Over four hundred demonstrators were taken into custody after protests were staged in 34 urban centres in Zimbabwe yesterday (13 September). In this paper Maggie Makanza explores why the opposition in Zimbabwe has not been effective. She asks: “Why has the pro-democracy movement not been able to capitalise on the many reported failures of the ZANU (PF) government?” She explains that the reason the people of Zimbabwe have not revolted against the Mugabe regime is because although they agree on the need for change, they are unsure about where the MDC is taking them.

Why has the pro-democracy movement not been able to capitalise on the many reported failures of the ZANU (PF) government? Some people say all the necessary conditions needed for combustion to happen exist in Zimbabwe. All that is needed is a spark.

Most pressure for reform appears to be coming from external rather than internal forces. There have been calls for the international community to intervene and for President Thabo Mbeki to 'do something' about the Zimbabwean crisis. Such efforts as we know have not yielded any results.

If anything, positions have hardened and the situation continues to deteriorate at an alarming rate. There is something special about one who has the ability to laugh at one's situation in spite of its gravity. That person has transcended the boundaries of what others call normal and refuses provocation. Zimbabweans have that 'collective character' that the world has termed the 'great Zimbabwean mystery'. Should you ask them, how are things in Zimbabwe, the response without fail is “Zvakaoma”. Meaning, it is 'tough'. It is an abnormal response for one not to be outraged in the face of extreme provocation. Let’s explore why.

The Change Equation

The change equation tells us that change equals the degree of dissatisfaction with one's current situation, plus a compelling and attractive vision for the future. The assumption has been that if we increase the level of discomfort and suffering of the Zimbabwean people, change will inevitably come. It has not despite the fact that Zimbabweans were rated as the unhappiest lot in the world (survey in June, 2006).

While we as a nation are clearly dissatisfied with our current reality, specifically the economic situation, the forces for democratic change have failed to provide Zimbabweans with a compelling and attractive vision of the future. While people agree on the need for change, they are unsure of where the MDC is taking them.

The end state is not clear. Is it simply about a change of government or more so, a change of rulers? There has been a lack of clarity on the political position of the pro-democracy forces on key and emotive issues like the land reform programme. Discontent alone is not sufficient as a rallying point for change.

On the other hand, the ruling party ZANU (PF) had a potentially compelling and attractive vision of the future given our liberation history and the primary reason why we fought a war(s). Notice that I use the word potential, because it has not been realised. They failed to package their vision of transforming Zimbabwe and did not sufficiently share it with the masses.

The people of Zimbabwe have therefore questioned their motives for propelling the land question forward at this point in time. The poor and chaotic implementation of the Land Reform programme, shrouded in corruption and greed by officers in high places, has made it difficult for people to buy into the ZANU (PF) vision of the future.

Also, it must be noted that while it is an acknowledged fact that those of us in the Diaspora have been disenfranchised by the Mugabe regime, there is a general disengagement by Zimbabweans from active participation in politics. We are usually resigned to being armchair critics. This disengagement is evidenced in the ways external people express themselves in reference to the MDC and ZANU (PF). You hear people saying 'what the MDC should do is………or ZANU (PF) should do A, B and C to get the economy back on track'. These statements are telling. They show a clear distancing of oneself from these two major political parties.

The lack of energy and inertia to fight the regime could partly be explained by what I will term a latent support for the ZANU(PF) programmes and policies, specifically with regards to the Land Reform program and Mugabe's position on imperialism and neo-colonialism. The opposition has worked on the false assumption that no one supports ZANU(PF). This assumption has largely informed the politics of protest by the MDC and other opposition forces, which is naïve for a group fighting for democracy.

According to Machiavelli in his book “The Prince”, when you introduce a new order of things, you face resistance from those who stand to lose from a change in the status quo, and you must know that you have only a few lukewarm supporters of change who might benefit from the new order. There are a lot of people currently benefiting from the status quo. So why change something that you are benefiting from? They are working tirelessly and conspiring with the regime to make change impossible.

Democracy and governance amid poverty

The rural constituency has largely been misunderstood and underestimated. Through the arrogance of the political elite, they have often been used during elections and thereafter abandoned. They have clearly expressed their displeasure at the failed promises by the current regime to deliver. An attempt to show this displeasure was expressed in the many Parliamentary and Presidential elections since independence.

