cc. Going the extra mile to find the truth and ensure accountability for perpetrators of post-election violence.
Excitement. Then panic. Then terrified powerlessness. Kenya’s politicians have ridden the rollercoaster of emotions since the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election-Violence presented its report.
They have said the report is a threat to peace and national cohesion. They have said it is a product of illegal processes. They have also come round to accepting that they must implement it.
One of the expectations in setting up the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence was that it would find the people responsible for gross human rights violations and recommend appropriate punishment.
The decision not to publish the names of people the commission believes bore responsibility for the violence has elicited mixed reactions.
The commission handed the coalition government two tough political choices involving complex tradeoffs. While there are those who would prefer that justice for perpetrators of the post-election violations be secondary to structural reforms of the institutions that failed the country, Kenya’s recent crisis suggests that failure to punish those responsible would set a bad precedent.
The single most important recommendation in the Waki Report is the setting up of a Special Tribunal to seek accountability from persons bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations relating to the 2007 elections. The tribunal should apply Kenyan law as well as international criminal law through the International Crimes Bill, which is pending enactment into law.
Further, an agreement on the tribunal’s formation must be signed within 60 days of the Panel of Eminent Persons receiving the report. The Special Tribunal should be created by law within 45 days of the agreement being signed. The tribunal will be anchored in the constitution and insulated from challenges arising from constitutional provisions about its jurisdiction.
If the Special Tribunal is established in any other manner than what has been set out, a list containing the names of suspects and relevant information will be handed over to the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court.
The commission not only set general guidelines and principles on how to bring to justice those who were behind the post-election violence. It also provided measurable benchmarks within a specific timeframe. Failure to comply would spring referral to the ICC. This is by far the most ingenious proposal visited on Kenyans. The threat of enforcement is real in the event of default.
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
For the first time in Kenya’s history, a commission of inquiry isolated sexual and gender-based violence for special attention. An analysis of the Commission’s investigation on sexual and gender-based violence is carried in the COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS section of this issue.
WEIGHED, MEASURED, AND FOUND WANTING
Security agents failed to protect citizens and instead engaged in criminal behaviour.
How did state security agencies act in the lead up to polling day? Answering this question enabled the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence to determine how prepared security agencies were for what would come.
The Waki report analyses how the security apparatus runs as well as its failures in the period after the elections. Overall, its verdict is that the state security agencies failed institutionally to anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence and that individual members of the state security agencies were [often] guilty of acts of violence and gross violations of the human rights of the citizens.
In many ways, the report complements, confirms and builds on previous findings by various actors in the security sector. Its recommendations form a good basis on which to establish governance systems in the security agencies that bring them in line with democratic practice.
HOW THE POLICE FAILED KENYA
The report analyses how the state security machinery works in detail. It identifies this machinery as consisting of politicians, civil servants and officials in the national intelligence service, the police, the administration police, the prison service and the military.
Usually, this system develops security intelligence, which it delivers to the police or the military for action. The system is administrative and not subject to regulation by law. This makes it difficult for the public to hold it to account for its actions or omissions.
In summary, the Waki commission found the following anomalies in the way the security system was run:
1. MONOPLOY OF FORCE: The President unilaterally appoints all the people who occupy senior positions in this system. In the post-election period, the security machinery, which is designed to serve the interests of the political regime in power, was under the sole control of the Party of National Unity.
2. PARTISAN SPY AGENCY: The National Security Intelligence Service conducted an opinion poll and seemed to communicate the results outside the formal and established channels. The NSIS also became an agent of government in the electoral process. It sought accreditation badges for its officers from the Electoral Commission of Kenya; and it wrote to the ECK advising on how certificates should be dealt with by agents and that ECK should meet with media house owners and editors and the candidates with a view to striking a deal on the modalities of transmission and announcement of results. Specific advice of this nature was unwise and outside the NSIS mandate.
In the run-up to the December elections, NSIS had warned of... emerging allegations that the government is planning to use some sections of government organs including the provincial Administration and the Administration Police (APs) to rig the forthcoming elections. It seems that NSIS chose to do nothing about these allegations.
