Nearly four years after 9/11, hardly a day passes without the "war on terrorism" making headlines, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and now London holding centre stage. But away from the spotlight, a quiet, dirty conflict is being waged in Somalia, reports the International Crisis Group (ICG). "In the rubble-strewn streets of the ruined capital of this state without a government, Mogadishu, al-Qaeda operatives, jihadi extremists, Ethiopian security services and Western-backed counter-terrorism networks are engaged in a shadowy and complex contest waged by intimidation, abduction and assassination. The US has had some success but now risks evoking a backlash. Ultimately a successful counter-terrorism strategy requires more attention to helping Somalia with the twin tasks of reconciliation and state building."

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, our regular columnist, reflects on Norway’s decision to suspend some of its aid to Uganda as a result of faltering democratic reforms. It’s interesting that the West is only now starting to express concern over Uganda after treating President Yoweri Museveni as its ‘darling’ for many years, points our Abdul-Raheem. Museveni’s response of rejecting foreign interference and claiming that the Ugandan electorate should decide on his third term is also questionable. Why didn’t he reject foreign interference when it worked in his favour and why didn’t he consult the electorate when the World Bank and International Monetary Fund came knocking on his door?

Norway has cut some Aid to Uganda reportedly in protest against the 'slow pace and direction of democratic reforms' in the country. The Norwegian Ambassador to the country, Tore Gjos, put a sum to this displeasure at "mishandling of the democratic process'' at a whopping amount of $4 million which is ten percent of total Norwegian Aid to Uganda. The British government earlier in April took a similar line when it withheld $9.5 million in budgetary support to the Uganda government.

It will not be surprising if one or two more so called Donor countries took similar action. But they will be merely symbolic. It is important to note that both the British and the Norwegians talk about 'withholding' not canceling their Aid altogether. So the opposition need not congratulate itself that its campaign against Museveni is succeeding.

No doubt the withholding of Aid has something to do with the stated displeasure at the zigzags in the transitional politics of the country from a virtual one party state to a formal multi party system. The irony is that return to multi-partyism canvassed by both the opposition parties and donor friends of the President for many years - especially after the first ten years of division of Labor between them and the President - is exactly what Museveni has come round to. Is it now a case of not heading the advice: 'Be careful what you pray for, you may just get it'!

From 1986 to 1996 as a reward for bringing Uganda up from the backwaters into a 'positive' role model through macroeconomic reforms Museveni was given a huge discount on the usual democratic conditionalities beloved of Western countries when it pleases them. For being the apostle of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment policies he was more or less allowed to shape the politics of the country in his own image. He left the economy to them and they left the politics to him. He became the darling of the west and Kampala a must destination for Western delegations desperate for some good news from Africa or wanting to feel good about themselves.

However the romance has gone bad for many reasons. One, Uganda is no longer the single success story it used to be. Just look at the stories about Mozambique today and you wonder if you were not talking about Uganda of the 1990s. Two, almost all African countries have accepted the reactionary neo-liberal orthodoxy that proclaims that there is no alternative to the market. With so many of them prostrating before imperialism there is no need to be specially disposed towards one particular state or leader.

Three, imperialism has only permanent interests, not permanent friends. This is something that African and other Third world leaders always miss. They think they are so close, so popular and well liked in Washington, Paris, London or Brussels and delude themselves that they are indispensable. They are as dispensable as disposable towels in a toilet. When their Western patrons are tired of them they turn off the tap. The same people who praise them to the heavens as 'the best leader possible' 'the savior of the country', 'the best they can offer' or 'without him there will be chaos' will turn round to condemn them in the direct opposite of those praises.

Four, one of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc is a more positive environment for democratic politics to take root in many countries. While the West is not necessarily interested in democracy but continuing domination / exploitation, in recent years they are becoming more sophisticated in trying to give democratic legitimacy to their domination through some legitimate domestic processes. Partly this is because civil society in the West itself demands that their governments support what they preach although where their interests are more threatened like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, they do not shout so much. Also domestic pressures in many countries challenge the West's hypocrisy and double standards but also make democratic claims on their rulers. However for the many Banana/Ugali republics in Africa their shouts are much louder and impact more direct.

