Professor Issa Shivji's book, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, gives a detailed account of the historical, political and legal intricacies relating to the evolution of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, based on intensive research and exclusive interviews with selected people. In the course of recounting these events, he also provides insights into the history and challenges faced by African states in their effort to amalgamate under the philosophy of Pan-Africanism.

The author argues that imperial powers played a significant role in some of the successes and failures of the efforts by independent States of Africa to merge, including Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Shivji’s main thesis on the Union is that it is flawed from constitutional and international law points of view. He maintains that the leaders and peoples of Zanzibar were not adequately consulted, did not have access to adequate legal advice and on some occasions made some effort to reject the move.

He suggests that where some of the leaders in Zanzibar appeared to show any interest in the Union, the driving force was to propagate their hold on power, banking on support from Nyerere. In some cases, the author insinuates, Nyerere (the pragmatist) pushed for the merger beyond limits.

The foundation set up by Shivji in the course of his analysis of the political struggle to assume state power in Zanzibar and the subsequent merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika to form one state is grounded in the dominant and sometimes controversial issues of class and ethnicity. The laying of the foundation on the issue of class and ethnicity in Zanzibar has been tactfully set to provide a basis for the arguments advanced by the author in dismissing others’ views, including Nyerere’s, on yet another contentious issue that has troubled the minds of great political scientists: What constitutes nationalism?[1]

In his analysis of the period preceding the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the author provides, in chapter two, some insights on episodes that led to the revolution. He admits that there are many versions of the revolution and states that it is not important to go into the argument of which one is true. However, he proceeds to delve into the issue, where he dismisses other accounts and draws the reader to his theory, which is to some extent based on a combination of respondents, notes from former colonial officers and books purposefully selected to make his case.

Interestingly, the author does not seem to fully appreciate the role played by Okello in the revolution. He seems to rely more on Jumbe’s account of the revolution but tactfully brushes aside Okello’s. He does not make an attempt to critically analyse Okello’s claims as published in his autobiography.[2] It is also clear that the choice of respondents on the issue of the revolution is lopsided. Some of the key figures mentioned by Okello in his account on the revolution, for example, Job Lusinde and Rashid Kawawa, were not interviewed.[3] There is also no explanation why these important people were left out especially in view of the fact that Shivji generally seems to underestimate Okello’s account of the revolution and relegates his contribution to it to the periphery. [4]

The analysis seems to rely more heavily on the recollections of selected respondents from Zanzibar. The author does not state exactly why he omitted interviewing prominent personalities and then TANU stalwarts who are still alive on the Mainland to back his arguments. These people are certainly also quite knowledgeable and some worked very closely with Nyerere, not only on issues of the Union but on some of the contentious issues relating to the politics of Zanzibar.

As pointed out earlier, the author relies heavily on information from Jumbe, whom he considers as probably most knowledgeable on the history of what led to the formation of the Union and other issues relating to the history of Zanzibar. However, on some occasions Shivji dismisses the recollections of Jumbe on the excuse of 'memory lapses' and in one instance cautions the reader that Jumbe’s information should be taken with 'a pinch of salt' – implying that the respondent is not credible.[5]

In chapter three Shivji assesses the Union in the context of the East African Community. He suggests (although elsewhere he makes an effort to deny this) that forces behind the formation of the Union were predominately driven by imperialist pressure. According to him, the Union was not arrived at due to the urge of the peoples of both sides to link up for common purposes and objectives. The author seems to suggest, in a rather strategically cautious tone in some cases, that Nyerere was driven (and in some cases supported) by imperial powers in forming the Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. In coming to this conclusion, Shivji relies heavily on communiqués of former US and UK diplomats and officers (stationed in Zanzibar and Tanganyika at that time). Ironically, at times the author brushes aside some of those communiqués (ostensibly those not in his line of thinking) as exaggerations.