But they learned quickly. They now perceive politicians as an interruption to their serene and daily living. So, through a series of elections they have learned that this process is not beneficial to them in any way as it does not change their lives. The rural electorate have therefore decided to play games. 'Give the urbanites their votes and let them go back to Harare with minimal fuss. We will not see them for another five years'.

Voting is the power to decide. The act of giving somebody the power to decide their future assumes that one indeed has the power within their hands to make their own decision. This assumption is a complete fallacy. In a situation where poverty is rife and ignorance abounds, elections simply become a process whereby those who have access to resources abuse those who do not.

What is needed is radical change to the instruments for operationalising democracy in developing economies. The continued use of the ballot box under the present circumstances can only be described as sheer madness. Why continue to do the same thing when you know that that getting a so-called partial Electoral Commission to preside over the process is impossible? When the nature of humans is that of self-preservation and protection, why should the ruling party level the playing field?

The framework for democracy as currently conceptualised has become the source of much pain and suffering for the people of Zimbabwe. The last elections in Zimbabwe are a clear case in point. As one writer said 'it was a predictable surprise'. The results of the last election in Zimbabwe make a complete mockery of the people of Zimbabwe, but illustrate how as a developing country we have been fooled. Fooled to believe that democracy comes through an election process, that democracy comes through a box - transparent or not.

Humour and Cynicism - A Survival Strategy for Zimbabweans

The internet and the streets of Harare, Bulawayo Gweru, Mutare and the Diaspora abound with jokes and humour about the political scenario in Zimbabwe. It takes a different mindset, of defeating your enemy without fighting, hunger without starving, and diseases without allowing it to kill you. The ordinary people in Zimbabwe are challenging the premise that you have to fight hunger with food, and violence with violence. There is hope - zvichapera - it will end. This too shall come to pass.

And indeed, instead of fighting the regime, risking leg and limb, fighting that which will in time come to pass is by many seen as an exercise in futility. Many have resolved to wait and watch for the end of the regime’s time. 'It will come' you hear them say. Perhaps Zimbabweans are responding to the Mugabe regime in this way because they have weighed up their options and are indeed responding in the best way possible.

The Shona people were the first to capitulate to white rule in the 1890's, having realised that they would not win the war. They surrendered only to rise up decades later when they felt that they were much stronger. It is actually a recommended war strategy, to retreat in the face of a strong opposition. In the face of a strong enemy, you do not commit suicide, but retreat to regroup when the time is right. Perhaps.

Language plays a major role in the way people think. Our thought processes in turn influence the way we approach problems and find solutions to problems, and subsequently the way we behave. The humour used by most Zimbabweans is a way of playing with words and language to interpret the current events. In a way, the humour has developed into a second language for Zimbabweans, allowing them to talk about the painful situation without actually talking about it.

Often, the humour trivialises the issue and distances it from the person. In most cases, the humour is intellectual, creatively playing with words and abstracts from the current reality. Trivialised, reality therefore loses its power to demoralise and dehumanise its victim.

Towards collective responsibility and the building of a culture of tolerance and valuing diversity

I have often asked this question and risked losing life and limb. I know I am treading on a hornet's nest and risk assault. But I will pose the question anyway. Is Mugabe the real problem or the only problem in Zimbabwe? If Mugabe goes, will that solve our real problem?

I think Mavhaire was the first to make the 'Mugabe must go' call. If Mugabe goes, it will certainly solve the immediate economic isolation and bring back the IMF and World Bank, facilitate economic recovery and improved international relations. It will not however solve our fundamental problems as the people of Zimbabwe.

There is a culture of lack of tolerance for divergent views at all levels of society. I know of family disputes that have gone on for generations because they could not agree on certain issues or 'vakapumhana uroyi'. I know of churches that have split because the leadership did not agree on certain areas. Political parties have split because they could not tolerate different views or agree on the way forward. In the private sector, you hear very similar stories of 'camps' in the organisation. Perhaps it is the way we deal with conflict as a people.