President Museveni and his supporters have generally reacted in two predictable ways. One, they consider the threats of cutting Aid or withholding such and critical comments on the political transition as unacceptable foreign intervention. Their second counter is a seemingly democratic one. All the political issues, they argue, are to be decided by 'the people' therefore it is undemocratic for foreign countries to think they know better than the Ugandan electorate.

In principle both counters are legitimate but the politics is not. Uganda and President Museveni enjoyed so much foreign patronage and basked in it for so long that it is too late in the day to start decrying foreign intervention. They are not opposed to foreign intervention in principle as long as it is on their side. They obviously think that the saying 'those who pay the piper dictate the tune' does not apply to them.

The second argument about letting the people decide is the most unconvincing of the various populist responses from the NRM. They did not ask the people of Uganda when they went to the IMF/World Bank and prostituted themselves to all kinds of donors and foreign interests in the name of inviting investors to Uganda and building a middle class, so why now ask the people to decide only when you have contradictions with your friends? It is not every time that people vote that there is democracy or even a democratic outcome. Even Hitler came in through the ballot box.

The bitter truth though is that after this process is all over the same donors will crawl back to the state house in Kampala bearing their Greek gifts and the president will make his usual jokes, pet talks and foreign rounds and things will return to business as usual. It happened in 1996 and 2001 and who says it will not repeat itself even in the changing circumstances of 2006?

The NRM has succeeded in creating an opposition whose internal bickering and inconsistencies make many to fear them more even when they are alienated from the government. The opposition must learn from the experience of other pro-democracy groups in Africa like Senegal where it took more than forty years and an alliance of 17 opposition parties to get rid of Abdu Diouf or Ghana where Jerry Rawlings' party was fought to a standstill and eventual surrender through consistent battles within democratic spaces opened up through a constitution that he had orchestrated to perpetuate himself or his party if self -succession failed.

Or just look across to neighboring Kenya where after several years of squabbles and internecine warfare, once Moi was not in the picture the opposition was able to get rid of KANU. In both Ghana and Kenya it was important that the long-term ruler was not standing in the election. This is where the removal of limitation on presidential terms in Uganda posits different challenges for a coalition of opposition parties. As long as the President is standing it may be extremely difficult but as the Abdu Diouf experience in Senegal shows, it is not impossible.

What unites all three examples is the continuing engagement by the political parties within the skewed and unbalanced political field but at the same time niggling away at the authority of the ruling party. They did not achieve their victory through boycotts and I do not see how Uganda's anti-NRM groups will use boycott to get rid of Museveni and the NRM. How can they boycott a referendum simply because the government is on the same side. Why bother about the reasons of the NRM instead of concentrating on their own intentions for supporting a return to multi-party democracy? Why boycott the referendum and then contest the election to follow?

* Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa. ([email protected] or [email][email protected])

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Abuja Treaty: The 1991 Abuja Treaty established the African Economic Community, outlining six stages for achieving a single monetary zone for Africa. (Source: www.brook.edu)

Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA): The United States initiated AGOA was signed into law on May 18, 2000. It offers incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets. (Source: http://www.agoa.gov/)

African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States: Refers to the 79 member states that form this grouping. Visit http://www.acpsec.org/en/acp_states.htm for a full listing.