Surprisingly, the author omits to make a critical analysis of Nyerere’s vehement denunciation of allegations that he was a puppet of Western powers in the course of establishing the Union.[6] In his address to the special Meeting of the National Assembly on 25 April 1964, on the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Nyerere stated:
'
It is an insult to Africa to read cold war politics into every move towards African Unity. Africa has its own maturity and its own will. Our unity is inspired by a very simple ideology – unity. We do not propose this Union in order to support any of the “isms” of this world….'[7]

Nyerere is also on record to have refuted similar insinuations when he stated: 'It has been suggested by some stupid people that I advocate Federation because I am a stooge of the British and I want to impose on East Africa a form of government acceptable to my British masters. I believe in the unity of Africa. I do not mind, therefore, what appellations stupid people give me as a result of that belief. But let us examine the true position.' [8]

Shivji admits that he has made a u-turn relating to the legal status of the Union. He 'disowns' his Professorial Inaugural Lecture delivered in 1990. Eighteen years later, he appears more convinced that there is no evidence in law to give legal credence to the Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. What is interesting is the basis for the round about turn: Documents retrieved from the archival records of the British High Commission and CIA records, further interviews and readings.[9] Mark you, as pointed out elsewhere, in some cases the author has dismissed records from these sources as having been exaggerated. This time around, the author showers a lot of credit on these sources, to the extent of 'disowning' his own findings duly presented at his Professorial Inaugural Lecture.

It will also strike the reader that some of the prominent people who would have provided some information for the author to work on were not interviewed, although they are mentioned in the chapter as having played key roles in negotiating the instruments from both a political and legal standpoint. Admittedly, some of the persons who were party stalwarts at that time and played a key role could certainly not be traced. However, one would have expected the author to make at least some attempt to trace close associates to get their views, just as he did in respect of some respondents from Zanzibar.

The author even went to the extent of relying on information obtained from a reported conversation on Nyerere’s thinking between an official of the British Embassy and Irene Brown, a spouse of the expatriate Attorney General, Roland Brown.[10]

What the author acknowledges, without necessarily directly saying it, is that research is essentially an on-going process aimed at generating knowledge with the passage of time. Along the same lines, what is discovered today may be refuted later. This reality equally applies to the author’s findings, not only on the issue of the legality of the instruments that were used to establish the Union, but the whole thesis he advances, especially in the light of the observations on choice of respondents, among others.

This also partly explains the deviation that the author makes from his own findings in 1990. The author seems to suggest that his study now provides conclusive evidence that there was no ratification or enactment of any law ratifying the Articles of the Union on the part of Zanzibar. Accordingly, Shivji argues that a court of law would certainly agree with his argument. The choice of respondents who formed the Commission which concluded that the Revolutionary Council actually ratified the Articles of the Union would also not escape a critical eye.

One of the key members of this Commission, who is still alive, is mentioned by the author, but again there is no reason why his views on this matter were not probed further by way of interview. A court of law would certainly want to satisfy itself by inquiring into some of the controversial matters pointed out before reaching a verdict on whether or not the evidence the author presents borders on conclusiveness.

In the fourth chapter, the author paints a vivid picture of the events that followed after the signing of the Union, culminating in the assassination of Karume and the increasing usurpation of constitutional power by Nyerere. According to the author, the creation of a Union Constitution by Nyerere and the cementing of the Union by him led to the progressive erosion of Zanzibar’s autonomy. Shivji argues that the creation of a party-state, dismantling of the independence of the judiciary and the elimination of those who opposed the move were part of the strategies to erode Zanzibar’s autonomy.

The differences between the founding fathers of the Union on substantial matters which, according to Shivji, almost led to the break up of the Union are discussed in chapter five. The author provides an illuminating analysis of what he suggests were efforts made by Jumbe to uphold Zanzibar’s autonomy and the ploy employed by Nyerere to counter the efforts. Accordingly, Nyerere’s endeavours paid off with the promulgation of a Permanent Constitution for the Union which in the author’s view, was structured in a manner that put matters to rest, in so far as diminishing the autonomy of Zanzibar, within the Union framework, was concerned.

It will also not take the reader any effort to realise that the type of respondents the author has selected to corroborate some of the documents retrieved from the archives in Zanzibar and London reveal that there has been an inclination to focus more on those who have vivid memories of the events and in some cases those who took part. The author also made some effort to trace relatives and close associates of people who either took part or who were knowledgeable on the events that led to the formation of the Union, in some cases, their spouses.