The culture of intolerance is a big problem in Zimbabwe, as well as the lack of unity of purpose in each and every one of us. Selfishness and individualism has ruined us. There is need for us to look at ourselves in the mirror and admit that Mugabe is not the only problem in Zimbabwe. That in our own ways, we have individually and collectively contributed to the situation that we find ourselves in.

What roles can the Zimbabweans in the Diaspora play?

So, do Zimbabweans in the Diaspora have a role to play? Frankly I do not think we can play any significant role in the politics in Zimbabwe from the comfort of our adopted countries or cyberspace.

Yes, we can continue to play the role of breadwinners providing for those relatives who remain in Zimbabwe. There is no way that people can survive on the salaries that they are taking home in Zimbabwe. So how are Zimbabweans coping with the prices of goods and services, which are in no way linked to the pay cheques that people take home? The Diaspora has been sustaining and fuelling these price hikes. The Diaspora has significantly contributed to price and income distortions in Zimbabwe. The breadwinner role of the people in the Diaspora has only served to delay the process of change as it ameliorates and smothers the suffering and creates the false impression that local people are coping. That, unfortunately, is the law of unintended consequences.

Conclusion

The Zimbabwean crisis is like a big party where the invited guests come to the table and the hosts are nowhere to be seen. My call to all Zimbabweans both at home and in the Diaspora, is to come to the 'party'. Stand up and be counted. Whether you are an MDC or ZANU (PF) or whatever political persuasion you are, please show up otherwise this democracy game will remain a concept.

• This is an edited version of a paper presented at the Public Discussion forum hosted by the Zimbabwe Social Forum. Maggie Makanza is a member of the Zimbabwe Social Forum, a psychologist by training. She can be contacted at: [email][email protected]

• Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

At a mini-summit in Ivory Coast, political leaders ended in disagreement after failing to reach a consensus on preparations for elections. Also, mediation does not seem to be serving its purpose. Yveline Deverin argues that: “To be a mediator in the Ivory Coast crisis is, in effect, to validate one’s own diplomatic credentials, to raise the profile of oneself and one’s country, and to show oneself a champion of political correctness and of democracy. What is validated here is the function of the mediator, not the success of the mediation.”

For a mediation to “work” requires a common will for peace and reconciliation. The role of the mediator is to convince those involved that the conflict must be halted and to give up part of their claims so as to move towards each other. For the mediation to be effective, there must be political will on the part of both protagonists and mediators.

However, there is a factual dissonance between this official will and particular interests - between the “politically correct” label and the “geopolitical interest” which the parties and mediators act out in reality.

Although 19 September 2002 marked the beginning of the crisis, the conditions surrounding the election of President Gbagbo were a preliminary phase.

During preparations for the elections, an initial mediator intervened without success. On 10 August 2000 in Yamoussoukro, President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, at that time president of the Conseil de l’Entente (although remaining very discreet since then) had tried to persuade General Guei not to stand in the presidential elections: “Do what your conscience tells you is good for your country”. His initial undertaking amounted to agreeing not to become a candidate.

At this same meeting in Yamoussokro, Alpha Oumar Konare and Gnassingbe Eyadema had tried to ensure that no artificial exclusion would apply to any of the candidates. Before them, the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade had expressed his active concern about the Ivory Coast situation.

Once battle had commenced, mediators succeeded each other without interruption, each passing to the others the baton of seeking an improbable peace. Some intervened at several stages in relation to different issues.

From 19 September 2002 to March 2006 the following participated at different points:

- the CEDEAO (Economic Community of West African States)
- the African Union
- France, former colonial power and privileged partner of the country with which it has defence agreements – a mediator which one could describe as “permanent”.
- Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal, in his role as President of CEDEAO (2002-2003)
- Eyadema Gnasingbe, President of Togo, as a senior member of the Presidents of the CEDEAO countries (remaining a mediator until his death)
- Alpha Oumar Konare, former President of Mali, in his role as President of the Commission of the African Union
- Amani Toumani Toure, known as ATT, President of Mail.
- John Kuofor, President of Ghana, in his role as President of CEDEAO (2003-2005)
- Omar Bongo, President of Gabon, as a senior member of the heads of African states
- Mamadou Tandja, President of Niger, in his role as President of CEDEAO from 2005
- Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, in his role as President of the African Union from 2004 to 2006 ( a frequent mediator)
- Abdou Diouf, former President of Senegal, in his role as President of the OIF (International Francophone Organisation)
- Thabo Mbeki, President of the South African Republic, designated as a mediator by the African Union on 7 November 2004
- Mohamed VI, King of Morocco who “almost” entered the fray in February 2005, but who withdrew precipitously following a diplomatic-political imbroglio
- Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Congo, in his role as newly-elected President of the African Union (2006).