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the agricultural policy of the EU. It is a highly regulated agricultural trade regime, designed to prevent cheaper imported products flooding EU markets. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Cotonou Agreement: This refers to an agreement between members of the ACP and The European Community, signed in Cotonou On 23 June 2000. It is an international agreement between 78 ACP countries and the 25 countries of the European Union (EU). It consists of comprehensive provisions, dealing with aid, trade and political relations. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Doha round of the WTO: The Doha round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations aims to lower barriers to trade around the world. Talks have been hung over a divide between the rich countries and developing countries. Agricultural subsidies are the most significant issue upon which agreement has been hardest to negotiate. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): There are two schools of thought on EPAs. The EU largely sees EPAs as a free trade area agreement involving the elimination of import duties, inclusion of all economic sectors and that will include agreements on trade in services and trade related areas. ACP governments believe that if EPAs are to support the economic development of their economies and contribute to the elimination of poverty they must include measures to promote the structural transformation of ACP economies. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

European Union (EU): The EU is a union of 25 European countries. It was established in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). A key activity of the EU is the establishment and administration of a common single market, consisting of a customs union, a single currency a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Fisheries Policy. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Everything But Arms (EBA): On September 20th 2000, the European Commission announced the adoption of a plan to introduce duty free access to the EU market for all exports “originating” in least developed countries, with the exception of arms”. The existence of EBA is important in relation to EPAs as it raises the question of what interest do least developed countries have in negotiating a reciprocal preferential trade agreement with the EU given that they already have a non-reciprocal arrangement? (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Free Trade Area (FTA): An area in which member states eliminate tariffs among themselves but maintain individual tariff schedules on imports from non-member countries. (Source: http://www.eu-ldc.org)

Least Developed Countries (LDC): The category of LDCs is a social/economic classification status applied to around 50 countries around the world. The UN defines LDCs based on 3 criteria, with a country needing to meet all three to be considered an LDC. One of the criteria is based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita, where income is under $750. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Lomé Convention: The Lomé Convention is a treaty that regulated trade between the EU and ACP countries between 1975 and 2000. Established in 1975 in Lomé, Togo, the treaty preserved some of the preferential access rights of members of the Commonwealth of Nations to the United Kingdom market on its entry into the Union. It was renewed in 1979, 1985, 1989, and 2000 before being succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Non-reciprocity: This refers to trade preferences which are extended by one country or group of countries to another country or group of countries without any obligation being placed on the second group of countries to grant trade preferences to the first group of countries. A key difference between existing arrangements and EPAs is that EPAs will be reciprocal preferential trade agreements. (Source: www.epawatch.net)

Singapore Issues: The "Singapore issues" refer to four working groups set up during the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1996 in Singapore, namely investment protection, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. Disagreements between largely developed and developing economies prevented a resolution in these issues, despite repeated attempts to revisit them, notably during the 2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, whereby no progress was made. (http://en.wikipedia.org)

Special and Differential Treatment: Refers to the argument of developing countries that special circumstances require specific consideration and trade restrictions can be legitimate and appropriate instruments for development purposes. (Source: www.soutchcentre.org)

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time. Trips is controversial especially when it comes to access to medicines, where patents have led to higher drug prices. (Source: http://www.wto.org)

World Trade Organisation: The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body whose purpose is to promote free trade by persuading countries to abolish import tariffs and other barriers. Based in Geneva, the WTO was set up in 1995, replacing another international organisation known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk)

Websites for more information:

http://www.epawatch.net
http://www.econewsafrica.org/
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/
http://www.acpsec.org/
http://www.europaworld.org/
http://www.igtn.org/
http://www.twnafrica.org/
http://www.seatini.org/
http://www.aprodev.net/
http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/
http://www.tradecraft.org/
http://www.focusweb.org/
http://www.twnside.org.sg/
http://www.wto.org/

Richard Kamidza is not optimistic about the outcome of EPAs, arguing that they will ultimately undermine Africa’s economies. Kamidza explains that negotiations are taking place in the context of a skewed relationship between Africa and Europe that already hinders development prospects. This means that the EU is unlikely to face strong opposition to its desire to fast track EPA negotiations.

Introduction

The first round of the Cotonou Agreement ended without the legally binding document that is necessary for future references. Indeed, the European Union (EU) emerged the victor, a development that is haunting the ongoing economic partnership agreement (EPA) negotiations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the EU. As the EPA negotiations fast approach the EU-imposed deadline, the predictions are that the score will be EU 1, ACP 0, because the process firmly allows the EU to protect its interests against those of a begging trading partner.