3. ABUSE OF POWER: It appears that the Head of Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr Francis Muthaura, ordered that a large number of Administration Police officers be trained to act as election agents for the Party of National Unity. A senior academic together with high-ranking government officials, commanders of the Administration Police, conducted the training.
The role of the AP officers was to disrupt polling and where possible ensure that government supporters amongst the candidates and voters prevailed. Mr Muthaura told that Commission that this deployment was approved by the Government and was commissioned for security reasons and that the reason for sending these people under plainclothes is that the area was very unfriendly.
4. LICENCE TO KILL: The police often used excessive force and killed many citizens using live bullets in efforts to maintain law and order. In some cases, victims were “shot whilst in and around their own homes.As a result, 405 people died of gunshot wounds, while 557 received treatment for gunshot wounds. The commission largely attributes these excesses to the police, saying it did not receive any evidence to show that anyone else shot or killed people with guns.
Police armoury records relating, for example, to the use of firearms and ammunition in Nyanza Province were analysed and revealed that significant amounts of ammunition and tear gas were expended and in very many cases there is no record at all of ammunition expended. Witnesses also testified that police use of firearms was indiscriminate.
The police themselves had a prime difficulty in defending the use of lethal force on retreating crowds. There was “no legal or operational basis for justifying the shooting of civilians from behind at any given time during the circumstances presented to it.
The use of live ammunition also raises two important questions. For example, the Homa Bay police boss told the Commission that his staff were only issued with live rounds and not blanks or rubber bullets. How was it that this district only received live ammunition? Perhaps the police had run out of rubber bullets, were overwhelmed and therefore resorted to using whatever means at their disposal to deal with the emergency. Or it could be that a deliberate decision was made to use live bullets in areas hostile to the government.
5. COVER-UPS AND INCOMPETENCE: Even when provided with strong evidence identifying offenders, police did not investigate complaints -- especially those relating to property offences, deaths by shooting, and rape. Where inquest files were opened, at best [only] a superficial investigative effort was undertaken. This failure to investigate is attributable to factors such as self censorship or fear on the part of the investigators who are susceptible to pressure and manipulation. Senior public officials told the commission that such self-censorship is real especially in respect of investigating individuals who could influence an investigator’s work prospects or pose a personal threat.
6. CRIMINALS IN UNIFORM: The commission found credible evidence of criminal behaviour by the police, including murder, gang rape and looting. For example, an Administrative Police officer in Nairobi, who was identified by many witnesses, is alleged to have shot a number of citizens, many of whom were killed. There were numerous instances of police officers committing acts of sexual violence, including gang rape.
7. WINKING ON RAPE: The police failed to take allegations of rape seriously. For example, some senior officers told the Commission they did not include figures relating to sexual violence in their statistics, apparently not deeming it important. The presentation by the Commissioner of Police does not have any statistics on sexual violence. The Commissioner of Police should also be held accountable for this serious omission. Indeed, the commission says victims of sexual violence who went to the police to report were met with a dismissive response.
8. TRIBAL POLICE: Policing agencies were divided along ethnic lines. In Naivasha, for example, the commission established that there were breaks in the chain of command and parallel ethnic command structures within the police meant that even with the best planning the police were too weak to respond adequately to the violence.
In addition, victims testified that they received assistance from police officers from their ethnic groups while facing hostility from officers who were not from their tribe. This testimony is corroborated by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and the International Crisis Group, which observes that there was considerable evidence that officers have taken sides and that in many cases, decisive police action came only when officers thought their tribes or those who voted with their communities were under siege.
The commission also observed, at least four senior police officers were transferred or retired from their area of responsibility during the violence and at the height of operations. It is plausible that ethnic considerations were a major motivation for these transfers and retirements.
9. MISPLACED ARROGANCE: The police were simply too far off the mark in terms of being prepared to deal with the post-election violence. Their preparation and planning was scant, commenced far too close to the event, failed to take account of the intelligence received and information available on the ground, and did not encompass preventive activities designed to reduce and/or ameliorate the impact of violence around the 2007 General Election.
The approach taken by the police reflected misplaced arrogance that they would always be able to control what came up. Second, the policing system in Kenya is designed for reactive, as opposed to, preventive policing. It was, therefore, incapable of preparing and planning properly to manage the General Election. Many police officers said their plans were not written. Many seemed to be actions or reactions to events as they unfolded on the ground.