MEDIATORS – MEDIATIONS: “ BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE”

The mediator is at once envoy, commissioner and referee, but a referee who blows the whistle only when he has the consent of both parties. It is worth recalling that, in the role of envoy, the mediator is taking a risk, as he is frequently the bearer of bad news and often held responsible for the content of the message he brings.

The continuation of the Ivory Coast crisis is due, not only to the fact that none of the protagonists has a vested interest in its resolution, but also because the various mediations have failed. It is not possible to bring together two parties without their mutual consent.

It is interesting to note that the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, has “lasted” longer at this game than others, but, like the others, he has been both rejected and recognised by the two parties in turn. Until August 2005, he appeared to be adulated in turn by one side and vilified by the other in equal measure, but from August his “mediation” became “stabilised” in favour of the ruling power and was thus totally discredited.

Before him, all the mediators underwent similar ups and downs: Eyadema of Togo was in turn denounced as a “rebel subversive” then as a “supporter of Gbagbo,” sometimes both in the same week!

To be a mediator in the Ivory Coast crisis is, in effect, to validate one’s own diplomatic credentials, to raise the profile of oneself and one’s country, and to show oneself a champion of political correctness and of democracy. What is validated here is the function of the mediator, not the success of the mediation.

Almost all the mediators found a personal interest in intervening: Mbeki wished people to forget the bad image left by his policy of inactivity against Aids. He tried to resurrect his tarnished image within the ANC (African National Congress) where his liberal management of his country is more and more heavily criticised.

Eyadema took advantage of his status as mediator to bring about, in the face of complete international indifference, a change to the Constitution, permitting him to become President for life. President Kuofor of Ghana, changed, thanks to the Ivory Coast crisis, his status as an unknown President to that of an internationally known President, appreciated for his efforts at mediation. He was re-elected easily in December 2004.

Omar Bongo was able to draw a veil over his internal problems, as was Tandja of Niger, whose administration was being heavily criticised for the food shortage which arose in the North of his country over the winter of 2005.

It is typical that those who withdrew very quickly from any involvement in mediation were those who had nothing personally to gain from it: Amani Toumani Toure (known as ATT) of Mali and Mathiew Kerekou of Benin, with stability in their own countries and having already gained plaudits for “good governance” to a degree. Moreover, many African countries or, rather, their elites, gained economic or geopolitical benefit from the situation.

From the beginning of the crisis, the different Ivory Coast parties requested the intervention of other countries, arguing that in the sub-region, “ the Ivory Coast is pivotal” that it represents “ 40% of the wealth of the WAMU (West-African Monetary Union) and that the collapse of the Ivory Coast would bring about, de facto, that of the whole of West Africa.

These political and geopolitical interests should not allow us to forget the economic interests that accompanied them. For instance, South African business interests in Ivory Coast have developed since the mediation role undertaken by their President.

For example, MTN, a South African business, became a majority shareholder in Telecal (mobile telephones, one of the three sectors which are still profitable in Ivory Coast). Sotra (the State public transport company) signed a contract to buy buses with a South-African company [Le jour, 20/10/2005, DNA 17/9/2005].

A huge market was taken over from the Ivory Coast electricity company (CIE). A South-African company was contracted to provide electric meters with prepayment cards [DNA 17/9/2005]. Similar arrangements were instituted in less visible, but more widespread markets.

Le Nouveau Reveil of 13 August 2005 notes: “For some time, South African wine has been well represented in our supermarkets…” and “Now that the South-African President has been called to play a mediation role, a systematic presence of South-African businesses is developing” and “with Gbagbo, Mbeki is well placed to undermine the economic hegemony of France in Ivory Coast.”