Europe as a ‘partner’

As a partner, Europe is fortifying its vertical links with Africa, which also benefits its bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. Unfortunately, vertical integration with Europe is unlikely to facilitate the industrial development of African economies, because the EPA process does not take into account the differences in development between Europe and Africa, and within Africa itself. For instance, 34 of the 48 countries currently negotiating an EPA with EU are least developing countries (LDCs). They should have continued to benefit from the Lomé Convention’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative but under the EPA process they will have to do without such special treatment.

The current thrust of the EPA negotiations suggests that their main concern is solving Europe’s overproduction and profitability crisis by opening up more markets for its products and services in Africa. EPAs are essentially 'free trade areas' between partners that are both economically and politically unequal. They come supported by 'one size fits all' neoliberal policies, a development that provides a further example of the combined effort of global forces (the EU, International Monetary Fund, World Bank) to thwart the development of poor countries. Trade relations that were non-reciprocal are now being made reciprocal thereby removing the developmental component that characterised the previous Lomé Conventions. Indeed, EPAs seek to replace past special preferences, a development that also suits Europe’s political interests well, particularly now that the 25-member body is increasingly sensitive to the demands of the new member-states, which are reluctant to be guided by past colonial relationships.

The EU as a major trading ‘partner’

The EU is well positioned to ensure that its negotiating options and financial, institutional and technical resources all serve its interests in both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, the European Commission (EC) has a layer of technical experts whose sole duty it is to prepare these negotiations. It is likely to exploit its superior bilateral bargaining power to push for EPA outcomes that maximise the EU’s political and economic interests at the WTO negotiations. The EU’s push for EPAs is inextricably linked to the WTO’s political processes, where decisions are based on a one-country, one-vote consensus. So, EPAs provide the ideal political framework for the EU to neutralise the potential for opposition to its agenda in the WTO from a large constituency of the G90 grouping – the multilateral body of which the ACP countries constitute the larger proportion.

In addition, the EPA process will assist the EU politically by fostering a community of interest between it and the ACP in future WTO negotiations. The EU is also fast-tracking the negotiations in order to meet the end of the current waiver date of the WTO, which is December 2008. The above clearly shows the promotion of Europe’s interests at the expense of Africa’s long-term sustainable development as well as the failure of the dominant partner to muster the political will to defend future pro-Africa positions at the WTO.

While Africa is concerned about developmental issues and resources, Europe is busy prioritising issues within the six clusters (development, agriculture, services, trade-related issues, fisheries and market access) that countries are to negotiate with the EC. Europe is also working out how to bring back the rejected Singapore issues of competition policy, investment policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation, issues that are much easier to manage at the WTO level. This is also the reason why the EU is fast-tracking the process, so that the EPA negotiations are concluded before the finalisation of the Doha Development Agenda. As a result, the EU is ready to use all its leverage to put pressure on the four African configurations to come up with EPA outcomes that favour Europe, even though this may not necessarily promote the Africa’s long-term sustainable development through trade.

The EU as a ‘donor’

Europe provides developmental assistance to individual countries and debt relief to the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) of the continent. Having realised the vulnerability of African economies, Europe then dangled the 'developmental aid purse', which resulted in the split of Africa into four configurations that totally disregard existing regional economic communities. The division of Africa into small, weak and fragmented negotiating structures suits the EU politically, especially since to date no country has received the promised developmental assistance despite the development challenges they face.

The EU also supports many projects across Africa and provides assistance to fiscal financing. In some African countries, this budget support is estimated to be over 60% of the total fiscal budget. At a regional level EU support has gone to implementing developmental projects and bankrolling regional integration efforts on the continent. These regional groupings were able to establish trade protocols that seek to facilitate trade and development within and outside the regions. However, largely through the EPA process, the EU is sacrificing the very regional integration it has long been bankrolling. In the process, it is deligitimising the existing regional integration agenda simply because of its desire to experiment with the new wave of regional negotiating structures that are set to negotiate a new medium- to long-term trade regime with Europe.

