an expected reasonably free and fair election. Previous elections according to international observers (such indeed as our own institute) have proved peaceful, reasonably free and fair and enthusiastically welcomed.

However the delicacy of the situation for others does present problems for Hargeisa. In contrast to 2002, the EU and member states appear less keen to show their support – financial or moral - for these elections. This appears linked to their equally important funding of and desire to see success in the Mbagathi government- building process in (Southern) Somalia and worries that the new ‘government’ (still investigating where to relocate to in Somalia) will react negatively to funding for the Somaliland parliamentary elections. Additionally the Somaliland government is only willing/ able to provide 30% of the projected budgetary costs of the election due to a decline in revenues and increased military expenditure due to the Somaliland/ Puntland dispute. A scaled down election may be possible, although 6-7,000 people will still be needed to run any kind of election. The Danish government has agreed to provide a consultant to work with the National Electoral Commission (NEC), following British funding of a consultant to work on a draft electoral code.

As well as external constraints, there are also internal differences. There was an initial unwillingness, as there was in 2002 by political parties to accede to demands for women candidates to be placed towards the top of party lists - the closed party list system operates, due at least in part to widespread illiteracy. Whilst complete gender equity is unlikely, there was in the draft electoral law a formula, although seemingly under threat from traditionalists, that would enshrine the right of women to be candidates in the top 5 of the party lists without the constitution being breached. All three political parties claimed to us that they had shifted position on accepting (and publicly welcoming) women candidates since 2002. The women’s umbrella body, NAGAAD, is keen to keep plugging away on gender representation questions following up on their campaigning and lobbying in media, and meetings with government and parliament. There has been training of women candidates in the political parties.

Other civil society organisations have committed to helping in the electoral process as indeed have the Aqils (local community leaders who administer justice at dir (sub clan) level). Both wish to promote peaceful elections through civic/ voter education, encouraging communities to vote and help organise neutral help for the blind, illiterate etc in polling stations. One leading local NGO, the Academy for Peace and Development has committed its staff to election-related work until the election period finishes. It is involved in discussions with the Parliament and the political parties, including the parties signing up to a voluntary code of conduct. NAGAAD, having had experience in the last two elections, expects to coordinate local observer groups with COSONGO, the national NGO umbrella, and to run civic education programmes dividing up the country east and west as they did in 2002 and 2003.

The opposition parties and sections of the populace allege that parliamentarians, especially those allied to UDUB, have more commitment to their own stay in power than to the democratisation process. The recent electoral law passed in early February 2005 by parliament calling unrealistically for a census and full registration process does little to overcome that perception. Many Somalilanders also expect UDUB to lose to Kulmiye. President Riyale has though told parliament to pass the electoral code as a matter of urgency, and informed at least one would-be foreign donor of the commitment of the government to the electoral process.

The implication is that without substantial funding there will be a cut-price election where the free and fair nature of the election will be under threat or at least demand a great deal of consensus. Given the circumstances of the 2003 presidential election where Kulmiye lost by a small margin, claiming that it had in fact won but was prepared for the sake of the nation to accept the result, such consensus is unlikely to be forthcoming. This is especially the case if due to the electoral law, the process has to be delayed. At the time of writing we still await the reaction of the NEC and indeed the President to the practically impossible conditions set by Parliament if elections are to go ahead within less than two months.

A general worry therefore is that if there is not an election the one stable part of ‘greater Somalia’ will relapse from the democratic path, thereby rendering useless the internal and international goodwill, investment and work that has been undertaken so far. The less the technical conditions are perfect, the more the NEC and others have to rely on mutual goodwill and argued for consensus. These will be the first direct parliamentary elections in greater Somalia for 35 years. Somaliland still has a long path to go towards democratisation (which is a process rather than an event after all); the parliamentary elections and a new parliament (and possibly government) open up great opportunities for civil society. It can be empowered to seek greater government accountability, and a constructive but critical engagement with government on key issues in society, economy and polity – not least human rights, development, issues like HIV/AIDS, and greater commitment to gender equality and opportunity.

Whilst Somaliland vaunts its home-grown approach, it is also desperately aware of its need for international assistance which up till now has been forthcoming. The situation is now complicated not just by the new electoral law, but by its usual funders being engaged with the process in (southern) Somalia and the sensitivities of those it is engaging with down there. However, outside donors can make a lot of difference with small amounts of money. Indeed Somalilanders told us that they do not want assistance beyond their capacity to control and monitor such outside resources. They do stress, however, that the international community has wanted Somaliland to take the ‘good governance’ path and there is need for support from those suggesting that path.

The worry is that without support the cash-strapped government will not be able to run an election that can be shown to be free and fair and therefore that instability will result from this. Given the internal and external commitment to stability in Somaliland and the general climate amongst donors (inside and outside of the NEPAD and Commission for Africa processes) to push for ‘good governance’ and democracy in the continent, this would be an opportunity squandered. The fragility of this region cannot be overstressed – something that Somaliland parliamentarians also need to reflect upon.

* Steve Kibble is Africa/ Yemen Advocacy Officer at CIIR. Adan Abokor is the Country Representative of International Cooperation for Development, the name by which CIIR’s skillshare programme is known in certain countries.

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