The paper notes: “Despite the significantly increased risk in Ivory Coast because of the state of war, a striking penetration of South-African business into our country’s economic fabric is noticeable.”

We should guard against any naivete or anthropomorphism in geopolitical analysis. “A State has no friends, it only has interests” as General de Gaulle lucidly remarked.

Mediation/intervention attempts by France are in a paradoxical position. Intervening to block the advance of the rebels on Abidjan, it seemed good that the attempts had as their objective the evacuation of the children from the American Baptist school in Bouake (25 September 2002), thus stemming any American attempt to intervene in its sphere of influence.

The evacuation of “foreign” nationals followed the next day and was accomplished by 27 September. This operation necessitated the establishment of the “ligne de confiance” [trust line] which split the Ivory Coast in two. Its perpetuation was justified by the notion that it would prevent the resumption of hostilities through contact between combatants.

“Foreigners” in Korhogo were evacuated on Sunday 29 September by the American army [announcement by the Ministry of Defence, 4 October 2002). This last little-known point reveals an evident exchange of favours, permitting France to let the United States intervene in a “humanitarian role”, without letting it evacuate the children from the Baptist school, which would have been perceived as France’s incapacity to guarantee the security of “foreigners” in its former colony.

From the evidence, France intervened at an early stage to protect its position, above all. Afterwards, its mediation interventions (Marcoussis in particular and the Licorne intervention force which often carried out local mediation) can be understood in the context of France’s absolute need for a pacified, and if possible, a well-disposed Ivory Coast.

HIJACKING THE MEDIATION PROCESS

The first demands of the rebels were very precise and concerned three points:

- the law relating to rural land
- the nationality code and
- the repeal of article 35

Very quickly, discussions were turned aside, to disarmament (a favourite theme which recurs regularly), the elections and the issue of the referendum (giving authorisation to the change in article 35). The attention and energy of the mediator were thus diverted from the fundamental problems at the root of the crisis.

At the time of the peace agreement on 4 July 2003, the emphasis was placed on matters relating to the gathering of combatants and on an inventory of military material on both sides, rather than on a response to the causes of the crisis.

Discussions ran into difficulties on the order of events: disarmament or legislative reform. The rebels demanded reforms as a prerequisite for any disarmament, the “loyalists” demanded the opposite. And this without any discussion of the content of the reforms!

It was only on 9 July 2004 that article 26 of the law on rural land was changed, following the Marcoussis agreement (giving back to non-Ivory Coast heirs the right to inherit ownership of land acquired by their forebears).

The laws, whose modification was agreed at the time of the Marcoussis agreement, were never voted through. The debate turned abruptly to the manner in which they were to be passed, then to their form, which, given the potential for discussion about the formulation, led to months of sterile debate.

On the other hand, the rebels refused to disarm for security reasons (given the intensive armament undertaken by the government party). Disarmament therefore became the object of successive frustrations: disarmament at that point being not “disarmament of all those with arms” (to take up the expression of General Ouassenan Kone in March 2006) but only of the rebels. President Gbagbo demanded that the rebels alone disarmed, claiming (despite what everyone knew) that there were no armed militias (sic!). Then the discussion turned to suitable gathering places, then to finances, then to whether the militias and the rebels should be required to disarm simultaneously or consecutively etc.

Another practice in which President Gbagbo was a past master consisted in transferring the crisis onto the agreements resulting from mediation. In this way, attention was no longer focused on the mediator, but on the results of the mediation process. The point at issue then became, not the rebellion, but the mediation agreements.

The stereotypical example was the reaction which followed the Marcoussis/Kleber agreements (26 January 2003), which was accompanied by the first large-scale anti-French riots. But the same observation could be made for all the agreements, with points of violence against the agreements or the mediators, the most recent being the flare-up in January 2006 against the GTI (International Working Group) in relation to the delegates’ mandate which was about to expire.

The enemy became the mediator. The problem was no longer “to resolve the crisis” but “whose side is the mediator on?” The problem was no longer the crisis but the mediator. It is not a good idea to meddle in other people’s business [translated from French proverb “between the bark and the tree one should not put one’s finger”]. There is an understandable reticence on the part of governments of neighbouring countries to intervene militarily, as was shown by the extreme slowness in which the CEDEAO intervention force (consisting of troops from Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin and Togo) was set up.