Of interest is the EU’s desire to bankroll an EPA with the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) region - the 'high breed configuration' which does not have the legal standing and structures that ought to be required by any donor. But because the donor is an interested party, which expects to gain from the conclusion of the negotiating rounds, it simply overlooks the ESA’s legal and structural deficiencies. Under normal circumstance, no donor could bankroll the activities of a recipient through another 'entity’s structure' the way the EU is supporting ESA-EPA activities through COMESA. This raises a number of questions: Why bend the rules of donor funding? Whose interests are at stake if proper legal structures are established, albeit at a slow pace? What will happen if ESA member-states refuse to honour funds coming from the EU through COMESA? All this points strongly to the EU having considerable interests at stake over EPA negotiations. It therefore appears that forming these new regional configurations is likely to produce desirable results for the EU comparable to those of the 1884 Berlin Conference, which carved Africa into small but controllable states solely for the benefit of Europe.

The EU’s divide and rule policy

EPA negotiations have bundled countries in Africa into new regional political structures a development that separates them from the existing regional integration frameworks and hampers regionalisation efforts. Since countries belong to multiple economic integration blocs, the EPA structures have further split and bundled them into a weak and loose trade negotiating machinery. For instance, this process has split the EAC, ECCAS and SADC regional groupings, a development that raises the question of what will happen to Tanzania, the four original members of SADC (Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the three ECCAS member-states (Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the event of a good or bad ESA–EPA deal. This is part of divide-and-rule tactics associated with the EU and other bigger powers at the multilateral level. The result is total control over the other partner (Africa) and compliance with the EU’s interests. Africa is aware of well-documented threats the EU has made in the past, including withdrawing development aid, existing trade, aid and investments, contracts and budgetary support; interfering with national and regional security policies; re-imposing trade barriers; and removing ambassadorial representations from WTO and ACP-EU headquarters where key events take place.

Africa as a ‘partner’

EPAs will tie Africa to Europe in an unbalanced framework, and in so doing will undermine the continent’s economies, particularly the producers of goods and services and the regional integration effort. Africa is experiencing serious developmental challenges including supply-side constraints, growing unemployment and declining economic activity. The supply-side constraints include: the unreliable provision of public utilities (electricity and water); a poor public infrastructure (run-down roads and railways); weak institutional and policy frameworks (leading to fluctuating exchange rates and high interest and inflation rates); and low labour productivity (arising from poor education, health and housing provision).

In addition, all the African countries negotiating an EPA are locked into an unhealthy post-colonial dependence on Europe for development aid, fiscal support and markets, which hinders Africa’s competitiveness in the national, regional and international markets. This dependence and these economic weaknesses ensure that the EU is unlikely to face strong opposition to its desire to fast track EPA negotiations. Europe is aware that African configurations not only lack independent preparation, but are also small, weak, poor and too fragmented to mount a strong position in the timeframe that is being determined by Europe. Europe is also aware that African countries do not have the resources to mount any serious resistance to its long-term agenda and that her negotiators at every level lack the experience of their EC counterparts.

This clearly illustrates that Africa is being denied an opportunity by its partner and the referee of this process to revitalise its industrial development so that its products and service can become more competitive. Surely, the EU is set to win this bilateral round of negotiations. It is also certain to score victories at the WTO given its strategy for neutralising the larger organic group in the south.

* Richard Kamidza has just joined the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) as a senior researcher. You can reach him on [email protected] or +27315023908.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Gender issues are conspicuous by their absence from the 'hard' areas of EPA negotiations, such as trade and regional cooperation. In order to estimate the likely impact of future trade agreements on poor women and men, a more systematic approach to trade policy negotiations and to capacity building in ACP countries is required, writes Karin Ulmer.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement differs significantly from the Lomé Convention, which it succeeded. Although it still contains a commitment to reducing and eliminating poverty, there is a stronger emphasis on integrating the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states into the global economy. The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are designed to speed up this process by reducing or ending preferential treatment of ACP exports to the European Union (EU), and between ACP countries themselves.