Again, conspicuously absent in those sourced for information in this chapter are the respondents who were influential in the formation of the Union from Tanzania mainland. It would have been helpful if the author explained this bias, or at least the limitation confronted in pursuing other renowned people who are alive and still active in politics. Suffice it to point out here that some of these people have been involved (directly or otherwise) in initiatives to resolve what the author refers to as the “headache” of the Union that Nyerere did not live to see.

In chapter six, Shivji continues his analysis on the increasing marginalisation of Zanzibar within the framework of the Union. He maintains that the chronology of events from the judicial and military reforms, among others, that Nyerere crafted were aimed at demeaning Zanzibar within the Union. Accordingly, Jumbe became more adamant in efforts to protect the 'sovereignty' of Zanzibar and fell out of Nyerere’s favour. Since that time, Shivji argues, there has always been a crisis on the nature of the Union as a result of first, Nyerere increasing the list of Union matters at the expense of Zanzibar, and second, subsequent political gimmicks to legalise and legitimise the usurpation of Zanzibar’s sovereignty.

By way of concluding his study, the author analyses the problems that have hindered the example of a Pan African Union and points out to the lessons that can be drawn from the Tanganyika-Zanzibar merger and implications for the future of Pan-Africanism, in the wake of globalisation and imperialism. The solutions to circumvent the legal problems in a manner that will ensure tranquillity considering the 40 years of the life of the Union discussed by the author, are not critically analysed, especially in the light of the ripples that may unfold, threatening its very existence.

Of course, the author makes an implicit and rather remote reference to a constitutional court and consulting the people, ostensibly as part of the solution. The attempts being made by the fourth phase government to find a solution to the problems that have plagued the Union, which had commenced before the author’s study, are interestingly not analysed. On the contrary, Shivji suggests that Nyerere’s successors have made things worse.[11]

These contentious issues notwithstanding, the book provides food for thought. It is certainly a valuable and welcome addition to the literature on the history of Zanzibar from legal and political perspectives. It is also an eye-opener, providing thought-provoking insights on efforts to revitalise Pan Africanism.

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* Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, by Issa G. Shivji, is published by Mkuki na Nyota, Dar es Salaam, in association with OSSREA, Addis Ababa. (ISBN: OSSREA 978-9994-455-21-8; Mkuki na Nyota 978-9987-449-99-6).
* This article first appeared in the maiden issue of CHEMCHEMI, Bulletin of the Mwalimu Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan African Studies of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and is reproduced here with the kind permission of the Editorial Board of CHEMCHEMI.
* Hamudi Majamba is in the Dar es Salaam School of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam.
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] See pages 66-67of the book.
[2] The author cites Okello’s biography in his list of references.
[3] See Okello pp. 173 and 205. On the contrary, Okello’s account of events and his role in the revolution seem to be acknowledged and corroborated by Michael Lofchie (1965) Zanzibar: Background to the Revolution, New Jersey: Princeton University Press (see specifically pages 274-277). Luanda et al, (1993) Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny January 1964 Tanzania People’s Defence Force., Dar es Salaam: Dar-es-Salaam University Press, also suggest that Okello had planned the Mutiny, p. 66.
[4] Okello states that he was welcomed by Kawawa on his visit to Dar-es-Salaam after the revolution to collect supplies requested from Nyerere, see p. 171. Kawawa’s views would have thrown some light on the genuineness of Okello’s claims on his role and contribution in the revolution. Kawawa agreed to be interviewed by Luanda et al, op cit p. 89.
[5] See p. 121: footnote 63; see also p. 59, footnote 60, where the author admits that one of his interviewees was apparently lying to him.
[6] Luanda et al, op. cit, provide a comparatively revealing account of the “arm-twisting” techniques employed by imperial powers during the 1964 Mutiny and the efforts that Nyerere used to avoid being submissive, see p. 126.
[7] Nyerere, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, p. 292 (Shivji in fact cites this quotation, though from a different source on p. 83).
[8] Ibid., p. 92.
[9] Including the views of Wolfgang Dourado, former Attorney General of Zanzibar, whose character, as portrayed by the author, the reader would find inconsistent and opportunistic.
[10] See footnote 44 on p. 115 of the book.
[11] See p. 251 of the book.