Under the Accra I agreement of 29 September, it [the intervention force] was due to take over from France from October 2002 and the first troops, whose arrival was constantly reported, were not deployed until March 2003!

This reticence was reinforced by another tactic of which President Gbagbo was also a past master, making use of an appeal to patriotism – that of taking hostages from among the nationals of countries which were taking their turn at mediation, in order to put pressure on the mediation process. This was particularly evident in the case of French nationals (notably after Marcoussis in 2003 and November 2004) but nationals of Senegal, Mali and Nigeria had also to pay their tribute to the mediation role of their country, although this was less highlighted by the international press.

The mediator’s margin for manoeuvre is thus considerably curtailed.

* Yveline DEVERIN is a lecturer in Geography at the University of Toulouse-le-Mirail GRESOC-UTM SEDET-Paris VII. This article was kindly translated from French to English by Fiona Campbell.
* Please send comments to: or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

In the competitive but lucrative US market, African films are still on the margins. New York-based Kino International and California Newsreel in San Francisco are two rare American companies struggling to fill this gap by distributing African videos and DVDs in the US. Recently, Kino released three African films, YEELEN (1987), HYENAS (1992) and GENESIS (1999) on DVD as a part of the company's tradition of distributing classics and foreign language art films. (HYENAS was released in association with the California Newsreel's Library of African Cinema, the largest library of African films and videos in the country.)

As the three DVDs arrive in American video stores, one might be tempted to ask how well these DVDs will do with American audiences. Will they face the same difficulty other African films have had finding broader audiences in the US? And why are African videos and DVDs so absent from the American market? There are no quick or simple answers to these questions.

Nonetheless, we can say that the absence of African videos and DVDs in the US market is tied to the specific challenges facing African films throughout the international market. Film producers in Africa lack strong commercial organizations to help them distribute and exhibit their films, both in Africa and abroad. As a result, the distribution of African films is carried out individually by African filmmakers themselves, with the support of European and American companies, a situation which looks like that of independent filmmakers anywhere -- although the difficulties faced by independent filmmakers in more affluent countries pale in comparison to the ordeals experienced by African filmmakers.

Made by three major Francophone African directors, YEELEN, HYENAS and GENESIS have already gained unique significance in universities and risen to a special place in world cinema because of their highly stylized and metaphorical representations of contemporary Africa. All three films use allegory to tell their stories about Africa's descent into political chaos and economic poverty at the end of the 20th century. These fin de siècle fables describe the betrayal of the dreams of development and progress that followed an enthusiastic independence era in post-World-War II Africa.

YELEEN is the fourth feature by Malian Souleymane Cissé, a pioneer and leading figure of African cinema (along with Senegalese director Ousmane Sembène). In 1987, YEELEN won both the Grand Jury Prize of the International Film Festival at Cannes and the Golden Prize of the Pan-African Film Festival of Ouagadougou, in Burkina Faso. Since then, the film has earned critical acclaim around the world.

Loosely based on the oral epic of ancient Mali, YEELEN is set in an unspecified time in a Bambara kingdom in pre-colonial West Africa. The film mixes legend and history to recount the struggle for power and knowledge between Nianankoro, a son with a Promethean complex, and his father Soma, who is a sorcerer and the high priest of a secret society known as the Komo. Nianankoro -- a newly initiated Bambara warrior with supernatural powers --wants to end the Bambara's abuse of power and secret knowledge. Considered a dangerous threat to the privileges of the Komo Order, he is banned and persecuted. The secret order mandates that one of its members - the warrior's father, Soma -- find and punish Nianankoro. This clash between Nianankoro and the members of the Komo order is seen in Africa as a metaphor for young people's rebellion against autocratic regimes in Mali and Africa during the 1980s.