The second key aspect of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is that civil society is to be informed and consulted about decisions on aid, and the economic, social, and institutional reforms that the EU intends to support. It is in this area that APRODEV and other non-state actors can play a vital role in helping to shape policy.

APRODEV’s Zimbabwe case study (Mugabe, Okore and Ulmer 2002) identified the likely effects of EPAs and argued for capacity building of women's organisations and civil society groups more generally, to ensure them a voice in trade policy making. Given the political events in Zimbabwe, advocacy positions since the research have not been further formulated. However, a number of aspects of the Zimbabwe case study are relevant to women in other ACP countries, as well as to policy makers and trade negotiators. The findings of the APRODEV study have also been used to provide input into the EU's sustainability impact assessments and have provided background information for discussions on EPAs and women in West Africa.

What's new about economic partnership agreements?

The current EPA negotiations are not simply about future conditions of access to the EU market, but about extending exclusive trade preferences to the EU. Even though ACP countries have agreed to engage in these talks, they remain uncertain about how far EPAs will benefit their economic transformation, or affect their competitiveness once free trade arrangements are in place. There is some suspicion about how 'free' the trade arrangements will be, given the distorting effects of agricultural subsidies under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There is also a widespread fear that rejection of the EU's proposals may mean that they risk losing all or part of their aid allocations. The EU wants EPA negotiations to go beyond tariffs and trade, to include a wide range of trade-related issues such as tourism, financial services, telecommunications, competition policy, intellectual property rights, labour standards, and consumer policy. The European Commission has explicitly said that it wants discussions to go beyond existing WTO commitments. But virtually all ACP governments lack the capacity to take up this negotiating challenge.

From a one-way to a two-way street

The European Commission strongly favours a radical transformation of ACP–EU trade relations, from a system of non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade preferences. This means that the EU will have preferential access to ACP markets, while goods from ACP countries have preferential access to EU markets. The Commission favours this shift because it wants to ensure that future ACP–EU trade relations are compatible with WTO standards. It claims that under the previous arrangements ACP countries have failed to deliver better industrial or trade outcomes, or to achieve development objectives. It is not entirely accurate, however, to claim that the ACP countries' development objectives were not addressed under preferential arrangements with the EU. For example, between 1980 and 1997, prior to the current economic crisis, Zimbabwe was one of the most successful ACP countries in taking advantage of improved access to the EU market. From 1992 to 1996, Zimbabwean agricultural and horticultural exports rose by 35%. In 1998 the sugar sector alone saw an estimated income transfer to Zimbabwe of more than ?18 million, an amount greater than the annual aid allocation to Zimbabwe under the Lomé Convention (Netherlands Economic Institute Study 2000).

APRODEV has raised concerns over the ability of the new EPAs to contribute to the eradication of poverty. They could instead result in free trade which benefits the EU, but produces very few long-term advantages for the ACP countries. These countries start from a low base: an unhealthy and poorly trained workforce, inadequate transport infrastructure, and weak institutional and policy frameworks. They are vulnerable to agreements with the developed world which are not in the longer-term interest of their people, especially women, who are the backbone of agricultural production. It is vital that existing sub-regional initiatives in Africa continue to be the basis for economic development. As it is not a 'level playing field', ACP states need to develop tough negotiating strategies, and to cooperate much more closely with one another.

Under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) agreement, for example, Zimbabwean food producers have free access to the large South African market. It will be difficult for Zimbabwean food exporters to compete with EU products once the EU also has free access to the Southern African markets in 2010, as stipulated in the EU–South Africa Trade Agreement. This is a strong incentive for Zimbabwe's food-processing industry to become competitive with the EU over the next few years. However, it remains to be seen whether or not this can be achieved.