10. PLANNING FAILRUE: The National Security Advisory Committee did not meet during the crisis period. Few of the other systems that run the security machinery were working.
The provincial and district Intelligence committees put in a mixed performance. The police force does not have their own highly developed information gathering and intelligence systems. Its chain of command orientation undermines speedy and accurate dissemination of information. As information moves up and down the chain of command, it is not only distorted but also precious time is lost.
There are poor linkages and incompatibility between various intelligence arms and reporting systems. The functions of the NSIS overlap with those of the police’s Criminal Investigation Department. The law fails to spell out how the activities of the NSIS and the CID are supposed to be coordinated. The Commissioner of Police is not even a member of the National Intelligence Security Committee. The whole system is also prone to leakages.
The commission established that the security agencies do not review their performance as a matter of practice, and have not made credible efforts to assess how they worked during the post-election violence period.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
1. Policing reforms should be guided by the principles of fair representation of all ethnic groups in the policing entities, impartiality and cultural sensitivity, decentralization informed by a single integrated command model based upon community policing, respect for human rights, legal and political accountability, and integration of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police. These principles are based on best international practices.
2. The Police Act should be amended to strengthen police governance, accountability and organisational arrangements in a way which is suitable for a contemporary age” and improving the effectiveness of the police.
3. A new and modern Code of Conduct should be enacted to build trust in the police because trust is an essential component without which the police cannot function effectively. Such a code of conduct would seek to instill ethical standards in policing, including honesty, integrity, professionalism, fairness and impartiality, respect for people and confidentiality.
4. Criminal investigations should be strengthened. The question of independent investigations is particularly important because the commission says the police have a fundamental problem with its investigative capability and capacity. The commission also found that there was inability or reluctance to investigate effectively, serious crimes and their perpetrators even when strong evidence existed. The omission also established that the Police service has weak systems and approaches to investigating incidents where police officers are involved. There is therefore a compelling case for establishing an independent and autonomous Directorate of Criminal Investigations.
5. A Police Service Commission must be established, and with it a Civilian Oversight of Policing. The Police Service Commission would be responsible for holding an amalgamated police agency (that integrates the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service) to account. With respect to civilian oversight of policing, it envisages the establishment of a well researched, legally based, professional and independent Police Conduct Authority.
Among other things, the Police Conduct Authority would be responsible for investigating the conduct of policing agencies and officers. A specialized and independent Police Reform Group (PRG) consisting of both national and international policing experts would lead this reform process. The PRG is supposed to be established immediately (presumably following the presentation of Waki Report) and report to the Minister of Justice within six months.
ANALYSIS: WHAT THE WAKI REPORT DID NOT DO
As political temperatures rose and the election loomed, Kenya had a security machinery that was dominated by the regime in power. This security machinery gave wide unrestricted powers to various individuals. The commission made a number of important recommendations that should be implemented. However, it does not provide a clear plan for prosecuting and punishing security agents who committed various crimes against the citizenry; and it does not recommend how the security intelligence apparatus can account to the citizenry, as well as be integrated with policing agencies.
The Waki report is an excellent account of how police officers exploit and violate the human rights of Kenyans. It collected credible evidence to show that a number of officers committed murder, rape, and theft, as well as soliciting bribes. These findings support those of other organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. Abuse of power by police officers greatly compromises the effectiveness of policing.
The commission appears to suggest that errant police officers should be investigated and dealt with through the machinery of the proposed Independent Police Conduct Authority. This Authority is expected to have power to investigate public complaints against police and retrospective powers to deal with historical serious misconduct. Since there are no timelines on when this authority must be in place, it is hard to tell how long the victims of police crime will wait for justice.
The recommendations concentrate too much on the reform of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police. The NSIS also requires a total overhaul if the goal of democratic governance of security intelligence is to be achieved. Additionally, security reform will need to embrace the military
Specifically, it is important to take note of the following gaps in the report:
1. It is clear that Mr Muthaura acted arbitrarily, abused the powers of his office, and violated the tenets of civil service neutrality. It is not clear why the commission did not recommend sanctions against Mr Muthaura for abuse of office. These circumstances the commission established raise questions about whether, in a multi-party democracy that preaches political neutrality for the civil service, the Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet should sit in, and exercise power over, the state’s key security agencies.