HYENAS was the last feature by Senegalese director Djibril Diop Mambéty, who died in Paris in July 1998. During a "career" that spanned almost three decades, Mambéty was a non-conformist who completed only two features and a few short films. His second feature HYENAS was made almost twenty years after his first feature, TOUKI BOUKI, or THE JOURNEY OF THE HYENA. The 1973 TOUKI BOUKI, considered a classic of African cinema, is an avant-garde film about disillusioned youth -- their existentialist search for meaning in independent 1960s Senegal, and their ironic fascination with France, the old colonial power. Like TOUKI BOUKI, HYENAS is a tour de force in symbolic storytelling and a centerpiece in Mambety's obsessive quest for an African style of cinema.

Based on Swiss playwright Frederich Dürrenmatt's "The Visit of the Old Woman" (which was made into a movie with Ingrid Bergman and Anthony Quinn in 1964), HYENAS is a dark satire on human greed and a nightmarish tale of how things have gone astray in present-day Africa. Mambety's version of "The Visit" is set in contemporary Senegal. Linguère Ramatou, a rich old woman, returns to her native neighborhood of Colobane on the outskirt of Dakar to unleash bittersweet revenge against her former lover, Draman Drameh. Years before, Draman Drameh betrayed and abandoned Ramatou after she became pregnant to marry a wealthy woman. Driven out of Colobane, Ramatou was forced into prostitution, and miraculously, she became very rich. Now that she is "richer than the World Bank," according to the praise songs of musicians in Colobane, billionaire Ramatou promises her riches to the townspeople (and all the glitters of consumer society), but only if they will kill her former lover Draman Drameh.

The film provides a hypnotic and sarcastic account of this Faustian bargain between the desperate townspeople and the unforgiving Ramatou, offering a metaphor for the present-day impoverishment and plunder of Africa by corrupt local leaders and institutions like the Word Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Cheick Oumar Sissoko's GENESIS is another ambitious end-of-the-century allegory by a member of the second generation of African filmmakers. Written by French screenwriter Jean-Louis Sagot-Duvauroux, the film is a revisionist adaptation of GENESIS, the biblical story about fratricidal strife in the house of Abraham, set now in a West African context. Drawing from the Old Testament, the film chronicles the internecine conflict among three clans: the hunter-gatherers led by Isaac's elder son Esau (played by famous Malian singer and pop star Salif Keïta), his younger brother Jacob's clan of monotheistic nomadic herdsmen, and their cousin Hamor's Canaanite clan of sedentary farmers who still practice polytheism.

The plot of GENESIS, which seems convoluted to many, is driven by a series of events that lead to a deadly conflict amongst the three clans. As Esau roams the mythic space of the story, he plots a merciless revenge against his younger brother Jacob, who has tricked him out of his birthright. Jacob, on the other hand, has become a recluse as symbolic self-punishment for his own actions that led to the selling into slavery of his favorite son Joseph by his own envious brothers. Harmor the Canaanite is drawn into the conflict when his son Sechem abducts Jacob's simple-minded daughter Dinah. The pacifist Hamor proposes intermarriage as a possible solution to their differences, and he even allows the two youngsters to marry, but not before he has been forced by Jacob's sons to accept a condition that all the Canaanite males must be circumcised. Following the circumcision, Jacob's clan led by his sons raids the compound of the Canaanites and slaughters all the males. Their deceitful act further propels the cycle of violence in this story of hatred and revenge.

Like his previous film GUIMBA, THE TYRANT, which is itself an allegory about dictatorship in contemporary Africa, Sissoko's GENESIS symbolically delves into the current drama of civil wars and conflicts in Africa and around the world. Sagot-Duvauroux and Sissoko's bold revision of this archetypal story of madness and vengeance not only gives the biblical story a genuine African perspective, it also infuses the historical experience of Africa with universal understanding.

From the early 1980s onward, allegory as a means of social criticism has become a widespread practice in African cinema, and has helped filmmakers develop an aesthetic of resistance in countries that have become increasingly totalitarian. Ultimately, all three of these films symbolically explore the fate of Africa, as the continent struggles with both real and imaginary forces: internal and external, economic and political, social and cultural.

* This article first appeared in “Really Good Films” online magazine, and it is republished here with a kind permission of the author. Hamidou Soumah is an independent film scholar who lives and teaches in Los Angeles.

* Please send comments to: or comment online at www.pambazuka.org