What's in it for women? The case of Zimbabwe

If official negotiators on both the EU and ACP sides focus only on the macro-economic and political implications of trade, they could fail to address the implications for different social and economic groups. As has happened in the past, the burden of EPA reforms could fall heavily on women. In Zimbabwe, the 1990s Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) resulted in some negative trends for women. Women's employment in the formal sector declined by 9.5% in the first year, and only 6% of jobs created under employment schemes went to women, with only 11% of loans going to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (ZWRCN 1998). SMEs have proved to be an important area for the economic and social empowerment of women worldwide, but greater liberalisation under EPAs may reduce their capacity to compete with foreign goods and services. Women are seriously disadvantaged by restricted access to productive resources and gaps in training and technology transfer.

In Zimbabwe, most households are headed by women, and 74% of these are poor, whereas 54% of households headed by men are regarded as poor (Ministry of Public Service 1995). Eighty per cent of the rural population depends on agriculture, and women farmers are doubly disadvantaged. Women are allocated the worst and smallest pieces of land, and only 11.8% of all land is controlled by women. Women access only 19.8% of available oxen and 23.3% of available credit to purchase seeds and fertilisers (ZWRCN 1994). In general, past experiences of ACP–EU co-operation show that gender inequality has not been addressed. A 1997 review of 24 EU-funded development projects in ACP countries found that 21 in no way addressed gender inequalities (European Commission 1997). A 2002 Review of EU Country Strategy Papers and aid allocations concluded that gender mainstreaming was hardly taken up in country analysis or strategies in vital sectors such as transport, food security, and rural development (European Commission 2002).

The example of value-added food processing

In Zimbabwe, agriculture is not only essential to individual survival but also the backbone of the economy. It provides 45% of the country's exports, 60% of all raw materials used by its industry, and employment for 70% of the population. Seventy-one per cent of the total female population gains employment from the farming of communal areas. Women comprise 70% of smallholder grain farmers, and maize is an important source of household cash income for them, as well as being a basic crop for household food security (Central Statistical Office 2001).

The 'value-added' food industry in Zimbabwe is an important part of the industrial sector and an important market for locally produced agricultural products. A wide range of food products is produced, including breakfast cereals, biscuits, milk and sugar-based products, canned fruit and vegetables, and a wide variety of processed meat products. These industries absorb a significant proportion of the locally produced agricultural products from both communal and commercial farmers. Communal farmers (largely women) supply the local food-processing industry with maize, cotton, peanuts, sunflowers, and paprika, while commercial farmers supply sugar, soya beans, wheat, and pigs.

The EU's Common Agricultural Policy reform in the cereal sector has reduced EU cereal prices by 45–50% since 1992. It has also led to an 18% expansion of EU cereals production and cereal-based exports from 1991 to 2000 (European Commission 1992–2000). The CAP reform process will affect the market conditions facing ACP producers of competing products, and this in turn will affect their incomes at different stages of agricultural production, processing, and marketing. The impact is likely to be felt most heavily by women. Any trade arrangements which allow the import of cheap subsidised maize or other cereal at prices which undermine local prices are likely to depress rural household incomes. Free trade in maize, cereals, and related products needs to be carefully structured to maximise income opportunities for women in rural areas. Cereals and cereal-based products would need to be subject to special trading arrangements, safeguard mechanisms and special protocols, as with the SADC Free Trade Area. Free trade with the EU is hugely distorted by subsidies to EU farmers. In the case of Zimbabwe, as with other ACP countries, there is a real danger that the deals on offer will damage regional food-processing industries, and women will bear a disproportionate cost.