2. Kenya needs to re-examine the NSIS to determine how best it can serve the interests of Kenyans as opposed to the parochial interests of the regime in power. Although the Waki report says that NSIS was perhaps the best-prepared state security agency, it fails to sanction it for its blatant partisanship. The NSIS is one of the institutions that Kenya must constitute afresh as a matter of necessity and urgency. For as long as the President retains the power to appoint the Director-General of NSIS, security intelligence will always be dictated by the imperatives of keeping the ruling regime in power. The NSIS is not a democratic institution and its preoccupation with helping the ruling regime to hold power has ruled out the need for public accountability in its work.
3. The commission says the security machinery did a good job of collecting security intelligence in the run up to the election, but this information was not shared in time and in the right way. There is an urgent need to overhaul the police structure to embrace preventive policing. Among other things, this will require that quality, extensive and specialized planning that begins many months if not years before an event such as a general election.
4. On investigations, the commission’s recommendations are not clear. On one hand, the commission seems to go along with the Attorney-General’s suggestion that an independent and autonomous Directorate of Criminal Investigations should be created. On the other hand, it also suggests that in addition to developing workable and functioning independent civilian oversight arrangements, there should be provisions for some less serious allegations to be investigated and resolved by the police themselves.
This raises a number of questions. What are less serious allegations? Should the police handle cases where the less serious allegations are made against police officers? How would an independent and autonomous Directorate of Criminal Investigations function alongside independent civilian oversight arrangements?
5. Although the military may not have been intimately involved in the post-election violence, it is worth noting that the police undertook a joint mission with the Kenya Army to deal with the challenge posed by the Sabaot Land Defence Force, a militia group fighting for land rights. As the dispute over the result of the presidential election was raging, the SLDF was wreaking havoc in the districts of Mt Elgon and Trans-Nzoia.
In a joint operation against the SLDF termed Operation Okoa Maisha, the police and the Kenya Army are said to have committed ‘truly shocking’ human rights violations, ‘in particular, systematic torture.’
This activity raises a number of fundamental questions. First, how should the citizenry be policed especially in times of war? Second, how should joint operations of the police and the armed forces be conducted in a democracy? Third, how should allegations of improper conduct made by the citizenry against security forces be handled? In particular, how can the citizenry hold security forces to account in times of peace and in times of war? In this respect, it will be necessary to interrogate how the military works.
It is also worth noting that the power to deploy the military in the maintenance of internal order is not regulated. The Defence Council is not required to consult or seek the approval of Parliament. Given that the Armed Forces are not subject to the ordinary courts of law, it is therefore difficult for the public to hold the army to account for transgressions in the course of maintaining internal order.
CONCLUSION
In view of the commission’s highly credible and damning findings, there is an urgent need to overhaul the state security machinery.
Overall, the Waki commission largely fulfilled its mandate. It established credible evidence that clearly demonstrates the actions or omissions of State security agencies during the period when the post-election violence occurred. Nevertheless, it did not suggest concrete measures for bringing to justice police officers responsible for criminal acts. This is a glaring shortcoming in the report. This could unduly delay efforts to give justice to the victims of police crime.
Secondly, the report does not make recommendations on how the security intelligence and policing agencies can be integrated in a legal and accountable manner. This measure is particularly necessary if Kenya is to have democratic governance of its security. Additionally, the commission should have suggested how public actors such as the Commissioner of Police, the Director-General of the NSIS, and the Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet should be sanctioned for their abuse of office since evidence of this is abundant throughout the report.
The greatest obstacle to the implementation of the Waki report is lack of political will. Many politicians are apprehensive that their careers will come to a halt should the recommendations of the Waki report be acted on. The international community must stay engaged; Kenyans must view the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process as an international initiative.
* This article was written collaboratively by Kenyans For Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ). KPTJ is a coalition of over 30 Kenyan and east African legal, human rights, and governance organisations, together with ordinary Kenyans and friends of Kenya, working for equitable justice for all Kenyans. For more information, please visit: [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/
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