Ethical trade makes sound commercial sense

The Zimbabwe case study also looked at the expansion of the cut flower sector under current preferential access to EU markets. In this sector, 83% of the permanent workforce and 90% of the seasonal workforce are female (Okore 2001). These women have been the principal beneficiaries of improvements to wages and working conditions resulting from preferential market access to the EU. Cut-flower producers and exporters got together to ensure compliance with quality standards and created a body to uphold the principles of the Agricultural Ethics Assurance Association of Zimbabwe, which covers about 31% of the workers of this sector. This ethical trade initiative has supported improved labour conditions for women working on farms. With premium prices being paid in the EU for 'ethically produced' flowers, the growers have found improved labour conditions beneficial to production efficiency and financial returns. This case demonstrates that fairer labour practices have the potential to bring social and economic gains at the household level, while making sound commercial sense. The research found that any loss of preferential access to the EU market in the cut-flowers sector would adversely affect women. Future trade arrangements should secure and maintain favourable conditions of access to the EU market.

Threat to new regional export opportunities

Under the current SADC protocol, Zimbabwe's sugar industry can exploit the protected and high-priced refined sugar market, with positive spin-offs in terms of female employment. Women are predominantly employed in the packing operations for refined sugar. Zimbabwe is potentially a competitive exporter to the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) market for value-added sugar products. Should free trade with the EU be introduced in the sugar sector, this could pose a real threat to the expansion of Zimbabwe's refined sugar exports to the Southern and Eastern African region. Under current CAP reform, European producers in these sectors receive direct aid, which results in lower prices for their sugar and beef. European agro-business and exporters will be most likely to benefit from low prices and increased exports to ACP markets. In the face of this competition, Zimbabwe may not be able to take advantage of opportunities to export sugar and beef to regional markets, and women will lose opportunities for employment in value-added products in the beef sector.

The need for informed, gender-aware policy

The ACP–EU trade agreements need to incorporate an understanding of the constraints faced by women that make it difficult for them to benefit from trade arrangements. These include low levels of technical capacity and funds, as well as infrastructure and market standards which currently limit or inhibit women's capacity to engage with trade opportunities. The implications of trade distortion resulting from EU agricultural subsidies also need to be recognised, and sensitivity to existing local and regional markets needs to be reflected in agreements. To take the Zimbabwean example, future trade agreements relating to maize could ensure that income opportunities for women in rural areas are maximised, not lost. As a signatory to the Millennium Development Goals, the EU has committed itself to halving the number of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries by 2015. Future trade regimes will have to be measured against this objective. Improved access to the EU markets is of benefit to the huge female workforce in ACP countries, especially in agriculture. It is therefore essential that the progressive opening up of international markets takes into consideration the impacts on women. If future ACP–EU trade arrangements do not improve the position of women, then they do not materially improve the situation of the poorest people.

* Karin Ulmer is the policy and gender officer at APRODEV, where she has worked since 2000. In that time she has worked on the gender/social impact of the EU–ACP trade negotiations (EPAs) and EU gender mainstreaming policies and practices. ([email protected]) This article first appeared in Gender and Development, Volume 12 Number 3 November 2004.

Notes 1 Association of World Council of Churches related development organisations in Europe, a network of 17 major development organisations in Europe.

References

Central Statistical Office (2001) Statistical Bulletin Harare: Central Statistical Office.

European Commission (EC), Directorate General for Agriculture (1992–2000) 'Agricultural situation in the European Union', successive annual reports 1992–2000, Brussels: EC

European Commission (1997) 'Integrating gender issues in development cooperation: progress report 1997', Brussels: SEC (97) 2067

European Commission (2002) 'Assessment of country strategy papers with reference to gender', Brussels: EC

Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (1995) 'Survey', Harare: Central Statistical Office

Mugabe N, Okore M, and Ulmer K (2002) 'EPAs – What's in it for women? Women in Zimbabwe: issues in future trade negotiations with the EU', Brussels: APRODEV.

Netherlands Economic Institute Study (2000) 'Evaluation of the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector', Annex A3, Rotterdam: CEC

Okore, M (2001) 'Survey: aggregated data based on individual farm report sheets from the Agricultural Ethics Assurance Association of Zimbabwe' (unpublished), Harare

ZWRCN (Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network) and the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (1994) 'The gender dimension of access and land use rights in Zimbabwe', Harare

ZWRCN (1998) 'Beyond inequalities: women in Zimbabwe', Harare